By Frederick

HIS article is an essay in that difficult genre, contemporary history In the case of the Soviet Union and its policy, the chronicler-analyst's task is of course complicated by the almost complete lack of nontactical oral or written communications of opinion by Soviet leaders and by their special doctrinal language, probably fully intelligible only to the trusted Communist inner circle, in terms of which their propaganda must be evaluated.

I attempt here to sketch the main lines of official and of popular Soviet thought and feeling in a complex transition period. This difficult and perhaps decisive period was bounded, roughly, by the last months of the war in Europe and the unsuccessful London Conference of Foreign Ministers in September 194S. It was a period in which many hoped a new era was dawning in the relations between Russia and the West. It now seems to have been, instead, the premature end of a promising interlude. Understanding of the factors involved in this return to an abnormal "normalcy" in Soviet-Western relations may contribute now to balance and perspective. Had such understanding been more widespread in 1944 and 1945, the probably inevitable "cold war" might have been less intense and confused than it has been, although this is not certain.

It seems that after Tehran and Yalta the Soviet leaders hoped that they could eat their cake and have it too. They could build a security belt of contiguous states, and extend their dominant influence throughout most of the rest of Eurasia. At the same time by exploiting the World Trade Union Federation and the United Nations, and because of

C. Barghoorn

expected postwar economic difficulties in the United States and Britain and, above all, the immense Soviet prestige won on the battlefield, they could obtain large credits on favorable terms from these and the few other countries in which they expected the capitalist system to retain some degree of health for a considerable period.

These grandiose ambitions reflected not merely hope but fear as well To the Kremlin "security" meant, in effect, impregnability. When American opinion grasped the nature of the Soviet program, angry disillusionment set in. When the Kremlin realized that its hopes might be dashed and its fears confirmed, it began, at first stealthily, to transfer the symbols of hostility and aggression from Nazi Germany to "imperialist" America.

Of course the full development of this suspicion, and especially of its open public expression, took place outside the chronological limits of this article. However, it was reflected during this period in the anxious treatment by the Soviet press of Soviet-Allied problems and by the renewal of unfavorable reporting of internal affairs in Britain and America, which had been all but abandoned during the earlier war years. Most important of all, probably, was the growing tendency of the Soviet press and official statements to revive openly the idea—never repudiated during the war—that the U.S.S.R. was a beleaguered fortress of socialism in a hostile capitalist world.

One other extremely interesting theme, which was to become vastly important in the "cultural purges" of 1946-49, was developing. This was the wickedness and the danger of seduction of

Soviet citizens by the false glitter of bourgeois culture.

None of these themes or problems were new; most of them were continuations or new forms of themes as old as the Russian Revolution. The one striking exception to this statement is the problem of the impact of Western culture on Soviet people. While this had always existed, wartime contacts were on so vast a scale and the effects were so unfavorable that they constituted a new major problem. The only thing remotely comparable in Russian history was the intellectual ferment among Russian officers after the Napoleonic wars, leading to the Decembrist uprising.

Who Won the War?

Almost from the day of Germany's attack in June 1941, the Soviet line was that Russia was bearing the main burden of a war to save humanity from fascism. Only in the first anxious months before the repulse of the Germans at Moscow was Allied (at this time mainly British) aid reported in a manner calculated to impress its significance vividly upon the consciousness of Soviet readers. For it was only during these months that British bombing of Germany, Anglo-American war production news, and similar themes were reported prominently not only on the foreign page of the Soviet newspapers (normally the last of four pages) but also frequently on the front page.

From June 1942 on—that is, after the publication of the communique announcing Soviet-Allied agreement on the "urgent task" of establishing a second front in Europe in 1942—Stalin's official statements and frequent, often bitter press items broadcast to Russians and the world that Russia alone was doing its full share. In part this second front line probably expressed a real fear on the part of the Soviet leaders that fh* Allies were trvine to weaken

Russia. At the same time, it was a potent propaganda instrument of both domestic and foreign policy.

In the final period of the European war, and to an even greater extent during the few weeks of the Soviet war against Japan, the Soviet claim to leadership in the Allied war effort reached unprecedented and fantastic proportions. For example, as Paul Winterton pointed out in International Affairs,¹ in the seven days of the expansion of the Remagen bridgehead and the fall of half a dozen great western German cities, the average daily space devoted to those events by the Soviet Army newspaper Red Star was twenty-four lines on the back page In the meantime, the bulk of all Soviet newspaper space during those days was devoted to Orders of the Day, editorials and news accounts recording Red Army victories

Similar examples could be multiplied ad infinitum, but a full appreciation of the slanting of war news by the Soviet press is possible only if one carefully reads Pravda or Red Star for at least the last months of the war. During the Soviet-Japanese war, Soviet operations received literally hundreds of times as much space as American operations.

The atomic problem

The only attention paid to the atomic bomb during this period, for example, was a very brief news item, without comment, on the Hiroshima raid. Any suggestion that the bomb might have played a major role in forcing the Japanese surrender was suppressed by Soviet censors from the reports of foreign correspondents in Moscow. Space and chronology do not permit discussion here of the Soviet attitude toward atomic energy. It should be pointed out, however, that such press treatment, while logical in view of Soviet efforts to build up the Soviet role in the Pacific war for political reasons, did not do jus-

¹ No 22, 1946.

tice to the Soviet estimate of the A- bomb's military significance. Molotov's reference to the bomb in his November 6, 1945 speech, as well as subsequent attacks on United States "atomic diplomacy," indicated Soviet concern. Much popular gossip which I heard in the fall of 1945 convinced me that there was widespread popular fear of the bomb.

The Soviet handling of these subjects reflected anxiety and at the same time was such as to arouse concern in Britain and America regarding the future of the "Anglo-Soviet-American coalition." Another of the many straws in the wind was the fact that V-E Day was celebrated in Moscow on May 9 instead of May 8, as in the United States and Britain, and that the Soviet public was given the impression that the Reims surrender was of little importance.

Official Attitudes Toward the Postwar World

It is impossible here to deal with individual problems, such as Germany, the Balkans, the United Nations, and the host of other staggering issues which crowded upon the attention of Soviet and Allied policy makers in 1944 and 1945. In general, as military victory drew near, difficult and potentially divisive political problems assumed ever increasing importance. Two slogans more and more prominent in Soviet speeches and press articles in early 1945 suggested the attitudes of Soviet leaders viewing the international scene onto which the U S S.R. was emerging. One of these was the demand for the "moral and political" defeat of fascism. The other was the appeal to the Soviet people to do everything possible to increase Russia's "economic and military might."

Together with growing re-emphasis on Marxist-Leninist ideology, these themes indicated a tendency to revert toward the prewar concept of "two worlds"— the Soviet and the bourgeois—coexisting in unstable equilibrium.

Thus for example, in the week of May 13-19, shortly following V-E Day, the Soviet press gave strong indications that with the European war over, it would henceforth view both foreign and domestic affairs with renewed emphasis upon the uniqueness and superiority of Soviet institutions and methods. Most of the Soviet press comment and news on foreign affairs during that week was directly or indirectly related to the slogan of the moral and political defeat of fascism. The microbes of Hitlerism, it was declared, were prevalent on both sides of the Atlantic The foreign news material selected for publication revealed differences between Allied and Soviet policies regarding Germany, Poland, Yugoslavia, and other areas or problems. In that week also, for the first time since the prewar period, the Soviet daily press gave prominence to the question of unemployment in the United States. A series of articles in Red Star demanded that intensified propaganda be disseminated in the Soviet Army regarding the superiority of the Soviet system over capitalism.

I vividly remember that week's press, since the changing attitudes reflected in it impressed me deeply at the time. A few days later General Alexander compared Tito's actions in Trieste with the methods of Mussolini and Hitler. This was prominently reported in the Soviet press. According to a well-informed American journalist with whom I talked at the time, his Soviet friends were deeply depressed at the turn events were taking. One of my Soviet acquaintances remarked: "Diplomacy is beginning."

Increasingly—during the spring and summer of 1945—the Soviet press, especially the militant magazine New Times (its name was changed from War and the Working Class in June of that year), attacked "certain circles" in

Britain and America for their alleged reactionary, anti-Soviet influence on Allied policy. It was only, however, after the failure of the London Conference in the fall that the Soviet press openly identified the policy of the American and British Governments with that of the reactionaries.

Indications of danger

But in the months preceding the ill- fated London meeting, danger signals too numerous even to be listed were flying A striking one was the series of articles by the Soviet journalists N. Sergeeva and E. Zhukov, reporting from San Francisco on the United Nations Conference on International Organization. The most biting of these articles was Sergeeva's two-column piece "The Old and the New'¹ in Pravda for May 29. Briefly, Sergeeva's thesis was that since the death of President Roosevelt the forces of reaction, representing the "old," had begun to work more actively against the "new" ideas which he had brought into American life. Sergeeva's article took the line, which was to become more and more * pronounced henceforth in the Soviet press, that opponents or critics of Soviet policies were fascists or profascists. Sergeeva also attacked American culture, which for her was symbolized by the literature, ranging from pornography to Mein Kampf, on display in a San Francisco book store.

A far more significant indication, to mention another among many, of the trend of Soviet official thinking in this period was the speech made by Mikhail Kalinin, Soviet President, to a conference of rural Party secretaries in August. This speech was published in the Central Committee theoretical journal Bol'shevik and in the Leningrad party theoretical organ Propaganda and Agitation. The speech, entitled "Some Problems of Party-Political Work in the

Village," was unusually meaty for a Soviet official statement. Its most important thought regarding both domestic and international affairs was contained in the following paragraph:

But even now, after the greatest victory known to history we cannot for one minute forget the basic fact that our country remains the one socialist state in the world. You will speak frankly about this to the collective farmers. The victory achieved does not mean that all dangers to our state structure and social order have disappeared. Only the most concrete, most immediate danger, which threatened us from Hitlerite Germany, has disappeared. In order that the danger of war may really disappear for a long time, it is necessary to consolidate our victory ²

It is probably no great exaggeration to say that with this statement Soviet official thought was well on its way back to the Leninist thesis of the inevitability of war as long as capitalism exists, which, as is well known, Stalin was to restate bluntly in his famous speech of February 9, 1946.

It would, however, be doing violence to the facts to assert that this was the only note, at least in the Soviet press, during this confused period. There were less somber countercurrents. For one thing, though with increasing per- functoriness, the press continued to pledge allegiance to the idea of over-all Allied co-operation. The London Conference and Molotov's somewhat defiant speech of November 6 made it clear, however, that the coalition could continue to function only by accepting, on the whole, Soviet terms.

In the Cultural Field

But if Soviet official political attitudes were assuming an increasingly somber hue, this was somewhat less true of opinion in scholarly and cul-

- Quoted from Propaganda i Agitatsiia (Leningrad), No 18 (1945), p. 3.

tural fields, which reflected the Soviet intelligentsia's wartime hope that closer Soviet-Allied cultural relations would follow the war. Still less was it true of popular opinion, which either lagged behind the official propaganda or even, on some points, tended to differ sharply therewith.

Lack of space precludes more than mere mention of the wartime growth of popularity of English and American literature, films, and music, or of plays such as Alexander Korneichuk's Mr. Perkins³ Mission to the Land of the Bolsheviks. The latter, which was popular in Moscow in the fall of 1944, was scoffed at by American journalists who considered its sensationalist correspondent a caricature. However, in its scenes showing the millionaire Perkins making friends with a collective farm family and helping carry ammunition for Red Army men, it eloquently expressed the idea that Soviet Communism and American capitalism could "do business." The American film, It Happened One Night, was adapted for the Soviet stage as The Road to New York. In 1944 and 1945 "A Tavern in the Town" and "Tipperary" were among the most popular Soviet songs. A number of American films, particularly the Deanna Durbin film His Butler's Sister, were shown in 194S and even in 1946.

On a rather more highbrow level, concerts of American and British music were arranged by the All-Union Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries.

The popularity of English and American "bourgeois" culture thus certainly lasted well after official relations had deteriorated badly, and even continued to receive some encouragement in the press. Thus, for example, as late as December 28, 1945, Komsomol Pravda in an editorial urging study of foreign languages expressed approval of young people's interest in Oscar Wilde's plays.

A few months later, of course, Wilde's plays were to be anathematized as bourgeois "poison."

Popular Attitudes

The lag behind official propaganda was more pronounced among the broad Soviet public. Nothing could be more difficult, of course, than to analyze "public opinion" in a country like Soviet Russia. I am not attempting this impossible feat, but in the remainder of this article I shall seek merely to present the main lines of attitudes and opinion among the Soviet people with whom foreigners were in contact during late 1944 and, roughly, the first nine months of 1945.

The two general aspects of popular attitudes that interested me most during this and other periods of my Russian experience were the attitudes of ordinary people toward America and toward their own government and political system. Both were contradictory and confused.

The one point about which virtually all observers would agree, I think, was the great popular affection for Roosevelt and the genuine grief at his death. I personally knew Russians who wept when they heard of Roosevelt's death. A cynic might of course attribute this to their associating him with powdered eggs, jeeps, and Studebaker trucks, but I think it was more than that. On the other hand, one Soviet girl actually told an American friend a month or so before Roosevelt's death, that she liked Roosevelt because he "fed" her but disliked Churchill because he was "too "cunning." As I have pointed out elsewhere,³ the common man in Soviet Russia, as distinguished from the intellectual, has generally tended to like the Americans better than the British. One of my friends put it in a somewhat

⁸ F C Barghoorn, "What Russians Think of Americans," Foreign Affairs, January 1948 negative form. "We don't trust the British and we don't even trust you." Another Soviet person whom I knew for a time said that the British were chuzhespintsy, ie._; persons who acted behind others' backs. What impressed the ordinary people was that in a hard world in which authority was not benevolent, here was a powerful leader who had extended the hand of friendship in an hour of need.

The attitude of political sophisticates may have been different. They may have regarded Roosevelt as a "far- sighted politician," as one of my Soviet acquaintances put it, who was trying to save capitalism. They may even have regarded him as a "sucker," and no match for Stalin at the "green table." An "anecdote" that I heard in March 1945 may have reflected the latter feeling. Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin, sitting in a railway car, were listening to the click of the rails. Roosevelt thought he heard: "Give me Berlin." Churchill: "Divide it in half!" Stalin: "The devil with you both." Another of the several versions of this story was that in response to Roosevelt's and Churchill's claims, Stalin replied that Germany would be divided according to "work done." This barbed story reflected the feeling that the Russians had done the lion's share of the fighting and suffering.

The party propaganda machine responded very astutely to Roosevelt's death. It simultaneously suggested that this might be the end of an era, but that if Truman continued Roosevelt's policies, all would be well. Obviously, as in the case of the Tehran, Yalta, and Potsdam decisions, the Kremlin reserved the right to interpret whether or not Roosevelt's successor was continuing his policies. •

Good will and doubts

Another point about which all competent eyewitness observers would probably agree was the almost indescribable joy of the Soviet people on V-E Day and the great good feeling toward the Allies prevalent then and for a time thereafter. I have no doubt that the spontaneous good will manifested toward the Allies on this occasion, as also the similar feeling expressed by the Red Army men who met the Americans in the closing days of the European war, worried the Kremlin. The memoirs of General Eisenhower and General Deane's Strange Alliance make it clear that at least some of this friendliness, in the case of the Red Army, extended as high up as Marshal Zhukov. It is certainly significant that the trip to the United States which Zhukov apparently planned never materialized.

Even in popular feeling, however, and even during this halcyon period, one heard occasional expressions of doubt regarding the possibility of indefinite peace between America and Russia. Thus, one Soviet friend told an American in the spring of 1945 that there could not be permanent peace because, as this person put it, "You want capitalism and we want Communism."

Another closely related idea which I heard expressed by several intelligent Soviet acquaintances was that the whole world hated Russia. One told me that his uncle had been in Poland and had come back complaining, "We have no friends." Often I have heard Soviet people say: "We have many enemies."

My impression was that even those Soviet citizens—I do not know what percentage they were of the population —who thus expressed misgivings about the future of Soviet-Allied relations were, nevertheless, grateful for help received during the war.

I found Russians full of admiration, not unmixed with envy, for American life and "culture." One met this attitude among many types of people and in widely scattered places. For example, in December 1944, when I flew with some young Soviet aviators in a Soviet plane from Moscow to Baku, I heard praise for New York's automats, the shower baths in American hotels, and so on. These aviators were proud and dignified Their genuine appreciation of American technology was in no way servile. At the Red Army base, where we were snowbound for five days on this trip, I had a conversation of a type that was to be often repeated in later months. A woman who worked at the base asked me rather belligerently whether I thought the Russian people had lived as badly before the war as during it. She soon became more friendly, however, and ended up with the very common remark that Americans were a "cultured" people.

I did not discover any very high degree of correlation between the attitudes of a Soviet citizen toward foreign countries and toward his own government. To be sure, the small number of party members or officials who associated, on an official or semiofficial basis, with foreigners, combined an attitude of apparent Soviet patriotism with a close adherence to the current official line regarding foreign affairs—or domestic problems, for that matter. But then one could never be sure what these people thought. They certainly sounded as if they accepted the official line at face value. For example, an American who met a member of the Soviet Academy of Sciences during its 220th anniversary jubilee in June 1945 said that this Soviet scientist expressed with apparent sincerity the utmost confidence in the future prosperity and stability of Soviet society, which he contrasted with the unstable, crisis-ridden capitalist world.

The pull of the bourgeois life

But among the rank and file—and by this I mean persons mostly drawn from the lower- and middle-level salaried and educated group, among whom most foreigners had their few Soviet friends— one often found a combination of apparent Soviet patriotism and acceptance of an anticapitalist outlook and a yearning for the fleshpots of the bourgeois world. One journalist whose judgment I respected told me in the spring of 1945 that, in his opinion, the Soviet people who associated with foreigners were the ones who were not tough enough to stand the rigors of Soviet life. One American was told by a Soviet friend that his relatives considered him too delicate a type to live in the U.S.S.R.

There was a feeling among Soviet people at this time that they had suffered greatly and were leading a hard life. Many felt that the goal of eventual Communism, promised by Stalin in his famous speech at the Eighteenth Party Congress in 1939, would not be achieved in their lifetime or even in that of their children. Some, perhaps many, doubted if it would ever be achieved or if their government was sincere in proclaiming it. I was told of one conversation in which a Soviet student said that Communism was a fine ideal but it could never be realized. Yet a few minutes later this same student was echoing the Soviet propaganda about unemployment in America. Another Soviet student said that morality existed only in books.

Such moods probably were in large part the result of weariness and demoralization resulting from what was perhaps the most grueling war ever experienced by any country. It would certainly be difficult to prove that they were solely or mainly a natural reaction against the regimentation of the Soviet system. Only time will give us the answer to that question. In part, however, they resulted from contact with and information about the easier, freer life of western Europe and America. I heard enough evidence, some of which I have presented above, to convince me
that this was true. Additional evidence was presented by the desertion of thousands of Red Army men in Rumania in the summer of 1944.

Finally, a series of Soviet press* items helped to confirm the demoralizing effect upon Russians of contact with the West. The most striking of these were the two articles from Bucharest by Leonid Sobolev, a well-known Soviet writer, in Pravda September 24 and 26, 1944. Sobolev warned Soviet people not to be deceived by the "tinsel" of bourgeois culture. Inter alia he wrote: "True culture comes with you. It is our love for humanity, our torment experienced for it . . ."

Subsequently, numerous other articles in Pravda and Red Star and speeches such as the Kalinin talk referred to earlier, were to warn Soviet people not to be seduced by the false and theatrical glitter of bourgeois culture. Finally, in 1946—perhaps because these relatively restrained efforts had not proved adequate—the immense re-education campaign begun by Zhdanov in Leningrad in August 1946 was inaugurated.

Conclusions

Frederick C Barghoorn, PhD., New Haven, Connecticut, ts research associate of the Institute of International Studies at Yale University. From 1942 to 1947 he served as attachi at the American Embassy in Moscow, and in 1941-42 he was associate divisional assistant, Division of Eastern European Affairs, Department of State He is a frequent contributor to journals dealing with foreign affairs

I have tried in this article to sketch some of the main currents of thought and feeling in Russia in the twilight period between the war and the "cold war." Of. course, in addition to the problems touched upon here, there were great questions of reconstruction, of reconversion and demobilization, and of restoring the party and police to their prewar supremacy in the Soviet state. Hints, often cryptic, of things to come in these fields appeared of course during this period. Thus, for example, Stalin took advantage of a reception he tendered Red Army marshals in June 1945 to remind them that a good foreign policy was worth two or three army corps, and to point out that no one must become conceited. The granting in July 1945 of all rights and privileges of the Red Army to NKVD and NKGB personnel, Beriya's elevation to the rank of Marshal, and Stalin's to Generalissimo (about which I heard some sarcastic comment by Soviet people), were reminders to all in high or low places that the Kremlin did not intend to permit any relaxation of its authority or of State discipline.

The announcement by the press in August 1945 that a new Five-Year Plan was being drafted must have seemed omnious to many a weary Soviet citizen. A Soviet friend of a foreigner remarked ironically, "We'll finish it in two years," and said that none of the friends to whom she had mentioned the news had taken any interest in it.

The main lines of Soviet policy in most of these difficult domestic fields were not to become clear until 1946. Then they were to be approached from the point of view of a domestic "transition to Communism" and preparation for "all eventualities," externally. With the advantage of hindsight we can now trace many of the striking developments of 1946-49 to their origins in the transitional months of 1945.

Political, Administrative, and Judicial Structure in the U.S.S.R. Since the War

By John

econversion of the political,

administrative, and judicial apparatus to peacetime conditions was begun in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics immediately after the end of the war. The State Committee for Defense, created within a week after the German invasion of 1941,¹ had been given complete governmental authority ta conduct the war. All citizens, as well as agencies of the Communist Party, the Komsomol, the Government, and the military forces, had been required to execute its orders without question. -This Committee was liquidated by decree of September 4, 1945.²Its political functions were restored to the agencies of the Communist Party and the Supreme Soviet. Its administrative functions were transferred to the Council of People's Commissars.

The military situation was terminated officially a few days later,⁸ except for the Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian Soviet Socialist Republics, and the western districts of the Ukrainian and Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republics. As a result of the official termination of the military situation, local civilian administration was reinstituted in most of the territory of the U.S.S.R. Jurisdiction over crime, which had been

iScc Decree of June 30, 1941. Izvestiya, No. 153 (7529), July 1, 1941. As a more convenient source for this and other decrees cited herein, see Sborrdk Zakonov S.SS.R. i Ukazov Prezidiuma Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSJl., Vol. II (1938-44) and Vol. Ill (1945-46).

² See Vedomosti Verkhovnogo SovetaSSSR. (cited hereafter as Vedomosti), No. 61 (388), Sept. 8, 1945.

⁸ See Decree of Sept. 21, 1945 Vedomosti, No. 71 (398), Oct 9, 1945

n. Hazard

in the military tribunals of the Army or of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs during the period of the war, was restored to the civilian courts. The right of appeal was also reinstituted. Except in the newly occupied areas, the extraordinary judicial powers of the military tribunals were abolished.⁴ The Government went on record to the effect that it foresaw no more war.⁵

Commissariats were reorganized to mefet the needs of reconstruction. The Commissariats of the Tank Industry and of Mortar Armament were liquidated. Their staffs and facilities became a part of a large number of Commissariats created in late 1945 and 1946. The activities of the new Commissariats were denoted by the titles: Agricultural' Machinery Construction, Automobile Industry, Construction and Road Building Machinery, Construction of Fuel Enterprises, Construction of Heavy Industry Enterprises, Heavy Machine Building, Machinery and Instruments, and Transport Machinery Building.

Postwar Ejections

Election of deputies to--the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. was called for February 10, 1946.® The deputies then in office had been held over from year to year from December 1941, when their

¹ For a description of the peacetime powers of the military tribunals of the Army ands of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, see Hazard, "Soviet Agencies of Law" (1945) 21 Notre Dame Lawyer 69.

⁰ See Preamble to Decree of May 26, 1947, abolishing the death penalty in peacetime. Vedomosti, No. 17 (471), May 31, 1947.

°See Decree of Oct. 5, 1945. Vedomosti, No. 71 (398), Oct 9, 1945.

four-year terms had expired. New electoral rules to be observed in the conduct of the elections were issued.^{^[1]} The primary innovations in the new rules were two: (1) The age at which a candidate might stand for election was raised from 18 to 23. (2) A new type of electoral district was created for Soviet troops who were performing occupation duties beyond Soviet frontiers. The rate of representation for the troops was set at one deputy in each of the two chambers of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. for each unit of 100,000 men.

Both of the innovations required amendments to the Constitution of the U.S.S.R. To effect these amendments a decree had been promulgated the day before the new electoral rules were approved.⁸ Boundaries of electoral districts throughout the country were realigned by a decree which took into consideration population changes and the acquisition of considerable new territory during the war.^{^[2]} As a result of the realignment and addition of new districts, the number of electoral districts for the Soviet of the Union was increased from the 1937 figure of 569 to 656, and the number of electoral districts within the U.S S.R. for the Soviet of Nationalities was increased from the 1937 figure of 574 to 631. The total for both chambers of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. was therefore 1,287. Further additions to the districts occurred before the balloting, so that the final count was a total of 1,339 deputies (682 in the Council of the Union and 657 in the Council of Nationalities).^xo

Electoral procedures

No change of importance occurred in electoral procedures. Elections were conducted by secret ballot, as had been the case since the 1936 Constitution. Nominations were made by the groups specified in the Constitution. In most cases these were industrial units whose workmen were guided through the procedure by the trade union, or collective farms which were guided by the administration of the co-operative. Names of nominees were forwarded to the Electoral Committees set up for the purpose by a Central Electoral Committee, created by Decree of October 20, 1945.¹¹

The local Electoral Committees had the task of posting lists of the nominees and preparing the printed ballots. Soviet custom, as established in the previous elections of December 12, 1937 for the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. and the subsequent local elections, was followed. In spite of the implication of multiple candidates to be found in the electoral rules, which required the printing of the names of all nominees on each ballot, and the striking out of all but one name by the voter, the voters were given the choice of only one name. They could accept or reject. Official reports indicate that of 101,717,686 registered electors, 99.7 per cent voted. Of this total, 819,699, or 0.8 per cent, crossed out the name of the candidate presented for the seat in the Soviet of Nationalities ^vi The dissents were scattered geographically in such a way that they did not affect the results.

Analysis of Supreme Soviet

Analysis of the professional and party status of the deputies to the newly

^1J See Vedomosti, No. 75 (402), Oct 23, 1945.

¹² See 6 Information Bulletin, No 24, March 12, 1946, and Vedomosti, No. 5 (414), Feb 15, 1946 elected Supreme Soviet of the U.S S.R. showed that 511 were workmen, 349 peasants, and the rest intellectuals and white-collar workers. There were 445 college graduates; 71 had incomplete university education, and 300 were high school graduates.¹³ Of the deputies to the Soviet of the Union, 84.4 per cent were members of the Communist Party; of those in the Soviet of Nationalities, 77.4 per cent were members of the Communist Party.¹⁴ Since the 1946 elections, the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. has met regularly twice a year in accordance with the requirement of the Constitution.

Republic and local elections

Elections on the republic level were held in each republic in the early part of 1947.¹⁰ Just prior to the elections the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. gave its approval to the amendment of the constitutions of the republics so as to increase the age of eligibility for election to a supreme soviet of a republic from 18 to 21.¹⁸A statute on elections was published in each republic.¹⁷ These provided for voting by leaving the name of the can-

^1JSce 6 Information Bulletin, No. 37, April 13, 1946

14 In the Soviet of the Union there were 682 party members and 106 nonparty members; in the Soviet of Nationalities there were 509 party members and 148 nonparty members See Meeting of the Supreme Soviet of the USS.R (First Session), Stenographic Report, Moscow, 1946 (in Russian), pp 30 and 39

15The decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic, dated Nov 24, 1946, set elections for Feb 9, 1947. Vedomosti, No. 41 (450), Nov. 26, 1946.

¹⁰ See Decree of Oct. 10, 1946. Vedomosti, No. 38 (447), Oct. 25, 1946. The RS.F.SR. made the change by Decree of Nov. 25, 1946. Vedomosti, No. 41 (450), Nov 26, 1946

¹⁷That of the RSFSR, was dated Nov. 26, 1946. Vedomosti, No. 42 (451), Dec 3, 1946 didate desired and crossing out the others. Nevertheless, when the standard form of ballot was reproduced in the official journal, it omitted the instruction to this effect,¹⁸ and thus departed from the previous custom of implying the existence of multiple candidates even though the name of only one was to appear.

Of the 752 deputies elected to the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic, 39.9 per cent were workmen and 16.4 per cent peasants. Half of the latter were presidents of collective farms. Nearly half of the membership was composed of clerical and administrative employees and the intelligentsia. Of all the deputies, 80.4 per cent were members of the Communist Party.¹⁰ Since the elections the Supreme Soviet of the R.S.F.S.R. has met regularly in accordance with the requirements of the republic's constitution.

Elections at the levels of the province, the district, the city, and the village were held in December 1947 and January 1948.²⁰ Electoral rules were published by each republic.²¹ A cam-

¹⁸ See Vedomosti, No 45 (454), Dec. 24, 1946

¹⁰ See Report of the Credentials Commission, Meeting of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR. (First Session), Stenographic Report, Moscow, 1947 (in Russian), p. 14.

²⁰ Elections were called by decrees of the various Union Republics for the following days: Sunday, Dec. 21, 1947—R.S F S R , Ukrainian S.S.R, Armenian SS.R., Karelo- Finnish S S.R, Moldavian S.S.R ; Sunday, Jan 11, 1948—Kirghiz SSR., Byelorussian S.S.R, Azerbaijan S.S.R., Uzbek S.S.R, Kazak S.SR, Georgian SSR.; Fnday, Jan 16, 1948 —Tajik S S.R , Sunday, Jan 18, 1948— Latvian SS.R, Estonian SSR., Lithuanian S.SR, Turkomen SS.R. These decrees are published in Vedomosti, No. 33 (487), Sept. 25, 1947, No. 34 (488), Sept. 28, 1947, No. 35 (489), Oct 4, 1947, and No 36 (490), Oct. 12, 1947.

-i Those of the R S.F.S.R. were promulgated by Decree of Oct. 8, 1947. Vedomobti, No. 36 (490), Oct 12, 1947. For an English trans- paign was begun to prepare the republic for the local elections.²² The elections were conducted in the same manner as all previous elections. Only one name appeared on each ballot. When the results were announced,^{^[3]} it was indicated that in 102 districts (R.S.F.S.R. 84, Ukrainian S.S.R. 11, Armenian S S.R. 3, Byelorussian S.S.R. 3. Kazak S.S R. 1) the candidates had failed of election because they had not received an absolute majority of the votes cast. The percentage of defeats was small, however, for in the RS.F.S.R. alone, 766,563 deputies were elected. In several districts the election was declared invalid because of violation of the electoral rules, and in some districts the elections were not held. In all such cases a new election was called.

The percentage of Communist Party members among the deputies elected varied widely. It was low in the republics which had recently come into the U.SS.R. (13.41 per cent in Moldavia, 11 per cent in Lithuania, 18.3 per cent in Latvia, and 25 per cent in Estonia). It was high in the long-established republics (46.8 per cent in the R.S.F.S.R., 52.3 per cent in the Kazak S.S.R., 50.3 per cent in the Azerbaijan S.S.R., and 47.23 per cent in the Uzbek S.S.R.). It was medium in the two established republics which had incorporated parts of Poland and Czechoslovakia (31.81 per cent in the Ukrainian S.S.R. and 26.6 per cent in the Byelorussian S.S.R.).

Judges in the principal courts of original jurisdiction—the People's Courts— are elected officials as a result of the innovation in the constitutions of the U.S.S.R. Electoral rules were published in 1948 for the R.S.F.S.R.,^{^[4]} and the elections were held early in 1949. Under the newly published rules, the age of candidates is raised from 18 to 23.

Legislative Procedures

Meetings of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S S.R. and of the Supreme Soviet of the R.S.F.S.R. have provided an opportunity to compare postwar with prewar procedures. In general, there has been much similarity, but several developments deserve attention, in view of their potential influence on the future.

Each chamber of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. has elected its standing Committees on Credentials, Legislation, Budget, and Foreign Affairs. The Committee on Legislation in each chamber has introduced a proposed set of rules to govern its activities. This proposal was accepted by each chamber at the Third Session of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. in February 1947.-⁵ The rules provide that "Members of the Committee on Legislation who do not agree with the decision of the Committee can speak in defense of their proposals during the discussion of the bill in the Soviet of the Union."

In this provision the possibility of a minority report was envisaged. This represented a departure from the practice in Communist Party agencies—a practice which had been carried into the Soviets—under which defeat in a subsidiary commission or conference silenced a dissenter when the issue was presented to the conference or Soviet

24See Decree of Sept. 25, 1948. Vcdomostt, No. 39 (538), Oct 8, 1948.

25See Meeting of the Supreme Soviet of the US S.R. (Third Session), Stenographic Report. Moscow, 1947 (in Russian), and English translation of statute in 8 American Review on the Soviet Union 91 (Oct. 1947).

as a whole. No deputy has yet presented a minority report, but the break with tradition has been made.

Discussion in Supreme Soviet

Discussion of the postwar Five-Year Plan brought forth some sharp criticism on the floor of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S R²⁶ A deputy from the Georgian S.S.R., after praising the general outlines of the proposed plan, argued that his republic was in great need of fertilizers, and he asked the addition to the plan of a chemical fertilizer plant for his republic. He asked also for a hydroelectric station, an enlarged cement plant, additions to a machine-tool factory, completion of the irrigation system, increased allocations in the local republic budget for local industry, new school buildings, and, above all, more money for housing. He felt that the amount of new housing allowed by the plan would not equal the amount which would go out of use because of deterioration. In all, his requests were stated to involve an increase of 140 million rubles over the 220 million rubles allocated to his republic in the plan.

A deputy from Gorki Province of the R.S.F S.R. argued for more attention to streetcars, buses, and river vessels. He wanted more money for oil prospecting in his province.

A deputy from the Tajik S.S.R. asked that the irrigation system in his republic be enlarged with the construction of a new canal. He asked also for the construction of coke ovens in the coal fields of his republic.

Similar requests for alteration of the plan came from each speaker. To all the answer was given that more would be done if possible, but greater activity depended on greater production, and

See Meeting of the Supreme Soviet of the U.SJSJR. (First Session), Moscow, 1946 (in Russian), p. 99 el seq.

the deputies' constituents were to be encouraged toward that end.²⁷

Drafting of new codes of law has called forth even wider discussion.²⁸Commissions were appointed in 1946 to prepare a draft of each code to be submitted to the Legislative Committee of each chamber of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. Many proposals have since been published by law professors, judges, prosecutors, and lawyers in the legal periodicals of the U.S.S.R. Some of these proposals have been adopted in principle, according to statements in articles by the reporters of the drafting commissions, although no complete draft of any code has yet appeared

From the experience of the postwar years it is evident that the informed public is being brought into the legislative process in an increasing degree, although there is no variation of opinion as to general policy comparable to that to be found in the Congress of the United States. Absence of a two-party system automatically eliminates the possibility of any vigorous group's dial- < lenging the policy of the party in power.

The Administrative Apparatus at Headquarters

A Council of People's Commissars became the administrative apparatus of the Russian Soviet Republic on the first day of the revolution in 1917. When the federation of the U.S.S.R. was formed in December 1922, the administrative functions for the Union were placed in a Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R. This body con-

²⁷ Ibid., p. 315. Similar criticism of the plan was voiced by deputies in the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian S.S R. See especially speeches of Deputies Z. T. Serdyuk and G. G. Dementev, Eighth Session of the Supreme Soviet, Ukrainian S.S.R, Stenographic Report, Kiev, 1947 (in Russian), pp 34-35, 40-41

-s See Hazard, "Drafting New Soviet Codes of Law," 8 The American Slavic and East European Review 32 (1948).

tinued to function with broad powers, extending at times to policy matters, up to the war. During the period of existence of the State Committee for Defense, the Council of People's Commissars became subordinate to the State Committee, but the record indicates that it was the executive for the State Committee. The latter published very few orders in its own name.

A change of name for the Council of People's Commissars occurred in 1946 at the first session of the Supreme Soviet of the U S.S.R. held after the war. Commissariats were changed in name to ministries by amendment to the Constitution.²⁰ The Council of People's Commissars became the Council of Ministers. Each republic subsequently renamed its Council of People's Commissars in similar fashion.³⁰

Organization of ministries for peacetime construction immediately after the war followed the pattern of small units which had become the favored form in the U.S.S.R. in 1934. Some industries of widely scattered geographical activity were even split between two ministries, as with coal, petroleum, and fishing. In consequence, the total number of ministries in the Federal Government was 49 when Article 78 of the Constitution was amended in 1946.⁸¹ Additions shortly thereafter to the number of ministries brought the total to 52 and it continued to rise until it reached a high point of 59 in April 1947.

Trend toward unification

While the pattern of periodic increases in the number of ministries was still being followed, a change set in. The purpose of increasing the number

²⁸ See Law of Mar. 15, 1946. Vedomosti, No. 10 (419), March' 28, 1946

⁸⁰ See Law of Aug 30, 1946 of Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SS.R Stenographic Report, op cit note 27 supra, at p. 270.

³¹ See Law of March 14, 1946. Vedomosti, No. 10 (419), March 28, 1946 of ministries had been declared by Molotov in 1938 to be the achievement of greater efficiency by creating administrative units sufficiently small to permit the minister to follow closely the activity of his ministry.³² The first break in the pattern after the war came with the combining of the Commissariats of Defense and the Navy in a single "Commissariat of the Armed Forces."⁸³ Subsequent changes involved the unification of the Ministries of Agriculture, Technical Culture, and Animal Husbandry into a single Ministry of Agriculture.³⁴ The reason was stated to be that unification was desirable to avoid parallelism. Even with this unification, the state farms formerly operated by the three ministries were joined together and placed under a new Ministry of State Farms.'¹¹⁵ The net reduction in the number of ministries was one.

The question of unification seems to have hung in the balance during 1947. A Ministry of Forest Economy was created in April 1947 to assume the administration of all forests except those transferred to the collective farms and forests of the village community.-¹⁰No additions have been made to the Council of Ministries since that time. Changes in the number of ministries

as See Supreme Soviet of the U.SSR. (First Session), Stenographic Report, Moscow, 1938 (in Russian), p 109

⁸⁸ See Decree of Feb 25, 1946. Vedomosti, No. 7 (416), March 3, 1946. The Commissariats of Internal Affairs and State Security had been combined for years during the war after a short period of separate existence. Sec Decree of Feb. 3, 1941 separating them (Vedomosti, No 7 [122], Feb 12, 1941), and Decree of July 20, 1941 uniting them, (ibid., No. 33 [148J). They were again separated in April 1943, but the decree has not been published in the official journals

34 See Decree of Feb 4, 1947 Vedomotii, No 6 (460), Feb. 12, 1947.

35See Decree of Feb 4, 1947. Ibid.

⁸⁰ See Decree of April 4, 1947. Vedomosti„ No 13 (467), April 18, 1947 have been in the direction of reduction The Ministry of Agricultural Reserve Stocks has been merged with the Ministry of Raw Material Reserve Stocks to form a Ministry of State Agricultural and Raw Material Reserve Stocks ^{^[5]}

The Ministries of Ferrous and Non- ferrous Metallurgy have been combined into a Ministry of the Metallurgical Industry.⁸⁸ It was explained in the decree that the purpose of unification was to unite leadership for the better use of productive power and further development and also for better use of the growing number of qualified specialists and the reduction of the cost of administration. On the same day the two Ministries of Forest Industry and Cellulose and Paper Industry were combined in a Ministry of Forest and Paper Industry.⁸⁰ No reasons were given. The process of unification of allied ministries continued with the joining of the Ministries of the Chemical and Rubber Industries in a Ministry of the Chemical Industry.^{^[6]} The same reasons as those stated in the decree on the metallurgical industry were given.

Trend toward centralization

A movement in the direction of centralization of administration in the ministries of the Federal Government has developed since the war. A number of public corporations operating specific units of industry have been transferred from the supervision of ministries in a republic to the supervision of a ministry in the Federal Government.^{^[7]} While the movement is not large by comparison with the total number of industrial units in the U.S.S R, it seems to indicate a tendency on the part of government administrators to assume the direction of plants which the republic or a province operates inefficiently or the product of which is consumed entirely by an industrial unit already under the direction of a ministry of the Federal Government.

Local initiative in the productive process has been encouraged, in part through revitalization of the industrial and consumers' co-operatives since the war.^{^[8]} At the same time, the co-operative movement has been brought directly under the supervision of the Government. A Decree of November 9, 1946 created a Chief Administration on the Affairs of the Producers' and Consumers' Co-operatives and attached it to what is now called the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R^{^[9]}

A similar linking of the co-operatives in the agricultural field to the Government occurred about two months earlier. A Council on Collective Farm Affairs was created under what is now the Council of Ministers to supervise the activity of the collective farms.^{^[10]} This decree did not mark as much of a break with the past as did the decree relating to the producers' and consumers' cooperatives. The collective farms had been in close relationship with the Council of People's Commissars since 1932, when the Collective Farm

(Aug 1948). The process has continued unabated since the listing was prepared

⁴² See Decree of Nov. 9, 1946, summarized in leading article in Izvestiya, No. 265 (9181), Nov. 12, 1946. The text of the decree has not been published in the official journals

⁴⁸ Not published, but referred to in I. V. Evtikhiev and V. A Vlasov, Adminhtrativnoe Pravo SSSR (Moscow, 1946), p 28

« i See Sob. Post. SSS.R1946, No. 13, Art. 254 For its charter, see ibid,, No 14, Art. 271.

"Unions" of each province and republic had been liquidated and the farms placed under the direction of the Commissariat of Agriculture, which operated through the Land Departments of the province, district, and village soviets. The producers' and consumers' co-operatives, on the other hand, had been more independent, maintaining liaison with the Council of People's Commissars through central agencies composed of their own representatives.

Local Soviets

Revitalization of the work of provincial, district, city, and village soviets has been the concern of the government of the R.S F.S.R The Council of Ministers of the R.S.F.S.R. has been hearing reports from the executive committees of the various provinces. Some of the reports have elicited sharp reprimands from the republic's leaders.

The Khabarovsk Province has been criticized for many things.⁴⁵ The cultivated land of the collective farms has not been restored to the prewar level. The livestock herds are below prewar levels by 25 per cent for cattle and 40 per cent for horses. The province has done little to aid local industry in the far north. Its machine tractor stations operate poorly because of inadequate repairs. About fifteen hundred families which have been transferred to the province have no homes. Bureaucracy in administration has not been abolished. Illegal conscription of collective farmers for work in industry has occurred. Local and co-operative industry has not been encouraged in spite of a wealth of raw materials locally available. Appropriated funds have not all been utilized to improve housing, and the housing program has been completed only to 43 per cent of plan. Schools are inadequate. All these short-

«See Decree of July 29, 1948. Sob Post. R,$JF.SJt., 1948, No. 9, Art. 52.

comings are laid to a failure on the part of the Executive Committee of the Provincial Soviet to guide its administrative departments and the local soviets.

Relations with local soviets were stated to have been conducted through agents in the local soviets. This practice was found to reduce the role and responsibility of the local soviets and not to aid the development of initiative at the local level. To meet this administrative defect the Provincial Soviet's Executive Committee was ordered to stop its practice of directing the local soviets through agents, in favor of leaving initiative in the local soviet subject to systematic review of the local soviet's work on the basis of reports. There must also be regular instruction of the local leaders and the offering of practical assistance when required.

The work of the Provincial Soviet's Executive Committee was ordered improved by better preparation for meetings of the whole soviet, so that deputies might be informed in advance of the work of their Executive Committee, to permit them to criticize the administration and make recommendations. Members of the Provincial Soviet and of its Executive Committee were ordered to attend meetings of city and district soviets.

The Khabarovsk decree followed the lines of the decrees issued on the basis of reports from the Executive Committees of the Voronezh City Soviet⁴⁰and the Kolomna City Soviet.¹⁷ In Voronezh the Council of Ministers of the R.S.F.S.R. had found that the Executive Committee of the City Soviet had summoned the deputies to a meeting only six times during eleven months of 1946. The Constitution requires 3 meeting at least once a month. At one

*^flSce Sob. Post. R.SFS.R., 1947, No. 3, Art 7.

« Ibid., Art 6

of the meetings only one deputy appeared. The lack of interest was found to be because no materials were prepared which would interest the deputies in coming. Interest was further dulled because matters of vital concern, such as housing, were repeatedly postponed for discussion at a later meeting.

A tendency to reduce the number of local soviets has emerged since the summer of 1948. Districts (rayony) within cities have been combined with other districts so as to reduce the number of administrative units within a city.⁴⁸ Districts within provinces have been abolished.⁴⁹ In some cases the district soviet in a district surrounding a city has been liquidated and the whole district put under the city soviet.⁰⁰ It may be that the. shortage of qualified administrators, which was felt in the ministries and resulted in unification, has been felt in local administration as well.

Agencies of Law

The special boards established in the Ministry of Internal Affairs in 1934^{^[11]}

See Decree of Kazak S.SR of July 7, 1948 {Vedomosti, No. 36 [5351, Sept 7, 1948), relating to Uralsk, Scmipalatinsk, Petropav- lovsk, and Chimkent; Decree of Ukrainian SSR. of Aug. 11, 1948 {ibid, No. 38 [537], Sept 29, 1948), relating to Kherson, Nikolaev, Vinnitsa, Poltava, Dnepr odzerzhinsk, and Chernovitz; Decree of R.S.FSR. of Aug. 3, 1948 {ibid, No 38 [537]), relating to Ulan Udc, Makhach-Kala, and Astrakhan.

Sec Decree of R S F S R of Aug 20, 1948 {Vedomosti, No. 38 [537J, Sept. 29, 1948), relating to provinces of Vladimir, Vologda, Yaroslav, and Shchcrbakov; and Decree of Tajik S.S.R. of Aug 24, 1948 {ibid.)_} relating to Almasinsk, Ganchinsk, and Vakhansk

^no See Dccree of R S F S R. of Aug 31, 1948 {Vedomosti, No 38 [537], Sept. 29, 1948), relating to Kolchugin, Aleksandrovsk, and Yalta. In the case of Yalta a part of the liquidated district was transferred to the Alushkin District Soviet and a part to the Balaklava District Soviet.

ⁿⁱ See Decree of July 10, 1934, Sob. Zak SSS.fi., 1934, I, No 36, Art. 283 and In- have continued *to function since the war. When they replaced the tribunals of the O.G.P.U. they were given jurisdiction over persons "recognized as being socially dangerous" and authorized to exile, banish, or intern such persons for periods up to five years. During the war they were active especially in the districts which had recently come into the US.SR. High claims have been made by foreigners as to the number of persons affected. These claims have been sharply disputed by the U.S.S R. Whatever the accurate figure of persons interned, it is clear that the special boards are active in the postwar period in sifting allegations of social danger when the alleged danger is unaccompanied by an overt criminal act. When crime has been committed, the case goes before a Federal or republic court.

Lower courts have been sharply criticized by a new Minister of Justice of the U.S.S.R. appointed in 1948 to revitalize the work of agencies of the law.^{^[12]} In the Minister's first report^{^[13]}to the workers in these agencies, the lower courts were criticized for low quality work requiring reversals on appeal, involving violation of procedural law and misinterpretation of substantive provisions; for poor maintenance of courthouses; for little effort to improve knowledge of the law by further study; and for poor execution of court judgments.

Republic ministries of justice were criticized for asking lower courts to prepare so many reports that no time was left for court work. Ministries of justice in the republics were ordered to try to find reasons for errors, and not just the errors themselves, and to publish handbooks to guide the courts and lawyers generally. A revision of the statute on the colleges of advocates— the practicing lawyers—was called for to raise the requirements for admission to the bar. A new notarial law was demanded. It appeared almost simultaneously, requiring all state notaries to have legal education.⁵⁴ The law schools were ordered to prepare more students with higher qualifications, and the research institutes to publish more textbooks

Examination of the court reports supports the Minister of Justice in his conclusion that there are many reversals by the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R. of lower court decisions. For example, in one issue of the court reports,⁶⁶ the Supreme Court has set aside convictions handed down by lower courts or supported by intermediate appellate courts when a defendant was convicted on the basis of testimony given at the preliminary examination but disavowed at the trial; when a deaf mute was convicted without having had an attorney or an interpreter of sign language; when an intermediate appellate court reduced a sentence on the basis of what the Supreme Court thought to be an unreasonable interpretation of the facts in the record of a trial; when an intermediate court in setting aside a conviction failed to set forth its reasons in its opinion; when a court failed sufficiently to investigate conflicts between allegations in the indictment and testimony introduced at the trial; when a court

*>Sec Sob Port RSFSR, 1948, No. 4, Art IS

⁵⁵ Sec Sudebnaya Praktika Verkhovnogo Suda SJSS.R1948, Vypusk II Moscow, 1948.

reached a conclusion on a technical subject requiring an agronomist's expert evidence, without the evidence; when a court refused to investigate a charge by a defendant that he had not been shown the full indictment and did not know of what he was accused; when a court refused to permit a defendant to call a witness in his defense and gave no reason for the refusal in its written opinion, and also did not investigate his explanation of the facts of the case; and when a defendant was not present at his trial In an effort to control such violations of law by lower courts, a new statute was enacted to provide a detailed procedure for the fining of judges who are negligent or undisciplined in their work.*"⁰

Conclusion

Peacetime governmental procedures have been reintroduced, since the end of the war, in all but the newly acquired areas of the U S S.R. Elections similar to those held before the war have been resumed at all levels Ministries have been reorganized for reconstruction of industry. Shortage of skilled personnel and a desire to cut operating costs have reversed the prewar trend toward multiplication of ministries and administrative districts in the cities and provinces. Centralization of administrative authority has been pressed, but at the same time there has been a campaign to strengthen the local soviets. The general public has been encouraged to participate in the legislative and administrative process in the interest of efficiency of operations. While the Ministry of Internal Affairs continues to deal with socially dangerous elements through special boards, the higher courts are showing greater concern for orderly procedures controlled by law. Recalcitrant judges are punished.

⁵⁰ See Decrec of July 15, 1948. Vedomoiti, No. 31 (530), Aug. 1, 1948.

John N. Hazard, J S D, New York City, is professor of public law at Columbia University, and a member of the staff of the Russian Institute of that university From 1935 to 1937 he attended the Moscow Juridical Institute under a fellowship of the Institute of- Current World Affairs. He has been an adviser on Soviet law to the United States Chief of Counsel for the Prosecution of Axis Criminality, and an adviser on state trading and government monopoly to the Commercial Policy Division of the Department of State He is a member of the New York Bar and author of Soviet Housing Law (1939) and papers on various aspects of Soviet law and government

The pattern of a country bent on speedy reconstruction as its primary concern emerges. The political process presents no opportunity to the public to dissent from major objectives, but there is increasing opportunity for criticism of the manner in which the objectives are being sought. Administrative patterns developed before the war are being followed, but not slavishly. There is constant experiment with new administrative variations.

Postwar Role of the Communist Party

By Merle Fainsod

HE power of the Communist Party permeates every part of Soviet society. Since 1917, despite profound changes in the social composition of the party, shifts in its leadership, and a succession of crises, the party has maintained its monopolistic position as the embodiment of the dictatorship of the proletariat. It remains the organizing, integrating, and directing force in Soviet life. Developments in party organization and ideology since the end of World War II reveal no disposition on its part to relax control; on the contrary, the party has sought to consolidate its hold over every aspect of Soviet activity. To understand the contemporary role of the party and to appraise its strength and weakness as a ruling elite, it is necessary to view the party against the background of developments both prior to and during the war.

Prewar Structural Changes

Of central importance were the changes which were taking place in the membership structure of the party. On January 1, 1938, toward the end of the period of the Great Purge, the size of the party, including members and candidates for membership, was 1,920,002, its lowest point since 1930. With the relaxation of the purge, party strength again began to increase By January 1, 1939, the total of members and candidates reached 2,306,933. A year later this figure had mounted to 3,399,975, the peak in the history of the party up to that time, with the exception of the total of 3,555,338 registered at the beginning of 1933.^{^[14]}

¹ Statistical data arc drawn from the article, "Questions of Membership in the Ail-Union

Side by side with this increase in party size, notable shifts in the party's age composition were evident. The pre- revolutionary generation had begun to die off, and the purge of 1936-38 decimated the ranks of the remaining old Bolsheviks. By 1939, only .3 of 1 per cent of the membership of the party consisted of those who had entered it before 1917. On the other hand, of the 1939 party membership, 70 per cent had joined in 1929 or later.^{^[15]} The rank and file of the party consisted overwhelmingly of those who had been admitted in the period of Stalin's unquestioned ascendancy.

The Stalinite generation also controlled the party leadership. In 1939, out of 333 higher party functionaries— secretaries of regional committees, territorial committees, and central committees of Communist Parties of the national republics—303, or 91 per cent, were under 40 years of age; 268, or 80.5 per cent, had been party members only since 1924. At a lower level, of 10,902 secretaries of district committees, city committees, and area committees, 10,020, or 92 per cent, were under 40 years of age, and 10,193, or 93.5 per cent, had been party members only since 1924.^{^[16]} The available statistics emphasize the youth of both party rank and file and officialdom; particu-
larly significant is the fact that leading functionaries of the party had been largely drawn into party activity in the period after Lenin's death. The party was on the way to being dominated by a new, postrevolutionary generation consolidated around the power and leadership of Stalin.

Prewar Social Changes

In the prewar period important changes in the social composition of the party were also noticeable. The new Soviet-trained intelligentsia (defined in the inclusive Soviet sense of all varieties of brain workers) played an increasingly important role in party and governmental affairs. At the Eighteenth Congress (March 10-21, 1939) the party rules were revised to eliminate the differential conditions of admission which had previously given a preferred position to the candidacies of industrial workers, and to a lesser extent, of Red Army men, collective farm workers, and agricultural laborers. With the abolition of these differentials, Soviet intellectuals and white-collar workers became eligible for party membership on the same basis as all other elements of the population.

The result was a considerable increase in the proportion erf party members -drawn from administrative and managerial posts—plant directors and managers, engineers and technicians, collective farm presidents, and the workers' aristocracy of foremen, brigade leaders, and Stakhanovite workers. On January 1, 1930, in the early stages of the First Five-Year Plan, 6S.3 per cent of the party members were classified as workers, 20.2 per cent as peasants, and only 14.S per cent as office workers, intellectuals, and others.⁴

⁴ Bol'shaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopedita [The Great Soviet Encyclopedia!, Vol. 11 (1930), p. S33.

On the eve of the war these proportions were sharply reversed. While no data are available for the Soviet Union as a whole, figures on local party organization bear witness to the trend. In Chelyabinsk province, for example, during 1941 and the first two months of 1942, admission to candidacies for membership consisted of 600 workers, 289 collective farmers, and 2,035 white- collar workers. Among those who completed their candidacy and became members in the same period were 909 workers, 399 collective farmers, and 3,5IS white-collar workers. More than 70 per cent of the new candidates and members belonged to the white-collar group.®

This profound change in the social structure of the party was part of a process of adaptation to the new demands of industrialization and collectivization. The successive five-year plans confronted the Soviet Union with a much more complex task of management. The crying need for plant directors, engineers, technicians, foremen, and agrarian and other specialists involved the education of a new generation to perform these tasks and inevitably fostered the development of a large-scale bureaucracy with important managerial responsibilities. The problem of the relationship of this new Soviet intelligentsia to the party became of crucial significance. When the pre-1939 admission rules of the party proved a barrier, they were changed to facilitate the absorption of the new intelligentsia. As a result, the purge of the old Bolsheviks in 1936-38 was followed by a large-scale recruitment of the new technical and managerial generation. The party was replenished and reinvigorated by the admission of younger cadres of bureaucrats, engineers, plant directors, foremen, and Stakhanovites. In the process a con-

⁰ Pravda, April 22, 1942, p 3.

siderable step was taken, at least at the level of personnel, toward a merger of party and administration.

The emergence of the new postrevo- lutionary elite in leading party posts on the eve of the war provided an important core of leadership for the struggle ahead. Despite the bloodletting and the purges of the late thirties, the top leadership of the Communist Party succeeded in rejuvenating itself. It enlisted the energies and ambitions of many of the new postrevolutionary intelligentsia, rewarded them, and consolidated the power of the party around them. That this constituted an element of internal strength seems clearer in retrospect than it appeared to be at the time.

The War Test

With the Nazi attack on the Soviet Union in June 1941, the Communist Party faced a supreme test of its capacity to survive. Could it mobilize the technical resources and the organizing capacity to ward off defeat; could it count on the loyalty of the nonparty masses to support the war effort? In the first flush of the rapid Nazi advance, the outcome seemed far from certain. The initial welcome accorded the Nazi conquerors in the western border regions by collaborationists raised doubts about the closeness of the bonds between the party and the nonparty masses. It may well be that the party owes an eternal debt of gratitude to the Nazis for the ruthless atrocities which they perpetrated in the course of their advance. There can be little doubt that these atrocities contributed substantially toward cementing the bonds between the party and nonparty elements in Soviet society where they showed signs of strain.

During the war the party's efforts to mobilize popular support took two main directions: (1) the party opened its ranks and greatly increased its membership in order to widen its basis of support; (2) it sought to broaden its mass appeal by muting revolutionary and class ideology and stressing nationalism and patriotism as socially unifying objectives.

Early in the war the party relaxed its standards of admission in order to encourage members of the armed forces, and particularly front fighters, to apply for entrance. By a Central Committee decree of August 19, 1941 such applicants could be received into the party on the endorsement of three party members of one year's standing. By a later decree of December 9, 1941 the candidacy stage for such applicants was reduced to three months.⁶ Many of the new members were selected from frontline soldiers of the Red Army during the period of heaviest crisis without particular concern for their ideological knowledge or degree of political sophistication. According to one Soviet authority, during the year 1942 alone, 1,340,000 new members were recruited into the party.⁷ The size of the party —measured by the total number of the members and candidates—increased from 3,399,975 on January 1, 1940 to 5,760,369 on January 1, 1945. By September 1947, according to Party Secretary Malenkov, this total had reached 6,300,000.® About half of this number was accounted for by those who had

6These decrecs arc summarized in Partiinaya Zhizn' [Party Life], No. 20 (Oct. 1947), pp. 73 ff

7P. Pospelov in Bol'shevik, No. 20 (Oct. 30, 1947), p. 37.

8This is the figure given by Malenkov in his report to the organizing confercncc of the Cozninform in Poland toward the end of Sep- temper 1947. See Informatsionnoie Sovcsh- chanue Predstavitelei Nekotorych Kompartii [Informational Conference of Representatives of Certain Communist Parlies I, Moscow, 1948, p. 144.

joined the party during the war and postwar period⁰ It was evident that the party was consciously reaching out to strengthen its mass base, particularly in the crucial military formations.

Wartime Ideology

At the same time, the party also sought to broaden its appeal to embrace all elements in Soviet society. The wellsprings of Russian national sentiment were tapped to the full to mobilize popular support for the war within the Soviet Union. The war was christened variously as the Great Patriotic War, the Great Fatherland War, a National War of Liberation. National history was rehabilitated, the patriarchate restored, Pan-Slavism emphasized, a new national anthem introduced, the army glorified, and patriotism stressed at every turn. Marxist slogans were temporarily subdued, particularly during the early, critical phase of the war.

Yet nationalist ideological appeals never entirely supplanted Marxist appeals; rather they ran side by side and were addressed to different audiences. Red Star, the Army newspaper, for example, was predominantly nationalist in tone. Komsomolskaya Pravda, with its Young-Communist clientele, struck a more Marxist note, though it too had its nationalist overtones. The propaganda addressed to the peasantry and to the Red Army, in which the peasantry was heavily represented, was cast predominantly in Holy Russia terms. In the factories, particularly in cities with strong working-class traditions, such as Leningrad and Moscow, Marxist-Leninist doctrine was much more strongly emphasized, especially in the later stages of the war.

Thus ideology during the war was shaped to suit the particular groups to whom appeals were being addressed.

^y See Malenkov, op at

For the Allies in the West, the revolutionary motif was muted, the Comintern dissolved, and the alliance of peace- loving democratic anti-Fascist nations featured. The peasantry and the army were given predominantly nationalistic propaganda For the party and factory workers, nationalism was tempered with the traditional revolutionary symbolism.

Marxist Revival

With the approach of victory, there was increasing evidence of a Marxist revival on the ideological front. Beginning with the triumph at Stalingrad and intensifying during 1944 and 1945, theoretical training of both party and nonparty people in Marxist-Leninist doctrine, which had been neglected during the early phases of the war, again began to be stressed. Particular attention was paid to the proper indoctrination of the populations of the districts which had been liberated from the Germans. As Pravda put it in its issue of October 17, 1944:

During the occupation, the German invaders tried by every method to poison the consciousness of Soviet men and women and to confuse them. . It is the duty of party organizations to stimulate tirelessly the political activity of the workers. . . . Particular attention must be paid to the question of implanting in the population a socialist attitude toward labor and public property, strengthening state discipline, and overcoming the private-property, anticollective farm, and antistate tendencies planted by the German occupants¹⁰

Postwar Problems

Victory brought its own peculiar problems for the party leadership. The party had swollen greatly in size dur-

¹⁰ Quoted from John S. Curtiss and Alex Inkeles, "Marxism in the U.SSR.—The Recent Revival," Political Science Quarterly, Vol. LXI, No 3 (Sept 1946), p. 358.

ing the war, and at least half of the membership consisted of raw recruits who still remained to be politically indoctrinated. War casualties had not passed the party by; there was a shortage of trained leadership cadres for the tasks ahead. The Nazi occupation had left a heritage of disorganization in the Ukraine and the western border regions; local party organizations had to be rebuilt virtually from the ground up.

The mood and temper of the Soviet populace also posed difficulties. After the bitter sacrifices of the war, there was a disposition, on the part of at least some of the population, to yearn for peace and quiet, for a relaxation of tempo, and for an opportunity to enjoy the good things of life. Soldiers returning from the West had caught a glimpse of capitalistic comforts and luxuries which were unavailable in the Soviet Union, and transmitted disquieting doubts about the perfection of the Soviet paradise. Party propagandists and agitators encountered considerable mass apathy when they lectured on political themes. During the war, the party, in the name of national unity, had winked at the practice of collective- farm members who encroached on land of the collectives, expanded their private plots, and grew relatively well-to- do through private trading. But the persistence of these tendencies into the postwar period caused the party lively concern.¹¹ Similarly, the apolitical attitudes of some members of the Soviet 'literary intelligentsia, and their openly expressed admiration for Western ideas and artistic models, while tolerated in the honeymoon period of the war alliance, became a dangerous infection as the war alliance disintegrated.

¹¹ See the decree of September 19, 1946, Measures to Liquidate Violations of the Statute regulating Artels and Kolkhozes, discussed in the article by I Laptev, "The Party and the Soviet Peasantry," in Partiinaya Zhizn' [Party Life], No 2 (Jan. 1947), pp 71-72

Cleavage Between East and West

The deterioration of relations between the Soviet Union and the West presented a transcendent problem. The increasingly strong resistance of the West to Soviet expansionism, which found its culmination in the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall plan, was attended by a powerful ideological reorientation, the reverberations of which were felt not only in the party but in every corner of Soviet society. The seeds of this reorientation (perhaps it might more appropriately be labeled a reaffirmation) were planted at the height of the war alliance, when the Soviet press reminded its readers that both Britain and the United States were rich in anti_:Soviet elements, and when suspicions were voiced time and again that the Allies were deliberately delaying the second front in order to weaken the Soviet Union.

A series of authoritative pronouncements by party leaders at the end of the war served as a reminder that the historical perspective of Marxism-Leninism had not been cast into the discard. Kalinin's address to the Moscow district party conference in 1945 was one of the first to put major emphasis on the perils of "capitalist encirclement" after -the defeat of Hitler. Stalin's election speech of February 9, 1946 opened with an affirmation of the basic Communist postulates on the nature and causes of capitalistic wars, and called for a powerful industrial upsurge emphasizing heavy industry and designed to guarantee the "homeland . . . against all possible accidents." Zhdanov's blunt speech at the organizing conference of the Comin- form in September 1947 left no doubts about the party's ideological position. The world was divided into two camps: the "imperialist" camp led by the United States, and the "anti-imperialist" camp led by the Soviet Union,

Communists in all countries were summoned to lead the battle against the "imperialist aggressors."

Control of National Life

It is against this perspective that the postwar role of the Communist Party must be visualized. Its special mission 'is to reassert its control over all phases of national life. It is being called upon in a period of serious international tension to reawaken a sense of crisis in the Soviet population, to discipline the masses for new sacrifices, and to mobilize support for a vast new industrial effort which will make the Soviet Union impregnable.

The Zhdanov analysis of the international position of the Soviet Union has its counterpart in recent developments on the domestic Soviet ideological front. Under the leadership of Zhdanov until his death in 1948, and under the immediate direction of the Department of Propaganda and Agitation of the Party Central Committee through its journal Culture and Life (the first number of which appeared in June 1946), an unrelenting campaign has been waged to bring every aspect of Soviet intellectual life, from literature, art, and music to philosophy, economics, and science, into tune with the new realities. The emphasis on the dangers of capitalist encirclement, joined with pride in the achievements of the Great Patriotic War, has helped to shape a new synthesis between the specifically Russian nationalism of the war period and Marxism-Leninism.

"Soviet Patriotism"

This synthesis, which finds its expression in the phrase "Soviet patriotism," is being vigorously propagated through every channel of thought and opinion.^{^[17]} In part, it is pure pride of

¹² For an indication of the way in which this synthesis is worked out, see the pamphlet country. In a more important aspect, it involves stressing the superiority of the Soviet social and political order over capitalism—emphasizing the achievements of Soviet science and learning, industry and agriculture, literature and art. In part, it is an effort to direct the energies of the nation to the urgencies of reconstruction—to discourage war- weariness, apoliticalness, and retreat from the tasks ahead. In part, as the campaign against Varga indicated,^{^[18]} it is designed to achieve doctrinal purification and to make secure against any possibility of challenge the Communist analysis of capitalist disintegration through economic crisis. In part, as revealed by the attack on the Leningrad Zvezda group, the blast against Alex- androv's History of Western Philosophy, and the denunciation of the musicians, it represents an effort to rid Soviet thought of adulation of the West and subservience to foreign thought and foreign literary schools and forms.

Ideology serves as a weapon of policy. Through Soviet patriotism the party leadership proposes to create the Soviet man of the postwar world—politically conscious, an active participant in the tasks of reconstruction, proud of his society, aware of the dangers of "capitalist encirclement," and prepared to make his contribution to the consolidation and expansion of Soviet power.

Party Discipline

Coupled with these developments is a renewed effort to strengthen the ca-' dres of the party and to emphasize their leading and dominating role in Soviet society. Since the end of the war the admission of new members into the party has substantially fallen off.¹⁴ Instead of increasing the size of the party, the energies of the party leadership have been focused on a weeding-out process— the elimination of the new Communists who have been found deficient in political knowledge or activity or who have proved inefficient or venal in discharging party assignments or administrative tasks.

No official figures have been released on the extent of party expulsions or probations, but there is evidence to indicate that the "purge," or party verification as it has been officially called, has been signally mild in comparison with the mass arrests, expulsions, and liquidations of the period 1936-38. Even in the Ukraine, where the party shake- up has been most severe, and where, shortly after the war, large numbers of party officials were replaced for inefficiency, incompetence, or Ukrainian nationalist deviations, the reports of competent outside observers who had some opportunity to observe the process on the ground in its early stages indicate that the shake-up largely took the form of demotions and transfer of assignments rather than arrest, criminal prosecution, or liquidation.¹⁰ The acute shortage of trained manpower has apparently not been without its influence in determining the character of party discipline and penalties.

Unlike experience in some of the earlier purges, there have been no public trials. Party verifications have taken

¹⁴ See the speech by G Malenkov to the organizing conference of the Cominforra, op. cit. note 8 supra, pp. 125-56.

^1BA possible indication of the demoralized situation in the Ukraine was the dispatch in early 1947 of L M Kaganovich, one of the ablest of the Politburo organizers, to replace N. Khrushchev, also a member of the Politburo, as chief secretary of the Ukrainian party. Khrushchev, however, was subsequently restored to this position, and Kaganovich returned to his duties as Deputy Minister of the U.SS.R.

the form of secret interrogations by groups of trusted Communists operating under the direction of the Central Committee. Most expulsions have been on a "not qualified" basis, without criminal prosecutions. In a large number of cases the party member whose conduct is regarded as unsatisfactory is placed on "probation" and given a* chance to perfect his knowledge of Marxist-Leninist theory. If he succeeds in repairing his deficiencies, he may apply for restoration of full party rights.

Some clues as to future developments in party organization have been provided by the Malenkov report to the organizing conference of the Cominform in September 1947. In his report Malenkov indicated that the Central Committee of the party was at work on a revision of the party rules aimed at tightening entrance requirements and discipline and emphasizing the necessity of political education to raise the ideological level of party members. He reported:

A considerable number of Communists, especially those who have entered the party in recent years, have not yet succeeded in receiving the necessary political training . . . Owing to this, the party at present puts its emphasis not upon forcing further growth of its ranks but upon the development of political education of members and candidates. . . . Quality is more important than quantity^ac

Malenkov disclosed that the party planned to extend its wide network of party schools and courses throughout the nation in order to ensure the necessary political indoctrination of the party membership. Since 1946 emphasis on political education and propaganda has reached a new high level of intensity.

Party Leadership

The concern of the top party leadership has been by no means confined to

¹⁶ op. cit note 8 supra, p. 145.

the state of mind of the party rank and file. It has also extended to the party apparatus with particular emphasis on the lower rungs of the party hierarchy— secretaries of district, town, and area committees, and other local functionaries. Here the flow of samo-kritika (self-criticism) in the party journals has been helpful in providing insights into the operative aspects of party lifq.^{^[19]}

In a few cases there have been charges of venality and peculation, and local officials have been removed and subjected to criminal prosecution. In many more cases, there have been charges of inefficiency, and local party officials have had to pay the price of failure of enterprises in their jurisdiction to realize planned economic targets. In stilly other cases, the charge has been failure to carry out assignments at the level of political education and indoctrination.

1939 (after 18th Party Congress)

Members

Stalin

Molotov

Voroshilov

L. Kaganovich

Mikoyan

Andreyev

Khrushchev

Zhdanov (died 1948)

Kalinin (died 1946)

Candidates

Shvernik Beriya

Typical examples of the deficiencies of local party leadership are stressed in a speech by Khrushchev, the secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party, to a plenum of the Central Committee of that party on March 9, 1948.^{^[20]} While admitting that there had been considerable improvement since the end of the war, he expressed himself as still dissatisfied with the performance of his subordinates. He criticized local party leadership for taking on responsibilities which properly belonged to governmental organs, for being unfamiliar with what was actually happening in their districts and failing to give the collective farms in their area personal supervision, for directing operations through specially empowered emissaries and a flood of orders and decrees instead of building competent local leadership from the outset, for working bureaucratically instead of with people, and for failure to check execution of plans on the ground. As a result of such criticism, which is by no means confined to the Ukraine, there have been numerous changes in party leadership at the local level.^{^[21]}

The Politburo

At the top political level, the level of the Political Bureau (Politburo), leadership has been remarkably stable. The Politburo continues to be dominated by Stalin's henchmen, those who gathered around him in the struggle against left and right deviations in the late twenties and early thirties and in the purge period of 1936-38. Table 1 makes this continuity clear.

Table 1—Composition of Politburo

1948 Members

Stalin

Molotov

Voroshilov

L. Kaganovich

Mikoyan

Andreyev

Khrushchev

Malenkov (named candidate and member 1941)

Beriya (named member 1946)

Voznesensky (named candidate 1941, member 1947)

Candidates

Shvernik Bulganin (1946) Kosygin (1946)

¹⁹ For somewhat similar criticisms addressed to the Leningrad party organization, see the summary of the speech of P. S. Popkov, the secretary of the Leningrad organization, contained in Pravda, Dec * 23, 1948, p 2

As this table indicates, of the original 1939 group of members and candidates, two, Zhdanov and Kalinin, have died. The rest remain in the Politburo family. The only change in status has been the promotion of Beriya from candidacy to full membership in 1946. Until March 1949 continuity was also manifest in the distribution of responsibilities. Stalin remained sui generis, with an all-encompassing mandate over both party and government. Molotov's special province was foreign affairs. Voro- shilov's area remained the military field, though he was recently overshadowed by the appointment of Bulganin as Minister of the Armed Forces. L. Kaganovich had long made transportation a special interest, though his responsibility also extended into heavy industry. Mikoyan's forte was foreign trade. Andreyev's was agriculture. Khrushchev, as secretary of the Ukrainian party, focused his energies on Ukrainian affairs. Beriya had supervision over the secret police and had also been recently charged with the development of atomic energy. Shvernik, originally a specialist in trade union matters, replaced Kalinin as President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet.

Of the newer faces in the Politburo, Malenkov made his career as personal secretary to Stalin and had primary responsibility for organizational affairs in the party. Voznesensky was chairman of Gosplan (State Planning Commission).^'^{^[22]} Bulganin, after distinguished

^19a Early in March 1949 a number of important governmental changes were announced affecting certain members of the Politburo Molotov was succeeded as Foreign Minister by A Y Vyshinsky, Mikoyan as Minister of Foreign Trade by M. A Menshikov, and Voznesensky as Chairman of Gosplan by M. Z Saburov Molotov and Mikoyan remained deputy prime ministers; Voznesensky did not No reasons were given for the changes, and as of March 15, 1949, the new service as head of the Military Council for the Defense of Moscow, was made Minister of the Armed Forces at the end of the war. Kosygin, after winning his spurs in the textile industry before the war, emerged as premier of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic (R.S.F.S R.) and deputy prime minister of the U.S.S R. at the end of the war. After serving briefly as Minister of Finance, he became Minister of Light Industry. Of this newer group, only Bulganin is over fifty years old; the rest are in their early and middle forties. By 1939 all of them were already members of the Central Committee of the Party.

The Orgburo

Greater changes have taken place in the composition of the party Secretariat and the Organizational Bureau (Orgburo). Since these bodies are primarily concerned with the internal problems of the party bureaucracy, they have special importance for the future shape of party organization.

In 1939 the party Secretariat consisted of Stalin, Zhdanov, Andreyev, and Malenkov. All of them with the exception of Malenkov were also members of the Politburo. Of this group Zhdanov is now dead, and Andreyev has been relieved of his responsibilities as party secretary as well as of his membership in the Orgburo. In addition to Stalin and Malenkov, the present Secretariat also includes: G. M. Popov, the secretary of the Moscow party organization; A. A. Kuznetsov, who at one time was secretary of the Leningrad party organization; M. A. Suslov, who also acts as chief of the Propaganda and Agitation Department of the Central Committee; and P. K. Ponomarenko, who formerly served as secretary of the White Russian party organization.²⁰ It is worth noting that all of the known members of the Secretariat with the exception of Pono- marenko were also named members of the Orgburo in 1946.

The membership of the Orgburo has been substantially enlarged since 1939. Table 2 indicates the membership in 1939 and 1946.

Table 2—Membership of Orgburo

1939 1946

Stalin	Stalin
Zhdanov (dead)	Zhdanov (dead)
Malenkov	Malenkov
P Mekhlis	Mekhlis
Mikhailov	Mikhailov
Andreyev	A. A. Kuznetsov
Shvernik	G M Popov
L. Kaganovich	Bulganin
Shcherbakov (dead)	Patolichev
	Andrianov
	G. F. Alexandrov
	Shatalin
	V V. Kuznetsov
	Rodionov
	Suslov

Of the original nine members of the Orgburo in 1939, five were also members of the Politburo at that time. Of this group, with Zhdanov dead, only one, Stalin, now remains as a member of the Orgburo. The present Politburo is, however, also represented in the Orgburo by Malenkov and Bulganin. Two members of the 1946 Orgburo, Mekhlis, the Minister of State Control, and Mikhailov, whose special province is Komsomol affairs, were also members of the Orgburo in 1939.

Of the remaining nine members, three—Popov, Suslov, and A. A. Kuz-

The membership of Ponomarenko m the top party Secretariat was confirmed by a dispatch in Pravda, December 16, 1948, p 4. It is possible that M F Shkiryatov is also a member of the present Secretariat, since his name frequently appears in the Soviet press in lists which include known members of the Politburo and the Secretariat No announcement of his appointment, however, has been made.

netsov—are also secretaries of the Central Committee. Shatalin is a high functionary on the Personnel Staff of the Central Committee, and acted as editor of the journal of the Central Committee, Party Life, until its recent discontinuance in April 1948. Pato- lichev came to the Orgburo as a specialist in Ukrainian party affairs, while Andrianov came with a similar background in the Urals. V. V. Kuznetzov is chairman of the Ail-Union Council of Trade Unions, while Rodionov succeeded Kosygin as chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic (R.S.F.S.R.). G. F. Alexandrov served as chief of the Propaganda and Agitation Department of the party Central Committee until November 1947, when he fell from favor as a result of Zhdanov's attack on his History of Western Philosophy. In view of this attack, it is doubtful that he is still a member of the Orgburo.

Indeed, there has been no announcement of changes in the composition of the Orgburo since 1946. Since the Central Committee Secretariat and the Orgburo have traditionally been an antechamber to the Politburo, it is probably to this apprentice group that the Politburo will look to replenish its ranks in the future.

Age and Education

While the top leadership of the party maintains a surprising continuity with the prewar years, the same cannot be said of the party rank and file. According to Malenkov, at least half of the membership in September 1947 consisted of those who had entered the party during and immediately after the war. The accent is still on youth. Before the war, party members under the age of 25 were 8.9 per cent of the total; at the end of the war they accounted for 18.3 per cent of the total. At the end of the war 63.6 per cent of all party members were under 35 years of age.²¹

The level of education represented by the party membership has also substantially improved compared with that of prewar years. As of January 1, 1947, out of 6,000,000 members and candidates, 400,000 were listed as having a university education, 1,300,000 as having completed high school, and 1,500,000 as having an incomplete high school education.²²

As an indication of its increased hold on the intelligentsia, the party listed among its members 148,000 engineers, 24,000 agronomists and other agricultural specialists, 40,000 doctors, and 80,000 teachers.²³ Its representation in rural regions, however, continued weak. Out of 28,207 collective farms in the Ukraine in 1948, Khrushchev, the secretary of the Ukrainian party, reported that only 11,895 had party organizations.²⁴ It is evident that party controls thin out as one moves out from the great industrial centers into the agricultural hinterlands.

Question of Solidarity

It is not easy for the outside observer to appraise the current strength of the party when firsthand information on its internal operations is so meager. There is obvious danger in accepting at face value party claims of monolithic unity and iron discipline. Historical experience suggests that the monolithic party is a fagade which conceals a host of internal tensions. It is equally difficult, without opportunity for direct observation, to be certain about the hold which the party has on the loyalty of the nonparty masses. The very violence

²¹ Partiinoye Stroitel'stvo [Party Construction], No. 4 (1946), pp. 27-28.

²²Partiinaya Zhizn' [Party Life], No. 20 (Oct. 1947), p. 83.

** Ibid.

²⁴Partiinaya Zhizn' LParty Life!, No. 5 (March 1948), p. 11, of the propaganda campaign which the party is currently waging to enforce its postwar program suggests resistances which may be difficult to document, but which nevertheless loom as very real.

Conditioning of Present Membership

There is also danger in assuming that the party is riddled by internal cleavages and that the dynamic ideological momentum of the Communist revolution has been exhausted To be sure, the party is no longer what it once was, a party of revolutionaries struggling for power in Russia. For two-thirds of the present party membership, the Revolution of 1917 is either a page in the history books or something that happened so far back in childhood that its spirit and mood have to be consciously recreated in order to be a meaningful part of experience. The lives of the generation that is rising to power in the party have revolved around the great tasks of the postrevolutionary period—industrialization and collectivization, and, more recently, the war against the Nazi enemy. It is an increasingly technical-minded generation, involved intimately in problems of production, of organization, and of administration, and it is educated with these responsibilities in mind.

The new generation of leadership, moreover, is drawn heavily from the aristocracy of Soviet society—plant managers, technicians, party and governmental bureaucrats, and privileged workers. It is not the party of the underdog, and, unlike the revolutionary generation of old Bolsheviks, it has never had the experience of being an underdog. It is a generation which occupies the privileged and responsible positions in public life, and it may well be under greater temptation than the last generation to begin to take its privileges
for granted and even to seek to perpetuate them for its offspring.

This new generation has been educated in a mold of Stalinite authoritarianism. It grew up in a period when the opposition to Stalin was being broken up, and a Stalin cult was being systematically developed. It is a generation which is deeply indebted to Stalin and his entourage for its position in Soviet society. Unlike the old revolutionary generation, it is also a generation which, except for World War II, has had very little contact with the outside world and which has been deliberately insulated from such contact. It is, consequently, a generation for which the whole tradition of Western democracy tends to be meaningless, since it is known only in the distorted form of the shibboleths of party propaganda and has never been directly experienced or observed. This is a generation which has been taught to believe that the political organization of the Soviet Union is far superior to the so-called freedoms of Western democracies.

It is also worth remembering that this new generation of leadership has been tempered, proved, and hardened by the experience of the late war. It has created great new traditions of its own, traditions of self-sacrifice, patriotism, and perseverance in the face of great odds. It emerges from the struggle proud of its record and convinced that the Soviet Union carried the major burden of the conflict and contributed most to the Nazi defeat. It is a leadership which reasons that survival would not have been possible without the sacrifices made earlier to achieve industrialization. It is persuaded that, even though living standards continue low, the processes of industrialization must be intensified if the safety of the Soviet Union is to be ensured in the future. It has behind it the relatively undeveloped resources of a potentially rich and powerful nation, and it is bent on developing these resources to the full.

Immediately prior to and during the war, the party succeeded in greatly broadening its base. It has been particularly concerned with attaching the rising stratum in the population to the party, and it has sought to incorporate this stratum into the party's hierarchical structure of privileges and rewards. These represent elements of internal strength which ought not to be discounted.

Future of the Party

Whether or not the party can continue to maintain and expand its power in the postwar world remains to be seen. As in earlier periods, the party still relies on the twin engines of persuasion and repression to mobilize support and to neutralize or destroy opposition. The product on the side of persuasion is a very highly developed system of indoctrination and propaganda which is designed to shape the minds of men in the Communist pattern. The product on the side of repression is an equally highly developed system of terror, with its organs of secret police and forced labor camps, which is designed to intimidate opposition and to root out and destroy enemies of the regime wherever they are discovered.

Merle Fainsod, Ph.D, Cambridge, Massachusetts, is professor of government at Harvard University and on the staff of that university's Russian Research Center. In 1936 he was a member of the staff of the President's Committee on Administrative Management, and from 1940 to 1943 he served with several government agencies. In 1944- 45 he was deputy director of the Civil Affairs Training School, Harvard University. He is author of International Socialism and the World War {1935); coauthor of The American People and Their Government (1933) and Government and the American Economy (j1941); and contributor to technical journals.

The problems which loom ahead for the party are not easily resolved. Can the party solve the problem of the succession after Stalin's death without setting in motion a struggle for power within the party which will greatly weaken it? Can the party continue to exact endless sacrifices from the Soviet populace in the interest of military impregnability without risking its increasing isolation from the nonparty rank and file? Can the party maintain its ideological strait jacket on the Soviet intelligentsia without drying up the vitality and initiative, the inventive and creative forces, on which it must ultimately rely if it is to maintain its forward momentum? Can it continue to emphasize its ideological ilan and the expansionist foreign policy which is its expression, without embarking on an adventurist course which may have disastrous consequences? To put these questions is not to imply that there are easy answers or that the party may be expected to lose its firm hold over Soviet society in \he discernible future. It is to suggest that the ability of the party to survive and consolidate its power still awaits a series of grim tests the results of which may go far to determine the fate of man in the years ahead.

Family and Church in the Postwar U.S.S.R.

By Alex

HE Soviet Union viewed as a distinct political and socioeconomic system emerged essentially intact from the Second World War. There were, however, several notable adjustments made in the legislation governing marriage, the family, and divorce, in the relations between the state and organized religious groups, and in the realm of education. Because these are important areas of social life, the shifts in Soviet policy are of considerable interest in themselves. Their significance is highlighted, furthermore, by the fact that these developments are manifestations of a broader process of social change which has been in progress in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics since the middle thirties.

This article will very briefly describe the major elements of the changes which have occurred in the status of the family and in religious life,^{^[23]} and will seek to assess their significance for an understanding of the general postwar development of Soviet society.

The major adjustments in the law governing family life were introduced by an extensive Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. on July 8, 1944 ^{^[24]} This decree was followed by a long series of supplementary legislation and administrative decisions and orders.^{^[25]} Taken together, they have ef-

Inkeles

fected a profound change in the legal regulations governing the family in the Soviet Union. Only the briefest mention can be given here of a few of the major features of these acts.

Legally Constituted Marriage

Under the present law, only marriages which have been registered with the civil registry authorities (Zags) engender either rights or obligations for the marriage partners. In adopting this principle the Soviet Government has reversed a policy of almost twenty years' standing, since from 1926 on, de facto marriages produced essentially the same legal consequences as did registered marriages.^{^[26]}

Divorce

Prior to the recent changes, a divorce could be obtained in the Soviet Union more freely than in probably any other

Brake i Scm'e, Moscow, 1947. The discussion of family law given below closely follows Abramov and Grave.

* This applied specifically to the Russian Republic, which encompasses the greater part of the territory and population of the Soviet Union. There is a high degree of uniformity between the family law codes of the sixteen constituent republics, however, and six of the republics have adopted the code of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic Furthermore, the basic laws of July 8, 1944 and June 27, 1936 were Federal enactments, and hence were applicable in all of the constituent republics Finally, in 1947 the Soviet Constitution was amended to provide that the establishment of principles governing marriage and family legislation shall be under the jurisdiction of the Federal Government. See G. M. Sverdlov, "Razvitie Sovetskogo Semei- nogo Prava," Sovetskoe Gosudarstvo i Provo, No. 10 (Oct. 1947), pp. 111-12; and Abramov and Grave, op cit note 3 supra, pp 38-39.

nation in the world. No court procedure was required,^{^[27]} and divorces were granted more or less automatically by the civil registry bureaus upon application by one or both parties. Under the new law the regulations governing divorce have been fundamentally changed in at least three major respects.

First, divorce has been returned to the courts, and it has become the object of litigation (spot) subject to public proceedings which for the first time now involve an inquiry into the reasons why divorce is sought.

Second, it is currently much more difficult to obtain a divorce. There are two stages in the court procedure. The People's Court, representing the initial stage, must attempt to reconcile the parties, but is not authorized to grant a divorce. Failing this reconciliation, the person or persons seeking a divorce may then petition the next higher court. This court, following a complete hearing, may grant a divorce, but does so largely at its discretion, since no specific grounds for divorce are stated by law.

It has been stated in a recent publication of the Ministry of Justice of the U.S.S.R. that a divorce should be granted only in those cases where the court concludes that "the family has disintegrated [and] it is already impossible to restore or preserve it by any measure whatsoever."^{^[28]} Early court practice (1944-45) appears to have followed the pattern of granting a divorce in all cases where there was mutual consent.^{^[29]} This procedure does not appear to have the full approval of all Soviet legal commentators.^{^[30]}

Third, securing a divorce has been rendered much more costly. After June 1936 the registration of a first divorce involved a SO ruble fee, a second 150, and a third and subsequent divorces 300 rubles.⁹ At present, if the divorce is granted, the court assigns a fee of from 500 to 2,000 rubles to be paid by one or both of the parties. This is in addition to expenses such as the 100 ruble fee which must accompany the initial petition and the costs involved in publishing notice of the action in the local press, which were not incurred under the former procedure. Consequently, for a considerable segment of the Soviet population the cost of divorce proceedings might prove prohibitive.

The Unmarried Mother and Her Child

According to the Decree of July 8, 1944, suits seeking to establish the paternity of a child have been abolished. This means that the children of unwed mothers no longer have the opportunity of obtaining full rights equal to all other children of the father, including the right to support and inheritance. Instead, the unwed mother is now granted a modest state allowance for the support and upbringing of her child, and she has, in addition, the option of placing the child in a public institution at state expense. There is still no legal stigma of illegitimacy, but the likelihood of effective social stigmatization is increased by the fact that the child now takes the name of the mother.

Gosudarstvo i Pravo, No. 7 (July 1946), pp 22-26.

8 See Abramov and Grave, op. ctl. note 3 mpra, pp 25-27.

9Sobranie Zakonov i RasporyazhenH S.S.S R., No. 34 (July 21, 1936), Text 309, Sec Vin.

State Aid to Families

The wartime legislation includes a series of measures designed to encourage large families. State payments to the mothers of large families now begin with the birth of the third child, rather than on the birth of the seventh, as provided by the original procedure instituted in 1936.¹⁰ Maternity leave has been extended and other safeguards have been introduced for employed pregnant women. Parents of large families have been granted greatly reduced fees at nursery schools, and- marked advantages over single persons and childless couples in income tax payments. Finally, a series of special medals and awards has been introduced

for mothers of five and more children.

State Policy Towards the Family

The state of current Soviet thinking about the family is, of course, reflected not only in the specific legislative acts adopted, but also in the general discussions which accompanied their introduction. For the sake of convenience we may concentrate on the comments of G. M. Sverdlov, who is one of the most prominent Soviet commentators on family law. The family, according to Sverdlov, should be regarded as the very "basis of society," and, he affirms, "the stronger the family becomes, so much the stronger will be society as a whole."¹¹ The state, furthermore, sees in the family "a real foundation on which it can depend and which will support it," and consequently takes the position that "by strengthening the family it is strengthening itself, increasing its own might." ¹²

¹⁰ Sobranie Zakonov i Rasporyazhemi S.S.- 5 J?., No 34 (July 21, 1936), Text 309, Sec. II

¹¹G M. Sverdlov, "Novy Zakon o Mater- mstve, Brake, i Sem'e," Propagandist, No 18 (1944), p 27.

¹² G. M. Sverdlov, Legal Rights of the Soviet Family, published by Soviet News, London (no date), p 17.

From this proposition there follow several implications for the policy of the state towards the family. Contracting a marriage must be the object of a "solemn procedure" which will underscore the significance of this moment in the individual's life and which will emphasize its social importance. Since the registration of marriage is the instrument through which the state exercises its influence and control over that institution, the state demands that all marriages be registered if they are to be afforded legal status.

But more than registering and certifying the act of marriage, the Government "with all the force of its authority supports it, favors it, and places it under its care and protection." It does not take a similar attitude towards the unregistered marriage, because to protect the de facto marriage "saps the strength and the significance of the registered marriage "¹³

Once marriage has been entered upon, the current Soviet view anticipates that its natural outcome will be a "strong, many-childrened family," the development of which is regarded as the fulfillment of both individual instinct and the interests of society.¹⁴ The state seeks to increase the population, "and this can only be assured when normal conditions for family life exist."

Furthermore, the family is regarded as the basis for "the normal and healthy upbringing of children" which makes possible the development and strengthening of "those qualities and traits in the child which should form the norms of behavior of every citizen of the Soviet Union."¹⁵

Finally, great ease in dissolving marriage is regarded as running counter to

¹⁸ G M. Sverdlov, "Novy Zakon o Materin- stve, Brake, i Sem'e" loc dt note 11 supra, p 23.

"7W&, p 27. « ^ieG. M. Sverdlov, Legal Rights of the Soviet Family, p. 17.

the "strong, vital interest" of society, and the state therefore seeks to regulate divorce closely and to permit it only where it feels there are serious reasons for it.¹⁸

It should be clear from the preceding material that in most major respects the current Soviet position on the family is very close to that held in many of the states which form Western society. Although there are important substantive differences, it is essential to note that those differences are now of a smaller order of magnitude than the differences between the current Soviet position and that taken in the U.S.SR. during the first two decades of Soviet rule.

Divergence from Marxian Position

The basic Marxian position on marriage and the family was set forth by Friedrich Engels. It was his belief that with the transfer of the means of production to public ownership the single family would cease to be an economic unit in society, housekeeping would be transformed into a social industry, and the care and education of children— legitimate and illegitimate alike—would become a public affair. He did not foresee the disappearance of monogamy— indeed he visualized its being strengthened as a marriage principle. But he did anticipate that with the change in the mode of production and the disappearance of private property, the only motive for marriage would be "mutual inclination" based on individual sex love. Since this love was assumed to be variable in duration, he concluded that in the absence of such love, freedom of separation was of benefit both to the partners and to society. And he declared that this freedom would be possible without having people "wade

¹⁶ G. M. Sverdlov, "Novy Zakon o Melcrin- stve, Brake, i Sem'e," loc tit note 11 supra, pp 24-25.

through the useless mire of a divorce case." ¹⁷

As a matter of fact, several of the most prominent figures in the field of Soviet law went considerably beyond Engels, and developed the well-known theory of the "withering away of the family" as a legal entity¹⁸ Although this principle was not part of the program of the Communist Party, it certainly had semiofficial standing in that it was held by the well-known Madame Alexandra Kollontai, onetime member of the Central Committee and head of the Women's Department of the Party. Madame Kollontai declared in 1919 that "the family is ceasing to be a necessity for its members as well as for the state," and indicated that the care, upbringing, and instruction of children would as rapidly as possible be transferred to the community.¹⁰

History of Soviet Family Legislation

It may be said that, on the whole, the initial Soviet family legislation moved in the direction indicated by these doctrines. The early decrees on marriage and the family, particularly the Code of Laws (R.S.F.S.R.) of 1926, were widely

17 See Friedrich Engels, The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State (New York: International Publishers, 1942), especially pp. 61—73. The quotation is from p. 73

18 For a discussion of these early tcndcnacs see: Harold J. Berman, "Soviet Family Law in the Light of Russian History and Marxist Theory," The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 56, No. 1 (Nov. 1946), pp 26-57; Vladimir Gsovski, "Marriage and Divorce in Soviet Law," The Georgetown Law Journal, Vol. XXXV, No 1 (Jan 1947), pp. 209-23; and John N Hazard, "Law and the Soviet Family," Wisconsin Law Review, Vol. 1939, No. 2 (March 1939), pp. 224-53.

¹⁰ See the 1919 pamphlet by Alexandra Kollontai, Sem'ia i Kommunisticheskoe. Gosud- arstvo, available in English translation under the title Communism and the Family, San Francisco, no date The quotation is from p. 6 of the English translation.

regarded as the most radical legislatibn of their kind extant.²⁰

The first major reversal of the earlier Soviet policy came in the law of June 1936, which (1) abolished the freedom of abortion and (2) introduced several restrictions on the freedom of divorce,

Strictly speaking, the prohibition of abortion was not a reversal of policy, since the decision of November 18, 1920 to provide legal and free abortion declared it to be an unavoidable evil, the gradual disappearance of which was anticipated through the development of socialism.-⁵¹ But it was clear from the public discussion of the draft of this law, as reported in the Soviet press, that a large number of Soviet women regarded it as a reversal of policy.²²

The restrictions on divorce were minor, since in addition to the graduated fees already mentioned, the law required only that both parties appear at the Zags bureau, and that the fact of divorce be entered in a person's identification papers.²³

The quasi-official discussions and commentaries which accompanied the legislation, however, vigorously stressed the goal of "strengthening the family," and left little doubt that a fundamental shift in the basic Soviet position was in process.²⁴ As we have seen, a shift of really major proportions was finally introduced by the recent wartime legislation.

20 For a discussion of this early legislation see the works cited in footnote 18 above.

21 See Henry E. Sigenst, Medicine and Health in the Soviet Union (New York, 1947), pp 210-16.

22 See the issues of Pravda and Izvestiya, reporting on the public discussion, between May 26 and June 10, 1936.

23 Sobrame Zakonov i Rasporyazherm S.SJSR., No 34 (July 21, 1936), Text 309, Sees. I and VIII

24 For examples see S. Volfson, "Sotsializm i Sem'ia," Pod Znamenetn Marksizma, No. 6 (June 1936), pp. 31-64; N. Krylenko, "Sotsializm i Sem'ia," Bolshevik, No. 18 (Sept. 1936), pp. 65-78; and the Pravda leaders for May 28, 1936 and June 9, 1936.

Ideological Changes

There are, of course, many points of view from which one can assess current Soviet policy on the family. In terms of ideological consistency, for example, it is clear that the present policy is in several significant respects moving in a direction opposite to that visualized by Engels and Lenin.²⁵ Interestingly enough, there is a striking paucity of reference to Engels' work in the recent discussions, even when compared to a period as late as 1936.

From another point of view, attention may be drawn to the fact that Soviet legislation now provides for a markedly greater degree of state intervention in family life and an associated reduction in the areas of free choice and individual initiative. John N. Hazard has characterized the principles of Soviet family law as represented by the provisions of the 1926 code as follows: "The Soviet concept . . . was created ... to further a definite program of legislation whereby the marriage status was to be freed from extensive regulation by the state and left to the attention primarily of the parties concerned." ²⁶ As late as 1936 Soviet commentators were still able to say, although with extensive reservations, that "marriage and the family are private matters."²⁷ The current view is summed up as follows:

The law takes as its basis the fact that marital and family relations are not only the private concern of individuals, but the concern of the nation as a whole, and aims at regulating these relations in the inter-

25"It is impossible to be a socialist and a democrat without immediately demanding complete freedom of divorce. . . Vladimir I. Lenin, Sochinemya, 2nd edition, Vol. XIX, p 232.

26Hazard, op at. note 18 supra, p 232

27 B. Smulevich, Materinstvo pri Kapital- izme i Sotsializme (Moscow, 1936), p. 100.

ests of both the individual and of society as a whole.²⁸

Importance of the Family to Society

This trend may be indicative of the general tenor of the regime at the present time, and it is certainly not without significance for an assessment of the character of the current leadership.

In more general terms, however, one must note that the development of Soviet policy on the family constitutes a striking affirmation of the importance of that institution as a central element in the effective functioning of the type of social system which is broadly characteristic of Western civilization. The transfer of certain traditional family functions to other social institutions has been widely associated with the spread of industrialization and urbanization. But even where this transfer of family functions is most advanced, notably in the United States, responsibility for the early care and upbringing of lie child, and hence for its initial personality development, remains firmly rooted in the family.

Although the transfer from the family of even these functions is not beyond the realm of possibility in our type of society, Soviet experience clearly demonstrated that this could be effected only at the cost of making major and difficult readjustments in other parts of the social system. It also threw into relief the fact that even under conditions of careful planning, there would be many important unintended and unanticipated consequences generated by such a program of social action.²⁹ In this case, at least, the costs and difficulties encountered were sufficient to result in abandonment of the effort. And

³⁸ G M. Svcrdlov, op. cit. note 12 supra, p. 17.

²⁹ Some of the problems created by the early family policy will be treated in a study now in progress.

once the importance of the family for the effective functioning of the rest of the social system was fully acknowledged, state intervention and the restriction of personal initiative in matters affecting the family followed in relatively short order.

Status of Religious Groups in Wartime

In contrast to the developments affecting the family, the wartime changes in the status of religious groups and in the relations between church and state could not be so readily anticipated on the basis of the experience of the preceding decade. One of the earliest signs of a change in policy came within a few months of the beginning of the German invasion, when the two chief atheist publications, Bezbozhnik (The Atheist) and Anti-religioznik, suspended publication.³⁰

Throughout the war there appeared many other indices of a new atmosphere surrounding the major churches.*'¹ The Soviet press published exchanges of a friendly nature between Stalin and church leaders, reports on the award of medals to church dignitaries, and so on.⁸² Particularly striking was the appointment in November 1942 of Nikolai, Metropolitan of Kiev and Galicia, as one of the members of the Extraordinary State Commission for the investigation of German war crimes.³³ This

³⁰ New York Times, Oct. 6, 1941, p 4, and Oct. 7, 1941, p 12

81 Because of limitations of space this report is largely restricted to the Russian Orthodox Church, which is by far the most important in the Soviet Union. For a review of the events affecting the other churches and religious groups see John S Curtiss, "The Non- Orthodox Religions in the US S.R. During and After World War II," American Review on the Soviet Union, Vol. VIII, No 1 (Nov 1946), pp. 3-14.

82For examples see Pravda, Nov. 9, 1942 and Oct. 9, 1944; Izvestiya, Oct. 24, 1944

38 Pravda, Nov 4, 1942.

was probably the first time in the history of the Soviet regime that an important church figure had been appointed to a responsible government post.

Developments in Church-State Relationship

Several further new landmarks in church-state relations were later established in connection with the full-scale National Assembly (Sobor) of the Russian Orthodox Church which met early in 1945 to elect a new Patriarch and to adopt administrative statutes for the church. The assembly was addressed by Georgi G. Karpov, head of the State Council on Affairs of the Orthodox Church created in 1943,⁸⁴ who wished it success on behalf of the Soviet Government.⁸⁵

It is of some interest that this government representative, who has declared himself to be a Communist and a nonbeliever,⁸⁶ spoke from the same pulpit in the Church of the Resurrection in Sokolniki as did all of the assembled church dignitaries.⁸⁷ Even more impressive was the fact that the message of the assembly addressed to all believers in the Orthodox faith was published in Izvestiya, especially since it was liberally sprinkled with texts from the New Testament and criticized churchgoers for marrying without the grace of the Sacrament.⁸⁸

One last example of the new pattern of relations between church and state

⁸* Izvestiya, Oct. 8, 1943.

35Izvestiya, Feb 4, 1945.

36These facts were reported by Mr. Karpov in an interview with C. L. Sulzberger, New York Times, June 7, 1945, p. 5. The Council on Affairs of the Orthodbx Church is strictly a government agency, and does not include any representatives of the church

87Reported by Benjamin, Metropolitan of North America and the Aleutians, in the Information Bulletin, Embassy of the USS.R (Washington, D. C, Feb. 13, 1945), pp. 6-7

88Izvestiya, Feb. 6, 1945.

which deserves mention is the government decision taken early in 1946 to bring an end to taxation on monastery lands in the Russian Republic.⁸⁹

For its part, the Orthodox Church, by its vigorous support of the war effort, certainly facilitated the adoption by the state of a more friendly policy. This support included such acts as the collection of 300 million rubles in cash contributions,⁴⁰ the excommunication of bishops and clergy who supported the Germans,⁴¹ and the issuance of testimonials in support of the regime which blessed its efforts ⁴² and went so far as to refer to Stalin as "divinely appointed leader of our military and cultural forces. . . ."⁴⁸

Increased Opportunity for the Practice of Religion

These evidences of more amicable relations between church and state have been reflected in significantly improved opportunities for the conduct of religious worship and in pursuit of religious interests by the rank-and-file adherents of the various faiths. The Council on Affairs of the Orthodox Church, already mentioned, has been reported by its head, G. G. Karpov, to have over one hundred representatives throughout the country serving as liaison between local religious groups and local government organizations.⁴⁴ The functions of the council have been stated to include "elimination of vari-

⁸⁹ New York Times, Feb. 23, 1946, p. 7.

40Izvestiya, May 12, 1945.

41 Izvestiya, Sept 18, 1943, reprinting a decision of a council of bishops which appeared in Zhurnal Moskovskoi PatriarkhU, No. 1, 1943.'

42 For a collection of the early important sermons and other messages of the church in support of the war effort see Pravda o Religk v Rossii (Moscow, 1942), pp. 83-147, 409-18.

« Pravda, Nov. 9, 1942.

** Reported by Karpov in an interview with the Religious News Service, New York Times, Aug. 12, 1944, p. 13.

ous obstacles in the way of exercize by the citizens of the Soviet Union of the freedom of conscience proclaimed by the Constitution," and "co-operation with religious societies in the resolution of those problems which require dealings with other institutions," in particular with government agencies.^{^[31]} Without any evident basic change in the existing Soviet laws governing religious affairs,⁴⁰ the council has apparently implemented these goals in a variety of ways which have served to increase the opportunities for the pursuit of religious interests.

It now seems to be much more likely that a local religious society which qualifies as such under the existing law will be able to secure from the local authorities some sort of quarters suitable as a place of worship. Karpov has indicated that measures to facilitate the opening of new churches have been among the primary concerns of his council.^{^[32]}

These religious societies are now also in a better position to secure the services of the necessary clergy, both through the return to service of former clerics and through the training of new clergy in the Orthodox Theological Institute in Moscow and the theological pastorate courses in the bishoprics which began operations in 1944.^{^[33]}

Facilities have apparently been made available to the church to enable it to print prayer books, liturgies, religious calendars, and other necessary items. It has also been stated that the Government has no objection to the organization by the church of facilities and workshops necessary to the production of church cloth, plate, candles, and other materials needed for the proper conduct of religious services.

Finally, Karpov has declared that children may receive religious instruction not only from the parents in the home, but also when gathered in groups of any number.^{^[34]}

Significance of Recent Concessions

Considerable caution must be exercised in interpreting the significance of these indices of an improved situation for religious groups in the Soviet Union. Although they are notable in the light of the events of the preceding decades, the recent concessions do not go beyond giving greater reality to the long-standing constitutional guarantee of "freedom of conscience" and "freedom of religious worship." ⁵⁰ One must be aware

49 Religious News Service interview with G Karpov, Christian Science Momtor, Sept. 30, 1944, p 11; A. Kolosov, op. cit. note 45 supra, p. 1783

50 Article 124, Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Moscow, 1947 This article of the 1936, or Stalin, Constitution declares the separation of church and state, and school and church. It also recognizes "freedom of antircligious propaganda," but makes no mention of religious propaganda. The Federal constitution in effect before 1936 did not deal with religion, but those of the constituent republics did Thus, the Constitution of the R S.F.S R. in both its 1918 and 1925 versions provided for "freedom of religious and antircligious propaganda," but it was amended in 1929 to provide solely for "freedom of religious persuasion and antireligious propaganda." It was essentially this provision that was carried over to the Federal Constitution of 1936. See V Gsovski, "Legal Status of the Church in Soviet Russia," loc cit. note 46 supra.

that this guarantee is still interpreted as meaning that the church is a society of believers "established and existing only for the conduct of religious worship." It is firmly asserted, furthermore, that "any kind of propagandizing, moralizing, and educational activity . . is not a necessary part of this freedom of worship.⁸¹

It must be made clear, furthermore, that although the policy of the state and the Communist Party towards religion has undergone a significant change, their basic attitude on the subject has not. Thus, it was stated in 1947 in a quasi-official source that "the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks—founder and leader of the Soviet Government—never concealed and does not [now] conceal its negative attitude towards religion." And in the same source it was further asserted that the measures adopted in relation to the church during the war "do not by any means signify that the Communist Party and the Soviet Government have changed their attitude towards religion and religious prejudices." ⁵²

But while it may be in error to declare that we are witnessing the initial. stages of a "restoration" of religion in the Soviet Union, it cannot be stated with any assurance that the recent events represent simply one more strategic retreat in Soviet religious policy to be followed inevitably by a fresh outbreak of open conflict between organized religion and the state. On the contrary, the available evidence indicates that the present accommodation between church and state may be of relatively long duration.

It is of course widely known that one

⁶¹ A. Kolosov, op cit note 45 supra, pp 1783-84 This statement closely follows the provisions of the 1929 law governing the activities of religious organizations. See N. Or- leanskii, op. cit note 46 supra.

⁵² A Kolosov, op. cit. note 45 supra, pp, 1780-81 of the basic tenets of Marxism is a deep-seated and uncompromising opposition to religious beliefs and particularly to organized religion. It must be pointed out, however, that neither the basic Marxist position nor its vigorous restatement by Lenin dictated a policy of open conflict so marked that it bordered on effective denial of the opportunity for organized religious worship. In fact, the demands of the Leninist position could adequately be met by complete separation of church and state, absolute exclusion of religion from the school, and a large-scale program of antireligious propaganda.⁶³

Factors in Early Church-State Warfare

To understand the condition of virtual warfare between state and church which existed at intervals during the first two decades of the Soviet regime it is, therefore, necessary to take account of two factors beyond the Marxist-Leninist ideology. The first of these was the great secular, political, power of the church, which Soviet leaders apparently felt compelled to break before they could feel internally secure. The second was the fact of open church opposition to the Soviet regime, which led at one point to the outright challenge of its authority by the Patriarch Tikhon. On January 18, 1918 the newly elected Patriarch Tikhon, in his first message to the church, declared anathema against the leaders of the Soviet regime and called on Orthodox believers "not to enter into any kind of association with these monsters of the human race." ^C4

Compare Robert P. Casey, Rehgion in Russia (New York and London, 1942), Chap III; and Paul B Anderson, People, Church and State in Modem Russia (New York, 1944), Chap. IV

⁰⁴ Quoted in Julius F Hecker, Religion and Communism (New York, 1934), pp 200-201.

Although the secular power of the church was clearly broken, if not fully eliminated, by the time of Tikhon's public recantation in 1923, which forestalled his trial and almost certain conviction,⁰⁵ the Soviet leaders were apparently far from secure in their belief that the church no longer constituted a potential locus of organized opposition in times of crisis. They apparently felt confirmed in their insecurity by the events surrounding the collectivization of agriculture, when local religious leaders often became foci of opposition⁵⁶at a time which Stalin later described as "one of the most dangerous periods in the life of our party."⁶⁷

After the marked flurry of closing churches and burning icons, religious books, and other items of worship in carload lots, which accompanied the collectivization,⁵⁸ there followed almost a decade of relative quiet on the religious front. Although the regime did not adopt a much more compromising attitude, it did not engage in the type of open conflict which had been experienced in the preceding years. The prevailing attitude, however, continued to be one of deep-seated distrust and anxiety lest the church once again become a focus of resistance in time of crisis.

Change to Conciliation

The Soviet and party leaders were apparently relieved, therefore, to find the church a source of vigorous and active support during the struggle with Germany. Thus, the war years are now spoken of in semiofficial sources as a period of "sharp transition" in the life of the church, in which it not only

88 See Hecker, note 54 supra, pp. 207-14.

cs Ibid., Chap. XII.

⁵⁷Vlast' .Sovetov, No. 6-7 (March-April 1937), p 22.

⁸⁸ For relevant citations drawn from the Soviet press see V. Gsovski, "Legal Status of the Church in Soviet Russia," op. cit. note 46 supra, p. 15.

avoided conflict with the Soviet power but "entered on the road of supporting and aiding the regime." And the measures affecting religious life recently adopted by the government are described as evidence of the state's "approbation for the position which the church took in relation to the Soviet Government in the decade preceding the Great Patriotic War and in particular during the time of the war."⁵⁹

With the definite restriction of the independent, secular, political power of the church, and with the attainment of conditions under which the Government could feel secure in the loyal support of religious groups, the basic motivation and need for a policy of open conflict with organized religion were eliminated. In "fact, the situation now argues strongly for the wisdom of a conciliatory policy.

First, to continue a policy of open struggle with the church means to drain off energies which are greatly needed in the political and economic field during the present period of reconstruction.

Second, such a policy would mean the alienation, and in many cases the active hostility, of large segments of the population which might otherwise be expected to take a position either of active support or, to use a phrase of Lenin's, of benevolent neutrality towards the regime.

Finally, such a policy would mean the loss of the services of the churches, in particular the Orthodox and Moslem, as effective instruments of Soviet foreign policy, a capacity in which they have already shown themselves to be of considerable value.⁰⁰

Even in times of peaceful construction, such considerations would have to

⁰⁹ A. Kolosov, op. cit. note 45 supra, p. 1780.

⁶⁰ See John S. Curtiss, "The Russian Orthodox Church During World War II," The American Review on the Soviet Union, Vol. VII, No. 4 (Aug. 1946), pp 42-44.

be taken seriously by the nation's leaders. At a time when the Soviet regime is marshaling all of its forces and resources, both internal and external, for the double task of building up its devastated economy and pursuing a vigorous foreign policy in an atmosphere charged with talk of major armed conflict, they are bound to be taken very seriously indeed.

Attitudes of State and Church

Under the present state of affairs, the party and the Government are able to maintain a sense of ideological consistency and correctness by continuing to emphasize, as they have given every indication they will,^{^[35]} a program of antireligious propaganda and a policy of rigorous exclusion of religion from the school. The conciliatory attitude toward the church, on the other hand, can be justified and legitimated on the grounds that the Marxist position has never stood for the denial of freedom of conscience.^{^[36]} And if organized religious groups are willing to accept the formal Soviet interpretation of this principle as meaning simply "the conduct of religious worship," which at the moment they appear ready to do,⁰-' then it would seem that the present accommodation between church and state is likely to persist well into the future.

It is the avowed hope of the party and Government that the present policy will in time lead to the dying out of religious beliefs^{^[37]} Presumably it is also the hope of religious leaders that there will in time be a gradual religious revival, which would then have to be accepted as a fact by the state. But which hope is more likely of fulfillment, or what consequences might ensue for Soviet society in either case, it is beyond the powers of contemporary social science to predict.

Process of Social Readjustment

The developments affecting the family and religion treated in this article may both be viewed as manifestations of the same general process of social readjustment which has been in progress in the U.S.S.R. since the middle thirties. The keynote of this movement, which has been characterized by one commentator on the Soviet Union as the "stabilization of social relations,"⁶⁵ was sounded by Stalin in his address on the draft Constitution in 1936, when he declared: "... here, as in many other things, we need stability and clarity." ⁶⁶

In the broadest terms, this stabilization of social relations has essentially involved an effort to integrate Soviet social institutions with the demands of the newly established economic and politi-

⁰⁸ See the Foreword to Pravda o Rehgu v Rossu by the then Acting Patriarch Sergei, especially pp 9-10.

*⁶⁴A. Kolosov, op. cit. note 45 supra, pp 1780-81; Mr. Karpov has asserted that at most, only 15 per cent of the Soviet youth is Orthodox in any sense- New York Times, June 7, 1945.

⁶⁵ Rudolph Schlesinger, Soviet Legal Theory (New York, 1945), pp. 232-42.

⁰⁶ Joseph Stalin, Leninism (New York, 1942), p. 401.

cal orders carved out in the decade after Lenin's death and characterized by large-scale industry, collectivized agriculture, and the consolidation of Stalin's control over party and state.

The effort at integration has proceeded along two main lines.

In the first place, the distinctly avant- garde, radical, and frankly experimental approach to social institutions common during the first two decades of Soviet rule has been largely replaced by a more traditional and conservative treatment of social problems. This not only has been evident in the realm of the family, but was early manifested in the field of education, in the treatment of criminals, and in the role assigned to law in Soviet society.

Alex Inkeles, Cambridge, Massachusetts, is lecturer in social relations and regional studies, and research associate at the Russian Research Center, at Harvard University. He has served as a social science research analyst with the Department of State and other government agencies, and has been a Fellow of the Social Science Research Council. He is the author of severed articles on the U S S.R. and in the field of general sociology which have appeared in scholarly journals, and is currently completing a book on the mobilization of public opinion in the Soviet Union.

In the second place, marked efforts have been made to reduce intergroup tension and internal conflict at all points where such tension could not be interpreted by the leaders as serving the needs of the economic and political orders. The stress on the alleged absence of class conflict within the U.S.S.R. is probably the foremost example, but the recent readjustments in the relations between the state and organized religious groups may be taken as another important manifestation of this tendency.

The movement towards the stabilization of social relations is one of the most significant aspects of the recent development of Soviet society. It may, of course, be noted in many areas of Soviet life not dealt with here. In the field of education, for example, a whole series of measures recently adopted, including the separation of boys' and girls' schools at certain levels, the introduction of student identification cards, and the institution of fees for advanced secondary school and higher education, could be fruitfully examined within this framework of analysis.

The detailed study of this process of social stabilization strongly recommends itself both for the light it may throw on the course of development of the Russian Revolution, and for the relevance it may have for the formulation of an adequate general theory of the revolutionary process.

Postwar Soviet Ideology

By Percy

T WAS hardly to be expected that any remarkable development in the content of Soviet ideology would take place after the war, unless one took the most hopeful view of the prospect of warm and fruitful collaboration growing out of the military coalition. Even military collaboration had to be justified by a gloss on Marxist-Leninist doctrine which transformed a "war of imperialism" into "a war of liberation." ^{^[38]}This smooth rationalization of the elementary expediency of taking help from any quarter to avoid extermination finds no counterpart when the business in hand is the restoration and increase of Soviet power. Soviet ideology has needed no amending formula for justifying co-operation with capitalist states in building an effective world society, because such co-operation has for all substantial purposes been abandoned, if indeed it was ever inaugurated.

In place of the grudging combination of effort in face of a common enemy, we have once more the sharp conflict, by all expedient means, which is commanded by the creed of Marxism- Leninism. This, as Lenin and Stalin and their contemporary commentators have described it, is a struggle & outrance.

If nothing in the external relations and policy of the Soviet Union has occasioned any revision or amplification of the dialectical materialism of Lenin and Stalin, internal developments might have demanded some substantial re-

E. corbett

working of the dogma. But even here nothing but the lightest retouching has taken place.

The barrenness of Soviet philosophy has apparently caused some concern in the Politburo. This was indeed the point of the late Andrei Zhdanov's last vigorous onslaught on Soviet intellectuals. In June 1947, acting in his capacity as Politburo arbiter of intellectual production, Zhdanov flayed ninety assembled philosophers for their lack of courage, originality, and energy For him, both external and internal developments in and after the war cried out for Marxist-Leninist interpretation. He insisted, of course, that the new institutions and situations were in every respect a complete vindication of Soviet doctrine, and he made it clear that no deviation from that doctrine would be tolerated. What he wanted was fighting formulations, in terms of the orthodox materialist dialectic of the Communist Party, of the present stage of socialist construction in the U.S.S.R. and of the whole existing complex of world politics. The "philosophical front" was weak. The philosophers had continued in the mistaken belief that it was their privilege to live in ivory towers. They must rally to the defense of socialism at home and in the new democracies. They must furnish the new intellectual weapons needed by the world's workers for their final struggle with capitalist imperialism. More, they must lead the counterattack against the forces of obscurantist reaction now operating from their bases in England and America.

Zhdanov's last melodramatic challenge has not lain quite disregarded.

M. A. Leonov's Ocherk Dialekticheskogo Materializma, published by the Academy of Sciences in Moscow in 1948, is the most substantial response yet to reach this country. But this "sketch" (six hundred pages of close Russian text) displays very vividly the thorny position in which the contemporary Russian philosopher finds himself. Goaded to production, he must write. But with the painful personal results of independent thought on the part of friends fresh in his memory, he is reduced to something less than exegesis. He can, in fact, only compile. The product is a creditably neat mosaic, tiresomely repetitive in pattern, of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin, stuck together with a cement of banal paraphrase.

Contradictions Under Socialism

Mr. Leonov^s treatise, careful and pedestrian as it is, did not escape stricture. Joint critics in the BoVshevik of August 30, 1948 find heresy in it. Philosophy is, after all, under injunction to show signs of life. Leonov had incidentally tackled the problem of "contradictions under socialism," a subject on which Soviet writers have recently felt free to paraphrase observations made by members of the Politburo. One of these contradictions, says Leonov, is that between the "level of social life" and the "level of production." This was a blunder. It is clear from the passage as a whole that the author meant the discrepancy between production and social demand, but he used the . wrong words. "The level of social life" is not the level of consumer satisfaction, in the terminology of Messrs. Mako- rovskii and Vasilyev, authors of the Bol'shevik review. It is rather the type and stage of social organization. That, in the words of every Soviet writer, is the highest reached by any people in human history. It is moreover "the perfect organization" for removing the gap, or "contradiction," between production and consumer demand.²

The other contradictions persisting under socialism, and the current method of rationalizing them, merit some attention. Ts Stepanyan has an article on them in Pravda of August 20, 1947. The survival of contradictions under socialism might have presented a real difficulty, if Lenin himself had not left a formula for their accommodation. "Antagonism and contradiction" are by no means the same thing. The first will disappear, the second will remain under socialism.³ So the contradictions that survive are not antagonistic, and this means that they need not be resolved by a revolutionary change in society but are gradually overcome through the leadership of the Communist Party and the devoted co-operation of the Soviet people. Since the materialist dialectic makes all progress depend upon the struggle of opposing forces, and since such oppositions are therefore necessary even under socialism, it was indeed providential that a difference could be authoritatively established between the oppositions, conflicts, "contradictions" which doom capitalist society to violent destruction, and those which guarantee peaceful progress under socialism. To the uninitiated observer, the contradictions would seem very much the same in both systems, and clearly the run-of-the-mill Soviet citizen is sometimes puzzled. Stepan- yan's article purports to be a reply to an engineer in Vilna. But, as a comparison of Stepanyan and Leonov⁴shows, the dialecticians have now their standard patter on the subject, and are quite prepared to dispose of any doubts entertained by the man in the street

* Bol'shevik, No. 16 (August 30, 1948), pp. 51-52.

⁸ Leninskii Sbormk, XI, p 357

⁴ Ocherk Dialekticheskogo Materializma, pp, 293^308.

Supply vs. Demand

See how the "contradiction" between supply and demand is handled. The enormous growth of productive forces under socialism has enabled the Soviet Union to do something never achieved by capitalism. It has liquidated unemployment and poverty, guaranteed everyone the right to work, rest, and education. But social and personal demand goes . on growing. The vast expansion of the technical-material base of Socialism satisfies this increased demand only to find itself confronted with new wants. Thus the "contradiction" is constantly resolved and renewed, and invincible progress is the result. Thus, too, the wealth of products needed for the transition from socialism to communism (when to each will be given not, as now under socialism, according to his work, but according to his need) will be achieved.

No doubt the engineer in Vilna was satisfied with this picture of a new heaven and a new earth, regardless of its startling discrepancy with actual conditions of life in Soviet Russia. At any rate, I have seen no published denial of its adequacy.

Survivals of Capitalism

On another "contradiction," Stepan- yan's and Leonov's reply is less trenchant. Here we have to do with the opposition between the high level of "socialist consciousness" reached by the great majority of Soviet citizens and the "survivals of capitalism" still lingering in the minds of a vicious minority. These "survivals of capitalism" manifest themselves in a "non-socialist attitude towards work and community property, a tendency to exact more for oneself from the state and to give it less."⁵The example most frequently cited has been the widespread practice in the col-

⁰ Ts. Stepanyan, Pravda, August 20, 1947.

lective farms of cheating in the matter of work-units and appropriating excessive land for separate household plots. But the factories have suffered from similar human failings. To overcome these "contradictions," Stepanyan relies wholly on the Communist Party's decision to make the "communist education of the working masses" a principal political task, while Leonov attaches high hopes to "criticism and self-criticism."

Under the heading of "survivals of capitalism," we might have expected to find the retention of money, to say nothing of a number of other methods of exchange and production that are thoroughly familiar to our "monopolist- imperialist-capitalists." But Stalin had long ago anticipated such misintepreta- tion. Had he not laid it down in 1926, at the fourteenth session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, that money, trade, and credit in socialist society have a function radically different from that which they perform under capitalism? In the Soviet Union, they have become instruments "by which the socialist elements in the economy overcome the capitalist elements." ⁶ What more need be said?

Rural-Urban Friction

Stepanyan admits continuing friction between town and country. The revolution put an end to the exploitation of the peasantry by town and landowner, but some of the old inequalities and resentments remain. In capitalist countries, says the writer, these oppositions are becoming deeper and sharper with every passing year; but in the Soviet Union they are being worn down and eliminated by rural electrification, the mechanization of agriculture, and the

⁶ Stenographic report of the 14th session quoted by Leonov, op. cit note 4 supra, p 160.

rising technical-cultural level of the country worker. This process is particularly important from the Communist point of view, because the farmer's trader-capitalist propensities—ever a serious obstacle to socialism—are alleged to be dying out at the same time.

Few Americans are likely to be alarmed by the statement that opposition between the urban and rural elements of our society is deepening towards catastrophe. Few, also, will be surprised to learn that the leveling out of living conditions in town and country, which is a familiar accompaniment of rural electrification, mechanization, better health and educational services, the ubiquitous automobile and the radio, is proceeding to some extent even in the Soviet Union. What they may find novel is Mr. Stepanyan's conviction that the process is confined to his fatherland.

"Criticism and Self-Criticism"

"Criticism and self-criticism" has long been a slogan in the Communist Party. Speaking on the subject in 1929, Stalin said, "We cannot improve our economic, trades-union and party organizations, we cannot push forward the business of socialist construction or curb bourgeois wrecking unless we develop criticism and self-criticism to the full. ..."^{^[39]} It seems, however, that it remained for Zhdanov to find the perfect dialectical stereotype. Since the contradiction of opposites is essential to progress, and since the class struggle has been eliminated in the U.S.S.R., a general substitute is needed in the dialectic of social progress. In his speech to the conference of philosophers in June 1947,^{^[40]} Zhdanov laid it down that this substitute is "criticism and self- criticism."

Only minds cooped up within the hard walls of an enforced official dogma, and shut off from communication with the outside world, could conceive such an inflation of the commonplace or present the constructive use of criticism as a peculiar Soviet invention. Zhdanov's cliche has had wide circulation in recent Soviet writing. Stepanyan and Leonov echo it with reverence. By way of contrast with the position in the U.S.S.R, Leonov solemnly declares that "in class society criticism inevitably bears the character of criticism by arms."⁹

If the glorification of the value of criticism, whether addressed to one's own or to others' work, can win any measure of immunity for critics of theory and practice inside Russia, scholars everywhere will forgive some elaboration of the obvious But if criticism is forbidden to find anything good outside Marxism-Leninism (and this is made very clear in Zhdanov's speech), it would appear that the function of the critic, as viewed by the Politburo, is to detect defalcations from the creed and practice laid down in that sanctum sanctorum.

International Propaganda

In the field of international relations, the current Soviet ideology presents a lurid picture of head-on conflict between the Soviet Union and its satellites, champions of world peace/true democracy, and the equality and sovereignty of all states great and small, on one side, and, on the other, a capitalist- monopolist-imperialist conspiracy which seeks to enslave the world. There is nothing substantially new here; the litany of hate is rather a return from the truce between allies in war to the normal mythology of Marxism-Lenin-

⁸ Op. cit. note 4 supra, p 302.

ism. What is new is the sharp concentration of the attack on the United States as the leading conspirator. This is, of course, an adaptation to the clear emergence of this country as the greatest world power.

Description of the European Recovery Program as a scheme to make of Europe a permanently exploited colony of Wall Street has become tiresomely familiar Less noticed has been an exaltation of state sovereignty which sounds strange in the mouths of Marxists. Lenin himself declared that "Marxists wage a decisive battle with nationalism in all its forms"¹⁰ and sovereignty is surely the legal synthesis of nationalism. Moreover, if the state is ever to "wither away," surely sovereignty must wither with it. Yet, for the moment at least, sovereignty figures in Soviet doctrine as the essential bulwark of national proletariats against the assaults of imperialist capital, and to uphold it has become an avowed first principle of Moscow's foreign policy. Even this is not quite adequate for international propaganda. As an appeal to all peoples to resist the dollar-coated wiles of American imperialism, something more general is needed than the protection of national proletariats. Therefore the sovereignty which the United States is allegedly attempting to destroy is presented as an indispensable defense for national cultures. American "cosmopolitism" aims not only at liquidating the political and economic autonomy of other states, it also asserts a "world-spirit" in art and science, and belittles the role of nationalism as a stimulus to intellectual production.¹¹This tenderness for cultural nationally Sochmeniia, 2nd ed, XVII (1930), p. 124. ii This is the burden of the characteristic leading article, "Protiv burzhuaznoi ideologii kosmopolitizma," Voprosy Ftlosofii, No. 2 (1948), pp 14-29 ism¹² justifies devout adulation and exaggeration of the artistic and scientific achievements of fellow countrymen. Claims to priority in discovery and invention, such as those with which Soviet publications now provide mild entertainment for the scientific world, are lauded as one form of the struggle (bor'ba) between dialectical materialism and the metaphysical idealism of the bourgeois nations. At all costs, we must have bofba.

The Soviet Union's unbending resistance to attempts to curtail the use of the veto in the United Nations is thus transfigured into a campaign to save the cultures as well as the freedoms of nations too weak to defend themselves. That this form of propaganda is not ineffective was made all too apparent in the long-drawn-out 1948 session of the General Assembly in Paris.

Needless to say, insistence on state sovereignty in its full traditional meaning by so great a power as the Soviet Union does not improve the prospect of effective world organization. Nor does it encourage the belief that real progress can be made in that "further development of international law" for which the United Nations has just appointed a permanent commission. It is true that the old debate among Soviet jurists as to the meaning and validity of international law from the Marxist-Leninist point of view seems to have given place to general agreement that international law exists and can be used by the Soviet Union, not less than by other states, as an instrument of national policy. But the stark insistence of Soviet jurists that each state remains judge as to the extent of its obligations under the law, while it unhappily differs little from the

It is worth noting, by way of contrast, that Lenin, in Soch, op cit note 10 supra, p. 124, had gone on to say that "it is not 'national culture' which is written on our banner, but international" The italics are his.

position taken by Western governments when important interests have been at stake, indicates that even the unofficial, professional support for a truly legal system of international rules, which is gathering strength in many other countries, will not be found in the U.S.S.R.

Proletarian Solidarity

The only form, of internationalism with which Soviet doctrine is really concerned, as the anonymous leading article in Voprosy Fttosofii, 1948, No. 2, explicitly admits, is the "solidarity of the proletariat of all nations in their struggle with capitalism." But when sovereignty or nationalism opposes Moscow's version of what that solidarity requires, it gets little respect either from the Soviet Government or its philosophers. Thus Tito's stand in Yugoslavia is an assertion of the wrong brand of sovereignty. Similarly, when the self-determination provided in the Yalta Agreement for the countries of eastern Europe threatened the progress of Communism there, self-determination was limited both in theory and in action to the "progressive" elements of the population, the decision as to what is "progressive" being taken in Moscow.

Ideology and Expediency

Here, as in other fields, a comparison of doctrine and practice shows that the apparent meaning of the literature of Marxism-Leninism never prevents any decision regarded by the Politburo as expedient from being taken and carried out. This does not mean that the doctrine can be disregarded in any attempt to forecast Soviet policy. On the contrary, it must always be borne in mind. But it does mean that we must distinguish between long-term ends and the means which for the moment seem most likely to advance those ends. Thus the sudden change of tone in January 1949 is rather aptly labeled by our press as a "peace offensive." It is a sheer matter of tactics, indicating no change of purpose whatever. The current ideology of the Soviet state excludes no temporary means; it bends to accommodate them.

This bending calls for rapidly shifting casuistry on the part of those whose business it is to explain policy to the public. Yet even here contemporary Soviet philosophy is disappointing. Its casuistry compares poorly in skill and finesse with an earlier period of patristic literature. The reason may be that, having sought safety in silence, the philosophers have allowed their weapons to rust. Certainly, those that were spurred into activity by Zhdanov rely less upon subtlety or cogency of argument than upon vigor of invective. In the latter respect Zhdanov's speech to the philosophers in June 1947 set a very high standard indeed; but the pages of Voprosy Fttosofii show that his followers are at least making an effort to match him.

The Fettering of the Mind

Few serious students of politics, however much they may detest Communist totalitarianism, deny that the literature of Marxism-Leninism embodies great new insights into social processes. I do not find, in my reading of the current Soviet output, anything that adds value to the classics of Communism. The most notable thing on the "ideological front" is not any development in the underlying philosophy; it is rather the intensity and scope of the postwar campaign of indoctrination.

Percy E, Corbett, LL Dt, New 'Haven, Connecticut, is professor of government and jurisprudence, chairman of the Department of Political Science, and research associate of the Institute of International Studies at Yale University He was dean of the faculty of law at McGill University, 1928-36; and has served as chairman of the Pacific Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations. His most recent publications are Post-War Worlds (1942) and Britain, Partner for Peace (1946).

This campaign is teaching us again something which we had begun to forget since the defeat of the fascist states. It is driving home the last full meaning of totalitarianism. It reminds us sharply that the Soviet system undertakes to mobilize for its purposes the whole mind and spirit. The thinker and the artist, whatever their medium, are commanded to produce, and their work must disseminate and fortify the theory of life, science, and government which the Politburo at any given moment declares itself to be implementing. The non-Russian world has heard a good deal about the way this compulsion operates in literature, music, genetics, and economics. What needs to be emphasized is that these have been merely the more spectacular points of attack of a policy which in every field is striving to set bounds to the thrusting imagination of man and harness it to the service of a governing party. The result is an intensely disquieting spectacle. But as an enduring method of increasing the power of a state, the policy hardly carries conviction. We are left with a persistent question. Can a people which has submitted to such a fettering of the mind long keep pace with the scientific and technological progress of freer competitors? Under modern conditions, it must do that to remain a great power.

Postwar Economic Reconstruction and Development in the U.S.S.R.

By Abram Bergson, James Horton

I. Introduction

T the end of the third year of their Fourth Five-Year Plan (194650), the Russians have already gone far towards recovering economically from the effects of the war New construction in the never-occupied areas and extensive restoration work in the devastated areas have brought fixed capital to substantially above the 1945 level. The labor force also has increased rapidly, and the aggregate production of the economy as a whole probably is now not much below that of 1940.

The recovery of the economy has been general, though there are significant divergences in the state of different sectors. Reflecting partly their favored status during the war and partly a large-scale expansion realized since, heavy industries generally have reat- tained and in some cases, particularly electric power and industrial machinery, have considerably surpassed the prewar production levels. A notable feature is the recovery of steel. With an increase in output of several million tons in 1948, production in that year reached some 17 million tons. This is just below the level of 1940.

The stringent consumers' goods position that prevailed at the end of the war has also been greatly alleviated, though living standards are still below those of 1940, which, as a result of the war preparations initiated after Munich, were already low by previous Soviet standards. A major element in the current improvement in the consumers' goods position is the spectacular recovery of grain from the low level

Blackman, and Alexander Erlich

reached after the drought of 1946. According to a Soviet official communique of January 20, 1949, the grain harvest of 1948 was nearly equal to that of 1940. By concentrating on low-cost, and no doubt also to some extent low- quality, housing, the Russians are making substantial gains also in this important sphere. The total construction since the end of the war, however, is still below the amount needed to make good war losses, let alone provide any satisfactory solution to Russia's proverbial long-term housing shortage.

As a result of extensive reconstruction and also some new building during the war, the railway network in use in 1945 actually was longer than in 1940. Necessarily, however, much of the wartime reconstruction was on a temporary and makeshift basis; and the Russians of course were in no position during the war to make good the huge losses suffered in rolling stock. Since the war, substantial progress has been made in restoring the network on a permanent basis, and with the completion of reconversion rolling stock again is being produced on a large scale. On this basis and as a result of careful economies in the use of facilities, railway transport is now carrying as large a volume of freight (measured in terms of carload- ings) as it did in 1940.

As a result of the foregoing achievements, the Russians would seem to be assured already of substantial successes in the fulfillment of the ambitious goals of the Fourth Five-Year Plan. Certainly, barring unforeseen adversities, the Soviet economy in 1950 will be operating at generally higher levels than
before the war. At that time, however, production in basic industrial lines will still be far below that in the United States.

These in brief are the main conclusions indicated by a summary survey of information available in Soviet and other sources on Russia's postwar economy. Unfortunately, as a result of the restrictive Soviet information policy, this information is limited in both quantity and quality. While the Russians probably are publishing more about their economy than is commonly supposed, there is no question that they are also withholding much, with the result that there are many important gaps, the contents of which are more or less open to conjecture. But it would seem that enough is known to measure in very rough terms the main postwar trends, and that is all the survey pretends to accomplish.^{^[41]}

Details of the survey are set forth below. Occupying sections II through IV is a summary review of the progress of reconstruction and development to date. Here consideration is given in turn to the over-all developments with regard to the total stock of fixed capital, the labor force, technology, and the national product; the developments in different economic sectors and industries; and the trends in the allocation of the national product as between different uses. Reference is made under each heading to pertinent wartime developments. Section V is devoted to an appraisal of various factors affecting the prospects for the fulfillment of the Fourth Five-Year Plan, section VI to some brief comments on the policies underlying the postwar developments, and the last section (VII) to the presentation of some comparative data on Soviet and United States basic industrial production.

II. Over-all Developments to 1948

Fixed capital

Russia's loss of property as a result of the war was huge by any standard; possibly it totaled as much as, if not more than, a quarter of the total prewar stock in the country as a whole. This at any rate is the conclusion indicated by a survey of a variety of scattered information, including particularly the Soviet war-damage claims. In the light of all the known facts about the destructive nature of the war, these claims do not seem especially excessive.

According to N. A Voznesensky,² the chairman of the State Planning Commission, the total losses of all sorts, in-

²N. A. Voznesensky, The Economy of the USSR during World War II (Washington, 1948), p. 87. This is a translation of a study originally published under the title Voennaia ekonomika SSSR v period otechestvennoi votny (The War Economy of the USSR tn the Patriotic War), Moscow Ogiz, 1947.

these territories accounted before the war for 45 per cent of the population of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as a whole, 33 per cent of the gross output of industry, 47 per cent of the sown area, 45 per cent of the cattle, and 55 per cent of the railway lines.^{^[42]} Details of Soviet claims as to losses in different branches of the economy, in relation to the prewar position in the country as a whole, are shown in Table 1. It should be noted that in many if not all lines, damaged as well as destroyed capacity is included among the losses listed in the table; also to a greater or less extent evacuated equipment may have been reckoned as lost. If allowance were made for the fact the damaged capacity could be restored, and perhaps also for the evacuated equipment, the losses presumably would be a good deal less than is indicated in the table.

The estimate cited above of Russia's wartime loss of property is intended to take into account not only the war damage, but also, in the case of fixed capital, the cumulative depreciation, which must have been unusually heavy in wartime conditions, and last but not least the offsetting item of new construction in unoccupied and reconstruction in liberated areas. The new construction in the eastern regions clearly was a crucial factor in the war effort, and, taken together with reconstruction, assumed sizable dimensions. According to Voznesensky, the volume of capital construction in the U.S.S.R. during the three war years 1942-44 amounted to 79 billion rubles, exclusive of evacuated equipment.^{^[43]} Presumably these investments are in terms of current prices. Voznesensky also states that the total stock of fixed capital of the U.S.S.R. as of 1940, in terms of 1945 prices, amounted to 709 billion rubles.⁵ Hence, ignoring possible price differences⁶ and

5 Ibid, p. 6 This represents the fixed capital of all "socialist enterprises" exclusive of cattle. Reference may be made here to some interesting and somewhat puzzling figures that Voznesensky (op cit note 2 supra, p 36) presents on the wartime change in the stock of fixed capital. According to him, in the second half of 1941 in connection with the occupation of Hitlerite Germany of a number of Soviet regions, the stock of fixed capital was reduced by 215 billion rubles (m 1945 prices) It is indicated furthermore that the stock remained at this level in 1942, with the expanded reproduction of fixed capital in the eastern regions offsetting further losses; and finally that the stock of fixed capital increased by 63 billion rubles in 1943. What is puzzling is how to reconcile these figures with the statement quoted earlier that the new construction in the entire three-year period 194244 amounted to 79 billion rubles. Also, if it is assumed that the expansion of capital in 1944 and 1945 continued at anything like the 1943 rate, the startling implication is that Russia emerged from the war with a total stock of capital little below the prewar figure.

It is believed that in the reference just cited, Voznesensky must be referring to the net change in the amount of capital available in the unoccupied areas rather than in the USSR as a whole The indicated loss of capital in 1941, thus, does not represent the amount of capital destroyed, but the total capital formerly in the occupied areas; at the same time the gains in 1943 represent the gains due not only to new investment but also to the recapture of capital in occupied areas. Considering the possible variations in the state of recaptured capital in different areas, particularly as between areas occupied for a long time and those held only during a campaign, there is little reason to think that the rate of capital expansion realized in 1943 could have been maintained in subsequent war years.

The possibility must be reckoned with also that the maintenance of fixed capital in 1942 and its increase by 63 billion rubles in 1943, as reported by Voznesensky, reflect to some extent the installation of evacuated equipment previously written off.

6 According to Voznesensky, op cit. note 2 supra, p. 69, the index of government wholesale prices for industrial goods in 1942 was 98 per cent of the prewar level. What the trend of these prices was in the period 1942-45 is not known.

TABLE 2—Selected Indices of Soviet Postwar Economic Development °

Item and unit	Absolute Figuies						Per Cent of 1940
Item and unit	1940	1945	1946	1947	1948	1950 Goal	1945	1948	1950

A. Population and Labor Force

(1) Population, mil	198	191				205	96		104
(2) Employees, mil	31 2	27 2	30.2	31.4	33 4	33.5	87	107	107
B. Basic Industries
(3) Coal, mil. tons	166	113	124	139	159	250	68	96	151
(4) Petroleum, mil. tons	310	19 4	21 7	25 9	29.2	35.4	63	94	114
(5) Electric power, bil. kw -
hrs.	48 3	43 2	47.5	54 6	63 4	82.0	89	131	170
(6) Power capacity, mil kw	11.3	10 7	11 7	12.8	14 4	22.4	95	127	199
(7) Pig iron, mil. tons	15 0	92	10 2	11.7	14 3	19.5	61	95	130
(8) Steel, mil tons	18.3	11 2	12.2	13.3	17.0	25.4	61	93	139
(9) Tractors, thous	31 1	7.3	12 6	26.3	53.7	112	23	173	360
(10) Trucks and automobiles,
thous.	147	83	115	150	214	500	56	146	340
(11) Commercial timber de
livered, mil. cu. meters	114	74.2	78 7	99.1	131.8	180	65	115	158
(12) Sawn lumber, mil. cu
meters	35.7	98	10.7	13.9	21 6	39.0	27	60	109
(13) Cement, mil tons	58	1.9	, 35	4.9	6.7	10 5	32	115	181
(14) Window glass, mil
square meters	44 4	22.2	36.6	43.5	52.2	80 0	50	118	180
(15) Slate, mil. pes.	205	80.4	159.3	2214	298 9	410	39	146	200

C. Consumers' Goods; Housing

(16) Cotton cloth, mil. meters	4005	1674	1959	2605	3230	4786	42	81	120
(17) Woolen cloth, mil meters	119 8	56 9	74 0	98 4	126.0	168	48	105	140 j
(18) Silk cloth, mil meters	64	32	44	65	85	122	53	133	190 '
(19) Linen cloth, mil. meters	165	63				190	38		115
(20) Paper, thous tons	812	335	539	674	809	1340	41	100	165
(21) Matches, mil cartons	99	1.9	24	33	5 3	9.9	19	53	100
(22) Urban housing, mil									* ,
square meters		4	8	13	30

^a See notes under Table 1

without allowing for wartime depreciation, the new construction comes to over 10 per cent of the prewar stock.

According to the Fourth Five-Year Plan, the wartime loss in fixed capital is to be fully made good by 1950, with the total stock at that time 8 per cent above the prewar level.⁷ To achieve this result, the plan calls for the putting into

⁷ Pravda, March 16, 1946.

operation in the five-year period of 5,900 newly constructed and reconstructed state enterprises, exclusive of "small-scale ones."⁸ Judging by the number of new or reconstructed state ⁸ A. Korobov, "Kapital'noe stroiteTstvo v tret'em rcshaiushchem godu poslevoennoi piatiletki" ("Capital Construction in the Third and Deciding Year of the Postwar Five Year Plan"), Planovoc khoziaistvo (Planned Economy), 1948, No 3, p. 33.

TABLE 2—Continued

Item and unit	Absolute Figures						Per Cent of 1940
Item and unit	1940	1945	1946	1947	1948	1950 Goal	1945	1948	1950
D. Agriculture
(23) Grain, mil. tons	119	66	61	97	115	127	55	96	107
(24) Cotton, mil. tons	2.7	1.2	1 7	20		3 1	46		115
(25) Sunflower seed, mil tons	33	1 8				3 7	54		111
(26) Sugar beets, mil. tons	20.9	89				26	42		124
(27) Horses, mil head	20 5	10 5	10 8			15 3	51		75
(28) Sheep and goals, mil
head	91.6	69.4	69.1			121.5	76		133
(29) Cattle, mil. head	54 5	47 0	46.8			65 3	86		120
(30) Hogs, mil. head	27.5	10 4	8.6			31.2	38		113

E Transport

(31) Daily carloadings, thous.
cars	97 9	69.1	78.1	85 9	102.5	115	71	105	117
(32) Passengers carried, bil
pass. km.	98.0	66 2	97.8			98	68		100
(33) Length of road in use,									117
thous. km.	105 3	112.9		114		123	107		117
(34) Electrified lines in use,
thous km.	1 8	20		4		7.3	110		401
(35) Freight car turn-around,
days	73	10 9	9.9			7	149		96

plants put in operation to date, substantial progress has been made towards fulfilling this goal. In all, these numbered about 800 in 1946, 1,100 in 1947, and 2,100 in 1948.⁹ Other information assembled in this survey on the general progress of the postwar economic development points to much the same conclusion.

Population; labor force

According to an independent estimate, the population of the U.S.S.r. was reduced by some 7 millions during the course of the war (Table 2). If the current rate of growth is anything like the phenomenally high rate of the immediate prewar period—about 2 per cent per annum—this loss already has been more than made good.

In relation to some popular notions

⁰ Korobov, op. cit. note 8 supra, p. 15, Pravda, Jan. 20, 1949.

on this subject, the cited figure on the wartime loss probably will seem surprisingly small. It should be observed, however, that this shows only the net decline in population due to the war. If there had been no war there would have been a large natural increase instead of a decline. If account is taken of this fact, it becomes clear that the total loss due to the war greatly exceeded the actual decline. With reference to the total loss in population, the frequently cited figure of 20 millions seems quite plausible.

According to Soviet data, the total number of employees (i.e., wage earners and salaried workers but not the collective farmers and other self-employed) declined from 31.2 millions in 1940 to 27.2 millions in 1945. The corresponding figure for 1948 is 33.4 millions (Table 2). The very limited wartime decline in the face of the mass mobili-
zation of military manpower is to be explained, of course, by the large-scale recruitment of women, children, and the aged. Presumably the resultant shift in the composition of the labor force (the ratio of women to the total, which was 38 per cent in 1940 and already had increased to 53 per cent in 1942 ¹⁰) meant that the wartime decline was qualitative as well as numerical. With demobilization and the return of males to the labor force, this development should have been reversed; no doubt also some newly recruited women have given up gainful employment since the close of the war. Insofar as the wartime reduction in food supplies and living standards generally resulted in a lowering of efficiency, the current improvements in the consumers' goods position should have reversed this wartime trend also. In this conhection mention should be made, too, of the currency reform of December 1947. The liquidation of rationing and the establishment of single open-market prices at that time, by giving more tangible meaning to money wages, undoubtedly served as a spur to greater efficiency throughout the economy.

Comprehensive figures on the total labor force, including collective farmers and other self-employed, are not at hand; presumably the general trends have been similar to those holding for employees.¹¹

Technology

Developments in the sphere of technology defy description in a summary survey. No doubt with some justification, Soviet sources portray these developments in impressive terms, with reference to the war as well as the post-

10 Voznesensky, op cit note 2 supra, p. 60.

11 For further information on current developments in the labor field, see in this same issue of The Annals the article by Harry Schwartz.

war period. Stress is placed on all manner of developments, including further mechanization, technological innovations, and electrification. Under the Fourth Five-Year Plan, particular attention is paid to mechanization and automatization of the production processes in lines which have been largely relying on labor-intensive methods, including the construction trades and some stages of coal extraction. Emphasis of course continues to be placed on the need for the rapid spread of assembly-line methods in machine building, where assembly-line methods were first introduced. During the war there was a large-scale application of these techniques to armament production.

The national product

Satisfactory global data on the Soviet national product are not at hand for the period under consideration. On the basis of. all the scattered facts assembled in this survey, it appears that there was a wartime decline in the national product, of similar or possibly larger magnitude than that for fixed capital, and that after three years of reconstruction this decline has been largely made good. The national product may have declined more than in proportion to fixed capital during the war, as a result of a variety of economic disproportions, e.g., disproportions arising from lack of full integration of the never occupied with the liberated areas, reconversion (this was already under way in the latter part of 1944), disruption of transport, and so forth. These maladjustments also constituted an obstacle to reconstruction in the first one or two postwar years, and no doubt there have been others at work besides, for example disproportions arising from the varying technical difficulties encountered in restoring different branches of the economy. Soviet writers have often complained particularly of the lag of extractive industries behind the processing industries.

III. Developments in Different Sectors to 1948

We turn now to the developments in different sectors and industries, including particularly munitions industries, basic industries, consumers' goods industries and agriculture, and transport

Munitions

In the face of the loss of capital and other resources and the resulting decline in the total national product, the Russians managed to realize in wartime a large-scale increase in munitions output. The following production figures are illustrative: In his interview with Harry Hopkins in July 1941, Stalin declared that the Russians were then producing 1,000 tanks and 1,800 planes a month.¹⁸ In a speech of February 1946, Stalin revealed that on the average in the period 1942-44 the Russians produced over 2,500 tanks, self-propelled guns, and armored cars and about 3,300

12 Reference may be made at this point to some aggregative data on Soviet industrial production compiled in A Bergson, "The Fourth Five Year Plan: Heavy Versus Consumers' Goods Industries," PoUlical Science Quarterly, June 1947, p. 199:

Gross Value of Output, Billions of 1926-27 Rubles

1940 1945 1950 goal AH industry 138 127 205 Heavy industries (including both munitions and

basic industries) 84 96 137

Consumers' goods industries 54 31 68

As is indicated in the source, these aggregative data in terms of 1926-27 ruble prices are subject to an appreciable margin of error In comparing the data with others to be presented subsequently, this fact should be borne in mind.

planes a monthAccording to Voz- nesensky,¹"' the allocation of ferrous metals to ammunition production increased from 830 thousand tons in 1940 to 2,437 thousand tons in 1943.

An outstanding featute of the reconstruction period is the large-scale conversion of the munitions industries to peacetime uses, and the associated decline in munitions output belpw the wartime levels. How the current munitions production compares with that of prewar years, however, is conjectural. Judging by the total budget allocations to defense listed below in section IV, the current output may well be comparable with the high levels reached in the period just before the Nazi attack.

Basic industries; general

The wartime increase in munitions production was achieved in the face of a decline not only in the total national product but also in the total output of basic industrial goods, including coal, steel, machinery, and others. In fact, the increase in munitions output was achieved to a great extent directly at the expense of basic industries, through conversion of these industries to war purposes (e.g., tractors, consumers' goods machinery, and so forth). For the rest, the increase in munitions output required the greatly increased allocation of basic industrial goods either to the production of machinery for munitions or directly as materials to the munitions industries.¹⁰

Pravda, Feb. 10, 1946.

¹⁵ Op. cit. note 2 supra, p. 43.

¹⁰ Compare with the data cited in note 12 supra. According to these data, the total output of heavy industrial goods in 1945 was 14 per cent greater than prewar, which would mean that the wartime decline in basic industrial production was nearly as great as the concomitant increase in munitions production. As has been mentioned, the indicated figure on heavy industrial production may be appreciably in error; very possibly it significantly overstates the 1945 production

With reconversion these trends have been reversed, and with the progress of postwar reconstruction to date the total output of basic industrial goods is now probably as great as, if not greater than, it was before the war.

The available information on wartime and postwar trends in basic industrial production consists partly of the data in Table 2 (for the most part the figures listed are either Soviet data or rough estimates based on Soviet data) and partly of a variety of fragmentary information. Some information of the latter sort is presented below on several important industries that are not listed in the table, along with some further details on several important industries that are listed.

Coal. The main wartime developments in the coal industry were two: the loss of output and capacity resulting from the wrecking of the Donbas mines, which before the war produced 52 per cent of the total Soviet coal output, and the partially offsetting expansion in the Moscow area and in the east. Since the Moscow and some of the eastern coal is of an inferior quality, the wartime developments resulted in a decline in average quality as well as in the total supply (Table 2). After three years of reconstruction, the output of the Donbas mines has now been raised to about 80 per cent of the prewar level; the indications are that this and the further expansion of output in other areas have raised the total output of the country as a whole to about the 1940 level.¹⁷

In view of the dominant importance of coal in the Soviet fuel economy, the recovery of this industry will have favorable effects throughout the whole

¹⁷ The estimates of coal output in Table 2 are based on a variety of Soviet information summarized in the Appendix (See note a, Table 1 ) As is indicated there, some of this information suggests that the 1940 output may already have been considerably surpassed.

economy. It is not clear, however, that the recovery is proceeding with sufficient rapidity in comparison with that in other industries to assure that the fuel supply keeps pace with requirements. During the first two postwar years Soviet officials frequently complained that coal was lagging behind other sectors, and that other industries were handicapped on this account.

Petroleum. The wartime decline in output (Table 2) reflects only to a minor extent the effects of war damage; the main factor was the decline in output in the Baku fields, chiefly as a result of the postponement of capital replacement and new drilling. All reports indicate that the wartime decline in production at Baku must have been drastic. A partial recovery in this area has now been achieved, but it is clear that the Russians are currently placing increased emphasis on the exploitation of other fields, particularly in the "Second Baku" in the Ural regions. Before the war the Baku fields provided about 70 per cent, and all eastern fields 12 per cent, of the total supply. According to the Fourth Five-Year Plan, the respective shares of these areas in 1950 will be about 50 per cent and 35 per cent.¹⁸

Electric power. One of the most impressive economic achievements during the war was the large-scale construction of power capacity in the eastern regions. In the aggregate, the electric power capacity put into operation in the Urals, Siberia, and Central Asia was nearly sufficient to offset the losses suffered in the west (Table 2). In accord with their long-standing policy of emphasizing this industry, and perhaps also with a view to its currently enhanced military importance, the Russians are endeavoring not only to reconstruct the losses in the invaded areas but also further to expand capacity in

¹⁸Pravda, March 16 and 21, 1946; Foreign Commerce Weekly, Aug. 23, 1947, p. JO.

the east. The Fourth Five-Year Plan calls for the introduction into operation of power stations having in all a capacity of 11.7 million kilowatts, or the equivalent of twenty Dneprostroys

Iron and steel. While the wartime destruction was exceptionally heavy in iron and steel, it was partially offset by new construction in the east, with the result that in 1945 the ferrous metals industry was able to operate at about 60 per cent of its prewar level (Table 2).

Early efforts to expand steel production under the Fourth Five-Year Plan were admittedly disappointing. In 1947, for example, only a 9 per cent increase in steel output was achieved, as compared with a planned growth for that year of 19 per cent. This initial failure of iron and steel to grow as planned has been attributed by Soviet writers largely to shortages of coal and railway transport and to construction delays.¹⁹

Nevertheless, the groundwork was laid in 1947 for important subsequent advances. The restoration of the "Zaporozhstal" iron and steel works and of the wheel rolling shops at "Karl Liebknecht" in Dnepropetrovsk was completed in that year, as was also the pipe-rolling factory at Nikopol With the introduction into operation of these and other installations it was possible to raise output substantially and nearly to reattain the prewar level in 1948. In 1948 appreciable gains were registered also in the volume of new building work, which exceeded that of the two preceding years by a wide margin.

Nonjerrous metals. In the cases of aluminum, magnesium, tin, and tungsten, production in 1945 was substantially above the 1940 level, the wartime losses being entirely offset by wartime expansion of capacity.²⁰ There was likewise a considerable expansion of copper production in unoccupied areas

19Pravda, March 1 and Nov 11, 1947.

20Izvestiya, April 2, 1946.

during the war, but it is not known whether this was sufficient to offset losses.²¹ Since 1945 the production of nonferrous metals generally has continued to expand, but it appears that in some branches, including copper, there has been a lag behind the plan.²²

Machinery. In the war effort, emphasis necessarily had to be given to the construction of machinery for defense industry and for basic industries serving this sector, but the production of all other types was drastically curtailed. Probably the output of machinery as a whole declined.

With the beginning of reconversion, which entailed among other things a shift to a more varied assortment of tools, machinery output dropped below its wartime level, but these losses have since been more than offset. Currently the total output of machinery of most types, including metallurgical and mining equipment, is probably much greater than in 1940. Agricultural machinery lagged at first, but recent gains have raised total output here also above the 1940 level.

In the postwar program, as in previous plans, engineering industries occupy a position of key importance. By 1950 machine building is scheduled to be double the prewar output; in addition, there is to be a great increase in the types and sizes of tools manufactured. As a result, the Soviet Union expects to have 1,300,000 machine tools in 1950, or 30 per cent more numerically (though probably not by weight or quality) than the United States had before the war.²⁸Ibid.

²³ In 1947 the planned increase for refined copper was 17 per cent over the previous year. In contrast to this, the realized gain in copper output was only 9 per cent (Pravda, March 1, 1947 and Jan. 18, 1948) See also quarterly reports of the State Planning Commission for 1948, Pravda, April IS and July 18, 1948

²⁸ Pravda, March 16, 1946 This goal for machine tools, which appears in a speech by

Chemicals. Available information does not permit a precise appraisal of the current output of chemicals, but it appears that with certain exceptions, such as matches and perhaps fertilizer, production now is generally above the prewar level. According to the Fourth Five-Year Plan, production for the industry as a whole in 1950 is scheduled to be 150 per cent of that of 1940. Particular stress is being placed on fertilizers, sodas, plastics, artificial fibers, and dyestuffs.

Timber. Commercial timber deliveries, while lagging in relation to the plan, are now above the 1940 level (Table 2). It seems that the chief gains are in industrial lines, such as railway ties and pit props. Sawn lumber for building remains extremely tight and probably will continue so for some time to come, even though domestic supplies are supplemented by reparations deliveries from Finland.

Consumers^{^[44]} goods industries; agriculture: general

The wartime conjuncture of a decline in the total national product with an increase in munitions output necessarily meant a drastic cut in the output of consumers' goods. Judging from the data in Table 2 and other information at hand,²⁴ production in this sector may have declined by more than two-fifths from 1940 to 1945. With the progress of reconversion and reconstruction, all the indications are that this sector of the economy is now recovering from the wartime setback with notable rapidity Total output is still below the prewar level, though perhaps not markedly so

As in the case of basic industries, we now comment briefly on the developments in some of the more important branches of the consumers⁷ goods sector listed in Table 2, as well as on a few not listed.

Grain. While the Russians managed during the war to bring about a limited expansion of the grain-sown area in the unoccupied areas, the net effect of the war on the crucial grain economy was overwhelmingly adverse (Table 2). The harvest of 1945 is estimated at some 66 million tons, only 55 per cent of the prewar level. Mainly as a result of a severe drought, the year 1946 brought a further decline to some 61 million tons.^2r>

A nearly complete recovery from this low level, however, has been achieved in the last two years. According to an official communique of January 20, 1948, the harvest of that year was almost equal to that of 1940.²⁶ This spectacu-

25 According to an official communique (Pravda, Jan. 21, 1947) the drought in terms of the area affected was more severe than that of 1921 and comparable to that of 1891 The fact that the drought occurred mainly in the liberated areas, which in 1946 had only been partially restored, helps to explain why the dccline in the harvest was no greater than is indicated by the estimates cited in the text

26The Soviet official crop statistics, it should be noted, arc based on the so-called biological or preharvest yield as distinct from the barn yield, according to which crops arc reported in the United States. These two yields differ as a result of losses in harvesting and threshing. For the prewar period, agricultural experts in the United States have estimated that the losses ran as high as 20 or more per cent of the biological yield. Since the losses vary in relation to the biological yield in dependence on weather conditions as well as harvesting techniques, the possibility must be reckoned with that the increase in lar gain presumably reflects in part the rapid increase in the production of tractors and other implements and the improvement of the fertilizer supply since 1946, and perhaps also a general improvement in the supplies of manufactured consumers' goods made available to the peasants. The possibility must be reckoned with, too, that better-than- average weather conditions were a factor. (The communiqu6 just referred to states that weather conditions in the Volga regions were unfavorable, but no comment is made on the weather conditions in the more important Ukraine areas. Presumably these were more favorable.) To the extent that this is so, of course, the crop statistics may tend to overstate somewhat the progress of reconstruction.

Livestock. The wartime losses in productive livestock (Table 2) must be viewed in the light of the interwar developments, particularly:

1. The drastic decline in herds suffered previously in the all-out collectivization drive. In all, about two-fifths of Russia's cattle, nearly two-thirds of her sheep and goats, and over half of her hogs were lost at that time.

2. The fact that as late as 1938 these losses had not yet been fully made good in the cases of cattle and sheep and goats.

3. Finally, the fact that there was a further decline in livestock numbers before the Nazi attack, presumably in connection with the mounting Soviet war preparations. Thus on the eve of the war, Soviet livestock herds generally were smaller than in 1928, on the eve of collectivization.^{^[45]}

Relatively, the wartime losses somewhat exceeded those under collectivization in the case of hogs (62 per cent), but were comparatively limited in the case of sheep and goats (24 per cent) and cattle (14 per cent). The heavy losses in hogs reflect the fact that these herds were concentrated more than the others in the invaded areas, and also the fact that they were particularly vulnerable as a result of shortage of fodder and the need to concentrate on Kttle- processed foods.

Because of the limitations in the available information, the degree of recovery that has been attained to date in livestock is difficult to judge. The drought of 1946, which was most serious in the case of feed grains, brought a setback at the outset, and particularly in the case of hogs the herds actually were reduced. According to many indications, however, there has been a rapid recovery since. Possibly the herds of sheep and goats and cattle are now close to the prewar level, but hog numbers must still be much below those of 1940.^{^[46]} The latter, it should be noted,

²⁸ The available information on the growth of livestock during 1947 and 1948 shows that the collective farms as such (as distinct from the private homesteads of collective farm members) made a considerable advance during these two years: in sheep and goats the prewar level was passed at the end of 1947 and in cattle at the end of 1948 (cf. Sotsialis- ticheskoe zemledelie, Feb. 7 and Nov. 13, 1948, and "The Third Quarterly Report on Fulfillment of the Plan for 1948," Pravda, Oct IS, 1948). On the herds of the private homesteads the only published information is the general statement of the third quarterly report of 1948 that "the number of cattle in the personal use of the collective fanners increased also." The failure to give definite data on the situation in the homesteads might suggest that their herds, and hence the total herds of the collective farms and homesteads taken together, have increased to a relatively less extent than those of the collective farms alone. The latter possibility is reinforced by explicit statements of the articles quoted which refer to the policy of buying livestock from are the main source of the meager Soviet meat supplies. Also, in general, meat supplies in relation to the prewar level may be lower than the size of the animal herds would indicate In order to increase herds at a rapid rate, the rate of slaughtering may be kept lower than before the war.

The war brought a decline in horses as well as in productive livestock. In all, one-half of the prewar stock of horses was lost. The degree of recovery achieved to date in this sphere is not known. Ultimately the Russians plan to continue the prewar practice of substituting machinery for animal draft power, so that in the course of time the requirements for horses will be reduced.

Other agricultural products. The available information indicates that while the recovery of cotton has progressed steadily since the war, sugar beets and sunflowers suffered severely from the drought of 1946 In both these latter lines, however, there was a remarkable recovery in 1947. The output of sugar beets almost tripled, and that of sunflower seeds increased by 79 per cent. Partly because of wartime development of home garden plots and victory gardens in the cities, the production of vegetables, in contrast with all other agricultural products, increased during the war. According to S. Demi- dov²⁰ the planting of vegetables (including potatoes as one of the major items) in 1944 was 14 per cent higher than in 1940. No information is at hand on the postwar developments in this sphere.

Cotton cloth. The drastic wartime decline in cotton textile production (al-

the farmers in order to increase the herds of the collective farmers It should be noted that as late as at the end of 1946 the collective farms accounted for only somewhat more than half of the total sheep and goats of Soviet agriculture and less than one-third of the big cattle.

²⁰ Planovoe khosiaistvo, 1945, No 2, p. 46.

most 60 per cent, Table 2) reflects only partly the wartime destruction. To an appreciable extent the conversion of capacity to war purposes and the temporary release of capacity in order to free co-operating resources (fuel, power, and skilled labor) for the same purposes were also responsible This industry thus stood to gain considerably from reconversion operations, and the rapid recovery achieved to date must be viewed in this light. Soviet reports for 1947 indicate that in that year progress was hampered by various bottlenecks, particularly power, fuel, and chemical dyestuffs. The more recent developments in this regard are open to conjecture.

Shoes. Scattered data at hand on developments in the shoe industry indicate that shoe production currently is well below the prewar level.

Semidurable consumers' goods. According to Soviet estimates made at the close of the third quarter, 1948, the production of such items as radios, bicycles, watches, sewing machines, and aluminum ware was to exceed the prewar level in 1948.³⁰ In the case of other articles, such as furniture, the Russians still have some distance to go to recover their former position. Interestingly, the Government has taken steps, apparently with only limited success, to expand the production of consumers⁷ semidurables as secondary products in heavy industrial plants.

Housing. Comments on the wartime losses in housing necessarily must be prefaced by reference to the weak character of this sector of the consumers⁷goods economy, resulting from years of comparative neglect under the five-year plans. Before the war the urban population of the U.S.S.R. had to manage somehow with a housing space of little more than 4 square meters per person.

According to Soviet claims, the Rus-

³⁰ Moscow News, Sept. 28, 1948

sians lost about half of the urban and 30 per cent of the rural dwellings in the invaded areas. In terms of housing space, it appears that the urban losses alone must have come to more than 60 million square meters.³¹ It is not clear whether or not this estimate takes into account losses due to wear and tear and the postponement of repairs. The rural dwellings lost numbered 3 S millions.

In order to deal with this situation the Russians:

1. Built and reconstructed during the war 12.8 million square meters of urban housing space in the liberated³² and an unknown amount in the never occupied areas. Presumably most of this was of a temporary character,³³ and in part simply workers' barracks.

2. Built and reconstructed during the years 1945-47 something of the order of 10 million square meters of urban housing space in the invaded areas, and some 15 million square meters in the never occupied areas.³⁴

3. Built and reconstructed in 1948 another 8 million square meters of urban housing in the invaded areas and 22 million square meters of urban housing in the never occupied areas.³⁵There are indications that these figures, like that cited above on wartime construction, may include a good deal of temporary or low-quality housing. At any rate, the investment per unit of housing constructed in 1948 is much below that for early postwar years. According to the official communique of January 20, 1949 from which the 1948 construction figures are taken, the total investment in housing in 1948 was 136 per cent of that in 1947. The urban housing space constructed in 1948 was 230 per cent of that in 1947.⁸⁶

4. In the years 1946-48, built and reconstructed 1.6 million rural dwellings in the U.S.S.R. as a whole.³⁷

The large volume of new construction in the east that is indicated here is presumably to take care of the increase in urban population resulting from normal growth and from the fact that many wartime evacuees from the west have permanently settled in the east. The latter development must be taken into account also in appraising the current housing situation in the invaded areas. Despite the economic revival in the cities of the invaded areas, the urban population there may still be somewhat below the prewar level. While the total housing construction there to date is less than one-third the amount needed to make good war losses, a res'* Pravda, Jan 20, 1949 ³⁶ The foregoing suggests a possible explanation for an apparent discrepancy between the figure on urban housing construction in the invaded areas for 1948 reported in the communique of January 20, 1949 (8 million square meters) and a corresponding figure for the first nine months of 1948 reported in Pravda, Nov. 27, 1948 (2 5 million square meters). Possibly the former figure is inclusive of, and the latter exclusive of, temporary dwellings, such as workers* barracks. ** Pravda, Jan. 20, 1949.

duction of the population would make the situation somewhat less difficult than it otherwise would be.

The current shortage of housing in the U.S.S.R. must be viewed not only as a factor in low living standards but also as a factor immediately affecting efficiency. Soviet writers refer again and again to the latter aspect, particularly in regard to the situation in the invaded areas, and it would seem that this must provide a stimulus to new construction.

Railway transport

The Soviet railway transport system performed tremendous tasks during the war, the success of which was surprising to friends and enemies alike. In the early stages of the conflict the railroads not only maintained the flow of military supplies to the front, but also accomplished a mass evacuation of defense plants and personnel to the safe regions of the interior. This operation alone involved the shipment to the east of one and a half million carloads of industrial equipment.

At the same time, Soviet railway transport suffered heavily from the Nazi invasion and occupation. Over half of the prewar network of railway lines was destroyed, including also some 13,000 bridges and innumerable buildings and installations. Wartime losses of freight cars and locomotives were of a similar magnitude.

Because of the high priority assigned to it, railroad restoration proceeded at a rapid pace while the war was still in progress. As a result of this work and some new construction, the railway network in use was actually longer than before the war. Much of the reconstruction, however, was on a temporary basis, and the efficiency of the system was seriously impaired by prolonged overloading and disrepair. Furthermore, almost no new rolling stock or locomotives were turned out by Soviet factories during the three or four years of the struggle, and only small deliveries of these items were obtained through lend-lease Thus, in 1945 the railroads were operating at little better than 70 per cent of their prewar volume as measured in terms of carloadings.

Since the war, according to all indications, the Russians have made substantial progress towards restoring the lines of the invaded areas on a permanent basis. All bridges over the Dnieper, Don, Dvina, Bug, Volkhov, and Dniester rivers have undergone capital repairs.

At the same time steps have been taken to carry out a substantial program for further development and modernization of railway transport in the country as a whole. In order to meet the growing freight requirements, the railroads have been allocated one-sixth of all capital investments to be made in the Soviet economy before 1950.³⁸ The Fourth Five-Year Plan provides for the building of 7,230 kilometers of new railway lines and the electrification of 5,325 kilometers. The bulk of the new building and electrification is to take place in the eastern sections of the country. The largest single project is for the construction of a South Siberian railway, to extend roughly 2,550 kilometers. This will be a vital link in the long- heralded second trans-Siberian route.

In the matter of equipment, the plan proyides for the full replacement of war losses of freight cars by 1950, with the production of the equivalent of 472,000 two-axle units. According to the Minister of Transport and Machine Building, the output of railway cars surpassed the prewar rate in mid-1947.³⁹

³⁸ This refers to "centralized" investments. See note 5 supra.

⁸⁹ USSR Information Bulletin, Soviet Embassy, Washington, D C., No 12 (July 30, 1947), p. 25.

Reconversion of the tank industry was undertaken during the latter days of the war, which made it possible for four plants to get into large-scale locomotive production during 1946. Production of transport equipment, however, lagged considerably -behind the plan in 1946 and to a less extent in 1947.⁴⁰

While the total stock of equipment is still well below the prewar level, the Russians have managed by economy measures to carry a comparatively large volume of freight. In terms of car- loadings, the volume of freight carried in 1948 equaled that in 1940. Recent Soviet editorials indicate, however, that planned tempos for the reduction in freight car turn-around have not been attained, and also that rail transport as a whole greatly overconsumed its quota of coal during the first two years of the plan.⁴¹ Ultimately, according to the plan, the freight car turn-around is to be reduced from an average of 10.9 days in 1945 to an average of 7 days in 1950, and the average length of haul is to be shortened from 491 miles to 429 miles.

Railway freight accounts for roughly four-fifths of the total freight shipments of the U.S.S.R., but it is planned to increase somewhat the relative importance of water and truck carriers in the postwar periods. The freight turnover for all kinds of transport is to be 36 per cent above the prewar level by 1950

IV. Trends in Division of National Product to 1948

The wartime and postwar trends in the division of the national product between different uses (military outlays, investment, and consumption) must be appraised qualitatively on the basis of the information on production trends

«Pravda, Jan 21, 1947 and Jan. 18, 1948.

⁴¹ Pravda, March 3, 1948; also Isvestiya, Aug 1, 1948.

already presented, together with other scattered facts at hand.⁴²

Military expenditures

The term "military expenditures" is here used with reference to the aggregate amount of goods and services allocated to immediate military purposes, including not only munitions production but also troop subsistence and other defense activities. Some notion of the wartime and postwar trends in Soviet expenditures on these items may be obtained from the Soviet budget figures listed in Table 3.⁴³

TABLE 3—Military Expenditures

Bill tons of rubles

1948 (forecast) 66.1

1947 66 4

1946 72.6

1945 128.2

1944 137.9

1943 125.0

1942 108 4

1941 80.0

1940 56.7

1939 39.2

1938 23 1

These budget outlays, it should be noted, are in monetary rather than real terms, and necessarily reflect the changes in the prices of munitions and subsistence and military pay. To obtain a measure in real terms it is necessary to allow for these changes. It would seem that the price level for military goods may now be appreciably higher than before the war, so that in comparison with the prewar period the current out-

42 On the basis of data published in Voz- nesensky, op. cit. note 2 supra, A. Gerschen- kron has prepared, for the years 1940, 1942, and 1943, some rule-of-thumb estimates on the allocation of the national product. See his review of Voznesensky in American Economic Review, Sept. 1948, p. 654.

43 Data for years 193&-46, from A Berg- son, "Russian Defense Expenditures," Foreign Affairs, Jan. 1948, p. 3 73, for years 1947 and 1948 from Pravda, Feb 1, 1948 lays are not as large in real as in money terms.⁴⁴

Clearly, the aggregate amount of goods and,services allocated to defense increased substantially during the war, in absolute terms as well as in relation to the reduced national product. Clearly, also, these wartime developments have now been reversed; both absolutely and in relation to the increasing national product, the defense outlays have declined. How the current outlays compare in real terms with those of prewar years is somewhat con-

⁴⁴ See Bergson, "Russian Defense Expenditures." In this source, an outer limit for the rise in defense goods and services is fixed by reference to the estimated rise in the general level of money wages m the USSR, from 1939 to 1947—about 85 per cent Depending on the increase in productivity, it is argued, the price of munitions (though not necessarily of military subsistence) might have risen much less than this According to information released by Voznesensky, op cit. note 2 supra, p. 69, it appears that in fact this must have been the case, or at any rate that changes in man-hour productivity together with a wartime increase in working hours much more than offset the rise in money wages in 1942, as far as defense goods prices are concerned. According to Voznesensky, the price index for goods produced by war industry stood at 72 in 1942 in comparison with a prewar level of 100

It should be noted also that contrary to the assumption in "Russian Defense Expenditures," there is good reason to believe that some or all outlays on defense plant construction are omitted from the budget defense expenditures The budget figures refer only to the allocations to the government departments immediately concerned with actual military operations (since 1946 unified as the Ministry of Armed Forces), and not to the allocations to various departments engaged in munitions production (i e, the Ministries of the Aviation Industry, of Construction of Military Plants, and of Armaments). Presumably the outlays on defense plant construction were greater in the period of armaments before the war than in the postwar period of reconversion

Finally, as is indicated in "Russian Defense Expenditures," pp. 373 ff., there are several other omissions, including possibly outlays on atomic energy research.

jectural, in view of the uncertain extent of price changes. Quite possibly the present level of allocations is comparable with the high Level reached in 1939, just after Munich, and perhaps even with that of 1940, just before the Nazi attack.

Current capital investments

To the extent that during the war an increased share of the reduced basic industrial production was absorbed in munitions production, the amount available for over-all capital expansion was necessarily curtailed. Even including outlays on defense plant construction, capital investments declined, not only absolutely but probably also in relation to the reduced national product.⁴⁵ With reconversion, the share of basic industrial production available for over-all capital expansion has again increased; on this basis and also with the aid of imports from abroad on reparations and other accounts,*⁶ the wartime trend with regard to capital investment has now been reversed. These developments are of course a basic factor in, and have in turn been accelerated by, the progressive recovery in the national product. As of 1946, capital investments already exceeded the prewar level; in 1947 they were 10 per cent greater than in 1946, and in the first nine months of 1948 they were 26 per cent greater than in the comparable period in 1947.⁴⁷

45 Above, sec II, (4) "the national product"

46 Since the end of the war Russia's imports, including reparations, have been on a relatively high level and in the aggregate considerably in excess of exports—about $1.5 billion in 1947 (See the article by A. Gerschcn- kron in this issue of The Annals.) Unquestionably there has been a net import balancc in the case of capital goods alone, as well as for all goods taken together

47 Korobov, op. cit note 8 supra, p 14; Pravda, Oct. 15, 1948. The foregoing statements refer to "capital construction" (kapitaT- nye raboty), which it is believed covers only investments in fixed as distinct from working

Current consumption

The conclusion already stated that the wartime stringency in consumption has been greatly alleviated but that living standards are still below the prewar level is intended to take into account the following facts.

1. The trends in production already referred to are considered.

2. During the war a considerable amount of the reduced output of consumers' goods was needed to meet the high rations of the Red Army, and hence was not available for civilians. With demobilization, the military requisitions presumably have been reduced, though an offsetting factor of unknown extent is the amount of goods, particularly grain, currently allocated to security stockpiles. These vital stockpiles were largely depleted during the war; it is clear that the Government is now rebuilding them. In a speech of November 6, 1948, Molotov said that the large harvest of 1948 sufficed not only for current requirements but also for some stockpiling.

3. Currently the Russians are obtaining sizable imports of consumers' goods on reparations and other accounts from Germany and other countries, and it seems likely that in the aggregate these exceed their exports of such goods.^{^[47]}

4. In the case of durable consumers' goods, of course, consumption depends more on stocks than on current output; neither the wartime decline nor the postwar recovery was as great in stocks as in production. This consideration is particularly important in the case of housing, where current production is necessarily small in relation to the stocks on hand.

V. Prospects for Fulfillment of Fourth Five-Year Plan

Below are listed the main facts, favorable and unfavorable, that it is believed must be taken into account in appraising the prospects for the fulfillment of the Fourth Five-Year Plan. With the information at hand, there does not seem to be much basis for going beyond the rather general conclusion on this matter already stated in the introduction to this article.

1. In Table 4 are shdwn by branches the average annual rates of expansion actually realized from 1945 to 1948 and the rates that still must be realized from 1948 to 1950 if the goals of the plan (as listed in Table 2) are to be fulfilled. As is evident, the tempos realized to date generally compare favorably with those that must now be attained.

2. To a considerable extent, however, the favorable record to date has been achieved through the reconversion of munitions capacity and also by the repair and restoration of partially destroyed capacity in the liberated areas. The first of these sources of expansion presumably was most important in the machinery industries. The second no doubt has been important in all lines. It may be expected that both sources of expansion will be less important in the remaining than they were in the first years of the plan The mainte-

probable that there are also some net imports of consumers' goods

TABLE 4—Realized and Required Rates of Growth in Specified Economic Branches, 1945-50®

Branch	Average annual percentage increase realized 194-5-48	A\ erage annual percentage increase required to fulfill Fourth Five- Year Plan, 1948-50
Coal	12 1	25.4
Petroleum	14 6	10.1
Electric power	13 6	13.7
production
Electric power	10 4	24.7
capacity
Pig iron	15.8	16.8
Steel	14 9	22.2
Tractors	94 5	44.4
Trucks and	37 1	52.9
automobiles
Commercial timber	21.1	16.9
delivered
Sawn lumber	30 1	34.7
Cement	52.2	25.2
Window glass	32.9	23.8
Slate	54 9	17.1
Cotton cloth	24.5	21.7
Woolen cloth	30 3	15.5
Silk cloth	38 5	19.8
Paper	34.2	28.7
Matches	40.8	36.7
Grain	20.3	5.1
Daily carloadings	14.0	59

" For underlying data, see note a under Table 1.

nance of the past tempos may become progressively more difficult on this account.

3. The demobilization of the armed forces to a peacetime footing presumably has by now been completed. Accordingly there can be little if any further expansion of the labor force from this source. This factor too may tend to make it difficult to maintain the previous tempos.

4. It is necessary to reckon also with the matter of bottlenecks. As a result of the sharp increase in steel output in 1948 this no longer seems to be as critical an area as it once did; it is still lagging behind other branches, however, and thus may serve as a brake on further progress. The available information indicates that coal production also may be lagging behind the plan.

5. Insofar as it may reflect unusually favorable weather conditions, the rapid recovery of grain may be in part only temporary. But insofar as the harvest can be further increased and consumption expanded on this basis, this would have favorable effects throughout the economy.

6. The five-year plan calls for the introduction into service of newly constructed or repaired urban housing having a total of 84 million square meters of floor space. During the first three years of the plan (1946-48) the Russians managed to build in all SI million square meters, or about 60 per cent of the total required by the plan. This would indicate that on a purely quantitative basis, the Russians should be able to fulfill the plan in this sphere. For reasons already mentioned, the postwar housing program may involve a considerable deterioration in quality.

VI. Note on Reconstruction and Development Policies

This does not seem to be the place to embark on any extensive discussion of the general economic policies established in the Fourth Five-Year Plan. These policies, particularly on the important question of heavy industrial versus consumers' goods, already have been discussed in some detail elsewhere by one of the present writers, and the other two are in general accord with his reasoning and with his main conclusion that primary emphasis in the current plan, as in previous ones, is on heavy industrial goods.⁴⁰

The policy applied in practice would seem to be much the same as that established in the plan. In any event, there

⁴⁹ Abram Bergson, op. cit. note 12 supra

is little basis to think that there has been any major revision of the policy in the plan in favor of either of the two sectors mentioned, heavy industrial or consumers⁷ goods. It is known that the targets for 1950 for cotton and woolen cloth were revised upward in December 1946, but these upward revisions were quite small in extent—little more than 2 per cent for cotton cloth and about 5 per cent for woolen cloth.⁵⁰ The factors accounting for the spectacularly rapid recovery of grain are not altogether clear. Considering that the output of tractors still must be more than doubled in the next two years to fulfill the 1950 goal, however, it seems doubtful that the comparatively rapid expansion of grain from the low 1945 level reflects any substantial above-plan investment in this sector.

Consideration is given also in the article just cited to the closely related question of the nature of Soviet policy on the internal structure of heavy industry, particularly with regard to the breakdown of the total output between munitions and basic industrial production. On this the conclusion was reached that the Fourth Five-Year Plan would see a substantial shift from the former to the latter.

On the basis of information now at hand there seems to be no reason to question this conclusion; but attention should be drawn here to a fact already mentioned, namely, that the current output of munitions, while much below the wartime peak, is still comparatively high by peacetime standards. Also, in view of the current state of international relations, the possibility must be considered that the immediate postwar trends may yet be reversed, and increased emphasis given to munitions in comparison with basic industries. Needless to say, such a development on any

In Table 2 are shown the revised goals for 1950 for these articles.

scale would require a complete reappraisal of Soviet economic prospects. The Fourth Five-Year Plan itself, or at least its unfinished portions, inevitably would be tossed into a cocked hat.

Space allows us only a few words on the Soviet postwar policy with regard to the location of industry. The established policy before the war, of course, was to emphasize the development of the eastern regions. It was here that the highest rates of economic expansion were realized. The creation in this way of a second great metals and fuel base in and beyond the Urals was a crucial factor enabling the Russians to survive the German invasion. During the war, as a matter of practical necessity rather than policy, the expansion of the economy of the eastern regions was pressed further, while at the same time the economy of the west was in large measure devastated. Currently, the Russians have resumed the prewar policy. On this the Fourth Five-Year Plan itself is quite clear. It is envisaged that the devastated areas will be fully restored, and will by 1950 be producing somewhat more industrial products than before the war. At the same time, however, substantial new investments are to be made in the eastern regions, so that the share of these regions in the total industrial output of the country will greatly exceed that attained before the war. The figures already cited on petroleum production provide one illustration of this development. Mention may also be made of the developments in steel. In relation to the total production of the entire country, the output of eastern works will increase from 34 per cent in 1940 to 51 per cent in 1950.^5X

⁵¹IA. Feigin, "Razmeshchenie proizvoditeT- nykh sil v novoi piatiletke" ("The Distribution of Productive Forces in the New Five Year Plan"), Bol'shevik, No. 23-24 (1946), p. 33.

TABLE 5—Comparative Industrial Production: U.S.S.R , Eastern Europe, and U.S.A⁰

Item and unit⁶	USSR			Eastern Europe" 1946	US.A 1947
Item and unit⁶	1948	1950 Goal	1965 Goal	Eastern Europe" 1946	US.A 1947
Coal, mil tons	159	250	500	90 7	613 4
Petroleum, mil. tons	29 2	35.4	60	4.8	229.6
Pig iron, mil. tons	14.3	19 5	50	1.8	53 7
Steel, mil. tons	170	25.4	60	34	76.9

° Sources: For U.S.S.R. see Appendix (see note a under Table 1) and Pravda, Feb. 9, 1946, for eastern Europe, see United Nations, Department of Economic Affairs, Economic Commission for Europe, A Survey of Economic Situation and Prospects for Europe, Geneva, 1948, pp. 130—32; for the United States, see Survey of Current Business, March, 1948. ^b All figures in metric units.

^c Including Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, and Yugoslavia, in the case of coal, also Bulgaria, and in the case of petroleum, also Rumania.

VII. Comparative Production: U.S.S.R. and U.SA.

The comparative data compiled on Soviet and American 'basic industrial production are shown in Table 5. The long-range goals cited for the U.S.S.R. were fixed by Stalin in a speech of February 1946. Stalin declared that these goals were to be fulfilled in a period of three or more five-year plans. Evidently when these goals are fulfilled the Russians will be producing about as much pig iron, somewhat less coal and steel, and far less petroleum than the

United States did in 1947. If to the Soviet output were added the production of eastern European countries in 1946, the Soviet production would still be less than that of the United States in all lines, though the two countries would then be about on a par in coal as well as pig iron. It should be noted, however, that the production of eastern Europe in 1946 was generally far below the prewar level, and that it has increased substantially in the past two years. Also, the production of the eastern zone of Germany is not included in the tabulation.

By Harry

OVIET labor policy reflects in the area of labor relations the objectives sought by the over-all economic plan at any given time. Since the goals of economic policy in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics center primarily about increased production, Soviet labor policy may be viewed as the totality of means used to increase output from the available work force in each period.

The specific policies of the Soviet regime during 1945-49 have been determined both by the historical setting and by the institutional organization of the Soviet Union.

Postwar labor policies have been formulated and executed against the background of tremendous material and human losses during the war. They have been greatly affected, too, by the significant changes in the labor force during the conflict. The totalitarian nature of Soviet society and the mono- planned direction of its economy have given the regime a wide choice of weapons to deal with the problems arising from this setting. The Fourth Five- Year Plan has contributed to these problems by aiming not only at the rapid reconstruction of the economy, but also at a substantial rise in total output and a large program of capital expansion.

As a result, the Soviet economy has continued to have high employment levels and steady expansion of non- agricultural labor requirements. These have created and aggravated many of the problems with which state policy has had to contend during the period discussed here.

Schwartz

Postwar Soviet labor policy has sought to increase the over-all labor force and to redistribute the labor force —both between urban and rural occupations and among different urban employments—in accord with the objectives set by the Fourth Five-Year Plan. It has also sought to obtain higher man- hour productivity through a variety of means.

The most important policy decision affecting the size of the postwar civilian labor force was that which dictated the extent and speed of Soviet demobilization, 1945-47 The writer has estimated elsewhere that perhaps ten million veterans returned to the civilian labor force during these years.¹ While the greater part of these veterans had originally entered service from agriculture and related occupations, a much smaller percentage probably returned to agricultural work, since the prime need of the postwar U.S.S.R. has been for laborers in industry, construction, transport, mining, and other nonfarm work. A hint of Soviet policy on this matter seems given by a labor specialist's remark that the wartime shortage of farm labor existed "primarily during harvest time." ²

Retaining Temporary War Workers

A second major aspect of the policy in this area was the effort to retain in the labor force large numbers of persons originally recruited for "temporary" nonfarm work during the war.

1 Harry Schwartz, Russia's Postwar Economy (Syracuse, 1947), pp 69-70

2BoVshaya Sovetskaya EntstklopecUya, Tom SSSR, p. 1130.

Voznesensky has revealed that in 1942 women accounted for 53 per cent of all workers and employees in the national economy,® as against 38 per cent in 1940, while the proportion of women among the able-bodied workers of rural areas rose to 71 per cent by the beginning of 1943. Persons under 18 and over 49 years of age composed 27 per cent of the workers and employees in all Soviet industry in 1942, as against only 15 per cent in 1939.⁴

These and other available data make it clear that many housewives, adolescents, and older people who would normally not have worked joined the labor force during the war. Moreover, a significant number of farm people left agriculture during the struggle to go to work in urban occupations.⁶

To induce these wartime additions to the labor force to remain at work— and to get other nonworking adults to accept jobs—the Soviet regime utilized to the full its control of prices, wages, and ration schedules.

Measures to Increase Productivity

The approximate tripling of rationed food prices in September 1946, accompanied by a less than compensatory rise in wages, must have served as pressure inducing idle persons to work and those working to remain on their jobs. This pressure must have been strengthened by the tightening of the ration system later in 1946, with provisions for reclassification of some workers into categories receiving less food, and further cuts in the already low amounts allowed nonworkers The financial and ration reforms of December 1947 acted similarly to increase the pressure on non- workers to go to work, since they wiped out or reduced substantially liquid savings, while increasing the real value of current earned income.

It is significant with respect to the above that six months after the 1947 ration and financial changes, Soviet writers hailed the great influx of housewives, youths in their late teens, and others seeking work as the result of these reforms. In the spring of 1948 Soviet writers asserted that their leading industries had sufficient workers. Factory managers were said to be able to pick and choose among applicants, selecting only those with most suitable skills and aptitudes, rather than accepting all who applied. Pravda emphasized that it was the urban population particularly whose idle members had been induced to seek work since the events of December 1947. The new job applicants were probably persons who had formerly had significant cash savings, members of families whose working members had formerly earned enough to buy rationed supplies, and former speculators and private traders who had previously thrived on the profit opportunities created by wartime and postwar shortages.^{^[48]}

State policy has also sought to maintain the flow of labor from collective farms to nonagricultural work. An important part of this policy has been the large-scale recruitment of rural adolescents for the state labor reserve schools, of which more below. The stress put in ⁶ Pravda, May 28, 1948.

the postwar period upon re-equipping agriculture with tractors and other farm machinery seems to have been motivated in part by a desire to reduce the labor needs of the collective farms so the resulting surplus could be drained off

Most important in this connection seems the unfavorable treatment accorded the farming population under the provisions of the ration and financial reforms of December 1947. The significant cash balances which farmers had accumulated earlier through open market sales at extremely high prices were reduced most substantially by the ten-to-one exchange ratio imposed by this reform. The high prices themselves were drastically reduced by the simultaneous lowering of commercial store food prices to approximately the former level of ration prices. These blows at farmers' savings and current income occurred at the same time that the real value of urban workers' current wages rose sharply as the result of the same measures. The relative attractiveness of nonagricultural and agricultural employment was thus sharply altered in favor of the former, creating new incentives for rural-to-urban migration.

Effect of Policies

The effect of these policies upon the entire Soviet labor force cannot be traced in detail because of the lack of data. In particular, changes in the agricultural and unfree labor forces are hidden behind the curtain of statistical secrecy. Only the growth of the number of workers and employees in the national economy—i.e., essentially the nonagricultural labor force—can be traced, as in Table 1.

Table 1 indicates that the nonagricultural labor force has grown much more rapidly than originally planned by Soviet leaders, the 1950 goal being

Table 1—Workers and Employees in the

National Economy ⁷
Year	Millions
1940	31 2
1943	19 3
1945	27 2
1946	30.2
1947	314
1948	33 4
1950 Goal	33 5

virtually attained by 1948. The sharp increase in 1948 after the relatively small rise in 1947 suggests that the financial and ration reforms of late 1947 were successful in inducing significant numbers of urban and rural people to enter the nonagricultural labor force*

A puzzling point in any effort to account for postwar Soviet labor force changes is the problem of the fate of the several million Soviet citizens who became prisoners of war or slave laborers during the conflict but returned to the U.S.S.R. after V-E Day. All or most of these people may have simply returned to their old homes and become net additions to the labor force, accountable in the same fashion as demobilized military personnel. Yet some evidence suggests that large numbers of these unfortunates returned under a heavy cloud of suspicion and were or

⁷ These data computed from information in the following sources. 1940—N Voznesensky, op. cit. note 4 supra, p. 13; 1943—ibid., p. 109; 1945—Planovoye Khozyazstvo, No. 2 (1946), p. 137; data for 1946-48 derived from 1945 figure by using figures given in Pravda, Jan 21, 1947, Jan. 18, 1948, and Jan. 20, 1949 The 1950 goal is from the Fourth Five- Year Plan. A higher number, 34.3 million for 1948, is obtained from the statement that in that year there were 10 per cent more workers and employees than m 1940 Cf. Pravda, Jan. 20, 1949. The figure given in Table 1 for 1948 can be obtained, however, if it is assumed the 10 per cent applies to the 30 4 million workers and employees in the US.SR. in 1940 within that country's boundaries in that year. No satisfactory reconciliation seems possible without further information.

are being employed as forced laborers.⁸If the latter alternative is correct, these people are not represented in the data in Table 1, which includes only free workers.

On the whole matter of the size of the unfree labor force we are almost completely in the dark. The size of this group was diminished during 1945-49 by the return home of many German prisoners of war and of smaller numbers of other former Axis soldiers. But the extent to which these repatriations have been balanced by the sentencing of dissident Soviet citizens—particularly groups in the formerly occupied regions who co-operated with the Germans, such as Ukrainians, Lithuanians, Tatars, and others—is unknown.

Redistribution of Labor

Hand in hand with the effort to increase the size of the labor force has gone the endeavor to redistribute those already in it. Policies aimed at drawing workers from agriculture to non- farm occupations have already been mentioned, but both within agricultural and in nonagricultural occupations, significant redistribution has taken place. Throughout the urban areas of the U.S.S.R. the Soviet regime has persuaded or forced hundreds of thousands of clerical workers and others engaged in so-called "ancillary" occupations to leave their jobs and take others more directly contributing to immediate physical production. By early 1947 it was reported that 730,000 vacant administrative and clerical positions had been eliminated as the result of this effort.

Similarly, on the collective farms the Government has attempted to limit sharply the number of persons engaged in other tasks than direct crop or live-

⁸ George Fischer, "The New Soviet Emigration," The Russian Review, Jan. 1949, pp. 9, 10 stock production, setting strict limits on the percentage of farm income that may go to pay for administrative work and revising pay differentials so as to attract agronomists from office to field assignments.

Increased Man-hour Productivity

Increased man-hour productivity has been the second major labor policy objective of the past few years. The Fourth Five-Year Plan requires that "productivity of labor in industry shall be raised 36 per cent by 1950 as compared with prewar" and "productivity of labor on construction work shall be raised 40 per cent by 1950 as compared with prewar."

Productivity gains required from 1945 to 1950 were undoubtedly much more substantial than indicated above, since 1945 productivity was almost certainly below the prewar level. In 1945 the industrial labor force contained large numbers of relatively inexperienced and poorly trained workers. Much of the machinery in the U.S.S.R. had been operated at maximum tempo during the war years, with little replacement and few spare parts. The lack of food and the poor living conditions generally during the war also tended to keep down productivity. Nevertheless, productivity in 1945 was probably well above that of 1942, since the labor force had gained much experience during the war. Moreover, Soviet technology improved during the war, and the use of conveyor-belt production lines became more frequent.

Compulsory overtime was abolished shortly after V-J Day, and the standard Soviet work week since in nonagricultural occupations has consisted of eight hours a day, six days a week—a level higher than before June 1940 but substantially lower than during the war. Vacations for nonagricultural workers, abolished during the war, were permitted again after 194S. Both of these moves must have tended to increase productivity through their effects on both the worker's morale and his physical well-being.

Initial reconversion from war to peace output during 1945 and 1946, however, must have tended to reduce labor productivity sharply It is significant that no mention is made of any increase in labor productivity in the State Planning Commission report on economic progress during 1946. During that year and also in early 1947, the Soviet press was replete with accounts of reconversion difficulties and the resultant poor output.^{^[49]}

Productivity of industrial workers was reported to have grown 13 per cent in 1947 and 15 per cent in 1948 over the previous year's figure, or a total of almost 30 per cent over the 1946 level.^{^[50]}Since the announcement on gains in 1948 noted that the prewar level of industrial productivity had been exceeded only in that year, it appears that the prewar mark may well have been 20 or 25 per cent above that of 1946. If we assume tentatively^ and perhaps conservatively, that the prewar level was only 20 per cent higher than in 1946, the goal sought for 1950—a rise of 36 per cent over prewar—would seem to be 60 or 70 per cent over the productivity in the first full postwar year.

In a real sense, much of postwar government economic policy may be said to have been directed at raising labor productivity. The program for increased output of new and improved machinery, the demobilization of millions of men in the prime of life from the armed forces, and similar measures of a general nature may well have been the most important factors making for productivity improvement.

We shall treat in detail here, however, only that narrower group of policies which focus directly upon the improvement of labor productivity. The most important of these policies seem to have been these: (1) A gigantic program of vocational training aimed at both increasing the number of skilled workers and improving the qualifications of those at work; (2) measures taken with respect to wages and real earnings of workers in order to increase incentives for maximum output; (3) measures taken to reduce labor turnover, as well as to improve worker morale generally; (4) policy with respect to work organization and socialist competition.

Vocational Training

With regard to vocational training, we may note first that the Fourth Five- Year Plan called for a continuation of the system of state labor reserve schools. Students in these are teen-agers obtained by a draft process or through volunteering. They are usually given two years of training and then are assigned to work where needed for four years afterward. These schools are scheduled to graduate 4,500,000 students during 1946-50, and to have by 1950 facilities permitting them to graduate 1,200,000 students annually, as compared with 400,000 graduates in 1946. Other on-the-job and related vocational training is planned to give technical training to 7,700,000 unskilled workers and to raise the skills of 13,900,000 other workers during 1946-50.

During the years 1946-48 inclusive, Soviet reports indicate that the state labor reserve schools graduated 2,170,000 students. About 7,000,000 unskilled workers have received some technical training, and 10,400,000 workers have improved their skills. Most of the graduates of the labor reserve schools appear to have been trained for work in coal mining, transport, and areas of heavy industry in which the shortage of specialists has been most pronounced.

Complaints in the Soviet press from time to time have indicated that the quality of vocational instruction is too often poor and that a significant portion of labor reserve school graduates find their training inadequate or are used at jobs other than that for which they have been schooled, when they are assigned to work after graduation.

German technicians induced or forced to come to the Soviet Union after V-E Day have probably been used as instructors of Soviet workers as well as directly in production.

Rewards for Production

Official Soviet doctrine emphasizes that the present stage of the U.S.S.R.'s development, socialism, is one in which rewards and income are directly dependent upon each individual's productive contribution. Long before World War II, wages and other types of remuneration were adjusted to reflect the quantity and the quality of different workers' contributions, through such means as the displacement of time rates by piece rates. More recently the trend has been toward displacement of simple piece-rate systems by variations. These seek to create greater incentive for high output by paying bonuses and higher sums per unit for output above the basic norm. Such modification of the wage system was pushed during the war and afterward as .well.¹¹

Where bonuses or higher unit rates are paid for above-norm output, any raising of the norm will have the effect of reducing the earnings of workers who have been exceediog their norms, unless,

¹¹ Cf. A. E. Pasherstnik, "Problems of Legal Wage Regulation," American Review on the Soviet Union (May 1946), pp. 63 ff.

of course, they increase their output to compensate for the higher norm. In a number of important Soviet industries after the war, the situation seems to have been that large numbers of workers were overfulfilling their norms regularly. The 1947 economic plan ordered industrial ministries to re-examine existing norms with a view to revising them upward In particular, output norms were ordered raised 20-25 per cent in machinery plants, repair installations, enterprises of local and republican industry, and some other types of enterprises. Such upward revision must have given many workers the alternative of increasing their output or accepting substantially lower earnings.

Discussion in the Soviet press in the postwar period has made it clear that in many plants norms are based on average actual performance, whereas government policy aims at basing norms on the output of the best workers, thus applying pressure upon the majority to improve their performance.

The Soviet version of profit sharing has been reinstituted since V-E Day. This is accomplished through the "Director's Fund" obtained in each enterprise by securing profits in excess of those planned. This fund is used for housing, nurseries, and other communal projects, as well as for individual bonuses. To help achieve higher profits, of course, workers must not only raise productivity in a physical sense but also reduce costs and wastes of all kinds.

Similar measures have been taken in agriculture in an effort to raise productivity there too. The most important changes introduced in agricultural payment procedures in the postwar period were these:

1. As far as possible, all payment to collective farmers is to be based on piecework. Farmers are to be grouped in permanent work teams, and the pay received by members of different work teams is to vary on the basis of differences in output obtained by these teams. Essentially this means that where old practice tended to give equal income for each "labor day" earned by all farmers on the same collective, the value of a "labor day" is now determined by the crop or livestock results achieved by the group with which the "labor day" was earned, and differs from group to group even on the same farm.

2. The entire system of farm work norms, on the basis of which labor days are granted farmers, was ordered reexamined with a view to raising the norms for each task. Existing norms, mainly introduced in 1933 and 1934, were declared obsolete and too low, and were said to be incompatible with the contemporary conditions of Soviet agriculture. Where formerly farm work was divided into seven different types, each being paid from 0.5 to 2.0 labor days per norm fulfillment, nine groups were introduced and the range made to extend from 0.5 to 2.5 labor days. Work in crop production was awarded higher rates than work in other branches of farm production. Rates of pay for different tasks involved in crop production were altered so as to give highest rewards for those employed in soil preparation, seeding, and harvesting, while less important types of work were assigned lower rates.¹²

In agriculture as in industry, therefore, future earnings are to be ever more closely linked with direct measurable output, at least if the changes ordered in 1948 are carried out. Comment in the Soviet press has indicated that the order to raise work norms and to establish differential values for labor days

¹² A comprehensive discussion of the changes introduced by the decree of April 1948 is given in S. Cheremushkin, "Za Dal'neishi Pod'em ProizvoditeTnosti Truda v Kolkhozakh," So- tsidlistickeskoye Sel'skoye Khozyctistvo (July 1948), pp. 3-10.

earned on the same farm has been met with something less than wholehearted enthusiasm. Many collective farms have apparently ignored these orders or executed them in the most formal and halfhearted fashion.¹⁸

Ration and Price Changes to Increase Output

Government policy on rations and prices has increased pressure for higher output. The rationing system of 194147 had been forced by shortages of essential commodities, but was regarded with official disfavor as tending to discourage desired productivity rises. A discussion in the State Planning Commission journal pointed out that rationing tends to equalize the real incomes of workers of high and low productivity, weakening incentives for maximum output. Only by ending rationing could the direct link between a worker's production, his current earnings, and his real income be made most plain so as to stimulate workers to put their utmost exertions into their work.¹⁴

Even before the abolition of rationing, the tripling of ration food prices in 1946—accompanied by a less than compensatory increase in wages—increased workers⁷ basic living costs substantially and must have made many workers feel sharply the need for increased income. Such higher income could in general be received by those already at work only by increasing output, since Soviet wage scales are usually on a piecework basis.

The reforms of December 15, 1947 were also aimed at the same objective. By abolishing rationing, lowering substantially the old very high commercial store (unrationed commodity) prices, and reducing the size of accumulated

¹⁸ Cf. the typical complaints on this score in Pravda, Sept. 19, 1948.

G. Kosyachenko, "Povysheniye MateriaT- nogo i KuTturnogo Urovnya Zhizni Naroda v Novoi PyatiletkePlanovoye Khozyaistvo, No. 2 (1946), pp 139-40.

savings—90 per cent in the case of cash hoards, but less sharply in the case of bank accounts and state bond holdings—the Government created a situation in which workers became more dependent than ever on their current incomes, and also the real value of current incomes increased Soviet testimony asserts that these changes stimulated greater devotion to work and higher output by workers who had formerly taken things easy, since the real value of their wages in the past had offered little incentive for higher production.¹⁵

Incentive of Unequal Earnings

Soviet propaganda in the past year has attempted to encourage what may perhaps be termed a "Keep-up-with-the- Joneses" psychology. Very high earnings of isolated workers are being much publicized, along with accounts of how they have been able to build homes, buy clothing, radios, and other commodities, and generally lead a more "cultured" life. The implication for others seems plain.

The inequality of earnings that has resulted from this policy may be seen if we attempt to compare average earnings of workers and employees in the national economy with isolated cases of very high earnings The estimation of average earnings is rather difficult because of the lack of data, but the figures shown in Table 2 are believed to give an approximate reflection of the movement of earnings since 1940.

The data in Table 2 portray graphically the wartime and postwar wage inflation in the Soviet Union, an inflation which proceeded much more rapidly than even the planners of the Fourth Five-Year Plan anticipated. The sharp rise in earnings between 1946 and 1947 is probably attributable in major part

¹⁵ Cf. the rather remarkable discussion of this in Pravda, Feb 13, 1948

Table 2—Annual Earnings of Workers and Employees in the National Economy ¹⁶

Year Ruble Earnings

1940 4,100

1946 6,000

1947 7,100

1948 7,400

1950 Goal 6,000

to the compensatory wage increases granted Soviet workers at the time of the tripling of rationed food prices in September 1946. These pay rises ranged from 110 rubles for those receiving 300 rubles a month or less to 80 rubles for those whose monthly pay was 700 rubles to 900 rubles. Those receiving higher wages got no compensatory increase. Most Soviet workers, therefore, got a pay rise of about a thousand rubles annually, or roughly the amount of increase shown in Table 2 from 1946 tq 1947.

¹⁰ The 1940 figure is derived from Voznesensky's statement in February 1941 The data for 1946-48 are estimated in the following fashion It is assumed that the wages fund goal of 280 billion rubles for 1947 set by that year's plan was actually achieved The 1946 and 1948 wages funds can be calculated on the basis of percentages showing their relationship to the 1947 fund These percentages were published in Pravda, Jan 18, 1948 and Jan 20, 1949 It is further assumed that the pay roll received by workers and employees in the national economy was about 80 per cent of the wages fund calculated above This assumption is based on the constancy of the percentages calculated by Professor Berg- son m his article in the Review of Economic Statistics, Nov. 1947, p. 236 Such use of these percentages was first suggested to the author by Professor Bergson. The pay roll estimates thus obtained are then divided by the figures on the number of workers and employees in the national economy given in Table 1, to obtain the averages in Table 2. A partial check on this calculation is provided by the statement in Voprosy Ekonomiki, No 8, 1948, p 23, that the wages fund in 1948 is almost double that of 1940. The 1948 wages fund calculated by the method given above is 308 billion rubles, almost twice the actual 1940 wages fund of roughly 16$ billion rubles.

To put the figures in Table 2 in proper perspective we must remember that they were accompanied over this period by a much sharper rise in the price of necessities. Between 1940 and 1948, prices of foods seem to have increased between two and three times, probably closer to the higher figure, while average annual earnings shown above increased only about 75 per cent A somewhat similar picture is indicated by a study of available data on changes in prices of the chief consumer goods. In 1948, despite the sharp rise in wages, the real earnings of Soviet workers were still apparently substantially below the 1940 level—a fact not very surprising in view of the great impoverishment suffered by the Soviet Union during World War II.^{^[51]}

It is illuminating, too, to contrast the data in Table 2 with the fragmentary information available on extremely high incomes in the Soviet Union. There is, for example, the recent article in Trud^{^[52]}telling of three Donbas miners whose annual earnings during the three years 1946-48 have been between 60,000 and 74,000 rubles. Data published at other times have told of workers earning between 10,000 and 15,000 rubles monthly, or at annual rates of 120,000 to 180,000 rubles. Since at the lower extremes some Soviet workers must receive as little as, say, 3,000 rubles annually, the range between high and low earnings is extremely great, and the ratio between them may be of the order of magnitude of 50:1 or 60:1 or more.¹⁰

Problem of Labor Turnover

Labor turnover has been a major problem of the postwar period, as it was of the 1930's. Frequent reference to this matter in the Soviet press, particularly in 1946 and early 1947, made it clear that much of this turnover was the result of unsatisfactory housing conditions, lack of food, and other discomforts, in many areas, all of which induced workers to migrate in search of better situations. Such migration was greatly facilitated by the high and expanding postwar need for nonagricultural labor. Managers of economic enterprises have apparently been glad to hire all who applied, often ignoring government regulations aimed at discouraging such migration in their eagerness to get the number of workers required to enable them to fulfill their output quotas. Without such confidence that they could obtain jobs easily, workers would probably have been much less eager to leave their posts. But such turnover tended to keep productivity down, as workers moved too frequently to learn any one job well. Aid, of course, frequent replacement of workers tends to interfere with normal factory routine.

To combat this migration and turnover, the Soviet regime has retained to the present the prewar legislation providing that workers must remain on their jobs until released by their employers. This legislation still provides penalties for violation of this and other job-freeze regulations.^{^[53]}

earnings of the lowest-paid worker at that time." Since the effort to increase inequalities of incomes has been pursued vigorously since 1934, the ratios suggested in the text do not seem unreasonable. Cf. Abram Bergson, The Structure of Soviet Wages (Cambridge, 1946), p 129

²⁰ Cf. M. T. Florinsky, "Stalin's New Deal for Labor," Political Science Quarterly (March 1941), pp 38-50

This system of compulsion apparently broke down during the confusion of the war and under the pressure of the great postwar labor shortage. It was revealed in the summer of 1946 that large numbers of workers did not even have labor books, the basic instrument through which control of free migration is exercised under the law. The Government ordered an immediate campaign at that time to ensure that all workers had labor books and that the provisions of the law against free movement of workers were enforced.²¹

More positively, however, the Government has sought to combat excessive migration through improvement of workers' living conditions. Large-scale housing construction is an important feature of the current Five-Year Plan, as is increased output of food and consumer goods. To the extent that these improvements in living conditions have been realized, they have presumably weakened the forces making for migration from job to job. On the other hand, the pace at which workers' living conditions could be improved has been kept down by the emphasis on heavy industry and capital investment in areas other than housing, as provided by the current Five-Year Plan.

In certain key occupations, such as coal mining, metallurgy, and the chemical industry, labor turnover has been combated in the postwar period by linking pensions and earnings with the number of years a worker has remained an employee of the same enterprise. It is perhaps a revealing commentary on conditions in the coal industry that more than a year after passage of this special legislation, official complaints about serious labor turnover in this industry continued to be voiced.

One of the chief migration problems apparently encountered in the early postwar period was the tendency of Pravda, July 27, 1946.

workers who had been moved from the west to the Urals and beyond to return to their homes without official sanction. In an effort to check this movement, which disrupted production at the plants and mines in the east, the Government announced a 20 per cent wage increase for workers in particular heavy industries in eastern areas, as well as a program for expanded housing construction there.²² Such differential benefits, of course, serve also to attract workers to these areas from other regions less favorably treated. ^k

Trade Unions

The trade union movement has been called upon to play an important role in improving workers' conditions of life and work in order to increase their productivity. Collective agreements between unions and managements were reinstituted as a major weapon of union activity beginning with 1947. These agreements contain provisions aimed at increasing worker output and others designed to help improve the conditions under which union members live and work. The magnitude of this trade union program is indicated by the Soviet statement that 40,000 such agreements were concluded in 1948, covering 17,000,000 workers and employees.²³

The effectiveness of these agreements in reaching their objectives is difficult to assess, since improvement of productivity arid living standards has been sought through other facets of government economic and labor policy too. Accounts in the Soviet press of the fulfillment and lack of fulfillment of the provisions of different collective agreements suggest that at the plant level in

^Ibid., Aug. 27, 1946. Some workers moved east during the war were, of course, permitted to return

²³ Izvestiya, Feb 3, 1949 This number of workers is about 60 per cent of the 27 million union members in the Soviet Union.

many cases such union activity has had appreciable effect, but in other cases the agreements have been of little or no importance.

Competitions

In the last group of policies listed above we may include primarily the postwar continuation and further development of the Stakhanovite movement. Outstanding workers such as the miner Zaporozhets, the textile worker Volkova, and others have been widely publicized as setting production achievements for others to attain. What might be called group Stakhanovism has been sought with entire shops or other work teams organized to achieve extraordinary production performance as a unit, in contrast to the individual achievements emphasized by the Stakhanovite records set originally. Soviet propaganda has emphasized that encouragement must be given to innovators and others who seek to increase production by changing old ways of doing things in favor of better ones.

The Soviet Union—as reflected in its newspapers—has been in a fever of socialist competitions all through the postwar period. Such competitions have been announced for almost every possible occasion. The abundance of these socialist competitions in the postwar era- suggests either that Soviet people labor in a state of constant competitive frenzy or—more likely—that the original power of these events to stimulate greater effort has been greatly weakened, requiring frequent application of the same stimulant.

Coercive Measures

No review of Soviet postwar labor policy would be complete without pointing out that a number of measures of labor compulsion introduced before and during the war have been retained. The collective farmer's obligation to work a minimum number of days each year on the collective fields is still a matter of legal requirement, violation of which makes him subject to six months' corrective labor on his collective farm, during which period 25 per cent of his wages are forfeited.²⁴

Workers absent from their jobs without authorization are criminally responsible under an edict of June 26, 1940, the continued existence of which has recently been reaffirmed.²⁵

The edict of April 15, 1943 placing railroad workers under martial law is still in effect according to Sotsialistiche- skaya Zakonnost' of May 1948. The same journal indicates that the decree of December 26, 1941 restricting the mobility of workers in defense industry is also still in effect.²⁰

Success of Policy

Judged purely by its effectiveness in increasing the labor force, raising productivity, and aiding the general increase in production, the complex of measures making up postwar Soviet labor policy has undoubtedly achieved a good deal of success.

One wonders, however, how those subject to this calculated combination of incentives and compulsions regard these policies. One wonders, for example, whether Soviet workers put the same low premium on their leisure and family life that their rulers do. If the experience of the British Government

²* This edict of April IS, 1942 was preserved according to the decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party "On Measures for an Upsurge of Agriculture in the Postwar Period," Pravda, Feb. 28, 1947.

25 V. M. Dogadov, "Steps in the Development of the Soviet Collective Agreement," lzvestiya of the UJSJ5.R. Academy of Sciences, Economics and Law Section (March-April 1948), p. 92.

26 SotsiaUsticheskaya Zakonnost' (May 1948), p. 55, in the article on the practice of the Plenum of the U.S.S.R Supreme Court.

Harry Schwartz, Ph D, Syracuse, New York, is associate professor of economics tn the Maxwell Graduate School of Syracuse University. He has taught at Columbia University and Brooklyn College and has served as an economist with the Department of Agriculture and the War Production Board. During and immediately after the war he was engaged in research on the Soviet economy for the Office of Strategic Services and the Department of State. He has been a frequent contributor to professional journals and the New York Times on matters related to the Soviet Union He is the author of Russia's Postwar Economy (1947), Seasonal Farm Labor in the United States (1945), and The Soviet Economy: A Selected Bibliography (1949).

in recent years is any guide, such a labor policy could never be executed in a democratic society in times of peace.

But then, the Soviet society is not democratic, and this is the era of the "cold war."

Russia's Trade in

By Alexander

FEW years ago the Berkeley Chapter of the Sloan Foundation prepared a somewhat unconventional map of the trading world in 1938. The shape of each country was preserved, but its area was changed to conform to its share in the aggregate trade of the world, so that 1 per cent of world trade was represented by 1 per cent of world area. In the east of Europe that map showed a small island, not quite the size of Switzerland, lost in the midst of a huge blank space. This island was Soviet Russia, whose trade at the end of the thirties amounted to just about 1 per cent of world trade.

During the war the hope was frequently expressed that the end of hostilities would fundamentally change the situation just described and inaugurate a long period of intensive trade relations between Russia and the Western world. It was believed that the years of the common struggle against Nazi Germany and the needs of economic reconstruction would induce Russia to relinquish its autarkic policies and to change the structure of its economy in such a way as to permit of a significant division of labor between Russia and the rest of the world. It is the main purpose of this paper to confront these expectations with developments since the end of the war and to compare Russia's current foreign trade structure and policies with those of the nineteen-thirties.

The Statistical Hazards

The desirability of obtaining at least a general notion of the magnitude and

* The writer wishes to acknowledge his indebtedness for valuable advice to Miss Caroline Lichtenberg, Mr. Gregory Grossman, and Professor Walter Galenson.

the Postwar Years

Gerschenkron *

structure of Russia's trade since the end of the war is obvious. In fact, any knowledge of the problems involved which is not based on some quantitative data is probably not worth having. But it is far from easy to assemble the pertinent statistics. The year 1938 was the last year for which regular statistics of foreign commerce were published in Russia. Recently N. Voznesensky supplied figures for the aggregate export and import values in Russia for the years 1940, 1942, and 1943,¹ but no information has been disclosed for any subsequent year. Accordingly, data on Russian foreign trade for the postwar years must be garnered from trade statistics of all the countries which traded with Russia during the period under review.² The results of such a compila-

¹N Voznesensky, The Economy of the V, 5. S. R. During World War II (Public Affairs Press, 1948), p 40.

² It is easy to believe that the Russians do not wish to publicize the amount of reparations which they have been extracting from eastern Germany, since they are also able to prevent publication of such data in the latter region. With regard to other data on Russian trade, including the reparations from eastern European countries, the Russian secrecy is much more difficult to understand, precisely because other countnes do publish statistics on their trade with Russia. Nevertheless, such secrecy is absolute, and sometimes leads to grotesque results Thus, an article in a Russian professional journal devoted to the recent developments of world fur trade, in which Russia plays such an important part, hardly mentions Russia at all (cf. Vneshnyaya Tor- govlya, Vol. XVIII, No 7, July 1948, pp 15). There are no signs that the Russians might lift the veil of secrecy Quite the contrary, it even seems that the Russians have begun to induce the satellite countries to adopt similar policies with regard to their own trade statistics. Bulgana discontinued publication of trade statistics in May 1948, and now treats such data as "state secrets "

tion for the years 1946 and 1947 are presented in the following section.

This indirect method of ascertaining a country's foreign trade values is not only very laborious but also highly uncertain. One need not be particularly versed in foreign trade statistics to appreciate the hazards and the pitfalls involved. Even in normal times, trade statistics of any pair of countries are subject to considerable discrepancies. There is always the question of costs of transportation. In most countries export values are entered on an f.o.b. frontier basis, while import values are on a c.i.f. frontier basis. That is to say, the former do not include transportation charges from frontier to destination, while the latter include such charges from the selling country to the frontier of the reporting country. In other countries, including the United States, both exports and imports are valued on an f.o.b. basis. In still others a flat percentage is added to the f.ob. value of imports. Obviously, an appropriate adjustment for cost of carriage must be made if, say, French imports from Russia are to be shown as Russian exports to France. The following figures include such an adjustment. In accordance with the prevailing custom, Russian exports have been placed on an f.o.b. basis and Russian imports on a c.i.f. basis. The magnitude of the adjustment must vary with distance, mode of transportation, and commodity structure of trade. In addition, transportation charges were lower in 1947 than in 1946.

Procedures used

The attempt has been to take into account some of these factors. For non- European countries (except the adjacent countries in Asia) the f.o.b. values were assumed to lie below the c.i.f. values as follows: IS per cent in 1946 and 11 per cent in 1947.³ Lower differentials were assumed for European countries which have no common frontier with Russia (11 and 9 per cent respectively), and still lower (S per cent in both years) for those countries which are adjacent to Russia but where a certain fraction of trade is as a rule channeled either indirectly through other countries or via maritime routes. Corresponding percentages have been used for converting exports to Russia into Russian imports Clearly, this is a very rough procedure, in that it disregards differences in commodity composition of exports and imports which on the whole should make for higher ratios of freight cost to trade values for Russian exports as compared with imports; on the other hand, shipping charges in general have been lower in east-west trade as compared with west-east trade, because of much largei shipments in the latter direction. No attempt has been made to take these factors into account here. For this and other reasons, all such adjustments must be in the nature of rough estimates.

There are other difficulties. In some cases, imported commodities were allowed to enter the statistics at their domestic rather than actual prices. In one important case, that of wheat imported into France from Russia in 1946, it was possible to make an adjustment by substituting the then current world market price of wheat for the low French subsidized price at which those imports were included in the records.

To obtain a uniform tabulation, trade values expressed in individual currencies must be translated into a common unit. The following tables show these values in United States dollars. This procedure raises the question of appropri-

³ These percentages have been used for similar purposes by the Economic Commission for Europe. Cf. United Nations, A Survey of the Economic Situation and Prospects of Europe (Geneva, 1948), p. 200.

TABLE 1—Russia's Foreign Trade (In millions of dollars)

	1946		1947		Balance
	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	1946	1947
Marshall plan countries (exclud
ing western Germany)	78	94	88	145	-16	-57
Soviet zone of influence in Eu
rope (excluding Soviet zone of
occupation in Germany, and
Albania)⁰	215	225	240	219	-10	+21
United States	101	422	77	166	-311	-89
Rest of world	6	52	25	74	-26	-49
	400	793	430	604	-363	-174

" Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Finland, Hungary, Rumania, Yugoslavia. Sources: The underlying data and a list of source references can be obtained in mimeographed form from the Russian Research Center, Harvard University, 38 Qumcy Street, Cambridge 38, Massachusetts.

ate exchange rates. Changes in official exchange rates which took place during 1946 and 1947 were taken into account by the use of monthly trade values. There are, however, far graver problems. In Italy, for instance, multiple exchange rates had been used in trade statistics to convert the foreign exchange values into lira values; reconversion into dollars for 1947 was based on computations made by the Italian Central Institute of Statistics. The conversion of the 1946 figures is even less certain.

In general, the pattern of official exchange rates which has developed since the end of the war is still far from realistic. In a great many countries, particularly in eastern Europe, exchange rates are much too high in relation to existing price levels in these countries. Whenever such an overvalued rate is used, the resulting dollar values represent in reality a smaller volume of trade as compared with equal dollar values resulting from conversion of trade values of countries with less overvalued exchange rates. Polish trade figures seem to suffer particularly from such an overvaluation. Since Poland bulks large in eastern European trade with Russia, the share of eastern Europe in Russia's foreign trade must appear larger than it actually is.

Finally, no Yugoslav trade statistics are available. As a result, independent estimates based on a Russian source⁴in conjunction with occasional references in the press had to be used. Similarly, exports to Russia from Russian-held enterprises in the Soviet zone of occupation in Austria do not appear in Austrian trade statistics and also had to be estimated.

These are serious difficulties. Nevertheless, the writer feels that the following figures provide some idea as to the order of magnitudes in Russian postwar trade, and may be found useful, as long as their precarious nature is borne in mind.

Value and Volume of Trade

The data which have been collected and adjusted as described are summarized in Table 1. These figures for

4 B. Shvets, "Vneshnyaya torgovlya Yugoslavia i yeye organizatsiya," Vneshnyaya Torgovlya, Vol XVI, No. 12, Dec. 1946; ibid., Vol. XVH, No. 5, p. 43.

Russian imports do not include Russian trade with Germany or (and this is most important) Soviet reparations extracted from Germany and the three eastern European countries, Finland, Hungary, and Rumania. This omission, which will be discussed later, must be borne in mind.

On the other hand, the figures do include deliveries to Russia by the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, as well as the so-called "pipe-line" imports under lend-lease from the United States. In 1946, UNRRA deliveries from the United States (including small amounts of private relief) came to 45 per cent and the lend-lease deliveries to 40 per cent of total United States exports to Russia. In 1947, the share of these two items fell to 34 per cent of United States exports to Russia. The United States supplied about 70 per cent of total UNRRA deliveries to Byelorussia and the Ukraine. The 1946 imports into Russia from "Marshall plan countries" (United Kingdom) and from the "Rest of the world" (Canada) likewise contain a not inconsiderable portion of UNRRA deliveries.

This means that the value of commercial imports proper into Russia was smaller than is indicated in Table 1. But even disregarding this circumstance, Russian trade in the two postwar years seems quite low. Assuming that prices in 1946 and 1947 were twice as high as in 1938, the "volume" (quantum of trade) of Russian trade is shown in Table 2.

Thus the volume of exports in both years was not inconsiderably below the 1938 level. The volume of imports in 1946 was indeed higher than in 1938, but deduction of UNRRA deliveries would reduce the volume of imports to about the 1938 level. In 1938, Russia's foreign trade was very low in relation to that which was attained dur-

TABLE 2—"Volume" of Russia's Foreign Trade (At 1938 prices)

	Millions of Dollars		1938	= 100
	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports
1938	266	285	100	100
1946	200	396	75	139
1947	215	302	81	106

ing the First Five-Year Plan. An index of the volume of foreign trade, prepared in Russia for 1929-38, shows that the volume of Russian exports and imports in 1938 was 43 and 39 per cent, respectively, of that of 1931.° The postwar volume of commercial exports and imports (including UNRRA imports) in relation to 1931 is therefore computed to be as shown in Table 3,

TABLE 3—Volume of Foreign Trade 1931 - 100

Kxportb I m pints

1946 34 54

1947 36 41

Thus the volume of trade which can be computed on the basis of the available statistics of Russia's trading partners is greatly below the level of trade which was attained in 1931. It must be recalled at this point, however, that the picture presented in these three tables is very incomplete. The fact that they do not include the "political"— i.e. the reparation—imports from Germany and three eastern European countries must now be considered a little more closely.

It would be desirable, of course, to provide data on reparation deliveries for both years, 1946 and 1947, for which figures were supplied in the first three tables. The data for 1946, however,

⁵Cf. S. N, Bakulin and D. D. Mishustin, Statistika vneshney torgovli (Statistics of Foreign Trade), Moscow, 1940, p 287. The index covers only nine months of 1938.

proved even more uncertain than the data for 1947, and the estimates had to be confined to the later year. This is unfortunate, since it would have been interesting to compare development of reparation deliveries in the two years, particularly as it must be assumed that these deliveries in 1946 were greatly in excess of those in 1947.

Reparations from eastern Europe

Let us first turn for the 1947 reparation estimate to the three eastern European countries: Hungary, Rumania, and Finland. The reparation deliveries were indeed scheduled and recorded thereafter at 1938 prices with some relatively minor (10-15 per cent) upward adjustments, but it is usually assumed that the relation of the reparation dollar to the current dollar must lie in the vicinity of 1:2. This ratio of course varies with the composition of reparation deliveries, but the 1:2 ratio is supported for Finland by the data in Finnish trade statistics and for Hungary by the budgetary data.⁶

On this basis, Finnish reparation deliveries in 1947 amounted to about $75 million, and the Hungarian deliveries to about $35 million. The estimate for Rumania, which is more uncertain, results in some $70 million for reparation deliveries in 1947. (All figures in current dollars.) Thus the total deliveries in 1947 may have amounted to some $180 million. To this must be added Finnish obligations resulting from the Russo-Finnish agreement concerning German assets in Finland. This agreement may have resulted in an additional $10-15 million worth of deliveries in 1947, increasing the total value of reparation deliveries from the three

« Cf. Finland* Officiella Statistik, Utrikskan- del, M&nads-publikation (Dec 1947), pp 67; and Gazdasdgstatisztikai T&jikoztatd, Vol. II, No. 1 (Jan 1948), p 58 eastern European countries to an amount close to $200 million.

Furthermore, the Polish trade statistics do not include the deliveries in 1947 to Russia of about 6.5 million tons of coal. These deliveries must be regarded as political exports, inasmuch as they were made, under a special Russo- Polish agreement, in consideration of Russian deliveries to Poland of German reparations goods; the price charged is said to be extremely low and may amount to about $1.00 per (metric) ton. These deliveries, valued at the current price for Polish coal of about $15-16 per (metric) ton, amounted in 1947 to about $100 million.⁷ Adding this figure to those previously obtained, results in a total estimate of $300 million political exports to Russia from eastern Europe.

Reparations from Germany

The question of deliveries to Russia from the Soviet zone of occupation in Germany is much more difficult to treat.

⁷ Until recently nothing was known as to what portion of German reparations was transmitted to the Poles. In January 1949, however, data for 1946 and 1947 were published by the International Monetary Fund in International Statistics, Vol. It, No. 1 (Jan. 1949), pp. 6, 165. According to this source, Polish receipts of German reparations amounted to $20 million in 1946 and $40 million in 1947. The figure of $40 million therefore ought to be deducted either from the value of Pohsh reparation coal deliveries to Russia in 1947 or from the value of German reparation payments to Russia. The latter figure, as will be mentioned presently, is so large and so uncertain, however, that it seemed unnecessary to take account of $40 million of Polish reparation receipts in Table 4. What should be noted here is the striking discrepancy between Polish reparation receipts and payments. In 1947, the Polish deficit on reparation account seems to have been in the vicinity of $60 million; since in 1946 the political coal deliveries to Russia amounted to about 8 million tons, or to about $80-100 million (at the 1946 price of $10-12 per ton), the Polish deficit in 1946 seems to have been at least as high as in 1947.

This is unfortunate, because quantitatively reparations from Germany undoubtedly were by far the most important single item in Russian imports. The available estimates are hardly more than informed guesses. On the basis of materials contained in a publication of the German Institute for Economic Research⁸ and in the so-called Harmssen Report,⁹ in conjunction with the computations by J. Herbert Furth in his review of the latter publication,¹⁰ it is not improbable that the value of reparation deliveries to Russia in 1947 was within the range of from $800 million to $1.2 billion. For the purposes of this paper it is believed that the figure of one billion dollars should give some idea of the order of the magnitudes involved.¹¹

8Deutsches Institut fur Wirtschaftsforschung, Wtrtschaftsprobleme der Besatzungszonen (Berlin, 1948), pp 120, 126, 140-41.

9 Reparationen, Sozialprodukt, Lebensstand- ard_f Bremen, Oct. 1947

10 J. Herbert Furth, American Economic Review, Vol. XXXVHI, No. 51, pp. 931 et seq Furth presents a maximum estimate for the 1947 reparation deliveries to Russia from the Soviet zone of occupation of about $1.2 billion; the computation is made on the assumption that the volume of the zone's output in 1947 was 50 per cent of that of 1936, or 4 billion mark of 1936 purchasing power, while reparations amounted to about 50 per cent of that output, or 2 billion mark. Converting this amount into current dollars at 60 cents to a mark yields the figure of $1.2 billion.

11 This figure disregards payments of the Soviet zone to the Russians on account of the cost of occupation. It is felt that since this tabulation is primarily concerned with Russia's trade, inclusion of the cost of occupation would require introduction of special assumptions with regard to the productive contribution of the manpower involved if it had not been employed in the Russian occupation forces. The figure, moreover, does not include an estimate for reparations Russia was able, in 1947, to obtain from western Germany. On the other hand, no allowance is made for such exports of raw materials for processing purposes as Russia may have delivered to its zone of occupation in Germany, or for the share of reparation deliveries that was transmitted to Poland.

Tabulation of total imports

Inclusion of the foregoing data for reparation deliveries, in 1947, changes radically the import column for that year in Table 1, as can be seen from Table 4.

TABLE 4

Imports in 1947 in millions of dollars

Marshall plan countries 145

Soviet orbit in eastern Europe Commercial imports 219 Reparations from Finland, Hungary, and Rumania 200'

Political coal imports

from Poland 100

Reparations from Germany 1,000

1,520

United States . 166

Rest of the world 74

1,905

Rough as the preceding estimates are, they permit some general conclusions. The aggregate volume of Russian imports, including political imports, undoubtedly increased very considerably. In 1947 it may have been some 30 per cent higher than in 1931, which probably means an all-time high in the history of Russia's foreign trade. The current value of imports greatly increased in relation to imports of other countries. In 1938, e.g., Russian imports were only 38 per cent of those of Belgium; in 1947 they just about equaled the imports of that country. In this sense, the expectation that during the postwar years Russia's reconstruction needs would lead to a substantial increase in its imports has been justified.

The increase, however, took place in a manner which was very different from that envisaged in wartime writings in this country on Russia's foreign trade.¹²

¹² The writer has the unpleasant duty of acknowledging that his own pamphlet on

These anticipations were doubly wrong. The idea that after the war the Russian economy would be readjusted toward a greater international economic interdependence has found no corroboration in postwar economic policies in Russia. Furthermore, the belief that increased imports during the reconstruction years would come mainly from the West, and particularly from the United States, has been likewise disproved by the actual course of events. What was not foreseen was, first, the extent to which the Russians would rely on "political" rather than commercial imports, and, second, the development of Russia's commercial trade proper with eastern European countries.

Within the sphere of commercial trade, the six eastern European countries which were listed in the footnote to Table 1 came to acquire a dominant position in Russia's commercial foreign trade. In 1938, Russian exports to, and imports from, these countries amounted to 1.7 and 6.8 per cent of the respective Russian totals. In 1947, even excluding reparations, these percentages increased to 56 and 36 respectively. The high level of Russia's imports in 1947 must be appraised against the background of this momentous shift in the geographic pattern of trade. Some remarks on the latter may therefore be in order.

The Pattern of Trade

It is frequently argued that an integral planned economy such as exists in Russia is likely to direct its foreign trade along bilateral rather than along multilateral channels. Such generalizations have the ring of plausibility. Nevertheless, they are not borne out by the history of Soviet foreign trade in the thirties. That trade essentially followed the distinctly multilateral pattern which

Economic Relations with the USSR (New York, 1945) falls into this category had been laid long before the establishment of the Soviet rule in Russia. To express that pattern in a simple formula, it may be said that it consisted in utilizing export surpluses achieved with western European countries for financing import surpluses, first from Germany and then increasingly also from the United States.

Coefficients of the degree of bilateralism in Russian trade can be computed with the help of the method used in the publications of the League of Nations.¹⁸Such computations reveal that in 1931 the percentage of bilaterally compensable trade in total Russian trade was even lower than in 1913. This percentage increased in the subsequent years with the general deterioration of the multilateral trading system in the world, but in 1938 it still was lower than the corresponding percentage of almost any important trading country in Europe.

There is no doubt that this pattern of trade well reflected both the commodity composition of Russian exports for which western Europe forms a natural market and the needs of the Russian industrialization which require imports of capital goods and technical assistance from the United States. It was essentially the belief in the close connection between the traditional pattern of Russian trade and the economic development of the country that in the past caused so many people speculating on the future of Russia's trade to assume that its expansion must primarily take the form of growing imports from the United States.

The distribution of Russian commercial trade as shown in Tables 1 and 4 is altogether overshadowed by the great shifts in favor of eastern Europe, including eastern Germany. Clearly, a new pattern of trade has evolved, and the question which one would like to

¹⁸ Cf. League of Nations, Review of World Trade 1935 (Geneva, 1936), p. 65.

pose is whether the volume of trade attained on the basis of these shifts can contribute to Russia's reconstruction and economic development as much as would the same volume of trade based on the traditional pattern. Phrased in a somewhat different way, the question is whether, say, one million dollars worth of goods obtained from Hungary mean just as much from the point of view of Russia's economic needs as one million dollars worth of goods obtained from the United States.

The steel supply

To pose the question in this form is almost to answer it. There is no question that neither the products of eastern German industry, produced with the help of equipment worn out during the war, nor the products of eastern European countries can compare in their economic importance for Russia with goods which this country could supply.

Viewed over a longer period, the question assumes a definite aspect. The crucial problem of Russian economic development is the supply of steel. Even though considerable success apparently has been achieved in raising the steel output in 1948, there is little doubt that in the longer run, steel will remain a limiting factor in the industrial growth of the country. Whether because of dimnishing returns in iron ore mining,^{^[54]} or because of difficulties with the supply of coking coal, the rate of growth in the output of steel may be assumed to be greatly below that at- tained in the thirties. Stalin's projection of 60 million (metric) tons of steel for the early sixties^{^[55]} implies a rate of growth of steel output about SO per cent below that of the thirties.^{^[56]} Under these circumstances, imports of substantial quantities of steel either in raw form or in form of machinery become an essential requirement for the continued speedy industrialization of the country.

Neither eastern Europe nor eastern Germany is in a position to produce sufficient quantities of steel. Eastern Europe produced in 1947 some 5 million tons of steel, and the steel output in eastern Germany is almost negligible. Even if the current economic plans are fulfilled, steel output of the whole region is unlikely to exceed in the early fifties some 10-12 million tons, most of which will have to be consumed domestically.

It is true, of course, that to the extent that Russia receives political imports which remain unrequited, she can afford to deflect men and capital to meet the increasing cost of domestic steel output. It is very questionable, however, whether such unrequited imports on a scale comparable to that of 1947 can continue for any considerable length of time.

Diminishing reparations

In June 1948 Russia felt impelled to scale down the outstanding reparation obligations of the three eastern European countries by 50 per cent, leaving a total outstanding amount of about 400 million current dollars payable over four years, or about $100 million per

¹⁸ Stalin's "election speech," Pravda, Feb. 10, 1946.

¹⁶ Alexander Gerschenkron, "The Rate of Industrial Growth in Russia Since 1885," The Journal of Economic History, Supplement VII, 1947, p. 172.

year.¹⁷ It is true that under the agreement concluded in Moscow in December 1948 ¹⁸ Italy has undertaken to pay Russia $100 million in reparations. It should be noted, however, that the payments are to be spread over a period of seven years; that perhaps as much as SO per cent of the amount will be paid not in terms of Italian goods but in terms of Italian assets in Rumania, Hungary, and Bulgaria; and, finally, that the Russians did not succeed in imposing on the Italians a valuation of reparation deliveries at 1938 prices; the $100 million refers to current prices. Thus, the impact of Italian reparations on Russian trade must be presumed to be very small.

At the same time, the amount of reparations from eastern Germany has been declining. In 1948 the Russians apparently undertook to limit the burden on the Soviet zone of occupation to 17 per cent of the region's total output for reparation deliveries and an additional 8 per cent for the cost of occupation. At the end of January 1949, Walter Ulbricht, a leader of the Socialist Unity Party in the Soviet zone declared that reparations in 1949 would be "slightly below" the 1948 level. Whatever the degree of faith one can place in such statements, the existence of a downward trend of German reparation payments to Russia appears reasonably certain.

The likelihood is that political imports will continue to decrease in the next few years. At the same time, the problem of steel imports from the West is likely to become more and more pressing.

¹⁷ Cf. for Rumania: New York Herald Tribune, July 9, 1948; for Finland* B. Suvi- ranta, "Finland's War Reparations in a New Phase," Unitas, Quarterly Review, No. 3 (August 1948), pp. 63 et seq; for Hungary: Gazdasdgstatisztikai Tdjikoztatd, Vol. II, No. 2, p. 132.

is Pravda, Dec. 14, 1948,

Russia in Eastern Europe

The preceding section thus leads to the supposition that the great increase in the share of eastern Europe in Russia's foreign trade does not meet the essential requirement of that trade, that is, the widening of the steel basis for the industrial growth of the country. This conclusion is reinforced by the Russian need for highly developed machinery from the West. At the same time, in a very real sense, Russian policies of economic penetration in eastern Europe and the policy of relying on the western economies for purchases of steel are genuine alternatives. The road which led to the present restrictive policy in the United States with regard to exports to Russia began when, in 194S, Russia embarked on her policies of economic subjugation in eastern Europe. In other words, Russia had apparently decided to pay the price for its eastern European economic penetration in terms of a greatly reduced access to industrial markets in the United States and to loans from the United States. Can this decision be explained in economic terms?

To say that in the long run Russia's primary need is steel, does not mean that trade with eastern Europe must be entirely wasteful from the Russian point of view. There is, for instance, the Rumanian oil. Russia currently has found it very difficult to expand its oil output at Baku. As is freely admitted in Soviet publications, the chief reason lies in the incompetent and predatory exploitation of the fields during the nineteen-thirties.¹⁹ Under these circumstances, imports of Rumanian oil are doubtless of importance to Russia.'

There are the products of Czech heavy industry, which likewise are needed in Russia.

w Planovoye khozyaystvo, 1947, No_f 1, pp. 39 et seq_f

But to embark upon the formidable effort of economic and political penetration of eastern Europe just in order to obtain Rumanian oil or Czech machinery can hardly be a rational procedure. Surely, Russia could have obtained large portions of the Rumanian oil output first through reparations and then through normal trade channels. Moreover, the war has left Czechoslovakia with a much larger share of heavy industry in its industrial aggregate, and since traditionally output of heavy industries in Czechoslovakia is exported to the east and south, while products of light industries are marketed in the west, there is little doubt that Russia could have obtained very considerable imports of Czech machinery without applying any means of pressure and without coming into conflict with the west. The same should apply to Hungarian bauxite and Bulgarian tobacco.

In the southern countries of eastern Europe, trade with Russia was artificially held down in the interwar period by political barriers. It was natural that with the removal of such barriers trade would increase, and such an expansion of mutually beneficial trade relations would hardly have produced any unfavorable repercussions in the United States.

Clearly, Russian policies in eastern Europe were not confined to the area of mutually beneficial trade. That virtually all countries in eastern Europe tried to escape from Russia's attempts to monopolize their foreign trade is perhaps most impressively shown by the changes in Russia's share in the trade of the countries concerned in 1946 and 1947, as seen in Table 5.

Percentages such as those reached in 1946 in Bulgaria, Rumania, Poland, and Hungary are fully reminiscent of the German trade drive in the Balkans in the second half of the thirties. The

TABLE 5—Russia's Share in the Trade of Eastern European Countries Excluding Reparations and UNRRA Deliveries (In percentages)

	1946		1947
	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports
Bulgaria	82	66	61	52
Czechoslo
vakia	10	12	6	5
Finland	21	20	11	12
Hungary	31	40	12	15
Poland	70	49	28	30
Rumania	68	64	49	50
Yugoslavia	16	30	30	17

general decline in 1947 of Russia's relative importance in the region's foreign trade testifies to the strength of resistance in eastern Europe to diversion of trade from its natural channels. An excessively large volume of trade with Russia was poorly suited to eastern Europe's plans for economic reconstruction and industrialization. In a sense, Table 5 tells the same story as the dramatic conflict between Yugoslavia and the Cominform.

The so-called "Molotov plan," which was evolved after the Russian refusal, in June 1947, to take part in the conference of the Committee of European Economic Co-operation, was in essence an attempt to counteract the tendency of eastern European trade to shift away from Russia. At the time of writing, data on trade in 1948 are still very incomplete, but it seems that sometime in 1948 the Russians succeeded in reversing the trend.²⁰ While it is clear that

²⁰ The following preliminary computation may shed some light on this development. In 1947, the value of exports to Russia of three eastern European countries (Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Finland) related to the value of exports to Russia of eight Marshall plan countries (Belgium, France, United Kingdom, Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Switzerland, and Iceland) as .76:1; the corresponding ratio for

Russia inflicted substantial economic injury on the countries of eastern Europe, the magnitude of the economic benefits which accrued to Russia as a result of these policies is much less conspicuous.

That there were such economic benefits is undeniable. Based on its strong power position in eastern Europe, Russia undoubtedly was able to obtain in the years of postwar shortages larger quantities of scarce commodities from eastern Europe than she otherwise would have been able to secure. In the immediate postwar period this was a considerable advantage, even when these imports had to be paid for by exports of Russian goods and even if the prices paid had not deviated from world market prices.

Russia, however, apparently was frequently able to secure terms of trade which were more favorable to it than seemed justified on the basis of price developments in world trade. Thus, Russia is supposed to have secured a price per ton of Polish cement which was almost equal to the price per ton of Polish coal in "nonpolitical" exports of coal to Russia, while normally the price of cement tends to be more than twice that of coal. Several similar instances have become known, but comprehensive statistical information is lacking. It is primarily in the case of Hungary that over-all terms of trade vis-^-vis Russia can be compared with those vis-a-vis other countries. The comparison, as

imports was .95:1. For January-August 1948 these ratios became 2.1:1 for export values and .93:1 for import values. Thus the Russians seem to have succeeded in increasing considerably their imports from eastern Europe in relation to imports from Marshall plan Europe This development is particularly reflected in Czechoslovakia, where in the first three-quarters «f 1948 Russia's share in , total imports and esports of the country increased greatly and apparently even exceeded considerably the high percentages reached in 1948.

TABLE 6—Hungary: Terms of Trade in 1947^a

	(n Hungarian Import Prices 1938-100	(2) Hungarian Export Pnces 1938-100	(3) Terms of Trade (2):(1)
Marshall plan
countries	760.7	869 8	114.3
Eastern Europe
(excluding
Russia)	771.4	668.8	86.7
Russia	717 9	547.0	76.3

^a Computed from Gazdasdgstatisztikai Tdje- kostatS, Vol. 11, No 1 Qan. 1948), p. 43.

shown in Table 6, indicates considerable Russian advantages.

According to Table 6, Hungary's terms of trade with the Marshall plan countries have improved since 1938 by almost IS per cent. They have deteriorated in the trade with Russia by almost 25 per cent. The figures, however, must be interpreted with caution, as they are likely to give an exaggerated picture of the actual development. The divergencies in the terms of trade can probably be explained to some extent by differences in the composition of trade. The inclusion in Table 6 of terms of trade with eastern Europe, which like those with Russia turned against Hungary, seems to point toward such an explanation. Hungarian exports to Marshall plan countries are chiefly agricultural; her imports from the west are chiefly industrial. The opposite is largely true of Hungary's relations with eastern Europe and particularly with Russia. Since prices of agricultural products and raw materials had risen more than those of industrial goods, the changed terms of trade denote to some extent this change in price structure, rather than Russia's ability to impose particularly favorable conditions on her trade with Hungary.²¹

²¹A somewhat similar computation for Poland has been presented by the House Select Committee on Foreign Aid, Preliminary Re-

If this circumstance is taken into account, the specific price advantages for Russia in the Russo-Hungarian trade appear reduced.

Indirect trade

It is true that Russia has been able to increase the economic efficiency of its trade with eastern Europe by re-exporting or redirecting goods purchased in the countries concerned. Thus in 1946 not inconsiderable quantities of Polish coal were re-exported by Russia to Finland. This appears clearly from Finnish trade statistics, which distinguish imports by the country of origin and the country of purchase. In 1947, however, as is shown by the same statistics, purchases of Polish coal from Russia greatly decreased, and deliveries of coal proceeded directly under the Finnish-Polish trade agreement. Instead, it was apparently potash and nitrogen from Germany that Russia resold to Finland.²² Similarly, goods purchased by Russia in Czechoslovakia were redirected to the Soviet zone of Germany and to Rumania. Moreover, in some cases the satellite countries ap- peared in various parts of the world as purchasers of goods on Russian account.

Difficulties

On the other hand, economic domination of eastern Europe undoubtedly involves some direct burdens from the Russian point of view. The decision in 1948 to grant Poland a long-run commodity loan of $450 million seems to show that force alone is insufficient to keep the countries concerned in the Russian fold, and some economic compensations, however inadequate from their point of view, must be offered to them for the economic losses entailed by their enforced separation from the west of Europe.

In summary, it would seem that some of the economic advantages enjoyed by Russia in eastern Europe are of short- run nature and will disappear as world scarcities of certain commodities gradually give way to more plentiful supplies. Nor is it likely that political imports from eastern Europe and eastern Germany can be maintained on a high level for a long time to come. Other advantages, such as those implied in relatively low prices of import commodities and relatively high prices of export commodities in Russia's relations with eastern Europe, might persist, but the value of these and similar advantages does not appear too great.

The final conclusion cannot be expressed in terms of a clear balance sheet. Any opinion expressed must be only tentative. Nevertheless, this writer would like to express his feeling that while in the short run the economic advantages to Russia of its penetration of eastern Europe may have been sizable, in the long run such benefits will be small indeed in relation to the lost economic opportunities in the West. In the long run the fact remains that it is not the cornfields of Rumania or the rose gardens of Bulgaria,, but the steel of Pennsylvania that is needed for Russia's economic development.

Basis of Russian policy

If this conclusion is correct, does it imply that the Russian policies in eastern Europe and the momentous shift of trade toward this region are dictated by strategic and political considerations, rather than by economic calculus? This is probably the accepted point of view. The writer does not feel qualified to express an opinion on the strategic importance to Russia of the eastern European area.

While, however, it is true that economic policies cannot be understood without relation to politics, the opposite relation also holds. From a long-run point of view, the increase in Russian power decisively depends on the development of Russian industry, and this in turn depends on the availability of steel. Thus, in the long run, the policies in eastern Europe may not be fully explicable even in terms of political aims. In the short run, however, possession of territory can indeed be substituted for the possession of steel from the military point of view.

Is the conclusion, then, that Russian economic penetration of eastern Europe should be considered in terms of short- run military plans of the Soviet Government designed to create a springboard for a quick jump to the Atlantic Ocean? This may indeed be the correct conclusion. Nevertheless, it may be worth while to suggest a possible explanation in somewhat less pessimistic terms.

It is possible that when in 1944-45 the Russians were making their basic decisions concerning policies in eastern Europe, they proceeded from two assumptions: first, that the war with Japan would continue for a long time to come; and second, that the end of the war would mark the beginning of a severe depression in the United States.

While the United States would dislike Russian penetration in eastern Europe, Russian help in the war against Japan and then the lure of the Russian market would make the United States forget and forgive the unpleasantness in eastern Europe. In other words, the Russians may have thought that penetration in eastern Europe and access to products of American industry were not genuine alternatives, and that windfalls in eastern Europe were quite compatible with considerable imports from the United States.

This reasoning would require an additional assumption, namely, that once propelled by the mechanics of a wrong fundamental decision, the Russians were unable to find a convenient turning point. Russian policies in eastern Europe would then appear as an error in rational judgment, rather than either a completely irrational policy or a policy which was necessarily adjusted to short- run plans of aggression.

Trade with the West

The foregoing interpretation may or may not be correct. The Russians may or may not be looking for an opportunity to right previous mistakes by a political settlement to be accompanied by a considerable expansion of trade with the West and particularly with the United States. One thing, however, is clear. It is impossible in the closing years of the forties to view trade with Russia in the same manner as in the twenties or the thirties. To represent, as is sometimes done,²⁸ the failure of development of postwar trade between the United States and Russia simply as a result of antagonism against Russia in the United States, means doing less than full justice to facts.

²⁸ For the most recent example see Stella K. Margold, Let's Do Business with Russia, Why We Should and Bow We Can (New York, 194$).

Such a view means, first of all, ignoring the postwar record of this country with regard to economic co-operation with Russia. In 1945 a substantial sum was reserved by the Export-Import Bank for a loan to Russia.²⁸⁴ The Russians were invited to join the Bretton Woods organizations, which would have provided them with additional sources of dollar exchange for purchases in this country. The United States drafts of a charter for an International Trade Organization included most generous stipulations with regard to the Russian foreign trade monopoly; Russia would have received all the benefits of the charter, in particular substantial tariff reductions, in exchange for very general and ill-defined commitments.

The Russians rejected all these offers, as they also rejected participation in the Marshall plan. Instead, they have created a political situation which in itself has become the major barrier to trade and has led to the present export policy of the United States: since March 1, 1948 all shipments to Europe have been subject to strictly scrutinized export licenses. There is no question that thereby exports to Russia have been most seriously affected.

Political tension

The present tense political situation has naturally changed the problem of Russia's trade with the West. The question that stood in the foreground of discussions during the war and immediately thereafter was the development of an institutional framework within which trade between the two different economic systems could proceed in a smooth and mutually beneficial way.

It is probably fair to summarize the result of these discussions by saying that while technical difficulties undoubt-

28a Cf. New York Times, July 18, 1945 and July 21, 1945.

edly existed they could have been overcome, given good will, a general atmosphere of confidence, and peaceful political conditions. The drafts of the ITO charter represented a serious attempt to free trade with Russia from political obstacles, and their authors doubtless assumed a situation of diminishing rather than growing political tensions. For the time being at least, this general problem has been removed from the agenda by Russia's refusal to be drawn into the system of international economic co-operation and by Russian policies of expansion in eastern Europe.³⁴ Therefore, in considering the problem of Russian trade now, one cannot disregard such questions as the increase in Russian war potential as a result of deliveries to Russia from the United States and the Marshall plan countries.

Theoretically, any exports to Russia of goods which the Russians would have produced at home in the absence of such exports may release labor and capital in Russia for military production. This may be true even of exports of such peaceful goods as ladies' dresses or chil-

²⁴ It is interesting to note in this connection that since the end of the war Russia has concluded new commercial treaties with a number of countries, including several in western Europe (e g_M Denmark, France, Switzerland, Italy). In all these treaties the contracting parties accord each other the most-favored-nation treatment. Since because of the nature of Russia's foreign trade organization most-favorcd-nation obligations assumed by Russia do not confer any real benefits on its trading partners, the recent treaties must be regarded as a return to the legal techniques of the twenties, when the problems presented by Russia's foreign trade monopoly were not yet understood. (The texts of commercial treaties concluded by Russia are published in the journal Vneshnyaya Torgovlya.) This development is certainly a retrogression as compared not only with the draft provisions of the ITO charter, but also with the stipulations of some of the commercial treaties and trade agreements of the thirties.

dreiTs toys. Such generalizations, however, do not lead very far, because in order properly to appraise their significance one would have to answer a host of additional questions concerning the ease with which labor and capital can be redirected in Russia, the degree to which Russia would be able to depend on the continuity of supply from the West, the quantitative importance of western exports in relation to Russia's total output and military production, and so forth. In addition, one would have to appraise exports to Russia in relation to the contribution that can be made by imports from Russia to the economic strength of the West, and particularly to the economic recovery of Europe under the Marshall plan.

Russia's potential contribution

A consideration of these questions exceeds the scope of this paper. A few remarks, however, may be in order. The problem of the east-west trade from the point of view of the West is essentially a problem of deliveries to the Marshall plan countries of three basic commodities: coal, timber, and grain. These commodities bulk large in the category of the "necessary imports" of the Marshall plan countries, and if they could be secured from eastern Europe in sizable quantities, the implementation of the Economic Recovery Program would be pro tanto facilitated.

No exports of coal, of course, can be expected from Russia; but grain and timber were in the past the staple goods on the Russian export list, although the share of grains fluctuated considerably during the thirties. At present the Russian timber industry apparently is still suffering from the effects of the war, and the domestic demand is heavy. In fact, in 1946 Russia was a net importer of sawn wood. In 1949, however, substantial quantities of timber ought to be available for export, and still larger quantities should be forthcoming in the following years. The timber output in Russia is planned for 1950 at 59 per cent above prewar,²⁶ while Russia's prewar (1937) exports of about 1.5 million standards of sawn softwood amounted to some 50 per cent of the present annual import requirements of the Marshall plan countries.²⁶

With regard to grains, Russia's contribution could be very significant. Assuming continuation of favorable harvests in Russia, she could cover the bulk of grain imports which are scheduled under the Marshall plan to come from areas other than the Western Hemisphere.²⁷

Russian inconsistency

The question immediately arises whether there is any point in listing Russia's theoretical export capabilities in lumber and grain in view of Russia's opposition to the Marshall plan, and her explicit declarations of intention to wreck the plan. The fact is, however, that at least in one important respect, Russia's policies in the course of the year 1947-4-8 were at variance with these declarations.

A scrutiny of Russian trade agreements reveals that in the course of that year Russia committed itself to export about 3.2 million metric tons of grain. Out of the quantity, 1.4 million tons

²⁶ Cf. Zakon o pyatUetnem plane vossta- novleniya i razvitiya narodnozo khozyaystva SSSR (Law concerning the Five Year Plan of Reconstruction and Development of the national economy of the TJ.SS.R), Moscow,

1946, p. 30.

26 Cf. European Recovery Program, Commodity Report, Chapter K, "Timber," Washington, 1948, p. K-7; Committee of European Economic Co-operation, Vol. II, "Technical Reports," U. S. Department of State, Oct.

1947, p. 395. The figure for 1937 includes exports from the Baltic States.

27 European Recovery Program, Commodity Report, Chapter A, "Food and Agriculture," p. A-69.

went to eastern Europe and 1.8 million tons, or about 56 per cent, to western Europe and Egypt and India. These shipments undoubtedly made a certain contribution to the economic recovery of Europe. Continuation an<J further expansion of this trade should reduce the dollar needs of western Europe and may play a not inconsiderable role in the process of stabilizing its balance of payments.

The inconsistency of the Russian policies is obvious, and appears even greater if one considers that the grain exported is likely to have amounted to more than 50 per cent of the Russian surpluses from the 1947 harvest, and that the Russian grain reserves were likely to be very low after years of war and the drought of 1946. Whether this inconsistency reveals Russian attempts to evolve more constructive foreign economic policies and adumbrates fundamental changes in this respect, no one can say.

Caution required

Alexander Gerschenkron, Ph.D., Cambridge, Massachusetts, is associate professor of economics and a member of the Russian Research Center at Harvard University. He has served as lecturer in economics at the University of California at Berkeley, and as chief of the Foreign Area Section at the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. He is the author of Economic Relations with the UJS.S.R. (1945), Bread and Democracy in Germany (1944), and other publications.

As far as the United States is concerned, the actual and potential importance of Russian exports for the economic rehabilitation of Europe, and the fact that exports to Russia from the United States may for some time play an important role in the east-west trade, would seem to warn against sweeping policies in this field on the part of this country. The problem of trade with Russia must be considered in its entirety. There can be no question of exports to Russia unless the quid pro quo in the form of imports to the United States and Marshall plan countries is reasonably clear. But there should equally be no question of an outright embargo on exports to Russia. The problem is much too complex to allow of such an easy solution.

A cautious policy of judicious weighing of advantages and disadvantages is likely to result in some increases in trade between Russia and the West. It would be quite unrealistic, however, to expect that such an increase in trade may in itself contribute significantly to a diminution of political tension in the world. In the middle of the nineteenth century a threatening war was indeed averted by a commercial treaty. While public opinion in France and England was getting ready for war, the Cobden- Chevalier treaty of commerce of 1860 became in effect a treaty of peace. But we have traveled a long way from the blissful simplicity of the past century. The present political problems cannot be resolved by other than political means. Should a political settlement with Russia take place, then trade presumably would develop very favorably, and its growth might in turn contribute in some measure to the further stabilization of the world situation. But at present not even the contours of a settlement are visible, and its absence would seem to set definite limits to such increases in Russian trade and such improvements in its pattern as may take place within the immediate future.

Soviet Prose After the War

By Marc Slonim

OR almost five years after June 1941, Soviet literature was a war literature. The gigantic "struggle for the fatherland" provided all the subject matter to Russian novelists, playwrights, and poets. In no other country did the war absorb the writers so completely or was it reflected in so many works as in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Of course, this literary activity was considered a.part of the war effort: the men of letters did what the Government, the party, and the country expected and asked them to do. The common opinion was that novelettes on German atrocities or poems on the heroism of Soviet fighters bolstered the morale and helped to win the war. Literature, as usual in the U.S.S.R., fitted into the general social-political framework and had a distinctly functional role.

Yet no official pressure or party prodding was necessary to make the writers act as they did. Their attitude was perfectly spontaneous and natural. The emotional impact of the horrible turmoil which their country was experiencing was in itself a sufficient incentive. Many writers wrote about the war because they could not concentrate on anything else. Dostoevsky had said that after the Lisbon earthquake nobody would have the impudence to concoct verses on nightingales and the sweet murmur of love, and his words were often quoted in 1942.

National Self-Assertion

After a short period of naturalistic reporting—sketches, short stories, front diaries—almost every writer having turned into a war correspondent, Soviet literature adopted a more interpretative approach to actuality. While the lyric poems by Konstantin Simonov, Alexei Surkov, Margarita Aligher, and others represented an immediate, emotional response to the tragic events and enjoyed a tremendous success in expressing the feelings of millions (some books of poetry were published in hundreds of thousands of copies), the prose tried to explain to the reader the real significance of the fateful duel between Hitler and the Soviet Union.

The purely descriptive tendency which insisted on battle scenes and war episodes was soon replaced by a psychological analysis of the heroes and a discussion of various problems raised by the war. The majority of novels and tales published between 1942 and 1945 attempted to portray the characteristic traits and mental attitudes of Soviet soldiers, guerrillas, and defense workers.

By emphasizing the stamina, the capacity for suffering, the heroism, and the moral strength of the Russians, this literature, eulogistic in style and didactic in purpose, accomplished the job of national self-assertion. The very titles of the best works in this category were quite revealing: The Traits of Soviet Man by Nicholas Tikhonov, The Russian Character by Michael Sholokhov, People are Immortal by Vassily Gross- ■ man, The Unvanquished by Boris Gor- batov, and others.

On the other hand the revival of the historical novel in 1942-45 was but another facet of the same trend: panoramas of a glorious past showed Russia overcoming all her crises and defeating all her enemies, and helped the soldiers on the front and the civilians in the rear to keep their faith in the future.

Novels by S. Sergeiev-Tsensky, S. Golu- bov, V. Yan, and many others belonged to this historical patriotic current.

Most of the novels, whether historical or contemporary, placed the emphasis on the ''simple man," on the average citizen. The hero of war fiction was not necessarily a party member. Peasants, workmen, intellectuals, leaders, and humble employees were all projected against a comprehensive background of an all-national unity, and their solidarity of spirit and firmness of purpose were continually underscored. Although the accents of anger, revenge, and even hatred were present in many works (particularly in tales about guerrillas and German cruelty, in poems by A. Surkov and articles by I. Ehren- burg), the ideological foundations of the war were formulated as the "defense of the new humanism." Most of the writers interpreted patriotism as an expression of a lofty sentiment of universal brotherhood. The soldiers were told that in defending Russia and the land of the revolution they were defending the highest achievements of mankind against medieval barbarity.

The New Patriotism

There is no doubt that the national, patriotic overtone dominated most of the Soviet war prose. The identification of Russia with the Soviet Union, which had been banned from the press in the twenties and the early thirties, was prominently displayed in both prose and poetry in the early forties (poems by Simonov, Selvinsky, Dolma- tovsky, and many others; short stories by A. Platonov, L. Sobolev, L. Leonov, and others). This trend was, however, mitigated by a comparison between the old nationalism and the new Soviet patriotism; the latter, according to Russian publicists, was a broader concept with definite social and political connotations. Writers like A. Bek, V.

Grossman, F. Gladkov, and F. Panferov endeavored to represent the U.S.S.R. as a "family of nationalities" where men and women of various peoples and tribes fought together in a solid phalanx for the liberation of their common land.

The slogan of the "union of all nationalities" was accompanied by that of the "union of all patriotic forces." In literature this implied a higher degree of freedom and a cessation of factional struggles. Old writers who had been silent during the preceding years started again to publish their works, side by side with those of the new generation. The publication of two collections of poems by Boris Pasternak, who was considered the main representative of "formalism," was an example of this general spirit of tolerance and union.

Postwar Shift in Policy

The victory brought a change in this mood. It also put an end to the liberal attitude which the Communist Party had displayed towards literature during the war years. A new shift soon became apparent on the often changing Soviet literary scene. Political pressure was applied more systematically to writers, and with it there was manifest a trend of what might be called "cultural isolationism."

The causes of the change in literary policy were apparently the same as those that determined the attitude of the Soviets in postwar international relations. Instead of inaugurating a period of peace and relaxation, the collapse of Germany provoked increased tension among the former Allies. This tension degenerated into a cold war, and the latter contained the potentialities of an open conflict between the U.S.S.R. and the United States. Such a situation, according to party leaders, called for an ideological "state of alarm" and for psychological preparedness for all eventualities.

Soviet Prose After the War it

In evaluating the situation we should remember that literature in the Soviet Union is but a part of the general picture. Its place in society is very important, for its emotional and intellectual role is recognized by all party theoreticians. If writers, as Stalin put it, are "engineers of human souls," the way they pursue their delicate job is, of necessity, of great concern to the rulers of the country. Literature helped to win the war. Now it is harnessed to help the party in the task of consolidating its ideological stability, which was somewhat undermined during the tribulations of the war years.

The victory terminated the era of "loose patriotic exultation." New times required a strengthening of the doctrinal attitude, and this, in terms of general policy, meant greater intransigence and the sharpening of Communistic weapons—obviously including literature. The end of the war also called for an educational effort. The people of the U.S.S.R. were exhausted by the tremendous outburst of energy which the war had exacted; and yet, immediately after the victory, they were again stimulated to new efforts. The new five- year plan, the new goals in agriculture, and the enormous task of reconstruction demanded sacrifice and relentless work. Literature—as during other crucial moments of the Bolshevik Revolution—was called to arms for the purpose of psychological warfare and propaganda.

The new literary policy was officially formulated on August 14, 1946, in a resolution by the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party. This resolution has since been commented upon and enlarged upon in explanatory speeches by the late Andrei Zhdanov, member of the Politburo, in articles and speeches by Alexander Fadeyev, secretary of the Union of Soviet Writers, and in hundreds of articles in the daily press and periodicals, which repeat the same arguments in monotonously identical terms.

Basic Themes of Literature

All these statements emphasize the need to strengthen the ideological awareness of Soviet literature. Zhdanov made this very plain:

Soviet literature neither has nor can have any other interests except those of the people and of the State. Its aim is to help the State to educate the youth ... to make the new generation cheerful, inspired by faith in their task, unafraid of obstacles and ready to overcome them all.

Almost every Communist critic quoted Lenin's words: "Literature must become party literature. Down with nonparty literati, down with literary supermen! Literary work must become a part of all proletarian endeavorl" The purpose of literature should be "to portray the Soviet man and his moral qualities in all their force and completeness." In other words, literature must describe the new hero, reared by the Soviet regime, and glorify those virtues that the state deems necessary for the triumph of its ideology.

In performing this task Soviet literature must "maintain its integrity and protect itself against the poisonous miasmas of western bourgeois art." Zhdanov as well as the Central Committee warned the writers against the lures and wiles of decadent Europe and America. Imitation of western writers was one of the worst crimes a Soviet writer could commit. "Is it becoming to our advanced Soviet literature," asked Zhdanov, "the most revolutionary literature of the world, to kowtow to the narrow, petty bourgeois literature of the West?"

A. Egolin, a prominent Soviet critic and party official, declared, "Bourgeois literature, apart from some positive elements, inevitably contains works poi- soned by bourgeois mentality." Lack of ideological integrity, lack of faith in man and in progress were quoted as instances of this corrupted mentality, as were also such signs of decadence as pessimism, Freudism, and an exaggerated interest in psychology; and the latter, it is claimed, was usually based on a false interpretation of human nature as a mere expression of the sexual and animal impulses. Formalistic tendencies in European and American art were also interpreted as direct manifestations of both ideological poverty and escapism.

These pronunciamentos reveal two main tendencies. One corresponds to the traditional desire of the Communist Party to find its aims and ideals reflected in current works of literature; thus the new hero must be portrayed as a product of Soviet society. The other is closely connected with the psychological preparation for an eventual armed conflict and with the necessity of waging an ideological battle against the United States and part of Europe. The concrete political situation in 1946—49 called for a bolstering up of the morale of the Soviet masses and for sharp criticism of their potential enemies.

This explains the isolationism, the anti-western and anti-American trend, in literature, as well as a systematic attempt to prove "the superiority of the Soviet regime, culture, and art over those of the declining West." All the main themes of current literary production have been more or less determined by these general trends of Soviet policy.

zoshchenko and akhmatova

The formulation of the main principles which are supposed to guide Soviet literature was accompanied by certain practical measures. These assumed the character of "exemplary lessons" very much in the vein of some political trials. The Central Committee's resolution of August 14, 1946 was directed against two Leningrad monthlies, Star (Zvezda) and Leningrad, both of which were accused of publishing "politically and ideologically obnoxious works" in prose and poetry.

It should be remembered that according to Russian tradition practically all important literary works are first published in monthly magazines which carry over two or three hundred pages of novels, short stories, and poems in each issue. The total circulation of the four leading monthlies—New World (Novy Mir), October (Oktyabr), Banner (Znamya), and Star {Zvezda)—is slightly over two hundred thousand copies, but their influence and importance in the cultural life of the Soviet Union are very great.

The immediate consequence of the Party Resolution was the suspension of Leningrad and the reform of the Star. Egolin, deputy chief of the Propaganda Department of the Communist Party Central Committee, was appointed editor in chief. Two writers—Michael Zoshchenko and Anna Akhmatova— were singled out to serve as scapegoats for the administrative wrath.

Michael Zoshchenko (born in 189S) ranked before the war as the outstanding Soviet humorist. In numerous short stories, which had a very wide circulation, he attacked the pettiness, smugness, and ignorance of small bureaucrats, and of what in the West would be called the lower middle class. His satire usually kept within the bounds of "healthy self-criticism" and was hailed by the party press as a "useful weapon in the fight against the remnants of bourgeois mentality."

In 1943, however, Zoshchenko was angrily criticized by Bol'shevik, the official party review, for his autobiographical novel Before the Sunrise. He was accused of describing various episodes of his childhood and adult life as being the result of conditioned reflexes and sexual drives, instead of interpreting them as the outcome of the social environment. The party critics dubbed him a "brainless and pornographic scribbler." His lack of patriotic enthusiasm during the war (which he spent, unlike many of his colleagues, in the tranquillity of Alma-Ata, capital of Kazak), hardly helped him to put matters right.

In Leningrad, after the war, Zosh- chenko began to play a prominent part in the local Writers' Union, and was, as always, very popular with his readers. Two weeks before he was publicly condemned, the party publishing house Pravda issued a cheap edition of his latest stories. The first printing was of one hundred thousand copies. It included his Adventures of an Ape which Zhdanov was later to call a "disgusting calumny on Soviet people" because Zoshchenko had intimated in his tale that the ape often displayed more intelligence and gentleness that the average Soviet biped. Zoshchenko was castigated as a writer who helped to disintegrate and corrupt literature, and then he* was expelled from the Union of Soviet Writers; his name became a synonym for "literary bum."

However, Zoshchenko made an attempt to atone for his sins. In September 1947 the Moscow monthly New World published several of his short stories in which he described the German occupation and the guerrillas' devotion to the regime. Despite the highly patriotic tone of these stories, whose title was We Shall Never Forget, no other work by this writer has been published in the Soviet Union in the last two years. Evidently his humor and light skepticism had fallen out of fashion under present conditions.

The other "exemplary defendant" was Anna Akhmatova (born in 1888), widow of the poet Nicholas Gumilev who was involved in an anti-Communist conspiracy and was executed in 1921. Before the revolution Akhmatova was rated as one of the best of Russian poets. Her short, epigrammatic poems on love, contemplation, feminine emotions, and anguish were extremely popular among the intelligentsia. Dozens of young poets, particularly women, imitated her subtle, pithy, and intimate lyrics. After the early 1920's Akhmatova kept silent, and did not resume her literary activity until the war, when she provoked a stir among the literati and discriminating readers by publishing a succession of poems in her old manner, mainly in 1943-45. Her growing influence was, however, checked by the vigilant leaders of Soviet literary policy. The Central Committee denounced her as a poet who divided "her interest between drawing room, bedroom and chapel," and it declared that her poems were intended for the "upper ten thousand" and reflected the theory of art for art's sake. Accused of "eroticism, mysticism and political indifference," Akhmatova, like Zoshchenko, was barred from the Union of Soviet Writers; the doors of magazines and publishing houses were closed for her.

The condemnation of Zoshchenko and Akhmatova put an end to certain undercurrents among the Moscow and the Leningrad writers: the poet Selvinsky stopped •talking of "Socialist Symbolism" as a substitute for "Socialist Realism"; the Ukrainian Petro Pancho ceased to insist on his claim that the writer had the right to make mistakes; and a number of novelists preferred not to press the point that perspective in time was necessary for the adequate interpretation of current events. This did not mean that all discussions were cut short but they either became confined to small groups of friends or were continued, in various forms, on the periphery of official debates.

Literary Discussions

These debates, on the whole, form one of the most important features of Soviet literary life; sometimes they disclose, under the usual terminology, what is actually brewing in the circles of novelists and poets.

The Resolution of the Central Committee and the replacement of Nicholas Tikhonov by Alexander Fadeyev as the chairman of the Union of Soviet Writers marked the beginning of an ideological offensive which was soon in full swing. Literary critics, playwrights, painters, and musicians were in turn called to order. Their flaws, their political aloofness and social irresponsibility, were all pointed out by the party officials. A campaign was also opened against "bourgeois liberalism" in literary scholarship. It reached its peak in 1948 when Alexander Veselovsky (18381906) was denounced for founding a school of comparative method in the history of literature and a theory of "migrating themes, plots, and borrowed motives" which had made an important contribution to scholarly research, particularly in folklore.

Veselovsky and his followers were reproached for holding "cosmopolitan ideas on the interdependence of all literatures" and being guilty of "formal- istic illusions" about the specific character of literary genres. (Thi§ contradicted the Marxist interpretation of literary phenomena as a superstructure of social-economic conditions.)

The main objective of this campaign was to prove that Russia's literary tradition and her cultural heritage were free from western influence. Since then authors engaged in the study of foreign sources of Russian classics have been continually made the target for violent attacks.

Innumerable discussions on the aims and methods of Soviet literature reveal certain characteristic trends. It would be pointless to deny that the endeavors to make literature "useful" and "helpful" are profoundly rooted in the Russian literary tradition. The Communist critics who fight against formalism and proclaim simplicity and universality as the highest attainments of art are merely repeating the theories which Tolstoy formulated in his What is Art? (1889). In its issue of November 13, 1948 the Literary Gazette stated:

Our people loves its literature more than any other people in the world; it does not regard a book as a relaxation or entertainment, it definitely seeks from it an answer to the most burning problems of actuality. . . . Real art teaches and educates.

This attitude explains why the demands made on literature by the state and the party do not seem so shocking or exacting to the large masses of readers. They accept implicitly the social role of art.

Optimism and Soviet Superiority

Two main points are continually stressed by party authorities: literature must be optimistic, and it must prove the superiority of the Soviet way of life over that of the West. The latter requirement involves a presentation of the non-Soviet world as morally decadent and ideologically confused. Literature has the assignment to convince the Russians that they are the standard-bearers of civic and personal virtues, that the U.S.S.R. is the best country in the world, that Soviet science is the most advanced, Soviet culture the most developed, and so on. These requirements, which are based on Soviet patriotism and political preparation for an eventual clash witl* the West, determine a very special feature of socialist realism: it has to portray the best traits in Soviet man and his new morality. There, according to Communist critics, is the synthesis of realism and romanticism in Soviet art.

These main themes are prevalent in the Soviet postwar literature. Of course, it would be a mistake to conclude that the actual contents of contemporary Soviet novels and short stories are limited to these main trends. The scope and range of the various topics treated by the writers in the U.S.S.R. are much broader than one would expect from the theoretical discussions and the official instructions. The latter have a "normative" character and serve to establish ideal aims. The current production overflows the ideological molds manufactured by the party.

Novels on the War

Because of some sort of literary and psychological tradition or inertia, the war novels, although decreasing in number, still formed the largest part of the literary production from 1945 to 1949. Their continual flow is somewhat monotonous. Most of them follow a certain pattern in structure and style, and hardly ever rise above the average. Yet they often offer a good insight into events; the study of character is also in the realistic tradition and conveys an impression of reality, although the narrative is mostly conventional and the plot flimsy.

A whole group of war novels deals with the problem which apparently worries quite a lot of people in the Soviet Union—the reason for the retreat of the Red Army at the beginning of hostilities. In his lengthy, slightly sentimental novel The White Birch, Michael Bubennov depicts a farmer-soldier who goes through the bitter experience of reverses in 1941 and learns his lesson the hard way. The same process of tempering and adjustment is shown by Aleksander Perventsev in his broad epic Stick to Your Honor When Young. His hero, a southern lad whose childhood and growth took place in a kolkhoz, has his first experience of war in the marines and in the paratroopers; together with hundreds of young soldiers, he comes to understand that modern warfare requires new technique, and that bravery and self-sacrifice are of no avail without planning, co-ordination, discipline, and machines—in short, without the same elements that assured the Soviet achievements in industry and agriculture.

Novels, memoirs, and articles stress this point: victory is not considered a result of patriotism and heroism, but is interpreted as the triumph of the regime and of the party. The latter is always represented as the leading, organizing force and the backbone of the country in the most critical moments of its history.

The same overtones are now patent in the group of novels about Stalingrad. The interesting scenario by Nicholas Virta, Battle of Stalingrad, showing Stalin's activity as Commander in Chief of the Army, is one example of this sort of literature. Another is Victor Nek- rasov's novel In the Trenches of Stalingrad, which has been favorably compared to Days and Nights by Konstan- tin Simonov. The idea of duty and military virtue dominate the thoughts of its hero, Kerzhentsev, who, when cut off from his unit, makes a superhuman effort to rejoin it. Like most of his comrades, he knows perfectly well what he is fighting for, and this awareness makes the Russians invincible. Although the critics praised it highly, Nekrasov's novel lacks artistic unity and resembles a series of notes in a diary. The same criticism can be made of Peter Shebunin's novel Mamaev Hitt (1948).

Much more satisfactory from a purely literary standpoint are two popular novelettes or long tales (a traditional form in Russian literature, particularly since the early nineteenth century): Soldier's Night (1947), by Georges Berezko describing the life and death of an Army commander who had to sacrifice his best units in order to assure ultimate victory, and The Star by Emmanuel Kazakevich—a moving and virile story of an intelligence platoon surrounded and annihilated by the enemy. Berezko's hero is an old Bolshevik who spares neither his own life nor the lives of others, and whose stamina and uncompromising firmness endear him to his subordinates, for he is a son of the people and is deeply rooted in the Russian soil. Kazakevich's heroes possess the highest virtue of Russian fighters: they know how to accept their fate and to die without fear or regret.

Less successful are the novels describing victory. One has the feeling that the description of suffering and sacrifice suits Russian war fiction better than that of exultation or joy. In any case, The Standard Bearers, by the Ukrainian Alexander Gonchar (194748), who depicts the march of the Red Army through the Carpathian Mountains and the storming of Budapest, is sketchy, rhetorical, and immature. The Taking of Berlin_f by Vsevolod Ivanov, one of the foremost Soviet writers, is too involved and artificial. Its hero, a Moscow painter, wants to solve all his personal problems as well as the problem of the artist in a socialist society by taking part in the campaign in Germany. Readers and critics reacted with equal coolness to this heavy and long- winded novel.

A large number of novels treat of the sufferings of Russians under the Germans and particularly of the ordeal of the population of Leningrad during the long siege. This last topic is most efficiently dealt with by some of the women writers. In 1946 Vera Inber published Almost Three Years—the diary she kept throughout the siege—a. most impressive and skillfully written human document. Elena Katerli's Stozharovs Family (1948) and Vera Ketlinskaya's The Siege (1947) are a transition to works that describe the efforts of the home front in forging the weapons for victory.

Next to Valentin Kataev's romantically high-pitched novel, The Wife, the most important novel in this category is KruzhUikha (1947) by Vera Panova, a young and talented author who provides a vivid picture of an armament plant in the Urals. Vera Panova is a name to be remembered. Her first novel, Companions (1946), treating of life on a hospital train, is an excellent study of characters, superior even to KruzhUikha in its realistic vigor, warm humor, and psychological insight. In both novels, Panova's well-drawn characters can never quite reconcile their absorbing work with the demands of personal life.

This contradiction between "my own happiness" and the "happiness of all" is mentioned by several writers, among others by Antonina Koptyaeva in her Siberian love story Comrade Anna, which was attacked by the Communist critics so viciously that the author was compelled to revise her text completely for a reprint of her work.

The main difference between Russian and European or American war novels is that the Soviet writer, whether he describes the front or the rear, interprets the war as a school of heroism and as a final test of human virtues. In one way or another he always returns to the same topic: the way in which men and women succeeded in controlling fear and overcoming privations, pain and destruction by the efforts of their will, by their sacrifice and the spirit of brotherhood. This basically optimistic attitude is supported by a feeling of national pride in the context of "new men- tality." Victory was possible because Soviet man is so marvelous—such is the main theme of Soviet prose. And this man is so marvelous because the regime shaped him that way.

The New Hero

From Kataev to Panova, all Soviet novelists speak of the "New Hero." The most complete vision of this heroic man whose psychology reflects socialist society may perhaps be found in the The Young Guard (1945) by Alexander Fadeyev, in The Tale of a Real Man (1947) by Boris Polevoy, and in Happiness (1947) by Peter Pavlenko, as well as in certain more recent novels on reconstruction.

The Young Guard, one of the most important war novels, unfolds in the broad, "Tolstoyan" manner the history of a resistance movement Tinder German occupation organized in 1942-43 by the teen-agers of Krasnodon. Based on authentic facts, it tells of the life and death of boys and girls who fought and perished with "chins up." The martyrdom of Fadeyev's heroes, who were actually tortured and executed, occupies but a small part in the narrative. The attention is primarily directed to their psychology, moral rectitude, and utter devotion to Russia and the cause of the revolution. One can say that Fadeyev often lapses into sentimentality and rhetoric, that he is supereulogistic and naively didactic, but his novel undoubtedly has a strong emotional appeal and offers a convincing picture of the idealistic tendencies in Soviet youth.

The Young Guard was received with enthusiasm by both critics and readers, but in 1947 Fadeyev, who is a prominent party member, was accused of "deviation." He had not sufficiently stressed the role of the party in the "youth movement," and he was accordingly invited to revise his work. As the critic L. Subozki declares:

The serious ideological and artistic mistake of the writer is that he did not create in his novel the complete image of Bolsheviks who are guiding and educating our youth ... he did not show the activity of party organization in the underground The criticisms of The Young Guard clearly revealed that the vast historical content of our era cannot be fully expressed in a work of art unless the latter describes the great role played by the party in the life of the people and creates vivid figures of Bolsheviks as men in the vanguard of the people.¹

Fadeyev's "mistake" was avoided by Boris Gorbatov in his Unvanquished (1944) or the Tarass Family. This novel about life and resistance under German occupation is composed in a highly romantic and lyrical key and thus forms a strong counterpart to Fadeyev's realism.

Polevoy's Tale is also tuned to a rather high-pitched note. Its hero, "the real man who is the product of the new regime," is the Army flier Meresiev. Having lost his legs in a forced landing, he crawls out of the enemy lines, in a way that reminds one of some of Jack London's adventure stories; then, by sheer will power, endurance, and determination, he succeeds in readjusting himself and in resuming his fighting job in the air force. This story and Polevoy's recent collection of sketches, We the Soviet People (1948), are based on fact.

Another facet of the "New Hero" is explored by Peter Pavlenko. (The English version of his novel Red Planes Fly East, predicting the war against Japan, was published in 1938.) Colonel Voropaev, the hero of his novel Happiness (1947), is demobilized and longs for peace, rest, and happiness. But as soon as he lands on the shores of the

i Novy Mir, Feb. 1948, p. 109.

Crimea, where he dreams of establishing his new home, he becomes involved in the rebirth of the peninsula, helps the new settlers, becomes one of their leaders, has no time to spare for himself, and finally realizes that true personal happiness consists in an active life spent for the welfare of the socialist community. Except for a poorly conceived love story. Happiness is well written, has good characterizations, a wealth of interesting realistic details, and even some glimpses of the background of the Yalta conference. The novel has been one of the high lights of Soviet literary life for almost two years.

A similar attempt to portray the image of a man whose whole mentality is shaped by his moral strength, lust for life, will for action, and absolute faithfulness to Communist ideals, is presented in a group of novels devoted to college students—Vladimir Dobrovol- sky's Three in Greatcoats, Grigory Konovalov's The University—or to the demobilized young men and women {Days of Peace by Michael Chakovsky, a young writer, author of two popular novels on the siege of Leningrad). All these books strongly emphasize the formation of the "virtuous" character. In some of them, especially in connection with problems of sex, there are strong puritanic undertones. The New Hero is not only firm, straightforward, and ideologically pure—he is also an idealist in love and a stanch believer in the sanctity of family ties.

Novels of Reconstruction

The new mentality of the Soviet hero is most fully revealed in his attitude toward work. Work is not only highly respected but almost sanctified as the best expression of human ideals. One of the principal aims of Soviet writers is to show that a new incentive, a new motivation for activity, has been created in Soviet industry and agriculture.

The egocentric psychology of profit and competitive personal drives, they claim, has been replaced by a collectivistic emotion of "belonging" to an all-national fraternity of builders of socialism. The postwar novels emphasize the idea that Stakhanovites—and most of the protagonists in works dealing with reconstruction are Stakhanovites—are not simply trying to achieve the highest records in industry or agriculture. They are aware of being parts of an important whole; they know that the sum total of their efforts solidifies the foundations of the country and the Communist state.

Another succession of novels and tales which were initiated by Valentin Ovechkin's widely discussed With Greetings from the Front (194S) raise various problem connected with the reconstruction. Contrary to what one would expect, only a few of them deal with industrial workers. For example, the highly praised novel Far Away from Moscow (1948) by Valentin Azhaev describes the building of a pipe line in the Far North. Soviet literature today seems to pay great attention to the farmers. The reader is constantly reminded that the U.S.S.R. is a land of collective farms and young people. In fact, with a persistency bordering on monotony, Soviet writers tell again and again about men and women in their twenties who concentrate on improving farm methods and raising the standards of production.

The usual hero or heroine, just back from the front, begins a campaign for building a dam, an improved silo, or an electric plant, or challenges the neighboring kolkhozes to compete in doubling the wheat harvest. They all have to face material obstacles as well as opposition from backward or petty bourgeois elements of the village.

With some slight variations, this is the story and the plot of the most popular novels of this genre, such as The Knight of the Golden Star (1947) by Semen Babaevsky, perhaps the best of these books (it deals with the collective farms of the Cossack regions); The Stone Wood by Gennady Fish (Karelian farms); With All Our Heart by Elizar Mal'tsev (a novel about the peasants of northern Russia, containing a good deal of acute naturalistic observation) ; The Dawn by Yuri Laptev; and Our Land by Serghei Voronin (Russian settlers in Karelia).

Even in poetry and drama, the kolkhoz has lately occupied first place. The most important poems of 1947 and 1948—The Flag Over the Village Soviet by Alexis Nedogonov and Spring in the Kolkhoz "Pobeda" by Stepan Griba- chev—as well as the latest theatrical hit, Our Daily Bread by Nicholas Virta, provide evidence of this prevalent trend. The majority of the novels on life on collective farms have a documentary rather than a literary value. Their realism has a strong naturalistic flavor, their style is pedestrian, their dialogues lengthy and dull. Yet they contribute to our understanding of the average Soviet villager and his daily routine. They also disclose one of the true aims of Soviet writers when they praise the regime and the Stakhanovites. Fish and Bubennov, Mal'tsev and Voronin, never miss the opportunity to stress the superiority of the Communist economy over the capitalistic West.

Anti-western Tendency

The anti-western and anti-American propaganda which was begun in 1946 increased in intensity throughout 194748, and by 1949 assumed quite large proportions. A very typical example is Konstantin Simonov's play, The Russian Question (1946), which describes an American foreign correspondent commissioned to write an anti-Soviet book. The hero is too honest to obey the orders of his boss—a capitalist tycoon— and is therefore sacked, and furthermore abandoned by his fiancee. His journalistic career is ruined because he does not want to join the ranks of red- baiters and Russia-haters.

In a later novel, The Smoke of the Fatherland, Simonov portrays a Soviet citizen who returns home after having spent two years in the United States, and compares the two conflicting ways of life—the American and the Russian. As may be expected, the novel acclaims the Soviet regime.

Towards the end of 1948 Simonov published Friends and Foes, a collection of poems, exposing the reaction, racial discrimination, hatred of the Soviet Union, and imperialistic trends in the United States, Great Britain, and Canada. In these satirical poems Simonov evidently attempted to revive the trenchant political verse of Maya- kovsky; but they lack the sweep, the irony, and the emotional vigor of the great Soviet poet.

In 1947 one of the best sellers was The Storm by Hya Ehrenburg, the well- known journalist. The action of this full-length novel takes place simultaneously in France and in the U.S.S.R. The author presents a vast panorama showing the collapse of the French Republic, the resistance movement led by the Communists, and the war waged against the Germans by the Red Army. Written in a snappy, sarcastic style, The Storm contrasts two worlds: the declining, corrupt, and feeble West where only a handful of courageous men are left to defend freedom and the higher values, and the heroic Soviet Union united in a supreme effort to liberate mankind from the fascist menace.

In many short stories and articles the West is represented as a place of perdition, moral degradation, and physical exhaustion, while America is pic-
tured as a vast colony of Wall Street, a hotbed of anti-Soviet conspiracies, a land of warmongers and atomic bomb fanatics. In an article by L. Mendelson in the December 1948 issue of Novy Mir (p. 20S) American literature, for example, is represented as "dealing endlessly with violence and death, permeated with cynicism and contempt for man, and reveling in dirt and nightmares; born from the womb of the rotting capitalist society, it is contaminated by its vices." The Russian reader is constantly warned against the pernicious germs that might come from Europe and America.

In his highly successful play The Great Strength (1947) Boris Romashov exposes a Soviet scientist who starts by kowtowing to the West and ends by becoming a regular enemy of his own country. This play also reflects the official trend which stresses the independence of Russian science from the western tradition.

Typical of many similar works is the Story of a Stolen Idea (1948) by Yuri Veber. This is a biography of A. S. Popov, a Russian professor and the discoverer of wireless telegraphy. Marconi is said to have exploited Popov's invention and to have taken all the credit, while the real inventor never received recognition. The merits of other obscure inventors and forgotten scientists form the topic of many other novels and tales.

The anti-western and isolationist tendency which reigns today in Soviet literature is also reflected in the articles and books of the former war correspondents, Yuri Zhukov (The West After the War, 1947) and Dimitri Kraminov (The Second Front, 1948).

Historical Novels

A similar trend is apparent in some of the historical novels when they portray non-Russian military leaders or

Russia's allies in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Leontii Rakov- sky, in his Generalissimo Suvorov (1947), is not particularly kind to either Austrian or German generals, while Marianna Yakhontova (in Po- temkin) and other novelists mainly treating of Russian naval and army commanders under Catherine the Great do not spare ironical remarks about the French and the British.

In general, the historical novel seems to have lost ground by comparison with prewar and war years. Since 1945, the only important work in this field is the impressive though not too penetrating trilogy loann the Awesome (or Ivan the Terrible) by Valentin Kostylev.

A place apart is occupied by the first two volumes of a trilogy, First Joys (1947) and Unusual Summer (1948), by Konstantin Fedin, an outstanding writer whose reputation was already well established in the early 1920's. These two novels depict life in a provincial Volga town before and during the Revolution of 1917. Their colorful and sophisticated style, the brilliant characterization, the profoundly human qualities of the story, and the romantic appeal of a complex plot, make Fedin's works stand out as the most significant and truly artistic achievements of Soviet literature since the war. First Joys and TJnusual Summer belong to the best tradition of Russian letters and are conceived in the spirit of true humanism and creative freedom.

Future Development

Marc L Slonim, Pk.DBronxville, New York, is professor of literature at Sarah Lawrence College. He is author of numerous books and articles on Russian literature and history in various European languages, and has in preparation a two-volume history of Russian Literature, the first volume of which is to be published in 1949.

Is Soviet literature likely to continue in its present course? This depends entirely on the evolution of international events. If the danger of war and the tension between the U.S.S.R. and the United States increase, then literature will toe the party line with greater strictness and intransigence. The quj> rents of isolationism and tendentious- ness already noted will be strengthened. On the other hand, a more favorable political situation would undoubtedly produce a more liberal atmosphere in Soviet literature. But before such a change occurs, it is hardly permissible to expect Soviet writers to deviate from the road traced for them by the leaders of the Communist Party.²

² The lack of space has prevented the writer from including in his survey the interesting developments of literature in the various national republics of the U.S S.R.

Recent Trends in Soviet Education

By Nic<

ATIONAL systems of education, as well as national literature, art, and political life, are the outward expressions of national character and tradition, as determined by historical development and geographical and socioeconomic situations. Even the most radical revolution eventually finds its balance by adjusting new ideas to national traditions and economic environment.

Historic Background

The present Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is a federation, of sixteen constituent national republics, including besides the three branches of the Russian people many nationalities of various origins, backgrounds, and traditions. Nevertheless all territories of the U.S.S.R., with the sole exception of Subcarpathian Russia (Ukraine), were at one or another time a part of historical Russia or later of the Russian Empire. And if the identification of the US.S.R. with Russia in a strict sense of definition is not now correct, the present international federation in its structure, both political and economic, has grown out of the former Russian Empire. Again, the U.SS.R. is the historical cradle of many ancient cultures, different in language and religious tradition, but the Russian language and the Russian cultural tradition were dominant in the past and are dominant at present. The U.S.S.R. was molded and fashioned by Russians (both Russian-born and Russified non-Russians) on a Russian background. And if other nationalities now fully participate as equal members, they can do so by accepting the common tradition of the Russian past. The Soviet educational system shares these characteristics. Imparted in as many as 180 languages, drawing its contents from the various national cultures, in its form and organization the Soviet school system is Russian in direct historical descent from prerevolu- as Hans

tionary Russia. Even the Marxist ide ology, permeating both the multinationa content and the Russian form, is adaptec to Russian conditions and is a Russiar variation of the original doctrine of Marx This fundamental fact of identity betweer historical Russia and the present international Marxist Soviet Union should be borne in mind in order to understand the theory and practice of Soviet education.¹

Russian education, from its very inception by Peter the Great in 1701, was a state secular system with a pronounced scientific-utilitarian character. In spite of some definitely reactionary periods, Russian education always had an egalitarian tendency clearly expressed in the ideal of a common school for both sexes and all sections of the population.² This historical tradition was followed out by the Soviet Government to its logical conclusion, and the characteristic features of the present system—state monopoly, secularism, equality of sexes, equality of nationalities, scientific-utilitarian tendency—all find their origins in the Russian past. During the first period of Soviet education the revolutionary leaders were too conscious of the negative-reactionary side of the Czarist regime, and in their missionary zeal they rejected the past wholesale. Gradually, however, a better knowledge of the past and acquired experience in organization and administration led them to a certain revaluation of historical traditions and a more realistic synthesis of the past with the future.

These trends in educational policy were apparent even before the Second

¹"N. Hans, Comparative Education, p. 308.

² See N. Hans, History of Russian Educational Policy, 1931.

World War, were accentuated by the German invasion and threat to national existence, and became an established foundation of educational practice in the postwar period. We shall discuss each period separately, giving but a short account of each.

Prewar Period

In its tempo and ruthlessness, the industrialization of the U.S.S.R. during the two five-year plans 1928-38 exceeded anything known in history. One hundred and fifty years of English industrialization were compressed into a period of ten years, and the face of the U.S.S.R. was radically changed. From a predominantly agricultural country, Russia has become one of the leading industrial areas of our planet. The percentage of urban population rose from 17 in 1913 to more than 30 just before the war. In actual figures it meant that about seven million adult peasants had become industrial workers in urbanized centers.

Side by side with this general transformation, two other important changes should be noted. The methods of production were more scientifically organized, new technical processes were introduced, and new branches of industrial activity were added. On the other hand, the prerevolutionary concentration of industry in the three areas of Leningrad, Moscow, and the Urals gave way to a more even distribution throughout the U.S.S.R., which meant that the backward non-Russian territories received their quota of industrial installations and underwent a rapid transition from a semifeudal society to an urban- industrial age.

From the educational point of view, this transformation demanded the training of millions of skilled workmen and thousands of technicians and engineers not only among the semiliterate Russian peasantry but among the entirely illiterate nomadic Moslems of central Asia. All the combined resources of the Soviet state and the Communist Party were devoted to that immediate end, and the long-term policy of cultural development was temporarily sacrificed. All general secondary schools were transformed into technical schools, and the universities were dissolved into separate specialized institutes.

The cultural level

The very success of this ruthless and rapid vocationalization of education very soon had a sobering effect. The lowering of general culture among the new, narrowly trained body of technical specialists became evident to everybody, and the Soviet and party authorities had to take notice. The first note of alarm was sounded by the September decree of 1932. It said:

The actual realization of previous resolutions led to perversions in practice, which were expressed mainly in one-sided attention to a quantitative growth of institutions and of the number of students, and to an inadequate attention to quality, as well as to an excessive division into specialties. As a result the graduates of Technical Institutes have the qualifications of a technician and not of an engineer. ... It is necessary to give the specialists a broad basis of general scientific and general technical education.

To remedy the damage of undue specialization, a Federal Committee of Higher Education was established in 1933, which in February 1934 pointed out the following defects:

The existing level of general culture of our students, although in political respects much higher than in capitalistic countries, is characterized by many essential defects (for example in the knowledge of historical facts, understanding of literature and fine art, general literacy). ... It is necessary that every student should be a truly cultured man—a proletarian intellectual.

This was followed up by decrees in the field of secondary education. The Central Committee of the Communist Party on April 23, 1934 noted an "overburdening to an inadmissible extent with the study ... of questions of Marxist and Leninist theory and the policy of the Party," a practice which the committee ordered to "stop immediately." Two special decrees of May 16, 1934 were devoted to the teaching of history and geography. Instead of "abstract definitions of social and economic factors," the decree recommended "the teaching of civic history in a lively and entertaining way, with exposition of the most important events in their chronological sequence and with sketches of historical personages." In geography, instead of "statistics, economic data and general schemes," the decree recommended more of "physical and geographical material and reading of maps."

This criticism led not only to a change of methods of instruction, but to the restoration of general secondary schools and universities. Entrance examinations were also restored in April 1934. The decree stated that all candidates to higher institutions must pass an examination in Russian language and literature, in mathematics, physics, and chemistry, and in social science. The syllabi issued at the same time were equivalent in their requirements to old Russian matriculation examinations. In all higher technical institutes special courses were introduced in general science and the humanities to raise the cultural level of future specialists. These cumulative measures bore fruit, and the previous narrow 'vocational training gave way to a more balanced curriculum. Thus just before the war the rapid expansion in numbers was followed by raised levels of both secondary and higher education.

Effects of the War

The invasion of the U.S.S.R. by the German armies interrupted the normal evolution of the school system and threw the whole country back for at least ten years. Six of the sixteen republics (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, White Russia, Moldavia, and Ukraine) were entirely submerged by the German deluge, and the Karelo-Finnish and Russian republics were invaded to a great depth. The invasion of the western Ukraine and White Russia and the three Baltic republics was too sudden and rapid to permit of an organized evacuation of schools and personnel, although many thousands of children with their teachers managed to escape before the German armies occupied these areas. In the eastern parts of White Russia and the Ukraine, on the other hand, the evacuation was systematically organized, and entire schools were transferred to the areas beyond the Volga and even beyond the Urals.

School life in the invaded republics came to a standstill. School buildings and the equipment which was left behind were destroyed by the Germans intentionally, and they did not even attempt to resume school attendance after they had taken full control of these republics. In many places both children and teachers were absent and the buildings were burned down. In White Russia, for instance, out of the total number of 10,000 schools, 7,000 were completely destroyed and the rest were occupied by the German army The same happened in the Ukrainian Republic and in those parts of Russia proper which were invaded. Thus in the Stalingrad area the Germans destroyed 567 schools and 186 children's homes.

Many universities and higher institutes were overrun before the evacua- tion, their equipment and libraries were looted, and they remained closed until the end of the war. Such was the fate of the universities of Lw6w, Minsk, Karunas, Wilno, Riga, and Tartu. The universities of Leningrad, Kiev, Odessa, Kharkov, and Petrozavodsk were evacuated in time. Leningrad University was evacuated to Saratov, Petrozavodsk to Siktivkar, Kiev and Kharkov to Kzyl- Orda in KazaJk, and Odessa to Bairan- Ali, Turkomen.

The transfer of schools and population created new problems in the receiving areas. All urban centers were overcrowded; the existing school buildings had to be used in two shifts and in many places in three shifts. Individual schools lost their identity and their local background. Ukrainian and White Russian schools were housed in Turkish- speaking surroundings, and the number of their national teachers was quite inadequate to continue regular school work. Thousands of teachers were called into military service, others joined the partisans in their localities, and many others were lost during the general chaos of sudden invasion. In 1941 there were 1,222,805 teachers in the U.S.S.R.; at the beginning of the school year 1943-^-4 only 774,795 were available in the whole Union. The relative loss in the western regions was of course much higher.

The loss in higher education was still more grievous. Eight universities and about two hundred higher institutes were completely lost for the duration of the war, and the evacuated institutions had to work in exceptionally difficult conditions. Table 1 shows the effect of the war on higher education.

The buildings of five universities (Minsk, Kiev, Kharkov, Odessa, and Dnepropetrovsk) were partly destroyed by the Germans, and the remaining equipment was plundered or taken to Germany. The material damage and

TABLE 1—Higher Education During War Years

No. of No of

Yeats Institutes Students

1940- 41 782 564,573

1941- 42 503 312,868

1942- 43 460 227,445

1943- 44 515 320,780

general disorganization of school life were the negative side of the war. There were positive results as well.³

Patriotism

The call of the "fatherland in danger," like the call of "la patrie est en danger" in. the France of 1793, aroused general enthusiasm and patriotic sentiment. Both boys and girls volunteered for national service, and those who were too young to j'oin the fighting forces were incorporated into the total effort of the nation in its struggle for survival. Senior pupils with their teachers went to the collective and state farms to take in the harvest. About four and a half million pupils worked on land during the summer of 1942. Younger children collected thousands of tons of berries, mushrooms, and medicinal herbs. The principles of self-help and mutual assistance were brought to the children's minds through actual practice. The deficiencies of school equipment were made good by children themselves with the assistance of technical schools.

The national character of the war was officially recognized, and the example of the patriotic war of 1812 against Napoleon was the main theme in school discussions. The continuity of the Russian past and present was emphasized by historical films, theater

³ According to the latest information, the material reconstruction of the ravages of the war is now almost completed, and the number of pupils reached 35,000,000 (730,000 in higher institutions) during the school year 1947-48. For recent data see: UcMUl'skaya Gazeta; Sovetskaya Pedagogika and Vestmk Vysshey Shkoly for 1948; also The Yearbook of Education, 1948 and 1949.

and opera, and literary productions. The names of Alexander Nevsky, Suvo- rov, Kutuzov, Nakhimov, and even of Czars Peter the Great and Ivan the Terrible were made popular as heroes of the Russian past.

The Orthodox Church was accepted as an ally of the Soviet state and as the representative of the glorious Russian tradition. Priests accompanied Army units to the front, and churches and cathedrals were overcrowded with people praying for their Soviet fatherland The Patriarchate was re-established, and the Government created a new Commission on the Affairs of the Orthodox Church. The Theological Academy was officially sanctioned in Moscow, and a Communist minister attended the opening ceremony. The common danger reconciled the Communists and Orthodox believers and resulted in mutual tolerance. Religion, however, remained outside the schools, and the secular-Marxian doctrine dominated the curriculum as before. The official curricula and syllabi were not changed during the war, but the textbooks of primary schools have been enlarged by patriotic tales from the past and the present.

Separation of sexes

A very important change was made in the organization of secondary schools. The previously universal coeducation of sexes in secondary schools was replaced by separate boys' and girls' schools. At first introduced only in the eighty large towns, the new practice was gradually adopted throughout the country with the exception of rural districts having only one school. The original Soviet policy was a complete identity of curricula for both sexes, with compulsory coeducation at all levels. Under the stress of war and the necessity for intensive military training for boys, the sexes were separated in secondary schools.

Later, theoretical reasons were added to make the reform a permanent feature. As the emancipation of women became an established fact, attention could be given to physiological and psychological differentiation of sexes during adolescence, and curricula could be given a certain bias in practical preparation of boys and girls for their respective functions in the adult society. Although the syllabi and textbooks in general subjects remained identical for both sexes, the boys received additional hours for military training, while girls devoted this time to domestic science The number of hours devoted to military training for boys was increased from 596 in 1938 to 1,048 in 1943, or from 6 per cent to 11 per cent of the total number of hours of the ten-year course of secondary education. During the lessons of physics and mathematics boys were given problems connected with military science, while girls applied them to domestic science.

Evening secondary schools

Other measures passed during the war were the lowering of the age of compulsory attendance from 8 years to 7 years and the establishment of evening secondary schools for young workers and peasants of both sexes. This measure should not be confused with the previous "Workers' Faculties" which had been created in the 1920's with the purpose of raising the percentage of proletarian students in the universities. Evening secondary schools as a war measure were designed to give a large number of young people whose secondary education had been interrupted by war service an opportunity of completing it. After the war these schools became a permanent feature of the Soviet educational system in order to make the equality of opportunity more real. In 1946-47 there were 2,001 evening secondary schools for young workers, with 374,770 pupils, and about

5,000 schools for young peasants, with 200,000 pupils.

Schools for war orphans

As a last wartime measure of importance, the establishment of boarding schools for war orphans should be mentioned. Special military and naval boarding schools, called "Suvorov" and "Nakhimov" schools, were created for training Regular Officers for the Army and Navy. Sons of officers and men who had lost their lives during the war were accepted as wards of the state after completing their primary education at the age of 11, for a seven-year course in these schools. They resemble the old Czarist Cadet Corps in every respect, having the same uniform and discipline and the same esprit de corps. But like the Cadet Corps in Czarist Russia, the new Suvorov schools in the Soviet Union have become largely schools of general secondary education, as many pupils prefer entering universities and civic occupations to a military career.

Postwar Situation

As mentioned before, the tendencies made manifest after 1934 and during the war were consolidated in the postwar period. In administration, the movement towards federal control began in 1933 with the establishment of the Union Committee of Higher Technical Education, which, as we have seen, introduced measures for raising the cultural level of technical specialists. In 1940 a Central Administration of Labor Reserves was created as a federal organ to organize and control vocational training throughout the Union. The war and mass evacuation of institutions from the western republics to Russia and to the Asiatic republics further strengthened the tendency towards federal control.

In 1946 the two federal committees were transformed into ministries with well-defined federal functions. The Ministry of Higher Education took over control and maintenance of all higher institutions throughout the Union, and the supervision of all technical education at the secondary level. The Ministry of Labor Reserves took over all vocational and lower technical schools. The sixteen republican ministries of education retain the control of preschool institutions, general primary and secondary schools, and adult education. But as the entrance examinations of higher and technical institutions dominate the curriculum of secondary schools, the federal ministries in the long run control secondary education in all sixteen republics as well.

A second factor tending to centralization is the Communist Party. The Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. is a highly centralized organization, and the decisions of its Central Committee carry equal weight in all sixteen Soviet Republics. As the Central Committee often adopts important resolutions on educational matters which are compulsory for all party members, the sixteen national systems of education are almost identical except for the language of instruction and special national subjects such as history and literature.

Differentiation

In school organization, too, the postwar period was mainly directed to material reconstruction in liberated areas and consolidation of war measures into a permanent system. The separation of sexes with differentiation of curricula for boys and girls was only one of the measures indicating the newest trend in Soviet pedagogy. The original egalitarian conception of education identical for both sexes and all groups of the population is gradually giving way to recognition of individual and regional differences, and adaptation of school activities to them. The structure of the school system remains the same—the seven-year school (ages 7—IS) as the compulsory basic school, and the ten- year school (or lately eleven-year for ages 7-18) as the complete secondary school leading to universities and-higher institutes. The basic minimum of general culture is considered to be identical for all young people, but education beyond that level is adapted to individual and regional differentiation.

The problem is the same as in western Europe, but the solution is slightly different. In England, for instance, differentiation is decided at the age of 11 by tests and examinations, and the children are directed either to grammar or technical secondary schools or to modern secondary schools. By such distribution the future of the child is practically decided and his social status determined.

The Soviet solution attempts to avoid this social stratification by keeping all children in the same school up to the age of 15 years. After 15 the pupils either continue their general education in the complete eleven-year secondary school or are transferred to specialized, technical, pedagogical, medical, or other secondary schools. The majority of children pass into the vocational schools of the Ministry of Labor Reserves.

Thus the three divisions of the English system (grammar, technical, and modern) are also accepted, but with two important variations. First, the furcation is postponed for four years (age 15 instead of 11); and second, by the establishment of a wide net of evening secondary schools, young workers and peasants are given an ■ additional opportunity to pass from the group of manual labor into the group of brain workers.

By these measures the Soviet school system avoids the inevitable social stratification of western Europe. The division into manual and brain workers still remains, but it does not result in a division into social classes. All young people share the basic culture imparted in the compulsory seven-year schools, and there is no social stigma such as usually attaches to manual work. A large number of university graduates come from workers' and peasants' families; many have spent years as factory hands or as workers on collective farms before entering higher institutions, and thus share the experiences and attitudes of the masses.

In the schools themselves, the adaptation to individual abilities and interests is achieved by outside voluntary activities. A great variety of clubs and societies are attached to each secondary school and to Pioneers and Komsomol organizations. Literary, artistic, musical, athletic, military, and other groups abound, and the teachers take an active part and encourage all pupils to join one or another group. The results of these activities are later incorporated into their regular school work. Political activity is concentrated in the Pioneers and Komsomol organizations affiliated to the Communist Party. In this way the Soviet school, in spite of an identical basic curriculum throughout the Union, gives ample opportunity for individualization of education.

Side by side with this differentiation a regional adaptation takes place. In agricultural areas the schools have plots of land and gardens attached to them, and the whole curriculum has an agricultural bias. In all the national regions national history, literature, and art and music form an integral part of the curriculum.

"Nationalism" in U.S.S.R.

Here we must digress to consider the meaning of nationalism in the U.S.S.R. Nationalism as sentiment is usually connected with a sovereign people, inhabiting a definite territory and possessing a distinct language and national cultural tradition. It is questionable whether the federation of sixteen Soviet Republics constitutes a "Soviet nation" and whether it is legitimate to speak of "Soviet nationalism." Both the Soviet constitution and the Communist doctrine consider the Soviet Union as an international federation with undefined frontiers. Tomorrow Rumania or Korea may join the Soviet Union without any change in the Soviet constitution or any change in the national character of these countries.

It is more correct to speak of "Soviet patriotism," which is a devotion to a certain ideology or way of life rather than to particular national characteristics. This point of view is in conformity with the original Marxian division of humanity into two "nations" of capitalists and "proletarians," and with the universal validity of the "proletarian" culture. This interpretation is still the official doctrine of Soviet authorities, and any exclusive "nationalism" is considered a bourgeois prejudice and is punishable by law. It is indisputable, however, that during the war the hatred of the Nazis was extended to all Germans (in spite of all official declarations to the contrary), and the love of the Soviet fatherland was often identified with the love of Mother Russia. Pan-Slav traditions were revived and officially propagated, and the natural leadership of Russia as the historic champion of Slavdom was accepted without question.

The synthesis of Marxian internationalism with "nationalism" was made possible by Stalin's interpretation of national traditions as an outward expression of universal "proletarian" culture. Stalin said:

Each nationality, whether big or small, has its own distinguishing qualitative features, its own specific nature which it alone possesses and other nationalities lack. These distinguishing features constitute the contribution which each nationality makes to the common treasury of world culture and which supplements and enriches it.

Language and literature, national dress and arts and crafts, are a legitimate and precious heritage of the past if they .are permeated by Marxian content of universal culture. Any tendency toward national exclusiveness or opposition on national lines is considered as a "deviation" and is punished as such If during the war the particular "Russian" patriotism was tolerated and even encouraged, now after the victory it is again subordinated to "Soviet" patriotism.

National School Systems

In this interpretation national traditions are accepted in the U.S S.R. and form the basis of national educational systems. Besides the sixteen constituent national republics of the Union, there are sixteen autonomous republics, nine autonomous regions, and ten national areas. In each the national language is the medium of instruction, and national traditions the core of the curriculum.

On the other hand, Russian as the language of Lenin and of the whole federation is compulsory in all republics as the second school language, and is universally used in the civil service and the Army. Russian literature and history inevitably play a very important part in the school curriculum in all areas, as until recently many national groups had neither a history nor a literature of their own. This is quite natural in a federation where the Russian-speaking population (Great Russians) forms 57 per cent of the whole, or 75 per cent if the two other branches (Ukrainians and White Russians) are added.

But there is no attempt at Russifica- tion. On the contrary, each nationality is encouraged by the Union Gov-
ernment to build up its own national school system. In the Ukraine, White Russia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaidzhan, national school systems were established before they joined the U.S.S.R., and they needed little help from the Moscow center for their natural growth. In the Karelo-Finnish, Moldavian and the five Central Asiatic Republics (Uzbek, Turkomen, Kazak, Tajik, and Kirghiz), the development of national systems was started and promoted by the Union Government.

This is still more true of many small groups and tribes. Thirty years ago dozens of these ethnic groups had no alphabet or literature, and their vocabulary was limited to everyday conversation. The Russian Academy of Sciences established its branches in all Asiatic republics, sent special cultural missions to smaller tribes, invented alphabets, printed textbooks, and trained the first generation of teachers for each tribe. At present the development of their languages has reached a stage when an original literature has made an appearance and the works of Russian and western European classics could be translated into all two hundred languages of the U.S.S.R.

Nicolas Bans, PhD., DJLitt., London, is Reader in Comparative Education at King's College, the University of London, and Joint Editor of the Yearbook of Education. Among his principal publications are The Principles of Educational Policy (revised 1933) a History of Russian Educational Policy, 1701-1917 (1931), Educational Policy in Soviet Russia (with S. Eessen, 1930), Educational Traditions in the English-Speaking Countries (1938), and Comparative Education (1949).

National academies of sciences and national universities existed before the war in the Ukraine, White Russia, and the three Baltic Republics. National universities existed also in Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaidzhan, Uzbek, and Kazak. During the war national academies were founded in Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaidzhan, and Uzbek, and after the war in the remaining Asiatic republics. The Karelo-Finnish University at Petrozavodsk was founded in 1940, the Moldavian one at Kishinev in 1945, the Subcarpathian one (Uzhorod) in 1946, and the Tajik University in 1947. The universities of Turkomen and Kirghiz are in the stage of formation. Thus each of the sixteen constituent republics has a complete national system of education from kindergarten up to an academy of sciences, with its own national theaters, opera, and symphonic orchestras.

Influence of Marxian Doctrine

In conclusion we should mention the role of the Marxian doctrine in educational theory and practice. Before the war the most notable case of influence of Marxian doctrine on pedagogical practice was the decree of the Central Committee of the Communist Party in 1936 against the "misuse of so-called pedology" in education. Psychological tests and the differentiation of pupils in accordance with their results were declared anti-Marxian and bourgeois prejudice. After the war the strict adherence to official orthodoxy was again enforced in the famous controversy between the "bourgeois" theory of Mendel and Weismann and the "proletarian" theory of Lysenko and Michurin. The Communist Party accepted the views of Lysenko as orthodox Marxian, and all Soviet biologists, whether in schools or in universities, have to accept that decision and teach accordingly. The Marxian doctrine, as interpreted by the Communist Party, thus continues to permeate the multinational content and the Russian form of Soviet education.

Postwar Historical Research in the Soviet Union

By Sergius Yakobson

REPORT on the progress of research in social studies under a totalitarian regime is bound to be a story of ever watchful political guidance and control which strangles the scholar's initiative, a story of ceaseless conflict between free choice and prescribed approach, between independent interpretation of factual sources and findings laid down in advance by state and party authorities interested not in the facts per se but in bolstering the political foundations of the regime. And developments and trends in the field of historical studies in the Soviet Union before and after the recent war have proved to be no exception. "History is politics projected into the past"; this pointed remark of Michael Pokrovsky, the leading historian of the earlier period of the Soviet regime, since denounced by the party as an anti-Marxist, is still characteristic of the attitude toward historical research prevailing in Soviet Russia.

History of Historical Questions

Indicative of the power wielded by the changing dictates of the party line is the repeated reorganization of one of the principal Soviet historical periodicals, recently rechristened Historical Questions (Voprosy Istorii). Each change has been a political act resulting from an important shift in policy decided on by the party.

Class Warfare

The story began in March 1931, when a Society of Marxist Historians, active in Moscow since 1926, added to its long list of publications a historical magazine entitled Class Warfare (.Bor'ba Klassov). The program of the new journal was set forth in great detail in its third issue. The central theme was to be the study of class warfare, particularly in the postwar period and especially in Russia. Furthermore, the journal was to become a "militant political organ responding actively to the most important political questions in the struggle of the Communist Party and of the Communist International." The history of class warfare appeared, in the eyes of the sponsors and editors of the review, to be a most effective aid toward the "militant education of the masses."

Related to class warfare, and with it the chief concerns of the new review, was the history of the party, of the October Revolution, and of socialist reconstruction in the Soviet Union. Particular emphasis was to be placed on the examination of Russian revolutionary movements, not as isolated phenomena but in their relationship to class warfare in the West and to revolutionary movements in the colonial countries of the East. "It is the task of Marxist historians," stated the present foreign minister of the Ukraine, D. Manuilsky, in the second issue of the review, to "help the young Communist movement in the West. We—the workers of the Comintern—appear as your creditors and demand that you honor the biH."

And interesting in the light of later developments was the attack, one hundred pages farther along in the same issue, on Eugene Tarle, today one of the most prominent Soviet historians. He was, said the writer of the article,
"a Russian bourgeois historian, an imperialist and a chauvinist of World War

I, an irreconcilable foe of Bolshevism, a protector of the warmongers of the First World War, an anti-Marxist" and an ideological torchbearer of the "general imperialist front directed against the Soviet Union."

Historical Journal

Bo/ba Klassov lasted for nearly six years. Then, in January 1937 the party suddenly decided to call it Historical Journal (Istoricheskii Zkurnal). No reason was given for this decision except for the announcement that the journal would be edited in the future "according to the directives of the party." Still, the move was revealing. It came on the heels of the adoption of the new so-called "democratic" Stalin constitution, which in itself was a response to the changed international situation. As early as 1934—one year after Hitler's rise- to power—the party discovered that it was a mistake to narrow the flow of civil history to the shallow record of class warfare. The Soviet elite at the time was lining up all available forces for the expected fight against Nazism and the eventuality of a two- front attack on the regime. In the days of the United People's Front propaganda, the publication of a magazine with such a challenging title as Class Warfare seemed out of date and had to be abandoned.

The Historical Journal survived the eight years of the search for collective security against Hitler Germany, of the close Soviet-Nazi collaboration before and after the outbreak of World War

II, and of the "Fatherland War" against German aggression. But unexpectedly, in June 194S—one month after V-E Day—a new ruling of the Central Committee of the Communist Party brought about another change. In the middle of the year, the subscribers to the journal were advised that its publication had been discontinued and that instead they would receive a new periodical entitled Voprosy Istorii. The editorial board of the Historical Journal was declared to have neglected its duties, to have failed in carrying out its assignment, and to have lowered unpardonably the scholarly standard of the publication.

Reconversion of Historical Thinking

The name of the new journal revealed the desire to give greater attention to theoretical questions. Its purpose was ambitiously explained as an effort to provide a "progressive" organ of historical research which was to exert a strong influence on the development of historical science outside of, as well as within, the Soviet Union. But the change had even more significant implications.

The Fatherland War was fought by the Russian people along purely nationalistic lines. The Soviet leaders, however, had their reservations. Even in 1941, in the days of the greatest peril to Moscow and to the very existence of the Soviet regime, Stalin did not lose sight of the tomorrow of world revolution. And repeatedly during the war, the Generalissimo stressed the distinction to be made between the German people who were capable of being attracted to the Communist side and the criminal Nazi leaders.

The war forced the party to open its ranks to Red Army men and women who wanted to face death or to continue living as privileged members of the party. There were six million registered Communists in the Soviet Union at the end of the war—more than one and a half times the membership of 1941. However, when victory was achieved and the Soviet "patriots" returned home bemedaled and ambitious, the party, by an arbitrary act of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. of October 10, 1945, deprived them of their constitutional right to be elected to that body until they were 23 years of age instead of the previous 18. Before being admitted to office, these young and "unprocessed" members of the Communist Party were first to be re-educated along the old orthodox party line, now once more in favor, and to be cleansed of their once popular nationalistic leanings. Marx and Engels were again to be the intellectual leaders of the Soviet elite.

The "purification" action was, however, not limited to members of the Red Army. Next to the neo-Commu- nists of the armed forces, the Russian intelligentsia, and with the intelligentsia the historians, were forced by party dictum to free themselves from indulgence in nationalistic thinking and from overzealousness in glorifying the Russian past.

Thus the establishment of Voprosy Istorii was a significant part of the postwar party effort to reconvert the nationalisticaUy minded Russians into a Marxist and class-conscious society. The magazine itself was intended* primarily as a "militant organ of the Marxist-Leninist historical school," which was recognized as the only admissible school of historical thinking. It was given the task of fighting "for the application of the principle of dialectical materialism to the analysis of the historical past." Once more the emphasis was placed on class warfare. Once more war was declared on the chauvinism of the Great Russians in the interpretation of the growth of the Russian state. And equally frowned upon was the petty-bourgeois nationalistic approach in the interpretation of the historical life of the many peoples living within the confines of the Soviet Union.

Scientific Effort Stimulated

Half a year after the appearance of the newly dedicated historical journal, on February 9, 1946, Stalin, as a candidate to the Supreme Soviet of the Union, delivered his famous pre-election speech. He exhorted the people, in the words of General Deane, "to extraordinary efforts in preparation for the inevitable wars which must be expected so long as the capitalist system exists." To the Soviet scientists Stalin promised new opportunities to develop their potentialities. "I have no doubt," he said, "that if we give our scientists proper assistance they will be able in the near future not only to overtake but to surpass the achievements of science outside the boundaries of our country."

Program of Historians

Stalin's appeal did not pass unheeded. Soon all the members of the Soviet Academy of Sciences were busy working out their own five-year plans for each of the disciplines they represented, and the program of the historians for the next five years was certainly not less ambitious than the plans of the other scholars. A projected twelve-volume collective History of the U.S.S.R. was to provide a Marxist interpretation of Russia's history from earliest times until the recent transformation into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. This enterprise was not only to facilitate the writing of monographs on special problems but was to serve "as an effective weapon against the partly malicious and partly bona fide misinterpretation of Russia then current in foreign countries." (None of the promised volumes has yet appeared.)

Another collective work of six vol- umes, so far also unavailable, was to cover the history of Russian towns. Additional projects in the field of social history were the study of the Russian peasantry in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and the history of the Russian proletariat. History of the domestic market, Russian diplomacy in the reigns of Catherine II and Alexander I, Anglo-Russian relations in the eighteenth century, Russia's Balkan policy of the nineteenth century, questions of historiography, the military history of Russia, particularly of the Army and Navy, and the Soviet pe-' riod of Russian history—all these were also specified as topics for detailed analysis and interpretation.

Party disapproval

The historians had, however, little luck in presenting for party approval their five-year plan for historical research. On November 30, 1946 the program was denounced by KuTtura i Zhizri, the all-powerful organ of the Board for Propaganda and Agitation of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, as anemic and "onesided." In the eyes of the party, it lacked revolutionary punch and was short of the desired propaganda value.

The paper blamed the promoters of the plan for having neglected the history of the Americas and of Asiatic countries in the age of imperialism, the history of colonial countries and colonial policy, and the history of revolutionary parties and revolutionary liberation movements. It attacked the plan for not having paid due attention (and this is important in view of Moscow's claim to leadership in the world revolutionary movement) to the elucidation of the "role and place of Russian history in the history of mankind" and of the influence exerted by the Russian people on the historical growth of other nationalities of the Union. And the conspicuous absence, in the suggested five-year plan, of complete surveys of the history of the Soviet system in the period between the Civil War and World War II, and the proposal to carry even the monumental twelve- volume History of the U.S.S.R. only up to 1920, leaving the account of the decisive next twenty-five years to another five-year plan, made the academy program particularly suspect from the party's point of view.

Counteracting "Bourgeois" Influence

A decisive landmark in Soviet political and intellectual life, with important repercussions on the future of postwar historical research in the Soviet Union, was Zhdanov's series of outbursts against western culture after the end of the war. Soviet historians were given an idea of what not to do, particularly through two ideological pronouncements of Zhdanov: first, his vehement attack on the literary magazines Zvezda and Leningrad in the fall of 1946, and, second, his famous denunciation, in the summer of 1947, of G. Alex- androv's History of Western European Philosophy. The impact of the West on the Soviet mind in spite of the Iron Curtain separating Soviet Russia from the outside world should not be underrated. Stalin, it would seem, made an even greater mistake in allowing the Red Army to see Europe than in allowing Europe to see his Army. The "vacillation" of Soviet youth due to outside "bourgeois" influences is today one of the chief concerns of Soviet educators. The war effort, furthermore, has left the masses of the Russian people tired, eager to live their lives as ordinary, everyday citizens, and apathetic toward "heroic" exploits demanded by the party.

Aware of these developments and speaking as a keynoter of the party, Zhdanov served notice to the whole Soviet "ideological front"—an important segment of which was represented by the historians—that "academic" and "objective" research was a senseless occupation unworthy of a Marxian scholar There was no room, he held, in the cultural life of the Communist state for indifference to politics and current affairs, for ivory-tower seclusion of the scholar, or for "obsequiousness" and "subservience" to the alien bourgeois culture of the West. Soviet scholars, the party insisted, were to be trusted, active Marxists, militant, partisan, and intolerant. "Partisanship in the proletarian world view"—it was later explained in Moscow—"did not exclude objectivity in the study of facts, but on the contrary presupposed it, since the class interests of the proletariat do not contradict but coincide with the objective course of historical development"

Attitude of Historians

Now, to what extent have Soviet historians been willing to respond to the party's renewed effort to slant their research and bring it in line with the new twists in Soviet domestic and foreign policies? There is no doubt that some of them, fearful of the inquisition instituted by Zhdanov, began in haste to revise their textbooks and monographs, to eliminate questionable statements, and to polish off the dangerous edges. The tailoring of history books to fit the party line of the moment had for some time been an established practice in Soviet Russia.^{^[57]} Without exception,

¹For example, the 1945 edition of a textbook on Russian history by A. Pankratova included Stalin's appraisal of the Allied landing in Normandy as a "brilliant success"— "the history of war knows no other enterprise like it for breadth of purpose, grandiose skill and masterful execution." The 1946 edition however, the historians refused to climb out on a limb by writing textbooks, surveys, or monographs on the history of the Soviet regime after the death of Lenin. And those who dared to speak in public on that subject refused to let their lectures be printed. To record Soviet domestic and foreign policies in the twenties and thirties and to analyze the Soviet scene frightened even the bravest and least suspect among them.^{^[58]}

Revision of History Text

Finally, the fate of a popular collective textbook on Russian history prepared for use by Soviet students majoring in history served as an object lesson to those historians who tried with discrimination to comply with the new directives of the party. The first edition (1939) of the textbook had as its editorial board the leading Soviet historians, V. Lebedev, B. Grekov, and S. Bakhrushin. Eight years after its first appearance the textbook underwent a substantial revision by its editors in order—in the words of Grekov—(a) to "bring it in line with present trends in the domestic life of the Soviet Union and in the field of international relations" and (b) to place additional emphasis "on the role played by the Great Russian people in the historical past of the Fatherland without, however, infringing on the role of other peoples."

The second objective reflected the postwar tendency in Soviet Russia to placate the Great Russians and to place them in relation to the other peoples of the Soviet Union in an avant-garde or privileged position similar to the superior status enjoyed by the members of the Communist Party in relation to the toiling masses of the Union. At the reception for Soviet war heroes at the Kremlin on May 24, 194S the Great Russians were toasted by Stalin as the central core of Soviet society. He said:

I drink in the first place to the health of the Russian people because it is the most outstanding nation of all the nations forming the Soviet Union. I raise a toast to the health of the Russian people because it has won in this war universal recognition as the leading force of the Soviet Union among all the peoples of our country.

Reorientation Required

The 1947 revised edition of the History of the U.SJS.R. failed, however, to satisfy the demands of the party. In November 1947 it was sharply attacked in the official magazine of the Central Committee of the party, BoVshevik. The party verdict laid down, the textbook was then thrown into the lap of the Academic Board of the Institute of Historical Research of the Soviet Academy of Sciences for further critical investigation.

The points brought out in the two meetings of the board on December 16 and 23, 1947 echoed the arguments set out previously in BoVshevik. The textbook was first and foremost accused of having given unwarranted attention to the "factual" presentation of historical events and processes, and of insufficient interest in "questions of theory and generalization." It was regarded as a bad example not only for scholarship at home but also for that of the people's democracies, i.e. the satellite states. The pendulum which in 1934 had swung away from dangerous sociological oversimplifications to the study and elucidation of primary historical facts was now moving swiftly back.

Furthermore, it is significant that this quest for "theoretical generalizations" in line with the philosophy of the Central Committee of the party was by no means limited to the historical discipline, but was symptomatic of the general reorientation requested by the party from Soviet scholars in the other fields of social science. The "social fact" formerly acclaimed as the basis of Marxist "realistic" thinking and interpretation was now discarded and sacrificed to the demand of a "theoretical generalization," partly, no doubt, in view of the discrepancy between the perceivable reality on the one side and the tenets of Marxism on the other.

For instance, Soviet authors describing the United States war economy could not resist the temptation to express admiration for the magnitude of the technological progress achieved by this country and for the grandiose volume of its industrial operations. The suspicions of party high command were aroused by these deviations of Soviet economists; and the heretics accused of purely "technological-economic" interpretations of the American scene, of an illegal divorcing of economics from politics, and of "admiration for American capitalism" became victims of a sustained attack by the party.

Change in Values

The fate of the second edition of the History of the U.S.S.R. touches upon other elements in Soviet scholarship which might be mentioned here. The disclosure that a short Soviet History of Russian Culture containing a critical appraisal of Paul Miliukov's similar work published in France was no longer worth printing because it was written five years ago, shows the swift changes in sets of values applied in the Soviet Union.

The difficulties which confront Soviet historians in their creative writing because of the constant shifts in what is acceptable evidence and interpretation are best illustrated in the remarks of K. Bazilevich, one of the contributors to the History of the U.S.S.R. He pointed out:

The authors of the textbook could hardly be blamed for discussing the influence exerted by progressive French bourgeois thought on Russian culture of the eighteenth century. Only a few years ago did not Stalin, Zhdanov, and Kirov themselves stress the fact that historians had not paid sufficient attention to the role and influence of western European bourgeois revolutionary and socialist movements on the formation of the bourgeois revolutionary and proletarian socialist movement in Russia? It seems that this reference has now been forgotten by some of the participants in the discussion. We do not want to worship the West. We have our own culture. We know its great sources, its shortcomings and its brilliant achievements, but to isolate the history of Russia from that of other peoples means to go back to the old, previously condemned conceptions and it is hardly right to follow such a path

Bazilevich's remarks were very timely and well taken; furthermore, he showed great courage in openly opposing Zhdanov's favorite theme of the autochthonous character of Russian history and culture. Nevertheless, while Grekov ignored Bazilevich's line of thinking, he accepted the other criticisms made in the discussion as valid, and approved their application not only to the recommended third revised edition of the History but also to the projected twelve- volume history of Russia still in preparation by the Soviet Academy of Sciences.

"Confessions"

Repentance takes various forms in the Soviet Union. There have been instances when people high up in the councils of the party and the Government were first purged, then made their sensational confessions, hardly ever corroborated by prima facie evidence, and were finally liquidated. There have been instances when Soviet intellectuals —for example several recent cases involving writers and composers—have been beaten to the ground by the party machine and forced to admit the guilt ascribed to them. Some were later allowed to go on with their work, promising full compliance with the established party line. Others disappeared into oblivion.

There have been instances, as in the case of Soviet painters, when intellectuals incriminated themselves without waiting for an official indictment. The historian N. Rubinstein is one of these. He wrote his book on Russian Historiography during the years 1936-39, in the period of Soviet ideological preparation for World War II. For technical reasons its publication was delayed until 1941, the year of Russia's actual entry into the war. The volume was well received by the Soviet press and praised at the time as the first Marxian analysis of its subject. Efforts were made to have an English edition of the work printed.

However, when the end of the war produced a change in the ideological climate of the Soviet Union, Rubinstein was the first to denounce his book—in February 1948. Loyalty to himself he sacrificed for loyalty to the party. He had failed, he confessed, to free himself in his methods and findings from the traditional point of view and the influences of prerevolutionary Russian historical writings. He now openly de- plored his having become a victim of a "formal," "objective," and "academic" approach instead of adopting the only admissible "militant party outlook" in dealing with scientific problems. Hence his main fault was that he presented the historical theories of Lenin and Stalin as "the outcome of previously existing progressive historical thought instead of interpreting them as the foundation of an entirely new revolutionary science of history."

In the spring of 1948 a discussion of Rubinstein's book was the chief topic on the agenda of a special meeting of the heads of the history departments of Soviet State Universities and Teachers Colleges called together by the Ministry of Higher Education of the U.S.S.R. in Moscow. The conference lasted six days, from March 15 to 20. Among the participants in the discussion were, besides the various members of the Institute of Historical Research of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, professors and lecturers of the Supreme Party School attached to the Central Committee of the party.

Rubinstein had to face a barrage of twenty-six speakers, including the Leningrad historian, O. Vainstein, who took this opportunity to repudiate his own favorable review of the book, written in 1942 for the Historical Journal. Conspicuous at the meeting was the high percentage of speakers from the Soviet provinces. Equally conspicuous was the absence of tie higher echelon of Soviet historians.

The attack on the book followed the now clearly established pattern of official thinking. Its author was accused primarily of impartiality, unpolitical attitudes, abstract idealism, shallow liberalism, and servility to the bourgeois West. At the end of the discussion Rubinstein accepted the ideas expressed by his critics, once more enumerated in his closing remarks the chief "vices" of his work, and identified himself with the demand not for a revised edition of the book suggested by some of the speakers but for an entirely new publication to be prepared as a collective work by the whole body of Soviet historians.

Nonconformity Among Historians

Lately the Stalin prize has been awarded to a few historical publications. Credit must be given, however, to some of the Soviet historians for having so far valiantly opposed the attempts of Communist Party leadership to force them to apply false formulas to the interpretation of world history. The advocated rejection of "bourgeois objectivism," it would seem, did not appeal to them. This assumption is borne out by an official exposS in the September 1948 issue of Voprosy Istorii, which frankly admits that the state of affairs on the Soviet "historical front" is, from the point of view of Soviet authorities and Communist leadership, still far from satisfactory. In the last few years, the magazine complains,

some historical works have appeared which expressed views alien and hostile to Marxism-Leninism. The publication of these evil works demonstrates that Soviet historians have not done everything necessary for the removal of all traces of the bourgeois outlook in the field of historical research.

The magazine finds particularly alarming the continuous interpretation of historical problems not from the party point of view but in the light of "bourgeois objectivism"; the neglect of "class warfare" and the revival of bourgeois concepts; the low standard of theoretical equipment of Soviet historians and lack of a militant Bolshevist approach; submissiveness to foreign influences; the impact of "American bourgeois apologetic historiography" on Soviet research; absence of a final break with the idealistic heritage of the past; the tendency on the part of some of the Soviet scholars to act as students and keepers of the traditions of the Russian bourgeois historical school; the toleration of "nationalistic" deviations; tardiness in the analysis of the history of Soviet society; and finally the avoidance by Soviet historians of scientific "criticism and self-criticism." The official writer in Voprosy Istorii laments:

Soviet historians have still not acquired the real militant party spirit advocated by Stalin. They still have not outlived the attitude of a family circle. They are unwilling to quarrel, they fear to offend someone, and they preserve the rotten tradition of blind devotion to learned "authorities" inherited from prerevolutionaiy days.

Such is the official Soviet verdict on the situation as it stood by the end of 1948, which clearly reflects the disappointment and the thwarted hopes of the Communist high command. As to the future, the Communists still expect to win over the Soviet historians to their side, or rather to force them to accept the Communist philosophy.

The "Ideal" Historian

The present Communist policies aim at turning Russia into a uniform, conventional, a kind of prefabricated, society. Soviet leaders have dictatorially laid down a pattern of behavior for all members of the community and for every member of the skills or occupations, which in the Soviet Union have taken the place of the old social groupings.

What, then, are the characteristics of the "ideal" or "true" historian⁸ in the Soviet Union today?

'In place of our word "ideal," the Communists in Russia use the terms "real," "true," and "genuine" (nastoiashchii). And Boris

Attitude toward Soviet regime

He is expected first of all to accept unreservedly all the theoretical tenets of Marxism-Leninism, and he must be particularly firm in questions of dialectical or historical materialism. Numerous quotations from Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin are especially likely to make his writings palatable to the party. He must derive guidance and inspiration from the decisions of the Central Committee of the party and from such "classic" historical writings as the official Short History of the All- Union Communist Party; Stalin's work On Dialectical and Historical Materialism; Stalin's, Kirov's, and Zhdanov's 1934 Comments on history textbooks; and finally, Stalin's letter of July 19, 1934 addressed to the members of the Politburo in which he repudiated En- gels' opinion expressed in 1890 that "a change of regime in Russia" was a chief prerequisite for the preservation of world peace. The "ideal" historian must be trained to derive "theoretical generalizations" in line with party doctrines and must be free from "excessive love for facts." For, as has been recently stated in Moscow, "where theory fails to play a leading role in research, vices are bound to appear—such as rotten liberalism, ideological weakening and lack of criticism and self-criticism."

The "ideal" historian has further to accept and live up to Zhdanov's dictum about the postrevolutionary transformation of Russian national character. Zhdanov stated:

Today we are not what we were yesterday, and tomorrow we shall not be what we are today. We are no longer the Rus-

Polevoy's Tale about a Real Man, which figures prominently on the prescribed reading lists for the Soviet collective farmers as well as the urban readers, is typical of their search for a model Soviet man.

sians we were until 1917; our Russia is no longer the same and our character is no longer the same We have changed and grown, 'together with the great changes which have fundamentally transformed our country.

Thus the Soviet historian is expected to interpret the particular period of history in which he is privileged to live and work, not as a result of a long historical development but as a beginning of a new era in the history of mankind.

The application of Lenin's basic idea that "in every modern nation there are two nations" is supposed to prevent the "real" Soviet historian from becoming an uncritical laudator temporis acti. At a conference of university teachers which took place in Moscow not long ago, Soviet historians were admonished specifically to base their research and educational work on the historic "truth" of the coexistence of two Russian nations—a good and an evil one—"the Russian people, the Russian workers, peasants and the progressive elements of Russian intelligentsia on one side and the Czars, the Russian squires, the capitalists and the Czarist colonial bureaucracy on the other."

Attitude toward minorities and foreign cultures

The "ideal" Soviet historian is further expected to steer clear of the so- called "nationalistic mistakes" which were said to have occurred in the interpretation of the history of the Ukrainians, the Tatars, the Kazaks, and the Bashkirs—i.e., the most independent national groups residing in the Soviet Union. He is supposed not to lend his support to the "nationalistically minded elements" of these minority groups, who were accused by Moscow of trying after their political defeat by the Communist Party to make their way not in politics but in the fields of history, literature, and art. The Communist Party resented particularly the emphasis allegedly placed by these freedom-loving national groups on elements of disunity in the history of Soviet peoples, as weH as their refusal to accept the resurrected idea of "class warfare" as a leading principle for their own national development.

The "true" Soviet historian is further to be free in his life and letters of "servile" admiration for foreign cultures and institutions. One is no longer permitted in the Soviet Union to speak of the European origins of Peter the Great's military reforms. And the nineteenth century western European historians, Leopold Ranke and Jules Michelet, are no longer regarded on a par with Michael Kachenovsky and Sergei Solov'ev.

Political rather than objective

The "true" Soviet historian has lastly to be militant and aggressive. His evaluation of historical facts is expected to be a political decision dictated by political considerations, and not the free objective judgment of an independent western scholar. Two examples might illustrate this point. The hypothesis of the establishment of the early Kievan state by the Scandinavians (Varangians)—the so-called Norse theory—was lately rejected in the Soviet Union not so much on scholarly grounds but primarily because it was regarded a "harmful" theory, offensive to the national honor of the Great Russian people. And the sapping effect of Allied strategic bombing on German war potential in World War II is intentionally belittled in the Soviet Union in an effort to amplify further the obstacles met by the Red Army on its road to Berlin.

Sergius Yakobson, Dr. Phil. (Berlin), Washington, D. C., is senior specialist on Russia with the Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress. He has served as honorary lecturer in Russian history and librarian at the School of Slavonic and East European Studies of the University of London, has given special courses at Yale and Cornell universities on Soviet government and Russian foreign policy, and has lectured on Russian topics of current and historical interest at various American and British universities and colleges. His writings, which have appeared in English and other European languages, deal chiefly with history, politics, and international relations.

The evidence of the past and the prospects for the future are constantly being reinterpreted officially in the Soviet Union, and all historical publi- cations there are expected to serve the purpose of indoctrinating Soviet readers with attitudes favorable to the interests of current Soviet foreign and domestic policies. Unbiased historical research is therefore as little tolerated in present- day Communist Russia as "art for art's sake," which was declared by the late Zhdanov, and is still regarded by his adherents, to be "alien to Soviet literature and pernicious to the interests of the Soviet people and the State."

Scientific Research in the U.S.S.R.

ORGANIZATION AND PLANNING By Gerald Oster

N a brief report it is, of course, impossible to discuss all phases of scientific research in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Instead, a brief sketch of the organization and the planning of Soviet scientific research will be given, and an attempt will be made to show how one phase of Soviet research has been applied to some important branches of the economy of the U.S.S.R.

Organization of Scientific Research

The Soviets have developed the organization and planning of scientific research to a high degree. An examination of Soviet scientific journals shows that although the procedures and methods used in working out a scientific problem are identical with those used in any other country, the choice of problems and the rapidity with which they are applied to the national economy usually differ considerably from most of the scientific work in other countries. A comparable situation to the planning and carrying out of a single large scientific program is that of the development and ideas in nuclear physics by scientists in the United States and Great Britain during the war, which led to the development of the atomic bomb.

Scientific research in the U.S.S.R. is carried out mainly by four bodies: (1) the Academy of Sciences, (2) the Ministry of Agriculture, (3) the Ministry of Health, and (4) the universities and technical colleges. The Academy of Sciences is the most important of these bodies, and the structure of this organization will be dealt with separately.

The principal research organization of the Ministry of Agriculture is the Lenin

Ail-Union Academy of Agricultural Sciences, which has a staff of over seven thousand research workers. It includes several subdivisions, such as the Institute of Plant Industry, the Institute of Animal Breeding, and others. Certain of its researches, for example that on the storage of foods, may overlap with the work of the Ministry of Food. Other researches, such as that on virus diseases of cattle, necessarily overlap with the work of the virus laboratories of the Ministry of Health, and of the Institute of Microbiology of the Academy of Sciences.

Connected with the Academy of Agricultural Sciences are numerous experimental stations, for example seed testing stations (one thousand in all), where results of work of the laboratories may be tested for practical results. The Academy of Agricultural Sciences publishes several scientific journals, including the monthly Doklady, or reports summarizing the results of current scientific research. It also publishes handbooks for the use of agriculturists in the field. Semipopular summaries of agricultural research have been published in English by the Society for Cultural Relations with Foreigners (VOKS) in Moscow.

Research in the medical sciences is carried out by the Ministry of Health, which also operates the medical schools. The work of the Ministry of Health is described by Sigerist.¹ Prior to 1944 most of the medical research was carried out in the thirty-five institutes and laboratories of the Ail-Union Institute

¹H. E Sigerist, Socialized Medicine in the Soviet Union, London, 1937
for Medical Research (VIEM); but the work has now been considerably enlarged and a more all-embracing organization, the Academy of Medical Sciences, has been founded. The results of medical research are published in about fifty specialized publications.^{^[59]}The results of the more important Soviet medical research are given currently in English in the Reviews of Soviet Medicine published by the American-Soviet Medical Society in New York.

Scientific research in the - universities is under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education. The work is not unlike that carried on in universities in the United States or Great Britain. Many university professors are also corresponding members of the Academy of Sciences, and in the academy are six hundred students doing research for their higher degrees. Some major scientific work has been submitted as doctorate research. For example, Veksler's invention of the sychnatron, a device for projecting nuclear particles at high speed, was submitted as doctorate material,^{^[60]} as was Petrazhak's work on the spontaneous fission of uranium.^{^[61]}

The Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R.

The Academy of Sciences was founded under the patronage of Peter the Great in 1725, and was modeled along the lines of the French Academy and the Royal Society of London. Among the earliest members was M. Lomonosov, a self-taught scholar (somewhat like Franklin) who made important contributions to physics, chemistry, linguistics, and other fields. The noted Swiss mathematicians D. Bernoulli and

L. Euler were also among the early members, and they worked in St. Petersburg. An account of the early history of the Academy is given by Knyazev.^{^[62]}

In 1945 the academy⁶ consisted of the foremost Soviet scientists (139 academicians and 198 corresponding members). They are paid generous salaries for this honor. There are a few foreign members, including the physicists Einstein, Bohr, and Dirac. The American chemist, the late G. N. Lewis, -and the American geneticist, the late T. H. Morgan, were also foreign members. The Academy consists of 57 institutes and had in 1945 over 4,300 research workers, not including students. It operates 73 libraries with a total of over ten million scientific books.

The Academy of Sciences is subdivided into the following: (1) physico- mathematical science, (2) chemical science, (3) geological and geographical science, (4) biological science, (5) technical science, (6) history and philosophy, (7) economics and law, and (8) literature and language.

Each division is made up of institutes. Thus, the technical science division has an institute of automatic and servo-mechanics, the division of history and philosophy has an institute of ethnography, and so forth. Each division may also have commissions which study specialized problems. For example, the chemical science division has a commission for the study of micro- molecular structure, and the biological division has a commission for the study of filterable viruses. Other commissions not covered by the divisions include a commission for the publication of popular scientific literature, a commission for

⁸ G. A, Knyazev, An Outline of the History of the Academy of Sciences, Izd. Akad. Nauk., 1945 (Russian).

⁶ For details see 220 Years of the Academy of Sciences, 1725-1945, Izd. Akad. Nauk., 1945 (Russian).

the production of scientific films, and so forth.

Attached to the academy are filial groups in the various autonomous regions, Kazak, Kirghiz, and other. The various republics have their own independent academies of sciences. Some of these are world-famous. Thus, the mathematical division of the Georgian Academy of Sciences is well known for its contributions to applied mathematics, particularly in the field of the theory of elasticity. The Armenian Academy of Sciences has produced good work in various branches of science, which is remarkable when one considers the small population of Armenia. The scientific papers of the academies of the various republics are published in the respective native languages, but fortunately contain Russian summaries.

The Academy of Sciences, U.S.S.R. is also a prodigious publisher of scientific works. It publishes 43 specialized journals,⁷ 71 tracts (usually annually), and 19 large continuous volumes such as the detailed catalogue of the flora of the U.S.S.R. Summaries of papers from the scientific institutes are published in the monthly Doklady. Before the war this periodical was also published in German, French, and English, but now appears only in Russian. More detailed papers of the various divisions are published either in the monthly Izvestiya, or bulletin, of the various divisions, or in specialized publications of Jhe Academy, such as the Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Physics. Convenient summaries of the research work of the institutes are published annually in the form of divisional Re- feraty, or reviews.

S. I. Vavilov, formerly director of the State Optical Institute, Leningrad, is the present president of the Academy of Sciences. Vavilov is a scientist of high

⁷ Listed in the Appendix of the work cited in note 6 supra.

caliber and has made important contribution in the fields of fluorescence and the biophysical properties of the eye.⁸ He is equally well known for his studies in the history of science, particularly for his modern evaluation of the work of Newton.⁹

The academy has sponsored and encouraged the study of the history of science. For example, the three-hundredth anniversary of the birth of Newton was the occasion for several meetings, and critiques of Newton's work were published.¹⁰ The academy has also published other works on the history of science.¹¹ There is also a great popular interest in the Soviet Union in the history of science, judging from the number of copies of books published on the subject.¹² Foreign observers of the Soviet Union are always impressed by the large numbers of copies of books published there on specialized topics.¹⁸

The Academy of Sciences also publishes a monthly semipopular science journal, Priroda ("Nature"), which contains useful summaries by prominent scientists of their own branches of science. The academy, in conjunction with other government bodies, has par-

⁸ G. Oster, Science Bulletin of the American- Soviet Science Society, June 1946.

⁹S I Vavilov, Isaac Newton, Izd. Akad. Nauk., 1943 (Russian) A German edition has been published by the "Neues Osterreich" Zeitungs-Verlagsgesellschaft m.b H., Vienna, 1948.

10 Third Centenary of the Birth of Newton, edited by S. I. Vavilov, Izd Akad. Nauk, 1943 (Russian).

11See, for example, S J Lurie, Archimedes, Izd Akad Nauk, 1943 (Russian); V. K. Kagan, Lobashchevsky, Izd. Akad Nauk., 1944 (Russian) Lobashchevsky was the inventor of non-Euclidean geometry.

12See, for example, V. Kholdodkovsky, Lobashchevsky, Izd. Molodaya Gvardiya, 1945 (Russian), editions of 50,000 copies.

¹⁸ See, for example, I E. Tamm (Ed.), The Meson, Gos. Izd Techn.-Theoret. Lit. 1947 (Russian) This highly technical work on a specialized branch of nuclear physics was printed in editions of 10,000 copies.

ticipated in large-scale public education in science. For example, five of the six pages of a recent number of Pravda¹⁴were devoted to a detailed discussion, with maps and tables, of a vast program of planting of trees along river beds and around fields in the European .part of the U.S.S.R. to prevent drought due to the passage of hot winds from Asia. This program was worked out with the help of the academy and other agencies.

Planning of Scientific Research

Many scientists, not only in the Soviet Union but also in other countries, have long felt the need for long-term planning of scientific research.¹⁶ In the Soviet Union, however, mainly because of its economic structure, planning in this field can be practiced on a large scale, and some examples are given below.

Planning of scientific research by the Academy of Sciences is done in cooperation with other branches of the Government in order to coincide with the economic needs of the country as a whole. Although the academy plays an integral part in the economy of the country, the plans do not restrict research to that which can be immediately utilized. Quite the contrary, the plans allow for research which may not be useful for many years to come. The plan also ensures that certain promising fields of science will be studied in great detail.¹⁰

A summary of the new five-year plan of scientific research of the academy has

Pravda, Moscow, Oct 24, 1948

¹⁶ See, for example, J D Bernal, The Social Function of Science, New York, 1939; Science and the Nation, prepared by the British Association of Scientific Workers, with an introduction by P M. S Blackett. Penguin Books, Middlesex, 1947.

¹⁶ For a firsthand account of such plans in the past, see, for example, the article by Ruhe- mann in Appendix VII of BernaTs book {op. cit. note 15 supra); also J G Crowther, Soviet Science, London: Kegan Paul, 1936.

recently appeared.¹⁷ The full draft of the plan is a document of 1,500 pages which was worked out by the various institutes of the academy over a period of two and a half years. The plan calls for an intensified study of many important problems, including that of the development of peacetime atomic energy, the increased study of the biophysical properties of living cells, development of mathematical computing machines, and so forth. How one aspect of an earlier plan for scientific research has been developed in practice and has affected the whole economy of the U.S.S.R. will now be considered.

Low Temperature Physics

The rapid development in the U.S.S.R. of research in low temperature physics and its applications to industry is due in part to the planning and co-ordinated effort between the Academy of Sciences and various government agencies, including the Ministry of Heavy Industry. In the early thirties, a low temperature physics laboratory was set up at the Physico-Technical Institute in Kharkov.¹⁸ This group co-operated actively with the State Nitrogen Institute of the Ministry of Heavy Industry in questions regarding the separation of nitrogen from liquid air and of hydrogen from coal gas for use in the production of ammonia for the manufacture of fertilizer.

Much more intensive work on low temperature physics was later carried on in the Institute for Physical Problems in Moscow under the direction of Kapitza. Kapitza is a scientist with that happy combination of great experi-

17 S. I. Vavilov, "Soviet Science in the New Five-Year Plan," Anglo-Soviet Journal, 7, 3 (1947). The English translation of Vavilov's speech contains an introduction by J. D. Bernal.

18 For a description of the equipment of this laboratory see M. and B Ruhemann, Low Temperature Physics, Cambridge, 1937.

mental ability and engineering skill. Besides competent experimentalists, the institute also has theoreticians, notably Landau. Adjoining the institute is a large pilot plant for experimentation on the industrial applications of low temperature physics.

Much of the work of the Institute for Physical Problems centers around studying physical phenomena near absolute zero temperature, where thermal motions of the atoms of matter are reduced to a minimum and matter exhibits very interesting properties. Near absolute zero, metals show no electrical resistance, and liquid helium exhibits zero viscosity. The latter phenomenon was discovered by Kapitza.¹⁹

Cheap Oxygen

An outgrowth of this work was the invention by Kapitza of a turbine for the production of oxygen at low cost.²⁰It is six times smaller than conventional installations, and operates at only 4 atmospheres rather than 200 atmospheres heretofore required. It starts quickly to give liquid oxygen at a moment's notice, and does not require that the air be treated to remove moisture and carbon dioxide. In other words, combined with a rectification system to remove liquid nitrogen, it is ideal for the industrial production of oxygen. The American physical chemist I. Lang- muir²¹ has discussed the problem with Kapitza and estimates that the Soviet oxygen liquefaction units can produce oxygen at one-thirtieth the cost of the best units used by the Germans during the last war for their production of liquid oxygen for rocket fuel.

¹⁹ P. Kapitza, Comptes Rendus Acad. Sc. URSS18 (1938). For a bibliography of this work, see Oster, op. cit. note 8 supra.

20p. Kapitza, J. Physics (U.SSR.), 1₉ 1 (1939).

²¹1. Langmuir, Chemical and Engineering News, 24, 759 (1946).

An important application of cheap oxygen is its use in the steel industry. In Bessemer converters, the nitrogen, which constitutes 70 per cent of the air used in the blast, is inert and seriously cools down the furnace. With the use in the blast of pure oxygen or oxygen- enriched air, however, the size of the furnace and the time of the blast is materially reduced. According to Langmuir 200 tons of steel daily is being manufactured by this method in the pilot plant of the Institute of Physical Problems, and the cost of steel is reduced to about 25-30 per cent of the cost of that made by ordinary air-blast converters. The experiment has been so successful that the Soviet Government is now spending two billion dollars to introduce this method in the steel mills in the Donbas and in Soviet Asia. The construction of suitable converters has been given considerable attention by Soviet metallurgists.²²

Industrial Uses of Oxygen

A further important industrial use of oxygen is in the underground gasification of coal. The idea of the conversion of coal to coal gas by burning the coal underground instead of mining, transporting, and then burning it is not new. In 1888 the Russian chemist Mendeleev proposed such a scheme, but its application to the coal industry was never made, for various technical and economic reasons. In the Soviet Union, the first experiments in the subterranean gasification of coal were made in 1931, and seven years later the first industrial plant on the gasification of sloping strata of lignites started operations.

As a result of theoretical and experimental research conducted in 1939-41 at the Power Institute of the Academy of Sciences, a new method for under-

²² For summary, see I. P. Bardm, Izvestiya Akad Nauk., S.SS.R., Technftal Science Section, No 10, 1385 (1946) (Russian).

ground gasification of horizontal and sloping coal strata was developed, and has been applied on an industrial scale since 1943. According to estimates by Abromov,²⁸ the mines already in operation in the Soviet Union have shown that the underground gasification of coal results in a decrease in cost of two- fifths of that for the conventional methods of obtaining coal gas, and a decrease in the number of workers to one-fourth, with an elimination of the unhealthy conditions and dangers to which miners are usually subject.

The coal gas produced is either piped to large cities or to metallurgical plants in the neighborhood, or directly converted into electrical energy by means of gas turbogenerators. The use of oxygen or oxygen-enriched air is, of course, imperative, since the large amount of nitrogen in air reduces, by dilution, the calorific value of the gas. How oxygen is used in this industry is described in the journal Kislorod ("Oxygen"), the bimonthly bulletin of the State Board for the Production and Utilization of Oxygen.²⁴

Industrial Gases

The methods developed in the Soviet Union for the separation of the components of various natural and industrial gases are described by Ruhemann,²⁵and a complete bibliography is given in the journal Kislorod.²* The Soviets have utilized industrial gases in a number of interesting ways, including the use of carbon dioxide (from factory flue gases) in hothouses to increase the photosynthetic process in living plants; the use of the rare gas krypton (from liquid air) for filling incandescent lamps, so they may operate at a higher filament temperature, with a consequent decrease in consumption of electricity; and the use of hydrocarbons (from waste gases in petroleum cracking) for the production of synthetic rubber.²⁷

Gerald Oster, Ph D._y is a physical chemist now engaged in research at the University of London. He was a research associate at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and at Princeton University and was, for the past three years, on the staff of the Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research.

OR the benefit of the lay reader, a map of that distant planet, modern mathematics, will be found useful. The two poles are algebra, the science of formal relations, and topology, the culmination of geometry. Between them and partaking in large measure of both, there lies the vast territory of analysis, the outgrowth of calculus, and such important countries as differential geometry, basic in the theory of relativity; dynamics, study of motion; probability and statistics, mathematical physics,

²⁸1. Abromov, Mining Journal (London), 225, 585 (1945).

See, for example, G. 0. Nusimov, Oxygen, No 2, 45 (1944) (Russian).

and applied mathematics—a continent with only vaguely outlined boundaries. Mathematical logic is largely algebraic. Topology is "qualitative" geometry. It has fulfilled the important task of giving solid and working content to, and removing much fog from, such basic concepts as: infinity, the dimension of figures, distances and measurement, and curve or surface. In the main, algebra as now understood, and topology, are

²⁶ M Ruhemann, The Separation of Gases, Oxford, 1940.

²⁶ Oxygen, No. 6 (1946).

For a bibliography of this last process, see J. G< Tolpin, Chemical and Engineering News, 26, 3096 (1948).

young sciences, while most of the rest are older.

And now to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and its mathematics. Right from the early nineteenth century Russia witnessed a healthy growth in mathematical science, and it contributed its share to the rostrum of outstanding mathematical figures. Loba- chevsky, the founder of non-Euclidean geometry, Chebyshov, the distinguished analyst, Liapunov, famous for his work on dynamical systems, differential equations, and related questions, Markov, outstanding for his work on probability, are household names among mathematicians.

Soviet Mathematicians

However, soon after the Revolution, mathematical research experienced an almost explosive growth. At once a number of front-rank figures appeared in the Soviet Union. The development of topology was especially noteworthy: Urysohn, one of the creators of dimension theory, a man of outstanding originality and depth, died very young; but Alexandrov, his intimate friend, and Pontrjagin are outstanding mathematical figures in our day. Although topology is utterly remote from "war research," it continued to thrive right through the war.

While not so outstanding in algebra as in topology, the Soviet mathematicians have made very distinguished contributions to this field also, and among Soviet algebraists one should name particularly Chebotariev, who died recently, and Kurosh and Malcev, who are still in their prime. Under the influence of Liapunov, to whom we have made earlier reference, the Soviet mathematical physicists have also made signal contributions to the general theory of differential equations and their applications to oscillatory phenomena. A whole school of research on oscillatory phenomena has developed in Moscow, and one of the books issued by that school, The Theory of Oscillations, by Andronov and Chajkin, has just appeared in an edited translation published by the Princeton University Press.

There are many other indications that Soviet scientists have not been unmindful of the applications of mathematics. Perhaps the most significant Soviet mathematician of the present time, A. A. Kolmogorov, still in his early forties, is a world authority in analysis in general, and particularly in the theory of probability and mathematical statistics. In this respect, Kolmogorov is in the direct line of succession of the pre-Soviet mathematicians among whom there have been several first rate contributors to the theory of probability. Kolmogorov began as a pure analyst, but became interested in the applications to switchboard analysis and from there branched off into the theory of probability.

These few lines may suffice to give an idea of the intense mathematical activities in the U.S.S.R. There is every indication that the developments there parallel those in the United States with equal energy and vigor in research. Nothing could give a clearer indication of the weight of Soviet mathematics than the fact that a growing number of young American mathematicians are endeavoring to learn scientific Russian with the sole object of being able to read the literature of their Soviet colleagues.

Solomon Lefschetz, M.E., Ph.DPrinceton, New Jersey, is H. B. Fine Research professor of mathematics at Princeton University. He has also taught mathematics at the universities of Nebraska and Kansas and in Mexico City. He is author of L'Analysis Situs et la Giomitrie Algi- brique (1924), Topology (1930), Algebraic Topology (1942), and Introduction to Topology (1949); and editor of the Annals of Mathematics.

Soviet Policy.in the United Nations

By C. Dale Fuller

NALYSES of Soviet policy in the United Nations are plenteous and diverse. Nevertheless, they can be encompassed within the same triangle of opinion that bounds the evaluations of any aspect of Russian policy—a triangle whose points are revolution, security, and pragmatism.

Clustering near one point are a variety of interpretations which base Soviet motivation on revolutionary theory. The thesis is that Russia regards the United Nations as a counterrevolutionary bourgeois "parliament" which she joined to undermine and destroy from within. The international organization serves as a sounding board for Communist propaganda and as a front behind which preparations go on for the third world war and the victory of world revolution.

At the second angle are grouped those views whose common denominator is that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is the champion of "peace and security through international organization." The argument is that the Soviets have consistently practiced open diplomacy and scrupulous fulfillment of treaty obligations and have advocated the indivisibility of peace and collective security.

The analytical formula for the third assemblage of theories is that the Soviet Government is not innately favorable or hostile to U.N. It will co-operate with other states in the United Nations or will obstruct action, depending on which policy best serves- the interest of Soviet policy at the moment.

Unfortunately, mathematics cannot be applied to parts of this triangle to derive truth about the whole. The same words and deeds of the Soviet delegates in the United Nations can be and are used by each school of thought to buttress its own interpretation. The reason is obvious—human motivation can seldom be determined with scientific accuracy.

Difficult as the assessment of the aims of another state may be, nevertheless the attributes of the thinking of leaders of foreign countries may be ascertained from the historical and contemporary record of the statecraft which those leaders fashion.

History Teaches

Historically, the Soviets have never displayed the enthusiastic hopes for international organization which sometimes have been evinced by European and American thinkers.

The new regime in Russia and the Third International proclaimed their opposition to the League of Nations at an early date. The Soviet leaders believed the League exhibited two tendencies: a tendency to collapse because of the contradictions existing among capitalist powers¹ and a tendency to become a strong alliance for strangling world revolution and its Russian motherland.² Leninist logic denied that the

1 E.g., "It became evident that the League of Nations does not exist. The union of capitalist powers is a futile deception and in actuality it is a union of two thieves each of which is endeavoring to swipe most anything, one from the other " V. I. Lenin, Sochineniia, Vol. XXV, 2nd ed. (Moscow-Leningrad- State Socialist Economic Publishing House, 1932), p 416.

2 Discussed at length in a letter dated October 24, 1918 to Woodrow Wilson from Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Chicherin See Foreign Relations of the United States,

League could prevent armed conflict, because war was a result of capitalism, and the international organization was composed of capitalist states.

Russia entered the League on September 18, 1934 somewhat reluctantly, and primarily at the insistence of the French, with whom the Soviets were negotiating for a mutual assistance pact. Litvinoff made it clear in his first speech at Geneva that the U.S.S.R. did not overrate the opportunities and means of the League for the organization of peace.® The press at home justified the departure from orthodox theory which League membership entailed, on the ground that Soviet participation changed the character of the organization. It was pointed out in addition that the League might prevent war or at least postpone it—a goal strongly to be desired.

During five years of membership, the Soviet representatives worked diligently for the principle of collective security. In accordance with League decisions, the U.S.S.R. applied an arms embargo against Paraguay and economic sanctions against Italy; Litvinoff's speeches were models for all men who wished to grant more power to the League to enable it to enforce its decisions.

Conception of U.N.

Marshal Stalin during World War II evidenced little ardor for the proposed United Nations organization. At the conclusion of the Moscow Conference, October 30, 1943, the governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, the U.S.S.R., and China issued a declaration recognizing the necessity for inaugurating, as soon as possible, a general security system in the form of an

1918, Supplement I (Washington: U.S.GP.O., 1933), pp. 448-55.

* League of Nations Official Journal, Special Supplement No. 125 (Geneva, 1934), pp. 65-69.

international organization. In an address eight days later, Stalin emphasized that the aim of the new postwar order in Europe was to "preclude the possibility of new aggression on the part of Germany" and to rehabilitate "the economic and cultural life destroyed by the Germans."⁴

There is a marked contrast between the delimiting spirit of Stalin's statement and that of Secretary of State Hull. The latter also spoke at the conclusion of the Moscow Conference. He told Congress:

As the provisions of the Four-Nation Declaration are carried into effect, there will no longer be need for spheres of influence, for alliances, for balance of power, or any other of the special arrangements through which, in the unhappy past, the nations strove to safeguard their security or to promote their interests.⁸

Plans for the establishment of U.N. were carried forward in the discussions at Dumbarton Oaks. The Russians participated in the discussions from August 21 to September 28, 1944. A month later, Stalin commented at length on the results of the meetings. A central theme in his remarks was again that a major purpose of the new organization was to prevent a rebirth of German aggression. He also stressed that "the actions of this world organization . . . will be effective if the great powers which have borne the brunt of the war against Hitler Germany, continue to act in a spirit of unanimity and accord. They will not be effective if this essential condition is violated."⁶

The issues of disagreement among the big powers as to the new interna-

* Joseph Stalin, The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union (New York: International Publishers, 1945), p. 106.

5 Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, Vol. II (New York: Macxnillan, 1948), pp 1314—IS.

6 Stalin, op. cit. note 4 supra, p. 142.

tional organization were settled at Dumbarton Oaks, with the exception of a final determination as to what matters were to be subject to a great-power veto in the Security Council of the proposed organization. This vital issue was referred to the Big Three at Yalta in February 194S. James Byrnes' shorthand notes of the exchanges between Stalin, Churchill, and Roosevelt are further evidence of the comparative lack of interest in the problems of international organization demonstrated by Marshal Stalin:

I was deeply disturbed by the clear evidence that Stalin had not considered or even read our proposal on voting in the Security Council even though it had been sent to him by diplomatic air pouch on December 5. This was February 6 and it occurred to me that if in those sixty- three days he had not familiarized himself with the subject, he could not be greatly interested in the United Nations organization. It was all the more impressive since this certainly was the only proposal on the agenda with which he was not entirely familiar.⁷

Absence of enthusiasm did not detract from the Soviet Union's diligence. The Russians vigorously participated in the drafting of the Charter at the United Nations Conference on International Organization, April 25-June 26, 194S. The Soviet delegation proved reluctant to depart very far from the words of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, and exhibited an intense interest in those charter provisions designed to protect the sovereignty of states.

Many differences of opinion arose at San Francisco, but the chief conflict again developed over voting procedure in the Security Council. The Soviet delegation insisted, contrary to our understanding of the Yalta formula, that a great power could veto even the dis-

⁷ James F. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1947), p. 37.

cussion of a dispute, unless the situation was clearly one that could be settled by peaceful means. The debate was stalemated until the Soviet delegation reversed its stand—a reversal which came only after a personal appeal directly to Stalin by Harry Hopkins.

Elements op Soviet Thinking

Undergirding the entire history of the Soviet attitude toward international organization from 1917 to 194S was suspicion of capitalist states. The foundation of the structure of suspicion was the Marxian doctrine that impersonal laws compel capitalist states to be hostile to a socialist state; the experiences of the intervention and civil war were the bricks of the edifice; and the cordon sanitaire and the reciprocal hostility of the West provided the cement. Aggravated suspicion in an individual warps his personality; suspicion on the part of a state stunts the growth of international society. Inherent in the idea of international organization is not only the conviction that differences can be ameliorated by discussion, but also the hope that settlements will be enhanced by the presence in discussions of neutral, impartial states whose objectivity will aid arbitration.

In the minds of Soviet leaders, impartial states were nonexistent when a question involved differing economic systems. In one international conference after another, Soviet delegates opposed the idea of compulsory arbitration of disputes by third parties. Only the following two exceptions to this statement are known to the writer:

On March 1, 1918 the Soviet Government concluded a treaty providing for compulsory arbitration with the worker-controlled government in Hel- singfors, Finland. It will be noted that both the parties to the treaty were proletarian states and that the arbitrator provided for was to come from the proletarian party in Sweden.⁸

In December 1922 the Soviets accepted the principle of international arbitration of political disputes with the nonsocialist states on her western borders, on the condition that agreements to disarm accompany the acceptance of arbitration. A consensus concerning disarmament could not be achieved, so the U.S.S.R. withdrew its offer to submit disputes to arbitration.⁹Thus, there is a long history behind the 1948 campaign which impugned the impartiality of the International Court of Justice and of Secretary-General Trygve Lie.

The lineaments of Soviet thinking which were conditioning U.S.S.R. policy by the time of the first session of the United Nations were, therefore: (1) to regard U.N. essentially as a security organization to prevent a rebirth of fascist aggression; UJNT. was not considered a panacea for the problems of international politics; (2) to construe international agreements strictly; the letter of the law was to be adhered to; (3) to believe that UJST.'s success or failure hinged on the unanimity of the great powers; (4) to respect state sovereignty above all else;¹⁰ (5) to be

⁸1. V. Kliuchnikov and A. Sabanin, Mezh- dunarodnaya PoUttka Noveishego Vremerti v Dogovorakh, Notakh i Deklaratsiyakh (Moscow, 1925), p 121.

®E. A. Korovin, Mezhdunarodnyie Dogov- ory i Akty Novogo Vremeni (Moscow: State Publishing House, 1924), p. 96.

¹⁰ "The Soviet state . . . regards sovereignty, not as a manifestation of unrestricted arbitrary power, but as the principle of self- determination in domestic and foreign affairs. . . . The principle of sovereignty serves as a legal barrier defending nations from imperialist encroachment, from military and economic aggression." E A. Korovin quoted in "Anglo- Soviet Debate on Sovereignty," Current Readings on International Relations No. 4 (Cambridge: Addison-Wesley Press, 1948), pp. 4, 7. Other brief English-language commentaries suspicious of the intentions of other states. An examination of the operation of Soviet policy in U.N. demonstrates that these five factors are still at work—although, as is true of any generalizations of this kind, exceptions will be observed.

The Veto

The principles enumerated account for the U.S.S.R.'s attitude toward the Jhotly debated problem of the veto. All the great powers uphold the right of veto as such. The criticism directed at the U.S.S.R. has resulted from the exercise of the power. The Soviet Union is charged with using the veto where its vital interests are not affected, to stop all action because the proposed action does not go far enough, to construe the definition of procedural matters too narrowly, and with using her power too often.

The U.S.S.R. had applied the veto twenty-nine times to eight general types of issues up to March 1949. It was used once in each of four cases: to defeat what the Soviets considered was a weak condemnation of Britain and France for retaining troops in Syria and Lebanon; to prevent censure of its satellite Albania in the Corfu Channel mine field case; to prevent the adoption of United States-sponsored atomic energy proposals; and to kill a resolution calling for the lifting of the Berlin blockade. It was applied four times in the discussions concerning the Franco regime in Spain to ward off a "weak"

pertinent to this subject include: T. A. Tara- couzio, The Soviet Union and International Law (New York: Macmillan, 1935), pp 2647; E. A. Korovin, "The Contribution of the USSR to International Law," Soviet Press Translations, Vol. HI, No. 21 (Dec. 1, 1948), pp. 655-64; House Committee on Foreign Affairs, The Strategy and Tactics of World Communism (Washington: U.S.GP.O., 1948), pp. 34-^36.

measure and to preclude the Assembly from considering the question.

Thirteen vetoes blocked the admission into U.N. of Trans-Jordan, Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Austria, Finland, and Ceylon. None of these states would have been supporters of the Soviet bloc. The stated objections varied. States were rejected because they had no diplomatic relations with the U.S S.R. or had been pro-Axis during the war; but the U.S.S.R. justified most of these vetoes on the ground that other (i.e., Soviet-sponsored) applicants were not to be admitted as members.

The Soviet delegate invoked the veto six times in the dispute about the Greek border and twice in the case of the Czech coup. These were principally to avert investigation or condemnation of Soviet satellite states. It was charged that investigations would violate the sovereignty of the states concerned.

The Soviet Union has made one major concession relevant to voting procedure. In practice, it has not considered an abstention from voting to be the equivalent of a veto—even though the great powers were on record at San Francisco conclusively that an abstention constituted a veto.¹¹

The sweeping exercise of the veto has led to a plethora of suggestions for modifying or restricting the right. In all such discussions the Soviets have relied on four defensive arguments: (1) great powers will contribute most to the enforcement of decisions, therefore they must have voting power proportionate to their responsibilities; (2) great powers will not act to enforce a decision with which they do not agree; (3) the veto hinders the organization of anti- Soviet blocs within the Security Council; (4) power matters cannot be settled by majority votes. Mr. Vyshinsky

¹¹ W. Koo, Jr., Voting Procedures in International Political Organizations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1947), p. 156.

was very explicit on this point when he addressed the General Assembly on November 21, 1947:

Behind the trees of all these beautiful words [to liberalize voting procedure] . . . is the forest of dark intentions which are designed to liquidate the rule of unanimity. . . . Most of the criticism of the voting rule in the Security Council arises because it is forgotten that the United Nations is not a federation, and is not a world superstate, and that the voting procedure of sovereign nations cannot possibly be considered on the same basis as the voting procedure in the Parliament or in the Congress of the United Kingdom or of the United States, respectively.¹²

Asms and Ivan

The veto is an instrumentality by which the Soviet Union has sought to achieve its aims in the United Nations. One of those aims, according to the statements of Soviet leaders cited earlier, is security. The U.N.'s efforts to formulate a security system have been directed toward a reduction of armaments, an agreement on control of atomic energy, and the providing of United Nations security forces.

Disarmament, or a substantial reduction in the size of military establishments, has been an objective of Soviet foreign policy since the Bolsheviks raised the issue in the Genoa Conference in April 1922. Records of today's debates on this problem read like pages from the annals of the Disarmament Conference of 1932-35. The Soviets still put forward breath-taking proposals for sweeping arms cuts. The West still fears that disarmament will leave the Soviets with two of the principal weapons in their arsenal—propaganda, and Communist parties in most countries of the world.

¹² United Nations Document No. A/P.V./ 122, Nov. 21, 1947, pp. 121, 122.

The question then is the issue now: Is a reduction of armaments the way to security, or must nations feel secure before they will part with their guns?

During the meetings of the first part of the third session of the General Assembly which met in Paris late in 1948, Mr. Vyshinsky proposed, as had Litvin- off twenty years earlier, that the way to reduce armaments is to reduce them. He suggested that each of the great powers slice by one-third, during one year, all its present land, naval, and air forces, and simultaneously with all other states submit information on the status of its military power. Ambassador Austin replied to this proposal by stating that prior to arms reductions, there must be established in U.N.: security forces, a system of inspections to see that agreements to disarm were being carried out, and controls for atomic energy.¹⁸

Atomic energy

The United States proposal for control of atomic energy became the essence of the UJN". majority's plan. It would establish an international authority to promote the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes and to prevent the use of atomic weapons. The international agency would be given management or ownership of all "dangerous" production processes and control of all "peaceful" atomic energy activities. Representatives from the international authority would be permitted to go where they wished, when they wished, in pursuit of their functions.

The U.S.S.R. objects to / international production of nuclear fuel, as an infringement on sovereignty. The Soviet plan provides instead for national ownership of plants—subject to limited inspection. The U.N. majority does not believe that the Russian proposal offers security, because of reasons of technology. There are hundreds of stages in the production of nuclear fuel in which a potential aggressor could divert sufficient amounts to manufacture bombs. It would be next to impossible for inspectors on occasional visits to determine whether nuclear fuel was being thus diverted. In addition, state ownership is no protection to the society of nations if one state is aggressively minded.

The United States plan provides that management and control be established before existing stockpiles of A-bombs are disposed of. The Soviets insist that the convention on the production and disposal of atomic weapons and the convention on the establishment of international controls be signed and put into force simultaneously.¹⁴

A third difference between policies concerns enforcement measures. The United States delegate does not want punishment of violators subject to veto. The Soviets visualize recommendations for punishment as coming before the Security Council, where the veto will be applicable.

United but unarmed

Reduction of armaments and regulation of atomic energy as wellsprings of security appear to be temporarily dried up by the conflicts among the policies of the great powers. The United Nations was to have had a third source of supply in the security forces provided for in Article 43 of the Charter. This article contemplated a degree of mili-

¹⁴ This is a modification of the Soviet stand taken in the U.N. Atomic Energy Commission for the preceding two years. Prior to October 2, 1948, the Russians had insisted that destruction of existing bombs and a ban on further production must precede the establishment of a control system.

tary strength behind the Security Council's decisions which was never available to the Council of the League of Nations. It obligates members to supply armed forces or facilities or other assistance; under the Covenant of the League, the Council could only recommend that member states contribute forces for the enforcement of decisions. However, the charter obligation must be implemented by agreements specifying the contribution to be made by Member States.

Such agreements have not been achieved. The U.S.S.R. on one hand and the western states on the other differ as to the principle which should regulate contributions of military forces to the United Nations, the location of the forces made available, and the problem of military bases.¹⁵

The guiding principle of Soviet policy is that each of the Big Five must contribute an identical number of soldiers, ships, and planes to the United Nations. The other great powers contend that a large sea power should contribute more ships and fewer soldiers than a strong land power and fewer planes than a state whose greatest strength is in the air.

Furthermore, the U.S.S.R. desires that the forces which a state contributes be located within the frontiers or territorial waters of the contributing nation and not on the territories of any other state.

Four of the permanent members of the Security Council believe that Article 43" of the Charter, which states that members will provide U.N. with "armed

¹⁸ Limitations of space necessitate that the writer strip the arguments of the great powers of their qualifications, refinements, and technical terms and present only the essence of the differences. For details of the Soviet position, see: United Nations Document No. S/336, April 30, 1947, 80 pp ; ,and Security Council, Official Records, Second Year, No. 44 (June 6, 1947), pp. 963-80.

forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage . . . ," implies a contribution of military bases from which the forces may operate. The Soviets construe the article literally and contend that "assistance and facilities" do not include bases.

The Soviet delegation upholds its policy concerning United Nations security forces on the grounds that the great powers have equality of status in the Security Council and therefore their contributions must be identical; that to locate troops of one country in another would be a violation of sovereignty; and that provision of bases likewise affects sovereignty and would be utilized by some states as a means of exerting political pressure on other states which provided such bases.

The Specialized Agencies

The paramount interest of the U.S.S.R. in the security aspects of U.N. partially explains her attitude toward the specialized agencies of the United Nations. The Soviet creed, like the Soviet deed, relative to these agencies, is generally conspicuous by its absence. However, speculation about the motives behind the policy of nonparticipation may not lead one too far from the path of fact.

The Soviet Union is a member of only two of the eleven agencies—the Universal Postal Union and the International Telecommunications Union. The activities of these two organizations are likely to have fewer political and economic connotations for the U.S.S.R. than would be true in the case of the nine bodies which she has boycotted. The UPU has existed since 187S to facilitate the transmission of mail across international boundaries. The ITU is designed to stimulate co-operation in such fields as the technical aspects of radio and telegraphy.

Cultural co-operation

The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, on the other hand, would hardly be viewed by the U.S.S.R. as nonpolitical. The outlook could not be otherwise, even if the occupants of the Kremlin were fully aware of the efforts which have been made to guarantee that the UNESCO program shall become a genuine multilateral exchange of ideas, rather than an instrument for competing propagandas. An unremitting battle has been waged by the men of science and letters in many lands to ensure reciprocity—to prevent the imposition of the culture of a few powerful states on weaker nations through UNESCO's machinery.

That struggle must have had little meaning for the disciples of dialectical materialism, who believe that education, art, music, and science cannot be separated from politics.

The Soviet Government at the moment shows little inclination to allow its citizens to have extensive contacts with the non-Communist world. This policy is diametrically opposed to the UNESCO concept of people speaking to people across international boundaries.

Food, money, trade

Membership in the Food and Agriculture Organization would require the Russian Government to make public a great deal of information about its agricultural production; many statistics of this type are now withheld. The Soviet leaders no doubt have weighed the advantages of membership and found them wanting when compared with the disadvantages of revealing what it considers to be secret information.

The Soviet Union withdrew from the World Health Organization early this year declaring that it was "not satisfied with the work" of the WHO and that it considered the administrative expenses of the organization "too heavy for member states to bear." It would seem that the WHO, like the FAO, could be of benefit to the Soviet Union only if the organization were acquainted with conditions within Russia.

By means of a state monopoly of foreign trade and a closed currency system, the U.SS.R. is confident that it has freed itself from the fiscal problems of trade which confront most other countries. This belief might explain the Soviet lack of interest in the International Trade Organization and in the International Monetary Fund, which were designed to stimulate international trade and ease the international exchange o£ money. The Soviets may feel, additionally, that the current economic problems of the non-Soviet world are inherent in the capitalist order and not capable of solution by international agencies.

The Soviets have made their views well known with respect to the International Refugee Organization. They do not approve of the IRO doctrine which is opposed to compulsory repatriation of refugees. The desire to avoid the political implications which would be involved in membership seems also to be a credible motive for not joining the International Civil Aviation Organization, the International Labor Organization, and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

Basis for speculation

It may be said that the U.S.S.R. is not adamantly hostile to the bulk of specialized agencies. Some evidence for this speculation is that one or more of the Soviet satellite states are members of ten of the eleven agencies. The Russian Government is also an active member of the Economic and Social Council, which works in close co-operation with the specialized bodies.

Two other points may shed light on Russian policy with reference to the specialized agencies. First, it will be recalled that the U.S.S.R. refused for more than a year to designate a delegate to the Trusteeship Council, one of the main organs of U.N.; but when that Council became involved in the Palestine problem (with balance-of-power implications), Russia occupied the seat which had been vacant until that time. Second, Soviet delegates to any type of international meeting are bound by detailed, strict instructions, which fact makes it difficult for them to achieve much from the conference process.

The Soviet Government probably feels that the advantages to be gained for itself from participation in the specialized agencies would not be worth the price of submitting itself to the influence, however small, of world agencies dominated by a competing political- economic system.

The General Assembly

The U.S.S.R. has refused to appoint representatives and has constantly fought the continuation of three Assembly agencies: the Temporary Commission on Korea, the Interim Committee (Little Assembly), and the Special Committee on the Balkans. However, generally speaking, Soviet policy has been one of vigorous participation in the debates carried on in the sessions and committees of the Assembly.

Early in the U-N.'s development, the U.S.S.R. challenged the competence of the Assembly to deal with matters affecting international peace and security. Similarly, the Soviet delegate on the Security Council was reluctant to transfer to the Assembly for consideration any items on which the Council .was stalemated.

The rigidity of this policy relaxed with the passage of time. The delegate of the U.S.S.R., who vetoed the transfer of the Greek and Spanish problems from the Council to the larger agency, did not obstruct this course at a later date. The U.S.S.R. was undoubtedly gratified by favorable action of the Assembly on Russian-instigated resolutions concerning disarmament and the prohibition of propaganda.

During the first part of the third session of the General Assembly which met in Paris late in 1948, the Soviets and satellites were beaten at every turn. Their proposals were voted down one after another, and for the first time in the history of the Assembly, no committee chairmanship went to a member of the Russian bloc. At the time of writing, it is not clear whether or not the reaction to those defeats will mean a renewal of attempts on the part of the Soviet Union to limit the jurisdiction of the Assembly.

It is not possible here to trace the details of Soviet policy through two and one-half regular sessions and two special sessions of the Assembly. Many of the discussions traveled ground already mentioned (Spain, the veto, disarmament, admission of new members) and involved issues of substance discussed in other articles in this issue of The Annals (Greece, and so forth). It is possible only to capsule rapidly the Soviet position on a few issues which came before the world's town meeting.

During the first session, the Soviet delegate pressed hard for a resolution requesting Member States to reveal the location and size of their armed forces stationed outside the homeland. The United Kingdom urged that the proposal should include a request for information on the size of uniformed personnel at home, as well. The U.S.S.R. countered that any such additional request must be accompanied by parallel reports on armaments, including atomic bombs and jet-propelled weapons. The discussion then became enmeshed in the general discussion of disarmament, which has been reviewed earlier in these pages.

Problems of food and relief for the needy have occupied the Assembly from time to time. The Soviet stand emphasized the need for relief to deserving countries without regard for political advantage. The U.S.S.R. held out vigorously but unsuccessfully for international administration of relief, when the United States Government decided to abandon the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration and initiate unilateral administration of food and supplies.

Trusteeship

Major differences between the Big Two arose over the establishment of the Trusteeship Council, one of the major organs of the UJsT. The Charter provides that "the terms of trusteeship . . . shall be agreed upon by the states directly concerned. . . ."¹⁶ The Soviet Union, abandoning its usual strict constructionist position, urged a broad interpretation of what constitutes "states directly concerned." In addition, the Soviets objected to administration of territories as an integral part of the trustee country, and to the erection of military bases in the trust territory without permission of the Security Council. They were defeated in the Assembly on all three counts.

Human rights

The Russians refrained from voting on the Declaration on Human Rights adopted by the Assembly in Paris. The abstention was apparently more because of what they believed to be sins of omission than of commission. In committee, the representatives of the U.S.SJR. had

¹⁶ Article 79 of the Charter Italics supplied.

not unnaturally attempted to incorporate tenets of their ideology into the document dominated by American and British beliefs concerning rights and liberties. They were of the opinion that the declaration would mean little unless accompanied by guarantees, they wished the rights restricted to those persons who opposed "fascism" and "warmongers," and they believed the document lacked adequate provisions for the protection of minorities and colonial peoples.

The U.S.S.R. voted for the convention on genocide which binds signatories to punish and prevent the extermination of any human group on racial, religious, or linguistic grounds. Approval by the Soviet delegation was forthcoming after an unsuccessful attempt on its part to link genocide to fascism.

The Interim Committee was established by the second session of the General Assembly, and its life extended by the first part of the third session, as a continuing body to function between Assembly meetings. Its tasks have been to prepare work for the Assembly meetings, to check on the execution of Assembly resolutions, and to perform special assignments referred to it by the parent body. One such assignment was to study methods by which the veto might be liberalized. The Soviets attack the Committee from their strict constructionist platform as a creation not called for by the Charter and designed to circumvent the Security Council and great power unanimity.

Prospects

One may conclude from a survey of Soviet policy in the United Nations that none of the theories encompassed in the triangle of opinion, discussed earlier, is correct in itself. To change the figure, the food of Russian diplomats is not
alone a big slice of revolution or of idealism or of pragmatism, but a stew concocted from all three. At any given moment, the diplomat's energy may come from one of the ingredients; but the wonderful thing about stew is that the next spoonful contains something different from the last.

Soviet policy is multimotivated; to interpret it otherwise is to commit the same grievous error as the Soviet analyst who sees only "profits" in American foreign policy. The objective observer can see in the Marshall plan, for example, a hope for a revived Europe which will be a source of profitable trade for the United States. This observation does not make him unaware of our desire that Europe shall not succumb to an antidemocratic way of life. Neither does it blind him to the keen sympathy which Americans have for needy people suffering the horrible aftermaths of war.

Soviet policy in the United Nations unquestionably has prevented action on many urgent problems. It has frustrated the hopes for U.N. held by many people. It must be pointed out, in fairness, that in light of the realities of our world—a world of nationalism and power politics—the frustration is due also to the wishful thinking of people who hoped for too much, too soon. The fourth candle will go on U.N.'s birthday cake in October '1949. Its record for a four-year-old isn't bad.

C. Dale Fuller is assistant professor of international relations at the University of Denver, member of the staff of the Social Science Foundation, and Coordinator for the Summer Institute for the Study of the Soviet Union. At present he is engaged in advanced study at the Russian Institute and in the Department of Public Law and Govern- ment at Columbia University, and is a lecturer in Soviet Government at Barnard College. He was formerly analyst and commentator for the ^t(Journeys Behind the News" radio series and researcher for the Army Information and Education Division in Washington, London, and Paris.

All has not been sweetness and light. If that were the nature of politics on this globe, U.N, would be unnecessary. Its job is to handle conflicts.

U.N. indispensable

The consequences will be fatal if an incipient idea that the United Nations is doing more harm than good becomes entrenched in mankind's consciousness. The United Nations is performing an indispensable function, no matter what the outcome of the cold war being fought across its green conference tables.

Despite the similarity of professed aims, the day-to-day operation of U.N. has revealed the differences between East and West to be almost as broad as life itself. Some day, East and West must agree on a political-ideological- cultural power balance between the two areas. One unavoidable process before that agreement can ever be reached is now being performed by the United Nations: the exploration of East-West differences in minute detail. Such a search is essential if meaningful agreements are to be achieved later, for each is learning what the other holds to be supreme values.

From the halls of U.N. men can gradually come to know what East and West must concede to each other if a durable world order is to be established. If these explorations reveal that coexistence is impossible, then the United Nations will have performed an equally indispensable function for those pitiful survivors in the Dark Age which will follow the Atomic War—that of demonstrating why it had to be.

Soviet Policy in Eastern Europe

By C.

USSIAN policy in eastern Europe ^ since 194S can best be understood in terms of the range of objectives of the Soviet regime. The minimum goal of security against possible future aggression is one which even a modest Russian government would have put forward upon the defeat of Germany. The maximum goal of world revolution is, on the other hand, more peculiarly characteristic of the Soviet system. At the same time, the ideological considerations which govern Soviet policy are such as to make security and world revolution almost synonymous insofar as their practical implementation is concerned. It is therefore necessary to refer briefly to the broader aspects of Soviet policy before examining in greater detail the course which it has followed in the countries of eastern Europe.

Soviet Objectives

Security

When Stalin stated at the Yalta Conference that "throughout history, Poland has been the corridor through which the enemy has passed into Russia," ¹ he was expressing an important consideration which prompted his desire to return to Russia's traditional position of influence in eastern Europe. From the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea, Russia has been engaged in military and political campaigns for over two centuries. Finland, the Baltic peoples, Poland, Hungary, Rumania, the South Slavs, Albania, Greece, and the Turkish Straits have all come within the scope of Russian policy. In the eyes of

¹ James F. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly (New York, 1947), p. 31.

;. Black

Russians, the numerous foreign invasions which their country has been forced to meet provide adequate justification for a policy of active intervention in eastern Europe. Had the Russia of the Romanovs survived World War I, it would almost certainly have annexed Constantinople and it would have made every effort to dominate such Slavic states as might have risen from the Habsburg ruins. The Provisional Government of 1917 might also have succumbed to the temptations of empire had it lasted until the Allied victory. -

For a variety of reasons, the Bolsheviks were forced to retreat to a frontier in eastern Europe more modest than Russia had known since the end of the eighteenth century. The Soviet regime did what it could during the first two decades of its rule to bolster its weak position with nonaggression pacts and other temporary devices. What is known of the crucial negotiations of the summer of 1939 and of the subsequent Nazi-Soviet partnership reveals clearly that the strengthening of Russia's strategic position in eastern Europe was the initial Soviet objective at that time. With the Nazi invasion of Russia and the subsequent development of World War II, security provisions for Russia in eastern Europe came to be accepted by western statesmen as a Matter of course.

World revolution

The theoretical goal of a Communist world revolution, never lost sight of by the Soviet Government, may be achieved by means other than direct military aggression. In eastern Europe, the Stalin-
ist regime has thus far tended to employ local Communist parties for the consolidation of Russian political and economic control rather than as missionaries of world revolution. The support given by Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia to the Communist-led Greek guerrillas has thus been the exception rather than the rule during the first postwar years. At the same time, the spread of Communism in eastern Europe has doubtless encouraged the movement elsewhere. If the time should arrive when Russia desires to promote Communism in western Europe by direct aggression, it will have in its present group of satellite states an indispensable base of operations.

Theoretical considerations

What is important is that regardless of whether Soviet Russia merely wants friendly states on her border or in fact desires to use eastern Europe as a springboard of aggression, the same revolutionary method will be employed. The theoretical basis of this policy is that only countries as fully sovietized as Russia itself can be regarded as safe neighbors and reliable friends. The Soviet leaders are well aware, however, that the countries of eastern Europe cannot be sovietized overnight. While the ultimate objective is to gather all the agricultural and industrial means of production into the hands of the state, the immediate goal is to capture what the Communists call the "commanding heights" of the economy.

This transitional policy requires a degree of co-operation with other political groups, the appeasement of the peasantry by a temporary repartition of the larger landholdings, and the guarantee of private enterprise in certain sectors of the economy while other sectors are being nationalized. The speed of these operations must necessarily vary with conditions in each country and with the attitude of the western powers, but as to their ultimate intent there can be no doubt.²

Establishment of a Soviet Sphere of Influence

The term "sphere of influence" has fallen into disrepute since World War II, yet it is a term with a long and honorable tradition, and is not to be discarded lightly in favor of such current euphemisms as "security zone" and "regional arrangement." Whatever the terminology, few will deny that today Russia has its own arrangement, zone, or sphere, in eastern Europe. More pertinent and controversial is the question of the extent to which the United States and Great Britain agreed during the war to the establishment of such a Soviet sphere of influence. The record as thus far revealed indicates that American and British statesmen came to recognize as the war progressed that Russia was bound to regain its traditional position of influence in eastern Europe. They were apparently willing to go to considerable lengths to make provision for what they understood to be Russian security requirements in that region. The record nevertheless shows that Roosevelt and Churchill did not intend that Russia should establish a belt of Communist-dominated satellite states.

Coalition warfare

The question of Russia's aims in eastern Europe was discussed at length at the time of the negotiation of the Anglo- Soviet treaty of alliance in the spring

² There is no straightforward presentation of the Soviet viewpoint, but its tenor may be gathered from two articles by I. Konstanti- novsky: "Progressive Role of the Working Class in the Countries of Eastern Europe," New Times, No. 28 (July 11, 1947), pp. 310 and "The People's Democracies—A Fresh Breach in the Imperialist System," New Times, No 49 (Dec 3, 1947), pp. 3-9 of 1942. At that time the Soviet Government pressed for recognition of the boundary which it had held in June 1941—that is, after the annexation of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, and parts of Finland, Poland, and Rumania. The British were able to resist this pressure only with vigorous American support. Roosevelt expressed the belief that all boundary settlements should be left until the end of the war, on the ground that such negotiations would tend to weaken the coalition. Stalin finally accepted this position, and the Anglo-Soviet treaty was signed on May 26, 1942, without any territorial provisions.⁸

The role of the three great powers in eastern Europe again became an issue when Churchill pressed for an Anglo- American invasion of the Balkans, and considerations of postwar influence in that region doubtless colored his views. Roosevelt and his advisers nevertheless opposed this plan, and believed, as did the Russians, that the best results would be obtained by an all-out effort in western Europe. The idea of a Balkan campaign was formally abandoned at the Tehran Conference in December 1943, although Churchill continued to urge it for another eight months.⁴

The British later turned to direct negotiations with the Russians with a view to defining their political relations in eastern Europe. In May 1944 Great Britain offered to recognize a controlling Russian influence in Rumania in return for Soviet recognition of a similar British position in Greece. When informed of this proposal, the American Government objected that a balance-of- power system based on spheres of in-

³ The Memoirs of CordeU Hidl (2 v., New York, 1948), Vol. II, pp. 1165-74.

* Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History (New York, 1948), pp 589-93, 746-47, 775-76; Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (New York, 1948), pp. 281-84.

fluence was not likely to form a sound basis for peace. Only after a direct appeal from Churchill to Roosevelt did the United States consent to withdraw its objections for a trial period of three months. When Eden saw Stalin in Moscow in October 1944, the matter was pressed further and the Russians were conceded predominant influence in Rumania, Hungary, and Bulgaria, in return for a full recognition of the British position in Greece and a fifty-fifty division of influence in Yugoslavia.⁵

These agreements were made only for the duration of the war, but they nevertheless pointed towards the acknowledgment of a special Soviet position in eastern Europe. A similar tendency was exhibited by the armistice terms agreed upon for Rumania (August 1944), Bulgaria (September 1944), and Hungary (January 1945). In these documents the Soviet Union obtained extensive economic rights in the three Axis satellite states, as well as the chairmanship of the Allied Control Commissions with almost unrestricted powers. This position was similar to that of Great Britain and the United States in occupied Italy. In the armistice terms signed with Finland (September 1944), which involved only the Soviet Union and Great Britain, the former was granted equally exclusive political and economic rights.

Soviet political initiative

In the meantime, the Russians had not neglected to press their political advantage to the full in the four eastern European countries which were fighting on the side of the United Nations' Czechoslovakia, Poland, Yugoslavia, and Greece. Russia established relations with the four governments in exile after the German invasion, but did not give them wholehearted support. Czechoslovakia was an exception, for the Soviet

⁵ Hull, Memoirs, Vol II, pp 1451-59.

Union recognized its pre-Munich frontiers and the two countries signed a twenty-year treaty of alliance in December 1943.⁶ Relations with Poland deteriorated rapidly, since the Russians would never commit themselves as to Poland's eastern boundary. Russia finally severed relations in the spring of 1943, when the Polish Government pressed for an impartial investigation of the "Katyn murders," and transferred Soviet attentions to the Union of Polish Patriots established on Russian soil earlier in the war.⁷

In Yugoslavia and Greece the Soviet Union encouraged the Communist-led guerrillas, and the National Liberation political coalitions through which they exerted influence. In Yugoslavia this policy received considerable British support and eventually led to the establishment of the vigorous regime of Marshal Tito. The National Liberation Front, known as the EAM in Greece, failed to gain a comparable position, although it continued long after the war to exert a powerful influence on Greek affairs. In Albania, which occupied an ambiguous position throughout the war, the Communist partisans under Enver Hoxha were ultimately successful.

Yalta

By the time the Big Three met at Yalta in February 1945, the chief concern of the American and British statesmen as regards eastern Europe was to negotiate a compromise which would acknowledge the basic Russian security requirements without formally recognizing a Russian sphere of influence. As

6Soviet Foreign Policy During the Patriotic War (2 v.; London, 1946), Vol I, pp. 250-56

7 Soviet Foreign Policy, Vol. I, pp. 202^3; Jan Ciechanowski, Defeat in Victory (Garden City, N Y., 1947), pp. 158-66; Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, The Rape of Poland: Pattern of Soviet Aggression (New York, 1948), pp. 2838.

James F. Byrnes later expressed it: "It was not a question of what we would let the Russians do, but what we could get the Russians to do." ⁸ It was agreed at Yalta that Russia should receive the part of Poland lying east of the Curzon line, and that Poland should be compensated with territories from eastern Germany. The Russians agreed to the admission of representatives of the government in exile and of other Polish groups to the Communist regime which the Russians had established on Polish soil. In Yugoslavia, Tito's regime was similarly to be broadened by the admission of representatives of the non-Communist parties under the leadership of Subasitch.⁹

These compromises regarding Poland and Yugoslavia, in addition to the armistice terms for Finland, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary, and the important position which the Communist parties had gained in Czechoslovakia and Albania, gave the Soviet Union a predominant influence in eastern Europe north of Greece. Although stated in some cases in general terms, these concessions were in essence considered by Roosevelt and Churchill as short- term agreements arising out of the immediate military situation. An effort was therefore made at Yalta to obtain Soviet adherence to the broad statement of policy known as the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe. In this document the three governments agreed to assist the liberated peoples "to form interim governmental authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population and pledged to the earliest possible establishment through free elections of governments responsive to the will of the people." The Yalta Declaration was accepted by

8 In his address before the American Bar Association, Seattle, Wash, Sept. 6, 1948.

9 Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, pp. 21-45; Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 850-70.

Stalin without serious discussion and in an atmosphere of genial comradery.¹⁰

Instruments of Soviet Policy

The defeat of Germany left the Soviet Union unchallenged in eastern Europe, and its allies were prepared to acknowledge its special interests in this region, if not its right to exclusive domination. It remained for the Soviet Government to give a practical political form to its new position of influence. This was a task in which prerevolu- tionary Russia had never been very successful, and the Soviet leaders employed a subtlety of approach and a flexibility of method fully equal to the difficult requirements of the situation.

Military force

The new Soviet sphere of influence in eastern Europe is founded on the exercise of overwhelming military force, used to annex some territories, to occupy others, and in some cases to exert only an indirect influence. Strategic security was held to justify the annexation of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. In other cases, however, the ethnic argument could be used. In eastern Poland, the Ukrainians, Byelorussians, and Russians outnumbered the Poles before the war and constituted almost half of the population. Similarly in the northern Rumanian province of Bucovina the Ukrainians had a relative majority, although in neighboring Bessarabia the Rumanians were in a clear majority. The Ruthenians, a people akin to the Ukrainians, formed a majority in Carpathian Ruthenia which was voluntarily

¹⁰ Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, pp 33-34; official Soviet accounts of the Yalta deliberations, such as "Krymskaya Konferentsiya 1945," Diplomaticheskii Slovar, Vol. I (Moscow, 1948), pp. 839-43, contribute little to an understanding of the subjective aspects of the conclusions reached.

ceded to the Soviet Union by Czechoslovakia in 1945.¹¹

None of these changes, with the possible exception of the cession of Ruthenia, was made with any more than nominal consent of the people concerned. Yet the fact that the Soviet Union was able to insist on these changes contributed greatly to its prestige and influence in eastern Europe.

The presence of Soviet troops in all the countries of eastern Europe north of Greece was also an important factor in extending Soviet influence. The Soviet Army occupied the four Axis satellite states under the armistice terms, and its high command exerted a direct and formal influence in these countries for some two years. Soviet troops also pursued the Germans across Polish, Czech, and Yugoslav territory, and made the liberated peoples fully conscious of Soviet power before they withdrew some months later. In Czechoslovakia the Russian Army had an orderly civil affairs arrangement with the Benes government; but in Poland the new regime had little popular support, and Soviet troops played an important role in restraining the nationalist guerrillas. It is even asserted that a "secret government" headed by a Soviet general has continued to guide Polish affairs from behind the scenes.¹² Large Soviet military missions were sent to Yugoslavia and Albania after the war, where their reception was on occasion less than friendly.

Generally speaking, the Soviet Army did not try to govern any of the countries of eastern Europe directly, and except in Poland it was in fact rather skillful in keeping out of local politics. It nevertheless exerted a powerful indirect influence in counterbalancing nationalist forces during the period in

11 Polish census of 1931; Rumanian and Czech censuses of 1930.

12 Mikolajczyk, Rape of Poland, pp 230 ff which the Soviet-sponsored regimes were being organized. Moreover, in Rumania and Bulgaria, and perhaps elsewhere, groups of former Russian troops have been settled as civilians in certain areas of strategic importance.

United-front governments

By far the most important instrument of Soviet policy has been the control exercised by the various Communist parties through the united-front governments. Tested on an experimental basis in France (1934), the united front was formally adopted by the Communist International in 1935 as a device by which the Communists could seize power through a flexible political coalition with other parties.¹⁸ These coalitions, known as Popular Fronts before the war, were now variously labeled National Liberation Fronts in Yugoslavia, Albania, and Greece, the Fatherland Front in Bulgaria, the National Democratic Front in Rumania and Finland, the National Independence Front in Hungary, the Government of National Unity in Poland, and the National Front in Czechoslovakia.

The Communist role in these regimes unfolded in two stages: minority participation, and leadership. The dividing line between these two stages was the acquisition by the Communists of the instruments of force: the police, and the army. In most countries of eastern Europe the Communists had already reached the second, or leadership, stage by the time the united-front regimes were established. In Yugoslavia, Albania, and Bulgaria, the war-hardened guerrillas played an important role in this process. In Poland, Rumania, and Hungary, the presence of Soviet troops was the only armed force on which the Communists could rely at first, and only

^1S Candidly described in the official Soviet PoUttcheskH Slovar [Political Dictionary] (Moscow, 1940), pp. 187-88.

later did they create their own militia. They were able to build up their armed units in Czechoslovakia in the freedom guaranteed by a friendly government.¹⁴Only in Greece and Finland did the Communists fail to make the transition from minority participation to leadership. In the former country the Communist-led EAM was defeated by the combined efforts of the Greek nationalists and the British Army.¹⁵ In Finland, the Communists could make little headway against the grim determination of the Finnish people.¹⁶

It may well be asked how the Communists were able under these circumstances to win the co-operation of other political groups, destined so soon to be wiped out. Leaders of other parties collaborated with the Communists for a wide variety of reasons. While a

¹⁴ The following are full critical accounts of the operation of the united-front technique: Stavro Skendi, "Albania Within the Slav Orbit: Advent to Power of the Communist Party," Political Science Quarterly, Vol. LXIII, No. 2 (June, 1948), pp. 257-74; Dr. G. M. Dimitrov, " 'Bravest Democrat of All,'" Saturday Evening Post, Vol. CCXX, No 23 (Dec. 6, 1947), 28-29, 208-10; Arthur Bliss Lane, I Saw Poland Betrayed (Indianapolis, 1948); Mikolajczyk, Rape of Poland; H. F. Arthur Schoenfeld, "Soviet Imperialism in Hungary," Foreign Affairs, Vol. XXVI, No. 3 (April 1948), 554-66; Ferenc Nagy, The Struggle Behind the Iron Curtain (New York, 1948); and Robert Bruce Lockhart, "The Czechoslovak Revolution," Foreign Affairs, Vol. XXVI, No. 4 (July 1948), pp 631-44. There are no accounts of equal detail and authority on the development of events in Rumania and Yugoslavia.

¹⁰ On Greece, see W. H. McNeill, The Greek Dilemma: War and Aftermath (Philadelphia, 1947), and C. M. Woodhouse, Apple of Discord: A Survey of Recent Greek Politics in Their International Setting (London, 1948), among numerous other accounts.

¹⁶ Eric C. Bellquist, "Political and Economic Conditions in the Scandinavian Countries," Foreign Policy Reports, Vol. XXIV, No. 5 (May 15, 1948), pp 52-56; J. H. Jackson, "Finland Since the Armistice," International Affairs, Vol. XXIV (Oct 1948), pp 505-14.

Mikolajczyk in Poland, a Subasitch in Yugoslavia, and a Maniu in Rumania agreed to participate in the united-front regimes only with the greatest misgivings, a Masaryk in Czechoslovakia, a Petkov in Bulgaria, or a Tildy in Hungary sincerely believed at first that their own political organizations would be able to continue in existence in a long-term, friendly relationship with the Communists.

Other leaders had motives which could not be given publicity. Some, like Szakasits in Hungary, Fierlinger in Czechoslovakia, and Os6bka-Morawski in Poland, were already in Communist hands. Others, such as Groza in Rumania, Georgiev in Bulgaria, and Bakirdjis in Greece, were motivated by a mixture of vanity, desire for power, and naivete.

In each case, whatever their motives, a body of opinion was won over, or a potential opposition group was neutralized, until such a time as the Communists would be strong enough to proceed on their own. The United States and Great Britain had a considerable share in assisting the establishment of these united-front regimes through recognition, UNRRA loans, and propaganda.

People's democracies

While the united-front governments are the device used by the Communist parties while they are in the process of consolidating their power to neutralize rival political groups, the constitutional regimes known as "people's democracies" represent the positive expression of their political initiative. Between 1946 and 1948 all the states under Soviet influence except Finland adopted the new constitutional forms. One function of these constitutions was to legalize the liquidation or appeasement of the political forces opposed to Soviet domination. The establishment of "people s republics" formalized the abolition of monarchies in Albania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Rumania, of the regency in Hungary, and of the nationalist republican regimes in Poland and Czechoslovakia. National antagonisms were appeased by the adoption of a federal system in Yugoslavia, by the provision for dualism in Czechoslovakia, and by the extension of linguistic rights to minorities in the other states. Of more general application were the measures embodied in each constitution for the muzzling of all persons who do not willingly accept the Communist-controlled regimes.

The chief purpose of the new constitutions was to provide a legal framework for the implementation of the Communist program. To facilitate the transition from capitalism to socialism, the constitutions define which sectors of the economy are to be nationalized immediately and which are to be left in the hands-of private initiative and of the co-operatives. While the new constitutions thus guarantee private property within prescribed limits, it is implicit in Communist theory that the state will proceed to full socialization as soon as it is prepared to do so. Similarly in the case of agriculture, the principle that the land belongs to those who cultivate it is intended only to win the favor of the peasants until the state is able to enforce collectivization.

While muzzling certain opposition groups and appeasing others, the new constitutions place full legislative power in popularly elected assemblies which the Communists are easily able to pack. The assemblies elect steering committees, known as presidiums, which are in permanent session. They are granted broad attributes of power, including the selection of the members of the cabinet and the appointment of all high officials. Decisions made by Communist party leaders are thus transmitted to the elected deputies in the assembly and thence to the presidium and the government.¹⁷

Co-ordination of policy

The problem of assuring that policies decided upon in Moscow will be faithfully implemented in the various states in the Soviet sphere, and more particu- largly that the diverse and frequently contradictory interests of these states will be harmoniously reconciled, is solved by a system of parallel and coordinated chains of command. The two official agencies of Russian control are the Communist party leaders and the Soviet diplomatic representatives Communist leaders make regular trips to Moscow and publicly acknowledge their close ideological and political ties with the Soviet Union Similarly, the Soviet diplomats make no effort to hide the special relations which exist between their country and the states to which they are accredited. In both cases, men of outstanding personality and international reputation are employed, and the great prestige of their names is often an important element in their exercise of authority.

Contrasted to these two official agencies of Russian influence are the representatives of the Russian Communist Party and of the secret police who supervise the implementation of Soviet policy in each country. Known generally only to a select few, and at times apparently unknown even to each other, these two powerful agents report back to the Politburo and the Ministry of State Security respectively. With their instructions thus implemented and checked, Soviet officials are able from Moscow to co-ordinate their policy

¹⁷ C. E. Black, "Constitutional Trends in Eastern Europe, 1945-48," Review of Politics, Vol. XI, No. 2 (April 1949); on the status of civil liberties, see the International Peasant Union, Memorandum to the United Nations General Assembly (Paris, 1948) within each country and among the various states. Russian military and commercial representatives are also present in each country, but their influence on the policy level is secondary. The Cominform, while differing somewhat from the Comintern in organization, serves a similar purpose in providing a source of authority and direction which is not formally connected to the Soviet Government.¹⁸

Political alliances

The importance of Russia's sphere of influence in eastern Europe to its general security policy is emphasized by the interlocking pattern of political alliances which it has built up with the states in this region. Some of these treaties date from the period of the war itself. The mutual assistance treaties with Czechoslovakia (December 1943), Yugoslavia (April 1945), and Poland (April 1945) bound the signatories to continue the struggle against Germany until final victory, to co-operate in all international activities, and to refrain from entering into agreements against each other. Looking to the future, the signatories were further bound to assist each other in case one should again become the victim of aggression by Germany or by an ally of Germany.

A second series of alliances was concluded three years after the war between the Soviet Union and the former Axis satellite states of Rumania (February 1948), Hungary (February 1948), Bulgaria (March 1948), and Finland (April 1948). These treaties are similar to the earlier group in their general terms, but place somewhat greater emphasis on the pledge of mutual assistance in case of "armed conflict with Germany, attempting to renew her

¹⁸ Andrew Gyorgy and V M Dean, "The Communist Information Bureau (Cominform)," Foreign Policy Reports, Vol XXIV, No. 13 (Nov 15, 1948), p 156 policy of aggression, or with any other State allying itself with Germany, directly or in any other way, in her aggressive policy. . . ."

In addition, a dozen or more bilateral agreements of similar scope have been concluded among the states of eastern Europe. A revived Germany, or in some cases merely "a third power," is cited in every case as the common danger which these states must prepare to meet. In each instance the treaties pledge support of the United Nations Charter, and the pattern of the Soviet alliance system as a whole appears to fall within the scope of Chapter VIII of the Charter, which deals with "regional arrangements." Unlike many such treaty structures, the relationship of the Soviet Union to each of its partners is so intimate that it can be kept fully informed as to the reliability of its allies at every juncture.^{^[63]}

Economic ties

In addition to its military and political influence, the Soviet Union is able to assert its point of view effectively by economic pressure of various sorts. Russian participation in the trade of eastern Europe on the eve of World War II was negligible, reaching as high as 2 per cent only in the case of Czechoslovakia; but it rose rapidly after the war. While at first this change was due to temporary and emergency reasons, by 1947 it was organized in a network of barter agreements covering all the countries in the region. From the point of view of Russian trade, the share of eastern Europe rose from about 2 per cent before the war to some SO per cent in 1946.^{^[64]} There are a variety of ways

¹⁹ Harry N. Howard, "The Soviet Alliance System, 1942-1948," Documents and State Papers, Vol. I, No. 4 (July 1948), pp. 219-49, commentary and texts

²⁰'World Economic Conditions: A Summary of Reports by the United Nations," In- in which Russia can use this commercial relationship in binding these countries more firmly to her policy.

Another source of economic influence is the reparations which Russia is collecting from the former Axis satellite states. These obligations, which are collected in kind on the basis of 1938 prices, amount to $200 million from Finland, and $300 million each from Rumania and Hungary. Moreover, in the latter two countries a permanent weapon of economic pressure has been created in the form of binational stock companies in the fields of raw materials and transportation. By investing in these companies the German assets acquired under the armistice terms, Russia is able to exercise a direct influence in certain key industries.^{^[65]} An attempt to integrate further the economies of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Rumania was initiated with the establishment on January 25, 1949 of the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance.^{^[66]}

Obstacles to Soviet Influence

Any policy with such broad and uncompromising objectives as that of the Soviet Union is bound before very long to arouse the opposition of the vast majority in each country who are not Communists. General political opposition can be kept in check by a vigilant and ruthless police, but two aspects of Soviet policy in particular have provoked resistance of a more intangible nature: economic imperialism, and the program of collectivization. The former has in certain instances even alien- ated important elements in the Communist parties, while the latter has threatened to arouse the peasants who form a majority in every country. Finally, the exclusive character of Russian control has led to vigorous counter- measures on the part of the great powers of the west.

Disunited fronts

It was the intent of Soviet policy that the united-front governments should be held together long enough to permit the major steps towards sovietization to be taken in the countries of eastern Europe before public opinion there and in the west was aware of what was really happening. In this the Russians failed, for in every case the coalitions broke up before their task had been completed, and this was followed by new waves of opposition both at home and abroad. The creation of the Groza government in Rumania in March 1945 marked the end of the participation of Maniu's Peasant Party and associated groups. In the following July and August, the Agrarian and Socialist members of the Bulgarian Cabinet resigned in protest against the Government's electoral tactics. A few months later, Subasitch and his colleagues left the Tito government.

While many in the west were prepared to write off the Balkan States, the Communists had a great interest in preserving the fagade of unity in Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia. It was therefore a blow to the myth of the united front when Mikolajczyk resigned after the Polish elections of January 1947, and when Nagy was ousted from the Hungarian premiership in the following June. The Czechoslovak coup d'etat of February 1948 came as a final disillusionment to all those who had hoped that a balance could be maintained between Communist and democratic objectives and methods. In failing to obtain the co-operation of the major non-Communist groups over any longer period of time, the Communists greatly increased the difficulty of their task and contributed largely to the consolidation of opinion in the west against Soviet policy.

The events in Finland contradict almost all that has been said in the^-preceding pages. There the Communists have been unable to move beyond the initial stage of minority participation in the government, and Soviet policy has continued to respect a regime which retains its integrity. The reason for this situation appears to be that the Finns know their Russians, and the Russians know their Finns. The tried Soviet methods have failed to work in Finland, because the Russians have been unable to convince even the small minority of Finns which their technique would require, that the Soviet system is an attractive one. The Russians moreover realize that if they used more direct tactics, they would risk losing the Finnish reparations deliveries and would provoke countermeasures on the part of the Scandinavian states and the western great powers. Thanks to a realistic and hardheaded policy, the non- Communist Finns have thus far succeeded where so many others have failed.

Nationalism

Soviet theorists have devoted much time to the understanding and manipulation of nationalist feeling, and they have achieved a considerable measure of success since 1945 in obtaining the co-operation of countries divided by profound traditions of irrational antagonism. Their single major failure in this field has been the revival of the Bulgarian-Yugoslav controversy over Macedonia.

On the other hand, Soviet policy has not been so successful in overcoming the antagonism which even some Communists feel towards the economic imperialism and doctrinaire methods of the Soviet Union. a large number of persons in eastern Europe and elsewhere went over to Communism because they thought it offered answers to the economic and social problems which their countries had found it so difficult to solve under the various parliamentary and authoritarian regimes of the interwar years. Upon seizing power, many Communists have been pained to discover that their countries are being drained of their resources by a patron who takes as full an advantage of his superior bargaining position as did the Nazis and the westerners in earlier years. They have also been discouraged by the Soviet insistence on methods which may have been necessary in Russia but which are alien to the traditions and interests of its satellites.

The most spectacular case of such disillusionment has come in Yugoslavia, where Tito has gone so far as to challenge the full authority of Stalin and his Cominform. That this is not an isolated case is indicated by the demotion of a Patra^canu in Rumania and a Gomolka in Poland, and by rumors of the imminent fall from favor of such veterans as the Bulgarian Kolarov and the Czech Gottwald.

Agrarianism

The significant role played by the peasant parties since the war, and the fact that such leaders as Tito and Gom61ka have objected to the Soviet doctrine of vigorous collectivization, point to the agrarian problem as one of the major obstacles to the sovietization of eastern Europe. Before the end of the nineteenth century the industrial revolution brought the agrarian peoples of this region face to face with the ques-. tion of preventing domination by urban interests. By the end of World War I the agrarian movement had defined the interests and rights of the rural population, and had produced such outstanding leaders as Kallio in Finland, Witos in Poland, Svehla in Czechoslovakia, Radich in Yugoslavia, and Stamboliisky in Bulgaria. The ideology which they developed relied on the co-operative efforts of small peasant proprietors, and formulated a clear view of the consideration which the peasant should receive in the overall economic policy of the state.

The views of the Communists were in direct contradiction to this agrarian doctrine. Communist policy, while paying temporary lip service to land reform, aimed at taking the land away from the peasant through collectivization and at burdening the agrarian sector of the economy with the bill for the industrialization and the bureaucracy. While some peasants were attracted by the initial slogans of land reform, as was the case in Russia in 1917, the majority soon understood what was going to happen to them, and rallied behind the leaders of the peasant parties. The Communists possessed the instruments of force and were able to coerce the peasant leaders, but they were unable to win the peasants over to the idea of collectivization.

Tito recognized that he must meet the Yugoslav peasants halfway if he was to have their co-operation for his economic program, and this deviation became one of the principal charges levied against him by the Cominform. The exiled peasant leaders, in the meantime, have formed an International Peasant Union with headquarters in Washington, D. C., for the purpose of continuing their struggle against Communism. This direct and deeply ingrained opposition of the peasant majorities in all the countries of eastern Europe to collectivization may well prove to be the crucial obstacle to Soviet policy.²³

Duel with the West

The attitude of Russia's western allies was on the whole favorable to a dynamic Soviet policy in eastern Europe during the later years of the war, and the expected demands of the Pacific campaign tended to draw western attention away from Russia's European borders in the months following the victory in Europe. During this period the Russians were nevertheless very sensitive to western pressure. In the winter of 1944 45 they abandoned a plan for the federation of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria because of Anglo-American objections, and in the summer of 1945 they postponed elections in Bulgaria when they saw signs of a stiffening western policy. As soon as it was clear that American bargaining power in eastern Europe was disintegrating, with the rapid withdrawal of the military forces from Europe and the termination of lend-lease, the Soviet statesmen were quick to press their advantage. They found that they could obtain western recognition of the new "people's democracies" and agreement on the peace treaties by making only nominal concessions, and during 1946 they made great strides in consolidating their controls in eastern Europe.

The turning point came in 1947. The United States finally took its stand on the Greek question, and as Soviet policy revealed itself more clearly in Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, and in the formation of the Cominform, opinion both in the United States and in

²⁸ Royal Institute of International Affairs, Agrarian Problems From the Baltic to the Aegean (London, 1944); Dr. G. M. Dimitrov, "Agrarianism," European Ideologies, Feliks Gross, ed. (New York, 1948), pp. 396-^52; and Dinko Tomasic, Personality and Culture in Eastern European Politics (New York, 1948), pp. 149-220.

western Europe became firmer in support of the Marshall plan and associated policies.

This adoption of a firm policy by the West has undoubtedly made the task of Soviet Communists in eastern Europe much more difficult. It has forced the Russians to speed up the process of sovietization, with a consequent increase in domestic conflicts of all sorts. It has also made available to local political leaders a positive alternative to subservience to the Russians. Without the stiffer western policy, it is difficult to imagine that Tito would have been able to pursue an independent line even as long as he has.

Balance Sheet

Many comparisons can be drawn between the immediate security objectives of the Soviet Union and those of the czarist regime. Even the broader aims of Soviet policy bear a certain resemblance in form, if not in substance, to the messianic outlook of czarism. When one compares the content of the two ideologies, however, and the methods by which the two policies have been applied, great differences emerge. Whereas the czarist ideology was founded on an Orthodox tradition which many Russians in high position were inclined to question, the Soviet commands the full adherence of most responsible Russian officials and the sympathy of important groups abroad. Where czarist Russia relied for the implementation of its policy in eastern Europe on local nationalists who needed Russia's assistance but looked to the west for their political philosophy, Soviet Russia makes use of well-organized political groups which look to Russia for both ideological and political guidance.

Insofar as its use of Communist parties permits the Soviet Union to keep a firm control over the countries within
its sphere of influence, its technique is a source of great strength. To the extent that this method arouses irreconcilable opposition within eastern Europe and firm resistance in the West, it is a major source of Soviet weakness.

C. E. Black, Ph D, Princeton, New Jersey, is assistant professor in the Department of History, Princeton University. He served with the Department of State tn Washington and in eastern Europe, 1943-46, and as adviser to the American delegation on the United Nations Security Council Commission of Investigation in the Balkans in 1947. He is the author of The Establishment of Constitutional Government in Bulgaria (1943), and of numerous articles, and co-author (with E. C Helmreich) of a forthcoming textbook, Twentieth Century Europe: A History.

After four years of feverish activity in eastern Europe, Soviet policy has a good deal to show for itself. It has succeeded, without disturbing the general peace, in placing in power Communist-dominated regimes in all the countries in its sphere of influence with the exception of Finland. It has made progress in the process, essential to Communist theory, of extending state ownership to all sectors of economic life. It has also bound these countries to Russia by political and economic ties until now they are accurately described by the term "satellite."

Yet the price paid for these achievements by Soviet statesmanship has been high. The bulk of the townspeople as well as the peasants have become permanently embittered, where they were quite willing four years ago to attempt cooperation on a reasonable basis. The western states have been provoked into implementing an unprecedented economic and military program designed to stem the Soviet tide. As a consequence, Soviet policy in eastern Europe is now based more than ever on overwhelming military force, exercised locally by the police and armies but resting ultimately on the Russian military establishment.

By Franz

ONE of the powers represented at the Potsdam Conference of July 1945 had a clearly defined and consistent policy toward Germany. Nor did the Potsdam agreement^{^[67]} embody a concrete and unambiguous joint policy of the United States, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the United Kingdom. To be sure, the three powers agreed on the ultimate creation of a unified democratic Germany. To achieve this grand aim, they committed themselves to destroy militarism, wipe out Nazism, punish war criminals, decentralize the political structure of Germany, and dissolve the concentrations of economic power. They undertook to create the democratic Germany step by step, from the bottom up, by developing "local responsibility" and by the creation of mere administrative central German organs for finance, transport, communications, foreign trade, and industry. A new democratic German government was to be the culmination of a development under the aegis of an Allied Control Council (ACC), to which France was added, and of four zone commanders who were to enjoy absolute sovereignty in their respective zones unless their powers were preempted by ACC legislation.

All this seems like a concrete and concerted program for Germany—but it is not. Words like "democracy," "militarism," "Nazism," "federalism," and "deconcentration" have no precise and universal meaning. Besides, France was not a partner to the Potsdam agree- r. Neumann

ment, although she was to become a member of the ACC and obtained a zone—a strange situation, to say the least.

All powers exhibited a schizophrenic attitude toward Germany: they feared Germany's resurrection and the inherent threat to European security; and, in view of Germany's geographic, demographic, and industrial situation, they were eager to win Germany over. The need of maintaining the wartime coalition had prevented the elaboration of a concrete and concerted program for postwar Germany. The unconditional surrender formula, coined by President Roosevelt on the spur of the moment, best expressed the lack of a concerted policy. Abstract and ugly words like "democratization," "denazification," ⁴' demilitarization," " decentralization,'' and "deconcentration" served as substitutes for an intelligent and concrete policy.

The Soviet Dilemma

The dilemma of the Soviet Union in her postwar German policy was the greatest of any of the powers. She had suffered the greatest damage by Nazi Germany, which had waged the most cruel war against her, and consequently during the war she had to retaliate by a policy that permitted no distinction between "good" and "bad" Germans. But at the same time the Soviet leaders were well aware that a mere policy of revenge might align the German people against the Soviet Union, and that consequently an attempt must be made not to jeopardize future friendship with the German people. This led during the war to the establishment in Moscow of the Free Germany Committee and of the German Officers' Union. With the fear of Germany there is mingled, moreover, admiration for German efficiency, and, especially in Stalin, a deep contempt for Germany's working class, and more particularly for her Communist Party—sentiments which he frequently voiced before the war and which he reiterated in the famous interview with Professor Oscar Lange.²

Soviet policy well expresses this contradictory attitude. It aims to make Germany pay for the damage inflicted upon the Soviet Union, to punish her for her misdeeds, to achieve security against a future Germany by strengthening Poland at the expense of Germany—and yet to win the allegiance of the German people with the aim of having in a future Germany a stable government friendly to the U.S.S.R. The first aim is best expressed by Soviet reparations and territorial policies; the second by the political, economic, and social transformation in the Soviet zone, and by the speeches of the Soviet leaders, especially during the conferences of the Council of Foreign Ministers.

To carry out both policies would have been difficult even if complete agreement among the four powers had prevailed. It became clearly impossible when divergencies between the powers arose and when the western powers began to forgo reparations, oppose the eastern territorial settlement, and pour money into western Germany. It is the impossibility of reconciling the two Soviet aims that is characteristic of Soviet policy in Germany and that has doomed it to failure.

Parliaments and Constitutions

In creating adequate controls, the Soviet Union proceeded on the same two lines as any other power: it estab-

^s April 28, 1944 at Moscow.

lished a military government machine, the Soviet Military Administration (SMA), and corresponding indigenous organs. The outer legal forms of the Soviet zone administration do not greatly differ from those of the western zones. The zone is organized in states and provinces with a total population of about 17.3 million, excluding the 3.2 million population of Berlin. Each state and province has its parliament, elected on the basis of universal franchise by proportional representation, and each possesses its constitution.

While constitutions in the twentieth century contribute but little to the understanding of the political processes of a country, and while they mean still less for Germany where military government retains sovereign power, the constitutions, at least by way of contrast with those of the western zones, show something of the spirit motivating the constitution makers.

While the constitutions in the western zones are, on the whole, typical of those in a constitutional democracy, with attempts to balance the three powers, the constitutions of the Soviet zone correspond to the concept of the so- called "people's democracy," with the total power vested in the parliaments.⁸"The diet is the highest bearer of the democratic will of the country." ⁴ The diet makes laws, elects the Prime Minister, and confirms the cabinet selected by him. It is not limited by a second chamber. When parliament is not in session, a permanent parliamentary committee exercises the parliamentary functions. To these belong, in addition, the establishment of principles of adminis-

⁸ All German constitutions printed in W. Wegner (Ed.), Die neuen deutscken Verfos- sungen, Essen-Kettwig, 1947; English and German texts in Constitutions of the German Lander (OMGUS, 1947). A useful study: Harold 0. Lewis, New Constitutions in Occupied Germany, Washington, D. C., 1948.

* Thuringia constitution, Art. 8.

tration and the continual supervision of the administration.

To be sure, civil rights are enumerated at various lengths in the various constitutions. But these civil rights are all guaranteed with escape clauses. Nazis, militarists, and generally those suspected of desiring to utilize democratic constitutions for antidemocratic purposes cannot invoke the civil rights provisions.^{^[68]} Besides, judicial review is incompatible with parliamentary sovereignty, and the guarantee of judicial independence is, to say the least, of a very doubtful nature.

It is true that the constitutions provide for the independence of the judiciary.⁶ But this independence is not institutionally secured, in spite of the fact that an impeachment of judges is not possible. Judges are civil servants. As such, they may be transferred or removed at the discretion of a diet majority if "they do not show themselves worthy of the confidence of the people." ^{^[69]} The potential pressure upon the judiciary inherent in these constitutional provisions has been cautiously stressed by Erwin Jacobi of the University of Leipzig, one of Germany's outstanding public lawyers.^{^[70]}

Judicial independence becomes still more questionable in view of the institution of the people's judges necessitated by large-scale removal of Nazi judges. "Politically and morally reliable" laymen between 25 and 45 years of age are trained for twelve months (formerly six or eight months), after successful examination are attached to a court, and are then appointed judges or public prosecutors.⁰As a transitional measure, and if their political and moral reliability is not determined by the Socialist Unity Party alone, this system is preferable to the western system of retaining judges of doubtful democratic convictions. But unfortunately the people's judges have become a permanent feature, and the selection of the candidates is in the hands of reliable Communists only.

"People's justice" meted out by "people's judges" is thus but a form of class justice, and the judicial administration has become a rational instrument for the pursuit of specific political ends.

Political Parties

What is the political end? It is to secure a government friendly to the Soviet Union. This, in turn, requires a political party upon which the Soviet Union can safely rely and which is able to control the political direction of the zone. The Soviet Union was the first power to recognize political parties after Germany's unconditional surrender. The Communist Party was registered in Berlin and in the Soviet zone as early as June 25, 1945—while Britain's military government was, on that very day, dissolving the Hamburg trade union organization because of its "too political" character. As a matter of fact, it was the positive attitude of the Soviet Union toward political parties that compelled the other powers at Potsdam to agree to recognize and encourage "all democratic political parties."

• Introduced by SMA Order Dec 17, 1945, extended by Order No. 193, Aug. 17, 1947; see: Neue Justiz, 1947 (I), pp. 13, 157.*

The term "democratic" meant for the Soviet Union four parties—Communists, Social Democrats, the Christian Democratic Union, and the Liberal Democratic Party. These in turn were exhorted and pressured into co-operation within an antifascist bloc. The significance of the post-1945 blocs, or fronts, be they patriotic, fatherland, democratic, or antifascist, lies (in contrast to the 1936 experiment) exclusively in that they permit a minority Communist Party to control all or a majority of the political parties in any given country. This manipulative device was necessary because the Communist Party of the Soviet zone was weak before 1945 and because, for obvious reasons, only the Communist Party could be considered a reliable instrument of Soviet policy.

Socialist Unity Party

To compensate for the weakness of the Communist Party, the Communist and Social Democratic Parties were merged in February 1946 into the Socialist Unity Party (SED). The argument for such fusion appears, at first sight, unassailable. Both parties, so it was argued, are socialistic, differing, it is true, in the means but agreeing on their aims. Their disunity, so it was argued even before 1945, had made possible the rise and victory of reaction and of the Nazis; their unity would prevent a similar occurrence in the future.

The arguments were faulty, but, combined with SMA pressure, sufficed to bring about the acquiescence of the Social Democratic Party everywhere except in Berlin, where four-power control vitiated Soviet pressure. The Social Democratic Party was not and is not now a socialist party (although the rank and file hold fast to a vague socialist ideal), but a democratic labor party, although its true nature was, and still is, partly hidden behind its Marxian program. The Communist Party is a socialist party only when a concrete political situation makes it advisable to be so. Its socialist character was revealed only late in 1947 after two years of repudiation of socialism in Germany.

That the split and the hostility of the two proletarian parties facilitated the rise and victory of Nazism is undeniable; but the organic unity of two such incompatible organizations is clearly unworkable, and has always meant for the Communist Party "unity from below"—that is, the attempt to split the Social Democratic membership from its leaders.

The merger of the two parties had far-reaching consequences. It entailed, as could be foreseen, the ascendancy of the Communist leaders within the SED; it put the other two bloc parties in a hopeless minority position; and it carried with it exclusive Communist control of the trade unions.

The SED assumed the status of a state party, being the transmission agent for the SMA, supplying the link between the state governments, and attempting to become the great mass party of a people's democracy. In this aim it failed. The failure is clearly exhibited in the two Berlin elections of October 1946 and December 1948 (see Table 1), where the Social Democratic Party emerged as by far the strongest political party, although before 1933 the Communists held that position. But even in the zone the SED did not live up to expectations, and consequently, with deteriorating conditions, municipal elections due for the fall of 1948 were indefinitely postponed.

Other parties

TABLE 1—Elections in the Soviet Zone and Berlin

Date	Registered	Total Vote	Per Cent Distribution Among Parties
Date	Registered	Total Vote	CP	SP	SED	Center CDU	Liberal	Nazi
Zone
May 1928	9,222,007	7,293,414	12.2	35.4	—	1 6	15 5	2.4
July 1932	9,857,122	8,545,925	15.9	26.6	—	2.1	26	42.4
Oct. 1946	11,364,807	10,409,298	—	—	48.0	23 1	23 2	—
Berlin	11,364,807
May 1928	3,169,860	2,500,897	24.5	32.6	—	3.3	14.2	1.6
July 1932	3,252,201	2,655,132	27.2	27.2	—	49	23	28 5
Oct. 1946	—	1,984,000	—	47.9	19 3	21.7	9.2	—
Dec. 1948 (West
ern sectors only)	1,586,090	1,331,770	—	64.5	—	19 4	16.1'	—

The Christian Democratic Union and the Liberal Democratic Party now present a very sorry spectacle. The lead- ership of both organizations was twice removed by the SMA, which has found it impossible to find a new set of leaders for the Liberal Democratic Party. The failure of the SED became strikingly apparent after the Marshall plan announcement, the creation of the Cominform, and the transformation of the Bizonal Economic Administration into a political administration. The SED, conforming to the pattern of Cominform parties, purged itself of unreliable members, eliminated from leading positions all but one of the former Social Democrats, strengthened the power of the old Communist cadre,¹⁰and finally created two new parties: the National Democratic Party headed by Dr. Lothar Bolz, and the Peasant Party under the able Communist functionary, Ernst Goldenbaum. The former serves to synchronize nationalists, the latter the peasant elements.

It was allegedly in order to permit these newcomers to organize that municipal elections were postponed. By permitting the existence of the Christian Democrats and the Liberal Democrats, and by the artificial creation of two new parties, the democratic nature

¹⁰ On the reorientation of the SED toward Marxism-Leninism, see Franz Dahlem in Neues Deutschland, Dec. 1$, 1948.

of the Soviet zone is thought to be demonstrated. In the east, as in the west, the "little" Nazis have become highly prized followers of the various political parties of the extreme right and the extreme left.

Denazification

In some respects denazification in the Soviet zone has a significance very different from that in the west. For the west, denazification is an infinitely more difficult problem because of the great scope of the authority of the states and because of the pluralistic political party system. Inadequate denazification is thus a serious political problem for the west In the east, however, where political controls are, on the whole, monolithic and where the SMA retains full control in spite of all semblance of self- government, inadequate denazification does not create an immediate political danger.

In certain fields (justice and education) denazification in the Soviet zone was far more thorough than in the west. In others (primarily managing positions in industry) it was, if anything, less thorough than in the west. The denazification commissions established under Allied Control Council Directive No, 24 have been dissolved by Soviet

Military Administration Order No. 35 of February 28, 1948, and denazification in the Soviet zone (as in all others) has also formally come to an end.^{^[71]}

Central Zonal Controls

The SED as the unifying link between the various state governments is by no means adequate to secure the cooperation of the various state administrations. Nor is the control of the state administrations by the SMA adequate, as the American administration has discovered is also true of military control in the United States zone.

An indigenous central administration is necessary for the co-ordination of the various German authorities. To this end the SMA created central German administrations standing between the German zonal authorities in the British zone and the former Council of States in the American zone. In the British zone, some of the functions of the defunct German national government are preserved in central zonal offices^{^[72]}which possess direct legislative power over the various state governments. In the United States zone, where federalist trends were driven to excess, the former Council of States was merely a consultative body of the Prime Ministers. The central German administrations in the Soviet zone stood somewhere between the two extremes, gradually, however, assuming more control of the state governments.

The decisive break occurred with the issue of SMA Order No. 138 of June 4, 1947¹⁸ establishing the German Economic Commission (DWK) "for the purpose of creating the necessary agreement in the work of the German administrations for industry, transport, fuel and energy, agriculture, trade and supply." Originally the DWK was considered as a kind of roof organization for the various economic administrations. But mere co-ordination proved inadequate in the face of the "hydra of the egotisms of the states," and SMA Order No. 32 of February 12, 1948 made of the DWK the supreme central legislative body for the economic organization of the Soviet zone—a response to the challenge of the new bizonal organization in the west.

Following its "democratic" reorganization by SMA Order No. 183 of November 26, 1948^{^[73]} the DWK now consists of a president (the able Communist agriculture expert Heinrich Rau), four deputies, a secretariat, the directors of the various central administrations, representatives of the trade unions and of the peasant committees, forty- eight deputies of the German people, to be elected by the diets, and fifteen representatives of the German political parties. In the field of economic organization, therefore, in the east (as in the west) an undisputed zonal authority stands at the disposal of the SMA and is able to impose its will upon the state governments. No decisive changes have as yet been made in the remaining central administrations for the interior, justice, health, and popular education.

The supervision of the states is entrusted to a Control Commission operated jointly by the DWK and the German Central Administration for the Interior (GIA), so that the zonal police can at any given time enforce directly the orders of the DWK. With stringent centralization and growing popular opposition, the need for a reliable zonal police force became obvious. While the western powers have resisted German ¹⁴Die Wirtschaft, 1948 (HI), p. 567.

pressure to permit such police and have equally opposed Mr. Molotov's proposal for a national police force,^{^[74]} the SMA has built up a central zonal police force.

Originally the police was a state affair, although from the very beginning standing under SMA influence. Since 1947 the GIA has begun to create its own police force and has gradually assumed ascendancy over the state police administrations. The state police forces were purged, and an old and reliable Communist (Kurt Fischer) as chief of the GIA was entrusted, in November 1948, with the creation of a reliable zonal police force which is not only centralized but also militarized, and may now number about 80,000 men. This is not the Paulus army, although undoubtedly many individual members of the German Officers' Union have found leading positions within the police force.

Agricultural Policy

Police power, central controls, and the power of the SED may easily lead us to assume that the whole German population in the Soviet zone is wholeheartedly opposed to the eastern regime. This is undoubtedly an overstatement. There is probably still considerable popular support for the SED in those rural regions where the land reform makes itself felt. This is shown by the fact that the SED polled the largest vote in Mecklenburg-Pomerania (S0.4 per cent in October 1946), while tie Communist Party in 1928 polled there only S.4 per cent and in 1932 10.1 per cent. It is here that the agrarian reform indeed involved a radical change in the property structure.

This is by no means to imply that the beneficiaries of the reform were and are motivated by gratitude in vot- ing for the SED. They are, as peasants are everywhere, motivated by their interests. They stand between two fears: fear from the west, that the reform may be undone and the former owners be reinstated; fear from the east, that the present system of private property may give way to collectivization. Western political developments generally, and western agrarian policy in particular, make it understandable why the present population in the east should stick to the SED.

The agrarian reform in the Soviet zone, carried out as early as September 1945, is, in spite of a considerable degree of arbitrariness, and in spite of its deleterious effect on agricultural production, a progressive measure, remedying the fatal omissions of the revolution of 1918. The land fund, composed of expropriated holdings of more than 100 hectares total acreage (except those belonging to municipalities, churches, and scientific institutions), and of holdings of active and leading Nazis and Nazi supporters regardless of size, totaling about 3,147,000 hectares of agricultural and forest land, was distributed to: 204,530 families of landless peasants and resettled persons (refugees); 79,700 families of smallholders; and 191,700 families of nonagricultural workers.^{^[75]} The Soviet zone has thus been transformed from a feudal and aristocratic preserve into a country of small farms.

This in turn created for the SED new problems of control. Collectiviza-

¹⁶ A more detailed breakdown for 1946 is taken from Europa Archiv, Dec. 1946, and Lewis, op. cit. note 3 supra, namely: 2,800,000 ha. were distributed to: 124,142 families of farm workers and landless peasants, 64,578 families of refugees, 74,170 families of smallholders, 55,864 families of nonagricultural workers, 2,150 rural communities (meadows and pastures), 387 mutual aid committees. The figures in the text are from Der Freie Bauer, July 11, 1948 tion, the easiest way to ensure it, was impossible in view of the political situation, although it may come soon. A middle way between individualistic peasant property and collectivized ownership was found in the Mutual Aid Committees, centralized in the Mutual Aid Association. The benefits derived from the committees and accruing to the peasants, especially to the new peasants, consisting of technological advice, the loan of agricultural machinery, and so forth, are unquestionably great, because the destruction caused by the war —the tremendous demands for building materials, machinery, fertilizers, cattle, and so forth, in the face of extreme scarcities—would have made a wholly individualistic peasant property a mere sham. But the price paid for aid is the tight control of the Mutual Aid Committees by the SED groups within them, and the supervision of the committees by the state councils and thus by the SMA.

Labor Policy

While the agrarian policy of the SMA had thus a fair amount of success, its labor policy failed. The Soviet Union was again the first power to recognize and encourage trade union organization,^{^[76]} and the Free German Trade Union Organization (FDGB) was at once created as the trade union organization for the Soviet zone, with more than 3,000,000 members. The structure and general policy of the FDGB have gradually been shaped according to Leninist principles—complete centralization with virtually no autonomy for the functional and territorial subdivisions of the FDGB, and complete subordination of the industrial organization under the political leadership of the SED^{^[77]}—with the result that the

17SMA Order No. 2 dated June 10, 1945.

18This is cautiously formulated by one of the FDGB leaders (now chairman of the Ber- few leading Social Democrats in the FDGB have been eliminated, and control has been concentrated in former leaders of the Red Trade Union Opposition (RGO).

Trade union functions may generally be grouped under three heads: inner trade union; marketing; and political- administrative functions. The inner trade union tasks, such as education, legal assistance, and material aid, were highly developed under the Weimar Republic, and the FDGB took over the many schools and services created by the former trade union organizations. It need hardly be mentioned that education is in the hands of reliable SED leaders.¹⁸

The exercise of the marketing functions (collective bargaining), however, has created tremendous difficulties which are due in part to the very fact of occupation, and in part to the unique economic structure of the Soviet zone. In the early period of occupation, wage policy for the whole of Germany was regulated by ACC Directive No. 14 of October 12, 194S, which continued the wage-stop of the Nazi period.^{^[78]} Gradually the prohibitions against collective bargaining were relaxed until, by SMA Order No. 61 of March 14, 1947,^{^[79]} the FDGB received authority to conclude collective agreements, subject to supervision and approval by the German Central Administration for Labor and the Labor Power Division in the SMA.

This at once raised two questions:

With whom could the FDGB bargain, and what were to be the standards of the German Central Administration and of the SMA in the regulation of wages and labor conditions? In the Weimar Republic, the normal bargaining agent for the employer was his employers' association. These associations, however, are banned in the Soviet zone as the nuclei of reaction and Nazism, and consequently new devices had to be developed. Smaller enterprises (up to 1,000 employees) are represented by the chambers of commerce, industry, and handicraft,²² now composed of one- third entrepreneurs, one-third trade union members, and one-third public administration representatives. Larger enterprises have to bargain individually.

This revolutionary break with a long tradition is, however, quite meaningless, because the real power to regulate wages and labor conditions rests with the German Central Administration for Labor, which in turn reflects the wishes of the SMA and co-operates closely with the leadership of the FDGB. The collective agreement is thus but the outward legal form hiding the one-sided order. Wage policy is still centrally directed.

This policy has culminated in the German Stakhanov movement, the Hennecke movement,²⁸ named after a Zwickau miner who, in October 1948, was able to step up his output per shift several times, and who is now the symbol of a speed-up, piecework and "efficiency" wage system that seems to outdo the Nazi system. (On New Year's Day 1949, Messrs. Hennecke and Stakhanov exchanged greetings.²⁴)

-² Arbeit und Sozialfursorge, 1947 (II), pp. 205-7.

23Die Wirtschaft, 1948 (III), pp. 537-39, and P. Morenow (chief of Labor Power Division in SMA) in Tagliche Rundschau, Dec 28, 1948.

-⁴ Tagliche Rundschau, Jan. 1, 1949.

Works councils

It need not arouse surprise that the Hennecke movement led to large-scale opposition, which in turn produced countermeasures by SMA, leading to the prohibition of the works councils. The works councils of the Weimar Republic were freely elected organs of industrial self-government for each plant, with certain functions regarding protection against dismissal, the levying of fines, and the conclusion of plant agreements. The trade union bureaucracy, originally hostile to the councils, acquiesced in them to the degree that it succeeded in controlling them. The contribution of the councils to the Weimar democracy was quite significant, but has been but little appreciated. The educational value of the councils was infinitely greater than were the rights granted to them by the Works Council Act of 1920.

Works councils for the whole of Germany were permitted by ACC Law No. 22 (April 1946), applied in the Soviet zone with SMA Order No. 150 giving the councils the right to conclude plant agreements with employers.²⁶ Even before the enactment of the ACC law, Thuringia had issued, on October 10, 1945, a works council law, which, modeled after the Weimar statute, worked fairly well if we can trust the evidence of a number of judicial decisions.³⁶

On the basis of the ACC law, elections took place m the summer of 1946 in 44,000 plants, where 118,000 works council members were elected.²⁷ The works councils were hailed, as were the trade unions, as organs for the "democratization" of the economy;²⁸ a

25 Arbeit und Sozialfursorge, 1947 (II), p. 207.

26 Labor Court Erfurt in Neue Justiz, 1947 (I), P. 191.

27Die Arbeit, 1948 (II), p. 43.

²8Paul Merker in Die Arbeit (FDGB), 1947 (I), pp. 201-2.

model convention for works councils was drafted, and the tremendous progress of the Soviet zone was contrasted with the hostility to the works councils' codetermination exhibited by western military government.

But the Hennecke movement played havoc with the works councils, which became obstacles to the drive for increased production rather than instruments of stimulating it. In November 1948 they were abolished.^{^[80]} SMA Order No. 76 of April 23, 1948 had already established the exclusive authority of management in nationalized plants. According to Paul Merker's argument, while works councils are still necessary in the western zones which are dominated by class antagonism, they are unnecessary in the east. Their place is now being taken by Betriebs- gewerkschaftsgruppenleitungen, that is, agents of the FDGB in the plants.

With the organs of workers' democracy eliminated, it is essential, for the understanding of the position of German labor, to know whether and to what extent the trade unions exert political functions, that is, actually represent workers' interests in nationalized plants. To understand this, we must turn to the economic organization of the zone.

Reparations

Economically, the most important single factor is the exactions of the Soviet Government in the form of reparations and occupation costs. In her reparations policy, the Soviet Union follows the secret Yalta protocol of February 11, 1945,⁸⁰ rather than the Potsdam agreement. The latter confines reparation claims to removals and external German assets, not mentioning reparations from current production and by forced German labor; the former distinguishes three categories of reparations: bulk removal (primarily for the purpose of demilitarizing Germany), reparations from current production, and the use of German labor. To that extent the three powers agreed at Yalta.

Great Britain, however, refused to commit herself to the understanding between the United States and the U.S.S.R. that the Moscow Reparations Commission should take as a basis for discussion the figure of 20 billion dollars for the total sum of reparations and that 50 per cent of it should go to the U.S.S.R. The claim for 10 billion dollars (in 1938 prices) ⁸¹ has since been raised by the Soviet Union at every international conference, while the other powers have consistently taken the position that Potsdam supersedes Yalta. "We will not follow Mr. Molotov," in the words of Secretary Marshall, "in a retreat from Potsdam to Yalta."

In executing the Yalta protocol rather than the Potsdam agreement, the Soviet Union in her zone has thus extracted all three types of reparations: large-scale removals, reparations from current output, and forced German labor for reconstruction in the U.S.S.R. The Soviet Union indignantly denies that she is shipping German workers to the U.S.S.R. sometimes with dismantled factories. Her spokesmen have asserted that the German workers signed voluntary labor contracts for work in the U.S.S.R.⁸²

It is difficult to measure the magnitude of Russian takings. Mr. Bevin as-

⁸¹ This includes the Polish claims The U.S S.R. has to satisfy Poland from her takings A Soviet-Polish reparations agreement was concluded on August 17, 1945. Poland is to receive 15 per cent of Soviet takings

³² Especially during the ACC discussions in October 1946.

serted³³ that over 7 billion dollars had been transferred from Germany to the Soviet Union, partly by removals and partly by taking 70 per cent of the Soviet zone production. The Soviet Union has consistently refused to account for her takings. She estimates the physical damage inflicted by the Nazis to be 128 billion dollars, and Voznesen- sky³⁴ merely admits that, until the end of 1947, the Soviet Union had recovered, in the form of removals of German industrial plants, 0.6 per cent of her damage, that is, 768 million dollars. This figure does not reveal very much. We can only make estimates based on a few facts.

In 1946 Thuringia was obligated to deliver 346 million marks' worth of commodities as reparations. When the state failed to comply with this order, the Soviet administration confiscated the total Thuringian production for the last three months of 1946. The 1947 obligation of Thuringia was fixed at 259 million marks.⁸⁰ To this must be added the occupation costs (to be defrayed by the delivery of food, building materials, machinery, and so forth, amounting to 45 million marks), and especially the production of the Soviet corporations.

From the budget of Thuringia it would follow that about 60 per cent of the total Thuringian production goes to the Soviet Union in the form of repara- tions and occupation costs. It may thus be safe to say that by the end of 1948 about 8 billion dollars' worth of reparations had been delivered, approximately one-half in removals, the other half in current production.³⁶ This is, of course, a substantial figure even if the devaluation of the currency is taken into account, and exerts tremendous influence on the economic policy of the Soviet zone and on the standard of living of the large masses.

Economic Reorganization

Originally, the SMA, the SED, and the FDGB decried socialism. All they aimed at, so it was said, was a "democratization" of the economy: the destruction of cartels and trusts; the elimination of Nazis and militarists from economic power through expropriation of their properties; the transformation of private into public banking; and the establishment of popular controls. This modest program has, however, been abandoned, and socialist planning is now the key slogan for the Soviet zone.

It is erroneous to believe that the Soviet zone is an overwhelmingly agricultural region. Table 2, based on 1937 figures, will dispel this illusion.

The changes since 1937 do not substantially affect the picture. The economic problems of the Soviet zone are as much industrial as they are agricultural, and the industrial problems are far more acute than those of the western zones, because of lack of iron and steel, for which the quite ambitious production goal for 1950 is only 875,000 tons of raw steel. If, therefore, the highly developed machine building industry is to be maintained or even to be increased, an active foreign trade is vital to the zone, which, for its equally highly developed textile industry, must

⁸⁶ A fair German estimate is in G W. Hanussen, Reparationen, Sozialprodukt, Leb- ensstandard, Bremen, 1947.

TABLE 2—Agrarlan and Industrial Proportions in Soviet Zone (Without Berlin) ^a

	•	Area				Population
		(In 100	sq. km )			(In thousands)
State				Indus				Indus
	Total	Agrarian	Industrial	trial per cent	Total	Agrarian	Industrial	trial per cent
				of total				of total
Mecklenburg	23 6	23.4	0.2	0.8	1,479	1,329	150	10.1
Brandenburg	26 9	22 7	4.2	1.6	2,355	1,062	1,293	54.9
Saxony (Province)	24 4	12.2	12.2	50 0	3,431	717	2,714	79.1
Thuringia	15 8	4.3	11.5	72.8	2,446	339	2,107	86.1
Saxony (State)	17.1	2.1	15.0	87.7	5,481	160	5,321	97.1
Soviet Zone	107.8	64 7	43 1	40 0	15,192	3,607	11,585	76.3
Germany (1937)	470 5	354 0	116 5	28.6	69,317	24,117	45,200	65.2

^a Source: Der Wirtschaftsspiegel (Wiesbaden)'special number: A us der Wirtschaft der Ostzone und Berlins.

import either cotton or synthetic fibers or both. The two-year plan adopted by the DWK^{^[81]} and outlined by the leader of the SED, Walter Ulbricht, envisages a rise in total production of 35 per cent over 1945, or 81 per cent over 1936; an increase in output per man-hour of 30 per cent over 1947; a rise of wages of 15 per cent over 1948; and a decrease in production costs in the nationalized sector of 7 per cent.

This is, of course, a very ambitious program, in spite of assertions frequently made by Molotov that production in the Soviet zone has outstripped that in the western zones, and in 1947 had already reached 51 per cent of the 1938 level.³⁸ Moreover, the economic goal must be pursued in such manner that it creates new vested interests upon which the Soviet Union can rely, and thus necessitates the elimination from economic life of the traditional middle- and upper-class owners. This policy is carried out in four different sectors: (1) the private sector, (2) the co-op- erative sector, (3) the nationalized industry, and (4) the Soviet corporations.

Until 1948, the sole legal basis for the reorganization of the economic system in the Soviet zone was the SMA Orders Nos. 124 and 126 of October 30, 1945.^{^[82]} Outwardly the two orders did nothing but implement the ACC laws, and they corresponded closely to U. S. Military Government Law No. 52. SMA Order No. 124 ordered the sequestration of certain categories of property, and the confiscation of property owned by the Nazi movement.⁴⁰SMA Order No. 64 of April 17, 1948 ended the sequestrations and abrogated Order No. 124.

In applying the two SMA orders, the Soviet authorities went far beyond American and British practice. Not only Nazis, supporters of the Nazi regime, war criminals, and so forth, were deprived of their properties, but also "any other persons designated by the SMA in special lists or otherwise." Actually, all industrial, and the major

39 An exception exists for the property owned by IG Farben regulated by ACC Law No. 9 of November 30, 1945 The special ACC committee for this property has, however, ceased to function

40ACC Law No. 2 of October 10, 1945.

handicraft, retail businesses were taken over by the SMA.

However, in the summer of 1946 the states in the Soviet zone passed legislation for the nationalization of the properties of active Nazis, supporters, and war criminals, and the SMA then turned certain categories of sequestrated properties over to the state governments. These, in turn, retained the most important ones for government operation, sold the less important ones to reliable private citizens or returned them to "clean" former owners, and, besides, greatly added to the scope of the cooperative sector. It is quite important to realize that the radical change in the property structure was not carried out as a socialist measure, but as a device of denazification. Socialism was still deemed to be undesirable.⁴¹

Direct and Indirect Economic Controls

Economically, the most important sector is that composed of the Soviet corporations. In the summer of 1946 it became known that the Soviet Union, instead of continuing the dismantling program, had decided to leave certain factories in Germany, to transfer their titles to the Soviet Union, and to operate them as Soviet properties for the reparations account. They now number about 180 factories, controlled by about 25 holding companies, which in turn are divided into economic groups These are: coal mining and fuel, ore mining, potash, electricity, metallurgy, machines, vehicles, electrotechnical industry, precision and optical instruments, chemicals, cement, rubber, and various (among them the former Prussian chinaware factory at Meissen).

According to Soviet statements, 35 per cent of the zone production is con-

⁴¹A good survey of these developments is in Europa Archiv, 1947 (II), pp. 1027-40, with full details.

centrated in the Soviet corporations, including, for example, about 33 per cent of the zonal coal production. These corporations are Soviet property, are managed by Soviet managers without participation of trade unions or works councils, and are all controlled by Soviet Industry Inc., a corporation having its managing board at Berlin and its presidency in Moscow.⁴² They work primarily for the reparations account, but, according to statements by Soviet managers,⁴⁸ also supply the nationalized sector as far as possible. The ultimate fate of the Soviet corporations remains in doubt, although Soviet authorities from time to time have indicated that the corporations will at some future time be returned*to German sovereignty.

The nationalized sector is made up of three different types of enterprises: municipal, state, and zonal. The first are owned and operated by the local administrations; the second by the state governments; the third by the DWK. The second are now called "people's plants" (volkseigene plants), and have a new penal code as for the protection of "people's property."⁴⁴ The state and zonal enterprises comprise about 2,700 plants and constitute about 25 per cent of the total industrial production in the Soviet zone.⁴⁵ The people's plants are co-ordinated in an Association of Nationalized Plants, and are grouped in five categories. They are directed by managers appointed by the respective state governments and as-

42 Der Sozialdemokrat, Sept 20, 1948.

43 Ibid.

44 Survey by Arno Barth in Neue Justiz, 1948 (II), pp. 144-49, and W. Kling in Die Wirtschaft, 1948 (HI), pp. 543-45.

45 According to Tagliche Rundschau (SMA paper), May 21, 1948, there are 1,713 people's plants, with 423,000 workers, distributed as follows* Saxony, 865 firms, 235,000 workers; Saxony-Anhalt, 333 firms, 88,000 workers; Thuringia, 251 firms, 77,000 workers; Brandenburg, 211 firms, 9,000 workers; Mecklenburg, 53 firms, 14,000 workers sisted by councils in which the trade union leadership is represented. The policy for the nationalized sector is formally determined by a state planning office, usually a part of the state ministry of economics; ⁴⁶ actually, of course, by the DWK, which in turn receives its directions from the SMA.

The role of the state enterprises, moreover, is declining in view of the gradual extension of zonal industries, operated directly by the DWK and today probably equal in size and importance to the state enterprises. Politically, the difference is, of course, irrelevant, in view of the direct power of the SED-FDGB combination and the indirect power of the SMA.

The most important co-operatives are not consumer but producer co-operatives, especially in the handicraft trades.⁴⁷ While it is not economically feasible to nationalize handicraft producers, it is politically unwise to leave them alone. Handicraft co-operatives supply the solution. Small, efficiently organized SED minorities within the co-operatives are able to exert an influence out of proportion to their numerical strength.

The economy of the Soviet zone is thus a highly centralized, hierarchically organized structure where the frequent use of the term "people's property" merely hides its authoritarian character.

The Prospects

The economic and political situation in the Soviet Zone has steadily deteriorated, both absolutely and relatively. While we cannot measure the absolute economic deterioration, we can study it,

46 For detailed discussion see Professor Martin Drath in Neue Justiz, 1947 (I), pp. 20713, 236-42.

47 Percentage of handicraft producer co-operatives: Saxony 42; Brandenburg 22; Mecklenburg 22; Thuringia 19; Saxony-Anhalt 19; zonal average 28. From Die Versorgung, 1947 (I), pp. 145-46.

and we are, above all, impressed by the relative worsening of the economic conditions, as contrasted with the upswing in the western zones The currency reform, introduced in the Soviet zone on June 22, 1948 by SMA Order No. Ill,⁴⁸failed to stimulate production, simply because, in contrast to the condition in the western zones, no adequate supply of consumer goods exists. Economic incentives for more and more intense work do not exist, and no amount of propaganda (like the Hennecke movement) and of coercive measures can compensate for them.

Nor are there psychological incentives. Such a substitute incentive might, indeed, exist if the social and economic organization of the zone were socialistic. The German worker holds to his socialist ideas, and where German administrations have been able to operate freely, they have proceeded to carry their old ideas into effect, and consequently many measures of the state governments are truly progressive. But by no stretch of imagination can the Soviet zone system be called a socialist state. Workers' representation does not exist. The integration of the FDGB and SED bureaucracies into the state machines strengthens the authoritarian rather than the democratic elements, and the fact that the whole system works for a foreign power makes it still more impossible to accept the Rousseauan identification of the general will, represented by SMA, SED, and FDGB, with the interests of the people, or more particularly with the working class.

The growing schism between socialist slogans and state capitalistic reality can be overcome either by a rapid improvement in the standard of living (which appears incompatible with the continued exaction of reparations) or by intensified coercion; and the establishment of

⁴⁸ Excellent survey by W Buder m Deutsche Rechtszeitschrift, 1948 (III), pp. 415-23
a zonal police is the best indication that coercion appears to be the solution in prospect.

The Soviet Union must be aware of this situation, and for it the easiest way would, indeed, be the unification of Germany, the establishment of a central government, and the disestablishment of all military governments with (or without) maintaining occupation troops.

The terms on which the Soviet Union is allegedly willing to abandon direct control in eastern Germany have been stated on various occasions. They are reparations from current production from the whole of Germany, participation of the Soviet Union in the international control of the Ruhr, and recognition of the Polish-German frontier. All these demands have been rejected by the western powers—the first because of the Potsdam agreement; the second because, in the words of Mr. Bevin,⁴⁹four-power control of the German economy as a whole must wait until Germany is unified; the third, appar-

Franz L. Neumann, J D., Ph D., New York City, is visiting professor of government at Columbia University. He served as special assistant in the European Research Divisions of the Department of State (1945-47) and of the Office of Strategic Services (1943-45). He was a member of the Institute of Social Research (1936-42), a member of the Berlin Bar, counsel to German trade unions, and lecturer in the German School of Politics (1927-33). He is the author of Behemoth—The Structure and Practice of National Socialism (1942,1944), Montesquieu, the Spirit of the Laws (1949), and other books.

⁴⁹ At the Moscow meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, March 1947.

ently, in order to be in a better bargaining position.

The unqualified rejection of the Soviet terms has made it impossible to test the seriousness of Soviet intentions toward Germany. It has enabled the Soviet Union to appear as the protagonist of German unity, to denounce Bi- zonia as incompatible with German unity, to attack the Ruhr agreement as an infringement upon German sovereignty, and to present the western powers as the new colonial masters of Germany.

That is not to say that the Soviet Union has won by propaganda what she has lost by her policy. Indeed, the Soviet Union has lost the battle for postwar Germany especially because of the Berlin air-lift. The whole SED- FDGB structure would collapse on the day military occupation ended. But democracy has by no means won in western Germany. Without German unity, without profound social and economic changes in the west, a neo-fascist movement may reap the benefit of the struggle over Germany.

By Harry N. Howard

GLANCE at the map of the Middle East is sufficient to demonstrate certain of the basic interests of the Soviet Union in that region and to recall to mind that the revolution of November 1917, while it added the new • dynamic of Communism and often new techniques for achieving fundamental purposes, did not alter the geography of southern Russia. Varied in its agriculture and general economy, rich in such basic mineral resources as oil, the Near and Middle East is one of the world's great highways and is a gateway to the three continents of Asia, Europe, and Africa. All told, from Afghanistan in the east to Egypt in the west, the Middle East has an area of some 2,700,000 square miles and a varied population of almost 100,000,000.

The often mutually conflicting interests of the peoples of the Middle East, the primitive living conditions in many areas, and the widespread and deep- seated poverty have made those peoples prey to Soviet propaganda, whatever its ulterior motives. The resurgent nationalism of the Middle Eastern peoples aside, fundamentally the new factors at play in the region lie in the dynamic qualities of Communist propaganda and action and the position of the United States, which since the beginning of World War II has evinced a new and abiding interest in the Middle East.

Soviet techniques and tactics have varied according to circumstances, while policies have remained constant, and have run from encouragement of nationalist movements, especially in the interwar era, through denunciation of Anglo-American, or Western, imperialism, to support of revolutionary uprisings. While it would be interesting to portray something of Soviet policy throughout the Middle East, especially among the Arab lands and Palestine, for purposes of brevity this article will be confined largely to Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan, since they border immediately on the Soviet Union.

Soviet Policy During and After the War

If it be true that Imperial Russia had already set the general framework of interest and policy in the Middle East in the past, it may also be suggested that the Hitler-Molotov talks of November 1940 delineated even more of the specific outlines which are evident today. For example, not only was the Soviet position as to domination of eastern and southeastern Europe set forth in those discussions, but Soviet demands for revision of the Montreux Convention (1936) and control of the Turkish Straits were clearly revealed, as well as the desire of the Soviet Union to bring Turkish policy more closely into line with its own, although this Soviet policy had been revealed as early as October 1939 in the Soviet- Turkish talks which precipitated the Anglo-Franco-Turkish alliance of October 19, 1939.

It is interesting to observe that in the discussions of November 1940 the Soviet Union called for recognition of its "security zone" in the region of the Straits, and the establishment of "a base for land and naval forces of the U.S.S.R. within range of the Bosporus and the Dardanelles by means of a long-term lease." Of equal interest was the Soviet
stipulation that the "area south of Batum and Baku in the general direction of the Persian Gulf" be recognized "as the center of the aspirations of the Soviet Union."

Soviet policy in the Near and Middle East took on such a character after World War II that President Truman, in his Army Day address of April 6, 1946, felt impelled to note that the Near and Middle East presented "grave problems." Indeed, he remarked:

This area contains vast natural resources. It lies across the most convenient routes of land, air, and water communications. It is consequently an area of great economic and strategic importance, the nations of which are not strong enough individually or collectively to withstand powerful aggression.

It is easy to see, therefore, how the Near and Middle East might become an area of intense rivalry between outside powers, and how such rivalry might suddenly erupt into conflict.

No country, great or small, has legitimate interests in the Near and Middle East which cannot be reconciled with the interests of other nations through the United Nations. The United Nations have a right to insist that the sovereignty and integrity of the countries of the Near and Middle East must not be threatened by coercion or penetration.

Turkey and the Soviet Union

Although during the Hitler-Molotov conversations the Soviet Government had expressed its view as to the Straits and its position as to territorial claims in eastern Anatolia, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, together with Great Britain, on August 10, 1941 confirmed its fidelity to the Montreux Convention and assured the Turkish Government that it had no aggressive intentions or claims regarding the Straits. Moreover, both governments were prepared scrupulously to respect the territorial integrity and independence of Turkey and to give assistance to Turkey in the event of an attack by a European power.

By the time of the Moscow Conference in October 1943, the Soviet Union expressed an interest in having Turkey come into the war actively on the side of the United Nations, although there is no evidence that definite plans were made for Turkish intervention or, indeed, that the U.S.S.R. genuinely desired Turkish armed intervention.

As the war drew to a close, specifically on March 20, 1945, the Soviet Government denounced the Soviet- Turkish agreement of neutrality and friendship, originally signed on December 17, 1925 and renewed and extended as late as March 24, 1941. The Turkish Government was soon advised that the price of re-establishing close Soviet- Turkish relations would involve a new regime of the Straits, the cession of territory in eastern Anatolia (in the Kars—Ardahan region), and the drafting of an alliance along lines which were then becoming familiar in eastern and southeastern Europe.

As a matter of fact, the subject of the Straits had come up at the Yalta Conference in February 1945, and it was discussed at the Potsdam Conference in July 1945, where President Truman suggested that such European "inland waterways" as the Danube River, the Rhine, the Kiel Canal, and the Turkish Straits be placed under "international authorities" and that there be "free and unrestricted navigation" of them. In the end, it was agreed at Potsdam that the Montreux Convention required revision, and that as the next step, the problem should be discussed through direct conversation between each of the three governments—the U.S.S.R., the United Kingdom, and the United States—and the Turkish Government,

Subsequently, on October 27, 1945, President Truman expressed his view "that all nations should have the freedom of the seas and equal rights to the navigation of boundary rivers and waterways and of rivers and waterways which pass through more than one country." In accordance with the Potsdam agreement and in line with the President's suggestion, on November 2, 1945 the United States, in a note to the Turkish Government proposed a set of principles for possible revision of the Mon- treux Convention. As a basis for an equitable solution of the problem, it was suggested (1) that the Straits be open to the merchant vessels of all nations at all times; (2) that the Straits be open to the transit of the warships of Black Sea powers at all times; (3) that except for an agreed limited tonnage in time of peace, passage through the Straits of worships of non-Black Sea powers be denied at all times, except with the specific consent of the Black Sea powers or when acting under the authority of the United Nations; and (4) that certain changes be made in the Montreux Convention for purposes of modernization.

Soviet proposals

While these principles were soon accepted by both the British and the Turkish Government as a basis for discussion, the Soviet Government did not find them acceptable, although it did not formally present its own views until August 7, 1946, when the "great⁴ debate" on the Turkish Straits really began. At the same time, a volume of captured German documents, purporting to "prove" Turkish misconduct during the war years, was conveniently published and heralded. In its note of August 7, and in a second statement of September 24, 1946, the Soviet Government charged Turkey with various misdemeanors concerning the Straits and set forth the following principles for a "new regime" of the Straits:

1. The Straits should be always open to the passage of merchant ships of all countries;

2. The Straits should be always open to the passage of warships of the Black Sea Powers;

3. Passage through the Straits for warships not belonging to the Black Sea Powers shall not be permitted except in cases specially provided for;

4. The establishment of a regime of the Straits, as the sole sea passage, leading from the Black Sea and to the Black Sea, should come under the competence of Turkey and other Black Sea Powers;

5. Turkey and the Soviet Union, as the powers most interested and capable of guaranteeing freedom to commercial navigation and security in the Straits, shall organize joint means of defense of the Straits for the prevention of the utilization of the Straits by other countries for aims hostile to the Black Sea Powers.

It is interesting to note that the Soviet Government not only referred to the treaties of Moscow (March 16, 1921) and Kars (October 13, 1921) and the Turco-Ukrainian agreement of January 2, 1922 as precedents for its proposal for joint Soviet-Turkish control of the Straits, but went back to the period of Ottoman-Russian relations to ^cite the treaties of 1798, 1805, and 1833 (Unkiar Eskelessi).

While there was little difficulty as to freedom of commerce, limitation of the right of passage for non-Black Sea warships, and freedom of passage for Black Sea war vessels, neither Turkey, the United Kingdom, nor the United States' was able to accept the proposition that the establishment of a regime of the Straits was the prerogative of the Black Sea powers alone, or that the Straits should be placed exclusively under the joint defense of the U.S.S.R. and Turkey; for all were aware of the essential significance of such an arrangement, and what it might mean for both the political independence and the territorial integrity of Turkey.

Moreover, while Turkey desired normal and friendly relations with the Soviet Union, it did not care to give up its friendly association with Great Britain, or to become a satellite of the Soviet Union along the lines represented in the treaty structure which the Soviet Union was building up in eastern Europe.

The American, British, and Turkish Governments all expressed (October 9, 18, 1946) a willingness to enter a conference for the purpose of revising the convention of the Straits; but apparently the Soviet Government saw no purpose in entering such a conference, and the public discussion of the matter ended in the fall of 1946.

Commercial significance of Straits

That the Turkish Straits were of general international concern was clearly evident from the statistics concerning the passage of commercial vessels through that strategic waterway, where Turkish commerce itself played a dominant role. While it was true that since the latter part of the nineteenth century about SO per cent of the total Russian export commerce went to the outside world via the Straits, until World War II British ships held a commanding lead, closely followed and often exceeded in the 1930's by Italian shipping. Greek and French commerce were also of significance. Soviet tonnage, which reached a peak of 1,614, 564 in 1935, averaged about 500,000 tons per year in the interwar era. But it was also noteworthy that the United States had a growing commerce in the region of the Straits, and after World War II American commerce in the Straits assumed first place, with 841,766 tons in 1945, 797,126 in 1946, and 787,495 in 1947, as compared with 495,843 in 1946 and 739,706 in 1947 for the Soviet Union.

Various pressures

Although the problem of the Straits did not appear to be an active subject of diplomacy after 1946, Soviet pressure on Turkey continued on that and other lines. As early as June 1945, for example, the U.S.S.R. indicated its desire for Turkish territory in the Kars- Ardahan region, the frontier of which had been determined in 1921. In December 1945 and February 1946 unofficial Georgian and Armenian claims within the same area were also formulated and publicized within the Soviet Union. It is probable that these claims should be considered against the background of historic Russian and more recent Soviet aims looking toward the security of oil installations in the Caucasus region, an outlet to the sea on the Persian Gulf, and pressure on Turkey for a more favorable regime in the Straits and for a pro-Soviet orientation in Turkish foreign policy.

That the Soviet Government had not renounced its position concerning the Kars-Ardahan region, although it did not pursue it actively, was indicated on October 24, 1947, when Mr. Vyshinsky publicly supported the claims, in the event that they turned out to be "scientifically" well founded, in a statement to the Political and Security Committee of the General Assembly of the United Nations. The Turkish Government, however, remained adamant as to its territorial integrity and political independence.

It was largely because of the persistent pressure of the Soviet Union on Turkey that the United States, which in December 1941 had "found the defense of Turkey vital to the defense of the United States," in extending lend- lease assistance to that country, provided assistance to Turkey in the post- war years. In his historic announcement of March 12, 1947, President Truman urged assistance to Turkey as well as to Greece, and on July 12, 1947, an American-Turkish agreement for assistance, which has since been extended, was signed.

Iran and the Soviet Union

Soviet-Iranian relations may be traced back to the treaty of February 26, 1921, by which Soviet troops were to be withdrawn from Iran, the capitulations were abrogated, debts and concessions were canceled, and Russian property was turned over to Iran. A new Soviet- Iranian treaty of security and neutrality was ratified on January 31, 1928, reaffirming the earlier treaty, and in July 1933 Iran became a party to the series of Soviet treaties then being negotiated with the border states.

On August 26, 1941, following the occupation by British and Soviet troops, the U.S.S.R. and Great Britain advised Iran that the action was designed to prevent Axis control of the country and that they had no designs against its independence or territorial integrity. On January 29, 1942 a treaty of alliance was signed by Iran with the U.S.S.R. and Great Britain, by which the latter parties jointly and severally agreed to respect the territorial integrity, sovereignty, and independence of Iran. Moreover, it was agreed that the occupation forces would be withdrawn not later than six months after hostilities with Germany and its associates had been suspended either by armistice or formal peace treaties. Great Britain and the Soviet Union were pledged not to approve anything at any future peace conferences perjudicial to the sovereignty, independence, or integrity of Iran, or to discuss anything at such conferences affecting the direct interests of Iran without consultation with the Iranian Government,

Iran was now to become a great bridge over which vast supplies were shipped to the Soviet Union for the service of the Soviet armies fighting against Germany. On May 2, 1942 the United States entered into agreement with Iran by which the United States was to supply Tran with goods and materials under the Lend-Lease Act. In November 1942 a United States military mission was established and American troops entered the country to expedite shipments to the Soviet Union. A reciprocal trade agreement was signed with the Iranian Government on April 8, 1943.

American forces in Iran did not include combat troops. British forces did, but British policy was directed towards the maintenance of the integrity of Iran, as far as this was consistent with the military purpose of the wartime occupation. The Russians, on the other hand, stationed a far larger body of troops in Iran than Great Britain and the United States put together. Moreover, Soviet forces interfered in the administration of Iran, its economic life, and the application of Iranian laws and regulations, beyond the dictates of military necessity. Soviet officials and agents, for example, actively associated with the Tudeh (Masses) Party, and with the so-called "Democratic" parties of Azerbaijan and Kurdistan which later took over the government in the northern Soviet-controlled zone.

At Tehran and Yalta

On September 10, 1943 the Iranian Government declared the existence of a state of war with Germany and announced its decision to adhere to the Declaration by the United Nations, which was signed on September 10, 1943. At the Tehran Conference, November 28-December 1, 1943, President Roosevelt proposed a declaration concerning the independence of Iran, and on December 1 a Declaration Regarding Iran was issued. In accordance with it, the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union recognized the assistance which Iran had given in the war, especially in "facilitating transportation of supplies from overseas to the Soviet Union." They recognized that the war had brought economic difficulties to Iran and agreed to continue to render such economic assistance to Iran as might be possible. Finally, the three great powers declared their oneness with Iran "in their desire for the maintenance of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iran." Although it was less specific than the Tripartite Treaty of January 1942, the United States considered it as morally binding as to the independence and integrity of Iran.

The question of Iran was also mentioned at the Yalta Conference, February 4—11, 1945, and it was agreed that the problem should be pursued through the diplomatic channel.

Request for troop withdrawal

Toward the end of the war, in May 1945, the Iranian Government addressed notes to the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and the United States requesting the withdrawal of their troops from Iran. As a matter of fact, the Persian Gulf Command of the United States Army had begun the termination of its activities, and the official announcement of May 31, 1945 was coincidental to the request of the Iranian Government. The British Government desired to safeguard British oil fields as long as the war with Japan continued, and did not wish to withdraw British forces while the Red Army remained in Iran. The Soviet Government did not reply at all to the Iranian note. The discussion was cor^tinued at

Potsdam, and on September 21, 1945, Soviet forces withdrew from Tehran with considerable publicity, but remained encamped at the airport just outside the city.

Difficulties continued in Iran, and on November 14, 1945 a revolt broke out in Azerbaijan, Iranian troops being stopped at Qazvin by Soviet forces, some ninety miles northwest of Tehran and well outside the province of Azerbaijan. The Iranian Government protested on November 17, and on November 24 the United States proposed that all Allied troops be withdrawn by January 1, 1946. The British Government replied on December 5, rejecting such early withdrawal but proposing discussions, while the Soviet reply denied that there had been any Soviet interference in Iran. There were further discussions, especially at the Moscow Conference in December 1945, but no solution was reached, although the few American forces in Iran were withdrawn on December 31, 1945.

Appeal to Security Council

The Iranian Government thereupon appealed to the Security Council of the United Nations, then sitting in London, and on January 19, 1946 the problem was placed before that body, which discussed it for the next two months, both an London and in New York. It is noteworthy that the Soviet reply of January 24, 1946 justified the presence of Soviet troops in Iran on the basis of the Soviet-Iranian Treaty of February 26, 1921. Moreover, the Soviet Government indicated that the problem should be settled through bilateral Iranian-Soviet negotiations. When Qavam es-Sultaneh became Premier of Iran on January 27 he was invited to Moscow for this purpose, and on March 1 it was announced that while Soviet troop with- cfrawal wpuld begin in March from

Meshed, Shadrud, and Samnan in eastern Iran, troops would remain in other areas until the situation had been "clarified."

At about the same time, on March 1, 1946, the last remnants of the British forces, some 200 in number, left Iran. On March 6 the United States formally requested that Soviet troops be withdrawn from Iran, and on March 12 the Department of State announced that it had received reports that additional Soviet armed forces and heavy military combat equipment had been moving southward from the Soviet frontier through Tabriz toward Tehran and the western frontier of Iran, and that it had made inquiries concerning the matter.

The Iranian Government again appealed to the Security Council on March 19, 1946, but on March 24, the day before the meeting, the Soviet Government announced that agreement with Iran had been reached that evacuation by Soviet troops would be completed by May 6. The Soviet representative in the Security Council therefore moved on March 26 that the Iranian plea be removed from the agenda. This proposal was rejected, and on March 27 the Security Council received a statement from the Iranian representative summarizing the negotiations, indicating that Soviet troops were to continue to stay in parts of Iran indefinitely, that Iran was to recognize the autonomy of Azerbaijan, and that, in lieu of a Soviet oil concession, an Iranian-Soviet joint stock company was to be established with 51 per cent of the shares to be held by the Soviet Government. The Iranian representative denied that any negotiations had been concluded or agreement reached, as Moscow had announced.

The Security Council thereupon asked both governments to advise it not later than April 3 as to the status of the negotiations and as to whether withdrawal of Soviet troops had been conditioned on agreements regarding other subjects. The Iranian reply indicated continued Soviet interference in Iran as well as the Soviet demands concerning oil and autonomy for Azerbaijan. As a result the Security Council postponed action until May 6, while on April 5 a Tehran communique announced conclusion of Iranian-Soviet agreement that Soviet forces would be withdrawn six weeks from March 24, and agreement concerning a joint Iranian-Soviet oil company. The problem of Azerbaijan was to be settled in accordance with existing laws and in a spirit of good will towards the people of Azerbaijan.

The Soviet representative then demanded that the Security Council dismiss the Iranian appeal, and it placed heavy pressure on Iran to withdraw its case, while Soviet troop movements increased. The Soviet request was rejected, and on May 7, 1946 the Security Council assembled to hear the reports of the two governments. The Soviet representative made no reply, while the Iranian representative indicated that although certain withdrawals had taken place, Iran was still not able to exercise its authority in Azerbaijan. In the end, under Soviet pressure, Iran formally requested that the question be dropped from the agenda of the Security Council, but the Council declined to comply, and remains seized of the problem.

Toward the end of 1946, and despite a Soviet warning, the Iranian Government undertook to execute its decision of December 7 to send troops into Azerbaijan to supervise elections. It did so on December 10, and the next day all Iran was apparently united under the sovereignty of Tehran. There was no indication, however, that Iran's difficulties with the Soviet Union were now solved, or that the country was to be allowed to live in undisturbed relationship with its great neighbor.

Afghanistan and the Soviet Union

Situated between the Soviet Union on the north, India on the east and south, with a small strip of territory touching the Chinese province of Sinkiang, and Iran on the west, Afghanistan has long been a point of interest to the Soviet Union, as it was to Imperial Russia. Afghanistan, however, did not appear as a central point of pressure in the same sense as Turkey or Iran in the period following World War II On June 13, 1946 the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet ratified an agreement with Afghanistan concerning the Soviet-Afghan frontier and settled conflicting water claims, and in April 1947 a joint Afghan-Soviet Commission met in Tashkent to discuss actual demarcation of the frontier. It was not, however, until September 29, 1948 that an agreement was finally reached fixing the revised Soviet-Afghan boundary.

Marxism-Leninism and in the interests of the Soviet state has caused and seems bound to cause serious conflicts of interest. The revolutionary movements in China, Japan, India, and southeastern Asia began before the Bolsheviks came to the top in Russia. They have their own force and logic. They may, in fact, owe more to the impact of western ideas and technology than to Bolshevism. They owe Soviet Communism a great deal for moral support and tactical instruction, but these debts are not enough to harmonize national and ideological differences

Soviet Communist support of revolutionary movements in Asia does not mean, in my opinion, either that the Politburo is chiefly interested in world revolution or that the success of these Communist-supported revolutions will necessarily cause a commensurate enlargement of the power of the Soviet state. On the contrary, the success of such revolutionary movements may and in some cases is almost certain to react against the extension of Russian power in Asia.

Features of Soviet-Asiatic Relations

In any discussion of Soviet policy in Asia, it will be helpful to bear in mind three features of Russia's relations with Asia.

First, about three-quarters of Soviet Russia is in Asia. Russia, in other words, is not a European power with possessions in Asia. It is an Asiatic great power as well as a European great power. The Russians, moreover, have been in Asia a long time. Yermak, the Cossack outlaw, who has a more heroic stature in legend than in history, began the conquest of Siberia about sixty years after Cort6s conquered Mexico for Spain and a quarter of a century before the English made their first permanent settlement in Virginia. Two years after the founding of Massachusetts, the Russians had reached the Lena River "in eastern Siberia. They reached the Pacific about 1640. As in America, Nature was a greater obstacle to expansion and settlement than the resistance of the aboriginal population.

Second, Russian contacts with Asiatic lands and peoples have included not only conquest and settlement of the lands of primitive peoples, but conquest and rule over peoples with ancient civilizations. These conquests, however, were more recent. Russia conquered the Central Asian khanates and Trans- caspia between 1864 and 1885.

Third, Russia has been in contact with the great powers of eastern Asia by the familiar methods of international relations: war, diplomacy, and trade. Relations of this type began with China in the middle of the seventeenth century. After a quarter of a century of warfare, a peace was made at Nerchinsk in 1689. Contacts with the Japanese began in the early years of the eighteenth century, but the first treaty was not made until 1855 at Shimoda, two years after Commodore Perry's expedition. The issues with which these relations were chiefly concerned were conflicting claims and ambitions in the border areas, Sinkiang, Outer Mongolia, Korea, and Manchuria. Those issues remain.

The Bolshevik Revolution

Soviet policies in Asia begin with the Bolshevik Revolution in Asiatic Russia. It is worth noting, first of all, that there was no October Revolution in Asiatic Russia. The fall of Czarism in March 1917 broke the barrier that had held back the nationalist or re- gionalist movements in the non-Russian parts of the Empire and in Siberia. When the Bolsheviks overthrew the Provisional Government in Petrograd and Moscow in November 1917, nationalist or regionalist governments took over in the" non-Great Russian areas of European Russia and in Siberia and Central Asia. The governing institutions of the Moslem peoples of the Transvolga (Tatars, Bashkirs), of Central Asia and Transcaspia (Kirghiz, Kazaks, Uzbeks, Turkomans), and of Transcaucasia (Georgians, Armenians, Azerbaidzhan Tatars) favored autonomy in a Russian federation and opposed the Bolsheviks.

The revolutions among the Moslem and Buddhist non-Russian peoples of Asiatic Russia were not Bolshevik revolutions, but nationalist. These areas did not join the Soviet federation through a spontaneous internal upheaval or from sympathy with Bolshevism. They were either conquered or in some cases compelled by the threat of force to make treaties of alliance with Moscow. These events occurred during the years 1917 to 1921, the years of civil war and intervention. Anti- Bolshevik Russians fought against pro- Bolshevik Russians, and foreign powers intervened in the struggle with military, economic, and financial means. But this period also is the time in which the Bolsheviks imposed the Communist Party dictatorship and the Soviet form of government on Asiatic peoples who had become part of the Russian Empire by conquest and annexation.

In Central Asia the emirate of Bukhara and the khanate of Khiva, which had never been wholly absorbed into the Russian Empire, became virtually independent in 1918. After attacking and capturing Kokand, Red Army units attempted and failed to capture the old walled city of Bukhara in January 1919. A year later the Bolsheviks helped a Young Khivan Party to overthrow the ruling khan and set up the Khoresm People's Soviet Republic at Khiva.

The same pattern was followed in Bukhara, where the Red Army championed the cause of some Bukharan revolutionaries living in Tashkent and gave, as was explained, "revolutionary fraternal help to the Bukharan people in its struggle with the despotism of the Bukharan autocrat." The revolutionary fraternal help was too much for the emir, who fled when the city fell on September 1, 1920. The Bukharan People's Republic was set up. Local guerrilla bands, the "Basmachi," kept up the fight against the Red forces until the middle of 1922.

In the reconquest of the non-Russian parts of the Empire the Communists used revolutionary tactics, but the decisive factor was military force.

Historic Relations with China

Russia's relations with China began when Chinese armies of the Manchu Dynasty checked the Russian eastward advance in the valley of the Amur. From the treaty of Nerchinsk (1689), written in Chinese, Russian, Manchu, Mongol, and Latin, for nearly two centuries the Chinese resisted the not very persistent efforts of the Russians to expand their diplomatic and trade relations. In the middle of the nineteenth century, Russia applied more vigor to what both Czarist and Soviet Russians have referred to as Russia's civilizing mission in Asia.

The immediate objects of this mission were the Chinese borderlands—Manchuria with the Maritime Province, Mongolia, and Sinkiang. By the threat of force rather than by the use of it, Russia took (1858—60) the Amur region and the Maritime Province, which China had acquired in 1644 along with the Manchu Dynasty.

Near the Korean border the Russians founded a city to which they gave the significant name Vladivostok—"the domination of the east." By the end of the century they had penetrated deep into Manchuria.

In the border region farther west, Russian-Chinese rivalry followed a similar course The Chinese annexed the lands of the western Mongols in 1690. The Mongols resisted Chinese rule; the Russians encouraged them then and on later occasions when the Mongols tried to break away from Chinese rule. Russia became in effect cosuzerain of Mongolia by Sino-Russian-Mongolian conventions of 1913 and 1915 by which China agreed to recognize the autonomy of Mongolia under Chinese sovereignty and to consult Russia on all political and territorial problems arising in that area.

By maneuvering in such a manner as to prevent coalition between Chinese and Mongols, Russia was able to rule Mongolia by pretending that the Mongols were free, and also to keep the rest of the world from interfering with its monopoly, by allowing it to be inferred that the Mongols were not free.¹

This suggests that the Communists did not invent all those refinements of power politics which they have occasionally used.

The story is repeated in Russian relations with China in the innermost border area—Sinkiang or Chinese Tur- kistan, a vast region twice the size of Texas, with a population of 3,700,000 of whom 95 per cent are Turkic in language, Moslem in religion.

The Chinese established their not very effective rule over Sinkiang in 1789. During the Moslem revolts, China's power in this remote region weakened. The Russians, who had established themselves on the other side of the mountains in the khanates of western Turkistan, sent troops to occupy Kulja in the Ili Valley of northern Sinkiang in 1871. The Russians, an-

¹ G. M. Friters, "The Prelude to Outer Mongolian Independence," Pacific Affairs, Vol. X, No. 2 (June 1937), p. 189.

ticipating their Soviet successors in central Asia, described their occupation of the region as neighborly help to China. The neighborly Russians expected to be paid in territory and trading privileges for their benevolence. Russian influence gradually increased in the following years, but Sinkiang did not again become an issue in Russian-Chinese relations until after the Russian Revolution of 1917.

Historic Relations with Japan

Russia's prerevolutionary relations with Japan concerned territorial claims, and trading and fishing rights on the lands and waters of northeastern Asia.

The Russians made their first contacts with Japan in the early eighteenth century. But their attempts to penetrate the Iron Curtain of the shoguns failed. The curtain was lifted through combined American, British, and Russian pressure.

In the 1890's Russian and Japanese expansionist programs, carried on at the expense of China and Korea, clashed and culminated in the Russo-Japanese War (1904—5). Russia suffered a great loss of prestige, was excluded from Korea, lost the southern half of Sakhalin, surrendered its dominance in southern Manchuria, and accorded to Japan fishing rights in Russian territorial waters.

The Treaty of Portsmouth (1905) was supplemented by a kind of imperialist armistice set forth in the conventions of 1907, 1910, 1912, and 1916. This armistice remained in effect until one of the parties, weakened by revolution and civil war, was unable to exploit or defend its sphere. For two decades following the revolution of 1917 Japan pushed ahead in all the border areas, while a weak Russia, obliged as on other occasions to trade space for time, gradually revived its power to resist.

Leninist Policy

In a speech on November 26, 1920, to a meeting of Communist Party secretaries, Lenin explained the world situation with respect to Soviet Russia and laid down some strategical and tactical principles. These principles had a particular application to the Far East.

"We are encircled," he said, "by imperialist states which hate us Bolsheviks to the depths of their souls." Since the imperialists were vastly more powerful militarily and economically, the Soviet Republic had to protect itself by other means.

With the Second Congress of the Comintern (1920), Lenin said that the Soviet Communists had established themselves ideologically and organizationally in the imperialist countries. No great increase in the tempo of revolution could be expected, and the Soviet Republic must find security in some other sphere. The Soviet Government, Lenin said, must follow a fundamental rule, which he stated in these words:

... we must use the antagonism between the two existing systems of capitalism—between the two groups of capitalist states—in such a way as to set one against the other. The rule . . . will remain basic until socialism finally triumphs over all the world. Until we complete our conquest of the world, and as long as we remain economically and militarily weaker than the capitalist states, we must stick to this rule. . . .

Lenin mentioned three important imperialist contradictions that would be useful to the Soviet Republic. One was between America and the rest of the capitalist world. Another was between Germany and the Entente allies. The third, and of more immediate significance at that time (1920), was the hostility between Japan and the United States. War between Japan and America, he said, was certain. He declared, a little prematurely, that Japan already had seized China with her 400,000,000 people and her coal reserves. America could not tolerate that. "Will not the stronger capitalists rob their weaker capitalist neighbor? If not, what good are they?" he asked.

Later in his speech Lenin summed up the whole business in this way:

If the imperialist powers go to war with one another, so much the better for us. Since we are obliged to put up with such rascals as the capitalist thieves, each of whom is separately sharpening his knife to use against us, our direct duty is to make them turn their knives against each other When the thieves fight, an honest man wins.²

Soviet Policy Toward Japan

Soviet policy toward Japan has passed through five phases since the revolution.

First phase

From 1919 to 1925 the Soviet Union was obliged to tolerate the presence of Japanese troops on Soviet soil. During this phase Moscow cultivated the good will of the United States against Japan.

A curious episode illustrates how Lenin applied the tactics he had recommended. An American named Washington Vanderlip appeared in Moscow alleging that he was a relative of Frank A. Vanderlip, the well-known banker, and a person of importance in the Republican Party. He made a proposition to the Soviet of People's Commissars with, as Lenin said, "the extreme frankness, cynicism, and coarseness of an American kulak" He said the United States had to fight Japan, but needed oil. The Republican Party was about to come to power. If Soviet Russia would lease Kamchatka to the United

² V I Lenin, Sochineniia, XXV (Second Edition), Moscow, 1932, pp 503-4. English version is in Selected Works, VIII, New York [1937], p 286

States, It would please the Republicans and be a great blow to Japan.

This letter offered an opportunity which, according to Lenin, the Soviet leaders had to seize with both hands. They did not know whether Kamchatka, at that moment, was supposed to belong to the spurious Far Eastern Republic or to the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic. They did not know whether Vanderlip was what he said he was. But they knew that Japan was "master of the Far East and can do there as she pleases." Therefore, Lenin argued, "if we give Kamchatka, which legally belongs to us, to America while Japan is actually in possession of it, we shall be the ones to profit."

The Vanderlip affair caused a lot of comment. Japan was uneasy. Lenin pointed out that this had cost the Soviet leaders only a little time and a small amount of paper. "It is sufficient to consult any European newspaper to see how we have profited." ⁸

This first phase came to an end with the Soviet-Japanese convention signed in Peking on January 21, 1925.

Second phase

During the second phase, from the convention of 192S to recognition by the United States on November 16, 1933, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics maintained generally better relations with Japan than with the United States. The Japanese drive in Manchuria in 1931 inevitably threatened the normal relations with Russia. But since the Soviet Union was unable either to resist or to persuade Japan to make a nonaggression treaty, the Russians, as has been said, "kept their heads and held their hands." This phase ended as the Soviets strengthened their military defenses along the Man- churian border and as recognition by the United States brought a temporary

^SV. I. Lenin, op. cit.

cordiality into Soviet-American relations.

Third phase

David J. Dallin has called the next phase, from 1933 to 1941, the "semi- war." It had all the qualities of a cold war warmed up to the boiling point. In 1933-34 the Japanese moved westward into the Jehol and Chahar, opening the way to Mongolia and Sinkiang, the only borderline in which the Soviet Union still had a foothold. "Japan," said one of her officials, "is knocking at the door of Mongolia as Commodore Perry knocked at the doors of Japan eighty years earlier."⁴ Border dashes increased in scale and significance until after the Soviet-Nazi pact of 1939.

The Nazis encouraged Soviet rapprochement with Japan as part of a Hitlerian concept of "the historical mission of the Four Powers—the Soviet Union, Italy, Japan and Germany to adopt a long range policy ... by delimitation of their interests on a worldwide scale."⁵ Quite apart from this grandiose but dubious project, both Tokyo and Moscow had more important things to do than to pursue their private semiwar. The Soviet-Japanese neutrality pact of April 13, 1941, whose importance was signalized when Stalin embraced Matsuoka three times on a Moscow station platform, officially ended the semiwar.

Fourth phase

The fourth phase was a period of generally peaceful relations. It ended on August 8, 1945, when Molotov told the Japanese Ambassador in Moscow that the U.S.S.R. would make war on Japan on the following day. The pe-

⁴D. J. Dallin, Soviet Russia and the Far East (New Haven, 1948), p. 25.

⁵ R. J. Sontag and J. S. Beddie (Eds.), Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-1941 (Washington: Department of State, 1948), p. 213, quoted by Dallin, op. cit., p. 155.

riod of Soviet-Japanese peace had survived both the Nazi attack on Russia and the Japanese attack on the United States.

As soon as Germany surrendered, however, the situation in the Far East took on a different look. It became important for the Soviet Union to have a hand in the defeat of Japan in order to have both the opportunity and a justification for the extension of Soviet control in the border regions over which Russia had contended, first with China and later with Japan, for so many years. The fifth and current phase of Soviet- Japanese relations began in August 1945, with th§ Soviet invasion of Manchuria.

In my opinion, Soviet Russia would have entered the war against Japan as soon as possible after the defeat of Germany even if Stalin had made no pledge at the Yalta Conference (February 1945). This is not to suggest that the Yalta agreement was not a very useful document for the U.S.S.R. The western allies, and particularly the United States, which was the only power capable of opposing Soviet aims in the Far East, agreed in advance to Soviet claims with respect to Outer Mongolia, Sakhalin, the Kuriles, and Manchuria. We also undertook to persuade the Chinese Government to concede to the Soviet Union rights in Outer Mongolia and Manchuria which a prerevolutionary China had been forced to concede years ago to an imperialist prerevolutionary Russia. But with or without such an agreement, the Soviet Union would have moved into* the power vacuum created by Japan's defeat and China's weakness. Had Russia moved into the border areas without an agreement with her allies, I do not believe the United States would have opposed such a move with force. But by the Yalta agreement and for reasons that seemed decisive then, we spared Russia whatever embarrassment such a move might have caused. We gave our blessing to a Russian action to which previously we had been opposed but which we were now in no position to prevent.

Fifth phase

Since August 1945 Soviet policy toward Japan has been to consider Japan a bastion of American imperialism from which the United States is preparing to attack the U.S.S.R. The Soviet Communists have applied some pressure to Japan through the activities of the Japanese Communist Party, the latter being illegal under Japanese rule but legal under American.

This party, with about 100,000 members, polled 3,000,000 votes in the 1949 election. Its propaganda is based chiefly on nationalism, racial independence, freedom from foreign rule, and criticism of American leniency to the zaibatsu. As elsewhere in Asia, Communist pressure is applied from the fulcrum of nationalism and self-determination rather than from that of social revolution.

Soviet Relations with Ci!ina

Soviet relations with China, as with Japan, have been concerned with the defense and promotion of the interests of the Soviet Russian state. The international issues between the Soviet Union and China in most cases have related to the same border areas that were disputed by Imperial Russia and Imperial China. But in contrast to Soviet relations with Japan, diplomatic, economic, and military relations have been less significant than revolutionary relations. This is because during the entire period of Soviet rule in Russia, China has been in the throes of a revolution of her own, which began in 1911.

Because of these revolutionary conditions the Chinese Government has not been in a position to carry out, as Japan did, effective aggressive measures when

Soviet Russia was weak, or successful defensive measures when Soviet Russia became strong. Furthermore, in this situation the interests of the Soviet state and the world revolution would, in the Soviet Communist view, be best served by the defeat and expulsion of Japanese, British, and American influences in China and by the triumph of a revolutionary party firmly attached to the Moscow line.

The curves of Chinese-Soviet international relations and Soviet-Chinese revolutionary relations have not always coincided, but they have been close enough to be considered together. For purposes of plotting these curves it will be convenient, as in the case of Soviet- Japanese relations, to divide the span of Soviet-Chinese relations into five periods.

First period

During the first period, from 1917 to 1924, the Soviet Government, fighting for its life against internal and external enemies, was unable to defend its position in China proper or in the borderlands. The Chinese Government could not do very much either, but it did what it could to recover what had been lost. It canceled the autonomy of Outer Mongolia; local rulers reduced Russian influence in Sinkiang, and the Chinese Eastern Railway, at first under Allied control, was in 1920 taken under the provisional management of the Chinese Ministry of Communications.

The Soviet leaders meanwhile made a virtue of necessity. On July 25, 1919, and again in 1920, the Soviet Government announced its intention to free the peoples of Asia and particularly the Chinese from the yoke of military force and foreign money. Moscow declared that the U.S.S.R. had given up all Czar- ist conquests in Manchuria and elsewhere in Asia; that it had repudiated all the secret treaties and special privileges, including extraterritoriality; and that it would restore the Chinese Eastern Railway (already in Chinese hands) without compensation. The Chinese Government in Peking did not immediately accept the offer to negotiate a treaty on this basis. In the meantime, events on both the international and the revolutionary levels were pressing the Chinese to revise their policy.

The withdrawal of the Japanese forces from the Maritime Province (1922) and the establishment of Soviet rule in Vladivostok, the liberation by the Red Army of Outer Mongolia in 1920-21 and the installation of a provisional revolutionary Mongolian government, the establishment of Soviet dominion in the Russian Central Asian khanates and the negotiation of a commercial treaty with Sinkiang, all were signals of the return of Russian influence in the borderlands.

Although the Soviet position in the Far East was unquestionably benefited by the Washington Conference (192122), the Soviet spokesmen interpreted the outcome of the Conference as a successful American maneuver that would lead only to the exploitation of the workers of eastern Asia and a postponement of the inevitable war between Japan and the United States.⁶

Delegates to the Communist-sponsored and -dominated Baku Congress of Eastern Peoples (1920) had pledged a Holy War against capitalism and imperialism in Asia. The Soviet Communists at the First Congress of the Toilers of the Far East at Moscow (1922) promised to build a bridge between the workers of Europe and America and the masses of the Far and Near East.

The most promising opportunity to carry out this policy was offered in China. Certain leaders of the intellectual movement, which took its name

⁶ V. Vilensky (Sibiriakov), Zhizn' Natsion- al'nostei, 3 (132), Jan. 26, 1922, p. 1 from the May Fourth (1919) student demonstrations, organized a Society for the Study of Marxism. This became, in 1921, the Chinese Communist Party.

In 1922, Dr. Sun Yat-sen, for thirty years the leader of the Nationalist revolutionary movement, was in great need of help. He could not get help from either Britain or America. He turned to Soviet Russia. In 1923 he made an arrangement with the Soviet diplomat Dr. Adolf Joffe, whereby Dr. Sun agreed to accept Communist aid but not Communist ideology to help win unity and independence for China. To carry out this alliance, Chiang Kai-shek went to Moscow to study, and Michael Borodin and other Communists came to China in 1923 to collaborate in the political and military organizations of the Nationalists. This arrangement with the Nationalists and Communists on the revolutionary level and the establishment of diplomatic relations between the Soviet Government and the Chinese authorities in Peking and Mukden marked the end of the first period and the beginning of the second. It should be noted, incidentally, that Soviet Russia reasserted Russia's claim to a share in the Chinese Eastern Railway and saw to it that the Mongolian People's Republic followed policies made in Russia, not in China.

Second period

The second period, from 1924 to 1927, was a period of normal relations between Soviet Russia and China and of collaboration between Soviet Communists, Chinese Communists, and Chinese Nationalists. The period ended in a violent break between the Communists and the Nationalists and the severance of diplomatic relations between the Moscow and Nanking governments. The causes of this break are significant.

Soviet Communist collaboration with the Nationalists in the Chinese revolution was based on the general strategy and tactics stated in the Theses and Statutes drawn up at the Second Congress of the Comintern (1920). This, in brief, is how the Communists estimated the situation and what they intended to do about it:

The capitalist powers are the deadly enemies of Soviet Russia.

The capitalist powers depend for their wealth and strength on the exploitation of colonies and backward areas.

The capitalist states cannot be expelled from the colonial or semicolonial areas by a proletarian revolution, since these regions have not yet developed a bourgeoisie and a class-conscious proletariat.

The Soviet Communist policy, therefore, is to establish contact with and give aid to any nationalist revolutionary force working to expel foreign imperialism.

In giving this aid, the Communists must make the greatest efforts to arouse and organize mass action of workers and peasants under Communist leadership.

The Soviet Communists must organize and guide national Communist parties. These parties must never merge with the middle-jclass revolutionaries.

Whenever the revolutionary liberation movement ceases to be truly revolutionary, according to the Communist view, or begins to oppose Communist work with the masses, then it is the duty of the Communists to expose and attack the revolutionary movement with which it has been allied.⁷

Communist-Nationalist collaboration was not without friction, but an open break did not come until the principal enemies of the Nationalists had been defeated. At that point (spring, 1927) the left-wing Nationalists and the Communists dominated the revolutionary government. In accordance with Com-

⁷ The Second Congress of the Communist International (Moscow, 1920), pp. 571 ff.

munist theory, the Chinese Communists, with their left Nationalist allies and guided by their Russian advisers, attempted to direct the revolutionary movement along lines laid down by the Soviet Communists in the Comintern.

Soviet tactics carried out in this period to serve the interests of the Soviet state and promote the revolution have been summarized by Robert North as follows:

1. to widen the breach between China and the imperialist powers;

2. to establish the U.S.S.R. as a champion of oppressed peoples and governments;

3. to abandon all concessions except those (such as the Chinese Eastern Railway) which had become vital to Soviet security ;

4. to provide legal facilities and protections for illegal work carried out by the Comintern;

5. to use diplomacy and even force to achieve revolution openly where circumstances (as in Mongolia) allowed.⁸

Failure of Soviet tactics

For the purposes of this paper it is not necessary to explore the doctrinal intricacies of the controversy over why Soviet tactics failed. These general considerations seem to me to be relevant.

The kind of conflict that arose between the Communists and their Nationalist allies had arisen before in Communist history. And it has arisen since. In almost all other cases the Communists have won. They have then expelled their allies from the government and destroyed or eviscerated their party organizations. This happened in Russia in the case of the Communists and the Left Socialist Revolutionists in 1917-18. It is happening, or has already happened, in the "people's democracies" of eastern Europe.

⁸ "Political Tactics in Soviet Policy Toward China, 1917-1947," MS., Hoover Libraiy.

The Communists have won because they have had superior forces. In Russia they had the police and armed organizations of loyal workers. In the "people's democracies" the party dictatorship has been made possible by the actual presence or proximity of the Soviet Russian Army. Matyis R&kosi, leader of the Hungarian Communists, has explained that a "people's democracy" is a dictatorship of the proletariat without soviets. The purpose of a proletarian dictatorship is to break the resistance of the class enemy. A people's democracy, like Hungary's, can build socialism without the Soviet form of a proletarian dictatorship because in this work it can rely on "the great Soviet Union." The opponents of the dictatorship cannot resist openly, because of their weakness and because of the presence of the Soviet Army. Thus the dictatorship is established without a bloody civil war.⁹

The Chinese Communists and their Russian advisers did not have enough loyal armed workers or enough armed support of any kind to match the Nationalists. Even more decisive was the fact that there was no Soviet Army near enough to intervene or exert pressure. In these circumstances the Nationalists applied to their ex-allies, the Chinese Communists, the same treatment the Communists have often applied to their ex-allies.

Third period

During the third period, from the break in 1927 until the signing of the Sino-Soviet nonaggression pact of August 21, 1937, Soviet policy consisted of a vigorous defense of the Russian rights in the Chinese Eastern Railway against Chinese attack in 1929, the

⁹ M. R&kosi, "Volksdemokratie und Sozialis- mus," Oesterreichische Volksttmme, No. IS, Jan. 1949.

strengthening of Outer Mongolia's ties to the U.S.S.R. by the Mutual Assistance Pact of 1936, the increase in Soviet economic penetration and political influence in Sinkiang after 1931, and a more revolutionary policy by the Chinese Communists.

After their defeat in the urban centers, the Chinese Communists shifted their scene of operations to the mountain areas of Kiangsi. There at Juichin, in 1931, they proclaimed the establishment of the Chinese Soviet Republic. Instead of co-operation with the Nationalists, the Communists preached class war, a radical agrarian program, and anti-imperialism—tactics aimed at undermining the Nationalist government by winning workers and peasants to the side of Communism.

The new Soviet Republic in Kiangsi responded to the Japanese advance in Manchuria by declaring war on Japan in 1932. Between that date and 1936 the Communists made the "long march" and established a new base in the northwest. Then under the leadership of Mao Tse-tung, one of the founders of the party and a leader of the peasant unions, the party became almost exclusively identified with the peasant movement and the most vociferous champion of national unity and defense against the Japanese aggressor.

The threat from Japan and the rise of the Nazis in 1936 caused the Soviet Communists to change both their foreign and revolutionary policies. The Soviet Government made overtures to its old enemies Britain and France, joined the League of Nations—previously the butt of so much Soviet contempt and derision—and began a brief era of good relations with the United States. The Comintern at the Seventh World Congress (1935) called for a united front with those parties recently denounced as "social fascists" and made a special appeal for a united front in

China between the Communists and the despised Nationalists.¹⁰

Chinese Communist championship of national unity and defense coincided with the national interests of the Soviet Union. Undoubtedly the change of line in Moscow had something to do with the change of line in Yenan, but it is also true that the new line served the interests of the Chinese Communists even more directly than it served the interests of the U.S.S.R. The capture and release of Chiang Kai-shek at Sian in December 1936 gave the occasion for the establishment of a united front of Communists and Nationalists against Japan.

Fourth period

During the fourth period, from 1937 to the end of the war in August 1945, the Soviet national interest was best served by material and diplomatic support of the Nationalist government. In the implementation of this policy the U.S.S.R. sent trucks, planes, and instructors. Between the Marco Polo Bridge attack in 1937 and September 1940, the U.S.S.R. advanced between $200 and $250 million in loans. Down to March 10, 1939, when Stalin appears to have given up all hope of collective action, the Soviet representatives repeatedly urged League aid to China and collective action against Japan. The Soviet Government urged this support to the government of Chiang Kai- shek, which for ten. years had been waging a war of extermination against the Chinese Communists.

After the outbreak of the war in 1939, and especially after the Nazi invasion of Russia, the U.S.S.R*. reduced its material aid for the understandable reason that all Soviet resources were needed in the West. The abandonment of Soviet diplomatic support of China

¹⁰ International Press Correspondence, Aug. 8, 1935, Dec. 17, 1935.

was a good deal less understandable to the Chinese. They were particularly distressed by the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact of April 1941,. and especially by the recognition by Russia of Japan's sphere in Manchuria and the "inviolability of Outer Mongolia" by Japan. It appeared that China's friend, Soviet Russia, was dividing Chinese territory with China's enemy, Japan.

While Communists and Nationalists maintained their outward unity, there was friction and suspicion beneath the surface. More important was the rapidly expanding success of the Communists in their military and political organizations in the border regions and in the densely populated areas of north China where they led resistance against the Japanese. The Communists also greatly increased their popular support by their economic program and their effective methods of enlisting the cooperation of peasants and small merchants. The Nationalists, to their great cost, were unable to match this program by a comparable one in the areas they controlled.

John K. Fairbank shows convincingly that the Communists implemented Dr. Sun's Three Principles of the People, but in inverse order. The Nationalists began with nationalism. The Communists began with livelihood, applying Dr. Sun's popular slogan "land to those who till it." They applied the principle of democracy by developing mass participation in political activities under the party's direction. They exemplified the principle of nationalism by their leadership in the resistance against Japan.¹¹

As a result of these developments the Communists held at the end of the war a stronger political and military position in the liberated areas of the north than the Nationalists. The Commu-

" John K. Fairbank, The United States and China (Cambridge, 1948), pp. 211-12.

nists had also attained a position based on experience and achievement, which was not dependent on the moral or material backing of Soviet Russia.

Fifth period

In the current postwar period of Soviet-Chinese relations, the Soviet Communists are learning that capitalists are not the only ones to have trouble with contradictions. The basic contradiction is this: The expansion of Soviet Russia's economic, political, and military interests in the Asiatic borderlands infringes upon the present or fu-. ture interest of China. The spread of Chinese Communist control in Manchuria and other areas contiguous to the long-disputed borderlands creates contradictions between the national (or regional) interests of Chinese Communists and the national (or regional) interests of Soviet Communists.

In these circumstances the Soviet Communists face these possibilities:

1. That the Chinese Communists will accept the theory that what is best for the U.S.S.R. is best for China as well as the rest of the world, and that Stalin knows what is best for everybody.

2. That the Chinese Communists do not agree that Stalin knows what is best for China In that event the Politburo may declare that Mao, like Tito, has been corrupted by nationalism and love of power and should be deposed. Moscow may then throw its influence behind some rival of Mao's like Li Li-san, who has lived in Moscow since Mao became undisputed leader of the Chinese party, and who is now in Manchuria.

3. That the Soviet Government will go ahead with the consolidation or expansion of its power in the border areas. This may take the form of holding to the strategic bases now in the hands of Soviet military and naval forces, retaining special and exclusive economic rights in the border areas, and at the same time sponsoring some kind of a federation—for example the Mongols of Outer and Inner Mongolia, of Barga (in northern Manchuria), and of 'eastern Sinkiang with the Buryat-Mongol Autonomous Republic of the Soviet Union. A comparable but even more difficult scheme would be a federation of the Moslems of western China and Sinkiang (Uigurs, Kazaks, Kirghiz, and Tajiks) with the Moslems of the Soviet republics of Russian Central Asia (Turkomen, Tajik, Uzbek, Kirghiz, and Kazak). .These interesting people are scattered over a wide area, they have many rivalries and differences, but they have linguistic affinities with kinsmen in the Soviet Union. And they are Moslems and they dislike the Chinese. The encouragement of closer relations between Mongols and Moslems of the borderland and the U.S.S.R. would facilitate what Owen Lattimore has called the politics of attraction as a means of extending Soviet influence.¹³

Soviet interest paramount

Events of the last three years suggest that the Soviet Communists will pursue what they consider to be in the interest of the Soviet state, regardless of whether the Chinese Communists are in control of part or all of China, and regardless of what the Chinese Communists think of Soviet tactics.

Under the secret agreements of the Yalta Conference, confirmed by the Soviet-Chinese treaty of August IS, 1945, ironically called the "Treaty of Friendship and Alliance," the Soviet Union recovered all it had lost to Japan in the war of 1904-5, plus the severance of Outer Mongolia from China. These gains, while nominally at the expense of Japan, were actually at the expense

¹² Owen Lattimore, Solution in Asia (Boston, 1945), p. 139; also his The Situation in Asia (Boston, 1949), pp. 75 ff.

of China, since, had Soviet Russia -not claimed the fruits of Czarist imperialism, China would have recovered the position in Manchuria which she had lost fifty years ago to Russia and Japan.

The methods used by the Soviet troops to disarm the Japanese and evacuate Manchuria were unquestionably to the advantage of the Chinese Communists. This was due, it appears to me, as much to the military and political situation at the end of the war between Communists and Nationalists, as to the intent of the Russians.

Soviet seizure, export, and destruction of Japanese plants, equipment, and material in Manchuria as "war booty" was both flagrant and conclusive evidence of the Soviet intention to pursue the interest of the Soviet state regardless of Chinese legal or moral claims.

The fact that the Chinese Communist propaganda represents the United States as the Number One enemy and the U.S.S.R. as the Number One friend, has no particular long-range significance. The Chinese Communist program, as John Fairbank writes, embraces a peasant rebellion, Marxist ideology, and real Chinese patriotism. It expresses itself at this moment in antilandlord, pro-Russian, and anti-American slogans. In the long run, Chinese patriotism and self-determination in local and foreign affairs are more significant than the current benevolence toward Russia and ill will toward America. As Fairbank suggests, acceptance of Marxist ideology does not mean taking orders from Moscow.¹⁸

Other Asiatic Relations

Elsewhere in eastern Asia the contradictions confronting Soviet policy are similar to, if less sharp than, those in China. Only in Korea, whose frontier

¹⁸ Cf. J. K. Fairbank, The United States and China, pp. 272-74.

is only seventy miles from Vladivostok, is the Soviet Union in a position to apply its military force to aid a national Communist Party to gain state power and to exercise it according to party lines laid down in Moscow.

Harold H. Fisher, L H.D., Stanford University, California, is chairman of the Hoover Institute and Library and professor of history at Stanford University. He served in the American Expeditionary Force in World War I and as an officer of the American Relief Administration in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. He was director of the Civil Affairs Training School and the School of Naval Administration at Stanford University during World War II. Among his published works are America and Russia in the World Community (1945) and The Famine in Soviet Russia (1927); (with others) The Bolshevik Revolution (1934) and The Bolsheviks and the World War (1940).

In southeastern Asia the Soviet Union has had but small success in making use of the contradictions between the European colonial powers and the United States. Soviet Communists have supported independence of the colonies, but wherever self-government has been achieved, as in India, Pakistan, Ceylon, and Burma, and even in Indonesia where it has not yet been won, the Communists who follow the Moscow line have been attacked by the nationalist revolutionary parties. Soviet opinion is hostile to the Pan-Asian movement under Indian leadership, and, in fact, to all regional movements not Communist led The Soviet Communists now must shift the weight of their attack from western imperialism to the newly awakened nationalisms which they have previously encouraged.

The record of Soviet policies in Asia in the last quarter of a century, and especially in the last decade, seems to show one thing clearly. The success of Communist parties outside the Soviet Union creates contradictions and problems of power that have not yet been resolved by Marxism-Leninism. The seeds of heresy are in every national Communist party. Titoism can flourish in America and Asia as well as in Europe. When the national Communist party is too weak to stand on its own legs, Moscow can check heresy and serve Soviet interests by the threat of excommunication and anathema. But where the party is strong enough to become the guardian of the interests of a national state, it is too strong to take orders from Moscow unless Moscow can give those orders an effective diplomatic, economic, and military backing.

Looked at from the other side of the ideological fence, the Soviet Communists expand and maintain their im- perium in Asia less by the word than by force.

Soviet-American-Relations Since the War

By Philip

HE problem which now dominates all aspects of postwar politics is that of the antagonism between American and Soviet politics. If there is a ballot on admitting new members to the United Nations, or a decision to be taken on reconstruction in Germany, it cannot be discussed on the merits of the case. Each position is taken with an eye to its effect upon the two contending greatest powers.

The extreme polarization of power is reflected along sensitive frontiers, as in Norway and Iran. It cuts across critical areas of homogeneous nationalities, as in the cases of Germany, Austria, and Korea. It is paralleled in dangerous fissures within many national communities and is reflected in the continuing unrest within Soviet satellites and in the struggles of the Communist parties in France and Italy, in Greece and China. The factors of conflict, which have been traced in several articles in this volume, have been tumultuous and remain dangerous.

The dangers are increased by the fact that both Soviet and American centers of power are largely self-contained; the outlook and purposes of each of these powers are generated internally, are secreted from its own way of life. The intentional or unforeseen repercussions of their acts affect many other peoples in their most sensitive interests and aspirations. In addition, each of these two great powers finds it difficult to arrive at a coherent judgment of the power and intentions of the other.

Soviet Ideas of the United States

When the Soviet leaders look at America, they think primarily of its

E. Mosely

great economic power. No doubt, they are rather well informed of its strength in specific skills and of its inventiveness. Their insistence upon the validity of a single philosophy prevents them from understanding the political and social experience and outlook which form the underpinning of American society. In applying with extreme rigor the system of piece-rate rewards and penalties to their own workers, they overlook the fact that in America differential incentives to workers rest on a high minimum standard of living. Admitting the technical superiority of American industry, always measuring their own achievements against American statistics, the Soviet leaders also believe unshakably that the American economy is certain to be pounded to pieces from within. And since the United States is now the only other great power, they wait impatiently for the time when that power will disintegrate and American policy will be paralyzed by internal stresses.

The duality in the Soviet evaluation of American strength was clearly shown in the question of a postwar loan. The Soviet representatives were eager to secure a very large loan—figures of six to ten billion dollars were bandied about— and admitted freely that Soviet reconstruction would be immensely facilitated by the inflow of American equipment. On the other hand, they were absolutely convinced that this loan was not something for which they would have to make an effort, even an effort to maintain some degree of diplomatic decorum. They were certain that America would come hat in hand, begging them to accept a large loan, solely for the purpose of staving off a catastrophic depression
at home. They felt they would be doing a favor to American manufacturers by giving their rickety economic system a few years of grace. Holding these views, the Soviet leaders assumed that their own offensive against American interests and sentiments was in no way incompatible with the obtaining of a loan. '

A similar opaqueness has shaped the Soviet leaders' understanding of American policies in the postwar world. They can recognize that Americans are basically oriented inwards and find it hard to be concerned steadily with world affairs. They know that the United States did not take the initiative in starting either of the world wars in this century. From the full and open discussion of policy which goes on in this country, they can see that most disputes revolve around the question of finding the best way to prevent a new war. Yet the Soviet leaders insist that America is the center of a new and active conspiracy to unleash a new world war.

Believing that the Soviet system alone has solved the inner contradictions of industrial society and that it is bound to expand into ever wider areas and some day to encompass the world, the Soviet leaders conclude that any forces which are outside Soviet control are, potentially or in reality, a menace to their ambition and to their regime. Professing to believe that the non-Soviet world envies the achievements of the Soviet Union and desires to destroy their system, they assume that the forces of the non-Soviet world are bound, sooner or later, to coalesce around the strongest non-Soviet power. Power beyond Soviet control and "anti- Soviet" power tend to become identified in their way of thinking.

In 1941 the Soviet leaders fully expected Britain and the United States to sit idly by while Hitler attempted to destroy the Soviet regime, or even to join with him. The prompt support which the Soviets received in a time of greatest danger, the great contributions of supplies, and the constant efforts to promote closer co-operation did not shake their faith in the dogma of "capitalist encirclement." In February 1946 this basic tenet was reaffirmed by Marshal Stalin as the central point in the postwar Soviet program.

Reasoning from unsound premises

The trouble about Soviet reasoning is not that it is illogical—it is usually too strictly logical—but that its premises ignore or distort simple facts which are readily discernible to minds which have not been subjected to the process of "Bolshevist hardening." If "lasting peace" is declared to be possible only under the Soviet system, then, logically, only the Soviet Union and its obedient satellites can be considered truly "peace- loving" countries. Whatever "subjective" horror of war may be expressed by "capitalist" leaders, their governments, "objectively" analyzed, are engaged in "warmongering." Anyone who criticizes or opposes Soviet claims and actions is, of course, "spreading anti- Soviet slander," "undermining peace," "promoting fascism," or "destroying Allied unity." This syllogism rests in turn on an assumption, which cannot be questioned or criticized in areas under Soviet control, that a small group of leaders in command of the regime has, through self-appointed apostolic succession to Lenin, a monopoly of wisdom and virtue.

Of course, the faculty of reasoning logically from unprovable hypotheses to untenable conclusions is not confined to any one group of men, although it seems to appear most often under conditions of absolute power. Such a faculty is dangerous when its pronouncements monopolize access to men's minds, in- eluding the minds of those who direct or serve the dictatorship.

There is a continual danger in the Soviet leaders' habit of taking action upon a set of facts which appear as facts to them alone. An even more serious danger lies in the marshaling and interpreting of a commonly perceived body of facts in accordance with a rigidly enforced philosophy, adherence to which is the password to authority and responsibility within the Soviet system.

Some American Misconceptions About the Soviet Union

Most Americans cannot make up their minds as to whether the Soviet Union is strong or weak. Because the Soviet war effort was greatly assisted through lend-lease, many Americans suppose that the Soviet Union cannot wage a major war on the basis of its own production. This assumption overlooks the fact that up to the turning of the tide at Stalingrad, the Soviet armies had received relatively small quantities of supplies from abroad. Throughout the war, the basic tools of war—artillery, tanks, planes—were almost entirely of Soviet manufacture. It would be shortsighted to suppose that Soviet capacity to wage war is far smaller, or is not actually substantially greater, than it was when the Soviet forces broke the German onslaught.

It is sometimes assumed that a denial of technical equipment and knowledge derived from the West will slow down or even disrupt the development of Soviet industry. It must, however, be assumed that in the production of machine tools the Soviet Union is "over the hump" in the process of industrialization. Failure to obtain abroad certain specialized or more modern types of equipment may delay or hamper but cannot prevent tie broad development of Soviet industry on the basis of skills already acquired. Finally, the ratio of total industrial power to war potential varies considerably under diverse systems. The Soviet system gives its leaders great leeway in deciding what proportion of industrial power shall be directed towards military needs.

A contrary assumption is also advanced that the Soviet leaders may lightheartedly engage in a new trial of strength by war, as soon as they feel confident of thereby gaining some immediate and decisive advantage. Their real range of choice seems to lie somewhere between two extremes. It is unrealistic to suppose that they would make concessions from their basic program, either to secure economic aid or to win favor in the eyes of the non- Soviet world. It is also unreasonable to assume that the urge to extend their system to new areas will lead them into war without considering the effect of war upon the low Soviet standard of living or without reflecting on the possibly unpredictable outcome of a war against a powerful, highly ingenious, and relatively impregnable enemy.

If the Soviet leaders have, since 194S, steadily weighted their choice in favor of a relentless political offensive against the non-Soviet world, this may be due in large part to their habit of subordinating economic considerations to factors of power. It may be due to a short-run assumption that the economic advantages which might be gained immediately through a more conciliatory policy are of minor importance to them when compared with the great extension of political power on which they are gambling. It may also be assumed that they have felt sure that a policy of strong pressure offered no risk to their basic security, since the American military machine was being dismantled with great haste and there was no other power to challenge their ambitions.

Because the Soviet Government rules through a centralized dictatorship and severely limits the range of suggestion or criticism allowed to its citizens and to supporters abroad, an American readily assumes that the system is inherently weak, maintained only through the constant stimulation of fear. This impression of political instability has been enhanced by the sensational abandonment of Soviet allegiance by individual citizens and by the much less publicized refusal of several hundreds of thousands of its citizens to return to the Soviet Union. To people accustomed to a regime which periodically submits to the judgment of the voters, these facts suggest weakness, hence, a necessity for such a regime to avoid war at all cost.

This interpretation, natural in American eyes, overlooks many unfamiliar factors: a long tradition of rule by a strong and irresponsible power, the tradition of combining incessant persuasion with coercion, and absence of conscious formulation of alternative programs despite widespread discontent with privations and injustices. It would be shortsighted to disparage the substantial level of disciplined action achieved under the Soviet regime or to assume that internal discontent would be an important factor, especially in a short test of strength. In any major war, of course, a defeated and occupied country may undergo a change of regime, and new currents may come to the surface. In Russia today, or anywhere in Europe, few of these currents would be tender of individual rights.

Popular appeal of Communism

It is hard for Americans to realize that Communism meets with acceptance and even fanatical support in many segments of the population. Communism remains a powerful force in France and Italy, for American gifts and economic recovery do not reach far into the basic factors making for discontent. Backward countries may be attracted to the Soviet recipe of quick action through dictatorship, rather than to the American method of piecemeal improvement and changes brought about through consent. Where problems of overpopulation, absence of technical skills and capital, and age-old accumulations of social and national resentments set dis- couragingly high barriers to modernization, the appeal of Communism is bound to remain strong. There it is judged by its promises of "progress"—not by the as yet unknown effects which may follow from the quality and direction of the "progress" it offers. The Soviet leaders choose to regard American democracy as a "conspiracy." It would be equally dangerous for Americans to assume that their own type of democracy is universally admired and desired, and that the strength of Communism resides only in a centralized conspiracy of force.

Since the Soviet leaders accept the duty of spreading their system and rejoice at the appearance of each new "people's democracy," it is easily and widely assumed that this political ambition motivates its leaders at all times with an unvarying emotional intensity. It is difficult to judge the emotional intensities within the Politburo, but it is clear from the record that the outward pressure of Soviet expansionism has fluctuated rather widely over the past thirty-one years. This intensity may vary in the future.

A relative relaxation of the outward thrust may come about in one of several ways. It may arise from a discouraged recognition of solid and impassable barriers erected in its path; or it may develop from the operation of internal factors. In the case of an ideology which offers the only "scientific" basis for prediction, repeated failures to predict accurately may result in the growth of skepticism towards the doctrine of infallibility itself. Or, when a militant ideology has outlived the generation which formulated it in the heat of revolutionary struggle, and becomes the property of a generation which docilely received the tradition ready- made, the fervor of the revolutionary "fathers" may not pass integrally into the postrevolutionary "sons."

The written word of revelation may remain sacrosanct, but if it is believed with, say, 10 per cent less fervor by a new generation, the compulsion to act hazardously on behalf of the doctrine may slacken. As a dogma becomes more rigid, it may not evoke the same desire to act. Since about 1937, Soviet dogma has achieved a remarkable posture of rigidity, unnatural in a people of quick mind and ranging curiosity. Meanwhile, since no confident prediction of a slackening of the Soviet urge to messianic expansion can be made, it has become necessary to act on the assumption that this urge can be restrained only by constructing external barriers and setting clear warning signals.

Soviet-American Relations During the War

During the stress of common danger a limited degree of co-operation was established between the Soviet Union and the United States, and a modest amount of combined planning for the postwar period was accomplished. During the war the American Government made many efforts, not always well directed, to win the confidence of a very distrustful group of leaders and to lay the groundwork of a postwar community of interest. It was agreed to establish a new security organization, dominated by the great powers, and specific agreements were reached concerning the postwar occupation and control of Germany and Austria. Some limited successes were achieved, and it could not be said with finality that the Soviet leaders were determined to go their own way in the postwar world and to ignore completely their allies' constant invitations to co-operative action. It can be said that in this phase the Soviet Government insisted on safeguarding its own strength, security, secrecy, and independence of decision, yet was willing, when none of these factors was directly involved, to make limited commitments to joint action. This phase lasted through the Yalta Conference, which marked the high point in the prospects for closer understanding and co-operation.

A fortnight after Yalta there occurred a significant shift in the emphasis of Soviet policy. While the slogan of "Allied unity" continued to be chanted in every key by Soviet propagandists, there took place a rapid ebbing in any signs of Soviet consideration for the interests or hopes of the western Allies. In direct violation of the recently signed Yalta agreements, the Soviet Government proceeded to impose governments of its own choosing upon the smaller countries of eastern Europe. In violation of another part of the Yalta agreement it gave its full support to the minority Lublin regime in Poland, and signed with it a close alliance and a unilateral agreement defining Poland's western boundary, again in disregard of a specific agreement with its allies. At this very time it also backed away, in a significant respect, from implementing the agreement to co-operate with its allies in the postwar control of Germany.

After the signing, in November 1944, of the Allied agreement for establishing joint control over postwar Germany, the three governments of Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States had agreed orally to set up immediately a nucleus of the future control machinery. The three, later four, nucleus control groups could thus, in advance, become accustomed to working together, could adjust their diverse administrative conceptions and establish their twelve working divisions, and would be ready to begin operations within a few days after the German surrender. The Soviet representative on the European Advisory Commission, in London, informed his colleagues that the Soviet nucleus group was being selected, that it was nearly complete, that it was almost ready to join the American and British groups. At Yalta Marshal Stalin agreed to expedite the arrival of the nucleus group, and about ten days later his representative in London informed his American colleague, with obvious satisfaction, that the Soviet group would arrive on a fixed day. Shortly after, the Soviet delegate sent a subordinate to inform the American delegation that the Soviet group was not coming at all. Viewed in retrospect," this reversal was merely one additional sign pointing to a strong trend towards unilateral Soviet policy everywhere in Europe.

Factors in post-Yalta shift

There may be several partial explanations of this post-Yalta shift from limited co-operation to an attitude of sharp rivalry. As Soviet troops entered German territory, the dominant voice in Soviet policy may well have passed from the Foreign Ministry, which had until then been responsible for planning the occupation on the agreed basis of joint Allied action, into the hands of the powerful economic ministries, bent on squeezing every bit of economic relief out of Germany, and of the secret police, responsible directly to the Politburo for enforcing Soviet control in occupied areas. Another factor may have been the strong Soviet expectation of a rapid withdrawal of American forces from Europe.

At Yalta, American officials had insisted that the United States Government could not commit its people to any specific and continuing responsibilities in Europe, and that American forces would be withdrawn across the ocean just as rapidly as the availability of shipping would permit. At that stage the Morgenthau "Plan," which dominated official thinking about the German problem, showed no trace of any concern for Germany's longer-range future. Turning Germany into a "pastoral" country would, of course, have left Communism as the sole hope for German survival. Knowing after Yalta that American power would be withdrawn with utmost speed from Europe, the Soviet leaders could also, and did, treat with contempt American protests, even President Roosevelt's personal appeals to Stalin, concerning lie open and frequent violations of the Yalta agreements on eastern Europe.

The same factors must have encouraged the Soviet lfeaders, after digesting the experience of Yalta, to hope that France and Italy, where the native Communist parties were far stronger and better organized than in Poland, Hungary, or Rumania, would also come under Russian Communist domination. In addition, throughout 1944—46 one of the strongest arguments of Communist supporters in western Europe was that America, though it appeared strong and friendly, was an unreliable friend, that its armies were nonexistent in time of peace and its economic assistance would melt away in a postwar economic crisis of its own, while the Soviet Union would remain close at hand and would know how to reward its adherents and punish its opponents.

As the Moscow Politburo wrote to the obstreperous Belgrade Politburo in 1948, the way in which the war ended had, "unfortunately," made it impossible for the Soviet Union to establish "people's democracies" in Italy and France. But if they could not be established in western Germany, France, and Italy by the expeditious means of Soviet military assistance, the same goal might still be achieved through combined pressure from within and without, provided American support were withdrawn and American policy reverted to transoceanic isolationism.

Soviet-American Relations, 1945-47

The new phase, of Soviet initiatives and intensive Soviet pressure, which began shortly after Yalta, continued into the spring of 1947. During this period Soviet policy was based on the assumption that France was beyond recovery, that Britain was done as a great power, and that the United States was about to isolate itself from European affairs or fall into economic impotence. At Potsdam there were still some slight traces of willingness on the part of Soviet leaders to give a hearing to the views of their allies and to compromise in minor details. But it was at Potsdam that the Soviet leaders gave frank expression to a program of expansion which, if achieved, would have made their power supreme in Europe and in the eastern Mediterranean.

To list the Soviet demands, flatly presented or delicately adumbrated at Potsdam, is to outline the policy which the Soviet leaders have pursued since 1945 with remarkable persistence. In Germany they wanted to rewrite the Allied agreement on zones of occupation by setting up a separate Ruhr region under three-power control, with a veto assuring them of a high degree of bargaining power. They wanted to slap a ten-billion-dollar reparations mortgage on Germany, regardless of its effects on the survival of the German people or on the American taxpayer. A completely unmanageable mortgage of this kind would have given them unlimited opportunities to promote the Sovietiza- tion of all Germany through hunger blackmail. Marshal Stalin tried hard to secure a release from the Yalta agreements concerning eastern Europe and to secure a carte blanche for whatever he might do there. The Soviet delegation pressed for an immediate confirmation of the Polish-German boundary which the Soviet Government had laid down; it reluctantly agreed to consider the boundary as provisional in return for Allied support of Soviet annexation of part of East Prussia.

The Soviet leaders also made it clear that they wanted control of the Turkish Straits, and expressed their "interest" in the Dodecanese Islands. They pressed for the immediate removal of British troops from Greece, and at the same time asked to be relieved of the obligation, signed in 1942, to remove their troops from northern Iran after the end of the war. Stalin did gain a definite advantage in this respect, for he now secured consent to keep his forces in Iran until six months after the end of the war against Japan—not against Germany as had been assumed until then Stalin's main argument was that "it [Iran] is too near Baku." Marshal Stalin also said he was "definitely interested" in the Italian colonies, but postponed asking for a trusteeship over Tripolitania until six weeks later, at the London Conference of Foreign Ministers. Shortly after Potsdam the Soviet Government also demanded, without success, an equal share in the occupation of Japan.

The Potsdam demands were set forth in a matter-of-fact manner, without the propaganda orchestration which was applied after the going became rough. Nevertheless, they added up to a very substantial program: a strangle hold on the Ruhr and on the entire German economy; an uncontested domination of the one hundred million people of eastern Europe; domination of the eastern Mediterranean through control of Greece, Turkey, and Tripolitania; and domination of Iran.

To the great perplexity and anger of the Soviet leaders, this second phase, outlined at Potsdam, was successful only in those areas where Soviet forces were on the ground at the close of the war. Elsewhere the execution of the program was averted through delaying actions, improvisations, evasion, and by the growth of an awareness in western Europe and America that Soviet ambitions had grown far beyond the "natural" sphere of a concern for security.

In the beginning of the second phase, American opinion was extremely sensitive to any disparagement of Soviet actions or intentions. In the wave of sympathy for Soviet sacrifices in the war, of enthusiasm for Soviet courage, and in the passionate hope that a solid basis of Allied understanding had been found, American sentiment discredited or ignored many facts which, added together, suggested that the Soviet leaders saw no obstacles in the path of their ambition to extend and entrench their power in a world which had been devastated and hollowed out by Nazi brutality and by war. By the end of this phase, which was marked by the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall plan, the pendulum had swung so far, under the hard impact of evidence of the Soviet challenge for power, that anyone who admitted the possibility of ever settling any dispute with the Soviet Government was likely to fall under suspicion of favoring "appeasement."

The Third Phase

In the third phase, the United States broke with ancient tradition to offer specific assistance and to furnish specific guarantees to countries which lay in the path of Soviet expansionism. Overcoming its scruples concerning the governments in Greece and Turkey, it came to their assistance. The alternative would have been acquiescence in the establishment of a Communist- dominated regime in Greece and the submission of Turkey to Soviet over- lordship, either through Soviet control of the Turkish Straits and of the highlands of eastern Anatolia, or through the installing of a "friendly" regime, according to the Soviet definition. By this decision the United States undertook to deter the Soviet Government from any sudden move to control the eastern Mediterranean.

The United States embarked on a far broader program of strengthening the economic and social structure of western Europe, although the program, announced tentatively in June 1947, went into effect only in 1948. Instead of joining the Committee of European Economic Co-operation and demanding a large share of American aid for itself and its satellites, the Soviet Government mobilized its supporters in opposition. Its attacks were not fully consistent. It asserted, on one hand, that the program was only a bluff and was bound to fail, and in the same breath denounced it as the spearhead of military aggression directed against the Soviet Union. To offset the attractions of the Marshall plan among its satellites, it established the Cominform in September 1947 and rounded out its control of the Soviet bloc by the Communist seizure of power in Czechoslovakia in February 1948, and by a pact of mutual assistance with Finland in April. The nervous insistence of the Soviet leaders on complete subservience of subsidiary Communist regimes, and their difficulties in securing a reliable picture of the true situation through their overindoc- trinated agents, were high-lighted in the falling away, or rather the kicking away, of the Yugoslav member of the Soviet bloc in June. The Soviet correspondence with the Yugoslav Politburo has shown clearly that the only "nationalism'¹ that can be tolerated within the Soviet orbit is Soviet nationalism.

The movement in western Europe for self-protection against Soviet pressure

moved steadily forward in 1948 and 1949, from Bevin s speech in January 1948 to the Franco-British agreement for mutual assistance, to the five-power Brussels Pact, and to the signing of the twelve-power North Atlantic Treaty on April 4, 1949. In bolstering western Europe against the massive land power of the Soviet Union, the United States had to choose between two approaches. It could have encouraged the formation of a Western European Union, in the hope that over a period of years this advanced and populous region would become strong enough to be, in itself, a deterrent to a possible Soviet attack or threat of attack, without becoming too closely bound to American policy. Western Europe might, it was hoped, emerge as a "third force," standing between the Soviet and American centers of power and able to deal effectively with both.

In the short run, however, western Europe has proved too weak to make adequate provision for its own security. It requires American support if it is to constitute even a moderately powerful deterrent. In addition, western Europe is unable to cope with the economic and political rehabilitation of western Germany except with American co-operation. 'In American policy the consolidation of western Europe and the recovery of Germany have become increasingly closely associated. In order to provide a firm barrier against Soviet domination of western Europe it has become necessary to avert a Soviet domination of all Germany. In order to attract western Germany to the side of the Atlantic powers it is necessary to promote the emergence of an effective economic and political regime in western Germany.

Since 1947 the Soviet Union has lost the momentum of military and ideological expansion in Europe, and political initiative has passed to western Europe and the United States. In China, on the other hand, the American effort to bring together Nationalist and Communist forces, to help in the strengthening of an effective central government, capable of active efforts at reform and of protecting China's national independence, was a failure. Parallel to the effort in Germany, there has been a shift in the occupation of Japan towards more strenuous promotion of economic recovery. The Soviet Government has constantly denounced American policy in Germany and Japan as a plot to acquire additional allies for an attack on the Soviet Union. Since both occupied countries are completely disarmed, these accusations are somewhat wide of the mark. However, the question of how the security of these two countries may be assured poses a serious dilemma. Certainly, there are strong misgivings about permitting any form of rearmament, but it is doubtful if the United Nations, which they can enter only with Soviet approval, can offer sufficient assurance of their continued independence.

Retrospect and Prospect

Looking back to Yalta and Potsdam, the Soviet leaders must realize that the successes which they anticipated have, in many instances, eluded their grasp. The hardening of American policy has been due to successive shocks administered by the Politburo. Their relative lack of success they owe, in large part, to their failure to understand the nature of the American polity and the underlying motives of American action abroad. They have underestimated the repugnance with which Americans view the destruction of the national independence of small but proud peoples. They have overestimated the elements of instability operating within the American economy. The mysterious

workings of a democratic public opinion which first praises them to the skies and then turns on them, while they feel they have remained themselves throughout, they explain away by reference to a malevolent "conspiracy." Attributing to others their own habits of thought, they are certain that there is an American "Politburo" which secretly manipulates the press, the economy, and the Government. The fact that the location, the membership, and the operations of this Politburo remain undis- coverable, they attribute to that well- known tradition of American ingenuity.

Philip E Mosely, Ph.D._} New York City, has been professor of international relations at the Russian Institute of Columbia University since 1946. Before World War II he taught European and Russian history at Cornell University. During the war he served as chief of the Division of Territorial Studies in the Department of State, and attended the conferences at Moscow (1943) and Potsdam (1945). He served as political advisor on the United States Delegations to the European Advisory Commission (1944-45) and to the Council of Foreign Ministers (1945-46). Be was the American representative on the four-power Commission for the Investigation of the Yugoslav-Italian Boundary (1946). He is the author of Russian Diplomacy and the Opening of the Eastern Question in 1838 and 1839 (1934) and of numerous shorter studies of Russian and Balkan history and of international problems.

Beyond the building of adequate deterrents to Soviet expansion, American policy has another duty. It has a difficult path to walk in these next years, strengthening the supports of a tolerable democratic peace and at the same time avoiding provocative actions and gestures. There is no better gift to the Soviet propagandists than speculation in the press by an American officer on how many atomic bombs it would require to "eliminate" the Soviet capacity to make war. American policy makers must likewise be prepared to state the terms on which they would be willing to settle specific problems through negotiation. Such terms have been stated repeatedly with respect to Austria and Korea. When the western German state is a going concern, the United States and its allies must be prepared eventually to negotiate for a reunification of Germany on terms guaranteeing its independence, or else allow the eastern and western German states to work out terms for their own unification.

Even after the American people were pitchforked by Japanese and German aggression into a war for national survival, it was far from clear that they would accept, after the war, any continuing responsibilities beyond their ocean borders. In 1945 they assumed that the United Nations, if firmly supported, would suffice to keep the peace and that they, as a nation, need have no concern for developments abroad beyond some temporary assistance in economic recovery. If the Soviet leaders had curbed their own postwar ambitions, they would have profited by a great fund of good will in America. If, in 1945 and 1946, the Soviet leaders had been less cocksure of the validity of their "scientific" prognosis andjhad met American interests and sentiments a part of the way, a continuing basis for correct and fairly co-operative relations might have been laid. This did not occur. The philosophy of world-wide expansion, which the Soviet leaders had muted down during the co-operation with. Hitler, was turned on full-blast against their recent allies. In their gamble, the Soviet leaders threw into the discard those human imponderabilia which even Bismarck considered as important in the conduct of successful policy as the possession of great power.

Report of the Board of Directors to the Members of The American Academy of Political and Social Science for the Year 1948

URING the year 1948 there have been two actions taken by the American Academy about which the Board is happy to report.

The first is the amendment of our Articles of Incorporation and our Bylaws. These amendments were requested in order to be sure that both Articles and By-laws were in appropriate form for the work of the Academy at the present time, and in line with the requirements of the State of Pennsylvania for such organizations. The Bylaws, as amended, were printed in the March 1948 issue of The Annals.

The second step taken during the year, about which the Board wishes to report, is the acquisition of new quarters for the administrative work of the Academy. For many years the Academy has been using rented space at considerable cost and with much inconvenience because of crowded conditions. Accordingly we purchased the property at 3817 Spruce Street and have been occupying it since the latter part of September 1948. Members will be pleased to know that the new quarters are a great improvement and have added appreciably to the efficiency of our work.

Meetings

On Thursday evening, January IS, a meeting was held on "The Marshall Plan." Addresses were given by Honorable Christian A. Herter, Mr. Henry Hazlitt, and Dr. Isador Lubin. *

The Fifty-second Annual Meeting was held on April 2 and 3, with the general title "How to Achieve One World." The attendance throughout the six sessions was one of the largest, if not the largest, in our history, and the addresses attracted wide and favorable attention. They appeared as the July 1948 issue of The Annals with the title "Looking Toward One World."

Publications

Costs of publication have continued to advance and have raised many perplexing questions for decision. The Academy has been able to acquire adequate amounts of paper and has continued with volumes of The Annals of about the ordinary size. The number of copies of each issue is high, running now from 14,500 to 15,000 as a minimum. It will be recalled that in addition to the copies distributed to members, there are sold a very considerable number of extra copies to members and to others; many of them for use in our colleges and universities, whose teachers of social science find the issues particularly helpful either as textbooks or for supplementary reading. An illustration of this is found in connection with the September 1948 issue entitled "Parties and Politics: 1948" which was used in a considerable number of classrooms.

Titles of the various issues of The Annals during 1948 were:

January Foreign Policies and Relations of

the United States March Organized Rehgion in the United States

May Peace Settlements of World War

July Looking Toward One World

September Parties and Politics: 1948 November Postwar Reconstruction in Western Germany

The special sales to members and others during 1948 amounted to 6,765 copies of The Annals, 8 monographs, and 82 pamphlets—a total of 6,855 items.

During 1948 the Academy continued its distribution of back issues of The Annals to be sent with the compliments of members of the Academy, particularly to libraries in occupied and devastated areas. We are sure that the members of the Academy who have contributed these copies will be glad to know that they are now being used to such great advantage.

Me:mcbership

During 1948 there were enrolled 3,350 new members. This may be compared with 2,986 in 1947 and with 3,202 in 1945; the last being the largest in our history prior to 1948. Our membership on December 31, 1948 was 14,003, which may be compared with 13,226 at the end of 1947.

Finances

The report of the Treasurer showing receipts and expenditures of the Academy for the year 1948 will be presented at this meeting, which under the new By-laws is being held on the fourth Monday in January. Although costs are rising, as yet there has been no increase in the dues of $5.00 per year. It is our hope that any increase can be avoided, although during 1948 current expenditures were somewhat greater than receipts.

Respectfully submitted,

The Board of Directors

Ernest Minor Patterson, President Carl Kelsey, First Vice President

J. P. Lichtenberger, Secretary Charles J. Rhoads, Treasurer

F. Cyril James, C. A. Kulp, M. Albert Linton, Otto T. Mallery, Thorsten Sel- lin, Stephen B. Sweeney, Alfred H. Williams.

January 24, 1949

REPORT OF AUDITORS

January 17, 1949

Charles J. Rhoads, Esq , Treasurer,

American Academy of Political & Social Science, Philadelphia, Penna.

Dear Sir:

We herewith report that we have audited the books and accounts of the American Academy of Political and Social Science for its Fiscal Year ended December 31, 1948.

We have prepared and submit herewith Statement of Receipts and Disbursements for the year ended December 31, 1948.

The Receipts from all sources were verified by a comparison of the entries for same appearing in the Treasurer's Cash Book with the records of bank deposits and were found to be in accord therewith.

The Disbursements, as shown by the Cash Book, were supported by the proper vouchers in the form of cancelled paid checks or receipts for moneys expended. These were examined by us and confirmed the correctness of the payments made.

As the result of our audit and examination, made in the manner above indicated, we certify that, in our opinion, the accompanying Statement sets forth the results of its operating activities for the period under review.

Yours respectfully,

(Signed) Edward P. Moxey & Co.

Certified Public Accountants

Vyshinsky, Andrei Y. The Law of the Soviet State. Pp. xvii, 749 New York, The Macmillan Company (for the Russian translation project of the American Council of Learned Societies), 1948 $15.00.

Originally published in 1938—certainly with no intention of pleasing or persuading an American public—this book was designed as a definitive statement of the new Stalinist doctrine of the socialist state and socialist law. Prior to 1936 it had been the official Marxist line that every state is an instrument of class domination, and that all law is a product of commodity exchange and the bourgeois market. With the achievement of classlessness the state would wither away, and law would be replaced by plan. But when Stalin proclaimed, in 1936, that socialism had finally been attained, he called in the same breath for a "socialist state" with "stability of laws." To Public Prosecutor Vyshinsky was assigned the difficult task of reconciling the new legal realities with the old Marxist ideology.

The method by which this is attempted will seem to the American reader to consist of little more than vituperation on the one hand and adulation on the other. Vyshin- sky's invective goes in two directions: first, against the law of other states, with their "inhuman, bestial relationship to the exploited masses of the people," and second, against the teachings of earlier Soviet jurists, notably against "the rotten theory of the wrecker Pashukanis." Correspondingly, no words are sufficiently exalted to do honor to "the genius Stalin," the great Stalin Constitution, and the genuinely free, democratic, and just character of the Soviet system.

What can the American reader learn from such a book? Something indeed of the "vigorous, uncompromising manner in which Soviet teachers present their thesis," as Professor John Hazard puts it in his valuable introduction Something also of the bare anatomy of the Soviet legislative, administrative, and judicial structure. But the most important features of the Soviet constitutional legal system are left out, and of analysis in the true sense there is almost nothing.

The real value of such a work is in what lies behind it. The Soviet reader is trained to read between the lines. He knows when the author has his tongue in his cheek (which is often, if not constantly). He knows what is said because it is old and has always been said, and what is now said just because it is new and has never been said before He knows why a book of 750 pages can be written as "the" definitive work on the Soviet system of state and law without more than a few skimpy pages on the Communist Party and with even less on Planning Indeed, the omissions are the most significant part of the book, and the Soviet jurists and officials and professors for whom it was written must note them very carefully. But the American reader will only be shocked and baffled. In the end he will wonder what is to be gained by a translation without extensive and expert annotation throughout.

Haboid J. Berman Harvard Law School

Voznesensky, Nikolai A. The Economy of the USSR Daring World War II. Pp. 115 Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1948 $3.00.

The American Council of Learned Societies and the Public Affairs Press have performed a badly needed service in making this volume available in English translation. In essence this is the official Soviet economic history of the past war, by the Politburo member who headed the State Planning Commission and was therefore in direct charge of the economic co-ordination and planning required during the struggle.

One accustomed to the official accounts of, say, the United States or Great Britain on the same subject will be struck by the marked differences in this volume. The book seems as much devoted to concealing information, for example, as to imparting it, and much of the discussion is carried on in terms of percentages whose bases remain unstated. Specialists in the field could probably perform a complementary public service if they were to issue a companion commentary volume translating as many of Voznesensky's percentages as possible into absolute figures which would be more enlightening

Voznesensky's book reflects not only rather justifiable pride in the wartime accomplishments of the Soviet economy, but also the now customary and irritating conviction of the "superiority" of the Soviet system over all others To this end he "buries" mention of the significant amount of foreign aid received during the war in a few obscure sentences which give virtually no hint of the vital importance of that aid.

With all its obscurity and irritating ideological snobbery, this is a "must" volume for all students of the Soviet economy. That this should be so is a telling commentary on the continued secrecy of the Soviet regime, even about economic events now almost a decade past. One cannot but wonder whether this secrecy is not in part motivated by fear that full statistical disclosure would weaken the argument for Soviet "superiority."

Harry Schwartz

Syracuse University

Kelsen, Hans. The Political Theory of Bolshevism. Pp. iv, 60. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1948. $1.00.

The purpose of this pamphlet, as the author explains in his introduction, is to exhibit some contradictions in the political theory of communism. The contradictions chiefly stressed are two. (1) that between the totalitarianism practiced by communism and the implied anarchism of the doctrine (derived from Marx and Engels) that in a communist society the state will "wither away," and (2) that between the dictatorship of a single party and any usual definition of democracy. Professor Kelsen does not, however, regard the latter issue as terminological: "The relationship between democracy and socialism is at stake" (p. 2). With Russian totalitarianism he contrasts the present English attempt to realize a socialist state by nonviolent processes while retaining political democracy in most of its usual senses The distortions of ordinary usage practiced by communist theorists in order to make it appear that ^tfcthe constitution of the U S S R. is the only thoroughly democratic constitution in the world" he sets down to "the extraordinary advantage a democratic terminology has in a political struggle which, although not primarily nor exclusively, is nevertheless directed against democracy" (p. 58).

Unfortunately, Professor Kelsen's analysis produces the impression that the issue, as he presents it, really is largely terminological. If the fault of Communist theory is merely that it contains internal contradictions, there is no evident reason why it might not be made coherent by altering the meaning of words such as democracy A communist could then be shown not to use the word in the sense which Professor Kelsen gives it (p. 7). Presumably, however, Professor Kelsen's positivist philosophy does not include any theory of "correct" definition, other than one which states customary usage. If, on the other hand, a person deceives himself in thinking that the values of democracy can be preserved when its normal political organization has been destroyed, his error does not lie in the misuse of words. In short, I suspect that Professor Kelsen's real objection to Communism is not that it is inconsistent, but that it destroys values of which he approves. Thus he says in his concluding paragraph that "even the most revolutionary philosophy of life cannot ignore man's indestructible desire for freedom." This is clearly a value judgment, and therefore it has, as he has pointed out, "a purely subjective character" based on "the emotional element of our consciousness," and about such matters no agreement is to be expected (pp. 8 f.). Apparently the upshot of the pamphlet would then be that Communists use words in queer ways, some of which are emotionally repugnant to Professor Kelsen Quite obviously, if this were all that he intended, the pamphlet would not have been written.

George H. Sabine

Cornell University

Lysenko, Trofim. The Science of Biology Today Pp. 62. New York. International Publishers, 1948 $1.25. This book is utter trash It is pure quackery and without scientific standing. There are no ideas in it newer than 1850, and most are but modern revivals of medieval and classical errors The author's basic principles reflect the speculations of philosophers who lived before the time of Christ. I could match special paragraphs of the book with paragraphs dating from 400 bc. to 1850 An.

Lysenko cites no experiments and gives no scientific data. He denounces work merely because it does not fit into the Communist dogma. For instance, much as he lauds Darwin, he rejects a part of Darwin's doctrine, not because it is unsupported by published data, but because En- gels rejected it. At no time does Lysenko show that he understands the simplest propositions of the science he rejects.

Conway Zirkle University of Pennsylvania

Dallin, David J. Soviet Russia and the Far East. Pp vii, 398. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1948 $5.00.

In his preface Mr. Dallin explains that his book includes more than the title suggests, since it deals with Soviet relations with Sinkiang and Mongolia as well as with Japan, Korea, and China. He also stresses the importance of this theater of Soviet international activities as a "workshop of new devices and strategies" where new methods and techniques were tried out before they were applied to Europe. He considers that the Communist parties of the Orient functioned always as "an arm of Soviet international activities"; he therefore discusses the Japanese and Korean Communist movements briefly, and Chinese Communism at greater length. His sources are chiefly in Russian and English, including a few works translated from Chinese and Japanese and a few titles in French and German. Parts I and II relate to the years 1931-39, Part III to the war years 1939-45, and Part IV to the period from V-J Day to the middle of 1948. The account of Soviet policies is detailed and documented. It reflects the author's well-known views It is a useful and timely book; more useful on Soviet diplomacy than on the dynamics of Communism in Asia.

Mr Dallin agrees with many others in regarding September 1931 as the beginning of a tragic era that closed with the dramatic finale on the deck of the Missouri, September 2, 1945 He also believes that the Soviet conflict with China in Manchuria in 1929 encouraged Japan to risk a grand-scale conquest on the mainland. He thinks that Japan could have been checked by Soviet-American co-operation, but that Communist ideology and hostility to the United States and Great Britain caused the Soviet leaders to reject such co-operation and appease Japan. In this fashion Soviet policy contributed significantly to the chain of events that led to Pearl Harbor.

Mr. Dallin concedes that, in spite of its "amateurishness, inconsistency, and weakness," something can be said for the American Far Eastern policy, which was based on the theory that the domination of the Far East by a single power was as great a menace to our security as one-power domination of Europe. But in the pursuit of that policy we have wavered, vacillated, and, as it now appears, failed. We have failed because of an abysmal lack of understanding of the situation and of Soviet methods and intentions. Only in Japan, under General MacArthur, have we effectively blocked Soviet expansion. In Korea we have won some empty victories while the U.S.S.R. has consolidated a military base.

In China our lack of comprehension led to General Marshall's impossible assignment and inevitable failure, from which the Chinese Communists emerged as "a major and mature power." Mr. Dallin does not believe that Chinese Communism is "a pure and simple product of Russian propaganda or of Comintern subsidies," but he says that no other party has shown so much veneration and imitation of Soviet Communism, and none is more subservient to Moscow dictation

There is no doubt that the Chinese Communists have made verbal obeisances to Moscow as unctuous as Tito's, but to as- sume that this movement is ^c'a conscious instrument of Russia's Far Eastern policies" is, in my opinion, to overestimate the power of the Kremlin and underestimate the revolution in China. I agree with Mr. Dallin that Russia's motives now and in earlier years are not economic advantage or settlement, but I believe they are somewhat more complex than merely "to enhance the power of the state and to invest its rulers with an aura of greatness and invulnerability."

H. H. Fisher

Stanford University

Nagy, Ferenc. The Struggle Behind the Iron Curtain. Translated from the Hungarian by Stephen K. Swift. Pp. xi, 471. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1948. $6.00.

Ferenc Nagy was the Prime Minister of Hungary for about two years up to the middle of 1947 and is probably the best known postwar political exile from eastern Europe. While the book is cast in the form of an autobiography and therefore begins with the chapter entitled "My Childhood," most of it deals with the history of Hungary after the Second World War. In that section the most significant chapters deal with the impact of the Soviet Union upon Hungary, particularly at the time Mr. Nagy was at the steering wheel.

Among many other things that took place in the Hungary of Mr. Nagy, he devotes considerable attention to the fantastic inflation which broke all previous records, and the expulsion of most of the German-speaking population from the country.

The historically most valuable parts of the book are the chapters in which he describes the postwar political situation of Hungary and particularly the policies and actions of the Small Landholders Party, of which he was one of the most prominent leaders. *

The most interesting part of the book is Mr. Nagy's detailed account of Communist policy and action in Hungary either directly through the Soviet occupying authorities or indirectly through the Moscow- trained Hungarian Communists in charge

of the most important departments of administration.

The exciting story told by the author is one of countless deceptions practised by the Communists in Hungary, the object of which was to seize power in fact, even though not in appearance. One chapter after another recounts the details of what Mr. Nagy calls Communist strategy and tactics The climax is reached in a part of the book entitled "Conspiracy" The last part is entitled "The Iron Curtain Descends," containing the gloomiest of all chapters: "The Soviet Steamroller Advances "

Mr. Nagy saw much and writes about the things he saw in a dramatic way. However, his book would carry greater weight if it were free of certain flaws. Judging by the testimony of his book, he saw through Communist machinations from the very beginning. If that was the case, why did he cover them up with his own person and party? Why did his antagonists have to eject him from the country in order to get rid of him? Again by his own testimony, he was impotent to make a stand against the Soviet steamroller. With this fatal defeat, much of the book reads like the grievances of a dismissed employee.

Mr. Nagy praises democracy but evidently has not grasped its real meaning. He writes that the "misled masses must be depoliticized." Again he writes that in the new world order "the masses" must have no opportunity or occasion to go astray politically. His idea of democracy is, evidently, one in which "the masses" are compelled to trust to the selective judgments of the politically minded leaders. The following sentence reveals Mr. Nagy's basic philosophy: "The ideal insurance for permanent peace and security is a condition in which each independent nation lives in an essentially identical political and economic order, differentiated only by the traditions and characteristics of the people."

Emil Lengyel

New York University

Hertz, Frederick. The Economic Problem of the Danubian States A Study

in Economic Nationalism. Pp. 223.

London* Victor Gollancz, Ltd.; New

York: Transatlantic Arts, Inc., 1947,

1948 $4.50.

Professor Frederick Hertz, an Austrian by birth, and the author of several important books on economic and sociological subjects, gives a detailed account of the economic history of the five Danubian countries—Austria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Rumania—during this century. In the decade before the First World War, when there was an Austro- Hungarian Empire, its national income almost doubled, showing a more rapid rate of increase than that of Britain or even Germany. The Empire had no large unemployment, and all the nationalities of its Austrian part showed an almost equal rise in wages, with the exception of the more backward regions, where the rise was even more swift.

Since the Austro-Hungarian Empire could not compare with other great nations in mineral resources and transportation advantages, these increases were not due to Nature's favors, Dr. Hertz shows. They were due to a large internal free trade market, favorable division of labor among the component areas, a comparatively liberal foreign trade policy, sound currency, and high credit rating.

This promising development came to a rapid halt after the First World War, because of the unimaginative peace treaties, followed by the abrupt rise of Danubian nationalistic fanaticism and militaristic blindness. At the peace conference scant attention was paid to economic necessities as the monarchy was hacked to pieces. The Balkanization of the valley was followed by the emergence of fascist systems aiming at economic self-sufficiency.

Increases of production were smaller than in the prewar Austro-Hungarian customs union. Besides, increases were usually at the expense of other sectors of the national economy or of neighboring nations. Austria, for instance, increased her food production at the cost of her industries.

Economic disorganization resulted in chronic unemployment, and it was normal for a third of the workers to be idle. Even at the peak of a spurious boom, incomes scarcely reached the pre-First World War levels. Worst hit was Austria, but even the most highly favored nation, Czechoslovakia, failed to reach the prewar standards.

An aggressive trade policy toward external markets was one of the most vicious features of economic nationalism. Prices were kept high by tariffs, and the excess profits were employed to subsidize exports. Protectionism was driven to extremes in the states of Danubia.

Hitler triumphed and the Second World War broke out largely because of this situation, Dr. Hertz holds The appalling mass unemployment led to mass impoverishment, which in turn caused the rise of a spirit of fatalism and the belief that any change would be better than the existing condition. This opportunity was cleverly exploited by the Nazis. It was the lack of any real solution in the Danube Valley that thus paved the way for the Fiihrer, "and it is very questionable whether there would ever have been a Second World War if the community of the Danubian nations had been maintained and reformed instead of being destroyed."

This is a very useful and highly important book, which is indispensable to all who want to know what Danubia was like before and after the First World War. The Hapsburg monarchy may have been a political monstrosity, but it certainly was an economic necessity.

Emil Lengyel

New York University

Kerner, -Robert J. (Ed.). Yugoslavia.

Pp xxii, 558. Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1949. $6.50.

In the well known series on the United Nations which the University of California Press publishes, Professor Robert J. Kerner has just edited a timely volume on Yugoslavia. Few countries are at present as difficult to deal with as Yugoslavia is. The nation—which emerged for the first time into history after World War I and the frontiers and composition of which have not yet been definitely settled—has an extremely complex background. The very last years have not only brought "a complete change of rule from bourgeois to communist," the editor remarks (yet Yugoslavia was hardly a bourgeois state, and the change which occurred was one from a government which combined Western and free institutions with traces of a semi- Oriental autocracy to one which has completely eliminated the Western and free institutions), but even within the communist world Yugoslavia occupies a rather unique and complex position.

In view of all these difficulties the present volume, which tries throughout to combine a warm admiration for the Yugoslavs with detachment towards their form of government, can be regarded as the best available introduction to the Yugoslav problem. Professor Kerner, who himself wrote two of the historical chapters and the Epilogue, has gathered a number of American and Yugoslav experts in various fields to present an authoritative but thoroughly sympathetic account of the background and the political, economic, and cultural aspects of the three Slav peoples who are so closely related, and yet in character and traditions so different The reader may regret that much too little attention is paid to the backgrounds of and trends among the various peoples—the Croats, the Slovenes, and the Macedonians —who by the victories of 1913 and 1918 were forged into a Yugoslavia without really fusing into a Yugoslav nation.

In that respect one may also doubt whether it is historically right to say "governments may come and governments may go but nations remain forever." It is of the essence of communist and fascist governments that they do not intend to go, but regard themselves as the fulfillment of history, either for all time to come as Lenin supposed, or at least for one thousand years as Hitler assumed. On the other hand, nations certainly do not remain forever. They are the product of history and they pass away with history. But as long as they exist, and especially in an age of nationalism which disunites the united nations, it is essential to study un- derstandingly the trends and aspirations of the various nations. To this end the present volume is an important contribution.

Yugoslavia occupies geographically a strategic position in central eastern Europe. Historically the Croats and Slovenes have been for many centuries in close touch with Italian and German civilization. In that way Yugoslavia, together with Greece and Turkey, could have fulfilled the role of forming a peaceful and connecting link between the West and the East. Truly free and independent Balkan states, in a close federation among themselves, could have become a factor of harmonization in a part of the world which in the nineteenth century was a cockpit of diplomacy and international intrigue. Steps in such a desirable direction were definitely taken in 1941 and 1942. Today these hopes have been destroyed, and destroyed partly through an American and British policy which did not take into account essential forces and factors at work. Mistakes of the past cannot be undone The growth of knowledge and understanding may, however, prevent a repetition. Thus, books like the present one become indispensable.

This book contains an excellent chronology and a good bibliography Its typographical presentation is worthy of high praise.

Hans Kohn

Smith College

Welles, Sam. Profile of Europe. Pp. viii,

386. New York: Harper & Brothers,

1948. $3.50.

Profile of Europe is an account of observations Mr. Welles made during his sojourns on the Continent and on a two months' visit to the Soviet Union It is a straightforward report, parts of which command, if not acceptance, at least serious consideration A good deal of it makes quite sordid reading, especially the chapters on means of political control and planned economy. The pages describing the potentialities of Soviet Russia and the fettering of the citizen, or the sacrifice of Citizen-Individual on the altar of Citizen-Collective, make depressing reading. Equally painful is the description of the suffering of the masses living under a top- heavy bureaucracy that enervates or destroys originality and levels all living thought. On these points one can hardly find ground, for disagreement with the au- thor, an associate editor of Time. His thumbnail sketch of Lincoln and Lenin as symbolized by the Lincoln Memorial and the tomb of Lenin is a masterpiece—almost melancholy poetry.

But the book also contains much that calls for challenge Mr. Welles predicts that there is little chance of a major war in the next fifteen years; he believes that the "two magnets" will come to some sort of a modus vivendi—but what is the modus operandi for such co-existence? This is not clear either to the reader or to the writer himself. The author often recommends that the United States demonstrate patience, firmness, and consistency in its policy toward the U S.S.R, avoiding, however, calling it a "tough policy." These are sheer platitudes, a journalistic jargon blunted by all too frequent eniployment by the daily <press. Welles extends the view that if the Soviet Government were only made aware of the preparedness of the United States, it would not dare to provoke a conflict—a familiar tune taken from an old Prussian song.

If some statements are debatable, others constitute outright nonsense. The author, little versed in Russian history and with hardly any linguistic equipment (he has only a "rusty" knowledge of French and a "little" Russian and German), is bound to fall into error. What is the basis, for instance, of his assumption that "for centuries the Russian people have been accustomed to a leader and to forms of collective living"? This only demonstrates a lack of comprehension of the Russian peasant. Or take, as an illustration, the trite reference to Russian fatalism as expressed in the term nickevo. Mr. Welles informs us that when you tell a Russian, "I'm sorry to hear your father died," his answer will be ttichevo, meaning, "yes, too bad, but he was an old man and had to go sometime." I happen to be familiar with the language, but I never knew that nichevo carries such connotation nor that it is even employed on such sad occasions. As to the interpretation of Russian sex life, it cries for correction, while some of the cited anecdotes are not even risque, they are plain vulgar.

Equally ridiculous is the interpretation that "emotionally, nearly all Russians [sic!] feel themselves part of a large family," or that "the Russians had an urge for unanimity long before the Big Four or the United Nations began meeting " But the following interpretation is the prize one: The author uncritically accepts Geoffrey Gorer's psychological explanation that tight swaddling of babies produces a frustrating feeling and "intense destructive rage," which causes in the later period "a largely unconscious feeling of pervasive but unfocused guilt." Eureka¹ We now are able to comprehend Russian nature: it derives from the tight swaddling clothes of babyhood, which produce in the Russian a sense of responsibility "for the sins and miseries of the whole world, and give a general and continuous demand for either confession, atonement, or revenge." Amen!

Anatole G. Mazour Stanford University

Gross, Feliks (Ed.). European Ideologies: A Survey of 20th Century Political Ideas Pp. xv, 1075. New York: Philosophical Library, 1948 $12.00.

The symposium as a medium for presenting information in the field of political and social problems has inherent shortcomings which no editor of such a volume and few reviewers fail to point out, but symposiums continue to appear in ever increasing numbers. The assumption must be that the advantages outweigh the shortcomings. In any case, few readers will refute that judgment of the present volume. European Ideologies certainly has greater value than the general run of collected essays by different authors, although, paradoxically, it has more than its share of the weaknesses.

Presented under the editorship of Feliks Gross are twenty-seven essays, by twenty- four specialists, on varied aspects of the development and the significance of modern European ideologies The list of contributors is an unusually impressive one; it includes Lewis Corey, Friednch W. Foerster, Sidney Hook, Waclaw Lednicki, Algernon Lee, Max Nomad, Friedrich Stampfer, and Vladimir Zenzinov The author in each instance "has lived as well as thought within the orbit of the idea system which he assesses/⁵ Virtually every chapter has some value in its own right. Rudolph Rocker's essay on ''Anarchism and Anarcho-Syndicahsm,'' Stephen Naft's "Hispanidad and PalangismReginald D. Lang's "European Federalism," and Waclaw Lednicki's "Panslavism" are particularly excellent.

But European Ideologies should be judged as a book rather than as a series of individual chapters The purpose is an admirable one: to present in a synthetic- survey manner selected European ideologies, the selection to include not only Fascism and Communism but significant less-known ideologies as well. The volume is not intended as an introductory textbook, but as a "synthesis for those who are interested in, and familiar with, the rudimentary principles."

In view of the nonexistence of readily available, condensed information on modern idea systems other than two or three of the most outstanding, justification of the attempt to meet this need is scarcely required. The present volume, however, meets it in part only. The work suffers from both a lack of unity and a lack of balance. Since the study makes no pretense of being an elementary textbook, it is certainly permissible, as Professor Gross explains in his Preface, merely to mention or omit altogether well-known elements of certain ideologies; but on this basis it is not justifiable to include lengthy discussions of elementary and well-known features of others, e.g., Kalijarvi's chapter on ''Nationalism," The objective presentation of both sides of controversial issues characterizes some of the essays, while others, eg., Foerster's "Pangermanism," are special pleadings for a particular point of view. In spite of the subtitle of the book, the treatment of "Socialism" by Algernon Lee is almost confined to eighteenth- and nineteenth-century developments. Although these and other weaknesses detract from the value of the book, they in no sense invalidate the judgment that it is an unusually excellent collection of essays on a subject the importance of which can scarcely be overemphasized.

Perhaps it is not amiss to warn the prospective purchaser that the publishers have recognized the value of the book in a very practical way: the retail sales price of the volume is $12 00

Joseph J. Mathews Emory University

Pritt, D. N. The State Department and the Cold War. Pp 96 New York. International Publishers, 1948. $1.25. As an item of Soviet apologetics, this book is a useful statement of the Russian case against the thinly veiled implications of the State Department's publication, Nazi-Soviet Relations 1939-1941 (released in January 1948). As a scholarly contribution to diplomatic history, it leaves much to be desired.

Mr. Pritt is a left-wing Labor M P. and a King's Counsel, with a creditable anti- Nazi and anti-Fascist record, which however parallels quite closely the several reversals in the Communist Party line during the past decade. His career as a counselor has equipped him with an argumentative, case-pleading style, at times convincing but often involving him in contradictions.

As a lawyer, he likes to have the whole of an argument: Russia is blameless of duplicity in her dealings with Germany and Britain which resulted in the nonag- gression pact of August 23, 1939, because she did not discuss the subject with Germany until a few days before the pact was signed; on the other hand, Britain is guilty of the worst hypocrisy for pretending not to know such discussions had been going on all summer. Russia is defended with equal vigor for refusing to commit herself to oppose Germany without Polish permission, and for moving into Poland without such permission

The author is especially adept in devastating attack upon straw men. More than half the volume is devoted to exposure of the sorry record of Chamberlain-Bonnet appearsement diplomacy, apparently on the theory that the world is full of people who need at this late hour to be persuaded from its cause. In a lengthy passage on the Soviet occupation of Eastern Poland in 1939 he calls in as witness no other than Winston Churchill to prove that the

Soviet motive was justified self-defense rather than imperialism. As a good lawyer he allows his witness to speak only to the particular question put

An excellent case can be made, and it is made here, that Russia should not be blamed for refusing to defend Anglo- French interests at the neglect of her own. Less convincing is the argument that in the Nazi-Soviet pact and in supplying Germany with valuable materials until June 1941, Moscow was adequately and intelligently defending her own interests. In his case against Chamberlain, Mr. Pritt assumes, as does almost everyone, that a strong stand against Hitler by Britain, France, and Russia would have prevented war. Moscow might better have swallowed Chamberlain's derelictions and inept diplomacy and acted on that assumption in 1939.

Oliver Benson

University of Oklahoma

Roberts, Leslie Home from the Cold

Wars. Pp. 224. Boston The Beacon

Press, 1948. $2 50.

Although Roberts' Foreword gives a definite impression that "the peoples of the lesser nations are sick and weary of the power politics" of both America and Russia, he definitely fails to give that impression in the rest of the book—in spite of his seemingly deliberate effort to present what people "were saying, thinking and doing during the spring and early summer of 1948 behind the Iron Curtain and Canada." The result is more than confusing, because of his slick, sleazy, and proposterous way of handling the facts.

Let me illustrate this by picking up some statements from the chapter on Czechoslovakia. We read that "the Czechs don't forget it was the Red Army" that saved Prague (p 138). But the author fails to note that Prague was actually liberated by Russia's pro-Nazi traitor, General Vlassoff. When Roberts talked to some Czechs about Masaryk's "suicide," suggesting that he might have been "liquidated" by Communists, "at least four men said 'Nonsense!'" simultaneously. Roberts must have consulted only straight Communists on this question, and he disregards evidence already available then, and now confirmed by numerous refugees from Prague. "Moscow had a finger in the pie," proclaims Roberts, but adds. "But such things mi^st be expected" (p. 136). Or. "Certainly the ordinary citizen suffers no [pohce] surveillance" (p. 132). And let the innocents ponder this question. "Have you given consideration to the idea that the administration may be glad to have [the] dissidents leave the country?" (p. 132). Did Roberts see the pictures in Life magazine last spring showing the Communist guards shooting at the "dissidents" trying to escape into the American zone of Germany? Roberts closes the chapter with this gem ". . . you had looked in vain for symptoms of public unease, for signs of the whip cracked over people's heads, and you had to admit that you hadn't seen any" (p. 140).

The rest of the volume is written in a similar vein. It is rare to encounter such a high degree of reportorial naivetk At a time of enforced re-evaluation, such as we are at present undergoing in regard to Soviet Russia's intentions, this is not only useless but definitely a dangerous book for any American who may be searching for the unpleasant truth about the course of world history.

Joseph S. Roucek University of Bridgeport

Bisson, T. A. Prospects for Democracy in Japan. Pp. viii, 143. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1949. $2.75. This brief account of attempted reform in the organized political life of the once most powerful nation of the Orient is one of a series of similar interpretative volumes initiated by the Institute of Pacific Relations for the purpose of providing a better understanding of the American occupation of Japan. Specific companion volumes in the I. P. R. series directly related to this, one are: Edwin M. Martin, Allied Occupation of Japan and Harold Wakefield, New Paths for Japan. Other more specialized reports ("Labor Problems in Japan," "Japan's Agricultural Problem" and several others) are to be released in the near future. The avowed aim of this volume "is to

present a concise critical analj-sis of certain crucial aspects of occupation policies and achievements'¹ (p. vii). The "crucial aspects" referred to are the series of political reforms conceived of by tlje American conquerors as the instruments that would bring "democracy" to Japan. Some of the "reforms" discussed are the adoption of the new constitution; the reorganization and reshuffling of government •ministries and bureaus; the reorganization of public health, welfare, education, police, and court activities and procedures; the purging of old guard "bureaucrats" from official positions of power, first in political office, then in the large business (zaibatsu) corporations, newspapers, and other enterprises; the dissolution of the old established and traditional "neighborhood associations," the Agricultural Association, and the Fisheries Associatian; and the official elimination of many other types of centralized control over the individual citizen and the small producer.

It is necessary to keep in mind the limited scope of the present volume as one of a series, and not one intended to be generally interpretative or analytical of the broader aspects of the whole ideology of "reform" and "democratization" of one nation by another—a conquering nation. One looks in vain in this book for any critical consideration of the basic conception of "reform"—that, apparently, is accepted as a matter of course.

The author seems to align himself with that segment of contemporary political thought which conceives of society as a conscious construct of man and regards the organization of national power as the result of design and plan by men who are either approved of as "liberal" and "democratic" or disapproved of as "feudal," "autocratic" and "reactionary bureaucrats." Reform and democracy (both, of course, patterned after American practice) are to be brought about, therefore, by changing the form of organization of political and social life. If the habits, attitudes, customs, and traditions—in short, the whole culture—of a people stand in the way, it is just too bad—they will have to change their customs and their habitual way of life. The book is critical of the accomplishments of the occupation, on the theory, apparently, that if other changes had been made or if other procedure had been followed, the desired end (reform) would have been nearer to achievement There is no recognition of the possible fallacy back of the whole ideology of the "reformation" of a culture, or of a nation, by another nation, especially a conquering nation.

If one grants the major assumptions about the reforming of a nation and of a culture, this is an excellent little book, which gives a consistent and logical account of major efforts attempted and incisive conclusions about probable effectiveness and obvious limitations. If one rejects these assumptions as anthropological and sociological absurdities, the book still gives a clear and concise picture of what has been attempted and provides a valuable basis for individual judgment as to what may be expected in this "the greatest single administrative enterprise ever undertaken by the United States" (p 1).

George B. Vold

University of Minnesota

Gayn, Mark. Japan Diary. Pp. x, 517.

New York: William Sloane Associates,

Inc, 1948. $4 00.

This eyewitness record of what is happening in Japan and Korea is one of the most significant recent books on the Far East. The author is an American "special correspondent" who kept an account of what he saw and heard from December 5, 1945 when he arrived in Tokyo until May 3, 1948.

This is no ordinary book, no superficial journalese. The data on postwar policies and personalities are gathered at first hand from all corners of Japan and from all sorts of people, logically and shrewdly, in a manner that Instorians and political scientists can respect. With a long knowledge of the East behind him, the author traveled up and down Japan talking with tenant farmers, landowners, industrialists, labor leaders, former Army officers, politicians, Military Government teams, and American officials. His disturbing story should be read by every American, for it describes in vivid language our unsuccessful attempt to convert overnight a conquered imperialist foe into a democracy—one of the most stupendous political and social experiments in American history.

Approving the United States Initial Post- Surrender Policy of August 1945 as "one of the great documents of American history," Mr. Gayn presents a wealth of incidents, experiences, and events showing that practically everyone, from General Mac- Arthur and the Emperor to the smallest school child, was disregarding it or modifying it in the interest of an unreformed Japan. He came upon children burying by night airplane engines and tools in their schoolyards and variously secreting vast quantities of rubber, metal, and other military equipment against the day when the American occupation ends. He found former members of the Thought Control working in other bureaus of the government, sometimes in higher places. He claims that there was no effective purge, simply a reshuffling of personnel. His most serious charge is lodged against our own Army in Japan and Korea, which on numerous occasions kept vital information from correspondents and from the American public. The combination of an undemocratic Army occupation and an undemocratic Japanese government retained in power, plus the natural tendency of the Japanese to circumvent their conquerers, is, in Mr. Gayn's opinion, making a farce of the occupation, "Japan, which lost the war, is fast winning the peace."

The author also presents evidence that Americans in Japan and Korea are sacrificing every consideration in order to make these countries bastions against Russian Communism. Koreans with whom he spoke preferred the Japanese occupation to the American/ The author maintains that America, which went into the Far East with popular esteem, has become hated because of its clumsy and reactionary practices.

This is an absorbingly interesting book, full of down-to-earth situations, and containing revealing interviews with the men who today are leaders in Japan and Korea. It may be extreme in its conclusions, but it contains an important body of data that no serious student of the times can afford to overlook.

Oscar G Darlington

Hofstra College

Tenenbaum, Joseph. In Search of a Lost

People: The Old and the New Poland.

Pp. viii, 312. New York: The Beech-

hurst Press, 1948 $4.50

The author is a New York physician and writer. He was an Austrian soldier during the First World War and subsequently was active in civic affairs in his native Galicia before migrating to America. As an American citizen and president of the World Federation of Polish Jews he revisited Poland in 1946 to survey, study, and make original notations of the fate of the Polish Jews during the Hitlerian epoch. He traveled widely in Poland during several months, interviewed officials and community leaders, visited the sites of Nazi concentration camps and gas chambers, talked to some of the handful of Jewish survivors, and observed their efforts to reconstruct their lives. Sections of the book describe Polish Jewish history from medieval times to the present, the manner of response and resistance to the Nazis, wartime slaughters of Warsaw and other Polish ghetto inhabitants, various concentration camps and gas chambers, and postwar manifestations of anti-Semitism and terrorization of Jews.

The reviewer, an anthropologist, would have wished for a survey that was perhaps less conventional and more psychologically oriented. But Dr. Tenenbaum's study will facilitate the task of other observers who will seek data that may throw light on the emotional behavior of millions of disturbed non-Jews who constituted the warp and woof of the Polish fabric of the thirties and early forties. Dr. Tefcenbaum has also sketched a background that will aid scholars who may attempt to describe the psychological behavior of the terrorized and doomed Pohsh Jews of this period. In a day when few professional historians or community observers are well versed in psychological theory and techniques of observation, a reviewer would be unfair were he to criticize in the light of a desire that the author had ventured such

interpretations and sought such evidences.

This survey is a serious effort, but it is no more the product of a scientific historian or sociologist than it is of a psychologically discerning reporter. There are no footnotes. Exact references are not given to pages of historical treatises, survivors' testimony, salvaged diaries, Nazi documents, or Nuremberg trial volumes, though sources such as these have been employed. Nonetheless, the author has written with praiseworthy care and responsibility. Justifiable emotions of grief and horror do not warp the narrative. The book is a worthy and illuminating historical survey for the general reader, as well as a guide to later scholars. Its restraint and objectivity are especially commendable because no more appalling chapter of history could be dealt with, and the author writes of the destruction by madmen of his own people.

Melville Jacobs

University of Washington

Lunau, Heinz The Germans on Trial

Pp. 180. New York. Storm Publishers,

1948. $2 50.

Shortly after the war came to a close, we were presented with an arrogant, flashy, and essentially pro-Nazi diatribe by Hein- rich Hauser, The German Strikes Back, written on the eve of his intended return to Germany. (Incidentally, he seems not to have returned, but to have found a haven in the United States he despises.) Lunau's book might be superficially compared to Hauser's, but it is basically quite different. Marked by fundamental humility rather than arrogance, it is worthy of a sober hearing.

Lunau's essential point is that although we initially distinguished between the Nazis and the German people, we have lost sight of that distinction. The punishments inflicted as the outcome of the Nuremberg trials were in most cases entirely justified, even though our failure to render the trials above suspicion by placing them in the hands of neutral jurists was a fatal error in propaganda tactics. These justified punishments, however, pale into insignificance alongside the unjustified suffering inflicted on entirely innocent Germans, from babes in arms to old women on the brink of the grave, because of our muddle- headedness and hasty decisions. The impromptu Morgenthau plan, which would have meant the starving down of a population numbering more than sixty millions to less than one-half or one-third that number, was succeeded by the improvised Byrnes pronouncement and that, in turn, by the almost equally off-the-cuff Marshall plan. We have followed no clear-cut policy line, but, appalled by the consequences of our planlessness, we have set up one stopgap after another. Even the Marshall plan, as initially announced, made no adequate provision for a western Germany that even then was clearly the fulcrum of any leverage we might exert against the Russian creeping advance.

The results of our ineptitude have been a major setback in the task of democratizing Germany, mass starvation and disease, and a degree of political nihilism that renders our glacis beyond the Rhine highly insecure. All this, and much more, Lunau points out. He himself contributed to the American war effort, was recently naturalized, and has every right to be heard. A man who risked his life against the Nazis should certainly have his day in court.

It might be added that the reviewer expresses his opinion on the basis of OSS work during the war with German anti- Nazi aides, and of eighteen months in 1947-48 in Military Government where familiarity with denazification procedures was an almost daily requisite. The sorry spectacle of ignorance—and even, on occasion, of malevolence—among American denazification officers has left him with a bad taste in his mouth. Were he writing a book like Lunau's, his mode of expression might consequently be somewhat bitter. Lunau is forthright, but rarely if ever censorious, self-righteous, or cynical. Published by a hitherto obscure firm, it is to be hoped that his book will get the immediate attention and wide reading it so eminently deserves.

Howard Becker University of Wisconsin

Badoglio, Pietro Italy in the Second World War. (Translated by Muriel

Currey.) Pp x, 234. New York: Oxford University Press, 1948. $3.50 This little volume consists of 204 pages of recollections or memoirs, and an appendix of 26 pages of documents on the Royal Army, the Royal Navy, the Royal Air Force, the government and patriots, prisoners of war, and internal reconstruction. Italy's entry into World War II, the defeat in the North African campaigns, the invasion of Italy by the Allies, the fall of Mussolini and the monarchy, and the organization of democratic government are the major topics to which the author devotes his attention., Obviously Badoglio writes from firsthand knowledge, for no other person was so intimately associated with the successive developments in the drama of Italian history from the conquest of Abyssinia to the national reconstruction after the collapse of the monarchy He conquered Abyssinia for the King and the Duce, a national victory that seemed to confirm Mussolini's claim to the mare nostrum and imperialistic expansion. Moreover, besides being Chief of Staff, he served the government in various other capacities, and when the Fascist regime tottered and fell "like a rotten pear," Badoglio was the logical person to assume the difficult task of directing popular resistance to the Germans, and co-operation with the American and English forces.

The situation in 1939, Mussolini's entry into the war, and the strange share of Italy in its progress are graphically if somewhat hurriedly told m less than 100 pages, while the progress of events from Brindisi to the liberation of Rome and the establishment of the new government occupy the succeeding 100 pages. Again and again, the reader would like to see more elaboration, and, if he is familiar with the memoirs of von Billow, the Kaiser's polished Chancellor at the turn of the century, or those of von Hetzendorf, the Austrian Chief of Staff of the period, he will be impressed with the relative paucity of Badoglio's reminiscences. True, memoirs are not, as a rule, regarded as very dependable historical source material; nevertheless they often reveal facts not found in the official documents, and add color and the personal outlook.

The latter is especially true of Badoglio's account, for it is peculiarly subjective in character. At times he seems almost obsessed with the idea that he must, at all costs, establish proof of his patriotism and of the soundness of his own judgment in major crises. He makes much of his opposition to Italy's entering the war; he asserts his criticism of Allied strategy in invading Italy from the south instead of by way of Sardinia, thus getting in the rear of the Germans; he confesses his surprise at Allied objections to his opening negotiations direct with Russia when there were more than 70,000 prisoners of war in the US.S.R.; and he boasts of his "resolute" stand against President Roosevelt's transfer of Italian ships to the Russians without consulting the Italian Government—which he designated as "an asphyxiation of Italy by the Allies."

William E. Lingelbach American Philosophical Society Philadelphia, Pa.

Williams, Francis. Socialist Britain. Pp. 278. New York: The Viking Press, 1949. $3.00.

Francis Williams has written a book about the social revolution now in progress in Great Britain that is as lucid and interesting as it is thoughtful and informative. As he has been an editor of the Daily Herald, a holder of important offices, and Prime Minister Attlee's adviser on public relations, he knows the labor movement from the inside. In this discussion of the Labour government's efforts to meet the threefold challenge in domestic, imperial, and foreign affairs, his firsthand knowledge is always in evidence.

The author dwells at some length on the efforts of the British socialists to end inequality and insecurity by means of a planned economy. It is emphasized that no rigid and complete collectivizing is contemplated, however, but a mixed system wherein basic industries are nationalized, while the remainder, although tied in closely with the national plan, will be left in private hands. The objective is a system in which the individual will enjoy more freedom than in either a capitalist or a communist one.

The brief section on the Empire reveals how fully in socialist thinking the earlier negative anti-imperialism has been replaced by a more positive and constructive view. The author, cautiously optimistic, believes that everywhere the Empire is moving to new strength and new cohesion and that, through the development of the new Asiatic dominions and of future African ones, there may evolve a union of free nations such as the world has not previously known.

The author is likewise hopeful about Britain's position in the world. Although temporarily weakened, he rates it as still a great power because of its imperial position, its strategic holdings, and its leadership in western Europe. He draws a good contrast between Russian communism and British socialism. He accepts political agreement with the United States as necessary to prevent aggression, but believes that an early recovery of British economic independence will be better for all concerned.

Some of the best chapters deal with the leadership of the Labour Party. Bevin, Cripps, and Morrison receive the credit that might be expected for their great contributions, but what will surprise those who derive their impressions from more superficial observers and leftist critics is the high place given to Attlee. Although exceeded in capacity in certain directions by his great subordinates, the Prime Minister has shown real strength, tenacity, and stability. His opponents have consistently underestimated the skill with which he revived a defeated and disorganized party and led it to victory and power, so that it is no accident that he now presides over Britain in revolution.

Carl F Brand

Stanford University

Hurwitz, Samuel J. State Intervention in Great Britain: A Study of Economic Control and Social Response, 1914-1919. Pp. x, 321. New York: Columbia University Press, 1949. $4.00. In the main section of the book, entitled "The Mobilization of Industry and Labor," the author makes a substantial contribution to the study of the First World War. The

account is enlivened by numerous quotations from official and unofficial sources. It emphasizes the improvising of policies (the muddling) by public officials and the compromises with traditions and selfish interests It reveals indirectly, however, the essential vigor, resourcefulness, and adaptability of the British people, who, while struggling toward democracy and preoccupied with peacetime problems, were suddenly thrust into total war.

Prewar conditions from 1905 to 1914 are described in the first chapter, "A Decade of Liberalism." That chapter sets the tone of the volume and illustrates both the virtues and the limitations of the study. The strains of a period of relative economic decline; the social ferments among the masses beneath the uneasy surface of dukes and bishops, bankers and industrial magnates; the political maneuvers of Lloyd George and his associates and opponents; the stumbling into war |nd its complete though temporary overshadowing of domestic discord—all of these varied aspects of the decade are put before the reader largely by the use of colorful quotations from men who played the leading roles in the drama.

The last section, "The Reaction of the Nation," presents, again with liberal use of quotations, what may be termed a diagnosis of the split personality of the nation. The section describes the almost universal opposition to war up to its outbreak, and. the sudden transition thereafter to wholehearted support; the reactions of workers to manpower controls, dilution of skills, and various other issues; and the extravagant promises and great expectations for reconstruction and the later disillusionment.

The Preface states that "in any presentation the selection of data inescapably conditions the conclusion " The data, especially the quotations, that were selected and the author's conclusions appear to the reviewer to give an exaggerated and somewhat lurid impression of the political turbulence and opportunism, the intellectual inconsistencies, and the social unrest preceding the war; the emotionalism attending the outbreak of the war; and the idealism and later disillusionment follow- ing the war. Ominous import is too often seen in the mere effervescence of vital democratic ferments.

These criticisms, however, are mainly questions of emphasis The study contributes to an understanding of the tragic failures after World War I, and by implication helps also to explain the present heroic efforts of the British people to avoid the mistakes of that period.

Witt Bowden

Washington, D C.

Bowle, John. The Unity of European

History. Pp. 383. London: Jonathan

Cape, 1948. 18 s.

The title of this volume, and the knowledge that the author has also written a volume on Western Political Thought, would lead one to expect an essay on political theory, or at least some general interpretation of the forces which might have produced unity. In his Preface, Mr. Bowie states: "My overriding object has been to present for the ordinary reader the unity and the development of the great cosmopolitan traditions of Europe, to relate economic and cultural achievement to the political background, and to set the mythologies of current nationalism in their proper place" (p. 7).

The book, however, turns out to be in its first 306 pages little more than a brief and well-written general history of European civilization from prehistoric times to the present The author has been most skillful in weaving together the threads of political, economic, and cultural development, and has ably highlighted the chief contributions of each era. Then in the last two chapters (pp. 307-44) he swings into an analysis of twentieth-century political and economic thought, and discusses, from the point of view of a British liberal, the needs of modern society.

The book was written during the war, and its publication was evidently delayed by the paper and other shortages in Britain. Great hope is expressed for the cooperation of the Western democracies and Russia in the United Nations organization, and the author lashes out at Fascism, "a poisonous idolatry in which thought is lost in action; it implies a deliberate and imbecile cult of violence" (p 323). Concerning the Soviet Union, Mr. Bowie notes: ^<4its success, won at the sacrifice of principles fundamental in Western tradition, presents a challenge to the economic and social systems of the rest of the world. Its future, as much as that of the rest of mankind, is dependent on the establishment of world order within a world law. This the Kremlin in spite of ideological preoccupation would be wise to promote" (p 321).

Mr. Bowie is at his best m discussing modern theory, and in these sections his work is stimulating, if a bit out of date. For the rest, the book is merely another history of civilization. The emphasis is well laid; the superiority of Byzantium in the early Middle Ages is stressed; the early history of Russia and the Slavic peoples is given proportionately full treatment, and the author seems au courant with the most recent historical literature and theories. His characterizations of epochs are often strikingly phrased. The prehistoric era he finds to be "a period of invention unparalleled in history until the sixteenth century of our own era" (p. 20); the Greeks "discovered the most powerful instrument of European thought—the power of abstraction and impartial observation" (p. 37); from the Jewish prophets derived "a flame of fierce nationalism" (p. 83); while "the impact of applied science on human institutions and the consequent need of a planned and flexible social order became the overriding theme of modern history" (pp. 256-57).

A few minor errors should be corrected: Arabic numerals were used in western Europe considerably earlier than the fifteenth century (p. 165), and Henry the Navigator of Portugal was the great-grandson of Edward III of England not the grandson of Henry III (p. 187). There are other points to which exception might be taken, but on the whole, the treatment is clear and the facts correct.

The book is too sketchy to be a textbook and too much of a general text to be popular; but for a lay reader it has considerable merit, and the author would seem to have accomplished the goal he set himself. The book would be almost per- feet for a discussion by a ladies' cultural society, and would afford them stimulating material.

John L LaMonte University of Pennsylvania

De Roover, Raymond. Money, Banking and Credit in Mediaeval Bruges. Pp. xvii, 420. Cambridge, Mass.: The Mediaeval Academy of America, 1948. $8.75; $7.00 to members of the Mediaeval Academy.

The contents of this book are so well indicated by the title that a reviewer need say little more about them. The author and his wife (nee Florence Edler) are well-known members of that band of youngish-middle-aged American medievalists who have pushed the frontier of economic research out into new regions by patient, lengthy labors on such business or legal records as have survived. Professor de Roover started his career as a historian by digging into the account books and business records of his native city, Antwerp, during the period—the sixteenth century— when that city was the commercial and financial metropolis of northwestern Europe. By chance he learned that there was similar material in Bruges, belonging to a still earlier period—in fact to the time when Bruges was what Antwerp later became. When he examined it, he found about 2,400 folios of ledgers or journals belonging to two Bruges money-changers, dated between 1367 and 1370. To decipher, interpret, and convert into living story this dry as dust collection, it was necessary not merely to scour the Belgian archives for further data but also to search in those Italian cities—Florence, Genoa, Lucca, and the rest—from which Italian traders came to trade in Bruges.

Such a job is a supreme challenge to the industry, imagination, ingenuity, and critical skepticism of any scholar; but from that challenge Professor de Roover has emerged with flying colors and much rich booty. He has made it possible for us to watch the commerce, banking, exchange transactions, payments, and defaults of interregional trade between the Mediterranean and the north, as well as the intra- regional traffic which centered on Bruges

We can see the wheels going round; we can understand the functions discharged by the three groups—the Italian merchant- bankers, the "lombards" doing their pawn- broking, and the essential money-changers who took deposits as a sideline and thus contributed one of the basic banking services to the community. We are reminded that the medieval economy was not impeded in its operation by the lack of some of the facilities which later centuries enjoyed, such as banknotes, but that it managed to carry on and do whatever it really felt necessafy for its work. The notion that earlier periods were immature just because they were earlier than ours dies hard; but Professor de Roover has hastened its demise. There is even more than a hint that the author suspects that our medieval ancestors enjoyed one of the perquisites of modern capitalism—the business cycle; but like a sound scholar he is too cautious to commit himself on that point He does, however, commit himself to a faith in the quantity theory of money.

Needless to say, the Mediaeval Academy has given this masterly study the setting it deserves, even to the ten delightful reproductions of oldf maps, pictures, and photographs of the kind of document that was used. The picture of the ledger page (p. 254) gives a grim idea of the kind of raw material from which the book has been produced.

Herbert Heaton University of Minnesota

Sarton, George. The Life of Science: Essays in the History of Civilization. Pp. vii, 197. New York: Henry Schuman, 1948. $3.50.

This illuminating little book is a sort of intellectual testament, with revelant allusions and illustrations, of the foremost American scholar and writer in the field of the history of science. Dr. Sarton is an adopted American—a Belgian refugee from the carnage of the First World War. Even before he had left his native land he had founded 'Isis, the most important journal devoted to the history and philosophy of science. Since coming to this country he has written many articles, edited Isis, and produced a monumental three-volume work oil the history of science. He has also labored indefatigably to promote interest in the history of science, which he regards as a field of history—indeed almost of aesthetics—as well as of science. This book is a collection of papers and essays which, in one way or another, well exemplify Dr. Sarton's notions of the history of science and its role and importance in the intellectual history of mankind.

The Life of Science starts off with three essays on the more general aspects and problems of the history of science: a brief consideration of the stages of intellectual history; a discussion of the similarities, differences, and interrelationships between the history of medicine and the history of art; and a comprehensive consideration of the history of science as an intellectual point of view and as a social experience. The last-mentioned is the most important contribution in the volume, and is one of the most cogent and competent discussions of the scope, role, and function of the history of science to be found anywhere in print.

The book next turns from general considerations to some specific contribution to the history of science. Leonardo da Vinci's epoch-making position in the history of science is outlined, with stress placed on the novelty of his method as well as on the versatility of his genius. There is a tender essay on the tragically brief hfe of the precocious mathematical genius, Evariste Galois. Then follows a delightful and sympathetic treatment of the intellectual interests and scholarly accomplishments of Ernest Renan, in which the emphasis is placed on Renan's scientific conception of history and his broad appreciation of the role of science in the intellectual and cultural history of mankind. Finally, in this section, Herbert Spencer is presented to illustrate the encyclopedic type of mind, devoted in Spencer's case to systematizing all knowledge from the evolutionary standpoint.

The third part of the book is devoted to a relatively long essay on the development of science in the Near East and western Europe, and the interchange of knowledge between the two areas over the ages. Special emphasis is placed upon the contributions of the Egyptians, the Greeks, the Moslems, and the Christian Scholastic philosophers and scientists. This essay is not only informing in the specific field of the history of science but is also a good case study in cultural diffusion.

The volume ends with a discussion of the need for, and possible contributions of, an Institute for the History of Science and Civilization, and a consideration of the value of the history of science as an intellectual stimulant and a civilizing force.

All in all, the book is written in clear and lucid fashion; it is impressive in its restrained learning, but is entirely devoid of the forbidding external mechanics of scholarship which all too often frighten off the intelligent general reader from any consideration of the history of science. In addition to its value to the educated public, the book should prove indispensable required reading in all courses now given in the humanities in our colleges and universities.

Harry Elmer Barnes Cooperstown, New York

Bober, M. M. Karl Marx's Interpretation of History. (Second ed., revised.) Pp. 445. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1948. $6.00. Professor Bober's study of the Marxian interpretation of history has been one of the standard accounts since it was first published in 1927, and in view of the constantly expanding literature on the subject a new edition is most welcome. The development of economic theory in the past twenty-one years is revealed in the titles of the two new chapters which have been added to the descriptive section: "Marx's Theories of Crises," and "Marx and Economic Calculation." Thd evolution of the author's own evaluation of Marx is reflected in the extensive revisions in the final critical section, and in numerous other changes made throughout the text.

Professor Bober has gone much further than in the first edition to show the relationship between the ideas of Marx and Engels and those of contemporary theorists, and important references are made to the work of Chamberlin, Dewey, Lange, Schumpeter, Sweezy, and in particular Keynes. On the other hand it must be noted, and not without regrets, that the author did not take the opportunity offered by the revised edition to consider the contributions of the Soviet theorists to the study of Marx and Engels. While the Soviet commentators may not have added a great deal to the thought of the two masters, they have contributed considerably to the popularization of Marxism, and it would be interesting to see their work through the discriminating and critical eyes of Professor Bober.

It is significant that with the passing of the years Professor Bober, like J. M Keynes, has become somewhat less harsh in his estimate of Marx As he himself suggests, a great depression and a Second World War have tended to strengthen the prestige of Marxism. Where in 1927 he grudgingly admitted that Marx had at least brought "humble economic facts" to the attention of historians in such a way that they could never again ignore them, he now states more positively that Marx's work has served as a great stimulus even to the great majority of social scientists who cannot accept his conclusions While the author's approach to Marx's interpretation of history has increased in scope and depth, his personal evaluation of the theory has not changed. He still believes that the wide following which Marx has won is due less to an appreciation of his analysis or to a success in his forecasts than to the scientific appearance of his method, to his almost religious appeal to reformers of all sorts, and to the many purposes which his ideas can serve. Professor Bober still regards the interpretation as a one-sided and hence unreliable guide to history. He still characterizes Marx's theory in his final sentence as "a key that fits many locks but opens few doors "

C E. Black

Princeton University

Okinawa: The Last Battle ("United States Army in World War II: The War in the Pacific.") By Roy E. Appleman, James M. Burns, Russell A. Gugeler, and John Stevens, Historical Division, Department of the Army. Pp. xxii, 529. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1948 $6.00.

Early in World War II the decision was made to prepare a comprehensive account of the military activities of the conflict. Trained historians were assigned to the larger units of the Army and War Department to initiate the work of research, analysis, and writing. As a result, "The United States Army in World War II" has taken quite definite form with plans for a ninety-nine volume series.

Two organizational studies have appeared, but the present volume is the first to report theater action. Oddly enough, the history of the last operation appears first; the explanation for this is that preparations for historical coverage from an organization standpoint were superior to those for previous operations.

Though not written in an inspired style, this volume covers as adequately as could be expected the military story of Operation ICEBERG, as the invasion of the Ryukyus was officially called. The contributions of the Navy, the Marine Corps, and the Army are considered vital, and no attempt is made to grant undue credit to one; obviously, in the light of the nature of the series, the role of the Navy has been sketched, while the services of the other branches are developed in detail

In the light of the size and terrain of Okinawa, severe restrictions were placed on the number and the size of combat units employed. Consequently, in this history there is much of small-unit action; the nature of modern front-line warfare is rather ably portrayed Instances of individual heroism and small-group valor are repeatedly cited. The deaths of General Buck- ner and Brigadier General Easley and of correspondent Ernie Pyle are simply told.

Fifty-four maps, mostly of the folding type, and nineteen tables and charts will undoubtedly be warmly welcomed by the professional reader or the student of military history. One hundred and four pages, approximately one-fifth of the book, are given to illustrations; they will prove of interest to both lay and professional read- i ers.

As is well known, Okinawa was one of the most bitterly fought battles in the Pacific war. American casualties were greater than those experienced in any other cam- paign against the Japanese, totaling 12,500 killed or missing and 36,631 wounded. The losses in ships were 36 sunk and 368 damaged, while losses in air were 763 planes in the three months of April through June. The authors of Okinawa: The Last Battle attribute this high cost "to the fact that the battle had been fought against a capably led Japanese army of greater strength than anticipated, over difficult terrain heavily and expertly fortified, and thousands of miles from home." The cost to the Japanese was even higher, with approximately 110,000 Japanese losing their lives in either the traditional hara-kiri manner or by the less orthodox but equally effective satchel-explosive or in comparably violent fashion. Indeed, only 7,400 prisoners were taken. In materiel, the enemy lost 7,800 planes, 16 ships sunk, and 4 damaged. And most significant of all, he surrendered 640 square miles of territory within 350 miles of Kyushu. Fortunately, V-J Day arrived before the potential strategic benefits of Okinawa, the last battle, were realized.

William E. Livezey University of Oklahoma

International Publishers. Documents Relating to the Eve of the Second World War (two volumes). Pp. 314, 243. New York, 1948 Vol. I, $2.75; Vol. II, $2.50. These documents, first published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union in an English translation in the summer of 1948, are now presented in an American edition. The Soviet Government was moved to the publication of this collection by the United States State Department's volume Nazi-Soviet Relations 19391941 The one collection, however, does not answer the other, for, as is indicated by the dates, the documents on the whole cover different periods. The emphasis of the Soviet publication is on the negotiations which led up to the Munich agreement. No essentially new revelations are made, although there are interesting side lights on the views of Chamberlain, Halifax, and Daladier. There is evidence that the English statesmen sincerely desired a real understanding with Germany and Italy when they took over office.

The documents are arranged chronologically and there are many photostats of the originals included An excellent biographical index of names is supplied Actually, Volume I is not a collection of documents from the German archives as advertised on the jacket, but is a collection from various sources, and some have gone through a number of translations. Nineteen are German and three are Czech documents from the German archives. The remaining documents m this volume are: four Czech documents from Hupert Ripka's Munich Before and After, two Czech documents from an unpublished Czech White Paper which was given to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, one Czech document from Z Fierlinger's In the Service of the Czechoslovak Republic, six Polish documents (source not indicated), one document from the archives of the Russian Foreign Office, and eight documents from English, French, and American sources. Forty-four such scattered documents covering a period from November 19, 1937 to December 16, 1938 hardly give a clear picture of events. Yet some individual pieces, such as the report of Hitler's conversation with Lord Halifax in 1937, are exceedingly important.

Volume II consists of documents from the private papers of Herbert von Dirksen, former German Ambassador to Moscow, Tokyo, and London. These were found by the Soviet Army on Dirksen's estate at Groditzberg. One long document from Volume I is repeated and two reports (1936, 1939) from Welczek, German Ambassador at Paris, are printed in an appendix. This volume has more unity; and a long summary by Dirksen—written in September 1939—of his activity as Ambassador at London is particularly noteworthy. It is clear that his views did not jibe with those of the German Foreign Office. He insisted constantly after the seizure of Prague that Britain would go to war if Germany and Poland became involved in a conflict. He felt that his attempts to re-establish better relations between London and Berlin in July and August 1939 were beginning to make some slight headway as English-Russian negotiations of this period bogged down. Dirksen's summary is an objective and clear statement of British policy and is at the same time an acute condemnation of Nazi diplomacy and propaganda techniques.

E C. Helmreich

Bowdoin College

Gantenbein, James W. (Ed.) Documentary Background of World War II: 1931 to 1941. Pp. xxxiii, 1122 New York: Columbia University Press, 1948 $10.00.

Without editorial comment, this compilation attempts to trace, through speeches of statesmen, diplomatic correspondence, and excerpts .from treaties, agreements, and other documents, the foreign policies of major countries in the period 1931-41 Sources are primarily the official publications of the governments of the United States, Great Britain, and France, and of the League of Nations. Responsibility for the choice, arrangement, and editing is assumed by Mr. Gantenbein, who states that the collection is not to be construed as being in any way official or as having the endorsement or approval of the United States Government.

Coverage is not comprehensive Mr. Gantenbein has merely attempted to bring together "a group of documents that, by either their intrinsic importance or their representative character, might be useful in tracing main lines of foreign policy." In this he has succeeded Where space has not permitted inclusion of entire documents, he has attempted to "avoid removing passages from contexts which are necessary for purposes of conveying accurate impressions." In a sense, the entire compilation suffers by removal from a larger context, namely, the massive body of documents relating to international relations in the decades preceding 1931. The foreign policies of the decade preceding World War II have deep roots. Against the background of events in the period following World War I, the position of Germany becomes no more moral, but certainly more understandable. One means of restoring these documents to context would have been to amplify them with appropriate editorial comment.

It is interesting to note that the only documents bearing on the first concrete demonstration of German aggressive militarism in the 1930's, the reoccupation of the Rhineland, are the German Ambassador's note to Anthony Eden (p. 651), the protest of the Soviet Union to the League of Nations (p. 594), and the League of Nations resolution relating to the breach of Article 43 of the Treaty of Versailles (p. 953). If there were any one point when the tide of provocation on the part of Germany might have been stemmed by threat of force, this would seem to have been the occasion. Mr. Gantenbein has missed an opportunity to present the positions of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France as an explanation of why events from that point forward took the course they did. Particularly interesting among the documents relating to German aggressions are those revealing Mr. Neville Chamberlain's misguided sincerity in the Czechoslovak crisis of 1948 (pp. 363 ff.).

Allen T. Bonnell Drexel Institute of Technology

Cave, Floyd A. (Ed.). The Origins and Consequences of World War II. Pp xxv, 820. New York: The Dryden Press, 1948. $4.75.

This history of recent international relations is designed to provide the ordinary reader with a clear focus on war as the greatest problem of the age, and to instruct him in the bases for a possible solution. Professor Cave and his eleven associates have covered the field, according to their several specialties, from the coming of the First World War to the present time, with a commendable selection of detail and a fairly sure sense of proportion.

Two criticisms are obvious. In the section on "Origins," which covers almost two-thirds of the book, the authors are retelling much that is already said in several excellent texts, while in the latter section on "Consequences" they are obliged by the nature of the subject to present us with imperfect data and even with speculative matter which later events and discoveries will surely render obsolete. The authors have sought to meet the first criticism by a new emphasis on the events which trended toward war, though some doubt remains m one's mind whether their effort has wholly succeeded. Perhaps what is really required is a thoroughgoing rein- terpretation of the whole period between the wars, and this the authors prudently do not attempt. The second criticism is at least partially met in an introduction by Sumner Welles, who reminds us that the formation of men's opinions cannot await the last word on contemporary events.

As in any collaborative enterprise, the various topics are unevenly handled, though the marks of an effort to secure unity are evident. The style is readable, if in some places a little over-colloquial. The general treatment is factual and expository, a conscious attempt being avowed to achieve objectivity and forswear prejudgment. If anything, this approach is overdone, fortunately it has not inhibited such expressions of opinion as Professor Godshall's frank belief that American abstention from the League was "far better for all concerned" (p. 108). Several essays on the ideological factor in international relations are skillfully and convincingly written to a degree unusual in general texts, and Professor Darlington's chapter on Munich and its consequences is vigorous and persuasive.

The rate of factual accuracy is gratify- ingly high, though suffering somewhat from the imprecision of all generalization. For example, the impression is given on page 136 that Russian policy veered away from Germany after the latter entered the League; though this was hardly the whole story, and indeed the impression is contradicted on the next page. There are several inaccuracies of detail. The Genoa conference sat in 1922, not 1923 (p. 136). The Bukowina was never part of Hungary, though special mention is made of it on page 219. The "winds dispatch" episode is told in its original and now discredited form on page 521. Several of the maps are regrettably careless in execution and even misleading, particularly those on pages 155 and 235.

Special mention should be made of Stefan Possony's searching and provocative study of the military causes of war (Chapter XVI)., He reminds us forcefully of the little-studied yet often critical role of military advisers in making up the minds of statesmen; and by his ingenious, if not in every case convincing, inferences from the known record, he recalls the historian's attention to the vital importance of those personal conversations and understandings that are not revealed by the official documents

Sherman S. Hayden

Clark University Worcester, Massachusetts

Jewkes, John. Ordeal by Planning. Pp xi, 248. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1948. $3.75. This is another volume in the Hayek tradition. It is dedicated to the proposition that "at the root of our troubles lies the fallacy that the best way of ordering economic affairs is to place the responsibility for all crucial decisions in the hands of the State" (Preface, p. vii). Central planning necessarily leads to serfdom by destroying the incentives which give rise to economic progress. It invariably causes economic instability, since the whole economic system is subjected to the whims of a few planners and "turns every individual into a cipher and every economic decision into blind fumbling . . ." (p. 9).

Mr. Jewkes is, however, optimistic about the future. He believes that the free enterprise system has sufficient vitality and is sufficiently capable of future contributions to frustrate the ambitions of those who would try to shackle our freedoms.

Two major threats confront our free enterprise system: the dangers of monopoly capitalism and the specter of unemployment Mr. Jewkes is complacent about the former. He marshals data to prove that monopoly breeds its own seeds of destruction through the lack of economy of large-scale operations. As long as freedom of enterprise continues, the dangers of monopoly can be eliminated.

The problems of unemployment are also surmountable. The Keynesian employment theory and Lerner's ideas of functional finance are fully endorsed as a bulwark against unemployment. One wishes that the author had elaborated on the specific applications of these theories, but Mr. Jewkes apparently has the faith of his predecessors (he is professor of economics at Manchester) in the "unseen hand" that would automatically allocate resources and create employment in the most efficient way.

The question thus arises, wherein lies the mystery of the political success of planners? Mr. Jewkes blames their ascendency on the infectious and fickle spread of the fashion which became popular several decades ago. It will consume us all, if not properly exposed. For even the planners themselves are ignorant of the dangerous path which they will have to tread. "The modern planning movement sets out with good will and noble intentions to control things and invariably ends by controlling men" (p. 208).

The author analyzes the postwar economic difficulties of England and attributes all the British ills to its Labor government. It would seem that England was the promised land flowing with milk and honey until the new government in 1945 robbed every English subject of his full fleshpot and led the people into the wilderness.

But the end is not yet in sight. "The planned and centrally directed economy," the author warns, "must invariably undermine the economic freedoms and, with them, the whole fabric of a free society" (p. 198). Since the book under review is the best evidence that such a situation does not exist as yet despite more than three years of a government of planners, his prediction is at best a conjecture. Mr. Jewkes hedges by holding that this will happen in the "long run" when, according to the late Lord Keynes, a favorite of our author, we are all dead.

Ordeal By Planning, nevertheless, deserves serious consideration. Its "solutions" of our economic ills, such as complete reliance upon central financial devices to do away with the problem of unemployment, may lack originality and be oversimplified, but the book's central message deserves attention. Though it is written against the British background, it applies equally well to the United States. While central planning may be compatible with democracy, the arguments of the author notwithstanding, there is always the danger of overdoing a good thing. Professor

Jewkes sounds a very eloquent warning for us to guard our precious freedoms. There is some justification to the blurb on the jacket of the book that the volume should be on the desk of every Washington administrator. He may need the space for more urgent and important material, but he should find time to ponder the thesis of the book.

Sar A. Levitan

Sampson College

Chevallier, Jean-Jacques. Les grandes

oeuvres politiques de Machiavel & nos

jours. Pp xiv, 406. Paris: Librairie

Armand Colin, 1949. 600 fr.

This opening volume of a new series, sponsored by the Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, sets a high standard. It also represents an auspicious choice. Andr6 Siegfried, president of the foundation, tells us in his preface that French higher learning has tended to pay inadequate attention to the history of political ideas. As a step toward remedy, the committee on instruction of the Ecole Libre des Sciences Politiques, under his guidance, proposed a new course on political literature. The course was entrusted to Professor Chevallier, who has continued to teach it in what is now the Institute of Political Studies. The Great Political Works from Machiavelli to Our Day in general proceeds along the path originally marked by the committee on instruction, but the author's skill in making the scene come alive gives his book personal distinction.

The treatise is divided into four parts First come the protagonists of absolutism. Machiavelli, Bodin, Hobbes, and Bishop Bossuet, whose Politics Drawn from the Holy Scripture was intended to prepare the Dauphin, his royal charge, for the burdens of government. The second part outlines the attack on absolutism: Locke, Montesquieu, Rousseau, and Sieyes, "the abbot, so little abbot," to whom the third estate was simply "a complete nation." Next the aftermath of revolution is presented in Burke's Reflections, Fichte's Discourses, and Tocqueville's Democracy in America,. In the fourth part, devoted to socialism and nationalism, the reader finds a striking documentation of the violence of the industrial age: the Communist Manifesto, Charles Maurras, Sorel, Lenin, and Hitler's My Battle. An all too brief concluding section is entitled "The Spirit against Leviathan."

It is quite probable that an American scholar, called upon to duplicate Professor Chevallier's assignment, would come up with a somewhat different selection of political writings characteristic of their times. But granting the possibility of justifiable alternatives, there is no question that the author has succeeded admirably in tracing the ideological drives of the modern era. He has a sure sense of the milieu of ideas, of the conditions that may lift a single pamphlet to the heights of fame. He has also an eye for the supporting cast of lesser figures. Moreover, while his exposition is systematic, it is wholly free from academic pedantry. Almost conversational in style, fast in pace, rich in color, his writing is a tempting bid for the interest of a large public.

In dealing with such contemporary figures as Alain and de Jouvenel, the author appears to sympathize with the spiritual "revolt" against the modern nation-state with its "monstrous concentration of power." He concludes, however, that, as things stand, all anguished outcries against Leviathan will only "accentuate the sarcasm of its smile" (p. 399). Here are the terms of reference for the political thinker of our epoch.

Fritz Morstein Marx Department of the Budget Washington, D. C.

Graber, Doris Appel The Development of the Law of Belligerent Occupation, 1863-1914: A Historical Survey. Pp. 343. New York: Columbia University Press, 1949. $4.00.

The author uses as the scaffold round which this study is built five codes of the law of belligerent occupation which were published during the period covered by the study: the Lieber Code of 1863, the Brussels Code of 1874, the Oxford Code of 1880, and the two Hague Codes of 1899 and 1907.

In Chapter 1 the author surveys the contents of these codes as "landmarks" of the law of belligerent occupation, and discusses them in the light of their appraisal by various writers on the subject. Chapters 2-7 deal with, "the nature of belligerent occupation," "the people's duties to the occupant," "the government of occupied regions," "the treatment of public and institutional property," and "requisitions and contributions."

Each of these chapters is divided into five distinct parts which analyze the problems involved in the light of the treatment they received in these five codes.

Chapter 8 describes the application of the law of belligerent occupation during the major wars which occurred between 1863 and 1914, particularly the American Civil War, the Russo-Turkish War of 1877, the War of 1897 between Greece and Turkey, the Boer War, the Russo- Japanese War of 1904-5, the Franco- Prussian War of 1870-71, the Spanish- American War of 1898, and others.

The analysis- shows that the earlier codes, particularly the Lieber Code, put the emphasis on the rights of the occupant, which he should exercise with limitations unless "military necessity" dictated otherwise. The Brussels and Oxford Codes stress the humanitarian approach, the protection of the rights of the occupied. Finally, the Hague Codes try to find a middle ground between these two approaches.

The study was not written with the idea of being helpful in the solving of the many legal questions that arise constantly in the now occupied territories. Principles developed many decades ago under conditions which, in scope and nature, were so utterly different from those existing today cannot be applied by way of legal analogy. The consequences of "unconditional surrender" for the status of the occupied, the treatment of underground organizations, the status of governments in exile, the problems of displaced persons—all this requires new legal approaches. Numerous unprecedented situations call for an international code of belligerent occupation which should represent the views of our generation; and it may eventually crystallize out of an evaluation of the events and data of the last two world wars.

The value of the present study lies in the fact that it indicates clearly the need for a new approach suited to the situations of belligerent occupation in our rapidly changing world. It is a carefully prepared, well-documented study.

William J. Dickman

Pennsylvania Military College

Brogan, D. W. American Themes. Pp

284. New York: Harper & Brothers,

1949. $3.50.

D. W. Brogan, professor of political science in Cambridge University, is a lively and witty Scot with extraordinary insight into two cultures other than his own— those of France and the United States. In his shrewd yet sympathetic* understanding of other peoples—their social climate, temper, folkways, and institutions—Brogan is the modern counterpart to James Bryce. His books are less magisterial, more journalistic, than the latter's, but in their casual unpretending way show greater intimacy with daily life and the minutiae of social history. The American Character made him known to many who had missed hearing him lecture during repeated trips to the United States, or who had failed to read the knowledgeable reviews of Americana—ranging from the Federal Guides of WPA to Henry Mencken's opus on our language—which Brogan has been contributing for nearly twenty years to the Manchester Guardian, Times Literary Supplement, Spectator, and other periodicals. These pieces form the backbone of the present volume. Although much of it consequently is journalism—a shade hasty and sometimes slightly repetitious—it is British critical journalism of a very high order.

Mr. Brogan writes with fluent charm, in the easy, urbane, richly allusive manner of an Oxford and Cambridge savant with the history and literature of Western Europe at his fingertips. He almost never pens a pedestrian page, or responds to any subject in a stale conventional way. His point of view, while learned and Olympian, is never impatient, hostile, or patronizing Knowing far more about America than, say, Geoffrey Gorer or Evelyn Waugh, he comprehends that wisecracks are not enough, and his unfailing humor is beneficent Nor does he waste indignation upon our declared Anglophobes, finding even Colonel McCormick "after all a traditional figure, the irascible, suspicious, arrogant rich man lapping up flattery and morbidly suspicious of having something put over on him," and whose power for mischief is almost negligible. This book is a useful commentaiy upon two decades of Anglo- American relations—from the early thirties, when each nation was too deeply engrossed in its own economic problems to give the other much thought, to Munich and the eve of another war when lethargy and indecision had to be conquered on both sides, and at last to the whole-souled collaboration of war at its peak. Brogan's little essay of 1944, "The Bulldozer," is an interpretive masterpiece of those latter days. But throughout these changing international moods, whether he is writing about Hollywood or the pictorial weeklies or crime stories or Rhodes Scholars, Brogan trusts his invariable instinct to get to the root of the matter with sympathy, understanding, and illumination. On topics of American constitutional history he is rivaled only by Harold Laski, among observers from overseas.

One thinks his intimacy with the American scene must often be so erudite as to baffle the average insular Britain, as when he speaks of a mythical American aristocrat named "Mr. Bronson Stuyvesant Salt- ontail," touches upon the stylistic influence that Edgar Saltus had upon President Harding, or alludes jestingly to "the famous social pathologist, Dr Frank Sullivan " So satisfying is this accomplishment that a cisatlantic reviewer hesitates to mention the lapses. Yet, since Mr. Brogan has always set others right in the friendliest way imaginable (such as Mencken, for example, who thought "Jag- gers" was Oxonian slang for St. John's, though it is a manifest deconsecration of Jesus College), it may not be amiss to in-' form Mr. Brogan in the same spirit that James FarrelTs hero is not Studs Lonergan but Lonigan, the blind musician from Wales not Archie but Alec Templeton, the author of The Thin Man not "Mrs" Dashiell Hammett; and to set him right on the spelling of Mary Johnston (author of To Have and to Hold) and of Jerome Weidman (author of I Can Get It for You Wholesale). We are also a little confused to find that a famous British misunderstanding of the term "jitterbug" is twice attributed to a public utterance of Sir Samuel Hoare and once to Neville Chamberlain—perhaps both of them misunderstood jive talk as badly as war talk But these are trivia. Both Americans and Britons can rejoice that the cultural rapprochement between their nations has been fostered by so keen, discriminating, and delightful a go-between as Dennis Brogan.

Dixon Wecter

Huntington Library

San Marino, California

Handlin, Oscar This Was America. Pp.

ix, 602 Cambridge, Mass : Harvard

University Press, 1949. $6.00.

The observations of foreigners who have traveled in the United States and recorded their impressions in books about America have always been regarded as valuable source material by historians, though all such data must be used with great caution, to allow for the bias and prejudices of the authors, and the frequent contradictions that appear in their writings. Some write with enthusiastic optimism, others as bitter and cynical critics of the American scene. Moreover, it is usually the distinctive and the unique which strikes the traveler's eye and inspires his generalizations, whereas the important commonplace may be overlooked.

The present volume will be welcomed as a very useful compilation of such travel literature, especially because it deals with the published works of non-English authors. The reader will find here not only familiar names like Peter Kalm, Creve- coeur, de Tocqueville, Ole Munch Raeder, Fredrika Bremer and the Duke of Saxe- Weimar-Eisenach, but selections from a Moravian bishop, a Hamburg merchant, a Jesuit priest, an Austrian savant, an Hungarian traveling companion of Kossuth, a German historian, an Italian geologist, a Spanish novelist, an Italian dramatist, and others, and these translations cover the period from the eighteenth century to Andre

Maurois in 1939 Needless to say, from such a wide range of material one may select innumerable comments on every aspect of American civilization, from the manners of the savages and whale fishing, to sports, amusements, river, canal and railroad traffic, the westward march of frontier society, the mingling of European peoples in the building of America, manners and customs, the temperance crusade and spirit rappings, the state of science, education and invention, American humor, religion, big business and the arts, the place of women in our society, the barbershop as an American institution, life in Nantucket, New Orleans, Salt Lake City and other cities, and in the Italian quarter of New York and Chicago and the Hungarian colony in McKeesport, and dozens of other miscellaneous items that help to explain the Amencan mosaic.

Other compilers probably would have made other selections, or would have reprinted other passages from the materials chosen by Dr. Handlin. But the material is both interesting and significant, and the brief introductory comments about each author and the several periods of American history from which the selections are drawn will prove helpful, especially for the so-called "general reader." But most of all this reviewer would like to commend the author for the pains he has taken to prepare an unusually detailed and complete index, which is not only essential for a book of this kind but multiplies its usefulness many times.

Carl Wittke Western Reserve University

Patterson, Caleb Perry, Sam B. Mc- Alister, and George C. Hester State and Local Government in Texas. (Third edition.) Pp. ix, 590. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1948. $3.50. Books on the governments of particular states are increasing in number, and their quality is, on the whole, improving. Any student who wishes to make a comparative study of state governments on some major point is now able to do so, to some extent, through these state government textbooks. Designed as they mainly are for undergraduate student use, these books natu- rally do not get far into the finer and more controversial points.

The first edition of this text appeared in 1940, and a reprint with a supplement in 1945. In the present edition there is one new chapter (Chapter 13, Regulation of Labor and the Professions), and there has been considerable rewriting, apparently mostly for the purpose of bringing the work up to date.

Eight chapters of the present book are devoted to general governmental matters like the state constitution, the legislature, the executive branch, the courts, and elections; eleven deal with state finances and administrative functions; and two describe county and city government in the state. The emphasis on functional services is very evident. For the functional chapters the authors acknowledge that they have relied rather consistently on information supplied to them by the appropriate state departments and agencies. It almost follows that the book is primarily descriptive rather than analytical or critical, and perhaps that is what such a textbook should be.

Some readers may suffer a little twitching of the eyebrows, however, when they read on page 1 about certain "constitutional principles" that were "determined and written down by the people," and then a few pages later learn that in a democracy a constitution "is a large throat through which the perpetual voice of the people is continually speaking to the agents of government, informing them of their limits in governing the people, and indicating to them how the people desire to be governed" (p. 7). These little propagations of myth, or stylistic peccadilloes, whichever they are, may not harm any reader. On the other hand, the treatment of the "white primary" and poll tax issues in Chapter 6 leaves something to be desired.

Out-of-state readers would like to know more than is told about certain terms and practices which, if not peculiar to Texas, are at least not found throughout the Nation. For example, what is a "flotorial" member of the state legislature (p. 31), and how does it happen that the state house of representatives includes 33 "student" members (p. 33)? All in all, however, the book is well written and informative. When other states put as much emphasis as Texas does on the teaching of the constitution and government of the state, and their local political scientists write texts upon their own states, they will find much to emulate in State and Local Government in Texas.

William Anderson University of Minnesota

Greer, Thomas H. American Social Reform Movements: Their Pattern Since 1865. Pp. ix, 313, New York: Prentice- Hall, 1949. $5 35.

This volume is a plain and factual summary of American reform and radical movements since the Civil War, together with a series of twenty-four illustrative documents. As a summary, drawn from standard printed sources, it will doubtless serve a useful purpose. It contains many standard facts, arranged on a rather slight interpretive framework To summarize, Mr. Greer concludes that American reform movements have helped to bring about fundamental changes. They are, however, extremely varied and cannot be separated from the complex forces at work in American life. Most of them have been caused by economic distress. But it does not necessarily follow that all periods of distress will produce reform movements, because time and education are also generally needed. Nor does it follow that a period of prosperity cannot foster a reform movement. Labor unions, for example, have made some of their greatest gains in periods of economic expansion. Reform movements have shifted in character between 1865 and the recent past from Utopian panaceas to practical workaday gains, in both labor and agriculture. Early reformers were short on effective methods; they drifted into independent political action. Such action is destined always to fail. However, independent parties do have significant effects in the long run because they force major parties to modify their policies. Reform movements often fail because of internal weakness, poor leadership, and political blunders. Many have been checked when the public lost interest. The most common cause of their disappearance has been "plain failure to achieve results." But it is also true that success has terminated some by ending the evils that gave rise to them. Some evils, however, disappear by themselves without benefit of the reform impulse—for example, when depressions are followed by prosperity. The Socialist Party, which has failed to abolish the capitalist system, has won many of its immediate demands, among them public works programs and social security. The Industrial Workers of the World was even less successful, but its principle of industrial rather than craft organization has had much success in the age of the Congress of Industrial Organizations. "The evidence seems to show that most social reforms are closely related to organized movements. However desirable or undesirable this condition might be, it is a fact of American democracy." A cautious thinker, Mr. Greer has adhered faithfully to hallowed canons of historical objectivity, and has succeeded in writing a noncontroversial book about a controversial subject.

Richard Hofstadter Columbia University

Dennett, Raymond, and Robert K. Turner (Eds.). Documents on American Foreign Relations: Vol. VIII, July 1, 1945-December 31, 1946. Pp. xxxvii, 962. Princeton: Princeton University Press (for the World Peace Foundation), 1948. $6.00.

This eighth volume in the increasingly useful series of the World Peace Foundation maintains the high standards which previous volumes have led scholars in international affairs to expect. Its appearance was delayed because of a decision to change the time coverage from a fiscal to a calendar year basis; thus this is the first volume in the series to give a selection of the major documents in the important postwar period. Even so, the editors found the selection so difficult that they were forced to omit negotiations on the World War II treaties, and have compiled those in a separate, supplementary volume, The First Five Peace Treaties.

Since the appearance of Volume I, the 'series has kept pace remarkably well with the growing role of the United States in world politics, a process climaxed in this current volume, which almost corresponds to a general documentation on the international relations of the world as a whole. New sections have been introduced on national defense, dependent areas, and cultural relations, but otherwise the general method of organization employed previously has been followed, with appropriate changes resulting from the termination of the war.

Special interest will be attracted by the editors' plan of dealing with the numerous problems involved in United Nations activities. These have been handled functionally, each topic being grouped with other American activities of the same type. Thus the chapter on cultural relations includes materials on the American cultural exchange program, on the Fulbright Act, and on participation in the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; that on labor and social problems provides documents on the Pan American Sanitary Bureau, the World Health Organization, the UN Economic and Social Council, and the International Labor Organization. Seven chapters in fact are dominated by United Nations affairs, including one (on international peace and security) which is devoted exclusively to the UN. The utility of the material is in no way decreased by this arrangement, but the predominance of United Nations matters in this section suggests rather forcefully that a major subdivision of the collection might well be set aside for them in the reorganization of the plan of presentation which the editors promise for the next and subsequent volumes.

Oliver Benson

University of Oklahoma

Reitzel, William. The Mediterranean:

Its Role in America's Foreign Policy.

Pp. 195. New York: Harcourt, Brace

and Company, 1948. $2.75.

This is the latest volume to come from the workshop of the Yale Institute of International Studies. Mr. Reitzel more than holds his own in an excellent tradition, and his essay is to be celebrated on two counts: it is the first study of the impact of Mediterranean affairs upon the United States, and it is something of a pioneer effort to establish a framework for "structured thinking" about American foreign policy. The latter is tragically absent in most current discussion; the pattern of this analysis can and should be applied to any critical area in which the United States has become deeply involved. ". . the relations of the United States with the Mediterranean region have been without the guidance of a comprehensive and consistent purpose . . since it is the natural interest that is in question, it is desirable to attempt to define the nature of that interest and to examine the general conditions that American policy must satisfy if its participation in Mediterranean affairs is to serve and not to frustrate national aims" —such is the theme. But the author has also dealt with a significantly larger query: what things would one want to know, what questions must one try to answer in order to evaluate American policy in a particular region?

Chapters are clustered about the following topics: (1) the course of involvement from 1942 to 1948, including the basic shift from short-run military decisions to more complex, long-term political decisions; (2) the Anglo-American relationship, its problems and implications; (3) the circumstances and contradictions which have surrounded American choices; (4) the evolution of anti-Russian "uses" of the region; (5) the Mediterranean as a region of complex international politics; (6) American interests in strategic unity and internal equilibrium, and their bearing in a two-power global situation; (7) internal tensions, local demographic and economic factors affecting those interests; and (8) the form and limits of American policy.

Mr. Reitzel rightly concludes that our outlook on this region (it is equally true of other regions) must be two dimensional; on the one hand, it must be viewed as a factor in a total power picture involving Europe and the Soviet Union, and on the other, ,it is an "organic fact"—an area of human societies with different cultures and interests whose stability is undermined by long-term, disrupting social and political trends. A logical coordination of the policies which grow naturally out of this ambivalence is difficult if not impossible. The author feels that a regional policy offers the best chance for effective adjustment, which will be "unconscious" rather than planned or legislated. This study ought to provide policy makers with the basis for developing attitudinal cues for such adjustments. The reviewer resorts reluctantly to a hackneyed phrase- here is a rewarding contribution to the literature of American foreign policy

R C. Snyder

Princeton University

Harris, Seymour E. (Ed.). Foreign Economic Policy for the United States. Pp xiii, 490. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1948. $6.00 This volume is addressed primarily to the literate public, rather than to the professional economist, although it should prove useful to both. After an excellent, although rather controversial, introduction by the editor, Blaisdell and Braderman give a concise description of the various agencies of the U. S Government that deal with economic aspects of international affairs. This essay, and the introduction, constitute Part I

Part n consists of ten separate essays dealing with the international economic relations of individual countries or areas— especially as these affect the United States. The essays of Cassels (United Kingdom), Barnett (Japan), Bryce (Canada), Wallich (Latin-America), and Baran (U.S S R) are, for the most part, readable brief summaries of the international economic relations of the countries and areas concerned. As the authors are all recognized authorities in their fields the reader may repose considerable confidence in the statements of fact made The other two essays in this section—Galbraith ("Germany") and Hinshaw ("Prosperity, Depression and the British External Problem")—are somewhat more controversial than the others; this was inevitable in view of the subject matter. The reviewer would not take substantial issue with either author, but some readers might.

Four essays in Part III discuss the operation and development of international economic organizations. The first of these by Camille Gutt, Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund, discusses the policies of that organization concerning exchange rates. It tells the reader what the fund can't do and/or won't do, but not very much about what it might accomplish. The essay is an ex parte defense of the relative inactivity of the fund and, as such, must be discounted. However, the reviewer would for the most part agree with M. Gutt. The second paper by Professor A. G. B. Fisher, International Fund and Bank, now of the Research Department of the former organization, analyzes the purposes, policies, and problems of these organizations in a realistic and clear fashion which the layman should find especially helpful. The final two essays: Brown ("General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade") and Hawkins ("Problems Raised by the I.TO.") are good summaries of the steps already taken towards increasing the freedom of international trade, and of the obstacles that yet remain.

Part IV on The European Recovery Program consists of five essays. Dean E. S. Mason states very clearly the purposes and functions of the Marshall Plan. Professor Calvin B. Hoover indicates what Europe can contribute to its own economic recovery, while S. S. Alexander considers the kinds and amounts of aid Europe will need under the Marshall Plan as well as its long run economic prospects.' Kirtley Mather, a geologist, has a very interesting essay on the relation between American mineral resources of various kinds and their rate of exhaustion in comparison with world resources and the corresponding rate. The essay proceeds on the implicit assumption that it is undesirable for us to exhaust our resources of any important mineral; many economists would at least question the propriety of such an assumption. Lincoln Gordon's contribution is a summary of the "Operating Problems and Policies Under E.R.P."; this is factual and will prove to be a handy reference, but it will be rather uninteresting to the general reader.

The five essays in Part V are the most interesting section of the book for the professional economist. The common theme of these papers is the kind and extent of governmental intervention desirable to establish satisfactory patterns of international trade. Criticism or even summary is impossible in a review of this length. Suffice it to say that the contributors Haberler, Hansen, Samuelson, Triffin, and Balogh are all recognized authorities, but their essays are highly controversial and they disagree with one another on a large number of important issues. The result is an interesting discussion from which the reader emerges free to draw his own conclusions. It is amusing to note, in this connection, that the editor abandons his Olympian position and enters the fray (Introduction, pp. 31-6) in opposition to Professor Haberler. It seemed to the reviewer that Samuelson's essay was particularly cogent; but to elaborate further would merely add another opinion.

M. W. Reder , University of Pennsylvania

Wilcox, Clair A Charter for World Trade. Pp. xvii, 333. (With reader's guide and full text of the International Trade Organization Charter.) New York: The Macmillan Company, 1949. $4.50.

This is a well-organized, clear-cut exposition of the Charter for the International Trade Organization now before Congress for approval.

The author has three outstanding advantages. His early journalistic experience makes the book easy to read. His position as director of the Office of International Trade Policy (State Department), and vice cfiairman of the United States Delegation to the Habana Conference, gives him a unique insight into the arguments for and against each paragraph of the Charter. His experience as an educator and professor of economics at Swarthmore gives him a broad historical view of previous efforts to prevent trade discriminations from impoverishing some nations and driving others to autarky, economic warfare, and shooting war.

In the Foreword, William L. Clayton, formerly Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, says. "The Charter makes the first attempt in history to ap- ply uniform principles of fair dealing to the international trade of private enterprise and public enterprise. . For the first time in history, it asks all nations to commit themselves, in a single document, to a policy of nondiscrimination in their customs charges and requirements and in their internal taxation and regulation."

The Charter is presented as the culmination of an American enterprise which began in the declaration of policy made in the Atlantic Charter in 1941, and in Article VII of the Lend-Lease Agreements of 1942. Fifty-odd nations, meeting at Ha- bana, Cuba, in 1948, wrote the final draft at the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment. The International Trade Organization is designed as a specialized agency of the United Nations on the same level as the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

Many well-wishers thought it would be impossible to obtain agreement among negotiators from such diverse economic and political systems. Representatives of thirty undeveloped nations opened the Habana Conference with a chorus of denunciation against the proposed Charter. They asserted that it served the interests of the great industrial states and held out no hope for the development of backward states. Some eight hundred amendments were presented, among them as many as two hundred that would have destroyed the very foundation of the enterprise. These issues were resolved, after a prolonged deadlock, by a series of compromises which preserved basic principles but permitted exceptions under specified conditions and subject to numerous safeguards. The chapter of this book on "Commitments and Escapes" is therefore of great importance.

The final result was the writing into a single document not one agreement but six —one on trade policy, one on economic development, one on commodity agreements, one on employment, one on international investments, and the constitution of the new United Nations agency in the field of international trade.

Some difficult international economic questions are settled, at least in principle, which have been beyond the reach of any government or combination of governments.

The Executive Board is a kind of Supreme Court of Trade to which appeals can be made by any member who considers that some benefit promised by the Charter is being impaired by another member. After various intermediate steps of investigation, arbitration, and recommendation, if no solution appears, the complaining member may be released from certain obligations toward the offending member Provision is made for an appeal from the Executive Board, which is weighted in favor of the nations of chief economic importance, to the conference composed on ■the basis of one nation, one vote. Russia is completely out and took no apparent interest in the proceedings

The National Association of Manufacturers opposes the Charter. The reader will determine what weight should be given to this association's specific objections and whether some of them emanate from a nostalgic desire to return to the "good old days" when each manufacturing interest wrote its own tariff schedule.

One NAM objection is that "the Charter makes the world safe for socialistic planning" and "gives national economic planning the right of way over the requirements of an orderly world economy." This seems to imply that the United States negotiators should have refused to recognize that many other countries are organized differently from the United States. Our negotiators did not endorse any other economic or trading system, but rightly thought that their function was not to attempt to change any system, but to find ways in which every kind of system could exchange more goods with every other kind. They realized that any practical charter must be for the world as it is, with all its varieties, shades, and degrees of governmental control. They realized that the likelihood was no greater that other countries would sign a charter to alter their respective economic systems than that Congress would do so. Only armies of occupation could achieve the uniformity in economic systems which the NAM implies the Charter should have attempted.

Another NAM objection is that "the Charter leaves the door wide open to cartels, monopolies, and commodity agreements." This assertion obscures the essential fact that this Charter takes the first step ever made toward any international control of cartels and monopolies The Sherman Antitrust Act did not abohsh trusts overnight in the United States. Neither this nor any other Charter could do so for the world. All any charter could offer is a gradual approach toward an ultimate end.

On many such questions Dr Wilcox throws light, especially needed at a time when opposition by such groups as the NAM makes doubtful the approval of the Charter by Congress. Even the best-informed readers will realize more fully the close interrelationship of the Charter to such other fundamental American peace policies as the European Recovery Program, to the integration of the resources of the states of western Europe, and to the North Atlantic Treaty. In this framework the Charter will be seen both as an essential economic approach to any wider political federation and as a much-needed supplement to the United Nations.

Otto Tod Mallery

Philadelphia, Pa.

Smith, R. Elberton. Customs Valuation tn the Umted States. Pp. xv, 380. University of Chicago Press, 1948. $7.50. This is a book about the realities of tariff practices. In a brief review it is not possible to do justice to it. It is detailed and scholarly. It is an expansion of a doctoral dissertation, but is easy to read in spite of its technical character.

"With rates of duty fixed by statute, valuation becomes the practically significant variable upon which actual duties depend. . . . What begins as the opinion of an administrator often ends as 'the will of Congress.' . . . Customs valuation in the United States is a branch of tariff administration unique in the multiplicity of ways in which it may actually or potentially contribute to tariff protection. . . . It may operate directly to increase tariff levies. In addition, it has exhibited at one time or another virtually all types of procedural barrier associated with administrative protection. These have included burdensome requirements . . . and a complex of minor legal and equitable anomalies which m some instances have provoked more irritation and antipathy than the major exactions." In some instances valuation methods conceal from the public the actual degree of protection.

More than a hundred pages are devoted to a careful tracing of the history of valuation methods employed by United States customs administration. Approximately 175 pages are devoted to contemporary valuation law and procedure. There is an extensive bibliography, a table of cases, an index of names, and an index of subjects.

The proposals for valuation reform are pertment and sound. To mention only one or two. "Specific purchase price is the most satisfactory 'ideal' form of dutiable valuation. . . . The satisfactoriness of an alternative basis must be judged largely in terms of its approximation to the actual prices paid by importers for their merchandise. ... [If it is necessary to perpetuate public ignorance] the least that can be done is to adjust rates and to narrow the class limits of value brackets to the point where rough proportionality of taxation obtains for all value classes of a given kind of merchandise. There will always be inevitable injustice in the administration of even the hypothetically most perfect tariff law, but there is no necessity for the perpetuation of manifest and remediable absurdity."

H. R. Enslow

Albany, New York

Cortney, Philip. The Economic Munich.

Pp. xx, 262. New York: Philosophical

Library, 1949. $3.75.

This book consists, in the main, of reprints of a number of articles, written between 1944 and 1948, in which the author sets forth his opinion concerning the cause of the depression of the 'thirties and criticizes certain views which he attributes to the late Lord Keynes. The depression, it is argued, could have been prevented if the dollar had been devalued in 1925. It was caused by the policy of credit expansion adopted by the Federal Reserve authorities between 1926 and 1929 Responsibility for this policy is laid, surprisingly, at the door of Keynes.

These articles are followed by an exchange of letters in which Keynes says that the result of Cortney's writings "is to produce a story very remote indeed from what is my actual position and purpose." Cortney invites Keynes to write an article clarifying his views, and Keynes replies, politely, that he is too busy to do so. This reply, says Cortney, "proves beyond doubt that Lord Keynes agreed . . . with my opinion on the origin of the wrong thinking which was the fundamental cause of our great troubles."

The title of the book is intended as a characterization of the Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization. But no attempt is made to analyze or even to describe any of the major provisions of that document. Two paragraphs are criticized; four hundred others are ignored. Mr. Cortney argues that a commitment to "take action designed to achieve and maintain full and productive employment" would obligate the United States to pursue a policy of monetary inflation. And he objects to a provision, in an article permitting nations to impose import quotas to protect monetary reserves, that denies the ITO authority to require that relevant domestic policies be modified.

The first of these criticisms is without substance. There is nothing in the charter that would enable the ITO or any of its members to force inflationary policies on the United States The second criticism has more force. The charter would be stronger if it conferred upon the ITO authority to require the modification of internal policies that might operate to produce imbalance in external relationships. But the day when nations will be prepared* to surrender economic sovereignty to an international organization has not yet arrived. As a matter of economics, Mr. Cortney's objection is sound. As a matter of practical politics, it is a product of the ivory tower.

The author asserts, in his Preface, that "the ideas or doctrines underlying many objectionable provisions of the ITO Charter are the aftermath of Keynes's teachings and, perhaps even more so, of its distortions by zealots, ignorants, clever politicians or 'do gooders.'" Aside from this sentence, the two parts of the book appear to be held together by little more than the binding.

Clair Wilcox

Swarthmore College

Black, John D., and Maxine E. Kiefer Future Food and Agriculture Policy: A Program for the Next Ten Years. Pp. viii, 348. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1948. $3.50. "This is a book on the food and agricultural problems that face the United States and the world in the next ten years. Its orientation is primarily that of the United States, but it includes other countries because they have the same problems and much of the time are part of the same problem." Thus do the authors state their purpose in the opening sentences of the foreward. In little more than three hundred pages of stimulating and challenging discussion they come surprisingly near to carrying out that ambitious assignment

So packed is this small volume with pertinent facts and challenging analyses that a brief review, such as this, cannot even list fully the content, much less deal with it critically or in detail. The first section, entitled "The Situation in 1947," brings the reader up to date on food production and consumption in the United States since 1935, and discusses the dietary situation in relation to widely accepted criteria of adequacy.

Part H,» entitled "Parts of the Problem," contains eleven short chapters, among them such titles as Food and Population, Instability in Agriculture, The Food Needs of the United States, Food the United States Could Produce, and so on. To the economist, and perhaps to the lay reader as well, this is the section that will prove most stimulating. Few will agree with aU of it, but all will find their thinking brought into sharper focus, and will profit by this condensed summary of analyses that have been taking shape in the thinking of the senior author over a period of thirty years or more; observations that have grown out of an almost unique opportunity for close contact with nearly all facets of the problem in one of the most dynamic periods in our history. Many of the ideas have appeared in earlier writings of the senior author, but nowhere has he attempted so broad an integration of them.

The last two sections, on "Programs" and "The Execution of Programs," deal with possible ways of implementing policies implied in the earlier sections. Here the grounds for disagreement are far more numerous, and many groups, especially those which have been prominent in formulating farm legislation in recent years, will be less willing to accept the conclusions arrived at. Whether they do or not they will find much food for thought in these all too briefly developed chapters, and will know more about the subject after reading Future Food and Agriculture Policy.

M R. Benedict University of California

Baer, Julius B., and Olin Glenn Saxon. Commodity Exchanges and Futures Trading Pp. xii, 324. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1949. $5.00. This is a revision of the book by Mr. Baer and George P. Woodruff first published in 1929 under the title Commodity Exchanges Like the earlier edition, it presents a clear, well-written description of the mechanics of futures trading on the American exchanges, and a good summary of the law governing futures trading in this country Beyond this, it has little to offer the serious student. Its historical sections are sketchy and not always to the point, its economic analysis is fragmentary and often superficial, and it entirely omits some very important topics.

For example, from reading this book alone one would never learn that twenty years of depression, revolution, and war have suspended if not destroyed all the free or nearly free international markets in agricultural staples in which commodity exchanges used to play a central part. He would have no inkling that one needs to analyze with great care the effects of these changes upon the economic rol6 of the speculator, the social distribution of risk, and the social location of the task of establishing prices. The authors merely mention in passing that the great exchanges of England and Canada have been eliminated by government fiat.

Utterly inexcusable is the failure of the authors to collect and use even for simple description the research materials readily available to them on the work of exchanges in the United States. They would have had to search very little in order to discover worth-while additions to the scant ten or so titles they list for the years since the big crash of 1929. There is no reason at all why their statistics on the volume of trading should be limited to one table covering the years 1871 to 1897, or why their statistics on prices should be limited to a photograph of a newspaper report on prices for one day and a few scattered tables having to do chiefly with the period prior to 1915.

Reavis Cox University of Pennsylvania

Clark, John M. Guideposts in Time of Change: Some Essentials for a Sound American Economy. Pp. x, 210. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1949. $3.00. "Guideposts in Time of Change" is the title given to a series of lectures delivered by Professor Clark at Amherst College. The lectures treat of such subjects as the totalitarian threat and the objectives of our own economy, including that of maintaining high level employment.

In discussing the threat of totalitarianism, Professor Clark indicates that he is speaking of its threat to personal freedom and democracy. We must frankly face the defects in our own economic system and defend not the status quo but the right to make changes by democratic methods. The Soviets, under guise of an ultimate goal of universal salvation, would systematically wipe out both truth and humanity.

Professor Clark emphasizes that in this conflict between the East and the West we must eschew appeasement, must continue to give support to the United Nations, must continue to rehabilitate Western Europe, including Western Germany. We must convince the Russians that the West is too strong to collapse or be captured and that, from the point of view of their

own interests, they should abandon aggressive conflict.

The remaining lectures are devoted to the conditions necessary to achieve the all-important objective of a "good and healthy" American people, exercising and developing their capacities to the fullest possible extent. The most difficult problem in attaining this goal is to provide the assurance of an adequate number of jobs. This, Professor Clark states, can be accomplished only if the total volume of spending is equal to the income the economy creates and if the level and structure of costs and prices are such that spending will generate real production and employment and not inflation.

As an important means of maintaining high level demand, Professor Clark favors a system of flexible public revenues. He is skeptical, overly so in the opinion of the reviewer, of the practicability of general credit controls and advocates control that is "wisely selective." Basically Professor Clark is more concerned with the threat of stagnation than that of inflation (except in its extreme form) and accepts the Key- nesian premise that a slow long-term upward drift in prices is advantageous.

In his treatment of the important problem of prices and costs, Professor Clark raises the question whether changes in the bargaining position of certain groups, particularly of labor, make for a different pattern of prices. Professor Clark emphasizes that increased average real wages for the whole economy must depend upon increased average productivity.

Professor Clark concludes his lectures by pointing out that the role of the economist, a specialist in certain kinds of cause and effect relationships, in finding solutions to these problems must of necessity be a narrow one. No one can prescribe a program for the whole structure of society. Democratic solutions must grow and not be imposed. "Democracy is living dangerously, and if it is saved today it must be saved again tomorrow."

B. H. Beckhart

Columbia University

White, Leonard D. Introduction to the Study of Public Administration. (Third

ed.) Pp. xvi, 612. New York: The

Macmillan Company, 1948. $5.75.

The third edition of Professor White's textbook has been greatly improved in both emphasis and style. As a balanced treatment of the subject, it is now a much better book than were the earlier editions, published in 1926 and 1939.

This latest edition omits certain materials of a more or less technical nature, such as the chapters on administrative areas, treasury management, employee compensation, and retirement systems. A new section has been added on the dynamics of management, which lends weight to the whole treatment. It deals with leadership, planning, co-ordination, public relations, and organization and methods of work. Some chapters, particularly the first two, have been rewritten; others have been extensively revised to remove unnecessary details and to bring them up to date.

The general framework of the book now deals essentially with five important elements of public administration. These are structure and organization, dynamics of management, fiscal management, personnel management, and administrative powers. By far the lengthiest treatment is still given to personnel management, in which the author has had official experience and is primarily interested. However, the other elements appear to be adequately discussed from the standpoint of public administration.

Aside from footnote references, the volume is without a bibliography The author points out that bibliographical materials on public administration are now easily available to students, and that such materials are kept currently up to date.

Although Professor White's book is intended for college use, the general reader interested in public administration will find it easy to follow and quite instructive.

A. E. Buck Institute of Public Administration New York, N. Y.

Hopkins, William Stephen. Labor in the American Economy. Pp. xi, 368. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1948. $3.50.

Texts on labor problems tend to become so long and encyclopedic that beginning students cannot read them, or cannot see the forest for the trees. Professor Hopkins, who is also director of the Institute of Labor Economics at the University of Washington, therefore set out to write a shorter account that would describe, analyze, and "give some clue as to the meaning of it all" The result is an excellent book for any reader: highly informative— despite exclusion of much detail commonly associated with such studies; sympathetic to labor but not partisan; temperate; shrewd; and written in an exceptionally readable style

Part One, on employment and unemployment, wages, hours, and working conditions, treats of problems that are common to all labor, organized or not Part Two deals with collective bargaining—its background, the structure and philosophy of American unions, employer and union combat weapons, collective bargaining dynamics, the labor-management agreement (a most useful chapter), and the process of living under and renewing agreements In a brief Part Three the author examines the nature of the public interest in labor- management relations and advances some general conclusions on national labor policy Appendices—there are also lists of readings and an index—present texts of the Employment Act of 1946, the Wagner Act, the Taft-Hartley Act (which the author deplores. "The job of government is not to conduct the details of labor-management relations but to remove the obstacles that interfere with the normal course of free collective bargaining"), and President Truman's Taft-Hartley veto message.

The labor field is vast, and no one, of course, will agree with every one of the author's judgments on the issues This reviewer, for example, feels that Professor Hopkins, while rightly regarding full employment as basic, has accepted some erroneous views about the problem of maintaining it. notably, the view that an increasing rate of investment is essential, the view that the proper fiscal policy will necessarily balance the Federal budget over the cycle, and the view that we are still far from able, under our democratic, individualistic system, to assure job opportunity to everyone able and seeking to work.

This book in any case sets a high standard. Not only college students but also all those who find today's labor news unintelligible—not to speak of many a self- accredited expert on the subject—would benefit by reading it.

John H. G Pierson Department of Labor Washington, D. C.

Mills, C. Wright. The New Men of Power• America's Labor Leaders Pp. 323 New York Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1948. $3 50.

America's leaders of labor—who they are, what they think, what they are doing for the country—on the subject matter of this popularly written and readable monograph by Dr. Mills

The study constitutes the third report by the author dealing with the characteristics of American labor leaders, and is based on materials gathered m answer to questionnaires sent out by the author in 1946, together with other information compiled from a wide assortment of sources ranging from Fortune and Labor and Nation to The Sixteenth Census of the U. S 1940.

In easy-reading style (there are no footnotes, and the statistical tabulations are informal and abbreviated) a general description of current American labor leaders is presented. Types of background of these men are suggested by examining such circumstances as the origins of the fathers of the leaders, their own birthplaces, the amount of their educational training, and the sources of origin of their own union careers.

One section of the book deals with the matter of incomes; another with questions relating to the political, economic, and social philosophies of labor leaders "Sixty- six per cent of the presidents of 62 international unions . . . received less than $9,500 a year [in 1944]; 50 per cent of these received between $4,500 and $9,499. ... 37 per cent of the AFL [presidents] and 24 per cent of the CIO receive over $9,500" (p. 100). But most of the local union officers, as well as many officers of nationals and internationals, receive little more than skilled workmen and foremen "The local labor leader is usually ideologically interested in his job or ambitious about the status and influence it affords him among his ex-coworkers" (p. 101).

The stands of leaders of labor on such important questions as racketeering and Communism are also briefly described. Most leaders oppose Communism for any one or more of several reasons: (1) the labor leader may be against the Communist Party ideology; (2) he may fear the Communists¹ successful overthrow of his rule of the union; or (3) he may believe that Communist members are bad for public relations. Thus most labor leaders within the Congress of Industrial Organizations have fought bitterly to cleanse the ranks of the Congress; those in the American Federation of Labor have succeeded in keeping out most of the Communists from the start.

The book closes with a brief discussion of alternative courses of action. To the right or to the left—that is the question. There is, however, as the author sees it, little room in the ranks of labor leaders for conservatism. "As the right focuses its program upon the business leader and makes its demands of the business community, so the left focuses upon the labor leader and makes its demands of the laboring community. . . . The left would establish a society in which everyone vitally affected by a social decision, regardless of its sphere, would have a voice in that decision and a hand in its administration. To so democratize modern society, to rebuild it upon the principles of immediate freedom and security, requires that the main drift be stopped, that society be rid of its increasingly managed movement through slump and war" (p. 252).

This is the job of the labor leaders and their unions.

In spite of its generalities and informalities, this book is informative and provocative, and should be especially helpful to those members of the great American public who are either dealing with labor leaders or uho are themselves the leaders.

Paul A. Dodd

University of California

Dankert, Clyde E. Contemporary Unionism in the United States. Pp. xv, 521

New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1948.

$6.65.

This is a study of the present-day labor movement, with enough historical material to make the current activities of unionism understandable. There is treatment of union structure, government, and administration; principles and activities of the American Federation of Labor and the Congress of Industrial Organizations; collective bargaining and strikes; union leadership and union-management cooperation. Dankert relies heavily for his data on Bureau of Labor Statistics reports and studies by academic specialists. He has read widely in the literature, his treatment is generally objective and balanced, and the book is well organized and well written.

Dankert believes that unionism has contributed substantially to the noneconomic welfare of the nation; as to its economic effect he sees both favorable and unfavorable influences, suggesting that the net effect is favorable. He is opposed to the closed shop and .thinks that the union shop and even maintenance-of-membership involve some evil, but less than would result from their outlawry. The growing tendency toward union involvement in political action, he holds, increases the dependency of workers on the state. This is good up to a point, but beyond that "individual initiative is seriously decreased and individual freedom seriously endangered" (p. 465).

Occasionally the material presented is out of date. It is something of a surprise to read in a 1948 publication that, in most cases where union constitutions determine strike benefits, the amount is between $5 and $10 weekly, and that the "Photo Engravers' Union . . . pays its journeymen members who are on strike $25 a week This is probably as high as any union goes" (p. 403). The explanation, of course, is that strike benefits, like almost everything else, have risen sharply since the study on which Dankert relied was published in 1936.

Some of Dankert's terminology is subject to criticism. Thus he uses the phrase "independent company unions" to describe unaffiliated unions limited to single plants. Again, he lists as a type of general strike (p. 393) "one which, although confined to a single industry, covers more than one employer and possibly more than one city." Far less excusable is his treatment of the sympathetic strike, which he confuses with the secondary boycott (p. 394).

The text is marred by a number of minor errors that a more careful reading of proof would have eliminated. Thus Eugene Debs is described (p. 147) as the perennial presidential candidate of the Socialist Labor Party, and names of labor leaders and authors are occasionally given incorrectly.

Despite these blemishes the volume is not without merit. A little more care and a little better judgment, however, would have made it a far more useful addition to labor relations literature

Joel Seidman

University of Chicago

Reynolds, Lloyd G., and Joseph Shister.

Job Horizons: A Study of Job Satisfaction and Labor Mobility. Pp. x, 102.

New York: Harper and Brothers, 1949

$2.25.

The major purpose of the authors' research at the Yale Labor and Management Center has been "to develop principles of human behavior in terms of observed cause and effect relationships." This book summarizes the authors' exploration of the structure and dynamics of the labor market in a New England middle-sized industrial community. It describes their tentative findings regarding factors of labor mobility which reside in the workers' adjustment and reaction to their jobs

Main factors considered in the interviews conducted in two sample groups are summarized as follows: physical characteristics of the job, worker independence and opportunities for control in his joB situation, wages, fairness of treatment (other than wage considerations), job interest, relationships with fellow workers, steadiness of employment, fringe payments (group insurance, pensions, etc), old age, satisfaction with previous jobs regardless of departure for a better one, and others.

Job Horizons exposes the mistaken rigidity with which economic theory is often applied to a worker's determination of the kind of job he desires to hold. The assumption, for example, that a worker constantly keeps his eyes peeled for a generally "superior" job in another plant and will immediately move to it, once he discovers it, is challenged by the replies. As one respondent put it, "A man who is happily married doesn't keep comparing his wife with every girl he meets on the street."

Economic theory also often assumes that the worker, when faced with employment alternatives, makes concrete comparisons between the characteristics of available jobs. To balance advantages over disadvantages in a job selection problem is a perfectly natural process But, for the individual, it can seldom be one of scientific definition and statistical interpretation of all factors involved. His degree of dissatisfaction with the job he currently occupies, his felt prospects for a more desirable job should he suddenly depart from a current position or refuse to accept one newly offered him, his age, his health, and his seniority represent some of the examples of vague and spontaneous evaluation which this study uncovers.

Unfortunately little attention is paid to the workers themselves. Sole preoccupation with job characteristics invites a mistaken assumption of their uniform evaluation. Thus the reader might overlook the personality of the worker as having little or nothing to do with the manner in which he reacts to the characteristics of a given job situation. This limitation prevents the study from drawing adequate conclusions regarding the effect of the less explored characteristics of employer-employee relationship (status and prestige, for example) upon job mobility.

This reviewer feels that certain of the authors' concepts respecting anticipated expressions of worker behavior partially stereotype the interpretation of these findings This is perhaps necessitated by the authors' avowal of "preliminary trends" and a "report to the public" psychology. This objection is partly alleviated by a short informative appendix on methodology. Any final evaluation of these findings and their utility to the social sciences must await the completion of this study.

Robert C. Sorensen University of Nebraska College of Law

Twentieth Century Fund Partners in Production—A Basis for Labor-Management Understanding. Pp. ix, 149. New York, 1949. $1.50.

This study is the sixth in a series of the Twentieth Century Fund, in the field of collective bargaining. It undertakes an ambitious task, to ". . . help unions and employers solve the pressing problem of how better to work together for their own welfare and the public good" (p. 4). It thus attempts to reach out and formulate a new philosophy of labor-management relations acceptable to both.

With this aim, the Twentieth Century Labor Committee, consisting, among others, of William H. Davis, Sumner H. Slichter, and Edwin E. Witte, sets out to examine the goals of labor and management and to study their attitudes in order to grasp in an inclusive way their mutual relations. The study presents a thoughtful and well balanced digest of the recently growing literature aiming at a better understanding of labor-management problems.

The report finds evidence of recent trends toward greater success in collective bargaining, which supposedly indicates a new era in this field of human relationships. Doctrines that preach class struggle and the inherent conflict between employers and their employees are being replaced by theories that connote common interests between the two groups. There persist, according to the study, some inherent conflicts. But recent experience has shown that these will remain with us in our imperfect world. The promised conflict-free lands, whether they be socialist England or communist Russia, have failed to solve frictions between employer and workers. The miners of England have discovered to their chagrin that under socialization of the mines their new bosses are not fellow workers familiar with their personal problems, but a remote impersonal National Coal Board, as far removed from the workers as any management ever was. As for Russia, Lenin instructed his disciples as early as 1919 to try "every scientific and progressive suggestion of the Taylor System." Nevertheless, the Twentieth Century Labor Committee looks hopefully toward the future development of an expanding area of community of interests resulting from success in solving common problems This will lead to better mutual understanding and respect for opposing interests upon which the foundations of peaceful industrial relations within a democracy are established The conclusiveness of the data gathered in Partners of Production will undoubtedly be questioned. It would appear that too much importance is ascribed to isolated experiences of companies and unions. Also, heavy reliance is placed upon opinion polls. The reviewer does not want to add to the recently overdone discrediting of data obtained through sampling techniques, but the acknowledged weakness of attitude polls in failing to recognize and measure intensity of feelings cannot be overlooked in connection with this study, since it seems to accept the polls' results without any reservations

But even if the validity of the findings of the study were granted, the applicability of its conclusion might still be challenged The report was written against a background of several years of full employment and high profits. The climate of opinion created by such favorable conditions may have accounted for the basic, almost mystic, faith of the Twentieth Century Fund Labor Committee in the "ingenuity and good will of fellow Americans" to bring about the desired industrial peace The question arises whether this will suffice when leaner years come upon us. Only history will tell whether the optimism suggested by this eminent committee will be justified should darker days descend upon the American economy.

Sar A. Leyitan

Sampson College

Spero, Sterling D. Government as Employer. Pp. ix, 497. New York: Rem- sen Press, 1948. $5 65,

In this exceedingly useful and timely book, the author, who is well known because of his previous contributions to the field of unionism in government service, provides students and practitioners in public and private administration and labor relations with a veritable mine of information on the nature and extent of unionization in public employment, the history, policies, and activities of particular unions of government workers, and the policies and attitudes of government employers as they are found in statutes, Executive orders, judicial decisions, and administrative rules and practices. ^J

Dr. Spero begins the volume with thoughtful and generously illustrated discussions of three basic problems, namely: government as the sovereign employer, the legal right to organize and strike, and political activity and neutrality. The current issue of loyalty investigations in the Federal service is treated as a part of the last of these three chapters. Part II, which constitutes something over one-half of the book, is devoted largely to an account of unionization among certain groups of government workers, such as the postal employees, white-collar workers, policemen and firemen, and teachers. The third and final portion of the book returns to a discussion of important issues such as collective bargaining, the closed shop, arbitration, and wage policies. Occasional references to foreign experience, principally Canadian, British, and French, are interspersed throughout.

The author, though obviously sympathetic toward the organization of public employees, presents a well-balanced treatment of his subject. He seldom attempts positive conclusions on controversial issues. Rather, he is content to marshal evidence and to point out alternative measures. He takes the view that employer-employee relations in government service should be approached on an experiential basis, and that it is essential to the security of both government and the worker that there be a great deal of mutual trust and give and take.

Noticeably lacking in the book is any substantial treatment of or reasoned conclusions concerning the impact and significance of the civil service system in relation to unionism and union activities in the public service. A fairly complete index adds to the usefulness of the volume There is no bibliography, but the reader will find a limited number of footnote references in each chapter. This latest of Dr Spero's contributions on the subject of the organization of government employees will be welcomed by all who are in any way concerned with the problems with which he deals.

Lloyd M. Short University of Minnesota

Planty, Earl G., William S. McCord, and Carlos A. Efferson. Training Employees and Managers for Production and Teamwork. Pp. xiii, 278. New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1948. $5 00.

The authors have produced a comprehensive and quite—almost Teutonically— detailed handbook on industrial training. The content is divided into three parts: (I) Training—What It Is and What It Does; (II) Organizing, Installing, and Administering a Training Program; and (III) Teaching and the Training Program Part I summarizes the objectives, breadth, and significance of the field. Part II deals with the organization and administration of training and is designed to aid* in setting up a training department, selecting and training a staff, and planning a program. Part III is devoted to a detailed statement of programs and methods.

One of the authors' major contributions is their exposition of the breadth, scope, and significance of industrial training (which they regard as synonymous with education). They emphasize the fact that there is much more to training than simple instruction in job skills. In training they see an opportunity to bridge the gap between workers and management by using it as a vehicle of communication to provide each with a better understanding of the other's problems. They have also incorporated a very worth-while discussion of the problem of the place and qualifications of the Ihstructor in industrial training.

The major weakness of the book is a considerable tendency to offer training as a universal panacea. Granting that there is tremendous room for improvement in

the applications of training industry, the promised "tangible results of training" seem a trifle optimistic. While training can undoubtedly make contributions in such areas as the "reduction of absenteeism and labor turnover" and the "encouragement of upgrading within the company," many other personnel procedures can also be expected to make considerable contributions This optimism is also found in the authors' statement of the "aim of training" Here they feel that, in addition to the development of knowledge and skills, much can be done in the development of better employee attitudes. While it is undeniable that attitudes can be improved, there is real reason to doubt that very radical changes can be induced. For example, the authors cite "sympathy with company problems and a desire to help" as attitudes to be developed. It is nice to establish this as a goal; how practical it is is another matter.

The same tendency expresses itself in the authors' conviction that "the first and most essential qualification for an industrial teacher is training in teaching, evidenced by a degree in education or at least by courses in teaching methods, curriculum construction, educational administration, * psychology of learning, etc." While a background of this character is doubtless helpful, its importance seems a little exaggerated. Too many persons with academic qualifications of this type are daily demonstrating their incapacity to teach.

The book also illustrates admirably the phenomenon of proliferation or "empire building" in an organization. By this is meant the extent to which one narrow phase of a function, in this case training in the larger framework of personnel administration, can develop disproportionately When this occurs, there is danger that other equally important functions may become dwarfed or be seen by management in improper perspective The authors illustrate this when they describe the status and scope of activity of one type of training director with whom they are clearly in sympathy. Of him they say "Training Director E is one of the most important men on the staff. His position is strategic, inasmuch as he and his assistants make more contacts with more workers of all levels than most of the other men combined. Training Director E knows that top management needs an intelligent ear and a wise interpreter and that it will pay high in status and backing for these qualities. He and his men can be the first to find and to start correction of faults in organization structure, potential and actual grievances and personality clashes among employees and executives He sees that in exercising his training functions, he can help top management in co-ordmating ^departments and key men Consequentlyr"he takes advantage of his peculiar position to aid the manager, the superintendent, and staff men in research, sales, costs, legal and other divisions." This is fine for the training director, but is it not possible that the line executives may misinterpret his actions and feel that he is not only usurping the personnel director's functions but also some of theirs as well? Such a situation often creates antagonism and may be costly to the acceptance, effectiveness, and prestige of the training department It is significant in this connection that no mention of the costs of such a department is made. These are apparently not regarded as important.

For anyone administering a training department, the book will be invaluable because it contains much material which will be extremely useful. It will also have considerable worth as a reference book for college courses It provides what is probably the most thorough and detailed treatment of the subject that has appeared to date Much case material has been included, together with a bibliography

Anyone interested in the field of industrial training, including executives, will profit from reading the book.

Robert N. McMurry

Chicago

Merrill, Harwood F. (Ed.) The Responsibilities of Business Leadership. Pp. 93. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1948. $2 SO. The leadership of American capitalism in recent years has passed from the banker to the industrialist In view of this change, the above study has particular significance.

It contains the statements of a group composed mainly of prominent businessmen. In their respective companies these industrialists have developed policies which have considered corporate responsibilities not only to stockholders, but also to employees and to the general pubhc. The statements of these business leaders, together with the introduction by Dean David, the chapter by Senator Flanders, and the closing section by Allen Dulles, constitute a pronouncement setting forth a high standard of social ethics for industrial capitalism.

Such a statement is particularly important for the stern testing period into which American capitalism is now entering. The book should particularly be must reading for those industrial leaders who regard such a period as an opportunity for returning to the corporate practices of the nineteenth century. The authors of this volume maintain that we must not go back, but must move forward to a new era which will seek not only regularity of profit but also steadiness of employment and equity for the consumer.

There are some statements which will be challenged by the reader One writer, probably influenced by the nostalgia of a past era, writes, "our system is based on the faith announced by Adam Smith that, in the sum total, selfish interests work together for the general good" (p. 38). Turning from economic theory to economic practice, one must have serious doubts about the recommendation "that every employee should be helped and given the chance to become a capitalist" (p. 23). The unhappy experience with employee stock ownership during the late 1920's fails to support this recommendation. These are but minor limitations in a sincere and timely pronouncement of business statesmanship.

George W Edwards College of the City of New York

Myint, Hla. Theories of Welfare Economics. Pp. xiii, 240. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1948 $4.00 The only field of economic theory which appears to have made significant progress during the war years is welfare economics, - and it was probably inevitable that doctoral dissertations of two sorts should now begin to appear: one trying to synthesize the recent developments, and the other reexamining earlier work in the field in light of recent studies. Melvin W. Reder's Studies in the Theory of Welfare Economics, which scarcely considers any work more than ten years old, is an example of the first, and Myint's book, which recognizes recent studies only in an occasional footnote, represents the second.

Theories of Welfare Economics is a publication of the London School of Economics and had its genesis in a doctoral thesis written under the supervision of F. A. Hayek. Myint appears to be a disciple as well as a student of Hayek, each reference to the master indicating complete approval, e.g.. "Prof. Hayek's criticism is deadly" (p. 175); "Recently Prof. Hayek has given us a vigorous criticism . . ." (p. 203); ". . . we may again recall Prof. Hayek's fundamental argument . . ." (p. 223). To those familiar with the work of Hayek, this indicates the tone of Myint's study.

Part I, "Physical Level," surveys the welfare analysis of the classical economists to John Stuart Mill. These writers are represented as conceiving the central economic problem to be a struggle between man and Nature, and they assumed that economic welfare was proportional to quantities of physical product.

Part II, "Subjective Level," "covers most of the modern theories of welfare economics" (p. xii), considering the Pa- retian theory of the general optimum, the Marshallian partial surplus analysis, and the Pigovian marginal social product analysis These writers, according to Myint, assumed economic welfare to be proportional to quantities of satisfaction of given and constant individuals' wants.

Part III, "Ethical Level," considers particularly the work of F. H. Knight and J. M. Clark, who were critical of the narrower welfare economics with its ethically neutral point of view and who argued for a broader social welfare analysis at the ethical level.

Myint concludes that "these three levels of welfare analysis are not competitive but complementary. . . . The important thing is to be perfectly clear about the level of our analysis at which we are conducting our argument and about its possibilities and limitations" (p. 229).

The reader is almost certain to agree with Myint that much of his book is "uncommonly like a tour round a dilapidated old building" (p. 83). It is likely to be of greater interest to the historian of economic thought than to the theorist, though Myint considers it not to be "merely an historical study." One is left with the impression that if welfare economics is to be "useful for the purpose of practical economic policy," the economist must be equipped with more than a proficiency with mathematical techniques and a statement of the problem; but the reader will probably not be convinced that what has yet been done in this field is likely to influence policy makers in the real world of pressure groups and conflicting ideologies Clark Lee Allen

Duke University

Ranulf, Svend On the Survival Chances

of Democracy. Pp. 60 Copenhagen,

Denmark* Ejnar Munksgaard, 1948.

The problem which the author has chosen to consider is that of "how to rescue democracy and to avoid totalitarianism, or at least to avoid the most objectionable aspects of totalitarianism, such as concentration camps." But we are, in part, told nothing about democracy's survival chances; it is suggested rather that prior to such an evolution we should construct at least four "indices of fascism," originally proposed by Gerard De Gr6. The indices should measure (1) racialism, (2) tribalism, (3) fiihrerism, and (4) statism. But the author even doubts the practical feasibility of this project, for if there are "narrow limits to the freedom of social scientific research under totalitarian regimes, there are also limits to this freedom in democracy."

Now, it would seem to make a difference whether we are interested in rescuing democracy or in avoiding the excesses of totalitarianism. This ambiguity in objective renders the argument difficult to follow. And the difficulty is not decreased by the absence of clear definitions as to what is meant by "democracy," "fascism," and "totalitarianism." Indeed, the inclusion of "racialism" among the "fascist indices" leaves some doubts as to the "totalitarian" character of communism, for "fascism" and "totalitarianism" seem to be used interchangeably. But even supposing that freedom of research be great enough to place no restriction on the construction of "fascist indices" and that we had "statistical techniques for determining the relative frequencies and intensities" of such indices, it is difficult to see how we should be in a position to determine the survival chances of democracy. Even less should we be able, as the author claims, to decide "to what extent Hayek is right in assuming that all the various aspects of totalitarianism are causally interconnected." Statistical techniques are aids to, not substitutes for, serious social analyses.

The lack of theoretical stringency should not be permitted to overshadow the real merits of this essay. It gives valuable indications of the post-occupation Danish mentality. And a suggestive section draws a plausible parallel between the ethos of National Socialism and that of the Danish resistance movement.

John Lindberg

Princeton University

Kallen, Horace M The Liberal Spirit.

Pp. vii, 242. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1948. $3 00.

"The problem of our generation," says the author of this important book, "is clearly to discern what freedom is and so to reorganize its ways and works as to bring them to dominance beyond all fear of overthrow." To which this reviewer is impelled to add: "And the nine studies which the book comprises shed a searching light on the meaning of freedom and indicate various practical steps whereby this meaning may be translated into individual and group actuality." It is rarely indeed that one comes upon discussions which are at once impressively informed and learned, yet bear directly on the life of every day as it has to be met and managed in concrete detail by each of us, whatever our economic status, profession, or occupation.

Anyone acquainted with Mr. Kailen's writings will be prepared to find concepts carefully defined which are commonly employed loosely or vaguely The present book is typical in this respect. It is rich in sharp definitions, definitions which do not end the quest for insight, but point the way to further exploration One example must suffice. "Modern" is distinguished from "the contemporaneous", it is defined as "a quality and form of human living." Says Mr. Kallen: "The moderns are a minority among the contemporaries. They are, however, the potent, pace-setting minority, the forerunners and shapers of the future majority." And he selects, as the differentiating character of the modern mind, active commitment to science, democracy, industrialism, and peace. These are the avenues to freedom.

Chapter headings, such as "The Liberal Spirit," "The Organization of Freedom," "Of Humanistic Sources of Democracy," "Freedom in the Factory," suggest the general nature of the subject matter. They of course convey no hint of the author's breadth of interest and information, of his epigrammatic wit, his expert characterization of men and events, the invariable freshness of his approach, the warmth of his appreciations, or the bite of his criticism wherever human freedom seems to him encroached upon.

"It is not necessity," says Mr. Kallen, "which is the mother of invention, but freedom." This freedom he is at pains to delineate throughout these studies The book is too profound for easy reading, but any reader who cares to make the effort to follow the author's thought, whether that reader has to get on without the benefit of "higher education" or has imbibed all that formal schooling can offer, is sure to find it an illuminating and stimulating experience.

M C. Otto New School for Social Research

Johnson, Alvin W., and Frank H Yost. Separation of Church and State in the United States; revised edition of Johnson's The Legal Status of Church-State Relationships in the United States. Pp 279. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1948. $4.50.

At a time when the issue of separation of church and state is more acute than it has been in generations, this volume is particularly welcome and important A completely revised edition of an earlier volume, it reviews a large part of all the evidence relevant to the problem It shows how Bible reading, "released time" for religious instruction, the wearing of religious garb, and various other practices have been tolerated in the pubhc schools of many states At the same time, it shows also how often these practices, when tested before the courts, have been found to be unconstitutional The fact that some mingling of church and state still exists does not, therefore, lead the authors to the conclusion that it is in any sense either desirable or constitutional On the contrary, their position is that the direction of recent court decisions is all to the good, particularly the famous McCollum case in Champaign, Illinois, which in 1948 resulted in denying the use of public schools for religious instruction on a "released time" basis

The authors, both of whom are professional religionists, believe that the cause of religion is best protected when left completely free to go its own way, and that every attempt by the state to interfere with or to overlap religious activities is therefore injurious both to the latter and to the state itself Accordingly, they do not consider another solution to the problem which would be more appropriate to a democracy than either their own advocacy of rigid exclusion or that of the Catholic Church in its present efforts to obtain government support for parochial schools. This solution would aim toward the ideal of including within public education a comparative study of the great religions—regarding these as powerful cultural institutions worthy of the same kind of public analysis and criticism as any other forces contributing to the evolution of mankind

Religious education in this sense would admittedly be difficult to carry on; it would not mean indoctrination in one or another absolute faith; it would mean that teachers should be prepared to discuss religious questions dispassionately and al- low students to reach whatever co-operative agreements about them they saw fit. This is not, of course, what the absolutists in religion want to permit, hence Johnson and Yost are thus far sound in their opposition to the kind of encroachment now threatening to break down the wall of separation which has been so painstakingly erected through the years. Whether they are equally sound in their belief that the study of religion in any sense is properly outside the prerogatives of public education is open to greater question What that belief does is to support, in one sense, the position of absolutism itself by permitting the indoctrination of the young with no opportunity for public criticism or comparison of a particular doctrine.

Theodore Brameld New York University

Loescher, Frank S. The Protestant Church and the Negro. A Pattern of Segregation New York: Association Press, 1948 $3.00

Dr. Loescher, Quaker teacher and sociologist, presents a variety of clear-cut evidence to demonstrate that American Protestantism as a social institution reflects and contributes to the segregation of the American Negro. The practices of Protestant churches and educational institutions tend to preserve the status quo in Negro-white relationships rather than to further the integration of the Negro into American society.

Over 93 per cent of Protestant Negroes are in separate denominations. About 6 per cent are in predominantly white denominations, but even here they are almost entirely in segregated local congregations. For several years the pronouncements of denominational bodies have opposed racial segregation. But in the local congregations interracial fellowship is extremely rare, and a similar pattern prevails among denominational colleges and secondary schools

Local church practices are governed chiefly by their community situations National policies and pronouncements are of little avail An intimate relationship exists between residential segregation, restrictive covenants and ecclesiastical ex- clusiveness The number of individuals and small groups devoted to "a non-segregated church and a non-segregated society" has increased in recent years, but it remains a small minority and it needs greater knowledge of the techniques which might be used to promote the goals of brotherhood and justice

Loescher expresses a restrained optimism regarding the capacity of Protestant institutions for interracial reform. He feels that the primary need is for social research to test the projects and programs which attempt to aclueve greater integration. He is quite correct in affirming that men need "to be shown how to achieve the goal of integration " Some readers may feel, however, that the problem of the white man with respect to the Negro is a more stubborn and tragic problem than Loescher comprehends Nonetheless, this book serves tie useful purpose of documenting the pattern of segregation in American Protestantism, and it is symptomatic of the good will and the troubled conscience that seek to overcome a major contradiction between Protestant principles and Protestant practices.

Vernon H. Holloway

Denison University

Landon, Kenneth P. Southeast Asia.

Crossroad of Religions Pp ix, 212

Chicago, Illinois University of Chicago

Press, 1949. $4 00.

Burma, Vietnam, Indonesia, and the Philippines are battling with the first difficulties of independent statehood. Siam, after an interval of reaction, is trying to regain the reformatory ardor of a previous generation. Malaya, Cambodia, and other parts of tropical Asia are consciously entering the path toward self-government. The whole region is in ferment. Reliable reporting of the day's events does not suffice for a knowledge of what is going on there The diligent reader is at a loss to understand this outbreak of insurrection, that show of deference to an indigenous ruling house which long seemed defunct, the remarkable influence of a Buddhist priesthood, the emergence of a mystic sect, and the queer mixture everywhere of ma- terial interests (which he can understand) and of nonmaterial interests (which he cannot understand). He realizes that the influence of India on the whole of southern Asia—as shown in the recent Asian regional conference—does not rest altogether on political power. He senses that practically all of the 150 million people of the region aspire to a worthier place in world society; but the manifestations of their aspiration are to him bewildering in their variety.

Doctor Landon is particularly well qualified to open the door to the cultural motivations that are mixed up with the political and economic demands. He combines in a happy way the results of years of specialized study with those of keen personal observation. And so he can tell us not only what the diverse peoples and groups believe, but how their beliefs and their moral zeal are connected with their historical experience.

The Asian peasant, it appears, is not so very different m his outlook from the European peasant in a similar stage of evolution, when the acceptance of a world faith and a pious performance of its rites had not yet eliminated from his sentiments and thoughts the older spiritism which in former times had filled his world with ghostly shadows that must be appeased.

Not only this, but just as our western culture is made up of fragments inhented from at least two great sources in historical civilizations, so that of tropical Asia is the residue of wave after wave of advanced cultural movements* Hinduism and Islamism from India, Confucianism and Taoism from China, Christianity from Europe These movements were not, of course, purely religious in character. Indeed, the "westernization" which is so closely associated with modernization and the growth of national aspirations in southeastern Asia itself represents a divided allegiance

What the author says about each of the religious groups and the broader influences upon them is trustworthy. In spite of the brevity of his exposition, he succeeds in conveying a sense of total personality and social outlook Many readers will wish to follow up this introductory survey with

further reading, for which an excellent bibliography is provided. Yonkers, N Y Bruno Lasker

Muste, A. J Not By Might Pp xiii, 227. New York Harper & Brothers, 1947. $2 50.

A prominent American spokesman for liberal religious pacifism repeats the familiar theme* men and nations must love one another or they will perish, and love requires unilateral disarmament and personal refusal to participate m war

The author displays a fine sensitivity to the human costs and consequences of war It may be questioned, however, whether his proposals are morally and politically relevant to the tasks which face the statesman and citizen.

In his analysis of Soviet-American relations he concludes that only war can be the result, unless a spiritual change is achieved within civilization World government cannot provide an answer because world community is lacking. The real challenge of our time is portrayed as the need to get war out of our "system," and the solution proposed is "a moral decision to renounce war."

Although Muste is a shade less confident than he was in some of his earlier works that love and nonviolence in the face of an aggressor will "overcome" evil, he is insistent that pacifism is the absolute requirement of the Christian ethic. He is quite assured that sacrificial love—the death, if need be, of those who prefer martyrdom to "compromise" with the employment of physical force—is not only a spiritual triumph in the face of evil but also the release of "power" over the disruptive elements of international society

There is ambiguity in this book as to the meaning and function of power. The "moral victory" of Christ on the cross is regarded as a model for solving political problems. The Christian's task, as Muste sees it, is to convince the nation that it must act upon the assumption that "Jesus' way of life is practical—now." He hopes that the United States may be led to renounce its military power to coerce others, that it will become a "Church," and that through ceasing to be a State with mili- tary power it will thereby produce a "chain reaction" which will convert the world to the pursuit of a spiritual politics that does not involve coercion.

One may share Muste's low estimate of war, but if he cannot share the implicit faith of liberal pacifism in the ability of men to live in the world as if it were a monastery, he may conclude that this book fails to understand both the Christian doctrine of man and the limited choices which confront the statesman

Vernon H Holloway Denison University

McAllister, Charles E. Inside the Campus: Mr. Citizen Looks at His Universities. Pp 247. New York Fleming H. Revell Company 1948 $5 00 This survey and report on various aspects of the life and activities of modern American colleges and universities was carried out by Dr Charles E. McAllister for the Association of Governing Boards of State Universities and Allied Institutions, of which organization Dr McAllister is president. The method employed in conducting this survey was that of the questionnaire, plus personal interviews with presidents, deans, board members and faculty members in eighty-nine state institutions The survey Was begun in the fall of 1946 and a report of findings was made to the Association of Governing Boards approximately a year later. The findings thus reflect highly contemporary conditions. The volume contains a wealth of useful, information and a number of conclusions of interest to a wide variety of people concerned with the status of higher education in the present-day United States. The report sought to assess the conditions and prospects chiefly of state educational institutions, but a few private institutions, such as Harvard, Stanford, and Amherst, were included for purposes of comparison and in order to highlight some of the relations between public and private institutions of higher learning.

Of the more important conclusions reached by Dr. McAllister, one notes with interest his assertion that he found little evidence of "political" interference in the management of state colleges and universities. He is convinced that such influences must be kept out of state-supported education and that, likewise, education should be restrained from "political" activity The findings of Dr. McAllister's survey on the presence of communism and communistic influences in our state-supported institutions will be welcomed by many. He insists that state university and college campuses are not breeding places for communism He holds further that the amount of subversive teaching and activity is slight in relation to the number of people involved in our vast public educational system. The author gives a high loyalty rating to the students and faculties of the institutions included in this report.

On the matter of religion and morality in state educational institutions, the survey indicates that there has not been a marked increase in alcoholism and sex offenses since the war, but a serious increase has been observed in the incidence of cheating, lying, and stealing. An adequate explanation for this latter situation is lacking Both administrative officers and faculty members appear to believe that non-sectarian courses in religion should be taught as a part of the regular college program

In a series of chapters, the report sets forth information on such matters as the relations of governing boards to faculty, students, and alumni; methods of financing state colleges and universities'; and increase in tuition rates and in faculty salaries ; and an entire chapter (number eight) is devoted to an appraisal of the contributions of state-supported institutions of higher learning to the national welfare. The discerning reader cannot fail to be greatly impressed by the magnitude of these achievements, as they are detailed by Dr. McAllister, in institution after institution. The concluding pages of this book contain a useful bibliography and a reproduction of the questionnaire used in the survey as well as extensive data obtained thereby which is arranged in tabular form In all, this is a timely and useful book which deserves reading by a far wider group than that composed of those professionally concerned with higher education.

James H. Barnett University of Connecticut

Cavan, Ruth Shonle Criminology Pp.

xv, 747. New York- Thomas Y. Crowell

Company, 1948

There are a considerable number of texts in the field of criminology, and when every so often an additional one appears, one inadvertently asks oneself, why. The material presented is generally so conventional, its distribution by now so standardized, that in most cases the only discernible reason is the desire of the author to have written a book himself, or of the publisher to participate in the textbook competition. It is true that statistical information and bibliographies have to be brought up to date; that here and there a slightly different interpretation or presentation technique is introduced; that one author is perhaps a bit more skillful in writing a "text" than another. But most of this could be taken care of by "new and revised" editions.

Cavan's criminology text is a refreshing thing to read; the above remarks certainly do not pertain to it, since the author does what every author venturing to write a new text should do—namely, justify its publication by the contents. In a well developed field a new text has the primary task of incorporating the new research material and new writings on the subject into the well established body of knowledge Very often this necessitates the revision of the conventional structure and concepts and leads to a new plan, a new synthesis. Cavan's book has enough of this honest and painstaking effort to incorporate what is new into what is well known to justify the whole endeavor. In reading this text one does not get the impression one gets from some others—that the author did not have the time and did not consider the writing of the text sufficiently important to find the time to do a thorough job of integration or revision. Of course, not enough new vistas have opened in the field of criminology to make possible this new creative synthesis throughout the entire text. But where the developments of the last 15 years justify it, the author has given it.

Though the whole structure of the book is very adequate for providing proper place and perspective for the criminological knowledge which is to be imparted to the students, the outstanding feature of the book is unquestionably the new conceptual integration of the field of the etiology of criminal behavior. For once we have a text that has managed to disentangle itself from the outdated cubbyholes of biological and constitutional theories of criminality and the geographical and social environment, and that gives us the analysis of the causes of criminal behavior in the frame of reference and the lingo of modern sociology The author's efforts to create a general frame of reference for the findings of Clifford R. Shaw and his associates in the study of high delinquency areas, for Sutherland's findings in his studies on organized crime and white collar criminality, and for the findings of those who are trying to understand the connection between mental abnormalities and criminality, etc, are commendable and in many cases very successful or at least highly interesting. The reviewer feels that this book for the first time makes these separate research findings conveniently teachable in a general survey course in criminology.

Otherwise also the book is very satisfactory. It is up to date in its statistical information and utilizes the most recent publications in the field. In the reviewer's opinion it can generally be highly recommended. There are, of course, some minor faults such as, for instance, the author's reference to the judicial criminal statistics as a current source of information, when in reality these were discontinued with 1946; but these faults are negligible.

Peter P. Lejins University of Maryland

Kluckhohn, Clyde. Mirror for Man: The Relation of Anthropology to Modern Life Pp. xi, 313. New York' McGraw-Hill Book Company (Whittlesey House), 1949. $3.75. Winner of the Whittlesey House "Science Illustrated" contest for scientific books for the layman, Mirror for Man is primarily a popular introduction to all the subdivisions of contemporary anthropology. "This book is intended for the layman, not

for the carping professional " The former will find it the best presentation since Boas' Anthropology and Modern Life, published two decades ago—and a lot of water has run under the anthropological dam since then. The latter will find a summary of conventional current anthropology; nothing new has been added in respect to either interpretation or integration of the field

The author considers anthropology to be the queen of the "human" sciences "Because of its breadth, the variety of its methods, and its mediating position, anthropology is sure to play a central role in the integration of the human sciences." Its method has three important "hallmarks". (1) "studying whole societies [and cultures] from a detached point of view"; (2) taking "the cultural point of view." "A good deal of human behavior can be understood, and indeed predicted, if we know a people's design for living"; (3) "applying to a particular situation what is known about societies and culture in general."

"Anthropology is no longer just the science of the long-ago and far-away"; it is "an aid to useful action." The author's devise for motivating the reader is given in the opening sentence: "Anthropology provides a scientific basis for dealing with the crucial dilemma of the world todays- how can peoples of different appearance, mutually unintelligible languages, and dissimilar ways of life get along peaceably together?" Throughout the book he answers this problem "unashamedly in terms of his own American sentiments"—which are those of a middle-class liberal.

James S Slotkin University of Chicago

Kuczynski, R. R Demographic Survey of the British Colonial Empire• Vol. I, West Africa Pp xiii, 821. London* Geoffrey Cumberlege, Oxford University Press, 1948. $20 00

Shortly before his death at the end of 1947, Robert Rene Kuczynski, one of the world's leading demographers, completed all but the final editing of a four-volume work on British colonial demography. This is the first of the volumes, and the second is now in press

The present work may properly be called massive. It deals with four colonies and their associated dependencies and mandated territories: Sierra Leone, Gambia, Gold Coast and Togoland, Nigeria and Cam- eroons. Following an introductory chapter that summarizes the salient demographic features of the four colonies on a comparative basis, a chapter is devoted to each of the colonies in turn These chapters follow a uniform organization, with minor variations reflecting peculiar features of a particular area or, more commonly, the various degrees of knowledge, opinion, and ignorance about the demographic situation. Each chapter traces the history of census-taking in the colony, summarizes data on total populations, discusses the composition of African and non- African populations, reviews the provisions for birth and death registration, and gives such data as are available on fertility, mortality, and population growth Each section employs liberal quotations from official sources on procedures, opinions, and results

Kuczynski had a well-earned reputation for criticism, ranging from ironic to biting, of the standards of census enumeration and vital registration in areas that interested him He was always a strong exponent of the view that figures must not be taken at their face value without examining how they were manufactured. The present volume amply demonstrates his concern with the statutes, administrative regulation, methods of enumeration, reporting procedures, and reliability of results. He is quick to detect foolish and capricious estimates and opinions, sham in spurious accuracy, and administrative incompetence, he is equally quick to comment on these foibles at considerable length It follows that much of the present volume, and probably of the rest of the series, is not made up of demographic data but of a discussion of the machinery that produced the data and that supports or undermines published figures.

Aside from the rather thorough reporting of available data, therefore, Kuczyn- ski's notable service is to put administra- tors on notice that their procedures are faulty, and to warn demographers and other social scientists to use the products with caution. The great expense of the book will stand in the way of its use by individual scholars. Much of this expense could have been avoided had the author been willing to summarize the procedures and opinions without such a great duplication of painful official papers and correspondence

Wilbert E Moore Princeton University

Sorre, Max. Les fondements de la gi- ographie kumaine, Vol. II: Les fondements techniques (premiere partie). Pp. 608. Paris, France: Libraire Armand Colin, 1948 1100 fr Professor Max Sorre of the Sorbonne has started and already partly completed a handbook on human geography which bears the modest title of "Foundations of Human Geography" but is probably the most complete treatment ever attempted by one man. The book reviewed here is only the first part of the second volume, and its size—six hundred pages—indicates the magnitude of the enterprise The first volume, treating the biological factors, has already been published; the second part of this volume is in preparation, and a third volume, discussing the human habitat, will follow

From the American point of view, the volume under discussion is probably the most important, because it gives the typical French approach to the role of man in his environment as formerly presented by Vidal de la Blache and Jean Brunhes. This approach, putting epiphasis on the triumph of man over his environment, is now widely accepted in the United States and has replaced, rightly or wrongly, the idea that the control by the environment is the dominating factor as expressed in the works of Friedrich Ratzel and of Ellen Churchill Semple.

The book is divided into three sections, two of which contain a discussion of the factors of energy (power) and of transportation (the conquest of space), usually found in books on human geography. Unusual, however, is the section treating the political and social environment Besides the treatment of such factors as distribution of population, of language, and of religion, Sorre gives a clear picture of the development of the political unit starting in the prehistoric era and leading up to the present period of nations and empires. He also treats the economic historic sequence with special emphasis on capitalism and its present clash with the communist approach. This section deserves special attention because it is rarely shown from the geographical point of view.

Max Sorre shows himself not only as a geographer of widest knowledge, obtained through traveling as well as through careful study of literature, but also as a man who expresses his thoughts clearly and often brilliantly. The book deserves a top place among the great works the French school of geography has given to the world; it has all the earmarks of French scholarship and tradition However, the reviewer personally wishes it was not so long and so crowded with details. One starts reading delighted by the presentation, but it needs courage to finish. As is characteristic of French books, there are only a few maps, while more of them would certainly have helped to make the book more digestible

This criticism should not, however, obscure the fact that Max Sorre is writing and has already partly completed a geographic masterpiece which will long stand out as a milestone in the progress of geographic thought. What Ratzel did to stimulate the study of human geography half a century ago, Sorre has done now for the present generation. The geographic world is greatly indebted to him.

S. Van Valkenburg

Clark University

International Labour Office. Housing

and Employment. Pp. iv, 147. Geneva,

1948 75 cents

This study is not a survey of housing conditions throughout the world. It is the development of a thesis, which is stated as follows. "Most countries accept rising standards of living and a high and stable level of employment as their basic economic and social aims The purpose of this study is to bring out the important contribution to be made by housing to the achievement of these aims." Treating this thesis in conjunction with the question of "the extent to which private enterprise will need in the future to be supplemented by public planning," the author analyzes the housing problem in the broader framework of general economic policy

The book deals adequately with the problems of cost of land, construction, and financing, of population and family size, and of distribution of income and expenditures. The author correctly emphasizes as the distinctive characteristic of housing its extreme durability, which makes the demand for annual additions to the total supply react violently to relatively slight fluctuations in total demand. He shows how this instability of demand is responsible for the organizational and technical backwardness of the industry, which is split into a great number of small units, each one concentrating on drawing high profits from a limited market, because it can do little to expand the market. The narrowness of the market in turn increases still further the instability of demand and consequently of supply, and the instability of supply increases the fluctuations of the business cycle The author proposes to break this vicious circle by public underwriting of a permanent high level of housing production Without minrniizjpg the value of this approach for the improvement of housing conditions, it must be emphasized that in order to achieve stable employment house-building activity would have to be not stable, but fluctuating in a counter-cyclical sense.

The author clearly defines the difference between housing need and housing demand and the conditions under which the two would coincide. In the absence of these conditions he considers subsidies to be justified by the "indirect benefits" of housing, frankly recognizing that subsidies involve first a redistribution of income and second a restriction of consumer choice.

This reviewer questions the statement that "an increase in family size will obviously create a strong pressure to increase expenditure on housing " As the National Resources Planning Board studies on family expenditures have shown, the percentage of income spent for housing varies inversely with family size.

Despite this and other minor shortcomings the International Labour Office's publication is one of the best—as well as one of the shortest—treatments of the housing problem.

Hans Blumenfeld City Planning Commission Philadelphia

Sherif, Muzafer An Outline of Social Psychology. Pp xv, 479. New York Harper & Brothers, 1948. $4 00. This work is an attempt to build an introductory text around the author's theory that social behavior springs largely from the way in "which the individual perceives the world. The idea that the principles of human behavior are essentially principles of social perception, i e, principles of perceiving the world in terms of one's group membership, was expounded by Muzafer Sherif in his earlier work, Psychology of Social Norms. In the book under review he has balanced this explanation of human behavior by a considerable increase in emphasis on the power of human motivation and particularly of biological demands This has led him to interesting and very timely discussions of the phenomena of human behavior in crisis situations, in which deprivation of essential needs seems to cause a breakdown of acquired forms of social perception.

Around this core of theory are built discussions of motives, groups and norms (values), social change, and individual differences in social reactions The author's theory of ego-involvements is presented in considerable detail.

The author's scheme of a treatment of social psychology along these lines was first developed by him for his class work in Ankara University in 1942-43 and later elaborated in this country.

The text is intended to be used for introductory courses of social psychology offered in either psychology or sociology departments. It appears to this reviewer that it might serve its purpose more usefully for courses given within the framework of a sociology department. The au- thor himself is a psychologist whose vision has brought him to an appreciation and understanding of social phenomena, but he is not a trained sociologist. As a result of this background his information coverage is stronger in the field of psychology than in that of sociology. Suffice it to point out, as has been pointed out before by La- Piere with regard to the author's work (with H. Cantnl), The Psychology of Ego- Involvements, that neither C H Cooley nor G. H. Mead is mentioned by him, although his discussion of self-perception is along the same lines as their work. It must also be noted that the text includes no reference to W. I. Thomas although the concept of the definition of the situation should certainly find its place in a book based on a theory of social perception A trained sociologist might be expected to supplement the text in these respects; a psychologist may encounter difficulties in doing so Furthermore, the material referred to in the book comes largely from the field of psychology and may therefore be particularly helpful to an instructor trained in sociology who seeks a balanced approach to social psychology

The presentation shows the development of the book out of lecture notes, and the style is frequently classroom style The clarity of the presentation is unfortunately not even. There are statements of surprising lucidity as well as statements which are so involved that they may present difficulties to students in an introductory course. Great emphasis is placed upon experimental verification of theoretical material and on the presentation of data which will strike students and instructors as pertinent in terms of modern concerns.

Otto Pollak

University of Pennsylvania

Beer, Samuel H The City of Reason.

Pp. viii, 227 Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1949 $4 00

The author, who is professor of government at Harvard University, addresses himself to a field which can perhaps be described as covering both moral and political philosophy. He intends "to refute irrationalism. The thesis of this book is that the world is rational" (p 9). Guided by Whitehead (and others), he discovers "a Law of Reason which is also an ethical imperative" and proceeds to construct "a philosophy of Liberalism based on A. N. Whitehead's metaphysics of creative advance" (p. 11). Lighted by a metaphysical "insight into the ultimate rational nature of things," he teaches The state "is not, and cannot be, an all-absorbing, a perfect community," for "the Law of Reason gives man the right and duty of rational [my italics] self-realization" (p. 206). For indeed democracy becomes a preferable form of government provided that "the bulk of the people . . . recognize and accept the Law of Reason" (p. 210), and that this law "be embodied in some agreed system of Fundamental Law" (p 211). The ideal City of Reason, or so we are told, "embodies the humility of the cynic, but not his defeatism and loss of nerve. It includes the decision of the fanatic, but not his pride. It draws a firm and abiding confidence in reason from a faith which reason itself reveals" (p. 216)

The scope of this review forbids a detailed examination of a system at once so learned and so pretentious. Obviously, however, it falls into the category which has Plato's Republic for prototype, and the practical conclusions it contains have a value neither greater nor smaller than the assumptions from which they are said to follow. The results will appear conclusive to those who share the author's metaphysical "decision." Whitehead's metaphysics (like all other metaphysical systems) contains certain latent political constructs; indeed, since the time of Plato, competent metaphysicians have (often quite cynically) recognized the political significance of the tales which they told their pupils Now, if the author's conclusions supported what we generally understand by democracy, I, for one, would not strenuously object to his new mythology. But I fail to see this new "Law of Reason" being "recognized" and "accepted" by the "bulk of the people." The new "ethical imperative" does not fall within the range of perception generally ascribed to the common man. Indeed, if past experience means anything, rationalist metaphysics seems hardly to provide a suitable basis for popular government

The book has a rare distinction for a work of this sort: it does not, I believe, a single time mention even the name of Henri Bergson.

John Lindberg

Princeton, N J

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Deshpande, P G. (Ed). Gandhiana (A Bibliography of Gandhian Literature). Pp. xii, 238. Ahmedabad, India: Navajivan Publishing House. No date or price. Dewey, John Reconstruction in Philosophy (second ed). Pp xli, 224 Boston: The Beacon Press, 1949. $2 75 Dupriez, Leon H Des Movements Ico- nomiques gineraux (two volumes). Pp. Vol. I—3d, 552; Vol 11—648. Louvain Belgium: Institut de Recherches Eco nomiques et Sociales, University de Louvain 1947. 675 fr The Economic Reports of the President. Pp xxxvi, 333 New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1949. $2.75. Federal Security Agency. Circular No. 247. Earned Degrees Conferred by Higher Educational Institutions 1947-48. Pp xiii, 440 Washington- Office of Education No price Fisher, Sydney N Foreign Relations of Turkey, 1481-1512 Pp 125. Urbana, 111. University of Illinois Press, 1948. Cloth- bound, $2 50; paperbound, $1.50 Foa, Bruno. Monetary Reconstruction in Italy. Pp. x, 147. New York: Columbia University Press for The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1949. $2.25 Garrett, Sylvester, and L. Reed Tripp Management Problems Implicit in Multi- Employer Bargaining Pp. v, 61 Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press for the Labor Relations Council of the Wharton School of Finance and Commcrcc, 1949. $1.00 Ginsberg, Morris. Reason and Unreason in Society: Essays in Sociology and Social Philosophy Pp. vii, 327 Cambridge, Mass • Harvard University Press for the London School of Economics and Political Science, 1948 $4 00. Goodrich, Leland M., and Edvard Hambro Charter of the United Nations: Commentary and Documents (second ed). Pp. xvi, 710 Boston: The World Peace Foundation, 1949 $4.75

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Hacker, Louis M, and Benjamin B Ken- drick The United States Since 1865 (fourth ed) Pp xxii, 739. New York Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1949. $5 00 Hamilton, Alexander, James Madison, and John Jay. The Federalist Edited by Max Beloff Pp lxxi, 484 New York: The Macmillan Company, 1948 $2 25. Hepner, Harry Walker. Effective Advertising (second ed ) Pp xv, 728 New York. The McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1949 $5 50

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Hollingwortu, Harry L Psychology and Ethics Pp ix, 247 New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1949 $3 "SO International Labour Office Vocational Training of Adults m the United States. Pp vi, 223 Washington, 1948 $1 25 International Military Tribunal Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, 14 November 1945-1 October 1946 (Vols. 22, 28, and 29). Pp 603 Nuremberg, Germany* International Military Tribunal, 1948. No price James, Preston E, and Hibbert V B. Kltne, Jr. A Geography of Man. Pp. xvi, 631. Boston Ginn and Company, 1949. $4.75. Joad, C E M. Decadence: A Philosophical Inquiry, Pp 430 New York: Philosophical Library, 1949 $4 75 Kennedy, Thomas Effective Labor Arbitration: The Impartial Chairmanship of the Full-Fashioned Ilosiery Industry Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1948 $3.50. Koiin, Clyde F (Ed). Geographic Approaches to Social Education. Pp. xv, 299 Washington- The National Council for the Social Studies, 1949. $3.00. Korner, Anneltese Friedsam Some Aspects of Hostility in Young Children. Pp ix, 194. New York: Grune & Stralton, 1949. $3 50.

Lachance, T R P Louis Le concept de droit selon Anstote et S Thomas (second ed) Pp 327 Montreal Les Editions du Ldvrier, 1948 $3 00 Lane, Rose Wilder, Henry Grady Weaver, et al. Mainspring Pp 236 Detroit, Mich : Talbot Books, 1947 $1.00 Larsen, Christian L, and Robert H Stoude- mire. Metropolitan Charleston Pp 48. Columbia, S. C : Bureau of Public Administration, University of South Carolina, 1949. No price.

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^{^[1]} See Decree of Oct. 11, 1945 Vedomosti, No. 72 (399), Oct 12, 1945.

^{^[2]} See Decree of Oct. 14, 1945. Vedomosti, No. 73 (400), Oct. 18, 1945.

^{^[3]} See 8 Information Bulletin, Nos 1 and 6 (Jan. 14 and March 31, 1948), pp. 22 and 184.

^{^[5]} See Decrce of July 23, 1948. Vedomosti, No 32 (531), Aug 7, 1948.

^{^[6]} See Decree of Aug. 2, 1948. Vedomosti, No 34 (533), Aug. 18, 1948.

^{^[7]} For a listing of all the dccrecs to the late

Communist Parly (Bolshevik)," in Partiinaya Zhizri [Party Life], No. 20 (Oct. 1947), pp. 73-83.

^{^[15]} XVIII S'ezd Vsesouiznoi Kommunisttches- koi Partii (b), 10-21 Mart a 1929, Steno- graficheskn Otchet LI8th Congress of the All- Union Communist Pact (B), 10-21 March 1939, Stenographic report] Moscow, 1939, pp. 148-49.

by S. G. Kolesnikova, 0 Sovetskom patriotizme [On Soviet Patriotism], Moscow, 1947.

^{^[18]} For an excellent treatment of this controversy see Frederick C. Barghoorn, "The Varga Discussion and its Significance," American Slavic and East European Review, Vol. VII, No 3 (Oct. 1948), pp. 214-36.

^{^[19]} The journal of the Central Committee of the Party, Parthnaya Zhizri [Party Life], and its predecessor, Partnnoye Stroitel'stvo [Party Construction], are particularly valuable in this connection. The publication of Parttznaya Zhizri was discontinued in April 1948.

^{^[20]} Reprinted in Partiinaya Zhizn', No. 5

assignments of the three Politburo members had not been made public.

^{^[23]} The recent developments in the field of education are dealt with in the article by Dr. Nicolas Hans in this issue of The Annals.

^{^[24]} Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta S S.S.R, No. 37 (July 16, 1944). The text of the decree also appeared in Pravda and Izvestiya for July 9, 1944.

^{^[25]} A detailed enumeration and discussion of

this legislation may be found in S N Abramov and K. A Grave, Novoe ZakondateVstvo o

^{^[27]} This applied in the R S F S R after March 1927. Before that time the courts were expected to verify the fact that one or both parties did indeed seek a divorce. Abramov and Grave, op. cit. note 3 supra, pp 23-24.

^{^[28]} Abramov and Grave, op. cit. note 3 supra, p. 25.

^{^[35]} The activities of the former League of Militant Atheists have been largely incorporated in a broader program of "political and scientific propaganda." But the party has left no doubt that religion is one of the main targets of this propaganda Thus, on June 28, 1948 Pravda declared editorially that "the insufficiently aggressive character of scientific propaganda is manifested from time to time in the failure to emphasize the struggle against religious prejudices." The editorial continued to assert that "the freedom of conscience . . certainly does not signify that our political and scientific organizations are neutral in their attitude towards religion." Also see the reports on the formation and activity of the All- Union Society for the Dissemination of Political and Natural Science in Kid'tura i Zkizn', No. 14, May 21, 1947, No. 16, June 10, 1947, and No. 19, July 10, 1947

^{^[36]} See A. Kolosov, op cit. note 45 supra, pp.

^{^[38]} The new description of what had been, before Hitler's invasion of the US.SR, "an internecine conflict between imperialist powers," was sanctified by Stalin in his radio speech of July 3, 1941.

^{^[39]} Stalin, Voprosy Leninizma, 11th ed, p 215. The translation is mine, as everywhere in this article

^{^[40]} Bol'shevik, No. 16 (August 30, 1947), p

^{^[40]} Robert Sherwood, Roosevelt and Bop-

^{^[41]} Insofar as it is based mainly on Soviet statistical information, the present study necessarily assumes that the Soviet Government does not falsify the data it releases Some grounds for this basic assumption are advanced in Abram Bergson, The Structure of Soviet Wages (Cambridge, 1944), p. x. See also Seymour Harris, Colin Clark, Alexander Gerschenkron, Paul A Baran, Abram Bergson, A. Yugow, "Appraisals of Russian Economic Statistics," Review of Economic Statistics, Nov. 1947

As the articles cited make clear, there are many pitfalls in Soviet statistics, arising chiefly from methodological deficiencies in the compilation, processing, and presentation of the data. These articles would suggest also that the Russians sometimes may be unduly tolerant of such deficiencies, particularly if they lead to a favorable picture of Soviet achievements

[42] Voznesensky, op cit. note 2 supra

Voznesensky, implies that the United States had a total of 1 million tools before the war According to Benjamin W. Carrada, editor of the American Machinist, the United States possessed 942,000 machine tools on January 1, 1940, and this number was increased to 1,711,000 by January 1, 1945. Although Voznesensky's reference to America appears borne out by the above testimony, it should be kept in mind that there probably are many obstacles to a comprehensive inventory of such equipment. Differences in enumeration technique and coverage may make intercoun- try comparisons of rather dubious significance.

^2t See note 12 supra.

^{^[45]} For data on the livestock herds in the interwar period, see BoVshaia sovetskaia ent- siklopedua—SSSR (The Great Soviet Encyclopedia-USSR), (Moscow, 1947), pp. 919-20,

^{^[47]} As is mentioned in note 46 supra, Russia's aggregate imports of all sorts have been substantially in excess of her exports since the war. While this import balance probably consists primarily of capital goods, it is entirely

^{^[48]} This term seems to include all who work for the Government directly or for any state- operated enterprise, as well as members of industrial co-operatives. Since it does not include collective farm members and unfree laborers, it may be taken as roughly equivalent to the nonagricultural free labor force, although it does include a relatively small number of persons who work on state farms, government agricultural experiment stations, etc. Cf. the discussion of this term in Harry Schwartz, "A Critique of 'Appraisals of Russian Economic Statistics,'" jReview of Economics and Statistics (Feb 1948), p 40.

4 N. Voznesensky, Voyennaya Ekonomika S S SJl. v Period Otechestvennoi Voiny (Moscow, 1947), pp. 111-13.

5 BoVshaya Sovetskaya Entstklopediya, op. cit. note 2 supra.

^{^[49]} Some of this material is summarized in Schwartz, Russia's Postwar Economy, op cit. note 1 supra, Chap. II.

^{^[51]} A fuller discussion of this problem is given in Solomon M Schwarz, "The Living Standard of the Soviet Worker," Modern Review (June 1948), pp 272-86, and I B Kravis and J. Mintzes, "Soviet Union. Trends in Prices, Rations and Wages," Monthly Labor Review (July 1947), pp 28-35

earnings of the highest-paid Soviet worker were more [his italics] than 28.3 times the

port Twenty, The East European Economy in Relation to the European Recovery Pro- gram, Washington, 1948, p. 26. Conclusions from this computation, however, are vitiated by the fact that it is based on the Polish domestic price structure. For an oblique acknowledgment from Sofiya of Russian price pressures on Bulgaria, see Georg P. Step- schitsch, "Die Aussenwirtschaft Bulgariens seit Kriegsende," Aussenwirtschaft, Vol. 3, No. 2 (Bern, June 1948), p 121.

that output of 19 5 million tons of pig iron required 37 million tons of ore; output of 50 million tons of pig iron will require in the future 150 million tons of ore. In other words, the ratio of iron ore consumed to pig iron produced would increase from 1.9:1 to 3:1. See I P. Bardin and N. P. Banny, Chernaya metallurgiya v novoy pyatiletke

(Ferrous Metallurgy in the New Five Year Plan), Moscow, Leningrad, 1947, pp. 36, 53.

limited its account of the landing to a bare statement that "on June 6, 1944 Allied forces accomplished a landing in Northern France."

^{^[58]} Literaturnaia Gazeta of October 2, 1948 pointed out that in the symposium volume published by the Soviet Academy of Sciences and dedicated to the thirtieth anniversary of the October Revolution there was not a single article printed on the history of the Soviet regime, while at the same time place was found for a contribution on "The social order of Southern Mesopotamia during the Third Ur Dynasty (2132-2024 b.c.)."

®V. Veksler, Journal of Physics (U S.S.R.) (in Russian), P, 153 (1945).

^{^[65]} For a general survey, see Vera Micheles Dean, "Economic Trends in Eastern Europe," Foreign Policy Reports, Vol XXIV, No. 2 (April 1, 1948), pp. 14-27; Vol XXIV, No. 3 (April 15, 1948), pp. 30-39.

^{^[67]} The pertinent documents are in: The Axis in Defeat (State Dept. Publication No. 2423), and Hajo Holborn, American Military Government, Washington, D. C., 1947.

^{^[68]} Thuringia: Art. 47, I; Saxony-Anhalt: Art. 64, I; Mecklenburg: Art. 64, I; Brandenburg* Art. 40; Saxony. Art. 62.

^{^[69]} SED (Socialist Unity Party) draft constitution Art. 5 as followed by: Thuringia: Art. 5, V; Saxony-Anhalt: Arts. 5 and 24; Mecklenburg: Arts. 6 and 22; Brandenburg* Arts. 4 and 9; Saxony Arts 6 and 26.

^{^[70]}Deutsche Rechtszeitschrift, 1948 (III), p. 212. For the official Soviet point of view: Max Fechner (the new chief of the German judicial administration) in Neue Justiz, Son- derheft, August 1948.

^{^[71]} Surveys of denazification in Neue Justiz 1948 (II), pp 37-38 and Sonderheft, Aug. 1948, pp. 126-31.

^{^[72]} For justice, budget, food and agriculture,

(FDGB), 1947 (I), pp 106-109, and more openly in ibid., 1948 (II), pp 33-34

^{^[78]} A good survey of the legislation up to 1947 appears in Arbeit und Sozialfursorge, 1947 (II), pp. 181-83

^{^[79]}Arbeit und Sozialfursorge, 1947, p. 108, and Die Arbeit (FDGB), 1947 (I), pp 20115.

^{^[80]}Paul Merker in Die Tribune (FDGB), Nov 27, 1948.

so First published by Tass, March 18, 1947 during the Moscow meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers

^{^[81]} Tdgliche Rundschau (organ of the SMA), June 6, 1948.