A history of Rome : from the tribunate of Tiberius Gracchus to the end of the Jugurthine War, B.C. 133-104

PREFACE

This work will be comprised in six volumes. According to the plan fhich I have provisionally laid down, the second volume will cover he period from 104 to 70 b.c., ending with the first consulship of 'ompeius and Crassus; the third, the period from 70 to 44 b.c., losing with the death of Caesar; the fourth volume will probably >e occupied by the Third Civil War and the rule of Augustus, while he fifth and sixth will cover the reigns of the Emperors to the iccession of Vespasian.

The original sources, on which the greater part of the contents if the present volume is based, have been collected during the last ew years by Miss Clay and myself, and have already been published u an abbreviated form. Some idea of the debt which I owe to Qodern authors may be gathered from the references in the foot-lotes. As I have often, for the sake of brevity, cited the works of hese authors by shortened and incomplete titles, I have thought it dvisable to add to the volume a list of the full titles of the works eferred to. But the list makes no pretence to be a full bibliography of the period of history with which this volume deals. The nap of the Wad Mellag and its surrounding territory, which I have nserted to illustrate the probable site of the battle of the Muthul, i taken from the map of the " Medjerda superieure " which appears i M. Salomon Reinach's Atlas de la Province Romaine d'Jfrique.

I am very much indebted to my friend and former pupil, Mr. ). J. Harding, of Hertford College, for the ungrudging labour which e has bestowed on the proofs of the whole of this volume. Many nprovements in the form of the work are due to his perspicacity nd judgment.

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viii

PREFACE

A problem which confronts an author who plunges into thi midst of the history of a nation (however complete may be thi unity of the period with which he deals) is that of the amount o introductory information which he feels bound to supply to hi readers. In this case, I have felt neither obligation nor inclinatioi to supply a sketch of the development of Rome or her constitutioi up to the period of the Gracchi. The amount of information 01 the general and political history of Rome which the average studenl must have acquired from any of the excellent text-books now ii use, is quite sufficient to enable him to understand the technicalities of the politics of the period with which I deal; and I was verj unwilling to burden the volume with a prdcis of a subject which 1 had already treated in another work. On the other hand, it is no! so easy to acquire information on the social and economic historj of Rome, and consequently I have devoted the first hundred pages of this book to a detailed exposition of the conditions preceding and determining the great conflict of interests with which oui story opens.

A. H. J. G.

Oxford, August, 1904

NOTE

This volume, intended as the first of a series, is now left by the lamented death of its Author as an isolated unit. Dr. Greenidge has not left behind him sufficient material to justify the continuance of the work by the hand of an Editor. Notwithstanding this unhappy curtailment of the original scheme, the Publishers believe that this volume, comprising as it does a strongly marked epoch of Roman History, is well able to stand alone, and to serve as a valuable contribution to the story of the later Republic,

August, 1906

CONTENTS

{The references are to the pages) CHAPTER I

Characteristics of the period, i. Recent changes in the conditions of Roman life, 2. Close of the period of expansion by means of colonies or land assignments, 3. Reasons for social discontent, 10. The life of the wealthier classes, 11. The expenses of political life, 23. Attempts to check luxury, 27, Motives for gain amongst the upper classes, 31. Means of acquiring wealth open to members of the nobility, 32; those open to members of the commercial class, 41. The political influence of the Equites, 47. The business life of Rome; finance and banking, 4g. Foreign trade, 53. The condition of the small traders, 55. Agriculture, 58. Diminution in the numbers of peasant proprietors, 59. The Latifundium and the new agricultural ideal, 64. Growth of pasturage, 66. Causes of the changes in the tenure of land, 69. The system of possession, 73. Future prospects of agriculture, 78. Slave labour, 81; dangers attending its employment; revolts of slaves in Italy, 86. The servile war in Sicily (circa 140-131 b.c.), 8g. The need for reform, 9g.

CHAPTER II

The sources from which reform might have come, 100. Attitude of Scipio Aemilianus, 102. Tiberius Gracchus; his youth and early career, 103. The affair of the Numantine Treaty, 108. Motives that urged Tiberius Gracchus to reform, log. His tribunate (b.c. 133), no. Terms of the agrarian measure which be introduced, in. Creation of a special agrarian commission, 116, Opposition to the bill, 117. Veto pronounced by Marcus Octavius, 120. Tiberius Gracchus declares a Justitium, 121. Fruitless reference to the senate, 122. Deposition of Octavius, 125. Passing of the agrarian law; appointment of the commissioners; judicial power given to the commissioners, 127. Employment of the bequest of Attalus, I2g. Attacks on Tiherius Gracchus, 130. His defence of the deposition of Octavius, 132. New programme of Tiberius Gracchus; suggestion of measures dealing with the army, the law-courts and the Italians, 134. Tiberius Gracchus's attempt at re-election to the tribunate, 137. Riot at the election and death of Tiberius Gracchus, 139. Consequences of his fall, 143.

A HISTORY OF ROME

CHAPTER I

THE period of Roman history on which we now enter is, like so many that had preceded it, a period of revolt, directly aimed against the existing conditions of society and, through the neans taken to satisfy the fresh wants and to alleviate the suddenly •ealised, if not suddenly created, miseries of the time, indirectly iffecting the structure of the body politic. The difference between ;he social movement of the present and that of the past may be ustly described as one of degree, in so far as there was not a single ilement of discontent visible in the revolution commencing with ;he Gracchi and ending with Caesar that had not been present in ;he earlier epochs of social and political agitation. \The burden >f military service, the curse of debt, the poverty of an agrarian proletariate, the hunger for land, the striving of the artisan and ;he merchant after better conditions of labour and of trade—the leparate cries of discontent that find their unison in a protest igainst the monopoly of office and the narrow or selfish rule of a lominant class, and thus gain a significance as much political as iocial—all these plaints had filled the air at the time when Caius liicinius near the middle of the fourth century, and Appius Claudius it its close, evolved their projects of reform. The cycle of a mtion's history can indeed never be broken as long as the character if the nation remains the same. And the average Roman of the niddle of the second century before our era¹ was in all essential parti-:ulars the Roman of the times of Appius and of Licinius, or even of he epoch when the ten commissioners had published the Tables vhich were to stamp its perpetual character on Roman law. He cas in his business relations either oppressor or oppressed, either lammer or anvil. In his private life he was an individualist whose

¹ The average, or at least the most powerful, type of a race is stamped on its ./story. It is perhaps needless to say that no generalisations on character apply o all its individual members. 1

CONTENTS

CHAPTER III

Attitude of the senate after the fall of Tiberius Gracchus, 145. Special commis: appointed for the trial of his adherents (b.c. 132), 146. Fate of Scipio Nas 147. Permanence of the land commission and thoroughness of its work, Difficulties connected with jurisdiction on disputed claims, 150. The Ital: appeal to Scipio Aemilianus, 154. His intervention; judicial power taken f the commissioners (b.c. 129), 157. Death of Scipio Aemilianus, 159. Tribui of Carbo (b.c. 131); ballot law and attempt to make the tribune immedia re-eligible, 163. The Italian claims; negotiations for the extension of franchise, 165. Alien act of Pennus (b.c. 126), 166. Proposal made by Flac to extend the franchise (b.c. 125), 167. Revolt of Fregellae, 170. Foundai of Fabrateria (b.c. 124), 171. Foreign events during this period; the kingt of Pergamon, 172. Bequest of Attalus the Third (b.c. 133), 175. Revoli Aristonicus (b.c. 132-130), 177. Organisation of the province of Asia (b.c. ] 126), 183. Sardinian War (b.c. 126-125), 188. Conquest and annexation of Balearic Islands (b.c. 123-122), 188.

CHAPTER IV

The political situation at the time of the appearance of Caius Gracchus a candidate for the tribunate (b.c. 124), rgo. Early career of Caius Graccl rgi. First tribunate of Caius Gracchus (b.c. 123), igg. Laws passed or ] posed during this tribunate; law protecting the Caput of a Roman citizen, i Impeachment of Popillius, 201. Law concerning magistrates who had b deposed by the people, 202. Social reforms, 203. Law providing for cheapened sale of corn, 205. Law mitigating the conditions of military serv 208. Agrarian law, 2og. Judiciary law, 210. Law permitting a crim prosecution for corrupt judgments, 216. Law concerning the province of A 218. The new balance of power created by these laws in favour of the Equi 221. Law about the consular provinces, 222. Colonial schemes of Ci Gracchus, 224. The Rubrian law for the renewal of Carthage, 227. Law the making of roads, 228. Election of Fannius to the consulship and of Ci Gracchus and Flaccus to the tribunate, 230. Activity of Caius Grace during his second tribunate (b.c. 122), 231. The franchise bill, 233. Opposil to the bill, 235. Exclusion of Italians from Rome; threat of the veto, suspension of the measure, 236. Proposal for a change in the order of vol in the Comitia Centuriata, 237. New policy of the senate; counter-legislal of Drusus, 238. Colonial proposals of Drusus, 240. His measure for the ] tection of the Latins, 242. The close of Caius Gracchus's second tribun 243. His failure to be elected tribune for the third time, 247. Proposal for repeal of the Rubrian law, 248. The meeting on the Capitol and its c sequences (b.c. 121), 24g. Declaration of a state of siege, 251. The seizur the Aventine ; defeat of the Gracchans; death of Caius Gracchus and Flaci 253. Judicial prosecution of the adherents of Caius Gracchus, 257. Ful judgments on the Gracchi, 25g. The closing years of Cornelia, 260. Estirr of the character and consequences of the Gracchan reforms, 261.

CONTENTS xi

CHAPTER V

The political situation after the fall of Caius Gracchus, 277. Prosecution and acquittal of Opimius (b.c. 120), 278. Publius Lentulus dies in exile, 280. Prosecution and condemnation of Carbo (b.c. ng), 281. Lucius Crassus, 282. Policy of the senate towards the late schemes of reform, 283. Two new land laws (circa 121-119 b.c.), 285. The settlement of the land question with respect to Ager Publicus in Italy (b.c. in), 288. Limitations on the power of the nobility; the Equestrian courts; trials of Scaevola (b.c. 120) and Cato (b.c. 113), 295. Consulship of Scaurus (b.c. 115); law concerning the voting power of freedmen, 296. Sumptuary law; activity of the censors Metellus and Domitius (b.c. 115), 297. Triumphs of Domitius, Fabius (b.c. 120) and Scaurus (b.c. 115), for military successes, 2g8. Confidence of the electors in the ancient houses, 2g8. Recognition of talent by the nobility; career of Scaurus (b.c. 163-115), 2g8. The rise of Marius; his early career (b.c. 157-ng), 301. Tribunate of Marius (b.c. 119), 303. His law about the method of voting in the Comitia carried in spite of the opposition of the senate, 304. He opposes a measure for the distribution of corn, 306. Marius elected praetor; accused and acquitted of Ambitus (b.c. 116), 306. His praetorship (b.c. irs), and pro-praetorship in Spain (b.c. 114), 304. Further opposition to the senate; foundation of Narbo Martius (b.c. 118), 308. Glaucia; his tribunate and his law of extortion (circa m b.c.), 3og. The spirit of unrest; religious fears at Rome (b.c. 114), 311. First trial of the vestals (b.c. 114), 312. Second trial of the vestals (b.c. 113), 313. Human sacrifice, 314. Great fire at Rome (b.c iii), 314.

CHAPTER VI

The kingdom of Numidia, 315. The races of North Africa, 317. The Numidians, 318. The Numidian monarchy, 320. Reign of Micipsa (b.c. 148-1t8), 322. Early years of Jugurtha, 323. Jugurtha at Numantia (b.c. 134-133), 324. Joint rule of Jugurtha, Adherbal and Hiempsal (b.c. ti8), 326. Murder of Hiempsal (circa 116 b.c.); war between Jugurtha and Adherbal, 328. Both kings send envoys to Rome; the appeal of Adherbal, 32g. Decision of the senate, 33r. Numidia divided between the claimants, 333. Renewal of the war between Jugurtha and Adherbal (circa 114 b.c.), 334. Siege of Cirta (b.c. 112), 335. Embassy from Rome neglected by Jugurtha, 337. Renewed appeal of Adherbal, 33g. Another commission sent by Rome, 340. Surrender of Cirta and murder of Adherbal, 343. Massacre of Italian traders, 343. Its influence on the commercial classes at Rome; protest by Memmius, 344. Declaration of war against Jugurtha, 345. Command of Bestia in Numidia (b.c. irr), 347. Attitude of Bocchus of Mauretania, 349. Negotiations of Bestia with Jugurtha; conclusion of peace, 351. Excitement in Rome on the news of the agreement with Jugurtha, 353. Activity of Memmius, 355. Jugurtha induced to come ;o Rome (b.c. no), 358. Jugurtha at Rome; the scene at the Contio, 361. Murder of Massiva, 363. Jugurtha leaves Rome and the war is renewed, 365. Spurius Albinus in Numidia, 367. He returns to Rome leaving Aulus Al-binus in command, 36g. Enterprise of Aulus Albinus; his defeat and compact with Jugurtha (b.c. iog), 370. Reception of the news at Rome; the senate invalidates the treaty, 372. Return of Spurius Albinus to Africa, 374. The Mamilian Commission (b.c. no), 375. Metellus appointed to Numidia (b.c. iog), 380.

A HISTORY OF ROME

CHAPTER I

THE period of Roman history on which we now enter is, like so many that had preceded it, a period of revolt, directly aimed against the existing conditions of society and, through the neans taken to satisfy the fresh wants and to alleviate the suddenly ealised, if not suddenly created, miseries of the time, indirectly iffecting the structure of the body politic. The difference between he social movement of the present and that of the past may be ustly described as one of degree, in so far as there was not a single Jement of discontent visible in the revolution commencing with he Gracchi and ending with Caesar that had not been present in he earlier epochs of social and political agitation. \The burden if military service, the curse of debt, the poverty of an agrarian woletariate, the hunger for land, the striving of the artisan and he merchant after better conditions of labour and of trade—the eparate cries of discontent that find their unison in a protest gainst the monopoly of office and the narrow or selfish rule of a lominant class, and thus gain a significance as much political as ocial-r-all. these plaints had filled the air at the time when Caius icinius near the middle of the fourth century, and Appius Claudius ,t its close, evolved their projects of reform. The cycle of a lation's history can indeed never be broken as long as the character f the nation remains the same. And the average Roman of the aiddle of the second century before our era¹ was in all essential parti-ulars the Roman of the times of Appius and of Licinius, or even of he epoch when the ten commissioners had published the Tables rhich were to stamp its perpetual character on Roman law. He ras in his business relations either oppressor or oppressed, either lammer or anvil. In his private life he was an individualist whose

¹ The average, or at least the most powerful, type of a race is stamped on its .story. It is perhaps needless to say that no generalisations on character apply 3 all its individual members. 1

A HISTORY OF ROME

sympathies were limited to the narrow circle of his dependants ; he was a trader and a financier whose humanitarian instincts were subordinated to a code of purely commercial morality, and who valued equity chiefly because it presented the line of least resistance and facilitated the conduct of his industrial operations. Like all individualists, he was something of an anarchist, filled with the idea, which appeared on every page of the record of his ancestors and the history of his State, that self-help was the divinely given means of securing right, that true social order was the issue of conflicting claims pushed to their breaking point until a temporary compromise was agreed on by the weary combatants; but he was hampered in his democratic leanings by the knowledge that democracy is the fruit of individual self-restraint and subordination to the common will—qualities of which he could not boast and symbols of a prize which he would not have cared to attain at the expense of his peculiar ideas of personal freedom—and he was forced, in consequence of this abnegation, to submit to an executive government as strong, one might almost say as tyrannous, as any which a Republic has ever displayed—a government which was a product of the restless spirit of self-assertion and self-aggrandisement which the Roman felt in himself, and therefore had sufficient reason to suspect in others.

The Roman was the same; but his environment had changed more startlingly during the last fifty or sixty years than in all the centuries that had preceded them in the history of the Republic, The conquest of Italy had, it is true, given to his city much that was new and fruitful in the domains of religion, of art, of commerce and of law. But these accretions merely entailed the fuller realisation of a tendency which had been marked from the earliest stage of Republican history—the tendency to fit isolated elements in the marvellous discoveries made by the heaven-gifted race of the Greeks into a framework that was thoroughly national and Roman. Ideas had been borrowed, and these ideas certainly resulted in increased efficiency and therefore in increased wealth. But the gross material of Hellenism, whether as realised in intellectual ideas or (the prize that appealed more immediately to the practical Roman with his concrete mind) in tangible things, had not been seized as a whole as the reward of victory: and no great attempt had been made in former ages to assimilate the one or to enjoy the other. The nature of the material rewards which had been secured by the epochs of

CLOSE OF THE PERIOD OF EXPANSION 3

Italian conquest had indeed made such assimilation or enjoyment impossible. They would have been practicable only in a state which possessed a fairly complete urban life; and the effect of the wars which Rome waged with her neighbours in the peninsula had been to make the life of the average citizen more purely agricultural than it had been in the early Republic, perhaps even in the epoch of the Kings. The course of a nation's political, social and intellectual history is determined very largely by the methods which it adopts for its own expansion at the inevitable moment when its original limits are found to be too narrow to satisfy even the most modest needs of a growing population. The method chosen will depend chiefly on geographical circumstances and on the military characteristics of the people which are indissolubly connected with these. When the city of Old Greece began to feel the strength of its growing manhood, and the developing hunger which was both the sign and the source of that strength, it looked askance at the mountain line which cut it off from the inland regions, it turned hopeful eyes on the sea that sparkled along its coasts; it manned its ships and sent its restless youth to a new and distant home which was but a replica of the old. The results of this maritime adventure were the glories of urban life and the all-embracing sweep of Hellenism. The progress of Roman enterprise had been very different. Following the example of all conquering Italian peoples,¹ and especially of the Sabellian invaders whose movements immediately preceded their own, the Romans adopted the course of inland expansion, and such urban unity as they had possessed was dissipated over the vast tract of territory on which the legions were settled, or to which the noble sent his armed retainers, nominally to keep the land as the public domain of Rome, in reality to hold it for himself and his descendants. At a given moment (which is as clearly marked in Roman as in Hellenic history) the possibility of such expansion ceased, and the necessity for its cessation was as fully exhibited in the policy of the government as in the tastes of the people. No Latin colony had been planted later than the year 181, no Roman colony later than 157,² and the senate showed no inclination to renew schemes for the further assignment of territory

¹ Even the Hellenes of the West are only a partial exception. It is true that their cities clung to the coast; but the vast inland possessions of states like Sybaris are scarcely paralleled elsewhere in the history of Greek colonisation.

^aThe Latin colony of Aquileia was settled in the former year (Liv. xl. 34 Vellei. i. 15), the Roman colony of Auximum in the latter (Vellei. I.e.).

A HISTORY OF ROME

amongst the people. There were many reasons for this indifference to colonial enterprise. In the first place, although colonisation had always been a relief to the proletariate and one of the means regularly'adopted by those in power for assuaging its dangerous discontent, yet the government had always regarded the social aspect of this method of expansion as subservient to the strategic.¹This strategic motive no longer existed, and a short-sighted policy, which looked to the present, not to the future, to men of the existing generation and not to their sons, may easily have held that a colony, which was not needed for the protection of the district in which it was settled, injuriously affected the fighting-strength of Rome. The maritime colonies which had been established from the end of the great Latin war down to the close of the second struggle with Carthage claimed, at least in many cases, exemption from military service,² and a tradition of this kind tends to linger when its justification is a thing of the past. But, even if such a view could be repudiated by the government, it was certain that the levy became a more serious business the greater the number of communities on which the recruiting commander had to call, and it was equally manifest that the veteran who had just been given an allotment on which to establish his household gods might be inclined to give a tardy response to the call to arms. The Latin colony seemed a still greater anachronism than the military colony of citizens. The member of such a community, although the state which he entered enjoyed large privileges of autonomy, ceased to be a Roman citizen in respect to political rights, and even at a time when self-government had been valued almost more than citizenship, the government had only been able to carry out its project of pushing these half-independent settlements into the heart of Italy by threatening with a pecuniary penalty the soldier who preferred his rights as a citizen to the benefits which he might receive as an emigrant.³ Now that the great wars had brought their dubious

¹Cic. de Leg. Agr. ii. 27. 73 Est operae pretium diligentiam majorum recordari, qui colonias sic idoneis in locis contra suspicionem periculi collocarunt, ut esse non oppida Italiae, sed propugnacula imperii viderentur.

²Liv. xxvii. 38; xxxvi. 3 ; cf. Marquardt Staatsverwaltung i. p. 51.

³ The Roman citizen, who entered his name for a Latin colony, suffered the derogation of caput which was known to the later jurists as capitis deminutio minor ancLexpressed the loss oicivitas (Gaius i. 161; iii. 56). That a fine was the alternative of enrolment, hence conceived as voluntary, we are told by Cicero {pro Caec. 33. 98 Aut sua voluntate aut legis multa profecti sunt: quam multam si sufferre voluissent, manere in civitate potuissent. Cf. pro Domo 30. 78 Qui cives Romani in colonias Latinas proficiscebantur, fieri non poterant Latini, nisi erant auctores acti nomenque dederant).

DEGLINE OF COLONISATION IN ITALY 5

but at least potential profits to every member of the Roman community, and the gulf between the full citizens and the members of the allied communities was ever widening, it was more than doubtful whether a member of the former class, however desperate his plight, would readily condescend to enroll himself amongst the latter. But, even apart from these considerations, it must have seemed very questionable to any one, who held the traditional view that colonisation should subserve the purposes of the State, whether the landless citizen of the time could be trusted to fulfil his duties as an emigrant. As early as the year 186 the consul Spurius Postumius, while making a judicial tour in Italy, had found to his surprise that colonies on both the Italian coasts, Sipontum on the Upper, and Buxentum on the Lower Sea, had been abandoned by their inhabitants: and a new levy had to be set on foot to replace the faithless emigrants who had vanished into space.¹ As time went on the risk of such desertion became greater, partly from the growing difficulty of maintaining an adequate living on the land, partly from the fact that the more energetic spirits, on whom alone the hopes of permanent settlement could depend, found a readier avenue to wealth and a more tempting sphere for the exercise of manly qualities in the attractions of a campaign that seemed to promise plunder and glory, especially when these prizes were accompanied by no exorbitant amount of suffering or toil. Thus when it had become known that Scipio Africanus would accompany his brother in the expedition against Antiochus, five thousand veterans, both citizens and allies, who had served their full time under the command of the former, offered their voluntary services to the departing consul,² and nineteen years later the experience which had been gained of the wealth that might be reaped from a campaign in Macedonia and Asia drew many willing recruits to the legions which were to be engaged in the struggle with Perseus.³ The semi-professional soldier was in fact springing up, the man of a spirit adventurous and restless such as did not promise contentment with the small interests and small rewards of life in an Italian outpost.

But, if the days of formal colonisation were over, why might not the concurrent system be adopted of dividing conquered lands amongst poorer citizens without the establishment of a new political

¹ Liv. xxxix. 23. ² Liv. xxxvii. 4.

s Liv. xlii. 32 Multi voluntate nomina dabant, quia locupletes videbant, qui priore Macedonico bello, aut adversus Antiochum in Asia, stipendia fecerant.

A HISTORY OF ROME

settlement or any strict limitation of the number of the recipients ? This 'viritane' assignation had always run parallel to that which assumed the form of colonisation; it merely required the existence of land capable of distribution, and the allotments granted might be considered merely a means of affording relief to the poorer members of existing municipalities. The system was supposed to have existed from the times of the Kings; it was believed to have formed the basis of the first agrarian law, that of Spurius Cassius in 486 ;¹ it had been employed after the conquest of the Volscians in the fourth century and that of the Sabines in the third ;² it had animated the agrarian legislation of Flaminius when in 232 he romanised the ager Gallicus south of Ariminum without planting a single colony in this region ;³ and a date preceding the Gracchan legislation by only forty years had seen the resumption of the method, when some Gallic and Ligurian land, held to be the spoil of war and declared to be unoccupied, had been parcelled out into allotments, of ten jugera to Roman citizens and of three to members of the Latin name.¹ But to the government of the period with which we are concerned the continued pursuance of such a course, if it suggested itself at all, appealed in the light of a policy that was unfamiliar, difficult and objectionable. It is probable that this method of assignment, even in its later phases, had been tinctured with the belief that, like the colony, it secured a system of military control over the occupied district: and that the purely social object of land-distribution, if it had been advanced at all, was considered to be characteristic rather of the demagogue than the statesman. From a strategic point of view such a measure was unnecessary; from an economic, it assumed, not only a craving for allotments amongst the poorer class, of which there was perhaps little evidence, but a belief, which must have been held to be sanguine in the extreme, that these paupers, when provided for, would prove to be

¹ For the assignations viritim in the times of the Kings see Varro R. R. i. 10 (Romulus); Cic. de Rep. ii. 14. 26 (Numa); Liv. t. 46 (Servius Tullius). That the Cassian distribution was to be kot' &vSpa is stated by Dionysius (viii 72 73) On the whole subject see Mommsen in C. I. L. i. p. 75. He has made out a'good case lor the land thus assigned being known by the technical name of viritanus ager. See Festus p. 373; Siculus Flaccus p. 154 Lachm. We shall find that this was the form of distribution effected by the Gracchi.

. ^^F°^r ^the ^settlement ⁱⁿ ^the ^land °f the Volsci see Liv. v. 24; for that made by M. Cunus in the Sabine territory, Colum. i. praef. 14; [Victor] de Vir. III. 33.

Cato ap. Van. R. R. i. 2. 7 Ager Gallicus Romanus vocatur, qui viritim cis Ariminum datus est ultra agrum Picentium ; cf. Cic. Brut. 14. 57 ;; de Senect. 4. n; Val. Max. v. 4. 5. ^T

⁴ Liv. xlii. 4 (173 b.c) ; cf. xli. 16.

DIFFICULTY OF LAND-ASSIGNMENT 7

efficient farmers capable of maintaining a position which many of them had already lost. Again, if such an assignment was to be made, it should be made on land immediately after it had passed from the possession of the enemy to that of Rome; if time had elapsed since the date of annexation, it was almost certain that claims of some kind had been asserted over the territory, and shadowy as these claims might be, the Roman law had, in the interest of the State itself, always tended to recognise a ale facto as a de jure right. The claims of the allies and the municipalities had also to be considered; for assignments to Roman citizens on an extensive scale would inevitably lead to difficult questions about the rights which many of these townships actually possessed to much of the territory whose revenue they enjoyed. If the allies and the municipal towns did not suffer, the loss must fall on the Roman State itself, which derived one of its chief sources of stable and permanent revenue—the source which was supposed to meet the claims for Italian administration¹—from its domains in Italy, on the contractors who collected this revenue, and on the enterprising capitalists who had put their wealth and energy into the waste places to which they had been invited by the government, and who had given these devastated territories much of the value which they now possessed. Lastly, these enterprising possessors were strongly represented in the senate; the leading members of the nobility had embarked on a new system of agriculture, the results of which were inimical to the interest of the small farmer, and the conditions of which would be undermined by a vast system of distribution such as could alone suffice to satisfy the pauper proletariate. The feeling that a future agrarian law was useless from an economic and dangerous from a political point of view, was strengthened by the conviction that its proposal would initiate a war amongst classes, that its failure would exasperate the commons and that its success would inflict heavy pecuniary damage on the guardians of the State.

Thus the simple system of territorial expansion, which had continued in an uninterrupted course from the earliest days of conquest, might be now held to be closed for ever. From the point of view

¹ The other sources were the portoria and the vicesima libertatis. Even at a period when the revenues from the provinces were infinitely larger than they were at the present time Cicero could write, with reference to Caesar's proposal for distributing the Campanian land, Portoriis Italiae sublatis, agro Campano diviso, quod vectigal superest domesticum praeter vicensimam ? (Cic. ad Att. ii. 16. i).

A HISTORY OF ROME

of the Italian neighbours of Rome it was indeed ample time that such a closing period should be reached. If we possessed a map of Italy which showed the relative proportions of land in Italy and Cisalpine Gaul which had been seized by Rome or left to the native cities or tribes, we should probably find that the possessions of the conquering State, whether occupied by colonies, absorbed by the gift of citizenship, or held as public domain, amounted to nearly one half of the territory of the whole peninsula.¹ The extension of such progress was clearly impossible unless war were to be provoked with the Confederacy which furnished so large a proportion of the fighting strength of Rome; but, if it was confessed that extension on the old lines was now beyond reach of attainment and yet it was agreed that the existing resources of Italy did not furnish an adequate livelihood to the majority of the citizens of Rome, but two methods of expansion could be thought of as practicable in the future. One was agrarian assignation at the expense either of the State or of the richer classes or of both ;_# the other was enterprise beyond the sea. But neither of these seemed to deserve government intervention, or regulation by a scheme which would satisfy either immediate or future wants. The one was repudiated, as we have already shown, on account of its novelty, its danger and its inconvenience ; the other seemed emphatically a matter for private enterprise and above all for private capital. It could never be available for the very poor unless it assumed the form of colonisation, and the senate looked on transmarine colonisation with the eye of prejudice.² It took a different view of the enterprise of the foreign speculator and merchant; this it regarded with an air of easy indifference. Their wealth was a pillar on which the State might lean in times of emergency, but, until the disastrous effects of commercial enterprise on foreign policy were more clearly seen, it was considered to be no business of the government either to help or to hinder the wealthy and enterprising Roman in his dealings with the peoples of the subject or protected lands.

Rome, if by this name we mean the great majority of Roman citizens, was for the first time for centuries in a situation in which all movement and all progress seemed to be denied. The force of

¹ See the map attempted by Beloch in his work Der Italische Bund unter Roms Hegemonic.

² Vellei. ii. 7. See ch. iv., where the attitude of the senate towards the proposals for transmarine settlement made by Caius Gracchus is described.

THE CLOSE OF THE LONG WARS 9

the community seemed to have spent itself for the time ; as a force proceeding from the whole community it had perhaps spent itself for ever. A section of the nominally sovereign people might yet be welded into a mighty instrument that would carry victory to the ends of the earth, and open new channels of enterprise both for the men who guided their movements and for themselves. But for the moment the State was thrown back upon itself; it held that an end had been attained, and the attainment naturally suggested a pause, a long survey of the results which had been reached by these long years of struggle with the hydra-headed enemy abroad. The close of the third Macedonian war is said by a contemporary to have brought with it a restful sense of security such as Rome could not have felt for centuries.¹ Such a security gave scope to the rich to enjoy 'the material advantages which their power had acquired; but it also gave scope to the poor to reflect on the strange harvest which the conquest of the great powers of the world had brought to the men whose stubborn patience had secured the peace which they were given neither the means nor the leisure to enjoy. The men who evaded or had completed their service in the legions lacked the means, although they had the leisure; the men who still obeyed the summons to arms lacked both, unless the respite between prolonged campaigns could be called leisure, or the booty, hardly won and quickly squandered, could be described as means. Even after Carthage had been destroyed Rome, though doubly safe, was still busy enough with her legions ; the government of Spain was one protracted war, and proconsuls were still striving to win triumphs for themselves by improving on their predecessors' work.² But such war could not absorb the energy or stimulate the interest of the people as a whole. The reaction which had so often followed a successful campaign, when the discipline of the camp had been shaken off and the duties of the soldier were replaced by the wants of the citizen, was renewed on a scale infinitely larger than before— a scale proportioned to the magnitude of the strain which had been removed and the greatness of the wants which had been revived. The cries for reform may have been of the old familiar type ³ but

¹ Polyb. xxxii. n.

² Besides the continued war in Spain from 145 to 133 there were troubles in Macedonia (in 142) and in Sicily during this period of comparative peace. Circa 140-135 commences the great slave rising in that island, and in the latter year the long series of campaigns against the free Illyrian and Thracian peoples begins.

s P. 1.

A HISTORY OF ROME

their increased intensity and variety may almost be held to hav^ given them a difference of quality. There is a stage at which a difference of degree seems to amount to one of kind : and this stage seems certainly to have been reached in the social problems presented by the times. In the old days of the struggle between the orders the question of privilege had sometimes overshadowed the purely economic issue, and although a close scrutiny of those days of turmoil shows that the dominant note in the conflict was often a mere pretext meant to serve the personal ambition of the champions of the Plebs, yet the appearance rather than the reality of an issue imposes on the imagination of the mob, and political emancipation had been thought a boon even when hard facts had shown that its greater prizes had fallen to a small and selfish minority. Now,; however, there could be no illusion. There was nothing but material wants on one side, there was nothing but material power on the other. The intellectual claims which might be advanced! to justify a monopoly of office and of wealth, could be met by an intellectual superiority on the part of a demagogue clamouring for confiscation. The ultimate basis of the life of the State was for the first time to be laid bare and subjected to a merciless scrutiny; it remained to be seen which of the two great forces of society would prevail; the force of habit which had so often blinded the Roman to his real needs; or the force of want which, because it so seldom won a victory over his innate conservatism, was wont, when that victory had been won, to sweep him farther on the path of reckless jnd inconsistent reform than it would have carried a race better endowed with the gift of testing at every stage of progress the ends and needs of the social organism considered as a whole..

An analysis of social discontent at any period of history must Lake the form of an examination of the wants engendered by the age, and of the adequacy or inadequacy of their means of satisfaction. If we turn our attention first to the forces of society which were in possession of the fortress and were to be the object of attack, we shall find that the ruling desires which animated these men of wealth and influence were chiefly the product of the new cosmopolitan culture which the victorious city had begun to absorb in the days when conquest and diplomacy had first been carried across the seas. To this she fell a willing victim when the conquered peoples, bending before the rude force which had but substituted a new suzerainty for an old and had scarcelj

NEW INFLUENCES ON LIFE 11

touched their inner life, began to display before the eyes of their Wonished conquerors the material comfort and the spiritual charm 'Vhich, in the case of the contact of a potent but narrow civilisation .with one that is superbly elastic and strong in the very elegance of ³its physical debility, can always turn defeat into victory. But the I student who begins his investigation of the new Roman life with the 'study of Roman society as it existed in the latter half of the second •century before our era, cannot venture to gather up the threads p of the purely intellectual and moral influences which were created by the new Hellenistic civilisation. He feels that he is only at the ' beginning of a process, that he lacks material for his picture, that • the illustrative matter which he might employ is to be found ¹ mainly in the literary records of a later age, and that his use of this matter would but involve him in the historical sins of anticipation p and anachronism. Of some phases of the war between the old ; spirit and the new we shall find occasion to speak ; but the culminating point attained by the blend of Greek with Roman : elements is the only one which is clearly visible to modern eyes. This point, however, was reached at the earliest only in the second half of the next century. It was only then that the fusion of the seemingly discordant elements gave birth to the new " Romanism," i which was to be the ruling civilisation of Italy and the Western provinces and, in virtue of the completeness of the amalgamation and the novelty of the product, was itself to be contrasted and to i live for centuries in friendly rivalry with the more uncompromising Hellenism of Eastern lands. But some of the economic effects of : the new influences claim our immediate attention, for we are engaged in the study of the beginnings of an economic revolution, and an analysis must therefore be attempted of some of the most pressing needs and some of the keenest desires which were awakened ; by Hellenism, either in the purer dress which old Greece had : given it or in the more gorgeous raiment which it had assumed during its sojourn in the East.

A tendency to treat the city as the home, the country only as a means of refreshment and a sphere of elegant retirement during that portion of the year when the excitement of the urban season, its business and its pleasure, were suspended, began to be a marked feature of the life of the upper classes. The man of affairs and the man of high finance were both compelled to have their domicile in the town, and, if agriculture was still the staple or the supplement

A HISTORY OF ROME

of their wealth, the needs of the estate had to be left to the supervision of the resident bailiff.¹ This concentration of the upp<$ classes in the city necessarily entailed a great advance in the price and rental of house property within the walls. It is true that the reckless prices paid for houses, especially for country villas, bj the grandees and millionaires of the next generation,² had not yet been reached ; but the indications with which we are furnished of the general rise of prices for everything in Rome that could be deemed desirable by a cultivated taste,³ show that the better class of house property must already have yielded large returns, whether it were sold or let, and we know that poor scions of the nobility, if business or pleasure induced them to spend a portion of the year in Rome, had soon to climb the stairs of flats or lodgings.⁴ The pressure for room led to the piling of storey on storey. On tbS roof of old houses new chambers were raised, which could be reached by an outside stair, and either served to accommodate the increased retinue of the town establishment or were let to strangers who possessed no dwelling of their own ;⁶ the still larger lodging-houses or " islands," which derived their name from their lofty isolation from neighbouring buildings,⁶ continued to spring up, and even private houses soon came to attain a height which had to be restrained by the intervention of the law. An ex-consul and augui was called on by the censors of 125 to explain the magnitude of a villa which he had raised, and the altitude of the structure exposed him not only to the strictures of the guardians of morals but to a fine imposed by a public court.⁷ Great changes were effected

¹ The officio, of the villicus have become very extensive even in Cato's time (Cato R. R. 5). Their extent implies the assumption of very prolonged absences on the part of the master.

² Lucullus paid 500,200 drachmae for the house at Misenum which had once belonged to Cornelia. She had purchased it for 75,000 (Plut. Mar. 34). Marius had been its intermediate owner. Even during his occupancy it is described as iroAi/reAfr oixta rpv<j>hs ex^<""^ro ^Ktt' Statras Bri\vT4pas ^ nar HvSpa iroKefitov Toaoinuiv /col avpaTtiwi abrovpy&v.

⁸ Diod. xxxvii. 3.

⁴ Sulla rented one of the lower floors for 3000 sesterces (Plut. Sulla 1).

⁵ The coenaculum is mentioned by Livy (xxxix. 14) in connection with the year 186 b.c. It is known both to Ennius (ap. Tertull. adv. Valent. 7) and to Plautus (Amph. iii. 1. 3).

" Festus p. in. The insula resembled a large hotel, with one or more courts, and bounded on all sides by streets. See Smith Diet, of Antiq. (3rd ed.) i. p. 665.

⁷Val. Max. viii. 1. damn. 7 Admodum severae notae et illud populi judicium, cum M. Aemilium Porcinam (consul 137 b.c.) a L. Cassio (censor 125 b.c.) accusa-turn crimine nimis sublime extructae villae in Alsiensi agro gravi multa affecit. The author does not sufficiently distinguish between the censorian initiative and the operation of the law. The passage is important as showing the existence of an

CHANGES IN DOMESTIC LIFE

jin the interior structure of the houses of the wealthy—changes excused , by a pardonable desire for greater comfort and rendered necessary Jboth by the growing formality of life and the large increase in the I numbers of the resident household, but tending, when once adopted, to draw the father of the family into that most useless type of (extravagance which takes the form of a craze for building. The , Hall or Atrium had once been practically the house. It opened on the street. It contained the family bed and the kitchen fire. ! The smoke passed through a hole in the roof and begrimed the , family portraits that looked down on the members of the household gathered round the hearth for their common meal. The Hall was the chief bedroom, the kitchen, the dining-room and the reception room, and it was also the only avenue from the street to the small courtyard at the back. The houses of the great had hitherto differed from those of the poor chiefly in dimensions and but very slightly in structure. The home of the wealthy patrician had simply been on a larger scale of primitive discomfort; and if his large parlour built of timber could accommodate a vast host of clients, the bed and the cooking pots were still visible to every visitor. The chief of the early innovations had been merely a low portico, borrowed from the Greeks by the Etruscans and transmitted by them to Rome, which ran round the courtyard, was divided into little cells and chambers, and served to accommodate the servants of the house.¹ But now fashion dictated that the doorway should not front the street but should be parted from it by a vestibule, in which the early callers gathered before they were admitted to the hall of audience. The floor of the Atrium was no longer the common passage to the regions at the back, but a special corridor lying either on one or on both sides of the Hall² led past the Study or Tablinum, immediately behind it, to the inner court beyond. Even the sanctity of the nuptial couch could not continue to give it the publicity which was irksome to the taste of an age which had acquired notions of the dignity of seclusion, of

enactment on the height of buildings. See Voigt in Iwan-Miiller's Handbuch iv. 2, p. 394, and cf. Vellei. ii. 10. Augustus limited the height of houses to 70 feet (Strabo v. p. 235).

¹ Diodoi. v. 40 (The Etiuscans) In . . . thus olxlcus to. irepl&Tcpa, irpbs toj tSk Btpwirtvimwv KxAaic rapa%hs ^feCpoc sbxpr)<r-rlav. See Krause Deinokrates p. 528.

* In spite of the plural form fauces (Vitruv. vi. 3. 6) may denote only a single passage. See Marquardt Privatl. p. 240; Smith and Middleton in Smith Diet, of Antiq. i. p. 671.

A HISTORY OF ROME

the comfort that was to be found in retirement, and of the convenience of separating the chambers that were used for public iron those which were employed for merely private purposes. The chief bedrooms were shifted to the back, and the sides of the courtyard were no longer the exclusive abode of the dependants of the household. The common hearth could no longer serve as the sphere of the culinary operations of an expensive cook with his retinue of menials ; the cooking fire was removed to one of the rooms near the back-gate of the house, which finally became an ample kitchen replete with all the imported means of satisfying the growing luxury of the table; and the member of the family loitering in the hall, or the visitor admitted through its portals, was spared the annoyances of strong smells and pungent smoke. The Roman family also discovered the discomfort of dining in a large and scantily furnished room, not too well lit and accessible to the intrusions of the chance domestic and the caller. It was deemed preferable to take the common meal in a light and airy upper chamber, and the new type of Coenaculum satisfied at once the desire for personal comfort and for that specialisation in the use of apartments which is one of the chief signs of an advancing material civilisation. The great hall had become the show-room of the house, but even for this purpose its dimensions proved too small. Such was the quantity of curios and works of art collected by the conquering or travelled Roman that greater space was needed for the exhibition of their rarity or splendour. This space was gained by the removal from the Atrium of all the domestic obstacles with which it had once been cumbered. It might now be made slightly smaller in its proportion to the rest of the house and yet appear far more ample than before. The space by which its sides were diminished could now be utilised for the building of two wings or Alae, which served the threefold purpose of lighting the hall from the sides, of displaying to better advantage, as an oblong chamber always does, the works of art which the lord of the mansion or his butler¹ displayed to visitor or client, and lastly of serving as a gallery for the family portraits, which were finallys removed from the Atrium, to be seen to greater advantage and in a better light on the walls of the wings. These now displayed the family tree through painted lines which connected the little shrines

¹ For this atriensis, the English butler, the continental porter, see the frequent references in Plautus (e.g., Asin. ii. z. 8o and ioi ; Pseud, ii. 2. 15), Krause Drino-krates p. 534 and Marquardt Privatl. p. 140.

CHANGES IN DOMESTIC LIFE

holding the inscribed imagines of the great ancestors of the house.¹It is also possible that the Alae served as rooms for more private audiences than were possible in the Atrium.² From the early morning crowd which thronged the hall individuals or groups might have been detached by the butler, and led to the presence of the great statesman or pleader who paced the floor in the retirement of one of these long side-galleries.³ Business of a yet more private kind was transacted in the still greater security of the Tablinum, the archive room and study of the house. Here were kept, not only the family records and the family accounts, but such of the official registers and papers as a magistrate needed to have at hand during his year of office.⁴ The domestic transaction of official business was very large at Rome, for the State had given its administrators not even the skeleton of a civil service, and it was in this room that the consul locked himself up with his quaestor and his scribes, as it was here that, as a good head of the family and a careful business man, he carefully perused the record of income and expenditure, of gains and losses, with his skilled Greek accountant.

The whole tendency of the reforms in domestic architecture was to differentiate between the public and private life of the man of business or affairs. His public activity was confined to the forepart of the house; his repose, his domestic joys, and his private pleasures were indulged in the buildings which lay behind the Atrium and its wings. As each of the departments of life became more ambitious, the sphere for the exercise of the one became more magnificent, and that which fostered the other the scene of a more perfect, because more quiet, luxury. The Atrium was soon to become a palatial hall adorned with marble colonnades;⁶ the small

¹ Plin. H. N. xxxv. 6 Stemmata vero lineis discurrebant ad imagines pictas. it is not known at what period the imagines were transferred from the Atrium to the Alae.

² Overbeck Pompeii p. ig2 ; Krause Deinokrates p. 539.

³ For the practice started, or developed, by Caius Gracchus of receiving visitors, some singly, others in smaller or larger groups, see Seneca de Ben. vi. 34. 2 and the description of Gracchus' tribunate in chapter iv.

⁴ Festus p. 357 (according to Mommsen, Abh. der Berl. Akad. Phil.-hist. Classe, r864 p. 68) Tablinum proxime atrium locus dicitur, quod antiqui magistratus in suo imperio tabulis rationum ibi habebant publicarum rationum causa factum locum ; Plin. H. N. xxxv. 7 Tabulina codicibus implebantur et monimentis rerum in magis-tratu gestarum. Marquardt, however (Privatl. p. 215) thinks that the name tablinum is derived from the fact that this chamber was originally made of planks (tablinum from tabula as figlinum from figulus).

⁵ The earliest instances of extreme extravagance in the use of building material —of the use, for instance, of Hymettian and Numidian marble—are furnished by

A HISTORY OF ROME

yard with its humble portico at the back was to be transformed into the Greek Peristyle, a court open to the sky and surrounded bj columns, which enclosed a greenery of shrubs and trees and an atmosphere cooled and freshened by the constant play of fountainf The final form of the Roman house was an admirable type of the new civilisation. It was Roman and yet Greek¹—Roman in the grand front that it presented to the world, Greek in the quiet background of thought and sentiment.

The growing splendour of the house demanded a number and variety in its human servitors that had not been dreamed of in a simpler age. The slave of the farm, with his hard hands and weather-beaten visage, could no longer be brought by his eleganj-master to the town and exhibited to a fastidious society as the type of servant that ministered to his daily needs. The urban and rustic family were now kept wholly distinct; it was only when some child of marked grace and beauty was born on the farm, that it was transferred to the mansion as containing a promise that would be wasted on rustic toil.² In every part of the establishment the taste and wealth of the owner might be tested by the courtliness and beauty of its living instruments. The chained dog at the gate had been replaced by a human janitor, often himself in chains.³ The visitor, when he had passed the porter, was received by the butler in the hall, and admitted to the master's presence by x series of footmen and ushers, the show servants of the fore-part of the house, men of the impassive dignity and obsequious repose that servitude but strengthens in the Oriental mind.⁴ In the penetralia of the household each need created by the growing ideal of comfort and refinement required its separate band of ministers,

the houses of the orator Lucius Licinius Crassus (built about g2 b.c.) and of Marcus Aemilius Lepidus, consul in 78 b.c. This growth of luxury will be treated when we come to deal with the civilisation of the Ciceronian period.

¹ As Krause expresses it (Deinokrates p. 542), at the final stage we find a Greek " Hinterhaus" standing behind an old Italian " Vorderhaus ".

² The case mentioned by Juvenal (xi. 15 r)

Pastoris duri hie est filius, ille bubulci. Suspirat longo non visam tempore matrem, Et casulam, et notos tristis desiderat haedos,

must have been of frequent occurrence as soon as the urban and rustic familiae had been kept distinct.

³ Suetonius says (de Rhet. 3) of L. Voltacilius Pilutus, one of the teachers cl Pompeius, Servisse dicitur atque etiam ostiarius vetere more in catena fuisse.

⁴For these atrienses, atriarii, admissionales, velarii see Wallon Hist, it I'Esclavage ii. p. 108.

GROWTH OF LUXURY 17

The body of the bather was rubbed and perfumed by experts in the art; the service of the table was in the hands of men who had made catering and the preparation of delicate viands the sole business of their lives. The possession of a cook, who could answer to the highest expectations of the age, was a prize beyond the reach of all but the most wealthy; for such an expert the sum of four talents had to be paid;¹ he was the prize of the millionaire, and families of more moderate means, if they wished a banquet to be elegantly served, were forced to hire the temporary services of an accomplished artist.² The housekeeper,³ who supervised the resources of the pantry, guided the destinies of the dinner in concert with the chef; and each had under him a crowd of assistants of varied names and carefully differentiated functions.⁴ The business of the outer world demanded another class of servitors. There were special valets charged with the functions of taking notes and invitations to their masters' friends; there was the valued attendant of quick eye and ready memory, an incredibly rich store-house of names and gossip, an impartial observer of the ways and weaknesses of every class, who could inform his master of the name and attributes of the approaching stranger. There were the lackeys who formed the nucleus of the attendant retinue of clients for the man when he walked abroad, the boys of exquisite form with slender limbs and innocent faces, who were the attendant spirits of the lady as she passed in her litter down the street. The muscles of the stouter slaves now offered facilities for easy journey-. ing that had been before unknown. The Roman official need not sit his horse during the hot hours of the day as he passed through the hamlets of Italy, and the grinning rustic could ask, as he watched the solemn and noiseless transit of the bearers, whether the carefully drawn curtains did not conceal a corpse.⁵

The internal luxury of the household was as fully exhibited in lifeless objects as in living things. Rooms were scented with fragrant perfumes and hung with tapestries of great price and

¹ Diod. xxxvii. 3; Sallust (Jug. 85) makes Marius say (107 b.c) Neque pluris pretii coquum quam villicum habeo. Livy (xxxix. 6) remarks with reference to the consequences of the return of Manlius' army from Asia in r87 b.c. Turn coquus, vilissimum antiquis mancipium et aestimatione et usu, in pretio esse; et, quod ministerium fuerat, ars haberi coepta.

² Plin. H. N. xviii. 108 Nec coquos vero habebant in servitiis eosque ex macello conducebant. The practice is mentioned by Plautus (Aul. ii. 4. 1; iii. 2. 15).

³ Condus promus (Plaut. Pseud, ii. 2. 14).

⁴ Wallon op. cit. ii. p. in. ⁶ C. Gracchus ap. Gell. x. 3. 5. 2

A HISTORY OF ROME

varied bloom. //Tables were set with works of silver, ivory and other precious material, wrought with the most delicate skill. Wine of moderate flavour was despised; Falernian and Chian were the only brands that the true connoisseur would deem worthy of his taste. A nice discrimination was made in the qualities of the rarer kinds of fish, and other delicacies of the table were sought in proportion to the difficulty of their attainment. The fashions of dress followed the tendency of the age; the rarity of the material, its fineness of texture, the ease which it gave to the body, were the objects chiefly sought. Young men were seen in the Forum in robes of a material as soft as that worn by women and almost transparent in its thinness. Since all these instruments of pleasure, and the luxury that appealed to ambition even more keenly than to taste, were pursued with a ruinous competition, prices were forced up to an incredible degree. An amphora of Falernian wine cost one hundred denarii, a jar of Pontic salt-fish four hundred; a young Roman would often give a talent for a favourite, and boys who ranked in the highest class for beauty of face and elegance of form fetched even a higher price than this.¹ Few could have been inclined to contradict Cato when he said in the senate-house that Rome was the only city in the world where a jar of preserved fish from the Black Sea cost more than a yoke of oxen, and a boy-favourite fetched a higher price than a yeoman's farm.² One of the great objects of social ambition was to have a heavier service of silver-plate than was possessed by any of one's neighbours. In the good old days,—days not so long past, but severed from the present by a gulf that circumstances had made deeper than the years —the Roman had had an official rather than a personal pride in the silver which he could display before the respectful eyes of the distinguished foreigner who was the guest of the State; and the Carthaginian envoys had been struck by the similarity between the silver services which appeared at the tables of their various hosts. The experience led them to a higher estimate of Roman brotherhood than of Roman wealth, and the silver-plate that had done such varied duty was at least responsible for a moral triumph.³ Only a few years before the commencement of the first war with Carthage

¹ Polyb. xxxii. n ; Diodor. xxxvii. 3. ² Diod. I.e.

⁸ Plin. H. N. xxxiii. 143 Invenimus legatos Carthaginiensium dixisse nullos hominum inter se benignius vivere quam Romanos. Eodem enim argento apud omnes cenitavisse ipsos.

COLLECTION OF WORKS OF ART 19

Rufinus^a consular had been expelled from the senate for having ten pounds of the wrought metal in his keeping,¹ and Scipio Aemilianus, a man of the present age, but an adherent of the older school, left but thirty-two pounds' weight to his heir. Less than forty years later the younger Livius Drusus was known to be in possession of plate that weighed ten thousand pounds,² and the accretions to the primitive hoard which must have been made by but two or three members of this family may serve as an index of the extent to which this particular form of the passion for display had influenced the minds and practice of the better-class Romans of the day.

There were other objects, valued for their intrinsic worth as much as for the distinction conveyed by their possession, which attracted the ambition and strained the revenues of the fashionable man. Works of art must once have been cheap on the Roman market; for, even if we refuse to credit the story of Mummius' estimate of the prize which fallen Corinth had delivered into his hands,³ yet the transhipment of cargoes of the priceless treasures to Rome is at least an historic fact, and the Gracchi must themselves have seen the trains of wagons bearing their precious freight along the Via Sacra to the Capitol. The spoils of the generous conqueror were lent to adorn the triumphs, the public buildings and even the private houses, of others; but much that had beeu yielded by Corinth had become the property neither of the general nor of the State. Polybius had seen the Roman legionaries playing at draughts on the Dionysus of Aristeides and many another famous canvas which had been torn from its place and thrown as a carpet upon the ground ;⁴ but many a camp follower must have had a better estimate of the material value of the paintings of the Hellenic masters, and the cupidity of the Roman collector must often have been satisfied at no great cost to his resources. The extent to which a returning army could disseminate its acquired tastes and distribute its captured goods had been shown some forty years before the fall of Corinth when Manlius brought his legions back from the first exploration of the rich cities of Asia. Things and names, of which the Roman had never dreamed, soon gratified the eye and struck the ear with a familiar sound. He learnt to love the bronze couches meant for the dining hall, the slender side tables with the strange foreign name, the delicate tissues woven to

¹ Val. Max. ii. g, 3. ^s Vellei. i. 13.

¹ Plin. H. N. xxxiii. 141. ⁴ Polyb. xl. 7.

A HISTORY OF ROME

form the hangings of the bed or litter, the notes struck from the psalter and the harp by the fingers of the dancing-women of the East.¹ This was the first irruption of the efflorescent luxury of Eastern Hellenism; but some five-and-twenty years before this date Rome had received her first experience of the purer taste of the Greek genius in the West. The whole series of the acts of artistic vandalism which marked the footsteps of the conquering state could be traced back to the measures taken by Claudius Marcellus after the fall of Syracuse. The systematic plunder of works of art was for the first time given an official sanction, and the public edifices of Rome were by no means the sole beneficiaries of this new interpretation of the rights of war. Much of the valuable plunder had found its way into private houses,² to stimulate the envious cupidity of many a future governor who, cursed with the taste of a collector and unblessed by the opportunity of a war, would make subtle raids on the artistic treasures of his province a secret article of his administration. When the ruling classes of a nation have been familiarised for the larger part of a century with the easy acquisition of the best material treasures of the world, things that have once seemed luxuries come to fill an easy place in the category of accepted wants. But the sudden supply has stopped ; the market value, which plunder has destroyed or lessened, has risen to its normal level; another burden has been added to life, there is one further stimulus to wealth and, so pressing is the social need, that the means to its satisfaction are not likely to be too diligently scrutinised before they are adopted.

More pardonable were the tastes that were associated with the more purely intellectual elements in Hellenic culture—with the influence which the Greek rhetor or philosopher exercised in his converse with the stern but receptive minds of Rome, the love of books, the new lessons which were to be taught as to the rhythmic flow of language and the rhythmic movement of the limbs. The Greek adventurer was one of the most striking features of the epoch which immediately followed the close of the great wars.

¹ Liv. xxxix. 6 Lectos acratos . . . plagulas . . . monopodia et abacos Romam advexerunt. Tunc psaltriae sambucistriaeque et convivalia ludionum oblectamenta addita epulis. Cf. Plin. H. N. xxxiv. 14.

² Polyb. ix. 10 'Fufiaioi 5^ fieTOKOfiiffavTes to irpoeLprniiva, rais fiev IStartKats KaTCLfTKevais tovs avT&v iKStrfiTiffav fiiovs, rais Se S^od'ais to koivo. rys ir6\eus. Another great raid was that made by Fulvius Nobilior in 189 b.c. on the art treasures of the Ambraciots (Signa aenea marmoreaque et tabulae pictae, Liv. xxxviii. 9).

REVERENCE FOR GREEK CULTURE 21

ater thinkers, generally of the resentfully national, academic and seudo-historical type, who repudiated the amenities of life which ley continued to enjoy, and cherished the pleasing fiction of the nemplary mores of the ancient times, could see little in him but a iurce of unmixed evil;¹ and indeed the Oriental Greek of the com-oner type, let loose upon the society of the poorer quarters, or orming his way into the confidence of some rich but uneducated :aster, must often have been the vehicle of lessons that would jtter have been unlearnt. But Italy also saw the advent of the 5st professors of the age, golden-mouthed men who spoke in the .nguage of poetry, rhetoric and philosophy, and who turned from le wearisome competition of their own circles and the barren fields ^? their former labours to find a flattering attention, a pleasing ignity, and the means of enjoying a full, peaceful and leisured life i the homes of Roman aristocrats, thirsting for knowledge and lirsting still more for the mastery of the unrivalled forms in which leir own deeds might be preserved and through which their own olitical and forensic triumphs might be won. Soon towns of Italy -especially those of the Hellenic South—would be vying with each ther to grant the freedom of their cities and other honours in their iff to a young emigrant poet who hailed from Antioch, and mem-ers of the noblest houses would be competing for the honour of his iendship and for the privilege of receiving him under their roof.²he stream of Greek learning was broad and strong;³ it bore on its osom every man and woman who aimed at a reputation for egance, for wit or for the deadly thrust in verbal fence which layed so large a part in the game of politics ; every one that re-lsed to float was either an outcast from the best society, or was riving to win an eccentric reputation for national obscurantism nd its imaginary accompaniment of honest rustic strength.

Acquaintance with professors and poets led to a knowledge of ooks; and it was as necessary to store the latter as the former

¹ Plin. H. N. xv. 19 Graeci vitiorum omnium genitores.

² Cic. pro Arch. 3. 5 Erat Italia turn plena Graecarum artium ac disciplinarum . . Itaque hunc (Archiam) et Tarentini et Regini et Neapolitani civitate ceterisque aemiis donarunt: et omnes, qui aliquid de ingeniis poterant judicare, cognitione que hospitio dignum existimarunt.

³ Cic. de Rep. ii. ig. 34 Videtur insitiva quadam disciplina doctior facta esse vitas. Influxit enim non tenuis quidam e Graecia rivulus in hanc urbem, sed lundantissimus amnis illarum disciplinarum et artium. Cicero is speaking of the :ry earliest Hellenic influences on Rome, but his description is just as appropriate the period which we are considering.

A HISTORY OF ROME

under the fashionable roof. The first private library in Rome was established by Aemilius Paulus, when he brought home the books that had belonged to the vanquished Perseus ;¹ and it became as much a feature of conquest amongst the highly cultured to bring home a goodly store of literature as to gather objects of art which might merely please the sensuous taste and touch only the outer surface of the mind.²

But it was deemed by no means desirable to limit the influences of the new culture to the minds of the mature. There was, indeed, a school of cautious Hellenists that might have preferred this view, and would at any rate have exercised a careful discrimination between those elements of the Greek training which would strengthen the young mind by giving it a wider range of vision and a new gallery of noble lives and those which would lead to mere display, to effeminacy, nay (who could tell ?) to positive depravity. But this could not be the point of view of society as a whole. If the elegant Roman was to be half a Greek, he must learn during the tender and impressionable age to move his limbs and modulate his voice in true Hellenic wise. Hence the picture which Scipio Aemilianus, sane Hellenist and stout P-oman, gazed at with astonished eyes and described in the vigorous and uncompromising language suited to a former censor. " I was told," he said, " that free-born boys and girls went to a dancing school and moved amidst disreputable professors of the art. I could not bring my mind to believe it; but I was taken to such a school myself, and Good Heavens ! What did I see there! More than fifty boys and girls, one of them, I am ashamed to say, the son of a candidate for office, a boy wearing the golden boss, a lad not less than twelve years of age. He was jingling a pair of castanets and dancing a step which an immodest slave could not dance with decency."³Such might have been the reflections of a puritan had he entered a modern dancing-academy. We may be permitted to question the immorality of the exhibition thus displayed, but there can be no doubt as to the social ambition which it reveals—an ambition

¹ Plut. Paul. 28.

² Sulla brought back the library of Apellicon of Teos, Lucullus the very large one of the kings of Pontus (Plut. Sulla 26 ; Luc. 42; Isid. Orig. vi. 5). Lucullus allowed free access to his books. Here we get the germ of the public library. The first that was genuinely public belongs to the close of the Republican era. It was founded by Asinius Pollio in the Atrium Libertatis on the Aventine (Plin. H. N. vii. 45 ; Isid. Orig. vi. 5).

³ Macrob. Sat. iii. 14. 7.

THE COST OF POLITICAL LIFE 23

which would be perpetuated throughout the whole of the life of the boy with the castanets, which would lead him to set a high value on the polish of everything he called his own—a polish determined by certain rigid external standards and to be attained at any hazard, whether by the ruinous concealment of honest poverty, or the struggle for affluence even by the most questionable means.

But the burdens on the wealth of the great were by no means limited to those imposed by merely social canons. Political life at Rome had always been expensive in so far as office was unpaid and its tenure implied leisure and a considerable degree of neglect of his own domestic concerns in the patriot who was willing to accept it. But the State had lately taken on itself to increase the financial expenditure which was due to the people without professing to meet the bill from the public funds. The 'State' at Rome did not mean what it would have meant in such a context amongst the peoples of the Hellenic world. It did not mean that the masses were preying on the richer classes, but that the richer classes were preying on themselves; and this particular form of voluntary self-sacrifice amongst the influential families in the senate was equivalent to the confession that Rome was ceasing to be an Aristocracy and becoming an Oligarchy, was voluntarily placing the claims of wealth on a par with those of birth and merit, or rather was insisting that the latter should not be valid unless they were accompanied by the former. The chief sign of the confession that political advancement might be purchased from the people in a legitimate way, was the adoption of a rule, which was established about the time of the First Punic War, that the cost of the public games should not be defrayed exclusively by the treasury.¹ It was seldom that the people could be brought to contribute to the expenses of the exhibitor by subscriptions collected from amongst themselves;² they were the recipients, not the givers of the feast, and the actual donors knew that the exhibition was a contest for favour, that reputations were being won or lost on the merits of the show, and that the successful competitor was laying up a store-house of gratitude which would materially aid his ascent to the highest prizes in the State. The personal cost, if it

¹ Dionys. vii. 71. . "They had made contributions in 186 b.c. towards the games ot bcipio Asiaticus (Plin. H. N. xxxiii. 138).

A HISTORY OF ROME

could not be wholly realised on the existing patrimony of the magistrate, must be assisted by gifts from friends, by loans from money-lenders at exorbitant rates of interest and, worst but readiest of all methods, by contributions, nominally voluntary but really i enforced, from the Italian allies and the provincials. As early as the year 180 the senate had been forced to frame a strong resolution against the extravagance that implied oppression ;¹ but the resolution was really a criticism of the new methods of government; the roots of the evil (the burden on the magistracy, the increase in the number of the regularly recurring festivals) they neither cared nor ventured to remove. The aedileship was the particular magistracy which was saddled with this expenditure on account of its traditional connection with the conduct of the public games; and although it was neither in its curule nor plebeian form an obligatory step in the scale of the magistracies, yet, as it was held before the praetor-ship and the consulship, it was manifest that the brilliant display given to the people by the occupant of this office might render fruitless the efforts of a less wealthy competitor who had shunned its burdens.² The games were given jointly by the respective pairs Qf colleagues,³ the Ludi Romani being under the guidance of the surule,⁴ the Ludi Plebeii under that of the plebeian aediles.⁶ Had these remained the only annual shows, the cost to the exhibitor, although great, would have been limited. But other festivals, which had once been occasional, had lately been made permanent. The games to Ceres (Cerialia), the remote origins of which may have dated back to the time of the monarchy, first appear as fully established in the year 202;⁶ the festival to Flora (Floralia) dates from but 238 b.c,⁷ but probably did not become annual until 173;⁸while the games to the Great Mother (Meg alesia) followed by thirteen years the invitation and hospitable reception of that Phrygian god-

¹ Livy (xl. 44) after describing the senatus consultum, in which occur the words Sieve quid ad eos ludos arcesseret, cogeret, acciperet, faceret adversus id senatus :onsultum, quod L. Aemilio Cn. Baebio consulibus de ludis factum esset, adds Decreverat id senatus propter effusos sumptus, factos in ludos Ti. Sempronii aedilis, jui graves non modo Italiae ac sociis Latini nominis sed etiam provinciis externis uerant.

² The effect was still worse when a rich man avoided it. Cic. de Off. ii. 17. 58 /itanda tamen suspicio est avaritiae. Mamerco, homini divitissimo, praetermissio ledilitatis consulatus repulsam attulit. Sulla said that the people would not give lim the praetorship because they wished him to be aedile first. They knew that he :ould obtain African animals for exhibition ( Plut. Sulla 5).

³ Cic. in Verr. v. 14. 36. ⁴ Liv. x. 47 ; xxvii. 6. ^s Liv. xxiii. 30. 6 Liv. xxx. 39.

⁷ Plin. H. N. xviii. 286. ⁸ Mommsen Rom. Munzw. p. 645.

POPULAR SPECTACLES 25

dess by the Romans, and became a regular feature in their calendar in 191-¹ This increase in the amenities of the people, every item of which falls within a term of fifty years, is a remarkable feature of the age which followed Rome's assumption of imperial power. It proved that the Roman was willing to bend his austere religion to the purposes of gratification, when he could afford the luxury, that the enjoyment of this luxury was considered a happy means of keeping the people in good temper with itself and its rulers, and that the cost of providing it was considered, not merely as compatible with the traditions of the existing regime, but as a means jf strengthening those traditions by closing the gates of office to the poor.

The types of spectacle, in which the masses took most delight, were also new and expensive creations. These types were chiefly furnished by the gladiatorial shows and the hunting of wild beasts. Even the former and earlier amusement had had a history of little more than a hundred years. It was believed to be a relic of that realistic view of the after life which lingered in Italy long after it had passed from the more spiritual civilisation of the Greeks. The men who put each other to the sword before the eyes of the sorrowing crowd were held to be the retinue which passed with the dead chieftain beyond the grave, and it was from the sombre rites of the Etruscans that this custom of ceremonial slaying was believed to have been transferred to Rome. The first year of the First Punic War witnessed the earliest combat that accompanied a Roman funeral,² and, although secular enjoyment rapidly took the place of grim funereal appreciation, and the religious belief that underlay the spectacle may soon have passed away, neither the State nor the relatives were supposed to have done due honour to the illustrious dead if his own decease were not followed by the death-struggle of champions from the rival gladiatorial schools, and men who aspired to a decent funeral made due provision for such combats in their wills. The Roman magistrate bowed to the prevalent taste, and displays of gladiators became one of the most familiar features of the aediles' shows. Military sentiment was in its favour, for it was believed to harden the nerves of the race that had sprung from the

¹ Liv. xxxvi. 36. On these festivals see Warde Fowler The Roman Festivals pp. 72. 91. 70. The Megalesia seem to have fallen to the lot of the curule aediles (Dio. Cass, xliii. 48), the others to have been given indifferently by either pair.

^a Val. Max. ii. 4. 7 ; Liv. Ep. xvi. It was exhibited in the Forum Boarium by Marcus and Decimus Brutus at the funeral of their father.

A HISTORY OF ROME

loins of the god of war,¹ and humane sentiment has never in any age been shocked at the contemporary barbarities which it tolerates or enjoys. But a certain element of coarseness in the sport, and perhaps the very fact that it was of native Italian growth, might have given it a short shrift, had the cultured classes really possessed the power of regulating the amusements of the public. Leaders of society would have preferred the Greek Agon with its graceful wrestling and its contests in the finer arts. But the Roman public would not be hellenised in this particular, and showed their mood when a musical exhibition was attempted at the triumph of Lucius Anicius Gallus in 167. The audience insisted that the performers should drop their instruments and box with one another.² This, although not the best, was yet a more tolerable type of what a contest of skill should be. It was natural, therefore, that the professional fighting man should become a far more inevitable condition of social and political success than the hunter or the race-horse has ever been with us. Some enterprising members of the nobility soon came to prefer ownership to the hire system and started schools of their own in which the lanista was merely the trainer. A stranger element was soon added to the possessions of a Roman noble by the growing craze for the combats of wild beasts. The first recorded " hunt" of the kind was that given in 186 by Marcus Fulvius at the close of the Aetolian war when lions and panthers were exhibited to the wondering gaze of the people.³ Seventeen years later two curule aediles furnished sixty-three African lions and forty bears and elephants for the Circensian games.⁴ These menageries eventually became a public danger and the curule aedile (himself one of the chief offenders) was forced to frame an edict specifying the compensation for damage that might be committed by wild beasts in their transit through Italy or their residence within the towns.⁵The obligation of wealth to supply luxuries for the poor—a splendid feature of ancient civilisation in which it has ever taken precedence of that of the modern world—was recognised with the utmost frankness in the Rome of the day ; but it was an obligation that had passed the limits at which it could be cheerfully performed as the

¹ Compare Livy's description (xli. 20) of the adoption of Roman gladiatorial shows by Antiochus Epiphanes—Armorum studium plerisque juvenum accendit.

² Polyb. xxx. 13. ³ Liv. xxxix. 22. ⁴ Liv. xliv. 18.

⁶ Dig. 21. 1. 40-42 (from the edict of the curule aediles) Ne quis canem, verrem vel minorem aprum, lupum, ursum, pantheram, leonem . . . qua vulgo iter fiet, ita habuisse velit, ut cuiquam nocere damnumve dare possit.

ATTEMPTS TO CHECK LUXURY 27

duty of the patriot or the patron ; it had reached a stage when its demoralising effects, both to giver and to receiver, were patent to every seeing eye, but when criticism of its vices could be met by the conclusive rejoinder that it was a vital necessity of the existing political situation.¹

\The review which we have given of the enormous expenditure created by the social and political appetites of the day leads up to the consideration of two questions which, though seldom formulated or faced in their naked form, were ever present in the minds of the classes who were forced to deem themselves either the most responsible authors, or the most illustrious victims, of the ^existing standards both of politics and society. These^juestions weref'Could^ the exhausting drain be stopped ? " and '*If it could not, how was; it to be supplied ?" A city in a state of high fever will always, produce the would-be doctor; but the curious fact about the RomeY of this and other days is that the doctor was so often the patients, in another form. Just as in the government of the provinces the]¹scandals of individual rule were often met by the severest legislation^ proceeding from the very body which had produced the evil-doers,\ so when remedies were suggested for the social evils of the city, the/ Vsenate, in spite of its tendency to individual transgression, generally displayed the possession of a collective conscience. The men who¹, formulated the standard of purity and self-restraint might bejgw in number; but, except they displayed the irritating activity and the uncompromising methods of a Cato, they generally secured the support of their peers, and the sterner the censor, the more gladly was he hailed as~~an ornament to the order. This guardian of morals still issued his edicts against delicacies of the table, foreign perfumes and expensive houses;² as late as the year 169 people would hastily put out their lights when it was reported that Tiberius Sempronius Graccus was coming up the street on his return from supper, lest they should fall under the suspicion of untimely revelry,³ind the sporadic activity of the censorship will find ample illustration in the future chapters of our work. Degradation from the various orders of the State was still a consequence of its animad-

¹ Cic. de Off. ii. 17. 60 Tota igitur ratio talium largitionum genere vitiosa est, temporibus necessaria. He adds the pious but unattainable wish Tamen ipsa et ad facultates accomodanda et mediocritate moderanda est. Compare the remarks of Pohlmann on the subject in his Geschichtt des antiken Communismus und Sozialismus ii. 2. p. 471.

'Mommsen Staatsr. ii., p. 382. ³ Plut. Ti. Gracch. 14.

A HISTORY OF ROME

versions; but a milder, more universal and probably far more efficacious check on luxury-\bhe system, pursued by Cato, of adopting an excessive rating for articles of value¹ and thus of shifting the incidence of taxation from the artisan and farmer to the shoulders of the r-jrlipst. rlass²—had been taken out of its hands by the complete cessation of direct imposts after the Third Macedonian War.³

Meanwhile sumptuary laws continued to be promulgated from the Rostra and accepted by the people. All that are known to have been initiated or to have been considered valid after the close of the great wars have but one object—an attack on the expenses of the table, a form of sensuous enjoyment which, on account of the ease and barbaric abundance with which wealth may vaunt itself in this domain, was particularly in vogue amongst the upper classes in Rome. Other forms of extravagance seem for the time to have been left untouched by legislation, for the Oppian law which had been due to the strain of the Second Punic War had been repealed after a fierce struggle in 195, and the Roman ladies might now adorn themselves with more than half an ounce of gold, wear robes of divers colours and ride in their carriages through any street they pleased.⁴ The first enactment which attempted to control the wastefulness of the table was an Orchian law of 181, limiting the number of guests that might be invited to entertainments. Cato was consistent in opposing the passing of the measure and in resisting its repeal. He recognised a futile law when he saw it, but he did not wish this futility to be admitted.⁵ Twenty years later⁶ a Fannian law grew out of a decree of the senate which had enjoined that the chief men (principes) of the State should take an oath before the consuls not to exceed a certain limit of expense in the banquets given at the Megalesian Games. Strengthened by this expression of opinion the consuls then went to the people

¹ Liv. xxxix. 44; Plut. Cat. Maj. 18.

² Nitzsch Die Gracchen, p. 128.

³ Cic. de Off. ii. 22. 76 (Paullus) tantum in aerarium pecuniae invexit, ut unius imperatoris praeda finem attulerit tributorum. A deterrent to luxury could still have been created by imposing heavy harbour-dues on articles of value; but this would have required legislation. Nothing,is known about the Republican tariff at Italian ports. The percentage may have been uniform for all articles.

⁴ Liv. xxxiv. cc. 1-8; Val. Max. ix. 1. 3 ; Tac. Ann. iii. 33.

⁵Macrob. Sat. iii. 17; Festus pp. 201, 242; Schol. Bob. p. 310; Meyer Orat. Rom. Fragm. p. gi.

"This date (161) is given by Pliny (H. N. a. I3g); Macrobius (Sat. iii. 17. 3) places the law in isg.

SUMPTUARY LAWS 29

with a measure which prescribed more harrassing details than the Orchian law. The new enactment actually determined the value and nature of the eatables whose consumption was allowed. It permitted one hundred asses to be spent on the days of the Roman Games, the Plebeian Games and the Saturnalia, thirty asses on certain other festival occasions, and but ten asses (less than twice the daily pay of a Roman soldier) on every other meal throughout the year; it forbade the serving of any fowl but a single hen, and that not fattened; it enjoined the exclusive consumption of native wine.¹ This enactment was strengthened eighteen years later by a Didian law, which included in the threatened penalties not only the giver of the feast which violated the prescribed limits, but also the guests who were present at such a banquet. It also compelled or induced the Italian allies to accept the provisions of the Fannian law² —an unusual step which may show the belief that a luxury similar to that of Rome was weakening the resources of the confederacy, on whose strength the leading state was so dependent, or which may have been induced by the knowledge that members of the Roman nobility were taking holiday trips to country towns, to enjoy the delights which were prohibited at home and to waste their money on Italian caterers.³

The frequency of such legislation, which we shall find renewed once again before the epoch of the reforms of Sulla ⁴ seems to prove its ineffectiveness,⁶ and indeed the standard of comfort which it desired to enjoin was wholly incompatible with the circumstances of the age. The desire to produce uniformity⁶ of standard had always been an end of Roman as of Greek sumptuary regulation, but what type of uniformity could be looked for in a community where the

¹ Gell. ii. 24 ; Macrob. Sat. iii. 17 ; Plin. H. N. x. 139 ; Tertull. Apol. vi. The ten asses of this law are the Fanni centussis misellus of Lucilius.

² It seems that we must assume formal acceptance on the part of the allies in accordance with the principle that Rome could not legislate for her confederacy, a principle analogous to that which forbade her to force her franchise on its members (Cic. pro Balbo 8. 20 and 21).

³ We may compare the enactment of 193 b.c., which was produced by the discovery that Roman creditors escaped the usury laws by using Italians as their agents (Liv. xxxv. 7 M. Sempronius tribunus plebis . . . plebem rogavit plebesqne scivit ut cum sociis ac nomine Latino creditae pecuniae jus idem quod cum civibus Romanis esset).

⁴ The Lex Licinia, which is attributed by Macrobius (l.c.) to P. Licinius Crassus Dives, perhaps belongs either to his praetorship (104 b.c.) or to his consulship (97 b.c.).

⁶ Gellius (ii. 24), in speaking of Sulla's experiments, says of the older laws Legibus istis situ atque senio obliteratis. ⁶ Exaequatio (Liv. xxxiv. 4).

A HISTORY OF ROME

extremes of wealth and poverty were beginning to be so strongly marked, where capital was accumulating in the hands of the great noble and the great trader and being wholly withdrawn from those of the free-born peasant and artisan ? The restriction of useless consumption was indeed favourable to the more productive employment of capital; but we shall soon see that this productive use, which had as its object the deterioration of land by pasturage and the purchase of servile labour, was as detrimental to the free citizen as the most reckless extravagance could have been. There is no question, however, that both the sumptuary laws and the censorian ordinances of the period did attempt to attain an economic as well as a social end; and, however mistaken their methods may have been, they showed some appreciation of the industrial evils of the time. The provision of the Fannian law in favour of native wines¹ suggests the desire to help the small cultivator who had substituted vine-growing for the cultivation of cereals, and foreshadows the protective legislation of the Ciceronian period.² Much of this legislation, too, was animated by the "mercantile" theory that a State is impoverished by the export of the precious metals to foreign lands^a—a view which found expression in a definite enactment of an earlier period which had forbidden gold or silver to be paid to the Celtic tribes in the north of Italy in exchange for the wares or slaves which they sold to Roman merchants.⁴

^Another series of laws aimed at securing the purity of an electorate exposed to the danger of corruption by the overwhelming influence of wealth. "~fcaws against bribery, unknown in an earlier period,⁵ become painfully frequent from the date at which Rome came into contact with the riches of the East. Six years after the close of the great Asiatic campaign the people were asked, on the authority of the senate, to sanction more than one act which was directed

¹ P. 29. ² Cic. de Rep. iii. g. 16; see p. 80.

³ Compare Tac. Ann. iii. 53. The Emperor Tiberius here speaks of Ilia femin-arum propria, quis lapidum causa pecuniae nostrae ad externas aut hostilis gentes transferuntur.

⁴ The prohibition belongs to the year 22g B.C. (Zonar. viii. ig). For other prohibitions of the same kind dating from a period later than that which we are considering see Voigt in Iwan-Muller's Handbuch iv. 2, p. 376 n. 95.

⁵ Earlier enactments had been directed against canvassing, but not against bribery. The simplicity of the fifth century B.C. was illustrated by the law that a candidate should not whiten his toga with chalk (Liv. iv. 25 ; 433 B.C.). TheL«* Poetelia of 358 B.C. (Liv. vii. 16) was directed against personal solicitation by novi homines. Some law of ambitus is known to Plautus (Amph. prol. 73 ; cf. Trinumm. iv. 3. 26). See Rein Criminalrecht p. 706.

THE MOTIVE FOR GAIN 31

against the undue influence exercised at elections;¹ in 166 fresh scandals called for the consideration of the Council of State ;² and the year 159 saw the birth of another enactment.³ Yet the capital penalty, which seems to have been the consequence of the transgression of at least one of these laws,⁴ did not deter candidates from staking their citizenship on their success. The still-surviving custom of clientship made the object of largesses difficult to establish, and the secrecy of the ballot, which had been introduced for elections in 139, made it impossible to prove that the suspicious gift had been effective and thus to construct a convincing case against the donor.

The moral control exercised by the magistrate and the sumptuary or criminal ordinances expressed in acts of Parliament might serve as temporary palliatives to certain pronounced evils of the moment; but they were powerless to check the extravagance of an expenditure which was sanctioned by custom and in some respects actually enforced by law.⁵ One of the greatest of the practical needs of the new Roman was to increase his income in every way that might be deemed legitimate by a society which, even in its best days, had never been overscrupulous in its exploitation of the poor and had been wont to illustrate the sanctity of contract by visible examples of grinding oppression. The nature and intensity of the race for wealth differed with the needs of the anxious spendthrift ; and in respect both to needs and to means of satisfaction the upper middle class was in a far more favourable position than its noble governors. It could spend its unfettered energies in the pursuit of the profits which might be derived from public contracts, trade, banking and money-lending, while it was not forced to submit to the drain created by the canvass for office and the exorbitant demands made by the electorate on the pecuniary resources of the candidate. The brilliancy of the life of the mercantile class, with its careless luxury and easy indifference to expenditure, set a standard For the nobility which was at once galling and degrading. They »vere induced to apply the measure of wealth even to members of their own order, and regarded it as inevitable that any one of their

¹Liv. xl. ig Leges de ambitu consules ex auctoritate senatus ad populum ulerunt. This was the lex Cornelia Baebia and that it referred to pecuniary cor-uption is known from a fragment of Cato (ap. Non. vii. ig, s.v. largi, Cato lege 3aebia: pecuniam inlargibo tibi).

³ Obsequens lxxi. ³ Liv. Ep. xlvii.

⁴ Polyb. vi. 56 iraph fiev KapxySovlois Sapa tpavepas StS6yres \ap&&vov<ri Tas apx&s, rapa He 'Poi/iai'uis Bdvaros ^oti irepl tovto irp6trrinov.

⁸ P. 23.

A HISTORY OF ROME

peers, whose patrimony had dwindled, should fill but a subordinate place both in politics and society;¹ while the means which they were sometimes forced to adopt in order to vie with the wealth of the successful contractor and promoter were, if hardly less sound from a moral point of view, at least far more questionable from a purely legal standpoint.

A fraction of the present wealth which was in the possession of some of the leading families of the nobility may have been purely adventitious, the result of the lucky accident of command and conquest amidst a wealthy and pliant people. The spoils of war were, it is true, not for the general but for the State ; yet he exercised great discretionary power in dealing with the movable objects, which in the case of Hellenic or Asiatic conquest formed one of the richest elements in the prize, and the average commander is not likely to have displayed the self-restraint and public spirit of the destroyer of Corinth.² Public and military opinion would permit the victor to retain an ample share of the fruits of his prowess, and this would be increased by a type of contribution to which he had a peculiar and unquestioned claim. This consisted in the honorary offerings made by states, who found themselves at the feet of the victor and were eager to attract his pity and to enlist on their behalf his influence with the Roman govern ment. Instances of such offerings are the hundred and fourteen golden crowns which were borne in the triumph of Titus Quinctius Flamininus,³ those of two hundred and twelve pounds' weight shown in the triumphof Manlius,⁴ and the great golden wreath of one hundred and fifty pounds which had been presented by the Ambraciots to Nobilior.⁵ But the time had not yet been reached when the general on a campaign, or even the governor of a district which was merely disturbed by border raids, could calmly demand hard cash as the equivalent of the precious metal wrought into this useless form, and when the " coronary gold " was to be one of the regular perquisites of any Roman governor who claimed to have achieved military success.⁶ Nor is it likely that the triumphant general of this period melted down the offerings which he

¹ The position of the ruined patrician will be fully illustrated in the following pages when we deal with the careers of Scaurus and of Sulla.

² P- 19- ⁸ Liv. xxxiv. 52. ⁴ Liv. xxxix. 7. 5 Liv. xxxviii. 9.

⁶ For the later history of the aurum coronarium see Marquardt Staatsverw. ii. p. 295. It was developed from the triumf hales coronae (Festus p. 367) and is described as gold Quod triumphantibus ... a victis gentibus datur and as imposed by commanders Propter concessam vitam (al. immunitatem) (Serv. Ad. Aen. viii. 721).

THE PATH TO WEALTH 33

might dedicate in temples or reserve for the gallery of his house, and we must conclude that the few members of the nobility who had conducted the great campaigns were but slightly enriched by the offerings which helpless peoples had laid at their feet. It would be almost truer to say that the great influx of the precious metals had increased the difficulties of their position ; for, if the gold or silver took the form of artistic work which remained in their possession, it but exaggerated the ideal to which their standard of life was expected to conform ; and if it assumed the shape of the enormous amount of specie which was poured into the coffers of the State or distributed amongst the legionaries, its chief effects were the heightening of prices and a showy appearance of a vast increase, of wealth which corresponded to no real increase in production.

But, whatever the effects of the metallic prizes of the great campaigns, these prizes could neither have benefited the members of the nobility as a whole nor, in the days of comparative peace which had followed the long epoch of war with wealthy powers, could they be contemplated as a permanent source of future capital or income. When the representative of the official caste looked round for modes of fruitful investment which might increase his revenues, his chances at first sight appeared to be limited by legal restrictions which expressed the supposed principles of his class. A Clodian law enacted at the beginning of the Second Punic War had provided that no senator or senator's son should own a ship of a burden greater than three hundred amphorae. The intention of the measure was to prohibit members of the governing class from taking part in foreign trade, as carriers, as manufacturers, or as participants in the great husiness of the contract for corn which placed provincial grain on the Roman market; and the ships of small tonnage which they were allowed to retain were intended to furnish them merely with the power of transporting to a convenient market the produce of their own estates in Italy.¹ The restriction was not imposed in a self-regarding spirit; it was odious to the nobility, and, as it was supported by Flaminius, must have been popular with the masses, who were blind to the fact that the restriction of a senator's energies to agriculture would be infinitely more disastrous to the well-being of the average citizen than the

¹ Liv. xxi. 63 (218 b.c.) Id satis habitum ad fructus ex agris vectandos ; quaestus omnis patribus indecorus visus.

A HISTORY OF ROME

expenditure of those energies in trade. The restriction may have received the support of the growing merchant class, who were perhaps pleased to be rid of the competition of powerful rivals, and it certainly served, externally at least, to mark the distinction between the man of large industrial enterprises and the man whose official rank was supported by landed wealth—a distinction which, in the shape of the contrast drawn between knights and senators, appears at every turn in the history of the later Republic. But, whatever the immediate motives for the passing of the measure, a great and healthy principle lay behind it. It was the principle that considerations of foreign policy should not be directly controlled 01 hampered by questions of trade, that the policy of the State should not become the sport of the selfish vagaries of capital. The spirit thus expressed was directly inimical to the interests of the merchant, the contractor and the tax-farmer. How inimical it was could not yet be clearly seen; for the transmarine interests of Rome had not at the time attained a development which invited the mastery of conquered lands by the Roman capitalist. But, whether this Clodian law created or merely formulated the antithesis between land and trade, between Italian and provincial profits, it is yet certain that this antithesis was one of the most powerful of the animating factors of Roman history for the better part of the two centuries which were to follow the enactment. It produced the conflict between a policy of restricted enterprise, pursued for the good of the State and the subject, and a policy of expansion which obeyed the interests of capital, between a policy of cautious protection and that madness of imperialism which is ever associated with barbarism, brigandage or trade.

But, if we inquire whether this enactment attained its ostensible object of completely shutting out senators from the profits of any enterprise that could properly be described as commercial, we shall find an affirmative answer to be more than dubious. The law was a dead letter when Cicero indicted Verres,¹ but its demise may have been reached through a long and slow process of decline. But, even if the provisions of the law had been adhered to throughout the period which we are considering, the avenue to wealth derived from business intercourse with the provinces would not necessarily have been closed to the official class. We shall soon see that the

¹ It was antiqua et mortua (Cic. in Verr. v. 18. 45).

THE NOBLES AS TRADERS 35

companies which were formed for undertaking the state-contracts probably permitted shares to be held by individuals who never appeared in the registered list of partners at all,¹ and we know that to hold a share in a great public concern was considered one of the methods of business which did not subject the participant to the taint of a vulgar commercialism.² And, if the senator chose to indulge more directly in the profits of transmarine commerce, to what extent was he really hindered by the provisions of the law ? He might not own a ship of burden, but his freedmen might sail to any port on the largest vessels, and who could object if the returns which the dependant owed his lord were drawn from the profits of commerce? Again there was no prohibition against loans on bottomry, and Cato had increased his wealth by becoming through his freedman a member of a maritime company, each partner in which had but a limited liability and the prospect of enormous gains.³ The example of this energetic money-getter also illustrates many ways in which the nobleman of business tastes could increase his profits without extending his enterprises far from the capital. It was possible to exploit the growing taste in country villas, in streams and lakes and natural woods; to buy a likely spot for a small price, let it at a good rental, or sell it at a larger price. The ownership of house property within the town, which grew eventually into the monopoly of whole blocks and streets by such a man as Crassus,⁴ was in every way consistent with the possession of senatorial rank. It was even possible to be a slave-dealer without loss of dignity, at least if one transacted the sordid details of the business through a slave. The young and promising boy required but a year's training in the arts to enable the careful buyer to make a large profit by his sale.⁶ Yet such methods must have been regarded by the nobility as a whole as merely subsidiary means of increasing their patrimony : and, in spite of the fact that Cato took the view that agriculture should

'P. 44.

² Cicero (Parad. 6. 46) speaks of those Qui honeste rem quaerunt mercaturis faciendis, operis_dandis, publicis sumendis. Compare the category of banausic trades in de Off. 1. 42. 150, although in the Paradoxa the contrast is rather that between honest and vicious methods of money-making. Deloume (Les manieurs d'argent a Rome pp. 58 ff.) believes that the fortune of Cicero swelled through participation in publico,.

³ Plut. Cato Maj. 21. ⁴ Plut. Crass. 2.

⁶ Plut. Cato Maj. 21. Cato employed this method of training as a means of increasing the peculium of his own slaves. But even the peculium technically belonged to the master, and it is obvious that the slave-trainer might have been used by others as a mere instrument for the master's gain.

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be an amusement rather than a business,¹ there can be no doubt that the staple of the wealth of the official class was still to be found in the acres of Italy. It was not, however, the wealth of the moderate homestead which was to be won from a careful tillage of the fields; it was the wealth which, as we shall soon see, was associated with the slave-capitalist, the overseer, a foreign method of cultivation on the model of the grand plantation-systems of the East, and a belief in the superior value of pasturage to tillage which was to turn many a populous and fertile plain into a wilderness of danger and desolation.

But, strive as he would, there was many a nobleman who found that his expenditure could not be met by dabbling in trade where others plunged, or by the revenues yielded by the large tracts of Italian soil over which he claimed exclusive powers. The playwright of the age has figured Indigence as the daughter of Luxury²; and a still more terrible child was to be born in the Avarice which sprang from the useless cravings and fierce competitions of the time.³ The desire to get and to hold had ever been a Roman vice ; but it had also been the unvarying assumption of the Roman State, and the conviction of the Roman official—a conviction so deeply seated and spontaneous as to form no ground for self-congratulation—that the lust for acquisition should limit itself to the domain of private right, and never cross the rigid barrier which divided that domain from the sphere of wealth and power which the city had committed to its servant as a solemn trust. The better sort of overseer was often found in the crabbed man of business—a Cato, for example—who would never waive a right of his own and protected those of his dependants with similar tenacity and passion. The honour which prevailed in the commercial code at home was considered so much a matter of course in all dealings with the foreign world, that the State scorned to scrutinise the expenditure of its ministers and was spared the disgrace of a system

¹ Plut. I.e. aiTT6fievos 8e ffvvTOvdjTepov Tropur/iov rh\v y^v yeotpytav /ia\\ov TjyetTO Stayoyy^v ir) TrpStroSov.

² Plaut. Trinumm. Prol. 8

Primum mihi Plautus nomen Luxuriae indidit: Turn hanc mihi gnatam esse voluit Inopiam.

³ Liv. xxxiv. 4 (Cato's speech in defence of the Oppian law) Saepe me querentem de feminarum, saepe de virorum, nec de privatorum modo, sed etiam magistratuum sumptibus audistis ; diversisque duobus vitiis, avaritia et luxuria, civitatem laborare. Compare Sallust's impressions of a later age (Cat. 3) Pro pudore, pro abstinentia, pro virtute, audacia, largitio, avaritia vigebant.

COMPARATIVE PURITY OF ADMINISTRATION 37

of public audit. I Even in this age, which is regarded by the ancient historians as maramg the beginning of the decline in public virtue, Polybius could contrast the attitude of suspicion towards the guardians of the State, which was the characteristic of the official life of his own unhappy country, with the well-founded confidence which Rome reposed in the honour of her ministers, and could tell the world that " if but a talent of money were entrusted to a magistrate of a Greek state, ten auditors, as many seals and twice as many witnesses are required for the security of the bond; yet even so faith is not observed; while the Roman in an official or diplomatic post, who handles vast sums of money, adheres to his duty through the mere moral obligation of the oath which he has sworn^;'; that " amongst the Romans the corrupt official is as rare a portent as is the financier with clean hands amongst other peoples ".¹ When the elder Africanus tore up the account books of his brother—books which recorded the passage of eighteen thousand talents from an Asiatic king to a Roman general and from him to the Roman State²—he was imparting a lesson in confidence, which was immediately accepted by the senate and people. And it seems that, so far as the expenditure of public moneys was concerned, this confidence continued to be justified. It is true that Cato had furiously impugned the honour of commanders in the matter of the distribution of the prizes of war amongst the soldiers and had drawn a bitter contrast between private and official thieves. " The former," he said, " pass their lives in thongs and iron fetters, the latter in purple and gold."³ But there were no fixed rules of practice which guided such a distribution, and a commander, otherwise honest, might feel no qualms of conscience in exercising a selective taste on his own behalf. On the other hand, deliberate misappropriation of the public funds seems to have been seldom suspected or at least seldom made the subject of judicial cognisance, and for many years after a standing court was established for the trial of extortion no similar tribunal was thought necessary for the crime of peculation* Apart from the long, tortuous and ineffective trial of the Scipios,⁵ no question of the kind is known to have been raised since Manius Acilius Glabrio, the conqueror of Antiochus and

¹ Polyb. vi. 56. 2 Polyb. xxiv. 9. .....

³ Cato ap. Gell. xi. 18. 18. The speech was one De praeda mihtibus dividenda. * We first hear of a standing court for peculates in 66 b.c. (Cic. pro Cluent. 53. 147). It was probably established by Sulla.

⁶ Rein Criminalr. pp. 680 ff.; Mommsen Rom. Forsch. 11. pp. 437 n.

A HISTORY OF ROME

the Aetolians, competed for the censorship. Then a story, based on the existence of the indubitable wealth which he was employing with a lavish hand to win the favour of the people, was raked up against him by some jealous members of the nobility. It was professed that some money and booty, found in the camp of the king, had never been exhibited in the triumph nor deposited in the treasury. The evidence of legates and military tribunes was invited, and Cato, himself a competitor for the censorship, was ready to testify that gold and silver vases, which he had seen in the captured camp, had not been visible in the triumphal procession. Glabrio waived his candidature, but the people were unwilling to convict and the prosecution was abandoned.¹ Here again we are confronted by the old temptation of curio-hunting, which the nobility deemed indecent in so " new " a man as Glabrio; the evidence of Cato—the only testimony which proved dangerous—did not establish the charge that money due to the State had been intercepted by a Roman consul.

But the regard for the property of the State was unfortunately not extended to the property of its clients. Even before the provinces had yielded a prey rendered easy by distance and irresponsibility, Italian cities had been forced to complain of the violence and rapacity of Roman commanders quartered in their neighbourhood,²and the passive silence with which the Praenestines bore the immoderate requisitions of a consul, was a fatal guarantee of impunity which threatened to alter for ever the relations of these free allies to the protecting power.³ But provincial commands offered greater temptations and a far more favourable field for capricious tyranny; for here the exactions of the governor were neither repudiated by an oath of office nor at first even forbidden by the sanctions of a law. Requisitions could be made to meet the needs of the moment, and these needs were naturally interpreted to suit the cravings and the tastes of the governor of the moment.⁴ Cato not only cut down

¹ Liv. xxxvii. 57 and 58 (190 b.c.).

² See especially the case of Pleminius, Scipio's lieutenant at Locri (204 b.c.), who, after a committee had reported on the charge, was conveyed to Rome but died in bonds before the popular court had pronounced judgment (Liv. xxix. 16-22).

"Liv. xlii. r (173 b.c.) Silentium, nimis aut modestum'aut timidum Prae-nestmorum, jus, velut probato exemplo, magistratibus fecit graviorum in dies talis generis imperiorum.

¹ For such requisitions see Plut. Cato Maj. 6 (of Cato's government of Sardinia) t&v npb auTOV tnpariryiiv elai6Tav xPVtOui Kal aicriv<&n*(ri Sjjjuoiriois mil K\lmis Kai tuaHois, TtoWtf 5c flepairefo koI tpl\uv ir\tyzi ical ircpl Mtrva. Sairiivais koI Trapturicevius fiapwivronr.

EXTORTION IN THE PROVINCES 39

the expenses that had been arbitrarily impbsed on the unhappy natives of Sardinia,¹ but seems to have been the author of a definite law which fixed a limit to such requisitions in the future.² But it was easier to frame an ordinance than to guarantee its observation, and, at a time when the surrounding world was seething with war, the regulations made for a peaceful province could not touch the actions of a victorious commander who was following up the results of conquest. Complaints began to pour in on every hand—from the Ambraciots of Greece, the Cenomani of Gaul³—and the senate did its best, either by its own cognisance or by the creation of a commission of investigation, to meet the claims of the dependent peoples. A kind of rude justice was the result, but it was much too rude to meet an evil which was soon seen to be developing into a trade of systematic oppression. A novel step was taken when in 171 delegates from the two Spains appeared in the Curia to complain of the avarice and insolence of their Roman governors. A praetor was commissioned to choose from the senatorial order five of such judges as were wont to be selected for the settlement of international disputes (recuperatores), to sit in judgment on each of the indicted governors,⁴ and the germ of a regular court for what had now become a regular offence was thus developed. The further and more shameful confession, that the court should be permanent and interpret a definite statute, was soon made, and the Calpurnian law of 1^9 ⁵ was the first of that long series of enactments for extortion which mark the futility of corrective measures in the face of a weak system of legal, and a still weaker system of moral, control. Trials for extortion soon became the plaything of politics, the favourite arena for the exercise of the energies of a young and rising politician, the favourite weapon with which old family feuds might be at once revenged and perpetuated. They were soon destined to gain a still greater significance as furnishing the criteria of the methods of administration which the State was expected to employ, as determining the respective rights of the administrator and the

¹Liv. xxxii. 27 Sumptus, quos in cultum praetorum socii facere soliti erant, circumcisi aut sublati (rg8 b:c).

² The Lex de Termessibus (a charter of freedom given to Termessus in Pisidia in 71 b.c.) enjoins (ii. 1. 15) Nei . . . quis magistrates . . . inperato, quo quid magis iei dent praebeant ab ieisve auferatur nisei quod eos ex lege Porcia dare praebere oportet oportebit. This Porcian law was probably the work of Cato (Rein Criminalr. p. 607).

³ Liv. xxxviii. 43 ; xxxix. 3 ; Rein, I.e. ⁴ Liv. xhu. 2.

⁵ Cic. Brut. 27. 106; de Off. ii. 21. 75 ; cf. in Verr. iii. 84. 195; iv. 25. 56,

A HISTORY OF ROME

capitalist to guide the destinies of the inhabitants of a dependent district. Their manifold political significance destroys our confidence in their judgments, and we can seldom tell whether the acquittal or the condemnation which these courts pronounced was justified on the evidence adduced. But there can be no question of the evil that lay behind this legislative and judicial activity. The motive which led men to assume administrative posts abroad was in many cases thoroughly selfish and mean,—the desire to acquire wealth as rapidly as was consistent with keeping on the safe side of a not very exacting law. No motive of this kind can ever be universal in a political society, and in Rome we cannot even pronounce it to be general. Power and distinction attracted the Roman as much as wealth, and some governors were saved from temptation by the colossal fortunes which they already possessed. But how early it had begun to operate in the minds of many is shown by the eagerness which, as we shall see, was soon to be displayed by rival consuls for the conduct of a war that might give the victor a prolonged control over the rich cities which had belonged to the kingdom of Pergamon, if it is not proved by the strange unwillingness which magistrates had long before exhibited to assume some commands which had been entrusted to their charge.¹

A suspicion of another type of abuse of power, more degrading though not necessarily more harmful than the plunder of subjects, had begun to be raised in the minds of the people and the government. It was held that a Roman might be found who would sell the supposed interests of his country to a foreign potentate, or at any rate accept a present which might or might not influence his judgment. A commissioner to Illyria had been suspected of pocketing money offered him by the potentates of that district in 171,² and the first hint was given of that shattering of public confidence in the integrity of diplomatists which wrought such havoc in the foreign politics of the period which forms the immediate subject

¹ Liy. xli. 15. (176 b.c.) Duo (praetores) deprecati sunt ne in provincias irent, M. Popillius in Sardiniam : Gracchum earn provinciam pacare &c. . . . Probata Popillii excusatio est. P. Licinius Crassus sacrificiis se impediri sollemnibus ex-cusabat, ne in provinciam iret. Citerior Hispania obvenerat. Ceterum aut ire jussus aut jurare pro contione sollemni sacrificio se prohiberi . . . Praetores ambo in eadem verba jurarunt. I have seen the passage cited as a proof that governors would not go to unproductive provinces; but Sardinia was a fruitful sphere for plunder, and the excuses may have been genuine. That of Popillius seems to have been positively patriotic.

² Liv. xlii. 45 Decimius unus sine ullo effectu, captarum etiam pecuniarum ab regibus Illyriorum suspicione infamis, Romam rediit.

THE KNIGHTS 41

of our; work. The system of the Protectorate, which Rome had so widely adopted, with its secret diplomatic dealings and its hidden conferences with kings, offered greater facilities for secret enrichment, and greater security for the enjoyment of the acquired wealth, even than the plunder of a province. The proof of the committal of the act was difficult, in most cases impossible. We must be content to chronicle the suspicion of its growing frequency, and the suspicion is terrible enough. If the custom of wringing wealth from subjects and selling support to potentates continued to prevail, the stage might soon be reached at which it could be said, with that element of exaggeration which lends emphasis to a truth, that a small group of men were drawing revenues from every nation in the world.¹

Such were the sources of wealth that lay open to men, to whom commerce was officially barred and who were supposed to have no direct interest in financial operations. Far ampler spheres of pecuniary enrichment, more uniformly legal if sometimes as oppressive, were open to the class of men who by this time had been recognised as forming a kind of second order in the State. The citizens who had been proved by the returns at the census to have a certain amount of realisable capital at their disposal—a class of citizens that ranged from the possessors of a moderate patrimony, such as society might employ as a line of demarcation between an upper and a lower middle class, to the controllers of the most gigantic fortunes—had been welded into a body possessing considerable social and political solidarity. This solidarity had been attained chiefly through the community of interest derived from the similar methods of pecuniary investment which they employed, but also through the circumstance (slight in itself but significant in an ancient society which ever tended to fall into grades) that all the members of this class could describe themselves by the courtesy title of "Knights"—a description justified by the right which they possessed of serving on their own horses with the Roman cavalry instead of sharing the foot-service of the legionary. A common designation was not inappropriate to men who were in a certain sense public servants and formed in a very real sense a branch of the administration. The knight might have many avocations ; he might be a money-lender, a banker, a large importer; but he was pre-

¹ Cic. in Verr. v. 48. 126 (70 b.c.) Patimur . . . multos jam annos et silemus cum videamus ad paucos homines omnes omnium nationum pecunias pervenisse.

A HISTORY OF ROME

eminently a farmer of the taxes. His position in the former cases was simply that of an individual, who might or might not be temporarily associated with others; his position in the latter case meant that he was a member of a powerful and permanent corporation, one which served a government from which it might wring great profits or at whose hands it might suffer heavy loss—a government to be helped in its distress, to be fought when its demands were overbearing, to be encouraged when its measures seemed progressive, to be hindered when they seemed reactionary from a commercial point of view. A group of individuals or private firms could never have attained the consistency of organisation, or maintained the uniformity of policy, which was displayed by these societies of revenue-collectors; even a company must have a long life before it can attain strength and confidence sufficient to act in a spirited manner in opposition to the State; and it seems certain that these societies were wholly exempted from the paralysing principle which the Roman law applied to partnership—a principle which dictated that every partnership should be dissolved by the death or retirement of one of the associates.¹ The State, which possessed no civil service of its own worthy of the name, had taken pains to secure permanent organisations of private share-holders which should satisfy its needs, to give them something of an official character, and to secure to each one of them as a result of its permanence an individual strength which, in spite of the theory that the taxes and the public works were put up to auction, may have secured to some of these companies a practical monopoly of a definite sphere of operations. But a company, at Rome as elsewhere, is powerful in proportion to the breadth of its basis. A small ring of capitalists may tyrannise over society as long as they confine themselves to securing a monopoly over private enterprises, and as long as the law permits them to exercise this autocratic power without control; but such a ring is far less capable of meeting the arbitrary dictation of an aristocratic body of landholders, such as the senate, or of encountering the resentful opposition of a nominally all-powerful body of consumers, such as the Comitia, than a corporation which has struck its roots deeply in society by the wide distribution of its shares. We know from the positive assurance of a skilled observer of Roman life that the

¹ For the principle see Gaius iii. 151-153.

THE PUBLIC COMPANIES

number of citizens who had an interest in these companies was particularly large.¹ This observer emphasises the fact in order to illustrate the dependence of a large section of society on the will of the senate, which possessed the power of controlling the terms of the agreements both for the public works which it placed in the hands of contractors and for the sources of production which it put out to lease;² but it is equally obvious that the large size of the number of shareholders must have exercised a profoundly modifying influence on the arbitrary authority of a body such as the senate which governed chiefly through deference to public opinion ; and we know that, in the last resort, an appeal could be made to the sovereign assembly, if a magistrate could be found bold enough to carry to that quarter a proposal that had been discountenanced by the senate.³ In such crises the strength of the companies depended mainly on the number of individual interests that were at stake; the shareholder is more likely to appear at such gatherings than the man who is not profoundly affected by the issue, and it is very seldom that the average consumer has insight enough to see, or energy enough to resist, the sufferings and inconveniences which spring from the machinations of capital. It may have been possible at times to pack a legislative assembly with men who had some financial interest, however slight, in a dispute arising from a contract calling for decision; and the time was soon to come when such questions of detail would give place to far larger questions of policy, when the issues springing from a line of foreign activity which had been taken by the government might be debated in the oold and glittering light of the golden stakes the loss or gain of which depended upon the policy pursued. Nor could it have been easy even for the experienced eye to see from the survey of such a gathering that it represented the army of capital. Research has

¹ Polybius (vi. 17), after speaking of various kinds of property belonging to the state, adds iraWa x^'P^ff'" <rv/i0ali>ei t& Trpoeiprj/iepa 8ia tou irX-fiBovs, Kal crxeSbp as eitos e'aretn nfanas 4p$e54<r8ai rats avals Kal Tats 4pya<riais rais 4k tovtuv.

² Polyb. vi. 17. The senate can irujUirc-ii/iaTor yepo/ievov Kovtpicrai Kal Tb itapi.irav iSuvaTov Tivbs o-v^&ptos airohvaai rrjs 4pyavlas. Thus the senate invalidated the locations of the censors of 184 b.c. (Liv. xxxix. 44 Locationes cum senatus precibus et lacrimis publicanorum victus induci et de integro locari jussisset.)

³In i6g b.c. it was the people that released from an oppressive regulation (Liv. xliii. 16). In this case a tribune answered the censor's intimation, that none of the former state-contractors should appear at the auction, by promulgating the resolution Quae publica vectigalia, ultro tributa C. Claudius et Ti. Sempronius locassent, ea rata locatio ne esset. Ab integro locarentur, et ut omnibus redimendi et conducendi promiscue jus esset.

A HISTORY OF ROME

rendered it probable that the companies of the time were composed of an outer as well as of an inner circle; that the mass of shareholders differed from those who were the promoters, managers and active agents in the concern, that the liability of the former at least was limited and that their shares, whether small or great, were transmissible and subject to the fluctuations of the market.¹ But, even if we do not believe that this distinction between socii and participes was legally elaborated, yet there were probably means by which members of the outside public could enter into business relations with the recognised partners in one of these concerns to share its profits and its losses.² The freedman, who had invested his small savings in the business of an enterprising patron, would attach the same mercantile value to his own vote in the assembly as would be given to his suffrage in the senate by some noble peer, who had bartered the independence of his judgment for the acquisition of more rapid profits than could be drawn from land.

The farmers of the revenue fell into three broad classes.V First there were the contractors for the creation, maintenance and repair of the public works possessed or projected by the State, such as roads, aqueducts, bridges, temples and other public buildings. Gigantic profits were not possible in such an enterprise, if the censors and their advisers acted with knowledge, impartiality and discretion; for the lowest possible tender was obtained for such contracts and the results might be repudiated if inspection proved them to be unsatisfactory. ^Secondly there were the companies which leased sources of production that were owned by the State such as fisheries, salt-works, mines and forest land. In some particular cases even arable land had been dealt with in this way,

¹ Deloume op. cit. pp. ng ff. Polybius (vi. 17) has been quoted as an authority for the distinction between these two classes. He says ol /iiv yap ayopi.£ovtrt irapa tSjv Tifi7]Twv avrol ras inS6<reis, ol Se noivwovtri roirois, ol 5' iyyvwvrai robs Tiyopaniras, oi Se ras obfflas SiSiWi jrepl roinuv (is rb Silvia ioi>. The first three classes are the mancipes, socii and praedes. In the fourth the shareholders {participes or perhaps adfrnes, cf. Liv. xliii. 16) are found by Deloume (p. 120); but the identification is very uncertain. The words may denote either real as opposed to formal security or the final payment of the vectigal into the treasury. A better evidence for the distinction between socii and shareholders is found in the Pseudo-Asconius (in Cic. in Verr. p. 197 Or.) Aliud enim socius, aliud particeps qui certam habet partem et non i»divise agit ut socius. The magnas partes (Cic. pro Rab. Post. 2. 4) and the particulam (Val. Max. vi. 9. 7) of a publicum, need only denote large or small shares held by the socii. Dare partes (Cic. I.e.) is to "allot shares," but not necessarily to outside members. Apart from the testimony of the Pseudo-Asconius and the mention of adfrnes in Livy the evidence for the ordinary shareholder is slight but by no means fatal to his existence.

² E.g. by loan to a socius at a rate of interest dependent on his returns, perhaps with a pactum de non petendo in certain contingencies.

OPERATIONS IN STATE CONTRACTS 45

and the confiscated territories of Capua and Corinth were let on long leases to publicani. ^Thirdly there were the societies, which did not themselves acquire leases but acted as true intermediaries between the State and individuals¹ who paid it revenue whether as occupants of its territory, or as making use of sites which it claimed to control, or as owing dues which had been prescribed by agreement or by law. These classes of debtors to the State with whom the middlemen came into contact may be illustrated respectively by the occupants of the domain land of Italy, the ship-masters who touched at ports, and the provincials such as those of Sicily or Sardinia who were burdened with the payment of a tithe of the produce of their lands.². If we consider separately the characteristics of the three classes of state-farmers, we find that the first and the second are both direct employers of labour, the third reaping only indirect profits from the production controlled by others. It was in this respect, as employers of labour, that the societies of the time were free from the anxieties and restrictions that beset the modern employment of capital. Except in the rare case where the contractors had leased arable land and sublet it to its original occupants,—the treatment which seems to have been adopted for the Campanian territory ³—there can be no question that the work which they controlled was done mainly by the hands of slaves. They were therefore exempt from the annoyance and expense which might be caused by the competition and the organised resistance of free labour. The slaves employed in many of these industries must have been highly skilled ; for many of these spheres of wealth which the State had delegated to contractors required peculiar industrial appliances and unusual knowledge in the foremen ana leading artificers. The weakness of slave-labour,—its lack of intelligence and spirit—could not have been so keenly felt as it was on the great agricultural estates, which offered employment chiefly for the unskilled; and the difficulties that might arise from the lack

¹ These are, in strict legal language, the true publicani; the lessees of state property are publicanorum loco (Dig. 39. 4. 12 and 13).

² Later legal theory-assimilated the third with the first class. Gaius says (u. 7) In eo (provinciali) solo dominium populi Romani est vel Caesaris, nos autem possessionem tantum vel usumfructum habere videmur. But the theory is not ancient—perhaps not older than the Gracchan period. See Greenidge Roman Pubhc Life p. 320. From a broad standpoint the first and second classes may be assimilated, since the payment of harbour dues (portoria) is based on the idea of the use of public ground by a private occupant.

³ Cic. de Leg. Agr. ii. 31. 84.

A HISTORY OF ROME

of strength or interest, from the possession of hands that were either feeble or inert, were probably overcome in the same uncompromising manner in the workshop of the contractor and on the domains of the landed gentry. The maxim that an aged slave should be sold could not have been peculiar to the dabbler in agriculture, and the ergastulum with its chained gangs must have been as familiar to the manufacturer as to the landed proprietor.¹As to the promoters and the shareholders of these companies, it could not be expected that they should trace in imagination, or tremble as they traced, the heartless, perhaps inhuman, means by which the regular returns on their capital were secured.³ Nor is it probable that the government of this period took any great care to supervise the conditions of the work or the lot of the workman. The partner desired quick and great returns, the State large rents and small tenders. The remorseless drain on human energy, the waste of human life, and the practical abeyance of free labour which was flooding the towns with idlers, were ideas which, if they ever arose, were probably kept in the background by a government which was generally in financial difficulties, and by individuals animated by all the fierce commercial competition of the age.

The desire of contractors and lessees for larger profits naturally took the form of an eagerness to extend their sphere of operations. Every advance in the Roman sphere of military occupation implied the making of new roads, bridges and aqueducts; every extension of this sphere was likely to be followed by the confiscation of certain territories, which the State would declare to be public domains and hand over to the company that would guarantee the payment of the largest revenue. But the sordid imperialism which animated the contractor and lessee must have been as nothing to that which fed the dreams of the true state-middleman, the individual who intervened between the taxpayer and the State, the producer and the consumer. Conquest would mean fresh lines of coast and frontier, on which would be set the toll-houses of the collectors with their local directors and their active " families " of freedmen and slaves. It might even mean that a more prolific source of revenue would be handed over to the care of the publican. The spectacle of the method in which the land-tax was assessed and collected in Sicily

¹ Thedenat in Daremberg-Saglio Diet, des Antiq. s.v. Ergastulum. "Compare Cunningham Western Civilisation in its Economic Aspects vol. i. p. 162.

COMMERCE AND IMPERIALISM 47

and Sardinia may have already inspired the hope that the next instance of provincial organisation might see greater justice done to the capitalists of Rome. When Sicily had been brought under Roman sway, the aloofness of the government from financial interests, as well as its innate conservatism, justified by the success of Italian organisation, which dictated the view that local institutions should not be lightly changed, had led it to accept the methods for the taxation of land which it found prevalent in the island at the time of its annexation. The methods implied assessment by local officials and collection by local companies or states.¹ It is true that neither consequence entirely excluded the enterprise of the Roman capitalists; they had crossed the Straits of Messina on many a private enterprise and had settled in such large numbers in the business centres of the island that the charter given to the Sicilian cities after the first servile war made detailed provision for the settlement of suits between Romans and natives.² It was not to be expected that they should refrain from joining in, or competing with, the local companies who bid for the Sicilian tithes, nor was such association or competition forbidden by the law. But the scattered groups of capitalists who came into contact with the Sicilian yeomen did not possess the official character and the official influence of the great companies of Italy. No association, however powerful, could boast a monopoly of the main source of revenue in the island. But what they had done was an index of what they might do, if another opportunity and a more complaisant government could be found. Any individual or any party which could promise the knights the unquestioned control of the revenues of a new province would be sure of their heartiest sympathy and support.

And it would be worth the while of any individual or party which ventured to frame a programme traversing the lines of political orthodoxy, to bid for the co-operation of this class. For recent history had shown that the thorough organisation of capital, encouraged by the State to rid itself of a tiresome burden in times of peace and to secure itself a support in times of need, might become, as it pleased, a bulwark or a menace to the government which had created it. The useful monster had begun to develop a self-consciousness of his own. He had his amiable, even his patriotic

¹ Cic. in Verr. ii. 55. 137 ; iii. 33. 77; ii. 13. 3² < 26. 63.

2 Ibid. ii. 13. 32.

4>8

A HISTORY OF ROME

moments; but his activity might be accompanied by the grim demand for a price which his nominal master was not prepared to pay. The darkest and the brightest aspects of the commercial spirit had been in turn exhibited during the Second Punic War.-^On the one hand we find an organised band of publicans attempting to break up an assembly before which a fraudulent contractor and wrecker was to be tried;¹ on the other, we find them meeting the shock of Cannae with the offer of a large loan to the beggared treasury, lent without guarantee and on the bare word of a ruined government that it should be met when there was money to meet it.² Other companies came forward to put their hands to the public works, even the most necessary of which had been suspended by the misery of the war, and told the bankrupt State that they would ask for their payment when the struggle had completely closed.³ A noble spectacle ! and if the positions of employer and employed had been reversed only in such crises and in such a way, no harm could come of the memory either of the obligation or the service. But the strength shown by this beneficence sometimes exhibited itself in unpleasant forms and led to unpleasant consequences. The censorships of Cato and of Gracchus had been fierce struggles of conservative officialdom against the growing influence and (as these magistrates held) the swelling insolence of the public companies; and in both cases the associations had sought and i found assistance, either from a sympathetic party within the senate, or from the people. Cato's regulations had been reversed and their vigorous author had been threatened with a tribunician prosecution before the Comitia;⁴while Gracchus and his colleague had actually been impeached before a popular court.⁶ The reckless employment of servile labour by the companies that farmed the property of the State had already proved a danger to public security. The society which had purchased from the censors the right of gathering pitch from the Bruttian forest of Sila had filled the neighbourhood with bands of fierce and uncontrolled dependants, chiefly slaves, but partly men of free birth who may have been drawn from the desperate Bruttians whom Rome had driven from their homes. The consequences were deeds of violence and murder, which called for the intervention of the senate, and the consuls had been appointed

¹ Liv. xxv. 3. 2 Liv. xxiii. 49.

³ Liv. xxiv. 18 ; Val. Max. v. 6. 8.

⁴ Plut. Cato Maj. ig. 5 Liv. xliii. 16.

THE FINANCIER

as a special commission to inquire into the outrages.¹ Nor were complaints limited to Italy; provincial abuses had already called for drastic remedies. A proof that this was the case is to be found in the striking fact that on the renewed settlement of Macedonia in 167 it was actually decreed that the working of the mines in that country, at least on the extended scale which would have required a system of contract, should be given up. It was considered dangerous to entrust it to native companies, and as to the Roman —their mere presence in the country would mean the surrender of all guarantees of the rule of public law or of the enjoyment of liberty by the provincials.² The State still preferred the embarrassments of poverty to those of overbearing wealth ; its choice proved its weakness; but even the element of strength displayed in the surrender might soon be missed, if capital obtained a wider influence and a more definite political recognition. As things were, these organisations of capital were but just becoming conscious of their strength and had by no means reached even the prime of their vigour. The opening up of the riches of the East were required to develop the gigantic manhood which should dwarf the petty figure of the agricultural wealth of Italy.

Had the state-contractors stood alone, or had not they engaged in varied enterprises for which their official character offered a favourable point of vantage, the numbers and influence of the individuals who had embarked their capital in commercial enterprise would have been far smaller than they actually were. But, in addition to the publican, we must take account of the business man (negotiator) who lent money on interest or exercised the profession of a banker. Such men had pecuniary interests which knew no geographical limits, and in all broad questions of policy were likely to side with the state-contractor.³ The money-lender

¹ Cic. Brut. 22. 85 Cum in silva Sila facta caedes esset notique homines inter-fecti insimulareturque familia, partim etiam liberi, societatis ejus, quae picarias de P. Cornelio, L. Mummio censoribus redemisset, decrevisse _ senatum ut de ea re cognoscerent et statuerent consules. For the value of the pine-woods of Sila see Strabo vi. 1. 9. .

² Liv. xlv. 18 Metalli quoque Macedonici, quod ingens vectigal erat, locationesque ^raediorum rusticorum tolli placebat. Nam neque sine publicano exerceri posse, et, ubi publicanus esset, ibi aut jus publicum vanum aut libertatem socns nullam esse. The pracdia rustica were probably public domains, that might have formed part of the crown lands of the Macedonian Kings and would now, in the natural course of events, have been leased to publicani.

³ It might happen that the interest of the negotiator was opposed to that of the publicanus. The former, for instance, might wish portoria to be lessened, the latter to be increased (Cic. ad Alt. ii. 16. 4). But such a conflict was unusual.

A HISTORY OF ROME

(fenerator) represented one of the earliest, most familiar and most courted forms of Roman enterprise—one whose intrinsic attractions for the grasping Roman mind had resisted every effort of the legislature by engaging in its support the wealthiest landowner as well as the smallest usurer. It is true that a taint clung to the trade— a taint which was not merely a product of the mistaken economic conception of the nature of the profits made by the lender, but was the more immediate outcome of social misery and the fulminations of the legislature. Cato points to the fact that the Roman law had stamped the usurer as a greater curse to society than the common thief, and makes the dishonesty of loans on interest a sufficient ground for declining a form of investment that was at once safe and profitable.¹ Usury, he had also maintained, was a form of homicide.² But to the majority of minds this feeling of dishonour had always been purely external and superficial. The proceedings were not repugnant to the finer sense if they were not made the object of a life-long profession and not blatantly exhibited to the eyes of the public. A taint clung to the money-lender who sat in an office in the Forum, and handed his loans or received his interest over the counter;³ it was not felt by the capitalist who stood behind this small dealer, by the nobleman whose agent lent seed-corn to the neighbouring yeomen, by the investor in the state-contracts who perhaps hardly realised that his profits represented but an indirect form of usury. But, whatever restrictions public opinion may have imposed on the money-lender as a dealer in Rome and with Romans, such restrictions were not likely to be felt by the man who had the capital and the enterprise to carry his financial operations beyond the sea. Not only was he dealing with provincials or foreigners, but he was dealing on a scale so grand that the magnitude of the business almost concealed its shame. Cities and kings were now to be the recipients of loans and, if the lender occupied a political position that seemed inconsistent with the profession of a usurer, his personality might be successfully

¹ Cato R. R. pr. i Est interdum praestare mercaturis rem quaerere, nisi tam periculosum sit, et item fenerari, si tam honestum sit. Majores nostri sic habuerunt et ita in legibus posiverunt, furem dupli condemnari, feneratorem quadrupli. Quanta pejorem civem existimarint feneratorem quam furem, hinc licet existim'are. Cf. Cic. de Off. i. 42. 150 Improbantur ii quaestus, qui in odia hominum incurrunt, ut porti-torum, ut feneratorum.

²Cic. de Off. ii. 25. 8g Cum ille . . . dixisset "Quid fenerari?" turn Cato "Quid hominem," inquit, " occidere ? "

³ For such professional money-lenders see Plaut. Most. iii. x. 1 ff.; Cure. iv. 1. ig.

BANKING

concealed under the name of some local agent, who was adequately rewarded for the obloquy which he incurred in the eyes of the native populations, and the embarrassing conflicts with the Roman government which were sometimes entailed by an excess of zeal. Cato had swept both principals and agents out of his province of Sardinia;¹ but he was a man who courted hostility, and he lived before the age when the enmity of capital would prove the certain ruin of the governor and a source of probable danger to the senate. In the operations of the money-lender we find the most universal link between the Forum and the provinces. There was no country so poor that it might not be successfully exploited, and indeed exploitation was often conditioned by simplicity of character, lack of familiarity with the developed systems of finance, and the lack of thrift which amongst peoples of low culture is the source of their constant need. The employment of capital for this purpose was always far in advance of the limits of Roman dominion. A protectorate might be in the grasp of a group of private individuals long before it was absorbed into the empire, the extension of the frontiers was conditioned by considerations of pecuniary, not of political safety, and the government might at any moment be forced into a war to protect the interests of capitalists whom, in its collective capacity as a government, it regarded as the greatest foes of its dominion.

A more beneficent employment of capital was illustrated by the profession of banking which, like most of the arts which exhibit the highest refinement of the practical intellect, had been given to the Romans by the Greeks.² It had penetrated from Magna Graecia to Latium and from Latium to Rome, and had been fully established in the city by the time of the Second Punic War.³ The strangers, who had introduced an art which so greatly facilitated the conduct of business transactions, had been welcomed by the government, and were encouraged to ply their calling in the shops rented from the State on the north and south sides of the Forum. These argentarii satisfied the two needs of the exchange of foreign money, and of advances in cash on easier terms than could be gained

¹ Liv. xxxii. 27.

² On the history and functions of the bankers see Voigt Ueber die Bankiers, die Buchfuhrung und die Litteralobligation der Rbmer (Abh. d. Konigl. Sachs. Gesell. d. Wissench.; Phil. hist. Classe, Bd. x); Marquardt Staatsverw. ii. pp. 64 ff.; Deloume Les manieurs d'argent d Rome, pp. 146 ff.

³ Plin. H. N. xxi. 3. 8.

A HISTORY OF ROME

from the professional or secret usurer, to citizens of every grade¹who did not wish, or found it difficult, to turn their real property into gold. Similar functions were at a somewhat later period usurped by the money-testers (nummularii), who perhaps entered Rome shortly after the issue of the first native silver coinage, and competed with the earlier-established bankers in most of the branches of their trade.² Ultimately there was no department of business connected with the transference and circulation of money which the joint profession did not embrace. Its representatives were concerned with the purchase and sale of coin, and the equalisation of home with foreign rates of exchange ; they lent on credit, gave security for others' loans, and received money on deposit; they acted as intermediaries between creditors and debtors in the most distant places and gave their travelling customers circular notes on associated houses in foreign lands ; they were equally ready to dissipate by auction an estate that had become the property of a congress of creditors or a number of legatees. Their carefully kept books improved even the methodical habits of the Romans in the matter of business entries, and introduced the form of " contract by ledger" (Utterarum obligatio), which greatly facilitated business operations on an extended scale by substituting the written record of obligation for other bonds more difficult to conclude and more easy to evade.

The business life of Rome was in every way worthy of her position as an imperial city, and her business centre was becoming the greatest exchange of the commercial world of the day. The forum still drew its largest crowds to listen to the voice of the lawyer or the orator; but these attractions were occasional and the constant throng that any day might witness was drawn thither by the enticements supplied by the spirit of adventure, the thirst for news and the strain of business life. The comic poet has drawn for us a picture of the shifting crowd and its chief elements, good and bad, honest and dishonest. He has shown us the man who mingles pleasure with his business, lingering under the Basilica in extremely doubtful company; there too is a certain class of business men

¹ Cf. Cic. de Off. iii. 14. 58 Pythius, qui esset ut argentarius apud omnes ordines gratiosus. . . .

² Yet the two never became thoroughly assimilated. The argentarius, for instance, was not an official tester of money, and the nummularii appear not to have performed certain functions usual to the banker, e.g. sales by auction. See Voigt if. cit. pp. 521. 522.

BUSINESS LIFE AT ROME

giving or accepting verbal bonds. In the lower part of the Forum stroll the lords of the exchange, rich and of high repute; under the old shops on the north sit the bankers, giving and receiving loans on interest.¹ The Forum has become in common language the symbol of all the ups and downs of business life,² and the moralist of later times could refer all students, who wish to master the lore of the quest and investment of money, to the excellent men who have their station by the temple of Janus.³ The aspect of the market place had altered greatly to meet the growing needs. Great Basilicae—sheltered promenades which probably derived their names from the Royal Courts of the Hellenic East—had lately been erected. Two of the earliest, the Porcian and Sempronian, had been raised on the site of business premises which had been bought up for the purpose,⁴ and were meant to serve the purposes of a market and an exchange.⁶ Their sheltering roofs were soon employed to accommodate the courts of justice, but it was the business not the legal life of Rome that called these grand edifices into existence.

The financial activity which centred in the Forum was a consequence, not merely of the contract-system encouraged by the State and of the business of the banker and the money-lender, but of the great foreign trade which supplied the wants and luxuries of Italy and Rome. This was an import trade concerned partly with the supply of corn for a nation that could no longer feed itself, partly with the supply of luxuries from the East and of more necessary products, including instruments of production, from the West. The Eastern trade touched the Euxine Sea at Dioscnrias,

¹ Plaut. Cure. iv. i. 6 ff.

Commonstrabo, quo in quemque hominem facile inveniatis loco.

Ditis damnosos maritos sub basilica quaerito. Ibidem erunt scorta exoleta, quique stipulari solent.

In foro infumo boni homines, atque dites ambulant.

Sub veteribus, ibi sunt qui dant quique accipiunt faenore.

² To be bankrupt is foro mergi (Plaut. Ep. i. 2. 16), a foro fugere, abire (Plant. Pers. iii. 3. 31 and 38).

³ Cic. de Off. ii. 24. 87 Toto hoc de genere, de quaerenda, de collocanda pecunia, vellem etiam de utenda, commodius a quibusdam optumis viris ad Janum medium sedentibus . . . disputatur. For Janus medius and the question whether it means an arch or a street see Richter Topogr. der Stadt Rom. pp. 106. 107.

⁴ Liv. xxxix. 44; xliv. 16. The Porcian was followed by the Fulvian Basilica (Liv. xl. 51). The dates of the three were 184, I7g, i6g b.c. respectively.

⁵ Deloume op. cit. pp. 320 ff.; Guadet in Daremberg-Saglio Diet, des Antiq. s.v. Basilicae.

A HISTORY OF ROME

Asia Minor chiefly at Ephesus and Apamea, and Egypt at Alexandria. It brought Pontic fish, Hellenic wines, the spices and medicaments of Asia and of the Eastern coast of Africa, and countless other articles, chiefly of the type which creates the need to which it ministers. More robust products were supplied by the West through the trade-routes which came down to Gades, Genua and Aquileia. Hither were brought slaves, cattle, horses and dogs; linen, canvas and wool; timber for ships and houses, and raw metal for the manufacture of implements and works of art. Neither in East nor West was the product brought by the producer to the consumer. In accordance with the more recent tendencies of Hellenistic trade, great emporia had grown up in which the goods were stored, until they were exported by the local dealers or sought by the wholesale merchant from an Italian port. As the Tyrrhenian Sea became the radius of the trade of the world, Puteoli became the greatest staple, to which this commerce centred; thence the goods which were destined for Rome were*conveyed to Ostia by water or by land, and taken by ships which drew no depth of water up the Tiber to the city.¹ But it must not be supposed that this trade was first controlled by Romans and Italians when it touched the shores of Italy. Groups of citizens and allies were to be found in the great staples of the world, receiving the products as they were brought down from the interior and supplying the shipping by which they were transferred to Rome.² They were not manufacturers, but intermediaries who reaped a larger profit from the carrying trade than could be gained by any form of production in their native land. The Roman and Italian trader was to be inferior only to the money-lender as a stimulus and a stumbling-block to the imperial government; he was, like the latter, to be a cause of annexation and a fire-brand of war, and serves as an almost equal illustration of the truth that a government which does not control the operations of capital is likely to become their instrument.³

¹ Large transport ships could themselves come to Rome if their build was suited to river navigation. In 167 b.c. Aemilius Paulus astonished the city with the size of a ship (once belonging to the Macedonian King) on which he arrived (Liv. xlv. 35). On the whole question of this foreign trade see Voigt in Iwan-Miiller's Handbuch iv. 2, pp. 373-378.

² Voigt op. cit. p. 377 n. 99.

³ Compare Cunningham Western Civilisation in its Economic Aspects vol. i. p. 165, " It is only under very special conditions, including the existence of a strong government to exercise a constant control, that free play for the formation of

THE SMALL TRADER

If we descend from the aristocracy of trade to its poorer representatives, we find that time had wrought great changes in the lot of the smaller manufacturer and artisan. It is true that the old trade-gilds of Rome, which tradition carried back to the days of Numa, still maintained their existence. The goldsmiths, coppersmiths, builders, dyers, leather-workers, tanners and potters¹ still held their regular meetings and celebrated their regular games. But it is questionable whether even at this period their collegiate life was not rather concerned with ceremonial than with business, whether they did not gather more frequently to discuss the prospects of their social and religious functions than to consider the rules and methods of their trades. We shall soon see these gilds of artificers a great political power in the State—one that often alarmed the government and sometimes paralysed its control of the streets of Rome. But their political activity was connected with ceremonial rather than with trade; it was as religious associations that bhey supported the demagogue of the moment and disturbed the peace of the city. They made war against any aristocratic abuse that was dangled for the moment before their eyes; but they undertook no consistent campaign against the dominance of capital. [ Their activity was that of the radical caucus, not of the trade-union.' But, if even their industrial character had been fully maintained and trade interests had occupied more of their attention than street processions and political agitation, they could never have posed as the representatives of the interests of the free-born sons of Rome. The class of freedmeii was freely admitted to their ranks, and the freedman was from an economic point of view the greatest enemy of the pure-blooded Italian. We shall also see that the freedman was usually not an independent agent in the conduct of the trade which he professed. He owed duties to his patron which limited his industrial activity and rendered a whole-hearted co-operation with his brother-workers impossible.

It is questionable whether any gild organisation could have stood the shock of the immense development of industrial activity

associations of capitalists bent on securing profit, is anything but a public danger. The landed interest in England has hitherto been strong enough to bring legislative control to bear on the moneyed men from time to time. . . . The problem of leaving sufficient liberty for the formation of capital and for enterprise in the use of it, without allowing it licence to exhaust the national resources, has not been solved."

¹ Plut. Numa 17. On the history of these gilds see Waltzing Corporations pro-fessionelles chez Us Romains pp. 61-78.

A HISTORY OF ROME

of which the more fortunate classes at Rome were now reaping the fruits. The trades represented by Numa's colleges would at best have formed a mere framework for a maze of instruments which formed the complex mechanism needed to satisfy the voracious wants of the new society. The gold-smithery of early times was now complicated by the arts of chasing and engraving on precious stones; the primitive builder, if he were still to ply his trade with profit, must associate it with the skill of the men who made the stuccoed ceilings, the mosaic pavements, the painted walls. The leather-worker must have learnt to make many a kind of fashionable shoe, and the dyer to work in violet, scarlet or saffron, in any shade or colour to which fashion had given a temporary vogue. Tailoring had become a fine art, and the movable decorations of houses demanded a host of skilled workmen, each of whom was devoted to the speciality which he professed. It would seem as though the very weaknesses of society might have benefited the lower middle class, and the siftings of the harvest given by the spoils of empire might have more than supplied the needs of a parasitic proletariate. It is an unquestioned fact that the growing luxury of the times did benefit trade with that doubtful benefit which accompanies the diversion of capital from purposes of permanent utility to objects of aesthetic admiration or temporary display; but it is an equally unquestioned fact that this unhealthy nutriment did not strengthen to any appreciable extent such of the lower classes as could boast pure Roman blood. The military conscription, to which the more prosperous of these classes were exposed, was inimical to the constant pursuit of that technical skill which alone could enable its possessor to hold the market against freer competitors. Such of the freedmen and the slaves as were trained to these pursuits—men who would not have been so trained had they not possessed higher artistic perception and greater deftness in execution than their fellows—were wholly freed from the military burden which absorbed much of the leisure, and blunted much of the skill, possessed by their free-born rivals. The competition of slaves must have been still more cruel in the country districts and near the smaller country towns than in the capital itself. At Rome the limitations of space must have hindered the development of home-industries in the houses of the nobles, and, although it is probable that much that was manufactured by the slaves of the country estate was regularly supplied

COMPETITION OF FREEDMEN

to the urban villa, yet for the purchase of articles of immediate use or of goods which showed the highest qualities of workmanship the aristocratic proprietor must have been dependent on the competition of the Roman market. But the rustic villa might be perfectly self-supporting, and the village artificer must have looked in vain for orders from the spacious mansion, which, once a dwelling-house or farm, had become a factory as well. Both in town and country the practice of manumission was paralysing the energies of the free-born man who attempted to follow a profitable profession. The frequency of the gift of liberty to slaves is one of the brightest aspects of the system of servitude as practised by the Romans; but its very beneficence is an illustration of the aristocrat's contempt for the proletariate; for, where the ideal of citizenship is high, manumission—at least of such a kind as shall give political rights, or any trading privileges, equivalent to those of the free citizen—is infrequent. In the Rome of this period, however, the liberation of a slave showed something more than a mere negative neglect of the interests of the citizen. The gift of freedom was often granted by the master in an interested, if not in a wholly selfish, spirit. He was freed from the duty of supporting his slave while he retained his services as a freedman. The performance of these services was, it is true, not a legal condition of manumission ; but it was the result of the agreement between master and slave on which the latter had attained his freedom. The nobleman who had granted liberty to his son's tutor, his own doctor or his barber, might still bargain to be healed, shaved or have his children instructed free of expense. The bargain was just in so far as the master was losing services for which he had originally paid, and juster still when the freedman set up business on the peculium which his master had allowed him to acquire during the days of his servitude. But the contracting parties were on an unequal footing, and the burden enforced by the manumittor was at times so intolerable that towards the close of the second century the praetor was forced to intervene and set limits to the personal service which might be expected from the gratitude of the liberated slave.¹ The performance of such gratuitous services necessarily

¹ The praetor was Rutilius (Ulpian in Dig. 38. 2. 1. 1), perhaps P. Rutilius Rufus, the consul of 105 b.c. (Mommsen Staatsr. iii. p. 433). See the last chapter of this volume. For the principle on which such operae were exacted from freedmen see Mommsen I.e.

A HISTORY OF ROME

diminished the demand for the labour of the free man who attempted to practise the pursuit of an art which required skill and was dependent for its returns on the custom of the wealthier classes; and even such needs as could not be met by the gratuitous services of freedmen or the purchased labour of slaves, were often supplied, not by the labour of the free-born Roman, but by that of the immigrant peregrinus. The foreigner naturally reproduced the arts of his own country in a form more perfect than could be acquired by the Roman or Italian, and as Rome had acquired foreign wants it was inevitable that they should be mainly supplied by foreign hands. We cannot say that most of the new developments in trade and manufacture had slipped from the hands of the free citizens; it would be truer to maintain that they had never been grasped by them at all. And, worse than this, we must admit that there was little effort to attain them. Both the cause and the consequence of the monopoly of trade and manufacture of a petty kind by freedmen and foreigners is to be found in the contempt felt by the free-born Roman for the "sordid and illiberal sources of livelihood".¹ This prejudice was reflected in public law, for any one who exercised a trade or profession was debarred from office at Rome.² As the magistracy had become the monopoly of a class, the prejudice might have been little more than one of the working principles of an aristocratic government, had not the arts which supplied the amenities of life actually tended to drift into the hands of the non-citizen or the man of defective citizenship. The most abject Roman could in his misery console himself with the thought that the hands, which should only touch the plough and the sword, had never been stained by trade. His ideal was that of the nobleman in his palace. It differed in degree but not in kind. It centred round the Forum, the battlefield and the farm.

For even the most lofty aristocrat would have exempted agriculture from the ban of labour;³ and, if the man of free birth could still have toiled productively on his holding, his contempt for the rabble which supplied the wants of his richer fellow-citizens in the towns would have been justified on material, if not on moral,

¹ Inliberales ac sordidi quaestus (Cic. de Off. i. 42. 150). * Gell. yii. (vi.) g; Liv. ix. 46; Mommsen Staatsr. i. p. 497. ³ Cf. Cic. de Off. i. 42. 151 Omnium autem rerum, ex quibus aliquid adquiritur, nihil est agricultura melius, nihil uberius, nihil dulcius, nihil homine libero dignius.,

CONDITION OF AGRICULTURE

grounds. He would have held the real sources of wealth which had made the empire possible and still maintained the actual rulers of that empire. ^Italian agriculture was still the basis of the brilliant life of RomeV Had it not been so, the epoch of revolution could not have been ushered in by an agrarian law. Had the interest in the land been small, no fierce attack would have been made and no encroachment stoutly resisted. We are at the commencement of the epoch of the dominance of trade, but we have uot quitted the epoch of the supremacy of the landed interest.

The vital question connected with agriculture was not that of its failure or success, but that of the individuals who did the work and shared the profits. The labourer, the soil, the market stand in such close relations to one another that it is possible for older types of cultivation and tenure to be a failure while newer types are a brilliant success. But an economic success may be a social failure. Thus it was with the greater part of the Italian soil of the day which had passed into Roman hands. Efficiency was secured by accumulation and the smaller holdings were falling into decay.

A problem so complex as that of a change in tenure and in the type of productive activity employed on the soil is not likely to yield to the analysis of any modern historian who deals with the events of the ancient world. He is often uncertain whether he is describing causes or symptoms, whether the primary evil was purely economic or mainly social, whether diminished activity was the result of poverty and decreasing numbers, or whether pauperism and diminution of population were the effects of a weakened nerve for labour and of a standard of comfort so feverishly high that it declined the hard life of the fields and induced its possessors to refuse to propagate their kind. But social and economic evils react so constantly on one another that the question of the priority of the one to the other is not always of primary importance. A picture has been conjured up by the slight sketches of ancient historians and the more prolonged laments of ancient writers on agriculture, which gives us broad outlines that we must accept as true, although we may refuse to join in the belief that these outlines represent an unmixed and almost incurable evil. These writers even attempt to assign causes, which convince by their probability, although there is often a suspicion that the ultimate and elusive truth has not been grasped.

A HISTORY OF ROME

The two great symptoms which immediately impress our imagination are a decline, real or apparent, in the numbers of the free population of Rome, and the introduction of new methods of agriculture which entailed a diminution in the class of freehold proprietors who had held estates of small or moderate size. The evidence for an actual decline of the population must be gathered exclusively from the Roman census lists.¹ At first sight these seem to tell a startling tale. At the date of the outbreak of the First Punic War (265 b.c.) the roll of Roman citizens had been given as 382,234,² at a census held but three years before the tribunate of Tiberius Gracchus (136 b.c) the numbers presented by the list were 307,833.³ In 129 years the burgess roll had shrunk by nearly 75,000 heads of the population. The shrinkage had not always been steadily progressive ; sometimes there is a sudden drop which tells of the terrible ravages of war. But the return of peace brought no upward movement that was long maintained. In the interval of comparative rest which followed the Third Macedonian War the census rolls showed a decrease of about 13,000 in ten years.⁴ Seven years later 2,000 more have disappeared,⁶ and a slight increase at the next lustrum is followed by another drop of about 14,000.⁶ The needs of Rome had increased_s and the means for meeting them were dwindling year by year. This must be admitted, however we interpret the meaning of these returns. A hasty generalisation might lead us to infer that a wholesale diminution was taking place in the population of Rome and Italy. The returns may add weight to other evidence which points this way; but, taken by themselves, they afford no warrant for such a conclusion. The census lists were concerned, not only purely with Roman citizens, but purely with Roman citizens of a certain type. It is practically certain that they reproduce only the effective fighting strength of Rome,⁷ and take no account of those citizens whose property did not entitle them to be placed amongst the

¹ See de Boor Fasti Censorii. A disturbing element in this enumeration is the uncertainty of numerals in ancient manuscripts. But the fact of the progressive decline is beyond all question. No accidental errors of transcription could have produced this result in the text of Livy's epitome.

² Liv. Ep. xvi.

³ Ibid. lvi. ⁱIbid. xlvi. xlviii.

⁶ Euseb. Arm. a. Abr. 1870 Ol. 158.3 (Hieron. Ol. 158.2 = 608 a.u.c).

⁶ Liv. Ep. lvi.

⁷ Eorum qui arma ferre possent (Liv. i. 44); t&v exiWajj/ r^v tx-roaT^iitxijuav i\kuA<n> (Dionys. xi. 63); rmv iv rats riKixtats (Polyb. ii. 23).

DECLINE OF THE WEALTHIER CLASSES 61

classes.¹ But, if it is not necessary to believe that an actual diminution of population is attested by these declining numbers, the conclusion which they do exhibit is hardly less serious from an economic and political point of view. They show that portions of the well-to-do classes were ceasing to possess the property which entitled them to entrance into the regular army, and that the ranks of the poorer proletariate were being swelled by their impoverishment. It is possible that such impoverishment may have been welcomed as a boon by the wearied veterans of Rome and their descendants. It meant exemption from the heavier burdens of military service, and, if it went further still, it implied immunity from the tribute as long as direct taxes were collected from Roman citizens.² As long as service remained a burden on wealth, however moderate, there could have been little inducement to the man of small means to struggle up to a standard of moderately increased pecuniary comfort, which would certainly be marred and might be lost by the personal inconvenience of the levy.

The decline in the numbers of the wealthier classes is thus attested by the census rolls. But indications can also be given which afford a slight probability that there was a positive diminution in the free population of Rome and perhaps of Italy. The carnage of the Hannibalic war may easily be overemphasised as a source of positive decline. Such losses are rapidly made good when war is followed by the normal industrial conditions which success, or even failure, may bring. But, as we shall soon see reason for believing that these industrial conditions were not wholly resumed in Italy, the Second Punic War may be regarded as having produced a gap in the population which was never entirely refilled. We find evidences of tracts of country which were not annexed by the rich but could not be repeopled by the poor. The policy pursued by the decaying Empire of settling foreign colonists on Italian soil had already occurred to the statesmen of Rome in the infancy of her imperial expansion. In 180 b.c. 40,000 Ligurians belonging to the Apuanian people were dragged from their homes with their wives

¹ Besides the proletarii all under military age would be excluded from these lists. Mommsen (Staatsr. ii. p. 411) goes further and thinks that the seniores are not included in our lists.

"The limit to the incidence of taxation was a property of 1500 asses (Cic. de Rep. ii. 22. 40), the limit of census for military service was by the time of Polybius reduced to 4000 asses (Polyb. vi. 19). Gellius (xvi. 10. 10) gives a reduction to 375 isses at a date unknown but preceding the Marian reform. Perhaps the numerals are incorrect and should be 3,750.

A HISTORY OF ROME

and children and settled on some public land of Rome which lay in the territory of the Samnites. The consuls were commissioned to divide up the land in allotments, and money was voted to the colonists to defray the expense of stocking their new farms.¹ Although the leading motive for this transference was the preservation of peace amongst the Ligurian tribes, yet it is improbable that the senate would have preferred the stranger to its kindred had there been an outcry from the landless proletariate to be allowed to occupy and retain the devastated property of the State.

But moral motives are stronger even than physical forces in checking the numerical progress of a race. Amongst backward peoples unusual indulgence and consequent disease may lead to the diminution or even extinction of the stock; amongst civilised peoples the motives which attain this result are rather prudential, and are concerned with an ideal of life which perhaps increases the efficiency of the individual, but builds up his healthy and pleasurable environment at the expense of the perpetuity of the race. The fact that the Roman and Italian physique was not degenerating is abundantly proved by the military history of the last hundred years of the Republic. This is one of the greatest periods of conquest in the history of the world. The Italy, whom we are often inclined to think of as exhausted, could still pour forth her myriads of valiant sons to the confines marked by the Rhine, the Euphrates and the Sahara; and the struggle of the civil wars,- which followed this expansion, was the clash of giants. But this vigour was accompanied by an ideal, whether of irresponsibility or of comfort, which gave rise to the growing habit of celibacy—a habit which was to stir the eloquence of many a patriotic statesman and finally lead to the intervention of the law. When the censor of 131 uttered the memorable exhortation " Since nature has so ordained that we cannot live comfortably with a wife nor live at all without one, you should hold the eternal safety of the State more dear than your own brief pleasure,"² it is improbable that he was indulging in conscious cynicism, although there may have been a trace of conscious humour in his words. He was simply bending to the ideal of the people whom he saw, or imagined to be, before him. The ideal was not necessarily bad, as one that was concerned with individual life. It implied thrift, forethought, comfort—even efficiency of a kind, for the unmarried man was a more likely

¹ Liv. xl. 38. ² Gell. i. 6. Cf. Liv. Ef. lix.

₍ INCREASE OF CELIBACY 63

recruit than the father of a family. But it sacrificed too much— the future to the present; it ignored the undemonstrable duty which a man owes to the permanent idea of the State through working for a future which he shall never see. It rested partly on a conviction of security; but that feeling of security was the most perilous sign of all.

The practice of celibacy generally leads to irregular attachments between the sexes. In a society ignorant of slavery, such attachments, as giving rise to social inconveniences far greater than those of marriage, are usually shunned on prudential grounds even where moral motives are of no avail. But the existence in Italy of a large class of female dependants, absolutely outside the social circle of the citizen body, rendered the attachment of the master to his slave girl or to his freedwoman fatally easy and un-embarrassing. It was unfortunately as attractive as it was easy. Amidst the mass of servile humanity that had drifted to Italy from most of the quarters of the world there was scarcely a type that might not reproduce some strange and wonderful beauty. And the charm of manner might be secured as readily as that of face and form. The Hellenic East must often have exhibited in its women that union of wit, grace and supple tact which made even its men so irresistible to their Roman masters. The courtesans of the capital, whether of high or low estate,¹ are from the point of view which we are considering not nearly so important as the permanent mistress or "concubine" of the man who might dwell hi any part of Italy. It was the latter, not the former, that was the true substitute for the wife. There is reason to believe that it was about this period that " concubinage " became an institution which was more than tolerated by society.² The relation which it implied between the man and his companion, who was generally one of his freedwomen, was sufficiently honourable. It excluded the idea of union with any other woman, whether by marriage or temporary association; it might be more durable than actual wedlock, for facilities for divorce were rapidly breaking the permanence

¹ See Wallon Hist, de VEsclavage ii. p. 276.

² Concubinatus could not, by the nature of the case, become a legal conception until the Emperor Augustus had devised penalties for stuprum. It was then necessary to determine what kind of stuprum was not punishable. But the social institution and its ethical characteristics, although they may have been made more definite by legal regulations, could not have originated in the time of the Principate. For the meaning oipaelex in Republican times see Meyer Der romische Konkubmat and a notice of that work in the English Historical Review for July 1896.

A HISTORY OF ROME

of the latter bond; it might satisfy the juristic condition of " marital affection" quite as fully as the type of union to which law or religion gave its blessing. But it differed from marriage in one point of vital importance for the welfare of the State. Children might be the issue of concubinatus, but they were not looked on as its end. Such unions were not formed liberum quaerendorum causa.

The decline, or at least the stationary character, of the population may thus be shown to be partly the result of a cause at once social and economic; for this particular social evil was the result of the economic experiment of the extended use of slavery as a means of production. This extension was itself partly the result of the accidents of war and conquest, and in fact, throughout this picture of the change which was passing over Italy, we can never free ourselves from the spectres of militarism and hegemony. But an investigation of the more purely economic aspects of the industrial life of the period affords a clear revelation of the fact that the effects of war and conquest were merely the foundation, accidentally presented, of a new method of production, which was the result of deliberate design and to some extent of a conscious imitation of systems which had in turn built up the colossal wealth, and assisted the political decay, of older civilisations with which Rome was now brought into contact. The new ideal was that of the large plantation or latifundium supervised by skilled overseers, worked by gangs of slaves with carefully differentiated duties, guided by scientific rules which the hoary experience of Asia and Carthage had devised, but, in unskilled Roman hands, perhaps directed with a reckless energy that, keeping in view the vast and speedy returns which could only be given by richer soils than that of Italy, was as exhaustive of the capacities of the land as it was prodigal of the human energy that was so cheaply acquired and so wastefully employed. The East, Carthage and Sicily had been the successive homes of this system, and the Punic ideal reached Rome just at the moment when the tendency of the free peasantry to quit their holdings as unprofitable, or to sell them to pay their debts, opened the way for the organisation of husbandry on the grand Carthaginian model.¹ The opportunity was naturally seized with the utmost eagerness by men whose wants were increasing, whose incomes must

¹ Cunningham Western Civilisation p. 156. Cf. Soltau in Kulturgesch. its klass. Altertums p. 318.

GROWTH OF LARGE ESTATES 65

be made to keep pace with these wants, and whose wealth must inevitably be dependent mainly on the produce of the soil. Yet we have no warrant for accusing the members of the Roman nobility of a deliberate plan of campaign stimulated by conscious greed and selfishness. For a time they may not have known what they were doing. Land was falling in and they bought it up; domains belonging to the State were so unworked as to be falling into the condition of rank jungle and pestilent morass. They cleared and improved this land with a view to their own profit and the profit of the State. Free labour was unattainable or, when attained, embarrassing. They therefore bought their labour in the cheapest market, this market being the product of the wars and slave-raids of the time. They acted, in fact, as every enlightened capitalist would act under similar circumstances. It seemed an age of the revival of agriculture, not of its decay. The official class was filled with a positive enthusiasm for new and improved agricultural methods. The great work of the Carthaginian Mago was translated by order of the senate.¹ Few of the members of that body would have cared to follow the opening maxim of the great expert, that if a man meant to settle in the country he should begin by selling his house in town ;² the men of affairs did not mean to become gentlemen farmers, and it was the hope of profitable investment for the purpose of maintaining their dignity in the capital, not the rustic ideal of the primitive Roman, that appealed to their souls. But they might have hoped that most of the golden precepts of the twenty-eight books, which unfolded every aspect of the science of the management of land, would be assimilated by the intelligent bailiff, and they may even have been influenced by a patriotic desire to reveal to the small holder scientific methods of tillage, which might stave off the ruin that they deplored as statesmen and exploited as individuals. But the lessons were thrown away on the small cultivator; they probably presupposed the possession of capital and labour which were far beyond his reach; and science may have played but little part even in the accumulations of the rich, although the remarkable spectacle of

¹ Plin. H. N. xviii. 3. 22 ; Varro R. R. i. 1. 10.

²Colum. 1. 1. 18. The Latin translation was probably made shortly after the destruction of Canhage, circa 140 b.c. (Mahaffy The Work of Mago on Agriculture in Hermathena vol. vii. i8go). Mahaffy believes that the Greek translation by Cassius Dionysius (Varro R. R. i. 1. 10) was later, and he associates it with the colonies planted by C. Gracchus in Southern Italy.

A HISTORY OF ROME

small holdings, under the personal supervision of peasant proprietors, being unable to hold their own against plantations and ranches managed by bailiffs and worked by slaves, does suggest that some improved methods of cultivation were adopted on the larger estates. The rapidity with which the plantation system spread must have excited the astonishment even of its promoters. Etruria, in spite of the fact that three colonies of Roman citizens had lately been founded within its borders,¹ soon showed one continuous series of great domains stretching from town to town, with scarcely a village to break the monotonous expanse of its self-tilled plains. Little more than forty years had elapsed since the final settlement of the last Roman colony of Luna when a young Roman noble, travelling along the Etruscan roads, strained his eyes in vain to find a free labourer, whether cultivator or shepherd.² In this part of Italy it is probable that Roman enterprise was not the sole, or even the main, cause of the wreckage of the country folk. The territory had always been subject to local influences of an aristocratic kind; but the Etruscan nobles had stayed their hand as long as a free people might help them to regain their independence.³ Now subjection had crushed all other ambition but that of gain and personal splendour, while the ravages of the Hannibalic war had made the peasantry an easy victim of the wholesale purchaser. Farther south, in Bruttii and Apulia, the hand of Rome had co-operated with the scourge of war to produce a like result. The confiscations effected in the former district as a punishment for its treasonable relations with Hannibal,⁴ the suitability of the latter for grazing purposes, which had early made it the largest tract of land in Italy patrolled by the shepherd slave,⁵ had swept village and cultivator away, and left through whole day's journeys but vast stretches of pasture between the decaying towns.

For barrenness and desolation were often the results of the new and improved system of management. There were tracts of country which could not produce cereals of an abundance and quality capable of competing with the corn imported from the provinces; but

¹ Saturnia in 183 (Liv. xxxix. 55), Graviscae in 181 (Liv. xl. 29), Luna in 180 and again in 177 (Liv. xli. 13 ; Mommsen in C. i. L. i. n. 539). See Marquardt Staatsverw. i. p. 3g.

² Plut. Ti. Gracch. 8 ; Nitzsch Die Gracchen p. 198.

³ Nitzsch Die Gracchen p. 198. ⁴ P. 68.

⁵ Liv. xxxix. 29. For the slave revolt of 185 b.C., which is here described, see p. 88,

GROWTH OF PASTURAGE

even on territories where crops could be reared productively, it was tempting to substitute for the arduous processes of sowing and reaping the cheaper and easier industry of the pasturage of flocks. We do not know the extent to which arable land in fair condition was deliberately turned into pasturage; but we can imagine many cases in which the land recently acquired by capitalists, whether from the State or from smaller holders, was in such a condition, either from an initial lack of cultivation or from neglect or from the ravages of war, that the new propietor may well have shrunk from the doubtful enterprise of sinking his capital in the soil, for the purpose of testing its productive qualities. In such cases it was tempting to treat the great domain as a sheep-walk or cattle-ranch. The initial expenses of preparation were small, the labour to be employed was reduced to a minimum, the returns in proportion to the expenses were probably far larger than could be gained from corn, even when grown under the most favourable conditions. The great difficulty in the way of cattle-rearing on a large scale in earlier times had been the treatment of the flocks and herds during the winter months. The necessity for providing stalls and fodder for this period must have caused the proprietor to limit the heads of cattle which he cared to possess. But this constraint had vanished at once when a stretch of warm coast-line could be found, on which the flocks could pasture without feeling the rigour of the winter season. Conversely, the cattle-rearer who possessed the advantage of such a line of coast would feel his difficulties beginning when the summer months approached. The plains of the Campagna and Apulia could have been good neither for man nor beast during the torrid season. The full condition which freed a grazier from all embarrassment and rendered him careless of limiting the size of his flocks, was the combined possession of pastures by the sea for winter use, and of glades in the hills for pasturage in summer.¹Neither the men of the hills nor the men of the plains, as long as they formed independent communities, could become graziers on an extensive scale, and it has been pointed out that even a Greek settlement of the extent of Sybaris had been forced to import its wool from the Black Sea through Miletus.² But when Rome had

¹ Varro R. R. ii. 5. " Pascuntur armenta commodissime in nemoribus, ubi virgulta et frons multa. Hieme secundum mare, aestu abiguntur in montes frondosos.

² Nitzsch Die Gracchen p. 16.

A HISTORY OF ROME

won the Apennines and extended her influence over the coast, there were no limits to the extent to which cattle rearing could be carried.¹It became perhaps the most gigantic enterprise connected with the soil of Italy. Its cheapness and efficiency appealed to every practical mind. Cato, who had a sentimental attachment to agriculture, was bound in honesty to reply to the question " What is the best manner of investment ? " by the words " Good pasturage". To the question as to the second-best means he answered "Tolerable pasturage". When asked to declare the third, he replied "Bad pasturage", To ploughing he would assign only the fourth place in the descending scale.² Bruttii and Apulia were the chief homes of the ranch and the fold. The Lucanian conquest of the former country must, even at a time preceding the Roman domination, have formed a connection between the mountains and the plains, and pasturage on a large scale in the mountain glades of the Bruttian territory may have been an inheritance rather than a creation of the Romans; but the ruin caused in this district by the Second Punic War, the annexation to the State of large tracts of rebel land,³ and the reduction of large portions of the population to the miserable serf-like condition of dediticii,* must have offered the capitalists opportunities which they could not otherwise have secured; and both here and in Apulia the tendency to extend the grazing system to its utmost limits must have advanced with terrible rapidity since the close of the Hannibalic war. It was the East coast of Southern Italy that was chiefly surrendered to this new form of industry, and we may observe a somewhat sharp distinction between the pastoral activity of these regions and the agricultural life which still continued, although on a diminished scale, in the Western districts.⁶i" We have already made occasional reference to the accidents on which the new industrial methods that created the latifundia were designedly based. It is now necessary to examine these accidents

¹ Nitzsch op. cit. p. 17.

² Cic. de Off. ii. 25. 89. So in Cato's more reasoned estimate (R. R. i. 7) of the relative degrees of productivity, although vinea comes first (cf. p. 80) yet pratum precedes campus frumentarius.

^s App. Hannib. 61. ⁴ App. l.c.; Gell. x. 3. 19.

⁶ Nitzsch Die Gracchen p. 193 So zerfiel denn Mittelitalien in zwei scharf-getheilte Half ten, den ackerbauenden Westen und den viehzuchttreibenden Osten; jener reich an HSfen, von Landstrassen durchschnitten, in einer menge von Colonien oder einzelnen Gehoften von Romischen Ackerbiirgern bewohnt; dieser fast ohne Hafen, nur von einer Kustenstrasse durchschnitten, fur den grossen RSmer der rechte Sitz seiner Sclaven und Heerden. Cf. p. 21. For the pasturage in Calabria and Apulia see op. cit. pp. 13 and 193.

CHANGES IN LAND TENURE

in greater detail, if only for the purpose of preparing the ground for a future estimate of the efficacy of the remedies suggested by statesmen for a condition of things which, however naturally and even honestly created, was deplorable both on social and political grounds. The causes which had led to the change from one form of tenure and cultivation to another of a widely different kind required to be carefully probed, if the Herculean task of a reversion to the earlier system was to be attempted. The men who essayed the task had unquestionably a more perfect knowledge of the causes of the change than can ever be possessed by the student of to-day; but criticism is easier than action, and if it is hot to become shamelessly facile, every constraining element in the complicated problem which is at all recoverable (all those elements so clearly seen by the hard-headed and honest Roman reformers, but known by them to possess an invulnerability that we have forgotten) must be examined by the historian in the blundering analysis which is all that is permitted by his imperfect information, and still more imperfect realisation, of the temporary forces that are the millstones of a scheme of reform.

The havoc wrought by the Hannibalic invasion¹ had caused even greater damage to the land than to the people. The latter had been thinned but the former had been wasted, and in some cases wasted, as events proved, almost beyond repair. The devastation had been especially great in Southern Italy, the nations of which had clung to the Punic invader to the end. But such results of war are transitory in the extreme, if the numbers and energy of the people who resume possession of their wrecked homes are not exhausted, and if the conditions of production and sale are as favourable after the calamity as they were before. The amount of wealth which an enemy can injure, lies on the mere surface of the soil, and is an insignificant fraction of that which is stored in the bosom of the earth, or guaranteed by a favourable commercial situation and access to the sea. Carthage could pay her war indemnity and, in the course of half a century, affright Cato by her teeming wealth and fertility. Her people had resumed their old habits, bent wholeheartedly to the only life they loved, and the prizes of a crowded haven and bursting granaries were the result. If a nation does not recover from such a blow, there must be some permanent defect in its economic life or some fatal flaw in its administrative system.

^lLiv. xxviii. n ; cf. Luc. Phars. i. 30.

A HISTORY OF ROME

The devastation caused by war merely accelerates the process of decay by creating a temporary impoverishment, which reveals the severity of the preceding struggle for existence and renders hopeless its resumption. Certainly the great war of which Italy had been the theatre did mark such an epoch in the history of its agricultural life. A lack of productivity began to be manifested, for which, } however, subsequent economic causes were mainly responsible. The 'lack of intensity, which is a characteristic of slave labour, lessened the returns, while the secondary importance attached to the manuring of the fields was a vicious principle inherent in the agricultural precepts of the time.¹ But it is probable that from this epoch there were large tracts of land the renewed cultivation of which was never attempted ; and these were soon increased by domains which yielded insufficient returns and were gradually abandoned. The Italian peasant had ever had a hard fight with the insalubrity of his soil. Fever has always been the dreaded goddess of the environs of Rome. But constant labour and effective drainage had kept the scourge at bay, until the evil moment came when the time of the peasant was absorbed, and his energy spent, in the toils of constant war, when his land was swallowed up in the vast estates that had rapid profits as their end and careless slaves as their cultivators. Then the moist fields gave out their native pestilence, and malaria reigned unchecked over the fairest portion of the Italian plain.²

One of the leading economic causes, which had led to the failure of a certain class of the Italian peasant-proprietors, was the competition to which they were exposed from the provinces. Rome herself had begun to rely for the subsistence of her increasing population on com imported from abroad, and many of the large coast-towns may have been forced to follow her example. The corn-producing powers of the Mediterranean lands had now definitely shifted from the regions of the East and North to those of

¹ Dureau de la Malle (Economie Politique ii. p. 58) compares the precept of the Roman "Quid est agrum bene colere ? bene arare. Quid secundum? arare. Tertio stercorare " with the adage of the French farmer " Fumez bien, labourez mal, vous recueillerez plus qu'en fumant mal et en labourant bien ".

² See Dreyfus Les lois agraires p. 07. Varro (R. R. i. 12. 2) is singularly correct in his account of the nature of the disease that arose from the loca palustria :— Crescunt animalia quaedam minuta, quae non possunt oculi consequi, et per aera intus in corpus per os ac nares perveniunt atque efficiunt difficilis morbos. The passage is cited by Voigt (Iwan-Miiller's Handbuch iv. 2. p. 358) who gives a good sketch of the evils consequent on neglect of drainage.

IMPORTATION OF CORN

the South.¹ Greece, which had been barely able to feed itself during the most flourishing period of its history, could not under any circumstances have possessed an importance as a country of export for Italy; but the economic evils which had fallen on this unhappy land are worthy of observation, as presenting a forecast of the fate which was in store for Rome. The decline in population, which could be attributed neither to war nor pestilence, the growing celibacy and childlessness of its sparse inhabitants,² must have been due to an agricultural revolution similar to that which was gradually being effected on Italian soil. The plantation system and the wholesale employment of slave labour must have swept across the Aegean from their homes in Asia Minor. Here their existence is sufficiently attested by the servile rising which was to assume, shortly after the tribunate of Tiberius Gracchus, the pretended form of a dynastic war; and the troubles which always attended the collection of the Asiatic tithes, in the days when a Roman province had been established in those regions, give no favourable impression of the agricultural prosperity of the countries which lay between the Taurus and the sea. As far south as Sicily there was evidence of exhaustion of the land, and of unnatural conditions of production, which excluded the mass of the free inhabitants from participation both in labour and profits. But even Sicily had learned from Carthage the evil lesson that Greece had acquired from Asia; the plantation system had made vast strides in the island, and the condition of the aratores, whether free-holders or lessees, was not what it had been in the days of Diocles and Timoleon. The growing economic dependence of Rome on Sicily was by no means wholly due to any exceptional productive capacities in the latter, but was mainly the result of proximity, and of administrative relations which enabled the government and the speculator in corn to draw definite and certain supplies of grain from the Sicilian cultivators. This was true also, although to a smaller degree, of Sardinia. But Sicily and Sardinia do mark the beginning of the Southern zone of lands which were capable of filling the markets of the Western world. It was the Northern coast of Africa which rose supreme as the grain-producer of the time. In the Carthaginian territory the natural absence of an agricultural peasantry amidst a commercial folk, and the elaboration of a de-

¹ Nitzsch Die Gracchen p. 228.

Polyb. xxxvii. 4.

A HISTORY OF ROME

finite science of agriculture, had neutralised the ill effects which accompanied the plantation system amongst other peoples less business-like and scientific; the cultivators had shown no signs of unrest and the soil no traces of exhaustion. It has been inferred with some probability that the hostility of Cato, the friend of agriculture and of the Italian yeoman, to the flourishing Punic state was directed to some extent by the fear that the grain of Africa might one day drive from the market the produce of the Italian fields ;¹ and, if this view entered into the calculations which produced the final Punic War, the very short-sightedness of the policy which destroyed a state only to give its lands to African cities and potentates or to Roman speculators, who might continue the methods of the extinct community, is only too characteristic of that type of economic jealousy which destroys an accidental product and leaves the true cause of offence unassailed. The destruction of Carthage had, as a matter of fact, aggravated the danger; for the first use which Masinissa of Numidia made of the vast power with which Rome had entrusted him, was an attempt to civilise his people by turning them into cultivators ;² and the virgin soil of the great country which stretched from the new boundaries of Carthage to the confines of the Moors, was soon reckoned amongst the competing elements which the Roman agriculturist had to fear.

But the force of circumstances caused the Sicilian and Sardinian cultivator to be the most formidable of his immediate competitors. The facility of transport from Sicily to Rome rendered that island superior as a granary to even the more productive portions of the Italian mainland. Sicily could never have revealed the marvellous fertility of the valley of the Po, where a bushel and a half of wheat could be purchased for five pence half-penny, and the same quantity of barley was sold for half this price;³ but it was easier to get Sicilian com to Rome by sea than to get Gallic com to Rome by land; and the system of taxation and requisitions which had grown out of the provincial organisation of the island, rendered it peculiarly easy to place great masses of corn on the Roman market at very short notice. Occasionally the Roman government enforced a sale of com from the province (frumentvm emptum)* a reasonable price being paid for the grain thus demanded for the city

¹ Nitzsch Die Gracchen p. 237. ² Polyb. xxxvii. 3. ³ Polyb. ii. 15. ⁴ For such purchases from Sardinia see Liv. xxxvi. 2, from Sicily (at a period later than that which we are considering) Cic. in Verr. iii. 70. 163.

THE SYSTEM OF POSSESSION

or the army; but this was almost the only case in which the government intervened to regulate supplies. In the ordinary course of things the right to collect the tithes of the province was purchased by public companies, who paid money, not grain, into the Roman treasury, and these companies placed their corn on the market as best they could. The operations of the speculators in grain doubtless disturbed the price at times. But yet the certainty, the abundance and the facilities for transport of this supply were such as practically to shut out from competition in the Roman market all but the most favourably situated districts of Italy. Their chance of competition depended mainly on their accidental possession of a good road, or their neighbourhood to the sea or to a navigable river.¹ The larger proprietors in any part of Italy must have possessed greater facilities for carrying their grain to a good market than were enjoyed by the smaller holders. The Clodian law on trade permitted senators to own sea-going ships of a certain tonnage;² they could, therefore, export their own produce without any dependence on the middle-man, while the smaller cultivators would have been obliged to pay freight, or could only have avoided such payment by forming shipping-companies amongst themselves. But such combination was not to be looked for amongst a peasant class, barely conscious even of the external symptoms of the great revolution which was dragging them to ruin, and perhaps almost wholly oblivious of its cause.

It required less penetration to fathom the second of the great reasons for the accumulation of landed property in the hands of the few; for this cause had been before the eyes of the Roman world, and had been expounded by the lips of Roman statesmen, for generations or, if we credit a certain class of traditions,³ even for centuries. This cause of the growing monopoly of the land by the few was the system of possession which the State had encouraged, for the purpose of securing the use and cultivation of its public domain. The policy of the State seems to have changed from time to time with reference to its treatment of this particular portion of its property, which it valued as the most secure of its assets

¹ Cf. Cato R. R. i. 3 (In choosing the situation of one's estate) oppidum validum prope siet aut mare aut amnis, qua naves ambulant, aut via bona celebrisque.

² P- 33⁸ For the traditions which assign a very early date for laws dealing with the

iger publicus see the following chapter, which treats of the legislation of Tiberius Gracchus.

A HISTORY OF ROME

and one that served, besides its financial end, the desirable purpose of assisting it to maintain the influence of Rome throughout almost every part of Italy. When conquered domain had first been declared "public," the government had been indifferent to the type of occupier which served it by squatting on this territory and reclaiming land that had not been divided or sold chiefly because its condition was too unattractive to invite either of these processes.¹ It had probably extended its invitation even to Latin allies,² and looked with approval on any member of the burgess body who showed his enterprise and patriotism by the performance of this great public service. If the State had a partiality, it was probably for the richer and more powerful classes of its citizens. They could embrace a greater quantity of land in their grasp, and so save the trouble which attended an estimate of the returns of a great number of small holdings; they possessed more effective means of reclaiming waste or devastated land, for they had a greater control of capital and labour; lastly, through their large bands of clients and slaves, they had the means of efficiently protecting the land which they had occupied, and this must have been an important consideration at a time when large tracts of the ager publicus lay amidst foreign territories which were barely pacified, and were owned by communities that often wavered in their allegiance to Rome. But, whatever the views of the government, it is tolerably clear that the original occupiers must have chiefly represented men of this stamp. These were the days when the urban and the rustic tribes were sharply divided, as containing respectively the men of the town and the men of the country, and when there were comparatively few of the latter folk that did not possess some holding of their own. It was improbable that a townsman would often venture on the unfamiliar task of taking up waste land; it was almost as improbable that a small yeoman would find leisure to add to the unaided labour on his own holding •Jie toil of working on new and unpromising soil, except in the cases where some unclaimed portion of the public domain was in close proximity to his estate.

'App. Bell. Civ. i. 7 rrjs Se yrjs rrjs SopiKT^rov <r<pt<rtv eKaffTore ytyvo ii4m\s t^n liev Qeipyaaiiivriv aiirUa toij oi/cifojue'cou imSijpawr t) eitiirpaaKOv t) 4£e/iiff8ow, rfy 5' apybv 4k tov noKeixov t6th olaav, % 5^ Kal /idKurra fV\^flue»/, oinc Hyovres iru ax⁰^" Sia\axew, iireK^pvTrov 4v roffffie rots iQeKovaiv iKtroveiv 4irl reKei r&v inriffiav Kapvav.

"For the evidence for this and other statements connected with the ager publicus see the citations in the next chapter.

EARLY AGRARIAN LEGISLATION 75

We may, therefore, infer that from very early times the wealthier classes had asserted themselves as the chief occupiers of the public domain. And this condition of things continued to be unchallenged until a time came¹ when the small holders, yielding to the pressure of debt and bankruptcy, sought their champions amongst the tribunes of the Plebs. The absolute control of the public domain by the State, the absolute insecurity of the tenure of its occupants, furnished an excellent opportunity for staving off schemes of confiscation and redistribution of private property, such as had often shaken the communities of Greece, and even for refusing to tamper with the existing law of debtor and creditor.² It was imagined that bankrupt yeomen might be relieved by being allowed to settle on the public domain, or that the resumption or retention of a portion of this domain by the State might furnish an opportunity for the foundation of fresh colonies, and a law was passed limiting the amount of the ager publicus that any individual might possess. The enactment, whatever its immediate results may have been, proved ineffective as a means of checking the growth of large possessions. No special commission was appointed to enforce obedience to its terms, and then execution was neglected by the ordinary magistrates. The provisions of the law were, indeed, never forgotten, but as a rule they were remembered only to be evaded. Devious methods were adopted of holding public land through persons who seemed to be bond fide possessors in their own right, but were in reality merely agents of some planter who already held land up to the permitted limit.³ Then came the agricultural crisis which followed the Punic Wars. The small freeholds, mortgaged, deserted or selling for a fraction of their value, began to fall into the meshes of the vast net which had spread over the public domain. In some cases actual violence is said to have been used to the smaller yeomen by their neighbouring tyrants,⁴ and we can readily imagine that, when a holding had been deserted for a time

¹ In consequence of the doubtfulness of the traditions concerning early agrarian laws this time cannot even be approximately specified. See the next chapter.

² Tradition represents the first laws dealing with the ager publicus (e.g. the supposed lex Licinia) as earlier than the lex Poetelia of 326 b.c, which abolished the contract of nexum.

³ Plut. Ti. Gracch. 8 iinepov Se twv yeirvidproiv ir\ov<rlav iiro/8\^TOis vpotrtiwois u€Tatpep6p¹ruip tcls fiiffddtreis eis eavrovs.

¹ App. Bell. Civ. i. 7 ol yap irXoiaioi . . . to . . . ayxov o-tpio-w, 'iaa Te ipi S.\\a jSpoxe'o irev^Tav, to /uec wpoi/ifvoi ireifJo? to Se /8(a Ka/iPdvovTes, weSio ftaupa opt! _Xwplav iyn&pyovv. Cf. Seneca Ep. xiv. 2 (90). 39 Licet agros agris adjiciat vicinum vel pretio pellens vel injuria.

A HISTORY OF ROME

through stress of war or military service, it might be difficult to resume possession in the face of effective occupation by the bailiff of some powerful neighbour. The latifundium—acquired, as it was believed, in many cases by force, fraud and shameless violation of the law—was becoming the standard unit of cultivation throughout Italy.¹ When we consider the general social and economic circumstances of the time, it is possible to imagine that large properties would have grown in Italy, as in Greece, had Rome never possessed an inch of public domain ; but the occupation of ager publicus by the rich is very important from two points of view. On the one hand, it unquestionably accelerated the process of the formation of vast estates; and a renewed impulse had lately been given to this process by the huge confiscations in the South of Italy, and perhaps by the conquest of Cisalpine Gaul; for it is improbable that the domain possessed by the State in this fertile country had been wholly parcelled out amongst the colonies of the northern frontier.²But on the other hand, the fact that the kernel of these estates was composed of public land in excess of the prescribed limit seemed to make resumption by the State and redistribution to the poor legally possible. The ager publicus, therefore, formed the basis for future agitation and was the rallying point for supporters and opponents of the proposed methods of agricultural reform.

But it was not merely the negligence of the State which led to the crushing of the small man by the great; the positive burdens which the government was forced to impose by the exigencies of the career of conquest and hegemony into which Rome had drifted, rendered the former an almost helpless competitor in the uneven struggle. The conscription had from early days been a source of impoverishment for the commons and of opportunity for the rich. The former could obey the summons of the State only at the risk of pledging his credit, or at least of seeing his homestead drift into a condition of neglect which would bring the inevitable day when it

¹ irtSio ndicpa (App. I.e.), Plin. H. N. xviii. 6. 35 Verumque confitentibus latifundia perdidere Italiam. (For the expression lati fundi see Siculus Flaccus PP- ^r57>Frontinus p. 53 Per longum enim tempus attigui possessores vacantia loca quasi invitante otiosi soli opportunitate invaserunt, et per longum tempus in-pune commalleaverunt. For the invasion of pasturage see Frontinus p. 48 Haec fere pascua certis personis data sunt depascenda tunc cum agri adsignati sunt. Haec pascua multi per inpotentiam invaserunt et colunt.

² In spite of the fertility of the land, the native Gallic population had vanished from most of the districts of this region as early as Polybius' time (Polyb. ii. 35). Cf. Nitzsch Die Gracchen p. 60.

THE CONSCRIPTION

could only be rehabilitated by a loan of seed or money. The lot of the warrior of moderate means was illustrated by the legend of Regulus. He was believed to have written home to the consuls asking to be relieved of his command in Africa. The bailiff whom he had left on his estate of seven jugera was dead, the hired man had stolen the implements of agriculture and run away ; the farm lay desolate and, were its master not permitted to return, his wife and children would lack the barest necessaries of existence.¹ The struggle to maintain a household in the absence of its head was becoming more acute now that corn-land was ceasing to pay, except under the most favourable conditions, and now that the demand for conscripts was sometimes heavier and always more continuous than it had ever been before. Perhaps one-tenth of the adult male population of Rome was always in the field ;² the units came and went, but the men who bore the brunt of the long campaigns and of garrison duty in the provinces were those to whom leisure meant life—the yeomen who maintained their place in the census lists by hardy toil, and who risked their whole subsistence through the service that had been wrested from them as a reward for a laborious career. When they ceased to be owners of their land, they found it difficult to secure places even as labourers on some rich man's property. The landholder preferred the services of slaves which could not be interrupted by the call of military duty.³

The economic evils consequent on the conscription must have been felt with hardly less severity by such of the Italian allies as lived in the regions within which the latifundia were growing up. To these were added the pecuniary burdens which Rome had been forced to impose during the Second Punic War. These burdens were for the most part indirect, for Rome did not tax her Italian socii, but they were none the less severe. Every contingent supplied from an allied community had its expenses, except that of food during service, defrayed from the treasury of its own state,⁴ and ten continuous years of conscription and requisition had finally exhausted the loyalty even of Rome's Latin kindred.⁶ It is true that the Italians were partially, although not wholly, free from the economic

¹ Val. Max. iv. 4. 6.

² Steinwender Die romische Bilrgerschaft in ihrem Verhdltnis zum Heere p. 28. ^! App. Bell. Civ. i. 7. ⁴ Polyb. vi. 39.

'Liv. xxvii. g (209 B.c.) Fremitus enim inter Latinos sociosque in conciliis ortus:— Decimum annum dilectibus, stipendiis se exhaustos esse . . . Duodecim (coloniae) . . . negaverunt consulibus esse unde milites pecuniamque darent,

A HISTORY OF ROME

struggle between the possessors of the public land and the small freeholders; but there is no reason for supposing that those of Western Italy were exempt from the consequences of the reduction in price that followed the import of corn from abroad, and the drain on their incomes and services which had been caused by war could scarcely have fitted them to stand this unexpected trial. Rome's harsh dealings with the treasonable South, although adopted for political motives, was almost unquestionably a political blunder. She confiscated devastated lands, and so perpetuated their devastation. She left ruined harbours and cities in decay. She crippled her own resources to add to the pastoral wealth of a handful of her citizens. In the East of Italy there was a far greater vitality than elsewhere in agriculture of the older type. The Samnites in their mountains, the Peligni, Marrucini, Frentani and Vestini between the Apennines and the sea still kept to the system of small freeholds. Their peasantry had perhaps always cultivated for consumption rather than for sale; then^- inhabitants were rather beyond the reach of the ample supply from the South ; and for these reasons the competition of Sicilian and African corn did not lead them to desert their fields. They were also less exposed than the Romans and Latins to the aggressions of the great possessor ; for, since they possessed no commercium with Rome, the annexation of their property by legal means was beyond the reach even of the ingenious cupidity of the times.¹ The proof of the existence of the yeoman in these regions is the danger which he caused to Rome. The spirit which had maintained his economic independence was to aim at a higher goal, and the struggle for equality of political rights was to prove to the exclusive city the prowess of that class of peasant proprietors which she had sacrificed in her own domains.

But, although this sacrifice had been great, we must not be led into the belief that there was no hope for the agriculturist of moderate means either in the present or in the future. Even in the present there were clear indications that estates of moderate size could under careful cultivation hold their own. The estate of Lucius Manlius, which Cato sketches in his work on agriculture,²was far from rivalling the great demesnes of the princes of the land. It consisted of 240 jugera devoted to the olive and of 100 jugera reserved for the vine. Provision was made for a moderate supply of

¹ Nitzsch Die Gracchen p. 194.

² Cato R. R. 144 etc.

PROSPECTS OF AGRICULTURE 79

corn and for pasturage for the cattle that worked upon the fields. But the farm was on the whole a representative of the new spirit, which saw in the vine and the olive a paying substitute for the decadent culture of grain. Even on an estate of this size we note as significant that the permanent and even the higher personnel of the household (the latter being represented by the villici and the villicae) was composed of slaves ; yet hirelings were needed for the harvest and the corn was grown by cottagers who held their land on a metayer tenure. But such an estate demanded unusual capital as well as unusual care. On the tiny holdings, which were all that the poorest could afford, the scanty returns might be eked out by labour on the fields of others, for the small allotment did not demand the undivided energies of its holder.¹ There was besides a class of politores² similar to that figured as cultivating the corn-land on the estate of Manlius, who received in kind a wage on which they could at least exist. They were nominally mdtayer tenants who were provided with the implements of husbandry by their landlord ; but the quantity of grain which they could reserve to their own use was so small, varying as it did from a ninth to a fifth of the whole of the crop which they had reaped,³ that their position was little better than that of the poorest labourer by the day.⁴ The humblest class of freemen might still make a living in districts where pasturage did not reign supreme. But it was a living that involved a sacrifice of independence and a submission to sordid needs that were unworthy of the past ideal of Roman citizenship. It was a living too that conferred little benefit on the State ; for the day-labourers and the politores could scarcely have been in the position on the census list which rendered them liable to the conscription.

If it were possible to lessen the incidence of military service and to secure land and a small amount of capital for the dispossessed, the prospects for the future were by no means hopeless. The smaller culture, especially the cultivation of the vine and the olive, is that to which portions of Italy are eminently suited. This is especially true of the great volcanic plain of the West extending

¹ Nitzsch Die Gracchen p. 187. ² Cato R. R. 5. 136.

³ Cato R. R. 136 Politionem quo pacto partiario dari oporteat. In agro Casinate et Venafro in loco bono parti octava corbi dividat, satis bono septima, tertio loco sexta; si granum modio dividet, parti quinta. In Venafro ager optimus nona parti corbi dividat . . . Hordeum quinta modio, fabam quinta modio dividat,

⁴ Nitzsch Die Gracchen p. 188,

A HISTORY OF ROME

from the north of Etruria to the south of Campania and comprising, besides these territories, the countries of the Latins, the Sabines, the Volsci and the Hernici. The lightness and richness of the alluvion of this volcanic soil is almost as suited to the production of cereals as to that of the vine and the olive or the growth of vegetables.¹ But, even on the assumption that corn-growing would not pay, there was nothing to prevent, and everything to encourage the development of the olive plantation, the vineyard and the market garden throughout this region. It was a country sown with towns, and the vast throat of Rome alone would cry for the products of endless labour. Even Cato can place the vine and the olive before grazing land and forest trees in the order of productivity,² and before the close of the Republic the government had learnt the lesson that the salvation of the Italian peasantry depended on the cultivation of products like these. The conviction is attested by the protective edict that the culture of neither the vine nor the olive was to be extended in Transalpine Gaul.³ Market gardening was also to have a considerable future, wherever the neighbourhood of the larger towns created a demand for such supplies.⁴ A new method of tenure also gave opportunities to those whose capital or circumstances did not enable them to purchase a sufficient quantity of land of their own. Leaseholds became more frequent, and the coloni thus created ⁵ began to take an active share in the agricultural life of Italy. Like the villici, they were a product of the tendency to live away from the estate ; but they gained ground at the expense of the servile bailiffs, probably in consequence of their greater trustworthiness and keener interest in the soil.

But time was needed to effect these changes. For the present the reign of the capitalist was supreme, and the plantation system was dominant throughout the greater part of Italy. The most essential

¹ Dureau de la Malle Economic Politique ii. pp. 225, 226.

³ Cato R. R. i. 7 Vinea est prima, . . . secundo loco hortus inriguus, tertio salictum, quarto oletum, quinto pratum, sexto campus frumentarius, septimo silva caedua, octavo arbustum, nono glandaria silva.

³ Cic. de Rep. iii. 9. 16 Nos vero justissimi homines, qui Transalpinas gentis oleam et vitem serere non sinimus, quo pluris sint nostra oliveta nostraeque vineae. Cf. Colum. iii. 3. 11.

¹ See Cato R. R. 7. 8 for the produce of the fundus suburbanus. Cf. c. 1 (note 2) for the value of the hortus inriguus.

⁶ See the citations in Voigt (Iwan-Miiller's Handbuch iv. 2 p. 370). Communities and corporations employed coloni on their agri vectigales (Cic. ad, Fam. xiii. 11. i i Hygin. de Cond. Agr. p. 117. ri; Voigt. I.e.),

SLAVE LABOUR

ingredient in this system was the slave,—an alien and a chattel, individually a thing of little account, but reckoned in his myriads the most powerful factor in the economic, and therefore in the political, life of the times, the gravest of the problems that startled the reformer. The soil of Italy was now peopled with widely varied types, and echoes of strange tongues from West and East could be heard on every hand. Italy seemed a newly discovered country, on which the refuse of all lands had been thrown to become a people that could never be a nation. The home supply of slaves, so familiar as to seem a product of the land, was becoming a mere trifle in comparison with the vast masses that were being thrust amongst the peasantry by war and piracy. At the time of the protest of Tiberius Gracchus against the dominance of slave labour in the fields scarcely two generations had elapsed since the great influx had begun. The Second Punic War had spread to every quarter of the West; Sicily, Sardinia, Cisalpine Gaul and Spain all yielded their tribute in the form of human souls that had passed from the victor to the dealer, from the dealer to the country and the town. Only one generation had passed since a great wave had swept from Epirus and Northern Greece over the shores of Italy. In Epirus alone one hundred and fifty thousand prisoners had been sold.¹ Later still the destruction of Carthage must have cast vast quantities of agricultural slaves upon the market.² Asia too had yielded up her captives as the result of Roman victories ; but the Oriental visages that might be seen in the streets of Rome or the plains of Sicily, were less often the gift of regular war than of the piracy and the systematised slave-hunting of the Eastern Mediterranean. Rome, who had crushed the rival maritime powers that had attempted, however imperfectly, to police the sea, had been content with the work of destruction, and seemed to care nothing for the enterprising buccaneers who sailed with impunity as far west as Sicily. The pirates had also made themselves useful to the Oriental powers which still retained their independence; they had been tolerated, if they had not been employed, by Cyprus and Egypt when these states were struggling against the Empire of the Seleucids.³ But another reason for their immunity was the view held in the ancient world that slave-

¹ Liv. xlv. 34.

^a Mahaffy (" The Slave Wars against Rome " in Hermathtna no. xvi. i8go) believes that the majority of these were shipped to Sicily. ⁸ Strabo xiv. 5. 2.

A HISTORY OF ROME

hunting was in itself a legitimate form of enterprise.¹ The pirate might easily be regarded as a mere trader in human merchandise, As such, he had perhaps been useful to Carthage ;² and, as long as he abstained from attacking ports or nationalities under the protectorate of Rome, there was no reason why the capitalists in power should frown on the trade by which they prospered. For the pirates could probably bring better material to the slave market than was usually won in war.³ A superior elegance and culture must often have been found in the helpless victims on whom they pounced; beauty and education were qualities that had a high marketable value, and by seizing on people of the better class they were sure of one of two advantages—either of a ransom furnished by the friends of the captives, or of a better price paid by the dealer. There was scarcely a pretence that the traders were mere intermediaries who bought in a cheap market and sold in a dear. They were known to be raiders as well, and numbers of the captives exhibited in the mart at Side in Pamphylia were known to have been freemen up to the moment of the auction.⁴ The facility for capture and the proximity of Delos, the greatest of the slave markets which connected the East with the West, rendered the supply enormous ; but it was equalled by the demand, and myriads of captives are said to have been shipped to the island and to have quitted it in a single day. The ease and rapidity of the business transacted by the master of a slave-ship became a proverb;⁶ and honest mercantile undertakings with their tardy gains must have seemed contemptible in comparison with this facile source of wealth.

An abundant supply and quick returns imply reasonable prices; and the cheapness of the labour supplied by the slave-trade, whether as a consequence of war or piracy, was at once a necessary condition of the vitality of the plantation system and a cause of the reckless-

¹ Cf. Arist. Pol. i. 8. 12 y iroKefUKii tyiaei kthitik{] ttus effroi. f] yap OrjpeOTiftJ) Hepos etuTrjj, y SeT xPV^at irp6s t€ to flrjpi'et Kal tSv hiBpinrav 'iaai ir<-<pvic6Tes apxeaBat ptil deAovfftv, o>s (pbffei Sfaaiov rovrov ovra rbv Tr6heftov.

² Mahaffy (I.e.) thinks that the Syrians and Cilicians of the first slave war in Sicily, whom he believes to have been transferred from Carthage, had been secured by that state in a trade with the East—the trade which perhaps took the Southern Mediterranean route from Malta past Crete and Cyprus.

³ Wallon Histoire de VEsclavage ii. p. 45.

⁴ Strabo xiv. 3. 2 iv SlSri yovv ir6\et t^j Ua/A<j>vXtas to. vaxnrhyia avviaTaro rais Ki'Ai|ic, vwb K^pmi re iirdXovv ixet roiis a\6vTas iXeuBepous Sfiohoyovvres.

⁰ Strabo (xiv. 5. 2), after describing the slave market at Delos, continues 3<rre Kal irapoinlav yeveaBai Sta touto • e^irope, KarairXevaov, i^eXov, n&vra iriwpaTat.

SLAVE LABOUR

ness and neglect with which the easily replaced instruments might be used. Cato, a shrewd man of business, never cared to pay more than fifteen hundred denarii for his slaves.¹ This must have been the price of the best type of labourer, of a man probably who was gifted with intelligence as well as strength. Ordinary unskilled labour must have fetched a far smaller sum; for the prices which are furnished by the comic poetry of the day—prices which are as a rule conditioned by the value of personal services or qualities of a particular kind, by the attractions of sex and the competition for favours—do not on the average far exceed the limit fixed by Cato.² For common work newly imported slaves were actually preferred, and purchasers were shy of the veterator who had seen long service.³ Employment in the fashionable circles of the town doubtless enhanced the value of a slave, when he was known to have been in possession of some peculiar gift, whether it were for cookery, medicine or literature ; but the labours of the country could easily be drilled into the newest importation, and prices diminished instead of rising with the advancing age and experience of the rustic slave.⁴

The cheapened labour which was now spread over Italy presented as many varieties of moral as of physical type, and these jame to be well known to the prospective owner, not because he aimed at being a moral influence, but because he objected to being worried by the vagaries of an eccentric type. Sardinians were always for sale, not because they were specially abundant, but because they showed an indocility that rendered them a sorry possession.⁵ The passive Oriental, the Spaniard fierce and proud, required different methods of management and inspired different precautions; yet experience soon proved that the hellenised sons of the East had a better capacity for organising revolt than their fellow-sufferers from the North and West, and much of the harshness of Roman slavery was prompted by the panic which is the

¹ Plut. Cato Maj. 4.

² If we make the denarius a rough equivalent of the drachma, some of the prices given in Plautus are as follows:—A child, 600 denarii, a nurse and two female children, 1800, a young girl, 2000, another 3000. Here we seem to get the average prices for valuable and refined domestics. Elsewhere special circumstances might increase the value; a female lyrist fetches 5000 denarii, a girl of remarkable attractions 6000. See Wallon Hist, de VEsclavage ii. pp. 160 ff.

³ Ter. Andria ii. 6. 26.

⁴ It is probable, however, that in the case of superintendents (villici, villicae, procuratores) experience may have been an element in the prices which they fetched.

⁵ Festus p. 322 Sardi venales, alius alio nequior.

A HISTORY OF ROME

nemesis of the man who deals in human lives. But more of it was due to the indifference which springs from familiarity, and from the cold practical spirit in which the Roman always tended to play with the pawns of his business game, even when they were freemen and fellow-citizens. A man like Cato, who had sense and honesty enough to look after his own business, elaborated a machine-like system for governing his household, the aim of which was the maximum of profit with the minimum amount of humanity which is consistent with the attainment of such an end. The element of humanity is, however, accidental. There is no conscious appeal to such a feeling. The slaves seem to be looked on rather as automata who perform certain mental and physical processes analogous to those of men. Cato's servants were never to enter another house except at his bidding or at that of his wife, and were to express utter ignorance of his domestic history to all inquirers; their life was to alternate between working and sleeping, and the heavy sleeper was valued as presumably a peaceful character; little bickerings between the servants were to be encouraged, for unanimity was a matter for suspicion and fear; the death sentence pronounced on any one of them by the law was carried out in the presence of the assembled household, so as to strike a wholesome terror into the rest. If they wished to propagate their kind, they must pay for the privilege, and a fixed sum was demanded from the slave who desired to find a mate amongst his fellow-servants.¹ The rations were fixed and only raised at the people's festivals of the Saturnalia and Compitalia;² a sick slave was supposed to need less than his usual share³—perhaps an excellent hygienic maxim, but one scarcely adopted on purely hygienic grounds. Such a life was an emphatic protest against the indulgence of the city, the free and careless intercourse which often reversed the position of master and slave and formed part of the stock-in-trade of the comedian. Yet, even when the bond between the man of fashion and his artful servants had merely a life of pleasure and of mischief as its end, we are at least lifted by such relations into a human sphere, and it is exceedingly questionable whether the warped humanity of the city did mark so low a level as the brutalised life of the estate over which Cato's fostering genius was spread. If we develop Cato's methods but a little, if we admit a little more rigour and a little less dis-

¹ Plut. Cato Maj. ai.

^a Cato R. R. 56. 57.

'Ibid. a.

SLAVE LABOUR

crimination, we get the dismal barrack-like system of the great plantations—a barrack, or perhaps a prison, nominally ruled by a governor who might live a hundred miles away, really under the control of an anxious and terrified slave, who divided his fears between his master who wanted money and his servants who wanted freedom. The villicus had been once the mere intendant of the estate on which his master lived; he was now sole manager of a vast domain for his absent lord,¹ sole keeper of the great ergastulum which enclosed at nightfall the instruments of labour and disgorged them at daybreak over the fields. The gloomy building in which they were herded for rest and sleep showed but its roof and a small portion of its walls above the earth; most of it lay beneath the ground, and the narrow windows were so high that they could not be reached by the hands of the inmates.² There was no inspection by the government, scarcely any by the owners.³There was no one to tell the secrets of these dens, and if the unwary traveller were trapped and hidden behind their walls, all traces of him might be for ever lost.⁴ When the slaves were turned out into the fields, the safety of their drivers was secured by the chains which bound their limbs, but which were so adjusted as not to interfere with the movements necessary to their work.⁶Some whose spirit had been broken might be left unbound, but for the majority bonds were the only security against escape or vengeance.⁶

Ttefe was, however, one type of desperate character who was permitted to roam at large. This was the guardian of the flocks, who wandered unrestrained over the mountains during the summer months and along the prairies in the winter season. These herdsmen formed small bands. Nit was reckoned that there should be one for every eighty or hundred sheep and two for every troop of

¹At the close of this period a division took place between-the functions of villicus and those of procurator. The former still controlled the economy of the estate and administered its goods; the latter was the business agent and entered into legal relations with other parties. See Voigt in Iwan-Miiller's Handbuch iv. 2 p. 368.

² Colum. i. 6.

³ An inspection of all the ergastula of Italy was ordered by Augustus (Suet. Aug. 32) and Tiberius (Suet. Tib. 8). Columella (i. 8) recommends inspection by the master.

⁴ Kidnapping became very frequent after the civil wars. It was to prevent this evil that inspection was ordered by the Emperors (note 3). See Thedenat in Daremberg-Saglio Diet, des Antiq. s.v. Ergastulum.

⁵ Plaut. Most. i. 1. 18 ; Florus iii. 19.

^e For the distinction between the vincti and soluti see Colum. i. 7.

A HISTORY OF ROME

fifty horses.¹ It was sometimes found convenient that they should be accompanied by their women who prepared their meals—women of robust types like the Illyrian dames to whom child-birth was a mere incident in the daily toils.² Such a life of freedom had its attractions for the slave, but it had its drawbacks too. The landowner who preferred pasturage to tillage, saved his capital, not only by the small number of hands which the work demanded, but also by the niggardly outlay which he expended on these errant serfs. It was not needful to provide them with the necessaries of life when they could take them for themselves. When Damophilus of Enna was entreated by his slaves to give them something better than the rags they wore, his answer was : " Do travellers then travel naked through the land ? Have they nothing for the man who wants a coat ? "³ Brigandage, in fact, was an established item in the economic creed of the day.

The desolation of Italy was becoming dangerous, and the master of the lonely villa barred himself in at nights as though an enemy were at his gates. On one occasion Scipio Africanus was disturbed in his retreat at Liternum by a troop of bandits. He placed nis armed servants on the roof and made every preparation for repelling the assault. But the visitors proved to be pacific. They were the very elite of the fraternity of brigands and had merely come to do honour to the great man. They sent back their troops, threw down their arms, laid presents before his door and departed in joyous mood.⁴ The immunity of such bands proved that a slave revolt might at any moment imperil every life and every dwelling in some unprotected canton. It was indeed the epoch of peace, when Roman and Phoenician armies no longer held the field in Italy, that first suggested the hope of liberation to the slave. 'Hannibal would have imperilled his character of a protector of Italian towns had he encouraged a slave revolt, even if the Phoenician had not shrunk from a precedent so fatal to his native land. But one of the unexpected results of the Second Punic War was to kindle a rising in the very heart of Latium, and it was the African

¹ Varro R. R. ii. 2 io The proportion is larger than would be demanded in modern times, but Mahaffy (I.e.) remarks that we do not hear of the work of guardianship being shared by trained dogs, and that the danger from wild beasts and lawless classes was considerable. As regards the first point, however, we do hear of packs of hounds which followed the Sicilian shepherds (Diod. xxxiv. 2), and it is difficult to believe that these had not developed some kind of training.

²Varro R. R. ii. io. 7. ³ Diod. xxxiv, 2. 38,

¹ Val. Max. ii, 10. 2,

198 B.C.] REVOLTS OF SLAVES IN ITALY

slave, not the African freeman, that stirred the last relics of the war in Italy. J>At Setia were guarded the noble Carthaginians who were a pledge of the fidelity of their state. These hostages, the sons of merchant princes, were allowed to retain the dignity of their splendid homes, and a vast retinue of slaves from Africa attended on their wants. The number of these was swelled by captive members of the same nationalities whom the people of Setia had acquired in the recent war.¹ A spirit of camaraderie sprung up amongst men who understood one another's language and had acquired the spurious nationality that comes from servitude in the same land. Their numbers were obvious, the paucity of the native Setians was equally clear, and no military force was close at hand. They planned to increase their following by spreading disaffection amongst the servile populations of the neighbouring country towns, and emissaries were sent to Norba in the North and Circei in the South. Their project was to wait for the rapidly approaching games of the Setian folk and to rush on the unarmed populace as they were gazing at the show ; when Setia had been taken, they meant to seize on Norba and Circei. But there was treason in their ranks. The urban praetor was roused before dawn by two slaves who poured the whole tale of the impending massacre into his ear. After a hasty consultation of the senate he rushed to the threatened district, gathering recruits as he swept with his legates through the country side, binding them with the military oath, bidding them arm and follow him with all speed. A hasty force of about two thousand men was soon gathered ; none knew his destination till he reached the gates of Setia. The heads of the conspiracy were seized, and such of their followers as learnt the fact fled incontinently from the town. From this point onward it was only a matter of hunting down the refugees by patrols sent round the country districts. Southern Latium was freed from its terror ; but it was soon found that the evil had spread almost to the gates of Rome. A rumour had spread that Praeneste was to be seized by its slaves, and it was sufficient to stimulate a praetor to execute nearly five hundred of the supposed delinquents.²

Two years later a rising, which almost became a war, shook

'Livy (xxxii. 26) speaks of them as nationis eius. He has just mentioned the slaves of the Carthaginian hostages. But it does not follow that either class was composed of native Africans. They may have been imported Asiatics, as in Sicily.

² Liv, xxxii. 26.

A HISTORY OF ROME

[B.C. 196

the great plantation lands of Etruria.¹ Its suppression required a legion and a pitched battle. The leaders were crucified ; others of the slaves who had escaped the carnage were restored to their masters. But these disturbances, that may have seemed mere sporadic relics of the havoc and exhaustion left by the Hannibalic war, were only quelled for the moment. It was soon found that the seeds of insecurity were deeply planted in the settlement that was called a peace. During the year 185 the shepherds of Apulia were found to have formed a great society of plunder, and robbery with violence was of constant occurrence on the grazing lands and public roads. The praetor who was in command at Tarentum opened a commission which condemned seven thousand men. Many were executed, although a large number of the criminals escaped to other regions.²

These movements in Italy were but the symptoms of a spirit that was spreading over the Mediterranean lands. The rising of the serfs only just preceded the great awakening of the masses of the freemen.³ Both classes were ground down by capital; both would make an effort to shake the burden from their shoulders; and, as regards the methods of assertion, it is a matter of little moment whether they took the form of a national rising against a government or a protectorate, a sanguinary struggle in the Forum against the dominance of a class, or an attack by chattels, not yet brutalised by serfdom but full of the traditions and spirit of freemen, against the cruelty and indifference of their owners. In one sense the servile movements were more universal, and perhaps better organised, than those of the men to whom free birth gave a nominal superiority. A sympathy for each other's sufferings pervaded the units of the class who were scattered in distant lands. Sometimes it was a sympathy based on a sense of nationality, and the Syrian and Cilician in Asia would feel joy and hope stirring in his heart at the doings of his brethren who had been deported to the far West. The series of organised revolts in the Roman provinces and protectorate which commence shortly after the fall of Carthage and close for the moment with the war of resistance to the Romans in Asia, forms a single connected chain. Dangerous risings had to be repressed at the Italian coast towns of Minturnae and Sinuessa;

¹ Liv. xxxiii. 36 Etruriam infestam prope conjuratio servorum fecit. ¹ Liv. xxxix. 29.

'Bucher Die Aufstandi der unfreien Arbeiter p. 34. Cf. Soltau in Kultur-gescli. des Mass. Altertums p. 326.

Circa 140 B.C.] SLAVERY IN SICILY

at the former place four hundred and fifty slaves were crucified, at the latter four thousand were crushed by a military force ; the mines of Athens, the slave market of Delos, witnessed similar outbreaks,¹ and we shall find a like wave of discontent spreading over the serf populations of the countries of the Mediterranean just before the second great outbreak in Sicily which darkens the close of the second century. The evil fate which made this island the theatre of the two greatest of the servile wars is explicable on many grounds. The opportunity offered by the sense of superiority in numbers was far ampler here than in any area of Italy of equal size. For Sicily was a wheat-growing country, and the cultivated plains demanded a mass of labour which was not needed in more mountainous or less fertile lands, where pasturage yielded a surer return than the tilling of the soil. The pasture lands of Sicily were indeed large, but they had not yet dwarfed the agriculture of the island. The labour of the fields was in the hands of a vast horde of Asiatics, large numbers of whom may conceivably have been shipped from Carthage across the narrow sea, when that great centre of the plantation system had been laid low and the fair estates of the Punic nobles had been seized and broken up by their conquerors.² In the history of the great Sicilian outbreaks Syrians and Cilicians meet us at every turn. These Asiatic slaves had different nationalities and they or their fathers had been citizens of widely separated towns. But there were bonds other than a common suffering which produced a keen sense of national union and a consequent feeling of ideal patriotism in the hearts of all. They were the prod ucts of the common Hellenism of the East; they or their fathers could make a claim to have been subjects of the great Seleucid monarchy ; many, perhaps most of them, could assert freedom by right of birth and acknowledged slavery only as a consequence of the accidents of war or piracy. The mysticism of the Oriental, the political ideal of the Hellene, were interwoven in their moral nature—a nature perhaps twisted by the brutalism of slavery to superstition in the one direction, to licence in the other, but none the less capable of great conceptions and valiant deeds. The moment for both would come when the prophet had appeared, and the prophet would surely show himself when the cup of suffering had overflowed.³

¹ Oros. v. g Diodor. xxxiv. 2. ig. ' Cf. Bucher op. cit. p. 79.

² Mahaffy I.e.

A HISTORY OF ROME

[Circa B.C. 140

The masters who worked this human mechanism were driving it at a pace which must have seemed dangerous to any human being less greedy, vain and confident than themselves. The wealth of these potentates was colossal, but it was equalled by their social rivalry and consequent need of money. A contest in elegance was being fought between the Siceliot and the Italian.¹ The latter was the glass of fashion, and the former attempted to rival, first his habits of domestic life and, as a consequence, the economic methods which rendered these habits possible. Here too, as in Italy, whole gangs of slaves were purchased like cattle or sheep; some were weighed down with fetters, others ground into subordination by the cruel severity of their tasks. All without exception were branded, and men who had been free citizens in their native towns, felt the touch of the burning iron and carried the stigma of slavery to their graves.²Food was doled out in miserable quantities,³ for the shattered instrument could so easily be replaced. On the fields one could see little but abject helplessness, a misery that weakened while it tortured the soul. But in some parts of Sicily bodily want was combined with a wild daring that was fostered by the reckless owners, whose greed had overcome all sense of their own security or that of their fellow-citizens. The treatment of pastoral slaves which had been adopted by the Roman graziers was imitated faithfully by the Italians and Siceliots of the island. These slaves were turned loose with their flocks to find their food and clothing where <uid how they could. The youngest and stoutest were chosen for this hard, wild life: and their physical vigour was still further increased by their exposure to every kind of weather, by their seldom finding or needing the shelter of a roof, and by the milk and meat which formed their staple food. A band of these men presented a terrifying aspect, suggesting a scattered invasion of some warlike barbarian tribe. Their bodies were clad in the skins of wolves and boars; slung at their sides or poised in their hands were clubs, lances and long shepherds' staves. Each squadron was followed by a pack of large and powerful hounds. Strength, leisure, need, all suggested brigandage as an integral part of their profession. At first they murdered the wayfarer who went alone or with but one companion. Then their courage rose and they concerted nightly

¹ Diod. xxxiv. 2. 27. For the large number of Roman proprietors in Sicily see Florus ii. 7 (iii. ig) 3—(Sicilia) terra frugum ferax et quodam modo suburbana provincia latifundis civium Romanorum tenebatur.

² Diod. xxxiv. 2. 32. 36. ³ Diod, l.c.

Circa 140 B.C.]

EUNUS

attacks on the villas of the weaker residents. These villas they stormed and plundered, slaying any one who attempted to bar their way. As their impunity increased, Sicily became impracticable to travellers by night, and residence in the country districts became a tempting of providence. There was violence, brigandage or murder on every hand. The governors of Sicily occasionally interposed, but they were almost powerless to check the mischief. The influence of the slave-owners was such that it was dangerous to inflict an adequate punishment.¹

The proceedings of these militant shepherds must have opened the eyes of the mass of the slaves to the possibilities of the position. Secret meetings began to be held at which the word " revolt" was breathed. An occasion, a leader, a divine sanction were for the moment lacking. The first requisite would follow the other two, and these were soon found combined in the person of Eunus. This man was a Syrian by birth, a native of Apamea, and he served Antigenes of Enna. He was more than a believer in the power of the gods to seize on men and make them the channel of their will; he was a living witness to it in his own person. At first he saw shadows of superhuman form and heard their voices in his dreams. Then there were moments when he would be seized with a trance ; he was wrapt in contemplation of some divine being. Then the words of prophecy would come; they were not his utterance but the bidding of the great Syrian goddess. Sometimes the words were preceded by a strange manifestation of supernatural power ; smoke, sparks or flame would issue from his open mouth.² The clairvoyance may have been a genuine mental experience, the thau-maturgy the type of fiction which the best of media may be tempted to employ; but both won belief from his fellows, eager for any light in the darkness, and a laughing acceptance from his master, glad of a novelty that might amuse his leisure. As a matter of fact, Eunus's predictions sometimes came true. People

¹ Diod. xxxiv. 2. 31. This may have been true of the time of which we are speaking ; for the influence of the Roman residents in Sicily on the administration of the island must always have been great. But Diodorus assigns an incorrect reason when he states that the Roman knights of Sicily were judges of the governors of the provinces. This is true only of the period preceding the second servile war.

² Historians profess to tell the mechanism by which this device was secured, a spark of fire was placed with inflammable material in a hollow nut or some similar small object, which was perforated. The receptacle was placed in the mouth, and judicious breathing did the rest. See Diodorus xxxiv. t. j ; Florus ii. 7 (iii. 19).

A HISTORY OF ROME

[Circa B.C. 140

forgot (as people will) the instances of their falsification, but applauded them heartily when they were fulfilled. Eunus was a good enough medium to figure at a fashionable stance. His latest profession was the promise of a kingdom to himself; it was the Syrian goddess who had held out the golden prospect. The promise he declared boldly to his master, knowing perhaps the spirit in which the message would be received. Antigenes was delighted with his prophet king. He showed him at his own table, and took him to the banquets given by his friends. There Eunus would be questioned about his kingdom, and each of the guests would bespeak his patronage and clemency. His answers as to his future conduct were given without reserve. He promised a policy of mercy, and the quaint earnestness of the imposture would dissolve the company in laughter. Portions of food were handed him from the board, and the donors would ask that he should remember their kindness when he came into his kingdom. These were requests which Eunus did not forget.

With such an influence in its centre, Enna seemed destined to be the spring of the revolt. But there was another reason which rendered it a likely theatre for a deed of daring. The broad plateau on which the town was set was thronged with shepherds in the winter season,¹ and some of the great graziers of Enna owned herds of these bold and lawless men. Conspicuous amongst these graziers for his wealth, his luxury and his cruelty was one Damophilus, the man who had formulated the theory that the shepherd slave should keep himself by robbing others.² Damophilus was a Siceliot, but none of the Roman magnates of the island could have shown a grander state than that which he maintained. His finely bred horses, his four-wheeled carriages, his bodyguard of slaves, bis beautiful boys, his crowd of parasites, were known all over the broad acres and huge pasture lands which he controlled. His town house and villas displayed chased silverwork, rich carpets of purple dye and a table of royal elegance. He surpassed Roman luxury in the lavishness of his expense, Roman pride in his sense of complete independence of circumstance, and Roman niggardliness and cruelty in his treatment of his slaves. Satiety had begotten a chronic callousness and even savagery that showed itself, not merely in the now familiar use of the ergastulum and the brand, but in arbitrary and

¹ Nitzsch Die Gracchen p. 228,¹ P, 86,

Circa 140 B.C.] REVOLT AT ENNA

cruel punishments which were part of the programme of almost every day. His wife Megallis, hardened by the same influences, was the torment of her maidens and of such domestics as were more immediately under her control. The servants of this household had one conviction in common—that nothing worse than their present evils could possibly be their lot.

This is the conviction that inspires acts of frenzy; but the madness of these slaves was of the orderly, systematic and therefore dangerous type. They would not act without a divine sanction to their whispered plans. Some of them approached Eunus and asked him if their enterprise was permitted by the gods. The prophet first produced the usual manifestations which attested his inspiration and then replied that the gods assented, if the plan were taken in hand forthwith. Enna was the destined place; it was the natural stronghold of the whole island; it was foredoomed to be the capital of the new race that would rule over Sicily.¹Heartened by the belief that Heaven was aiding their efforts, the leaders then set to work. They secretly released such of Damophilus's household as were in bonds; they gathered others together, and soon a band to the number of about four hundred were mustered in a field in the neighbourhood of Enna. There in the early hours of the night they offered a sacrifice and swore their solemn compact. They had gathered everything which could serve as a weapon, and when midnight was approaching they were ready for the first attempt. They marched swiftly to the sleeping town and broke its stillness with their cries of exhortation. Eunus was at their head, fire streaming from his mouth against the darkness of the night. The streets and houses were immediately the scene of a pitiless massacre. The maddened slaves did not even spare the children at the breast; they dragged them from their mothers' arms and dashed them upon the ground. The women were the victims of unspeakable insult and outrage.² Every slave had his own wrongs to avenge, for the original assailants had now been joined by a large number of the domestics of the town. Each of these wreaked his own peculiar vengeance and then turned to take his share in the general massacre.

Meanwhile Eunus and his immediate following had learnt news

¹ Diod. xxxiv. 2. 24 tmb yap rfis nenpup\lvT]s abrots KtKvpuaBai r^v mrplSa rty Cwav, oiaav aKp6itoXa> 8A.i)s rrjs vi\aov.

¹ Ibid. 2. 12 obb" ia-rui iXitiiv . . . 8Vra ivifipi(6v tc koI lvi\at\yaivov.

A HISTORY OF ROME

[Circa B.C. 140

of the arch-enemy Damophilus. He was known to be staying in his pleasance near to the city. Thence he and his wife were fetched with every mark of ignominy, and the unhappy pair were dragged into the town with their hands bound behind their backs. The masters of the city now mustered in the theatre for an act of justice ; but Damophilus did not lose his wits even when he scanned that sea of hostile faces and accusing eyes. He attempted a defence and was listened to in silence—nay, with approval, for many of his auditors were visibly stirred by his words. But some bolder spirits were tired of the show or fearful of its issue. Hermeias and Zeuxis, two of his bitterest enemies, shouted out that he was an impostor¹ and rushed upon him. One of the two thrust a sword through his side, the other smote his head off with an axe. It was then the women's turn. Megallis's female slaves were given the power to treat her as they would. They first tortured her, then led her up to a high place and dashed her to the ground. Eunus avenged his private wrongs by the death of his own masters, Antigenes and Python. The scene in the theatre had perhaps revealed more than the desire for a systematised revenge. It may have shown that there was some sense of justice, of order in the savage multitude. And indeed vengeance was not wholly indiscriminate. Eunus concealed and sent secretly away the men who had given him meat from their tables.² Even the whole house of Damophilus did not perish. There was a daughter, a strange product of such a home, a maiden with a pure simplicity of character and a heart that melted at the sight of pain. She had been used to soothe the anguish of those who had been scourged by her parents and to relieve the necessities of such as were put in bonds. Hence the abounding love felt for her by the slaves, the pity that thrilled them when her home was doomed. An escort was selected to convey her in safety to some relatives at Catana. Its most devoted member was Hermeias,³ perhaps the very man whose hands were stained by her father's blood.

The next step in the progress of the revolt was to form a political and military organisation that might command the respect of the countless slaves who were soon to break their bonds in the other districts of Sicily. Eunus was elected king. His name became Antiochus, his subjects were " Syrians ".⁴ It was not the first

¹Tr\dvoi> T6 fareK&Xow (Diod. xxxiv. 2. 14), ² Diodor. xxxiv. 2. 41.

"Ibid. 2. 39. ⁴Ibid. 2. 24.

Circa 140 B.C.] EUNUS BECOMES KING 95

time that a slave had assumed the diadem; for was it not being worn for the moment by Diodotus surnamed Tryphon, the guardian and reputed murderer of Alexander of Syria ? ¹ The elevation of Eunus to the throne was due to no belief in his courage or his generalship. But he was the prophet of the movement, the cause of its inception, and his very name was considered to be of good omen for the harmony of his subjects. When he had bound the diadem on his brow and adopted regal state, he elevated the woman who had been his companion (a Syrian and an Apamean like himself) to the rank of queen. He formed a council of such of his followers as were thought to possess wits above the average, and he set himself to make Enna the adequate centre of a lengthy war. He put to death all his captives in Enna who had no skill in fashioning arms ; the residue he put in bonds and set to the task of forging weapons.

Eunus was no warrior, but he had the regal gift of recognising merit. The soul of the military movement which spread from Enna was Achaeus,² a man pre-eminent both in counsel and in action,³ one who did not permit his reason to be mastered by passion and whose anger was chiefly kindled by the foolish atrocities committed by some of his followers.⁴. Under such a leader the cause rapidly advanced. The original four hundred had swelled in three days to six thousand ; it soon became ten thousand. As Achaeus advanced, the ergastula were broken open and each of these prison-houses furnished a new multitude of recruits.⁵ Soon a vast addition to the available forces was effected by a movement in another part of the island. In the territory of Agrigentum one Cleon a Cilician suddenly arose as a leader of his fellows. He was sprung from the regions about Mount Taurus and had been habituated from his youth to a life of brigandage. In Sicily he was supposed to be a herdsman of horses. He was also a highwayman who commanded the roads and was believed to have committed murders of varied types. When he heard of the success of Eunus, he deemed that the moment had come for raising a revolt on his own account. He gathered a band of followers, over-

¹ Liv. Ep. Iv.; App. Syr. 68. Cf. Nitzsch Die Gracchen p. 288.

² Diodorus describes him as an Achaean. Mahaffy (l.c.) suspects that he came from Eastern Asia Minor or Syria, where Achaeus occurs as a royal name. But the name also occurs in old Greece. One may instance the tragic poet of Eretria.

³ /cal (SouXi? koI x^e|p' SiaipSpuv (Diod. xxxiv. 2. 16).

⁴ Ibid. 2. 42. ⁵ Florus ii. 7 (iii. 19). 6.

A HISTORY OF ROME

[Circa B.C. 140

whelmed the city of Agrigentum and ravaged the surrounding territory.¹

The terrified Siceliots, and perhaps some of the slaves themselves, believed that this dual movement might ruin the servile cause. There were daily expectations that the armies of Eunus and Cleon would meet in conflict. But such hopes or fears were disappointed. Cleon put himself absolutely under the authority of Eunus and performed the functions of a general to a king. The junction of the forces occurred about thirty days after the outbreak at Enna, and the Cilician brought five thousand men to the royal standard. The full complement of the slaves when first they joined battle with the Roman power amounted to twenty thousand men; before the close of the war their army numbered over sixty thousand.²

The Roman government exhibited its usual slowness in realising the gravity of the situation; yet it may be excused for believing that it had only to deal with local tumults such as those which had been so easily suppressed in Italy. The force of eight thousand men which it put into the field under the praetor Lucius Hypsaeus may have seemed more than sufficient. Yet it was routed by the insurgent army, now numbering twenty thousand men, and in the skirmishes which followed the balance of success inclined to the rebels. The immediate progress of the struggle cannot be traced in any detail, but there is a general record of the storming of Roman camps and the flight of Roman generals.³ The theatre of the war was certainly extending at an alarming rate. The rebels had first controlled the centre and some part of the South Western portion of the island, the region between Enna and Agrigentum; but now they had pushed their conquests up to the East, had reached the coast and had gained possession of Catana and Tauromenium.⁴ The devastation of the conquered districts is said to have been more terrible than that which followed on the Punic War.⁵ But for this the slaves were not wholly, perhaps not mainly, responsible. The rebel armies, looking to a settlement in the future

¹ Diod. xxxiv. 2. 43. ² Ibid. 2. 18 ; Florus l.c.

³ Florus ii. 7 (iii. ig). 7 Quin illud quoque ultimum dedecus belli, capta sunt castra praetorum—nec nominare ipsos pudebit—castra Manli Lentuli, Pisonis Hypsaei. Itaque qui per fugitivarios abstrahi debuissent praetorios duces profugos praelio ipsi sequebantur. P. Popillius Laenas, the consul of 132 B.C., was praetor in Sicily either immediately before, or during the revolt (C. I. L. i. n. 551, 1. 9).

⁴ Strabo vi. 2. 6. For the question whether they held Messana see p. 98.

^s Florus ii. 7 (iii. ig). 2 Quis crederet Siciliam multo cruentius servili quam Punico bello esse vastatam ?

184-188 B.C.] END OF THE SERVILE WAR

when they should enjoy the fruit of their victories, left the villas standing, their furniture and stores uninjured, and did no harm to the implements of husbandry. It was the free peasantry of Sicily that now showed a savage resentment at the inequality of fortune and of life which severed them from the great landholders. Under pretext of the servile war¹ they sallied out, and not only plundered the goods of the conquered, but even set fire to their villas.

The words of Eunus when, at the beginning of the revolt, he claimed Enna as the metropolis of the new nation,² and the conduct of his followers in sparing the grandeur and comfort which had fallen into their hands, are sufficient proofs that the revolted slaves, in spite of their possession of the seaports of Catana and Tauro-menium, had no intention of escaping from Sicily. Perhaps even if they had willed it, such a course might have been impossible. They had no fleet of their own; the Cilician pirates off the coast might have refused to accept such dangerous passengers and to imperil their reputation as honest members of the slave trade. And, if the fugitives crossed the sea, what homes had they to which they could return ? To their own cities they were dead, and the long arm of Rome stretched over her protectorates in the East.³

It was therefore with a power which intended a permanent settlement in Sicily, that the Roman government had to cope. Its sense of the gravity of the situation was seen in the despatch of consular armies. The first under Caius Fulvius Flaccus seems to have effected little.⁴ The second under Lucius Calpurnius Piso, the consul of the following year, laid siege to Enna,⁵ and captured a stronghold of the rebels. Eight thousand of the slaves were slain

¹eVl Tj? TptHpdo-ei rav SpwirtTav (Diodor. xxxiv. 2. 48). Wallon (Hist, de VEsclavage ii. p. 307) takes these words to mean that the peasantry professed to be marching against the slaves. ² P. 93-

³ Mahaffy (I.e.) has raised and discussed this question. His conclusions are (i) that the pirates may have been influenced by a sense of business honour to the effect that the man-stealer should abide by his bargain, (ii) that these pirates may have received some large bribe, direct or indirect, from Rome, (iii) that the natural enmity between the slaves and the pirates may have hindered an agreement for transport, (iv) that the Cilician slaves, accustomed to permanent robber-bands, may have not held it impossible that Rome would acquiesce in such a creation in Sicily, (v) that the Syrian towns would not have troubled about the restoration of such of their members as had become slaves, even had they not feared to offend Rome. He remarks that the return of even free exiles to a Hellenistic city was a cause of great disturbance.

⁴ Liv. Ep. lvi.; Oros. v. 9. ⁵C. I. L. i. nn. 642, 643.

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[B.C. 132

by the sword, all who could be seized were nailed to the cross.¹ The crowning victories, and the nominal pacification of the island, remained for Piso's successor, Publius Rupilius. He drove the rebels into Tauromenium and sat down before the city until they were reduced to unspeakable straits by famine. The town was at length yielded through treachery ; Sarapion a Syrian betrayed the acropolis, and the Roman commander found a multitude of starving men at his mercy. He was pitiless in his use of victory. The captives were first tortured, then taken up to a high place and dashed downwards to the ground. The consul then moved on Enna. The rebels defended their last stronghold with the utmost courage and persistence. Achaeus seems to have already fallen, but the brave Cilician leaders still held out with all the native valour of their race. Cleon made a sortie from the town and fought heroically until he fell covered with wounds. Cleon's brother Coma² was captured during the siege and brought before Rupilius, who questioned him about the strength and the plans of the remaining fugitives. He asked for a moment to collect his thoughts, covered his head with his cloak, and died of suffocation, in the hands of his guard and in sight of the general, before a compromising word had passed his lips. King Eunus was not made of such stern stuff. When Enna, impregnable in its natural strength, had been taken hy treachery, he fled with his bodyguard of a thousand men to still more precipitous regions. His companions, knowing that it was impossible to escape their fate (for Rupilius was already moving) fell on each others swords. But Eunus could not face this death. He took refuge in a cave, from which he was dragged with the last poor relics of his splendid court—his cook, his baker, his bath attendant and his buffoon. The Romans for some reason spared his life, or at least did not doom him to immediate death. He was kept a prisoner at Morgantia, where he died shortly afterwards of disease.

It is said that by the date of the fall of Enna more than twenty thousand slaves had perished.³ Even without this slaughter, the capture of their seaport and their armoury would have been suffi-

¹ Oros. v. y. This Mamertium oppidum of Orosius has often been interpreted as Messana (Mamertinorum oppidum, Biicher, p. 68); for, although the slaves of this town had not revolted (Oros. v. 6. 4), it might have been captured by the rebels. Schafer, however (Jahrb. f. Class. Philol. 1873 p. 71) explains Mamertium as Morgantia {Murgentinum oppidum).

²Val. Max. ix. 12 ext. 1. Diodorus (xxxiv. 2. 20) calls him Comanus and speaks of his being captured during the siege of Tauromenium.

* Oros. v. g.

131 B.C.] THE PROBLEM TO BE SOLVED 99

cient to break the back of the revolt.¹ It only remained to scour the country with picked bands of soldiers for organised resistance to be shattered, and even for the curse of brigandage to be rooted out for a while. Death was no longer meted out indiscriminately to the rebels. Such of the slave-owners as survived would probably have protested against wholesale crucifixion, and the destruction of all of the fugitives would have impaired the resources of Sicily. Thus many were spared the cross and restored to their bonds.²The extent to which reorganisation was needed before the province could resume its normal life, is shown by the fact that the senate thought it worth while to give Sicily a new provincial charter. Ten commissioners were sent to assist Rupilius in the work, which henceforth bore the proconsul's name.³ The work, as we know it, was of a conservative character; but it is possible that no complete charter had ever existed before, and the war may have revealed defects in the arrangements of Sicily that had heretofore been unsuspected.

A climax of the type of the servile war in Sicily was perhaps needed to bring the social problem home to thinking men in Rome. Not that it by any means sufficed for all who pondered on the public welfare or laboured at the business of the State. The men who measured happiness by wealth and empire might still have retained their unshaken confidence in the Fortune of Rome. Had a Capys of this class arisen, he might have given a thrilling picture of the immediate future of his city, dark but grimly national in its emergence from trial to triumph. He might have seen her conquering arms expanding to the Euphrates and the Rhine, and undreamed sources of wealth pouring their streams into the treasury or the coffers of the great. If there was blood in the picture, when had it been absent from the annals of Rome ? Even civil strife and a new Italian war might be a hard but a necessary price to pay for a strong government and a grand mission. If an antiquated constitution disappeared in the course of this glorious expansion, where was the loss?

But there were men in Rome who measured human life by other canons: who believed that the State existed for the individual at least as much as the individual for the State: who, even when they were imperialists, saw with terror the rotten foundations on which

¹ Wallon Hist, de VEsclcwage ii. p. 308^ ² Florus ii. 7 (iii. 19). 8. 'For the lex Rupilia see Cic. in Verr. ii. 13. 32 ; 15. 37 ; 16. 39 ; 24. 59.

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the empire rested, and with indignation the miserable returns that had been made to the men who had bought it with their blood. To them the brilliant present and the glorious future were veiled by a screen that showed the ghastly spectres of commercial imperialism. It showed luxury running riot amongst a nobility already impoverished and ever more thievishly inclined, a colossal capitalism clutching at the land and stretching out its tentacles for every source of profitable trade, the middle class fleeing from the country districts and ousted from their living in the towns, and the fair island that was almost a part of their Italian home, its garden and its granary, in the throes of a great slave war.

CHAPTER II

ACAUSE never lacks a champion, nor a great cause one whom it may render great. Failure is in itself no sign of lack of spirit and ability, and when a vast reform is the product of a mean personality, the individual becomes glorified by identification with his work. From this point of view it mattered little who undertook the task of the economic regeneration of the Roman world. Any senator of respectable antecedents and moderate ability, who had a stable following amongst the ruling classes, might have succeeded where Tiberius Gracchus failed ; it was a task in which authority was of more importance than ability, and the sense that the more numerous or powerful elements of society were united in the demand for reform, of more value than individual genius or honesty of purpose. This was the very circumstance that foreshadowed failure, for the men of wide connections and established fame had shrunk from an enterprise with which they sympathised in various degrees. In the proximate history of the Republic there had been three men who showed an unwavering belief in the Italian farmer and the blessings of agriculture. These were M. Porcius Cato, P. Cornelius Scipio and Ti. Sempronius Gracchus. But the influence of Cato's house had become extinct with its first founder. The elder son, an amiable man and an accomplished jurist, had not out-lived his father; the second still survived, but seems to have inherited little of the fighting qualities of the terrible censor. The traditions of a Roman house needed to be sustained by the efforts of its existing representative, and the " newness" of the Porcii might have necessitated generations of vigorous leaders to make them a power in the land. Scipionic traditions were now represented by Aemilianus, and the glow of the luminary was reflected in paler lights, who received their lustre from moving in that charmed orbit. One of these, the indefatigable henchman Laelius'had risen to the rank of consul, and

(101)

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stimulated by the vigorous theorisings of his hellenised environment, he contemplated for a moment the formation of a plan which should deal with some of the worst evils of the agrarian question. But he looked at the problem only to start back in affright. The strength and truculency of the vested interests with which he would have to deal were too much for a man whose nerve was weakened by philosophy and experience, and Laelius by his retreat justified, if he did not gain, the soubriquet which proclaimed his " sapience "} But why was Scipio himself idle ? The answer is to be found both in his temperament and in his circumstances. With all his dash and energy, he was something of a healthy hedonist. As the chase had delighted him in his youth, so did war in his manhood. While hating its cruelties, he gloried in its excitement, and the discipline of the camp was more to his mind than the turbulence of an assembly. His mind, too, belonged to that class which finds it almost impossible to emancipate itself from traditional politics. His vast knowledge of the history of other civilisations may have taught him, as it taught Polybius, that Rome was successful because she was unique.²Here there was to be no break with the past, no legislator posing as a demi-god, no obedience to the cries of the masses who, if they once got loose, might turn and rend the enlightened few, and reproduce on Italian soil the shocking scenes of Greek socialistic enterprise. As things were, to be a reformer was to be a partisan, and Scipio loved the prospect of his probable supporters as little as that of his probable opponents. The fact of the Empire, too, must have weighed heavily with a man who was no blind imperialist. Even though economic reform might create an added efficiency in the army, Scipio must have known, as Polybius certainly knew, that soldiers are but pawns in the great game, and that the controlling forces were the wisdom of the conservative senator, the ambition of the wealthy noble, and the capital of the enterprising knight. The wisdom of disturbing their influence, and awakening their resentment, could scarcely appeal to a mind so perfectly balanced and practical as Scipio's. Circumstances, too, must have had their share in determining his quiescence. The Scipios had been a power in Rome in spite of the nobility. They were used because they were

¹ Plut. Ti. Gracch. 8. Plutarch speaks of an " attempt" (iirex^PV"¹ /"» ^rV 5iopflt4<rei); but the effort perhaps went no further than the testing of opinion to discover the probability of support. The enterprise may have belonged to the praetorship of Laelius (145 b.c).

² Polyb. vi. 11.

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needed, not because they were loved, and the necessary man was never in much favour with the senate. Although there was no tie of blood between Aemilianus and the elder Scipio, they were much alike both in fortune and in temperament. They had both been called upon to save military situations that were thought desperate ; their reputation had been made by successful war; and though neither was a mere soldier, they lacked the taste and the patience for the complicated political game, which alone made a man a power amidst the noble circles and their immediate dependants at Rome.

But the last generation had seen in Tiberius Gracchus a man whose political influence had been vast, a noble with but scant respect for the indefeasible rights of the nobility and as stern as Cato in his animadversions on the vices of his order, a man whose greatest successes abroad had been those of diplomacy rather than of war, one who had established firm connections and a living memory of himself both in West and East, whose name was known and loved in Spain, Sardinia, Asia and Egypt. It would have been too much to hope that this honest old aristocrat would attempt to grapple with the evils which had first become manifest during his own long lifetime ; but it was not unnatural that people should look to a son of his for succour, especially as this son represented the blood of the Scipios as well as of the Gracchi. The marriage of the elderly Gracchus with the young Cornelia had marked the closing of the feud, personal rather than political, which had long separated him from the elder Scipio : and a further link between the two families was subsequently forged by the marriage of Sempronia, a daughter of Cornelia, to Scipio Aemilianus. The young Tiberius Gracchus may have been born during one of his father's frequent absences on the service of the State.¹ Certainly the elder Gracchus could have seen little of his son during the years of his infancy. But the closing years of the old man's life seem to have been spent uninterruptedly in Italy, and Tiberius must have been profoundly influenced by the genial and stately presence that Rome loved and feared. But he was little more than a boy when his father died, and the early influences that moulded his future career seem to have been due mainly to his mother. Cornelia would have been the typical Roman matron, had she lived a hundred

¹ Nitzsch Die Gracchen p. 203.

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years earlier ; she would then have trained sons for the battlefield, not for the Forum. As it was, the softening influences of Greek culture had tempered without impairing her strength of character, had substituted rational for purely supernatural sanctions, and a wide political outlook for a rude sense of civic duty. Herself the product of an education such as ancient civilisations rarely bestowed upon their women, she wrote and spoke with a purity and grace which led to the belief that her sons had learnt from her lips and from her pen their first lessons in that eloquence which swayed the masses and altered the fortunes of Rome.¹ But her gifts had not impaired her tenderness. Her sons were her "Jewels," and the successive loss of nine of the children which she had borne to Gracchus must have made the three that remained doubly dear. The two boys had a narrow escape from becoming Eastern princes: for the hand of the widow Cornelia was sought in marriage by the King of Egypt.² Such an alliance with the representative of the two houses of the Gracchi and the Scipios might easily seem desirable to a protected king, although the attractions of Cornelia may also have influenced his choice. She, however, had no aspirations to share the throne of the Lagidae, and the hellenism of Tiberius and of his younger brother Caius, though deep and far-reaching, was of a kind less violent than would have been gained by transportation to Alexandria. They were trained in rhetoric by Diophanes an exile from Mitylene, and in philosophy by Blossius of Cumae, a stoic of the school of Antipater of Tarsus.³ Many held the belief that Tiberius was spurred to his political enterprise by the direct exhortation of these teachers; but, even if their influence was not of this definite kind, there can be little doubt that the teaching of the two Greeks exercised a powerful influence on the political cast of his mind. Ideals of Greek liberty, speeches of Greek statesmen who had come forward as champions of the oppressed, stories of social ruin averted by the voice and hand of the heaven-sent legislator, pictures of self-sacrifice and of resigned submission to a standard of duty—these were lessons

¹ Cic. Brut. 27. 104 Fuit Gracchus diligentia Corneliae matris a puero doctus et Graecis litteris eruditus. Id. Ib. 58. 211 Legimus epistulas Corneliae matris Gracchorum: apparet filios non tam in gremio educatos quam in sermone matris. Cf. Quinctil. Inst. Or. i. 1. 6; Plut. Ti. Gracch. 1.

² Plut. Ti. Gracch. 1. The King referred to in this story is perhaps Ptolemy Euergetes, who reigned from 146 to 117 b.c.

³ Plut. Ti. Gracch. 8.

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that may have been taught both by rhetorician and philosopher. Nor was the teaching of history different. In the literary environment in which the Gracchi moved, ready answers were being given to the most vital questions of politics and social science. Every one must have felt that the approaching struggle had a dual aspect, that it was political as well as social. For social conservatism was entrenched behind a political rampart: and if reform, neglected by the senate, was to come from the people, the question had first to be asked, Had the people a legal right to initiate reform? The historians of that and of the preceding generation would have answered this question unhesitatingly in the affirmative. The de facto sovereignty of the senate had not even received a sanction in contemporary literature, while to that of the immediate past it was equally unknown. The- Roman annalists from the time of the Second Punic War had revealed the sovereignty of the people as the basis of the Roman constitution,¹and the history of the long struggle of the Plebs for freedom made the protection of the commons the sole justification of the tribunate. From the lips of Polybius himself Tiberius may have heard the impression which the Roman polity made on the mind of the educated Greek : and the fact that this was a Greek picture did not lessen its validity ; for the Greek was moulding the orthodox history of Rome, and the victims of his genius were the best Roman intellects of the day. He might have learnt how in this mixed constitution the people still retained their inalienable rights, how they elected, ratified, and above all how they punished.² He might have gathered that the identification of the tribunate with the interests of the nobility was a perversion of its true and vital function : that, the tribune exists but to assist the commons and can be subject to no authority but the people's will, whether expressed directly by I them or indirectly through his colleagues.³ The history of the Punic wars did indeed reveal, in the fate of a Varro or a Minucius, how popular insubordination might be punished, when its end was wrong. Polybius's own voice was raised in prophetic warning against a possible demagogy of the future.⁴ But that history showed the

¹ Nitzsch Die Gracchen pp. 208 foil., 258.

² Polyb. vi. 14 npivei fiey olv S Srjfios /col Sta<p6pov (money penalties) iroWdxts . . . OavaTOv Se Kptvei iidvos.

³ Polyb. vi. 16 bipeihovoi 5' del voteiv oi S^fiap_Xoi to Sokovv t$ Sijfia /col fudKiaTa tTTOxd£eo-6at tt)s roirov jSouA^creois.

⁴ Polyb. vi. 57.

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healthy discipline of a healthy people—a people that had vanquished genius through subordination, a peasant class whose loyalty and tenacity were as great as those of its leaders, and without whom those leaders would have been helpless. Where was such a class to be found now ? Change the subject or turn the page, and the Greek statesman and historian could point to the dreadful reverse of this picture.¹ He could show a Greek nation, gifted with political genius but doomed to political decay—a nation whose sons accumulated money, lived in luxury with little forethought for the future, and refused to beget children for the State: a nation with a wealthy and cultured upper class, but one that was literally perishing for the lack of men.² Was this the fate in store for Rome ? A temperament that was merely vigorous and keen might not have been affected by such reflections. One that was merely contemplative might have regarded them only as a subject for curious study. But Tiberius's mind ran to neither of these two extremes. He was a thoughtful and sensitive man of action. Sweet in temper, staid in deportment, gentle in language, he attracted from his dependants a loyalty that knew no limits, and from his friends a devotion that did not even shrink from death on his behalf. Even in his pure and polished oratory passion revealed itself chiefly in appeals to pity, not in the harsher forms of invective or of scorn. His mode of life was simple and restrained, but apparently with none of the pedantic austerity of the stoic. In an age that was becoming dissolute and frivolous he was moral and somewhat serious.³ But his career is not that of the man who burdens society with the impression that he has a solemn mission to perform. Such men are rarely taken as seriously as they take themselves; they do not win aged men of experience to support their cause; the demeanour that wearies their friends is even likely to be found irksome by the mob.

Roman society must have seen much promise in his youth, for honours came early. A seat at the augural board was regarded as a tribute to his merit rather than his birth ;⁴ and indeed the

¹ Polyb. xxxvii. 4. _ 'Ibid. s Plut. Ti. Gracch. 2.

⁴ Ibid., 4 oStojs ~ttv trepiBiTjTos &<rr€ rrjs tu>v PJjyoipav \eyop-4vris ieptafftyris ifiaiSijj'ai 81' aperV /j-aWov fi Sio tV tvytveiav. Tiberius may have filled the place vacated by the death of his father (circa 148 b.c). He would have been barely sixteen; and Plutarch says (I.e.) that he had but just emerged from boyhood. Election to the augural college at this time was effected by co-optation. See Underhill in loc.

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Roman aristocrats, who dispensed such favours, were too clever to be the slaves of a name, when political manipulation was in question and talent might be diverted to the true cause. His marriage was a more important determinant in his career. The bride who was offered him was the daughter of Appius Claudius Pulcher, a man of consular and censorian rank and now Princeps of the senate,¹ a clever representative of that brilliant and eccentric house, that had always kept liberalism alive in Rome. Appius had already displayed some of the restless individuality of his ancestors. When the senate had refused him a triumph after a war with the Salassi, he had celebrated the pageant at his own expense, while his daughter, a vestal, walked beside the car to keep at bay the importunate tribune who attempted to drag him off.² A similar unconventionality was manifested in the present betrothal. The story runs that Appius broached the question to Tiberius at an augural banquet. The proposition was readily accepted, and Appius in his joy shouted out the news to his wife as he entered his own front door. The lady was more surprised than annoyed. " What need for all this haste," she said, " unless indeed you have found Tiberius Gracchus for our girl ? "³ Appius, hasty as he was, was probably in this case not the victim of a sudden inspiration. The restless old man doubtless pined for reform; but he was weighed down by years, honours and familiarity with the senate. He could not be the protagonist in the coming struggle; but in Tiberius he saw the man of the future.

The chances of the time favoured a military even more than a political career; the chief spheres of influence were the province and the camp, and it was in these that the earliest distinctions of Tiberius were won. When a lad of fifteen he had followed his brother-in-law Scipio to Africa, and had been the first to mount the walls of Carthage in the vain assault on the fortress of Megara.* He had won the approval of the commander by his discipline and courage, and left general regret amongst the army when

¹ Plut. Ti. Gracch. 4. ² Cic. fro Cael. 14. 34; Suet. Tib. 2.

³ Plut. Ti. Gracch. 4. The story is also told of the betrothal of Cornelia herself to the elder Gracchus (Liv. xxxviii. 57; Val. Max. iv. 2. 3; Gell. xii. 8); but Plutarch records a statement of Polybius that Cornelia was not betrothed until after her father's death, and Livy (I.e.) is conscious of this version.

⁴Fannius of. Plut. Ti. Gracch. 4 tov ye re'txovs eVe#jj ray iroKeiiliov irpwros. As the context seems to show that Tiberius did not remain until the end of the siege, the ret_x°^s was probably that of Megara, the suburb of Carthage (Nitzsch Die Gracchen p. 244); cf. App. Lib. 117.

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[B.C. 137

he quitted the camp before the close of the campaign. But an experience as potent for the future as his first taste of war, must have been those hours of leisure spent in Scipio's tent.¹ If contact with the great commander aroused emulation, the talk on political questions of Scipio and his circle must have inspired profound reflection. Here he could find aspirations enough ; all that was lacking was a leader to translate them into deeds. The quaestor-ship, the first round of the higher official ladder, found him attached to the consul Mancinus and destined for the ever-turbulent province of Spain. It was a fortunate chance, for here was the scene of his father's military and diplomatic triumphs. But the sequel was unexpected. He had gone to fulfil the duties of a subordinate ; he suddenly found himself performing those of a commander-in-chief or of an accredited representative of the Roman people. The Numan-tines would treat only with a Gracchus, and the treaty that saved Roman lives but not Roman honour was felt to be really his work. In a moment he was involved in a political question that agitated the whole of Rome. The Numantine treaty was the topic of the day. Was it to be accepted or, if repudiated, should the authors of the disaster, the causes of the breach of faith, be surrendered in time-honoured fashion to the enemy as an expiation for the violated pledge ? On the first point there was little hesitation ; the senate decided for the nullity of the treaty, and it was likely that this view would be accepted by the people, if the measures against the ratifying officials were not made too stringent. For on this point there was a difference of opinion. The poorer classes, whose sons and brothers had been saved from death or captivity by the treaty, blamed Mancinus as the cause of the disaster, but were grateful to Tiberius as the author of the agreement. Others who had less to lose and could therefore afford to stand on principle, would have enforced the fullest rigour of the ancient rules and have delivered up the quaestor and tribunes with the defaulting general.² It was thought that the influence of Scipio, always great with the agricultural voters, might have availed to save even Mancinus, nay that, if he would, he might have got the peace confirmed.³ But his efforts were believed to have been employed in favour of Tiberius.

¹ Plut. l.C.

² Plut. Ti. Gracch. 7; cf. App. Iber. 83; Nitzsch Die Gracchen p. 280; Long Decline of Rom. Rep. i. p. 83.

³ Plut. l.c.

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The matter ended in an illogical compromise. The treaty was repudiated, but it was decreed that the general alone should be surrendered.¹ A breach in an ancient rule of religious law had been made in favour of Tiberius.

But, in spite of this mark of popular favour, the experience had been disheartening and its effect was disturbing. Although it is impossible to subscribe to the opinion of later writers, who, looking at the matter from a conservative and therefore unfavourable aspect, saw in this early check the key to Tiberius's future action,² yet anger and fear leave their trace even on the best regulated minds. The senate had torn up his treaty and placed him for the moment in personal peril. It was to the people that he owed his salvation. If circumstances were to develop an opposition party in Rome, he was being pushed more and more into its ranks. And a coolness seems to have sprung up at this time between him and the man who had been his great exemplar. Tiberius took no counsel of Scipio before embarking on his great enterprise ; support and advice were sought elsewhere. He may have already tested Scipio's lack of sympathy with an active propaganda ; shame might have kept back the hint of a plan that might seem to imply a claim to leadership. But it is possible that there was some feeling of resentment against the warrior now before Numantia, who had done nothing to save the last Numantine treaty and the honour of the name of Gracchus.

His reticence could scarcely have been due to ignorance of his own designs; for his brother Caius left it on record that it was while journeying northward from Rome on his way to Numantia that Tiberius's eyes were first fully opened to the magnitude of the malady that cried aloud for cure.³ It was in Etruria, the paradise of the capitalist, that he saw everywhere the imported slave and

¹ Vellei. ii. i Mancinum verecundia, poenam non recusando, perduxit hue, ut per fetialis nudus ac post tergam religatis manibus dederetur hostibus. Plut. Ti. Gracch. 7 rbv fxkv yap fatarov tyn<pi<ravTO yvpvbv Kal dedefjtevov vapaSovyat rots NofiavTlvois, Tav 5' &\Kuv Ityzlaavro tr&vrasv Sia Ti/Sepiov. Cf. Cic. de Off. iii. 30. iog.

² Cic. Brut. 27. 103 (Ti. Gracchus) propter turbulentissimum tribunatum, ad quern ex invidia foederis Numantini bonis iratus accesserat, ab ipsa re publica est interfectus. Id. de Har. Resp. 20. 43 Ti. Graccho invidia Numantini foederis, cui feriendo, quaestor C. Mancini consulis cum esset, interfuerat, et in eo foedere im-probando senatus severitas dolori et timori fuit, eaque res ilium fortem et clarum virum a gravitate patrum desciscere coegit. The same motive is suggested by Vellei. ii. 2 ; Quinctil. Inst. Or. vii. 4. 13 ; Dio Cass. frg. 82 ; Oros. v. 8. 3 ; Florus ii. 2 (iii. 14).

³ Plut. Ti. Gracch. 8.

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the barbarian who had replaced the freeman. It was this sight that first suggested something like a definite scheme. A further stimulus was soon to be found in scraps of anonymous writing which appeared on porches, walls and monuments, praying for his succour and entreating that the public land should be recovered for the poor.¹ The voiceless Roman people was seeking its only mode of utterance, a tribune who should be what the tribune had been of old, the servant of the many not the creature of the few. To Gracchus's mother his plans could hardly have been veiled. She is even said to have stimulated a vague craving for action by the playful remark that she was still known as the mother-in-law of Scipio, not as the mother of the Gracchi.¹

But there was need of serious counsel. -Gracchus did not mean to be a mere demagogue, coming before the people with a half-formed plan and stirring up an agitation which could end merely in some idle resolution. There were few to whom he could look for advice, but those few were of the best. Three venerable men, whose deeds and standing were even greater than their names, were ready with their support. There was the chief pontiff, P. Licinius Crassus Mucianus, the man who was said to combine in a supreme degree the four great blessings of wealth, birth, eloquence and legal lore;² there was the brother of Crassus, P. Mucius Scaevola,³ the greatest lawyer of his age and already destined to the consulship for the following year; lastly there was Tiberius's father-in-law, the restless Appius, now eagerly awaiting the fulfilment of a cherished scheme by the man of his own choice.⁴

Thus fortified, Tiberius Gracchus entered on his tribunate, and formulated the measure which was to leave large portions of the public domain open for distribution to the poor. In the popular gatherings with which he opened his campaign, he dwelt on the nature of the evils which he proposed to remedy. It was the interest of Italy, not merely of the Roman proletariate, that was at stake.⁵

•Plut. I.e.

² Gell. i. 13. 10 Is Crassus a Sempronio Asellione et plerisque aliis historiae Romanae scriptoribus traditur habuisse quinque rerum bonarum maxima et praecipua: quod esset ditissimus, quodnobilissimus, quod eloquentissimus, quod jurisconsultis-simus, quod pontifex maximus.

³ Cic. Acad. Prior, ii. 5. 13 Duo . . . sapientissimos et clarissimos fratres, P. Crassum et P. Scaevolam, aiunt Ti. Graccho auctores legum fuisse, alterum quidem, ut videmus, palam; alterum, ut suspicantur, obscurius.

¹ Plut. Ti. Gracch. g.

⁶ App. Bell. Civ. i. g eVe/woA^Tjire irepl tou 'ItoAmcoO ylvovs. The expression suggests the further question whether Gracchus intended Italians, as well as

133 B.C.]

THE LAND BILL

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He pointed out how the Italian peasantry had dwindled in numbers, and how that portion of it which still survived had been reduced to a poverty that was irremediable by their own efforts. He showed that the slave gangs which worked the vast estates were a menace, not a help, to Rome. They could not be enlisted for service in the legions ; their disaffection to their masters was notorious; their danger was being proved even now by the horrible condition of Sicily, the fate of its slave-owning landlords, the long, difficult and eventful war which had not even yet been brought to a close.¹ Sometimes the language of passion replaced that of reason in his harangues to the crowds that pressed round the Rostra. " The beasts that prowl about Italy have holes and lurking-places where they may make their beds. You who fight and die for Italy enjoy but the blessings of air and light. These alone are your heritage. Homeless, unsettled, you wander to and fro with your wives and children. Our generals are in the habit of inspiring their soldiers to the combat by exhorting them to repel the enemy in defence of their tombs and ancestral shrines. The appeal is idle and false. You cannot point to a paternal altar, you have no ancestral tomb. No ! you fight and die to give wealth and luxury to others. You are called the masters of the world ; yet there is no clod of earth that you can call your own."²

The proposal, which was ushered in by these stirring appeals, seemed at first sight to be of a moderate and somewhat conservative character. It professed to be the renewal of an older law, which had limited the amount of domain land which an individual might possess to five hundred jugera;³ it professed, that is, to reinforce an injunction which had been persistently disobeyed, for this enactment restricting possession had never been repealed. The extent to which a proposal of this kind is a re-enactment, in the spirit as well as in the letter, depends entirely on the length of time which has elapsed since the original proposal has begun to be violated. A political society, which recognises custom as one of the bases of law, must recognise desuetude as equally valid. A law, which has not been enforced for centuries, would, by the common

Romans, to benefit by his law. On this question see p. 115. But, whatever our opinion on this point, the widening of the issue by an appeal to Italian interests was natural, if not inevitable.

¹ App. I.e. ² Plut. Ti. Gracch. 9.

³ App. Bell. Civ. i. 9; cf. Plut. Ti. Gracch. 8.

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consent of the courts of such nations as favour progressive legislation, be regarded as no law at all. Again, the age of an ordinance determines its suitability to present conditions. It may be justifiable to revive an enactment that is centuries old ; but the revival should not necessarily dignify itself with that name. It must be regarded as a new/tleparture, unless the circumstances of the old and the new enactment can be proved to be approximately the same. Our attempts to judge the Gracchan law by these considerations are baffled by our ignorance of the real date of the previous enactment, the stringency of whose measures he wished to renew. If it was the Licinian law of the middle of the fourth century,¹ this law must have been renewed, or must still have continued to be observed, at a period not very long anterior to the Gracchan proposal; for Cato could point his argument against the declaration of war with Rhodes by an appeal to a provision attributed to this measure²— an appeal which would have been pointless, had the provision fallen into that oblivion which persistent neglect of an enactment must bring to all but the professed students of law. We can at least assert that the charge against Gracchus of reviving an enactment so hoary with age as to be absurdly obsolete, is not one of the charges to be found even in those literary records which were most unfriendly to his legislation.³

The general principle of the measure was, therefore, the limitation to five hundred jugera of the amount of public land that could be " possessed " by an individual. The very definition of the tenure immediately exempted large portions of the State's domain from the operation of this rule.⁴ The Campanian land was leased by the State to individuals, not merely possessed by them as the result of an occupation permitted by the government; it, therefore, fell

¹ The most respectable of the authorities for the Licinian law having dealt with the land question is Varro (R. R. i. 2. g Stolonis ilia lex, quae vetat plus D jugera habere civem R). A similar account is found in many other authors (Liv. vi. 35 ; Vellei. ii. 6; Plut. Cam. 3g ; Gell. vi. 3. 40; Val. Max. viii. 6. 3). A variant in the maximum amount permitted to a single holder is given by [Victor] de Vir. III. 20 [(Licinius Stolo) legem scivit, ne cui plebeio plus centum jugera agri habere liceret]; or the word " plebeio," if not a mistake, may suggest another clause in the supposed law.

'Cato ap. Gell. vi. (vii.) 3. 37. Cato asks whether any enactment punishes intent (for the Rhodians were charged with having intended hostility to Rome), and points his argument by the following reductio ad absurdum of legislation conceived in this spirit, Si quis plus quingenta jugera habere voluerit, tanta poena esto: si quis majorem pecuum numerum habere voluerit, tantum damnas esto.

³ On this subject see Niese Das sogenannte Licinisch-sextische Ackergesetz (Hermes xxiii. 1888), Soltau Das Aechtheit des licinischen Ackergesetzes von 367 v. Chr. (Hermes xxx. i8g5). ⁴ Mommsen in C. I. L. i. pp. 75 ff.

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outside the scope of the measure ;¹ but, as it was technically public land and its ownership was vested in the State, it would have been hazardous to presume its exemption; it seems, therefore, to have been specifically excluded from the operation of the bill, and a similar exception was probably made in favour of many other tracts of territory held under a similar tenure.² Either Gracchus declined to touch any interest that could properly describe itself as "vested," even though it took merely the form of a leasehold, or he valued the secure and abundant revenue which flowed into the coffers of the State from these domains. There were other lands strictly "public" where the claim of the holders was still stronger, and where dispossession without the fullest compensation must have been regarded as mere robbery. We know from later legislation that respect was had to such lands as the Trientabula, estates which had been granted by the Roman government at a quit rent to its creditors, as security for that portion of a national debt which had never been repaid. It is less certain what happened in the case of lands of which the usufruct alone had been granted to communities of Roman citizens or Latin colonists. Ownership in this case still remained vested in the Roman people, and if the right of usufruct had been granted by law, it could be removed by law. In the case of Latin communities, however, it was probably guaranteed by treaty, which no mere law could touch: and so similar were the conditions of Roman and Latin communities in this particular, that it is probable that the land whose use was conferred on whole communities by these ancient grants, was wholly spared by the Gracchan legislation. In the case of those commons which were possessed by groups of villagers for the purposes of pasturage (ager compascuus),³it is not likely that the group was regarded as the unit: and therefore, even in the case of such an aggregate possessing over five hundred jugera, their occupation was probably left undisturbed.

¹ Cic. de Leg. Agr. ii. 2g. 81 Nec duo Gracchi, qui de plebis Romanae com-modis plurimum cogitaverunt, nec L. Sulla . . '. agrum Campanum attingere ausus est. Cf. i. 7. 21.

'Exemptions were specified in the agrarian law of C. Gracchus, which must have appeared in that of his elder brother. They are noticed in the extant Lex agraria (C. i. L. 1. n. 200; Brans Fontes i. 3. n) 1. 6 Extra eum agrum, quei ager ex] lege plebive scito, quod C. Sempronius Ti. f. tr. pi. rog(avit), exceptum cavi-tumve est nei divideretur. . . . The law of C. Gracchus is here mentioned as being the later enactment. Cicero, when he writes (ad Att. 1. ig. 4) of his own attitude to the Flavian agrarian law of 60 b.c. Liberabam agrum eum, qui P. Mucio L. Calpurnio consulibus publicus fuisset, is probably referring to land that, public in 133 b.c., still remained public in his own day.

⁸ See Voigt Uber die staatsrechtliche Possessio und den Ager Compascuus p. 22g. 8

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[B.C. 183

All other possessors must vacate the land which exceeded the prescribed limit. Such an ordinance would have been harsh, had no compensation been allowed, and Gracchus proposed certain amends for the loss sustained. In the first place, the five hundred jugera retained by each possessor were to be increased by half as much again for each son that he might possess: although it seems that the amount retained was not to exceed one thousand jugera? Secondly, the land so secured to existing possessors was not to be held on a merely precarious tenure, and was not to be burdened by the payment of dues to the State ; even if ownership was not vested in its holders, they were guaranteed gratuitous undisturbed possession in perpetuity.² Thirdly, the bill as originally drafted even suggested some monetary compensation for the land surrendered.³This compensation was probably based on a valuation of stock, buildings, and recent permanent improvements, which were to be found on the territory now reverting to the State. It must have applied for the most part only to arable land, and practically amounted to a purchase by the State of items to which it could lay no legal claim; for it was the soil alone, not the buildings on the soil, over which its lordship could properly be asserted.

The object of reclaiming the public land was its future distribution amongst needy citizens. This distribution might have taken either of two forms. Fresh colonies might have been planted, or the acquired land might merely be assigned to settlers who were to belong to the existing political organisations. It was the latter method of simple assignation that Gracchus chose. There was felt to be no particular need for new political creations; for the pacification of Italy seemed to be accomplished, and the new farming class would perform their duty to the State equally well as members of the territory of Rome or of that of the existing municipia and

¹ App. Bell. Civ. i. 9 avexalvt^e rbv v6fxov p.Tjb'eva tuv irevraKoaiav Tr\46puv ttK4ov '~X,eiv_y itaial 5' avrtav imep rbv Tzakaibv v6fiov TrpoaerlQei to rifilffea roirtcv. Liv. Ep. lviii Ne quis ex publico agro plus quam mille jugera possideret, cf. [Victor] de Vir. III. 64. The conclusion stated in the text, which is gained by a combination of these passages, is, however, somewhat hazardous.

² App. Bell. Civ. 1. ii 4xe\eve robs TtXovalovs . . . /a^, iv § irepl fitupuv Sia(p4povrai, twv ir\e6vo>v imepiSetv, fxio-Qbv dfia ttjs ireirovii^vris i^epyaffias avr6.pKf\ pepofi4vovs t^v i^aiperov avett TL/irjs Krtiaiv is ael B4Baiov IkoWiJ) irevTaKoaUev ir\48p<ev, Kal Trai<rtv, oh eld TratSes, eKtiffTCfi Kal tovtwv to ripiaea. If avev Tijxris means " without paying for it," the phrase has no relation to the ti/*^ mentioned by Plutarch (see the next note) which was a valuation to be received by the dispossessed. It can scarcely mean " without further compensation " ; but, if interpreted in this way, the two accounts can be brought into some relation with each other.

⁸ Plut. Ti. Gracch. 9 iKeXevae Tififyv irpoaXa/iBdvovTas ixBatyeiv &v iSlxas iKeKrqvro.

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coloniae of Roman citizens. There is some evidence that the new proprietors were not all to be attached to the city of Rome itself, but that many, perhaps most, were to be attributed to the existing colonies and municipia, in the neighbourhood of which their allotments lay.¹ The size of the new allotments which Gracchus projected is not known; it probably varied with the needs and status of the occupier, perhaps with the quality of the land, and there is some indication that the maximum was fixed at thirty jugera? This is an amount that compares favourably with the two, three, seven or ten jugera of similar assignments in earlier times, and is at once a proof of the decrease in the value of land—a decrease which had contributed to the formation of the large estates—and of the large amount of territory which was expected to be reclaimed by the provisions of the new measure. The all otments thus assigned were not, however, to be the freehold property of their recipients. They were, indeed, heritable and to be held on a perfectly secure tenure by the assignees and their descendants; but a revenue was to be paid to the State for their use: and they were to be inalienable—the latter provision being a desperate expedient to check the land-hunger of the capitalist, and to save the new settlers from obedience to the economic tendencies of the times.³

It is doubtful whether the social object of Gracchus could have been fully accomplished, had he confined his attention wholly to the existing citizens of Rome. The area of economic distress was wider than the citizen body, and it was the salvation of Italy as a whole that Gracchus had at heart.⁴ There is much reason for supposing that some of the Italian allies were to be recipients of the benefits of the measure.⁶ In earlier assignations the Latins had not been excluded, and it is probable that at least these, whether members of old communities or of colonies, were intended to have some share in the distribution. There could be no legal hindrance to such participation. With respect to rights in land, the Latins were already on a level with Roman citizens, and their exclusion from the new allotments would have been due to a mere political prejudice which is not characteristic either of Gracchus or his plans.

¹ Sicuhis Flaccus (p. 136 Lachm.); cf. Mommsen I.e.

'There is a reference to this limit in the extant Lex Agraria (C. I. L. i. n. aoo; Bruns Fontes 1. 3. ir) 1. 14 Sei quis] . . . agri jugra non amplius xxx possidebit habebitve, but there is no direct evidence to connect it with the Gracchan legislation.

³ App. Bell. Civ. i. 10. * Cf. p. 110. ⁸ Mommsen I.e.

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The ineffectiveness of laws at Rome was due chiefly to the apathy of the executive authority. Gracchus saw clearly that his measure would, like other social efforts of the past, become a mere pious resolution, if its execution were entrusted to the ordinary officials of the State.¹ But a special commission, which should effectually carry out the work which he contemplated, must be of a very unusual -kind. The magnitude of the task, and the impossibility of assigning any precise limit of time to its completion, made it essential that the Triumvirate which he established should bear the appearance of a regular but extraordinary magistracy of the State. The three commissioners created by the bill were to be elected annually by the Comitia of the Tribes.² Re-election of the same individuals was possible, and the new magistracy was to come to an end only with the completion of its work. Its occupants, perhaps, possessed the Imperium from the date of the first institution of the office ; they certainly exercised it from the moment when, as we shall see, their functions of assignment were supplemented by the addition of judicial powers. Gracchus was doubtless led to this new creation purely by the needs of his measure; but he showed to later politicians the possibility of creating a new and powerful magistracy under the guise of an agrarian law.

Such was the measure that seemed to its proposer a reasonable and equitable means of remedying a grave injustice and restoring rather than giving rights to the poor. He might, if he would, have insisted on simple restitution. Had he pressed the letter of the law, not an atom of the public domain need have been left to its present occupiers. The possessor had no rights against the State ; he held on sufferance, and technically he might be supposed to be always waiting for his summons to ejectment. To give such people something over and above the limit that the laws had so long prescribed, to give them further a security of tenure for the land

*App. Bell. Civ. i. io.

² Cic. de Leg. Agr. ii. 12. 31 Audes etiam, Rulle, mentionem facere legis Semproniae, nec te ea lex ipsa commonet III viros illos XXXV tribuum suffragio creatos esse ? App. Bell. Civ. i. 9 irpooWflfi . . . rj)y A.omV rpeij atperobs &i/Spas, ivakkao-o-o/ievovs kot' IVoj, Siave/JLeiv tois irevri<nv. Strachan-Davidson (in loc.) doubts this latter characteristic of the magistracy. The history of the land-commission proves at least that the occupants of the post were perpetually re-eligible and could be chosen in their absence. Thus Gracchus, in spite of his two years' quaestorship in Sardinia, was still a commissioner in 124 B.C. (App. Bell. Civ. i. 21). See Mommsen Staatsr. ii. 1. p. 632. The electing body was doubtless the plebeian assembly of the tribes under the guidance of a tribune. This was the mode prescribed by Rullus's law of 63 B.C. (Cic. de Leg. Agr. ii. 7. 16).

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retained which amounted almost to complete ownership—were not these unexpected concessions that should be received with gratitude ? And even up to the eve of the polling the murmurs of the opposition were sometimes met by appeals to its nobler sentiments. The rich, said Gracchus, if they had the interests of Italy, its future hopes and its unborn generations at heart, should make this land a free gift to the State; they were vexing themselves about small issues and refusing to face the greater problems of the day.¹

But personal interests can never seem small, and the average man is more concerned with the present than with the future. The opposition was growing in volume day by day, and the murmurs were rising into shrieks. The class immediately threatened must have been numerically small; but they made up in combination and influence what they lacked in numbers. It was always easy to startle the solid commercial world of Rome by the cry of " confiscation ". A movement in this direction might have no limits ; the socialistic device of a "re-division of land," which had so often thrown the Greek commonwealths into a ferment, was being imported into Roman politics. All the forces of respectability should be allied against this sinister innovation. It is probable that many who propagated these views honestly believed that they exactly fitted the facts of the case. The possessors did indeed know that they were not owners. They were reminded of the fact whenever they purchased the right of occupation from a previous possessor, for such a title could not pass by mancipation; or whenever they sued for the recovery of an estate from which they had been ejected, for they could not make the plea before the praetor that the land was theirs " according to the right of the Quirites," but could rely only on the equitable assistance of the magistrate tendered through the use of the possessory interdicts ; or, more frequently still, whenever they paid their dues to the Publicanus, that disinterested middle-man, who had no object in compromising with the possessors, and could seldom have allowed an acre of land to escape his watchful eye. But, in spite of these reminders, there was an impression that the tenure was perfectly secure, and that the State would never again re-assert its lordship in the extreme form of dispensing entirely with its clients. Gracchus might talk of compensation, but was there any guarantee that it would be adequate, and, even supposing

•App. Bell. Civ. i. n.

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material compensation to be possible, what solace was that to outraged feelings ? Ancestral homes, and even ancestral tombs, were not grouped on one part of a domain, so that they could be saved by an owner when he retained his five hundred jugera; they were scattered all over the broad acres. Estates that technically belonged to a single man, and were therefore subject to the operation of the law, had practically ceased to confer any benefit on the owner, and were pledged to other purposes. They had been divided as the peculia of his sons, they had been promised as the dowry of his daughters. Again those former laws may have rightly forbidden the occupation of more than a certain proportion of land; but much of the soil now in possession had not been occupied by its present inhabitant; he had bought the right to be there in hard cash from the former tenant. And think of the invested capital ! Dowries had been swallowed up in the soil, and the Gracchan law was confiscating personal as well as real property, taking the wife's fortune as well as the husband's. Nay, if the history of the public land were traced, could it not be shown that such value as it now possessed had been given it by its occupiers or their ancestors ? The land was not assigned in early times, simply because it was not worth assignation. It was land that had been reclaimed for use, and of this use the authors of its value were now to be deprived.¹

Such was the plaint of the land-holders, one not devoid of equity and, therefore, awakening a response in the minds of timid and sober business men, who were as yet unaffected by the danger. But some of these found their own personal interests at stake. So good had the tenure seemed, that it had been accepted as security for debt,² and the Gracchan attack united for once the usually hostile ranks of mortgagers and mortgagees. The alarm spread from Rome to the outlying municipalities.³ Even in the city itself a very imperfect view of the scope of the bill was probably taken by

¹ Cf. App. Bell. Civ. i. io.

² App. I.e. Sayeiarai re xp*^a Tavnjs iireSe'iKvvav.

³ App. I.e. 7rA?}(?os &\\o '6ffov iv rais airoltcois it6\*ffiv % rais IfroTFoKiTiiTiv 4) a\\»s i/cotvwvei TTjffSe rys yjjs, 5eSi6res ifioiois iirrteffav Kal is enarepovs avrwv b~Le[tepl(avTO. iVo7ro\(TiSej would naturally be the municipia {cf. Lex. Agraria 1. 31); but Strachan-Davidson (in loc.) thinks that the civitates foederatae are here intended. There is a possibility that Appian has used the term vaguely; but there is no real difficulty in conceiving the municipia to be meant. Even the majority, that had received Roman citizenship, still continued to bear the name, and they may have continued to enjoy municipal rights in public land. The wealthier classes in these towns were therefore alarmed; the poorer classes (possessed of Roman citizenship) hoped for a share in the assignment.

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the proletariate. We may imagine the distorted form in which it reached the ears of the occupants of the country towns. " Was it true that the land which had been given them in usufruct was to be taken away ?" was the type of question asked in the municipia and in the colonies, whether Roman or Latin. The needier members of these towns received the news with very different feelings. They had every chance of sharing in the local division of the spoils, and their voices swelled the chorus of approval with which the poorer classes everywhere received the Gracchan law. Amidst this proletariate certain catch-words—well-remembered fragments of Gracchus's speeches—had begun to be the familiar currency of the day. " The numberless campaigns through which this land has been won," " The iniquity of exclusion from what is really the property of the State," "The disgrace of employing the treacherous slave in place of the free-born citizen "—such was the type of remark with which the Roman working-man or idler now entertained his fellow. All Roman Italy was in a blaze, and there must have been a sense of insecurity and anxiety even in those allied towns whose interest in Roman domain-land was remote. Might not State interests be as lightly violated as individual interests by a sovereign people : and was not the example of Rome almost as perilous as her action?

The opponents of Gracchus had no illusions as to the numerical strength which he could summon to his aid. If the battle were fought to a finish in the Comitia, there could be no doubt as to his triumphant victory. Open opposition could serve no purpose except to show what a remnant it was that was opposing the people's wishes. But there was a means of at least delaying the danger, of staving off the attack as long as Gracchus remained tribune, perhaps of giving the people an opportunity of recovering completely from their delirium. When the college of tribunes moved as a united body, its force was irresistible ; but now, as often before, there was some division in its ranks. It was not likely that ten men, drawn from the order of the nobility, should view with equal favour such a radical proposal as that of Tiberius Gracchus. But the popular feeling was so strong that for a time even the unsympathetic members of the boaid hesitated to protest, and no colleague of Tiberius is known to have opposed the movement in its initial stages. Even the man who was subsequently won over to the capitalist interest hesitated long before taking

120 A HISTORY OF ROME t^BC- ¹³³

the formidable step. It was believed, however, that the hesitancy of Marcus Octavius was due more to his personal regard for Tiberius than to respect for the people's wishes.¹ The tribune who was to scotch the obnoxious measure was an excellent instrument for a dignified opposition. He was grave and discreet, a personal friend and intimate of Tiberius.² It is true that he was a large holder on the public domain, and that he would suffer by the operation of the new agrarian law. But it was fitting that the landlord class should be represented by a landlord, and, if there had been the least suspicion of sordid motives, it would have been removed by Octavius's refusal to accept private compensation for himself from the slender means of Tiberius Gracchus.² The offer itself reads like an insult, but it was probably made in a moment of passionate and unreflecting fervour. Neither the profferer nor the refuser could have regarded it in the light of a bribe. Even when the veto had been pronounced, the daily contest between the two tribunes in the Forum never became a scene of unseemly recrimination. The war of words revolved round the question of principle. Both disputants were at white heat; yet not a word was said by either which conveyed a reflection on character or motive.³

These debates followed the first abortive meeting of the Assembly. As the decisive moment approached, streams of country folk had poured into Rome to register their votes in favour of the measure.⁴ The Contio had given way to the Comitia, the people had been ready to divide, and Gracchus had ordered his scribe to read aloud the words of the bill. Octavius had bidden the scribe to be silent;⁵ the vast meeting had melted away, and all the labours of the reformer seemed to have been in vain. To accept a temporary defeat under such circumstances was in accordance with the constitutional spirit of the times. The veto was a mode of encouraging reflection ; it might yield to a prolonged campaign, but it was regarded as a barrier against a hasty popular impulse which, if unchecked, might prove ruinous to some portion of the community. Gracchus, however, knew perfectly well that it was now being used in the interest oi a small minority, and he held the

¹ Plut. Ti. Gracch. io. 2 Plut. l.c.

³ Plut. l.c. oiSh e'nreiv \4yoyrttt wepl aKK^Kuv ^Xcaipdv, ovSe prj/ia ■KpoamuCai OttTcpov npbs top irepov Si opy^v iiveireHfleiov.

Diod. xxxiv. 6 avvippsov eis rijv 'P(6_/u7j>' ol Sx^oi bib rrjs x<fy«s lumrepsl iroTttftol rives eis tV tbVtb Svyapevriv Se'xe<r9ai eiXwrrav.

^B App. Bell. Civ. i. 12.

133 B.C.] GRACCHUS'S ATTEMPT AT COERCION 121

rights which it protected to be non-existent; he believed the question of agrarian reform to be bound up with his own personality, and its postponement to be equivalent to its extinction ; he had no intention of allowing his own political life to be a failure, and, instead of discarding his weapons of attack, he made them more formidable than before. Perhaps in obedience to popular outcries, he redrafted his bill in a form which rendered it more drastic and less equitable.¹ It is possible that some of the douceurs given to the possessors by his original proposal were not really in accordance with his own judgment. They were meant to disarm opposition. Now that opposition had not been disarmed, they could be removed without danger. The stricter measure had the same chance of success or failure as the less severe. We do not know the nature of the changes which were now introduced ; but it is possible that the pecuniary compensation offered for improvements on the land to be resumed was either abolished or rendered less adequate than before.

But even the form of the law was unimportant in comparison with the question of the method by which the new opposition was to be met. The veto, if persisted in by Octavius, would suspend the agrarian measure during the whole of Tiberius's year of office. It could only be countered by a device which would make government so impossible that the opposition would be forced to come to terms. The means were to be found in the prohibitive power of the tribunes, that right, which flowed from their major potestas, of forbidding under threat of penalties the action of all other magistrates. It was now rarely used except at the bidding of the senate and for certain specified purposes. It had become, in fact, little more than the means of enforcing obedience to a temporary suspension of business life decreed by the government. But recent events suggested a train of associations that brought back to mind the great political struggles of the past, and recalled the mode in which Licinius and Sextius had for five years sustained their anarchical edict for the purpose of the emancipation of the Plebs. The difference between the conditions of life in primitive Rome

¹ Plut. Ti. Gracch. io Trapo£vv8eh 6 TiBepios rbv /tev <ptAdv9pwrrov iTravfl\ero v6fiov, rbv 8' rib"iu re tois tto\\o7s Kal a<poSp6npov eVl robs aStKovvras tla4<ptptv fJSr;, Ke\eiav i£io-Ta<r8ai rfjs x<^P^as V ^kVihtjito napa robs irportpovs v6/wvs. Plutarch is apparently thinking of the abolition of what he calls the ti/i^i (e.g.); but his words do not necessarily imply that the original concessions mentioned by Appian (p. 114) were removed.

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and in the cosmopolitan capital of to-day did not appeal to Tiberius. The Justitium was as legitimate a method of political warfare as the Intercessio. He issued an edict which forbade all the other magistracies to perform their official functions until the voting on the agrarian law should be carried through; he placed his own seals on the doors of the temple of Saturn to prevent the quaestors from making payments to the treasury or withdrawing money from it; he forbade the praetors to sit in the courts of justice and announced that he would exact a fine from those who disobeyed. The magistrates obeyed the edict, and most of the active life of the State was in suspense.¹ The fact of their obedience showed the overwhelming power which Tiberius now had behind him; for an ill-supported tribune, who adopted such an obsolete method of warfare, would have been unable to enforce his decrees and would merely have appeared ridiculous. The opponents of the law were now genuinely alarmed. Those who would be the chief sufferers put on garments of mourning, and paced the silent Forum with gloom and despair written on their faces, as though they were the innocent victims of a great wrong. But, while they took this overt means of stirring the commiseration of the crowd, it was whispered that the last treacherous device for averting the danger was being tried. The cause would perish with the demagogue, and Tiberius might be secretly removed. Confidence in this view was strengthened when it was known that the tribune carried a dagger concealed about his person.²

An attempt was now made to discover whether the pressure had been sufficient and whether the veto would be repeated. Gracchus again summoned the assembly, the reading of the bill was again commenced and again stopped at the instance of Octavius.³ This second disappointment nearly led to open riot. The vast crowd did not immediately disperse ; it felt its great physical strength and the utter weakness of the regular organs of government. There were ominous signs of an appeal to force, when two men of consular rank, Manlius and Fulvius,⁴ intervened as peacemakers. They threw themselves at the feet of

¹ Plut. Ti. Gracch. io. » Plut. l.c.

³ App. Bell. Civ. i. 12. Plutarch (Ti. Gracch. n) preserves a tradition that the meeting was practically broken up by the adherents of the possessors who, to prevent the passing of an illegal decree, carried off the voting urns.

⁴ MaAAioj Kal $oi\Bios (Plut. Ti. Gracch. n). Schafer {Jahrb. f. Class. Philol. 1873 p. 71) thinks that the first name is a mistake for that of Manilius the jurist, consul in 149 b.c, and that the second refers to Ser. Fulvius Flaccus, consul in

135 b.c.

133 B.C.] FRUITLESS REFERENCE TO THE SENATE 123

Tiberius, they clasped his hands, they besought him with tears to pause before he committed himself to an act of violence. Tiberius was not insensible to the appeal. The immediate future was dark enough, and the entreaties of these revered men had saved an awkward situation. He asked them what they held that he should do. They answered that they were not equal to advise on i matter of such vast import; but that there was the senate. Why not submit the whole matter to the judgment of the great council of the State ? Tiberius's own attitude to this proposal may have been influenced by the fact that it was addressed to his colleagues as well as to himself,¹ and that they apparently thought it a reasonable means of relieving the present situation. It is difficult to believe that the man who had never taken the senate into his confidence over so vital a matter as the agrarian law, could have had much hope of its sympathy now. But his conviction of the inherent reasonableness of his proposal,² of his own power of stating the case convincingly, and his knowledge that the senate usually did yield at a crisis, that its government was only possible because it consistently kept its finger on the pulse of popular opinion, may have directed his acceptance of its advice. Immediate resort was had to the Curia. The business of the house must have been immediately suspended to listen to a statement of the merits of the agrarian measure, and to a description of the political situation which it had created. When the debate began, it was obvious that there was nothing but humiliation in store for the leaders of the popular movement. The capitalist class was represented by an overwhelming majority; carping protests and riddling criticism were heard on every side, and Tiberius probably had never been told so many home truths in his life. It was useless to prolong the discussion, and Tiberius was glad to get into the open air of the Forum again. He had formed his resolution, and now made a proposal which, if carried through, might remove the deadlock by means that might be construed as legitimate. The new device was nothing less than the removal of his colleague Octavius from office. He announced that at the next meeting of the Assembly two questions would be put before the Plebs, the acceptance of the law and the continuance by Octavius of his tenure of the tribunate.² The latter question was to be raised on the general issue whether a tribune who

•App. Bell. Civ. i. 12 oi Svvarol robs Sim&'pxovs ii^lovv Imrptyat ry BovKy irepl liv Suupcpovrai. ⁸ App.

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acted contrary to the interests of the people was to continue in office. At the appointed time ¹ Octavius's constancy was again tested, and he again stood firm. Tiberius broke out into one of his emotional outbursts, seizing his colleague's hands, entreating him to do this great favour to the people, reminding him that their claims were just, were nothing in proportion to their toils and dangers. When this appeal had been rejected, Tiberius summed up the impossibility of the situation in terms which contained a condemnation of the whole growth and structure of the Roman constitution. It was not in human power, he said, to prevent open war between magistrates of equal authority who were at variance on the gravest matters of state;² the only way which he saw of securing peace was the deposition of one of them from office. He did not care in the present instance which it was. The people would be the arbiter. Let his own deposition be proposed by Octavius ; he would walk quietly away into a private station, if this were the will of the citizens. The man who spoke thus had more completely emancipated himself from Roman formulae than any Roman of the past. To Octavius it must have seemed a mere outburst of Greek demagogism. The offer too was an eminently safe one to make under the circumstances. On no grounds could it be accepted. At this point the proceedings were adjourned to allow Octavius time for deliberation.

On the following day Gracchus announced that the question of deposition would be taken first, and a fresh and equally vain appeal was made to the feelings of the unshaken Octavius.³ The question was then put, not as a vague and general resolution, but as a determinate motion that Octavius be deprived of the tribunate. The thirty-five tribes voted, and when the votes of seventeen had been handed up and proclaimed,⁴ and the voice of but one was lacking to make Octavius a private citizen, Tiberius as the presiding tribune stopped for a moment the machinery of the election. He again showed himself as a revolutionist unfortunate in the possession of a political and personal conscience. The people were witnessing a more passionate scene than ever, one that may appear as the last effort of reconciliation between the two social forces that were to

¹ Or in a contio held before the meeting. The scene is described in Plut. Ti. Gracch. n.

² Plut. l.c. vTvtnrav & TtBepios us oiik effTiv &pxovras amporepovs Kal irepl irpayftArwv fieyd\wv air¹ itrys Qovcrias Sia<pepo/ieyovs &yev iroKefiov Bte^e\6e7y rbv %p6vov.

³ Plut. Ti. Gracch. 12. ⁱCf. Mommsen Staatsr. iii. p. 409, note 1.

133 B.C.] DEPOSITION OF OCTAVIUS

125

meet in terrible conflict. Gracchus's arms were round his opponent's neck; broken appeals fell from his lips—the old one that he should not break the heart of the people: the new one that he should not cause his own degradation, and leave a bitter memory in the mind of the author of his fall. Observers saw that Octavius's heart was touched; his eyes were filled with tears, and for some time he kept a troubled silence. But he soon remembered his duty and his pledge. Tiberius might do with him what he would. Gracchus called the gods to witness that he would willingly have saved his colleague from dishonour, and ordered the resumption of the announcement of the votes. The bill became law and Octavius was stripped of his office. It was probably because he declined to recognise the legality of the act that he still lingered on the Rostra. One of the tribunician viatores, a freedman of Gracchus, was commanded to fetch him down. When he reached the ground, a rush was made at him by the mob; but his supporters rallied round him, and Tiberius himself rushed from the Rostra to prevent the act of violence. Soon he was lost in the crowd and hurried unobserved from the tumult.¹ His place in the tribunician college was filled up by the immediate election of one Quintus Mummius.²

The members of the assembly that deposed Octavius may have been the spectators and authors of a new precedent in Roman history, one that was often followed in the closing years of the Republic, but one that may have received no direct sanction from the records of the past. The abrogation of the imperium of a proconsul had indeed been known,³ but the deposition of a city magistrate during his year of office seems to have been a hitherto untried experiment. We cannot on this ground alone pronounce it to have been illegal; for an act never attempted before may have perfect legal validity, as the first occasion on which a legitimate deduction has been made from admitted principles of the constitution. It had always been allowed that under certain circumstances (chiefly the neglect of the proper formalities of election) a magistrate might be invited to abdicate his office; but the fact of this invitation is itself an evidence for the absence of any legal power of suspension. Tradition, however, often supplemented the defects of historical

¹ Plut. Ti. Gracch. 12.

² This is the name given by Appian (Bell. Civ ±. 13); Plutarch (Ti. Gracch. 13) calls him Mucius; Orosius (v. 8. 3) Minucius.

⁵ App. Iber. 83. Cf. Liv. xxvii. 20, xxix. ig. See Mommsen Staatsr. i. p. 62g.

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[B.C. 1SS

evidence, and one, perhaps the older, tale of the removal of the first consul Collatinus stated that it was effected by a popular measure introduced by his colleague.¹ This story was a fragment of that tradition of popular sovereignty which animated the historical literature of the age of the Gracchi : and one deduction from that theory may well have seemed to be that the sovereign people could change its ministers as it pleased. It was a deduction, however, that was not drawn even in the best period of democratic Athens; it ran wholly counter to the Roman conception of the magistracy as an authority co-ordinate with the people and one that, if not divinely appointed, received at least something of a sacred character from the fact of investiture with office. Even the prosecution of a magistrate for the gravest crime, although technically permissible during his year of office, had as a rule been relegated to the time when he again became a private citizen; the tribunician college, in particular, had generally thrown its protecting shield around its offending members, and had thus sustained its own dignity and that of the people. But, even if it be supposed that the sovereign could, at any moment and without any of the due formalities, proclaim itself a competent court of justice, and even though removal from office might be improperly represented as a punishment, there was the question of the offence to be considered. No crime known to the law had been charged against Octavius. In the exercise of his admitted right, or, as he might nave expressed it, of his sacred duty, he had offended against the will of a majority. The analogy of the criminal law was from this point of view hopeless, and was therefore not pressed on this occasion. From another point of view it was not quite so remote. The tumultuous popular assemblages that had, on the bidding of a prosecuting tribune, often condemned commanders for vague offences hardly formulated in any particular law, scarcely differed, except in the fact that no previous magisterial inquiry had been conducted, from the meeting that deposed Octavius. The gulf that lies between proceedings in a parliament and proceedings in a court of law, was far less in Rome than it would have been in those Hellenic communities that possessed a developed system of criminal judicature.

If criminal analogies failed, a purely political ground of defence

¹ Mommsen l.c.

133 B.C.] THE LAND BILL BECOMES LAW

127

must be adduced. This could hardly be based on considerations of abstract justice, although, as we shall see, an attempt was made by Tiberius Gracchus to give it even this foundation. Could it be based on convenience ? Obviously, as Gracchus saw, his act was the only effective means of removing a deadlock created by a constitution which knew only magistrates and people and had effectively crippled both. So far, it might be defended on grounds of temporary necessity. But an act of this kind could not die. To what consequences might not its repetition lead ? Imagine a less serious question, a less representative assembly. Think of the possibility of a few hundred desperate members of the proletariate gathering on the Capitoline hill and deposing a tribune who represented the interests of the vast outlying population of Rome. This is a consequence which, it is true, was not realised in the future. But that was only because the tribunate was more than Gracchus conceived it, and was too strong in tradition and associations of sanctity to be broken even by his attack. The scruples which troubled him most arose from the suspicion that the sacred office itself might have been held to suffer by the deposition of Octavius, and it was to a repudiation of this view that he subsequently devoted the larger part of his systematic defence of his action.

At the same meeting at which Octavius was deposed, the agrarian bill was for the first time read without interruption to the people and immediately became law. Shortly after, the election of the commissioners was proceeded with and resulted in the appointment of Tiberius Gracchus himself, of his father-in-law Appius Claudius and of Gracchus's younger brother Caius.¹ It was perhaps natural that the people should pin then faith on the family of their champion ; but it could hardly have increased the confidence of the community as a whole in the wisdom with which this delicate task would be executed, to find that it was entrusted to a family party, one of which was a mere boy; and the mistrust must have been increased when, somewhat later in the course of the year, the thorny questions which immediately encompassed the task of distribution led to the introduction by Tiberius of another law, which gave judicial power to the triumvirs, for the purpose of determining what was public land and what was private.² The fortunes of the richer

'App. Bell. Civ. i. 13 ; Plut. Ti. Gracch. 13.

² Liv. Ep. lviii Promulgavit et aliam legem agrariam, qua sibi latius agrum patefaceret, ut iidem triumviri judicarent qua publicus ager, qua privatus esset.

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[B.C. 183

classes seemed now to be entrusted to one man, who combined in his own person the tribunician power and the imperium, whose jurisdiction must have seriously infringed that of the regular courts, and who was assisted in issuing his probably inappellable decrees by a father-in-law and a younger brother. But, although effective protest was impossible, the senate showed its resentment by acts that might appear petty and spiteful, did we not remember that they were the only means open to this body of passing a vote of censure on the recent proceedings. The senate controlled every item of the expenditure; and when the commissioners appealed to it for their expenses, it refused a tent and fixed the limit of supplies at a denarius and a half a day. The instigator of this decree was the ex-consul Scipio Nasica, a heavy loser by the agrarian law, a man of strong and passionate temper who was every day becoming a more infuriated opponent of Tiberius Gracchus.¹

Meanwhile the latter had celebrated a peaceful triumph which far eclipsed the military pageants of the imperators of the past. The country people, before they returned to their farms, had escorted him to his house ; they had hailed him as a greater than Romulus, as the founder, not of a city nor of a nation, but of all the peoples of Italy.² It is true that his escort was only the poor, rude mob Stately nobles and clanking soldiers were not to be seen in the procession. But they were better away. This was the true apotheosis of a real demagogism. And the suspicion of the masses was as readily fired as their enthusiasm. A friend of Tiberius died suddenly and ugly marks were seen upon the body. There was a cry of poison ; the bier was caught up on the shoulders of the crowd and bome to the place of burning. A vast throng stood by to see the corpse consumed, and the ineffectiveness of the flames was held a thorough confirmation of the truth of their suspicions.³ It remained to see how far this protective energy would serve to save their favourite when the day of reckoning came.

Tiberius could hardly have shared in the general elation. To make promises was one thing, to fulfil them another. Everything depended on the effectiveness of the execution of the agrarian scheme;

The titles borne by the commissioners appear as III vir a. d. a. (Lex Latina Tabulae Bantinae, C. I. L. 1.197 ; Bruns F antes i. 3. 9 ; cf. Lex Acilia Repetundarum 1. 13, C. I. L. i. 198; Bruns Pontes i. 3. 10): III vir a. i. a. (C. I. L. i. nn. 552-555): III vir a. d. a. i. (C. I. L. i. n. 583).

¹ Plut. Ti. Gracch. 13. ² App. Bell. Civ. 1. 13.

³ Plut. l.c.

133 B.C.] BEQUEST OF ATTALUS 129

and, although the mechanism for distribution was excellent, some of the material necessary for its successful fulfilment was sadly lacking. There were candidates enough for land, and there was sufficient land for the candidates. But whence were the means for starting these penniless people on their new road to virtue and prosperity to be derived ? To give an ardent settler thirty jugera of soil and to withhold from him the means of sowing his first crop or of making his first effort to turn pasture into arable land, was both useless and cruel; and we may imagine that the evicted possessors had not left their relinquished estates in a very enviable condition. The doors of the Aerarium were closed, for its key was in the hands of the senate; and Gracchus had to cast an anxious eye around for means for satisfying the needs of his clients.

The opportunity was presented when the Roman people came into the unexpected inheritance of Attalus the Third, king of Per-gamon. The testament was brought to Rome by Eudemus the Pergamene, whose first business was with the senate. But, when Eudemus arrived in the city, he saw a state of things which must have made him doubt whether the senate was any longer the true director of the State. It sat passive and sullen, while an energetic prostates of the Greek type was doing what he liked with the land of Italy. No sane ambassador could have refused to neglect Gracchus, and it is practically certain that Eudemus approached him. This fact we may believe, even if we do not accept the version that the envoy had taken the precaution of bringing in his luggage a purple robe and a diadem, as symbols that might be necessary for a fitting recognition of Tiberius's future position.¹ It is also possible that suspicion of the rule of senators and capitalists may also have prompted the Greek to attempt to discover whether a more tolerable settlement might not be gained for his country through the leader of the popular party.² We cannot say whether Gracchus ever contemplated a policy with respect to the province as a whole. His mind was probably full of his immediate needs. He saw in the treasures of Attalus more than an equivalent for the revenues enclosed in the locked Aerarium, and he announced his intention of promulgating a plebiscite that the money left by the king should be assigned to the settlers provided for by his agrarian law.³ It is

'Plut. Ti. Gracch. 14. ²Nitzsch Die Gracchen p. 315.

³ Liv. Ep. lviii Deinde, cum minus agrj esset quam quod dividi posset sine offensa etiam plebis, quoniam eos ad cupiditatem amplum modum sperandi incit-

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possible that he contemplated the application of the future revenues of the kingdom of Pergamon to this or some similar purpose: and it was perhaps partly for this reason, partly in answer to the object tion that the treasure could not be appropriated without a senatorial decree, that he announced the novel doctrine that it was no business of the senate to decide the fate of the cities which had belonged to the Attalid monarchy, and that he himself would prepare for the people a measure dealing with this question.¹

This was the fiercest challenge that he had yet flung to the senate. There might be a difference of opinion as to the right of a magistrate to put a question to the people without the guidance of a senatorial decree ; the assignment of land was unquestionably a popular right in so far as it required ratification by the commons ; even the deposition of Octavius was a matter for the people and would avenge itself. But there were two senatorial rights— the one usurped, the other created—whose validity had never been questioned. These were the control of finance and the direction of provincial administration. Were the possibility once admitted that these might be dealt with in the Comitia, the magistrates would cease to be ministers of the senate ; for it was chiefly through a system of judicious prize-giving that the senate attached to itself the loyalty of the official class. There was perhaps less fear of what Gracchus himself might do than of the spectre which he was raising for the future. For in Roman history the events of the past made those of the future ; there were few isolated phenomena in its development.

From this time the attacks of individual senators on Gracchus became more vehement and direct. They proceeded from men of the highest rank. A certain Pompeius, in whom we may probably see an ex-consul and a future censor, was not ashamed of raising the spectre of a coming monarchy by reference to the story of the sceptre and the purple robe, and is said to have vowed to impeach Gracchus as soon as his year of magistracy had expired ;² the ex-consul Quintus Caecilius Metellus, of Macedonian fame, reproached Tiberius with his rabble escort. He compared

averat, legem se promulgaturum ostendit, ut iis, qui Sempronia lege agrum accipere deberent, pecunia quae regis Attali fuisset divideretur. [Victor] de Vir. III. 64 Tulit ut ea familia quae ex Attali hereditate erat ageretur et populo divideretur, Cf. Plut. Ti. Gracch. 14; Oros. v. 8. 4.

¹ Plut. Ti. Gracch. 14. ³ Ibid.; Oros. v. 8. 4,

133 B.C.] ATTACKS ON TIBERIUS GRACCHUS 131

the demeanour of the father and the son. In the censorship of the former the citizens used to quench their lights at night, as they saw him pass up the street to his house, that they might impress the censorial mind with the ideas of early hours and orderly conduct; now the son of this man might be seen returning home amidst the blaze of torches, held in the stout arms of a defiant body-guard drawn from the neediest classes.¹ These arrows may have missed the mark ; the one that hit was winged by an aged senator, Titus Annius Luscus, who had held the consulship twenty years before. His wit is said to have been better established than his character. He excelled in that form of ready altercation, of impaling his opponent on the horns of a dilemma by means of some innocent question, which, both in the courts and the senate, was often more effective than the power of continuous oratory. He now challenged Tiberius to a wager (sponsio), such as in the public life of Rome was often employed to settle a disputed point of honour or of fact, to determine the question whether he had dishonoured a colleague, who was holy in virtue of his office and had been made sacrosanct by the laws. The proposal was received by the senators with loud cries of acclamation. A glance at Tiberius would probably have shown that Annius had found the weak spot, not merely in his defensive armour, but in his very soul. The deposition of Octavius was proving a very nemesis; it was a democratic act that was in the highest degree undemocratic, an assertion and yet a gross violation of popular liberty.² The superstitious masses were in the habit of washing their hands and purifying their bodies before they entered into the presence of a tribune.³ Might there not be a thrill of awe and repentance when the idea was brought home to them that this holy temple had been violated : and must not this be followed by a sense of repugnance to the man who had prompted them to the unhallowed deed ? Tiberius sprang to his feet, quitter! the senate-house and summoned the people. The majesty of the tribunate in his person had been outraged by Annius. He must

•Plut. l.c. Cicero (Brut. 21. 81) speaks of a speech of Metellus "contra Ti. Gracchum ". Plutarch's citation may be from this speech.

² Cicero regarded Octavius's deposition as the ruin of Gracchus. Brut. 25. 95 Injuria accepta fregit Ti. Gracchum patientia civis in rebus optimis constantissimus M. Octavius. De Leg. iii. 10. 24 Ipsum Ti. Gracchum non solum neglectus sed etiam sublatus intercessor evertit; quid enim ilium aliud perculit, nisi quod potestatem intercedenti collegae abrogavit ? The deposition was an act of "seditio" (pro Mil. 27. 72).

⁸ Plut. Quaest. Rom. § 81.

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answer for his words. The aged senator appeared before the crowd; he knew his disadvantage if the ordinary weapons of comitial strife were employed. In power of words and in repute with the masses he stood far behind Tiberius. But his presence of mind did not desert him. Might he ask a few questions before the regular proceedings began ? The request was allowed and there was a dead silence. " Now suppose," said Annius, " you, Tiberius, were to wish to cover me with shame and abuse, and suppose I were to call on one of your colleagues for help, and he were to come up here to offer me his assistance, and suppose further that this were to excite your displeasure, would you deprive that colleague of yours of his office ?" To answer that question in the affirmative was to admit that the tribunician power was dead ; to answer it in the negative was to invite the retort that the auxilium was only one form of the intercessio. The quick-witted southern crowd must have seen the difficulty at once, and Tiberius himself, usually so ready and bold in speech, could not face the dilemma. He remained silent and dismissed the assembly.¹

But matters could not remain as they were. This new aspect of Octavius's deposition was the talk of the town, and there were many troubled consciences amongst the members of his own following. Something must be done to quiet them ; he must raise the question himself. The situation had indeed changed rapidly. Tiberius Gracchus was on his defence. Never did his power of special pleading appear to greater advantage than in the speech which followed. He had the gift which makes the mighty Radical, of diving down and seizing some fundamental truth of political science, and then employing it with merciless logic for the illustration or refutation of the practice of the present. The central idea here was one gathered from the political science of the Greeks. The good of the community is the only test of the Tightness of an institution. It is justified if it secures that end, unjustified if it does not: or, to use the language of religion, holy in the one case, devoid of sanctity in the other. And an institution is not a mere abstraction ; we must judge it by its use. We must, therefore, say that when it obeys the common interest, it is right: when it ceases to obey it, it is wrong. But the right must be preserved and the wrong plucked out. So Gracchus maintained that

¹ Plut. Ti. Gracch. 14.

133 B.C.] DEFENCE OF OCTAVIUS'S DEPOSITION 133

the tribune was holy and sacrosanct because he had been sanctified to the people's service and was the people's head. If then he change his character and do the people wrong, cutting down its strength and silencing its voice as expressed through the suffrage, he has deprived himself of his office, for he has ceased to conform to the terms on which he received it. Should we leave a tribune alone who was pulling down the Capitolium or burning the docks ? And yet a tribune who did these things would remain a tribune, though a bad one. It is only when a tribune is destroying the power of the people that he is no longer a tribune at all. The laws give the tribune the power to arrest the consul. It is a power given against a man elected by the people ; for consul and tribune are equally mandataries of the people. Shall not then the people have the right of depriving the tribune of his authority, when he uses this authority in a way prejudicial to the interests of the giver ? What does the history of the past teach us ? Can anything have been more powerful or more sacred than the ancient monarchy of Rome ? The Imperium of the king was unlimited, the highest priestly offices were his. Yet the city expelled Tarquin for his crimes. The tyranny of a single man was alone sufficient to bring to an end a government which had its roots in the most distant past, which had presided over the very birth of the city. And, if sanctity alone is to be the ground of immunity, what are we to think of the punishment of a vestal virgin ? Is there anything in Rome more holy and awe-inspiring than the maidens who tend and guard the eternal flame ? Yet their sin is visited by the most horrible of deaths. They hold then sacrosanct character through the gods; they lose it, therefore, when they sin against the gods. Should the same not be true of the tribune ? It is on account of the people that he is sacred ; he cannot retain this divine character when he wrongs the people ; he is a man engaged in destroying the very power which is the source of his strength. If the tribunate can justly be gained by a favourable vote of the majority of the tribes, can it not with greater justice be taken away by an adverse vote of all of them ? Again, what should be the limits of our action in dealing with sacred things ? Does sanctity mean immobility ? By no means. What are more holy and inviolable than things dedicated to the gods ? Yet this character does not prevent the people from handling, moving, transferring them as it pleases. In the case of the tribunate, it is the office, not the

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man, that is inviolable; it may be treated as an object of dedication and transferred to another. The practice of our own State proves that the office is not inviolable in the sense of being inalienable, for its holders have often forsworn it and asked to be divested of it.¹

The strongest part of this utterance was that which dealt with the sacred character of office; it was a mere emanation from the performance of certain functions ; the protection, not the reality, of the thing. Gracchus might have added that even a treaty might under certain circumstances be legitimately broken. The weakest, from a Roman standpoint or indeed from that of any stable political society, was the identification of the permanent and temporary character of an institution, the assumption that a meeting of the people was the people, that a tribune was the tribune. How far the speech was convincing we do not know; it certainly did not relieve Tiberius of his embarrassments, which were now thickening around him.

Tiberius's success had been mainly due to the country voters. It is true that he had a large following in the city; but this was numerically inferior to a mass of urban folk, whose attitude was sither indifferent or hostile. They were indifferent in so far as they did not want agrarian assignments, and hostile in so far as they were clients of the noble houses which opposed Tiberius's policy. This urban party was now in the ascendant, for the country voters had scattered to their homes.² The situation demanded that he should work steadily for two objects, re-election to the tribunate and the support of the city voters. If, in addition to this support, he could hold out hopes that would attract the great capitalists to his side, his position would be impregnable. Hence in his speeches he began to throw out hints of a new and wide programme of legislation.³ There was first the military grievance. Recent regulations, by the large decrease which they made in the property qualifications required for service,* had increased the liability to the conscription of the manufacturing and trading classes of Rome. Gracchus pro-

¹ Plut. Ti. Gracch. 15. ^,J App. Bell. Civ. i. 14.

⁸ Plut. Ti. Gracch. 16 alBis aWois vd/xois aveKaiiBavi to irA^floi, rov re XP^^V0VrStv ffrparetwv atpaipav, Kal Siliobs 4iriKa\etf76at rbv Sijfiov airb rSov SiKaoTwv Kal rots ttplvovai rire (TvyK\riTtKoTs oiai [rpiaKoaloLs] Karaiuyvvs 4k ray iirireW rbv Xaov apSjtiv. Dio Cass. frg. 88 to iiKaariipia oirb rrjs BovArjs 4tI robs iirire'os nerfjye (Cf. Plin. H.N. xxxiii. 34).

⁴ Polyb. vi. ig.

133 B.C.] PROGRAMME OF TIBERIUS GRACCHUS 135

posed that the period of service should be shortened—his suggestion probably being, not that the years of liability to service (the seventeenth to the forty-sixth) should be lessened, but that within these years a limited number of campaigns should be agreed on, which should form the maximum amount of active service for every citizen.¹ Two other proposals dealt with the question of criminal jurisdiction. The first allowed an appeal to the people from the decision of judices. The form in which this proposal is stated by our authority, would lead us to suppose that the courts to be rendered appellable were those constituted under standing laws. The chief of these quaestiones or judicicu publico* was the court which tried cases for extortion, established in the first instance by a Lex Calpurnia, and possibly reconstituted before this epoch by a Junian law.² A permanent court for the trial of murder may also have existed at this time.⁸ The judges of these standing commissions were drawn from the senatorial order; and Gracchus, therefore, by suggesting an appeal from their judgment to the people, was attacking a senatorial monopoly of the most important jurisdiction, and perhaps reflecting on the conduct of senatorial judices, as displayed especially in relation to the grievances of distressed provincials. But it is probable that he also meant to strike a blow at a more extraordinary prerogative claimed by the senate, and to deny the right of that body to establish special commissions which could decide without appeal on the life and fortunes of Roman citizens.⁴ So far his proposals, whether based on a conviction of their general utility or not, were a bid for the support of the average citizen. But when he declared that the qualification for the criminal judges of the time could not be allowed to stand, and that these judges should be taken either from a joint panel of senators and knights, or from the senate increased by the addition of a number of members of the equestrian order equal to its present strength, he was holding out a bait to the wealthy middle class,

¹ There was already such a maximum according to Polybius (vi. 19). What it precisely was, is uncertain, as the passage is corrupt. According to Lipsius's reading, it was twenty years, according to Casaubon's, sixteen under ordinary conditions, twenty in emergencies. The knights were required to serve ten campaigns. See Marquardt Staatsverw. ii. p. 381. The nature of the reduction proposed by Gracchus is unknown.

*Lex Acilia 11. 23 and 74. ⁸ Cic. de Fin. ii. 16. 54.

⁴ No mention is made of the appeal in five cases in which criminal commissions had been established by the senate. The dates of these commissions are b.c. 331 (Liv. viii. 18 ; Val. Max. ii. 5. 3), 314 (Liv. ix. 26), 186 (Liv. xxxix. 8-19), 184 (Liv. xxxix. 41) and 180 (Liv. xl. 37).

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who were perhaps already beginning to feel senatorial jurisdiction in provincial matters irksome and disadvantageous to their interests. We are told by one authority that Gracchus's eyes even ranged beyond the citizen body and that he contemplated the possibility of the gift of citizenship to the whole of Italy.¹ This, was not in itself a measure likely to aid in his salvation by the people; if it was not a disinterested effort of far-sighted genius, it may have been due to the gathering storm which his experience showed him the agrarian commission would soon be forced to meet.² Certainly, if all these schemes are rightly attributed to Tiberius Gracchus, it was he more than any man who projected the great programme of reform that the future had in store.

Unfortunately for Gracchus the time was short for nursing a new constituency or spreading a new ideal. The time for the tribunician elections was approaching, an active canvass was being carried on by the candidates, and the aggrieved landowners were throwing the whole weight of their influence into the opposite scale.³ Wild rumours of his plans were being circulated. The family clique that filled the agrarian commission was to snatch at other offices; Gracchus's brother, a youth still unqualified even for the quaestorship,⁴ was to be thrust into the tribunate, and his father-in-law Appius was destined for the consulate.⁶ Rome was to be ruled by a dynasty, and the tyranny of the commission was to extend to every department of the State. Gracchus felt that the city-combination against him was too strong, and sent an earnest summons to his supporters in the country. But practical needs were stronger than gratitude; the farmers were busy with their harvest; and it was plain that on this occasion the man of the street was to have the decisive voice. The result showed that even he was not unmoved by Gracchus's services, and by his last appeal that a life risked on behalf of the people should be protected by a renewed investiture with the tribunate.⁶

¹ Vellei. ii. 2 (Tiberius Gracchus) pollicitus toti Italiae civitatem.

² Cicero is perhaps stating the result, rather than the intention, of the Gracchan legislation when he says (de Rep. iii. 29. 41) Ti. Gracchus perseveravit in civibus, sociorum nominisque Latini jura neglexit ac foedera. No point in the Gracchan agrarian law is more remarkable than its strict, perhaps inequitable, legality. That its author consciously violated treaty relations is improbable.

⁸ App. Bell. Civ. i. 14.

⁴ For the qualifications at this period see Mommsen Staatsr. i. p. 505.

⁵ Dio Cass. frg. 88 ^xelpv<re koX h to 4iribv JVoj p.€Ta tov aSe\d>ov Sriuapyno-ai Kal Tby wcvBepov SiraTOv aTroSrijai.

⁶ App. l.c.

133 B.C.] GRACCHUS'S ATTEMPT AT RE-ELECTION 187

The day of the election arrived and the votes were taken. When they came to be read out, it was found that the two first tribes had given their voice for Gracchus. Then there was a sudden uproar. The votes were going against the landlords ; a legal protest must be made. Men rose in the assembly, and shouted out that immediate re-election to the tribunate was forbidden by the law. They were probably both right and wrong in their protest, as men so often were who ventured to make a definite assertion about the fluid public law of Rome. There was apparently no enactment forbidding the iteration of this office, and appointment to the tribunate must have been governed by custom. But recent custom seems to have been emphatically opposed to immediate reelection, and the appeal was justified on grounds of public practice.¹ It would probably have been disregarded, had the Gracchan supporters been in an overwhelming majority, or Gracchus's colleagues unanimous in their support. But the people were divided, and the president was not enthusiastic enough in the cause to risk his future impeachment. Rubrius, to whom the lot had assigned the conduct of the proceedings on that day, hesitated as to the course which he ought to follow. A bolder spirit Mummius, the man who had been made by the deposition of Octavius, asked that the conduct of the assembly should be handed over to him. Rubrius, glad to escape the difficulty, willingly yielded his place ; but now the other members of the college interposed. The forms of the Comitia were being violated ; a president could not be chosen without the use of the lot. The resignation of Rubrius must be followed by another appeal to sortition. The point of order raised, as usual, a heated discussion; the tribunes gathered on the Rostra to argue the matter out. Nothing could be gained by keeping the people as the spectators of such a scene, and Gracchus succeeded in getting the proceedings adjourned to the following day.²

The situation was becoming more desperate ; for each delay was a triumph for the opposition, and could only strengthen the belief in the illegality of Gracchus's claim. He now resorted to the last device of the Roman ; he ceased to be a protector and became a suppliant. Although still a magistrate, he assumed the garb of

¹ Mommsen Staatsr. i. p. 523. Dio Cassius indeed says (fr. 22) KuKvBev t6 rivet Sis tV ipxhv \aiiBdveiv; but tradition held that the proviso had been violated in the early plebeian agitations.

^aApp. Bell. Civ. 1. 14.

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mourning, and with humbled and tearful mien begged the help of individuals in the market place.¹ He led his son by the hand ; his children and their mother were to be wards of the people, for he had despaired of his own life. Many were touched; to some the tribunate of Gracchus seemed like a rift in a dark cloud of oppression which would close around them at his fall, and their- hearts sank at the thought of a renewed triumph of the nobility. Others were moved chiefly by the fears and sufferings of Gracchus. Cries of sympathy and defiance were raised in answer to his tears, and a large crowd escorted him to his house at nightfall and bade him be confident of their support on the following day. During his appeals he had hinted at the fear of a nocturnal attack by his foes: and this led many to form an encampment round his house and to remain as its vigilant defenders throughout the night.²

Before day-break he was up and engaged in hasty colloquy with his friends. The fear of force was certainly present; and definite plans may have been now made for its repulsion. Some even believed that a signal for battle was agreed on by Gracchus, if matters should come to that extreme.³ With a true Roman's scruples he took the omens before he left his house. They presaged ill. The keeper of the sacred chickens, which Gracchus's Imperium now permitted him to consult, could get nothing from the birds, even though he shook the cage. Only one of the fowls advanced, and even that would not touch the food. And the unsought omens were as evil as those invited. Snakes were found to have hatched a brood in his helmet, his foot stumbled on the threshold with such violence that blood flowed from his sandal; he had hardly advanced on his way when crows were seen struggling on his left, and the true object of the sign was pointed when a stone, dislodged by one of them from a roof, fell at his own feet. This concourse of ill-luck frightened his boldest comrades; but his old teacher, Blossius of Cumae, vehemently urged the prosecution of the task. Was a son of Gracchus, the grandson of Africanus, chief minister of the Roman people,⁴ to be deterred by a crow from listening to the summons of the citizens ? If the disgrace of his absence amused his enemies, they

'App. I.e.; Plut. Ti. Gracch. 13. The scene is thus described by Asellio (a contemporary):—Orare coepit, id quidem ut se defenderent liberosque suos, eumque, quem virile secus turn in eo tempore habebat, produci jussit populoque commendavit prope flens (Gell. ii. 13. 5). Appian also speaks of a son, Plutarch of children,

² Plut. Ti. Gracch. 16. ³ App. Bell. Civ. 1. 15.

¹5rpocrrdV?)s tih rov 'Vufialuv S^uou (Plut. Ti. Gracch. 17).

133 B.C.] RIOT AT THE ELECTION 139

would keep their laughter to themselves. They would use that absence seriously, to denounce him to the people as a king who was already aping the luxury of the tyrant. As Blossius spoke, men were seen running from the direction of the Capitol; they came up, they bade him press on, as all was going well. And, in fact, it seemed as if all might turn out brightly. The Capitoline temple, and the level area before it, which was to be the scene of the voting, were filled with his supporters. A hearty cheer greeted him as he appeared, and a phalanx closed round him to prevent the approach of any hostile element. Shortly after the proceedings began, the senate was summoned by the consul to meet in the temple of Fides.¹A few yards of sloping ground was all that now separated the two hostile camps.²

The interval for reflection had strengthened the belief of some of the tribunes that Gracchus's candidature was illegal, and they were ready to support the renewed protests of the rich. The election, however, began ; for the faithful Mummius was now presiding, and he proceeded to call on the tribes to vote. But the business of filing into their separate compartments, always complicated, was now impossible. The fringe of the crowd was in a continual uproar; from its extremities the opponents of the measure were tvedging their way in. As his supporters squared their shoulders, the whole mass rocked and swayed. There was no hope of eliciting a decision from this scuffling and pushing throng. Every moment brought the assembly nearer to open riot. Suddenly a man was seen at some distance from Tiberius gesticulating with his hand as though he had something to impart. He was recognised as Fulvius Flaccus, a senator, a man perhaps already known as a sympathiser with schemes of reform. Gracchus asked the crowd immediately around him to give way a little, and Fulvius fought his way up to the tribune. His news was that in the sitting of the senate the rich proprietors had asked the consul to use force, that he had declined, and that now they were preparing on their own motion to slay Tiberius. For this purpose they had collected a large band of armed slaves and retainers.³ Tiberius immediately imparted the news to his friends. Preparations for defence were hastily made: an improvised body-guard was formed; togas were girt up, and the staves of the lictors were broken into fragments to serve as clubs.

¹ App. Bell. Civ. i. 16. ² Richter Topographie p. ia8.

* Plut. Ti. Gracch. 18.

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The Gracchans more distant from the centre of the scene were meanwhile marvelling at the strange preparations of which they caught but glimpses, and could be seen asking eager questions as to their meaning. To reach these distant supporters by his voice was impossible; Tiberius could but touch his forehead with his hand to indicate that his life was in danger. Immediately a shout went up from the opposite side " Tiberius is asking for the diadem," and eager messengers sped with the news to the senate.¹ There was probably a knowledge that physical support for their cause would be found in that quarter, and the exodus of these excited capitalists was apparently assisted by an onslaught from the mob. A regular tumult was brewing, and the tribunes, instead of striving to preserve order, or staying to interpose their sacred persons between the enraged combatants, fled incontinently from the spot. Their fear was natural, for by remaining they might seem to be identifying themselves with a cause that was either lost or lawless. With the tribunes vanished the last trace of legality. The priests closed the temple to keep its precincts from the mob. The more timorous of the crowd fled in wild disorder, spreading wilder rumours. Tiberius was deposing the remaining tribunes from office; he was appointing himself to a further tribunate without the formalities of election.²

Meanwhile the senate was deliberating in the temple of Fides. In the old days their deliberations might have resulted in the appointment of a dictator, and one of the historians who has banded down the record of these facts marvels that this was not the case now.³ But the dictatorship had been weakened by submission to the appeal, and long before it became extinct had lost its significance as a means of repressing sedition within the city. The Roman constitution had now no mechanism for declaring a state of siege or martial law. From one point of view the extinction of the dictatorship was to be regretted. The nomination of this magistrate would have involved at least a day's delay;⁴ some further time would have been necessary before he had collected round him a sufficient force in a city which had neither police nor soldiers. Had it been decided to appoint a dictator, the outrages of the next hour could never have occurred. As things were, it seemed as though

¹ Plut. Ti. Gracch. ig. ² App. Bell. Civ. i. 15. * Ibid. 16.

⁴ The dictator was usually nominated by the consul between midnight and morning (Liv. viii. 23), for the purpose of the avoidance of unfavourable omens.

133 B.C.] ATTACK BY SENATORS

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the senate had to choose between impotence and murder. There was indeed another way. Such was the respect for members of the senatorial order, that a deputation of that body, headed by the consul, would probably have led to the dispersal of the mob. But passions were inflamed and it was no time for peaceful counsels. The advocate of summary measures was the impetuous Nasica. He urged the consul to save the city and to put down the tyrant. He demanded that the sense of the house should be taken as to whether extreme measures were now necessary. Even at this time a tradition may have existed that a magic formula by which the senate advised the magistrates " to see to it that the State took no harm,"¹could justify any act of violence in an emergency. The sense of the house was with Nasica, but a resolution could not be framed unless the consul put the question. The answer of Scaevola was that of a lawyer. He would commence no act of violence, he would put to death no citizen uncondemned. If, however, the people, through the persuasion or compulsion of Tiberius, should come to any illegal decision, he would see that such a resolution was not observed. Nasica sprang to his feet. " The consul is betraying the city; those who wish the salvation of the laws, follow me." ² With this he drew the hem of his toga over his head,³ and rushed from the door in the direction of the Capitoline temple. He was followed by a crowd of senators, all wrapping the folds of their togas round their left arms. Outside the door they were joined by their retainers armed with clubs and staves.⁴

Meanwhile the proceedings in the Area Capitolii had been becoming somewhat less turbulent. The turmoil had quieted down

¹ Tradition ultimately carried it back to the fourth century ex. In the revolution threatened by Manlius Capitolinus (384 b.c, Liv. vi. 19) the phrase Ut videant magistratus ne quid ... res publica detrimenti capiat was believed to have been employed.

³ Plut. Ti. Gracch. 19 iirel . . . irpo8lBat(riv 6 fapxw rty w6\iv, oi Bov\6fievot rots v6/iots Boiillelv aKoAouOeire. The most specific and juristically exact account of these proceedings (one probably drawn from Livy) is preserved by Valerius Maximus (iii. 2. 17):—In aedem Fidei publicae convocati patres conscripti a consule Mucio Scaevola quidnam in tali tempestate faciendum esset deliberabant, cunctisque censentibus ut consul armis rem publicam tueretur, Scaevola negavit se quicquam vi esse acturum. Turn Scipio Nasica Quoniam, inquit, consul dum juris ordinem sequitur id agit ut cum omnibus legibus Romanum imperium corruat, egomet me privatus voluntati vestrae ducem offero. . . . Qui rem publicam salvam esse volunt me sequantur.

³ App. Bell. Civ. i. 16; Plut. l.c. Appian speculates as to the meaning of the act. It may have been meant to attract the attention of his supporters, it may have been a signal of war, it may have been intended to veil the impending deed of horror from the eyes of the gods. Cf. Vellei. ii. 3.

⁴ Plut. Ti. Gracch. 19.

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with the exclusion of the more violent members of the opposition. Gracchus had called a Contio, for the purpose, it was said, of encouraging his supporters and asserting his own constancy and defiance of senatorial authority. The gathering had become a mere partisan mass meeting, such as had often been seen in the course of the current year, and the herald was crying " Silence,"¹when suddenly the men on the outskirts of the throng fell back to right and left. A long line of senators had been seen hastening up the hill. A deputation from the fathers had come. That must have been the first impression : and the crowd fell back before its masters. But in a moment it was seen that the masters had come to chastise, not to plead. With set faces and blazing eyes Nasica and his following threw themselves on the yielding mass. The unarmed senators snatched at the first weapons that lay to hand, the fragments of the shattered furniture of the meeting, severed planks and legs of benches, while their retinue pressed on with clubs and sticks. The whole column made straight for Tiberius and his improvised body-guard. Resistance was hopeless, and the tribune and his friends turned to flee. But the idea of restoring order occupied but a small place in the minds of the maddened senators. The accumulated bitterness of a year found its outlet in one moment of glorious vengeance. The fathers were behaving like a Greek street mob of the lowest type which had turned against an oppressive oligarchy. They were clubbing the Gracchans to death. Tiberius was in flight when some one seized his toga. He slipped it off and fled, clad only in his tunic, when he stumbled over a prostrate body and fell. As he rose, a rain of blows descended on his head.² The man who was seen to strike the first blow is said to have been Publius Saturius, one of his own colleagues. The glory of his death was vehemently disputed ; one Rufus, since he could not claim the first blow, is said to have boasted of being the author of the second. Tiberius is said to have fallen by the very doors of the Capitoline temple, not far from the statues of the Kings.³ The number of his adherents that perished was over three hundred, and it was noted that not one of these was

¹ [Cic] ad Herenn. iv. 55. 68.

² In the highly rhetorical exercise contained in [Cic] ad Herenn. iv. 55. 68 is to be found the following picture:—Iste spumans ex ore scelus, anhelans ex infimo-pectore crudelitatem, contorquet brachium et dubitanti Graccho quid e.sset, neque tamen locum, in quo constiterat, relinquenti, percutit tempus.

³ App. Bell. Civ. i. 16.

1s3 B.C.] DEATH OF TIBERIUS GRACCHUS

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slain by the sword.¹ Their bodies were thrown into the Tiber—not by the mob but by the magistrates; the hand of an aedile committed that of Tiberius to the stream.²

The murder of a young man, who was still under thirty at the time of his death,³ and the slaughter of a few hundreds of his adherents, may not seem to be an act of very great significance in the history of a mighty empire. Yet ancient historians regarded the event as epoch-marking, as the turning point in the history of Rome, as the beginning of the period of the civil wars.⁴ To justify this conclusion it is not enough to point to the fact that this was the first blood shed in civic discord since the age of the Kings;⁶for it might also have been the last. Though the vendetta is a natural outgrowth of Italian soil, yet masses of men are seldom, like individuals, animated solely by the spirit of revenge. The blood of the innocent is a good battle-cry in politics, but it is little more ; it is far from being the mere pretext, but it is equally far from being the true cause, of future revolution. Familiarity with the use of force in civic strife is also a fatal cause of its perpetuation; but familiarity implies its renewed employment: it can hardly be the result of the first experiment in murder. The repetition of this ghastly phenomenon in Roman politics can only be accounted for by the belief that the Gracchan imewte was of its very nature an event that could not be isolated : that Gracchus was a pioneer in a hostile country, and that his opponents preserved all their inherent weakness after the first abortive manifestation of their pretended strength. A bad government may be securely entrenched. The senate, whether good or bad, had no defences at all. Its weakness had in the old days been its pride. It ruled by influencing opinion. Now that it had ceased to influence, it ruled by initiating a riot in the streets. It had no military support except such as was given it by friendly magistrates, and this was a dangerous weapon which

¹ Plut. Ti. Gracch. ig.

² App. Bell. Civ. i. 16 xa\ irivras avrotis vvktos Qtppityav is to j^vjia rod iroTafiov. [Victor] de Vir. III. 64 (Gracchi) corpus Lucretii aedilis rnanu in Tiberim missum; unde ille Vespillo dictus.

³ Plut. C. Gracch. 1.

⁴ Vellei. ii. 3. 3 Hoc initium in urbe Roma civilis sanguinis gladiorumque im-punitatis fuit. Inde jus vi obrutum potentiorque habitus prior, discordiaeque civium antea condicionibus sanari solitae ferro dijudicatae (cf. Plut. Ti. Gracch. 20; App. Bell. Civ. i. 17). Cic. de Rep. i. ig. 31 Mors Tiberii Gracchi et jam ante tota illius ratio tribunatus divisit populum unum in duas partes.

— ⁶ Plut. Ti. Gracch. 20 rairiiv itpini\v itsropovaiv iv 'Pdyijj ffT&ffiv, iup' oS tIi dmriAeuen-flai KariXvirav, alfiwrt Kal tyivtp iroKnay StaKpiSfjvat.

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it hesitated to use. To ignore militarism was to be at the mercy of the demagogue of the street, to admit it was found subsequently to be equivalent to being at the mercy of the demagogue of the camp. In either case authority must be maintained at the cost of civil war. But the material helplessness of the senate was only one factor in the problem. More fatal flaws were its lack of insight to discover that there were new problems to be faced, and lack of courage in facing them. This moral helplessness was due partly to the selfishness of individuals, but partly also to the fixity of political tradition. In spite of the brilliancy and culture of some of its members, the senate in its corporate capacity showed the possession of a narrow heart and an inexpansive intelligence. Its sympathies were limited to a class ; it learnt its new lessons slowly and did not see their bearing on the studies of the future. Imperialism abroad and social contentment at home might be preserved by the old methods which had worked so well in the past. But to the mind of the masses the past did not exist, and to the mind of the reformer it had buried its dead. The career of Tiberius Gracchus was the first sign of a great awakening; and if we regard it as illogical, and indeed impossible, to pause here and estimate the character of his reforms, it is because the more finished work of his brother was the completion of his efforts and followed them as inexorably as the daylight follows the dawn.

CHAPTER III

THE attitude of the senate after the fall of Gracchus was not that of a combatant who had emerged secure from the throes of a great crisis. A less experienced victor would have dwelt on the magnitude of the movement and been guilty of an attempt at its sudden reversal. But the government pretended that there had been no revolution, merely an dmeute. The wicked authors of the sedition must be punished; but the Gracchan legislation might remain untouched. More than one motive probably contributed to shape this view. In the first place, the traditional policy of Rome regarded reaction as equivalent to revolution. A rash move should be stopped in its inception ; but, had it gone a little way and yielded fruit in the shape of some permanent organisation, it would be well to accept and, if possible, to weaken this product; it would be the height of rashness to attempt its destruction. The recognition of the fait accompli had built up the Roman Empire, and the dreaded consequences had not come. Why should not the same be true of a new twist in domestic policy ? Secondly, the opposition of the senate to Gracchus's reforms was based far more decidedly on political than on economic grounds. The frenzy which seized the fathers during the closing act of the tribune's life, was excited by his comprehensive onslaught on their monopoly of provincial, fiscal and judicial administration. His attempt to annex their lands had aroused the resentment of individuals, but not the hatred of a corporation. The individual was always lost in the senate, and the wrongs of the landowner could be ignored for the moment and their remedy left to time, if political prudence dictated a middle course. Again, reflection may have suggested the thought whether these wrongs were after all so great or so irremediable. The pastoral wealth of Italy was much; but it was little compared with 10 (145)

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the possibilities of enterprise in the provinces. Might not the bait of an agrarian law, whose chances of success were doubtful and whose operation might in time be impeded by craftily devised legislation, lull the people into-an acceptance of that senatorial control of the foreign world, which had been so scandalously threatened by Gracchus ? There was a danger in the very raising of this question; there was further danger in its renewal. A party cry seldom becomes extinct; but its successful revival demands the sense of some tangible grievance. To remove the grievance was to silence the demagogue; what the people wanted was comfort and not power. And lastly, the senate was not wholly composed of selfish or aggrieved land-holders. Amongst the sternest upholders of its traditions there were probably many who were immensely relieved that the troublesome land question had received some approach to a solution. There are always men hide-bound by convention and unwilling to move hand or foot in aid of a remedial measure, who are yet profoundly grateful tp the agitator whom they revile, and profoundly thankful that the antics which they deem grotesque, have saved themselves from responsibility and their country from a danger.

It was with such mixed feelings that the senate viewed the Gracchan ddb&cle. It was impossible, however, to accept the situation in its entirety; for to recognise the whole of Gracchus's career as legitimate was to set a dangerous precedent for the future. The large army of the respectable, the bulwark of senatorial power, had not been sufficiently alarmed. It was necessary to emphasise the fact that there had been an outrageous sedition on the part of the lower classes. With this object the senate commanded that the new consuls Popillius and Rupilius should sit as a criminal commission for the purpose of investigating the circumstances of the outbreak.¹ The commission was empowered to impose any sentence, and it is practically certain that it judged without appeal. The consuls, as usual, exercised their own discretion in the choice of assessors. The extreme party was represented by Nasica. Laelius, who also occupied a place on the judgment-seat, might have been regarded as a moderate;² although, as popular sedition and not

¹ Sail. Jug. 31. 7 Occiso Ti. Graccho, quem regnum parare aiebant, in plebem Romanam quaestiones habitae sunt. Val. Max. iv. 7. 1 Cum senatus Rupilio et Laenati consuhbus mandasset ut in eos, qui cum Graccho consenserant, more majorum animadverterent ... Cf. Vellei. ii. 7. 4.

² Cic. de Antic. 11. 37.

133 B.C.1 PUNISHMENT OF THE GRACCHANS 147

the agrarian question was on its trial, there is no reason to suppose that a member of the Scipionic circle would be less severe than any of his colleagues in his animadversions on the wretched underlings of the Gracchan movement whom it was his duty to convict of crime. It was in fact the street cohort of Tiberius, men whose voices, torches and sticks had so long insulted the feelings of re-pectable citizens, that seems to have been now visited with the penalties for high treason; for no illustrious name is found amongst the victims of the commission. On some the ban of interdiction was pronounced, on others the death penalty was summarily inflicted. Amongst the slain was Diophanes the rhetor; and one Caius Villius, by some mysterious effort of interpretation which baffles our analysis, was doomed to the parricide's death of the serpent and the sack.¹ Blossius of Cumae was also arraigned, and his answer to the commission was subsequently regarded as expressing the deepest villainy and the most exalted devotion. His only defence was his attachment to Gracchus, which made the tribune's word his law. " But what," said Laelius " if he had willed that you should fire the Capitol ? " " That would never have been the will of Gracchus," was the reply, " but had he willed it, I should have obeyed." ² Blossius escaped the immediate danger, but his fears soon led him to leave Rome, and now an exile from his adopted as well as from his parent state, he could find no hope but in the fortunes of Aristonicus, who was bravely battling with the Romans in Asia. On the collapse of that prince's power he put himself to death.³

The government may have succeeded in its immediate object of proving itself an effective policeman. The sense of order may have been satisfied, and the spirit of turbulence, if it existed, may have been for the moment cowed. But the memory of the central act of the ghastly tragedy on the Capitoline hill could not be so easily obliterated, and the chief actor was everywhere received with lowered brows and ill-omened cries.⁴ It was superstition as well as hatred that sharpened the popular feeling against Nasica. A man was walking the streets of Rome whose hands were stained by a tribune's blood. He polluted the city wherein he dwelt and the presence of all who met him. The convenient theory that a mere

¹ Plut. Ti. Gracch. 20.

³ Cic. de Antic. 11. 37; Val. Max. iv. 7. 1.

³ Plut. Ti. Gracch. 20. ⁴ Ibid. 21.

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street riot had been suppressed might have been accepted but for the awkward fact that the sanctity of the tribunate had been trodden under foot by its would-be vindicators. A prosecution of Nasica was threatened; and in such a case might not the arguments that vindicated Octavius be the doom of the accused? Popular hatred finds a convenient focus in a single man ; it is easier to loathe an individual than a group. But for this very reason the removal of the individual may appease the resentment that the group deserves. Nasica was an embarrassment to the senate and he might prove a convenient scapegoat. It was desirable that he should be at once rewarded and removed; and the opportunity for an honourable banishment was easily found. The impending war with Aris-tonicus necessitated the sending of a commission to Asia, and Nasica was included amongst the five members of this embassy.¹ There was honour in the possession of such a post and wealth to be gained by its tenure; but the aristocracy had eventually to pay a still higher price for keeping Nasica beyond the borders of Italy. When the chief pontificate was vacated by the fall of Crassus in 130 b.c, the refugee was invested with the office so ardently sought by the nobles of Rome.² He was forced to be contented with this shadow of a splendid prize, for he was destined never to exercise the high functions of his office in the city. He seems never to have left Asia and, after a restless change of residence, he died near the city of Pergamon.⁸

The permanence of the land commission was the most important result of the senate's determination to detach the political from the economic consequences of the Gracchan movement.⁴But they tolerated rather than accepted it. Had they wished to make it their own, every nerve would have been strained to secure the three places at the annual elections⁵ for men who re-

'Val. Max. v. 3. 2 e Is quoque (Scipio Nasica) propter iniquissimam virtutum suarum apud cives aestimationem sub titulo legationis Pergamum secessit et quod vitae superfuit ibi sine ullo ingratae patriae desiderio peregit. Cf. Plut. l.c.; Strabo xiv. 1. 38. See Waddington Fastes p. 662.

'Vellei. ii. 3. 1 P. Scipio Nasica . . . ob eas virtutes primus omnium absens pontifex maximus factus est. The other view, that Nasica was already pontifex maximus before his exile, was widely prevalent and is stated by nearly all our luthorities (Cic. in Cat. i. 1. 3; Val. Max. 1. 4. 1; Plut. Ti. Gracch. 21; App. Bell. Civ. i. 16).

³ Plut. l.c.

⁴ Val. Max. vii. 6 Par ilia sapientia senatus. Ti. Gracchum tribunum pi. agrariam legem promulgare ausum morte multavit. Idem ut secundum legem ejus per triumviros ager populo viritim divideretur egregie censuit.

"See p. n6.

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presented the true spirit of the nobility. But there was every reason for allowing the people's representatives to continue the people's work. The commission was an experiment, and the government did not wish to participate in possible failure; a seasonable opportunity might arise for suspending or neutralising its activities, and the senate did not wish to reverse its own work; whether success or failure attended its operations, the task of the commissioners was sure to arouse fears and excite odium, especially amongst the Italian allies ; and the nobility were less inclined to excite such sentiments than to turn them to account. So the people were allowed year after year to perpetuate the Gracchan clique and to replace its members by avowed sympathisers with programmes of reform. Tiberius's place was filled by Crassus, whose daughter Licinia was wedded to Caius Gracchus.¹ Two places were soon vacated by the fall of Crassus in Asia and the death of Appius Claudius. They were filled by Marcus Fulvius Flaccus and Gaius Papirius Carbo.² The former had already proved his sympathy with Gracchus, the latter had just brought to an end an agitating tribunate, which had produced a successful ballot law and an abortive attempt to render the tribune re-eligible. The personnel of the commission was, therefore, a guarantee of its good faith. Its energy was on a level with its earnestness. The task of annexing and distributing the domain land was strenuously undertaken, and other officials, on whom fell the purely routine function of enforcing the new limit of occupation, seem to have been equally faithful to then work. Even the consul Popillius, one of the presidents of the commission that tried the Gracchan rioters, has left a record of his activity in the words that he was " the first to expel shepherds from their domains and install farmers in their stead ".³ The boundary stones of the com-

¹ Plut. Ti. Gracch. 21, C. I. L. i. n. 552 C. Scmpionius Ti. F. Grac, Ap. Claudius C. F. Pule, P. Licinius P. F. Crass. Ill vir. A. I. A. (Cf. nn. 553. 1504), n. 583 (82-81 b.c.) M. Terentius M. F. Varro Lucullus Pro Pr. terminos restituendos ex s. c. coeravit qua P. Licinius Ap. Claudius C. Graccus III vir A. D. A. I. statuerunt. These termini suggest the limites Graccani of the Liber Coloniarum (Gromatici ed. Lachmann, pp. 2og. 210) which may refer to the agrarian assignments under the leges Semproniae (of Ti. and C. Gracchus) rather than to the colonial foundations of the younger brother.

² Liv. Ep. lix. Seditiones a triumviris Fulvio Flacco et C. Graccho et C. Papirio Carbone agro dividendo creatis excitatae. App. Bell. Civ. i. 18. C. I. L. i. n. 554 M. Folvios M. F. FZae, C. Sempronius Ti. F. Grac, C. Paperius C. F. Carb. Ill vire. A. I. A. (cf. ... 555).

³C. I. L. i. 551 (Wilmanns 797) Primus fecei ut de agro poplico aratoribus cederent paastores,

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missioners still survive to mark the care with which they defined the limits of occupied land and of the new allotments; and the great increase in the census roll between the years 131 and 125 b.c. finds its best explanation in the steady increase of small landholders effected by the agrarian law. In the former year the register had shown rather less than 319,000 citizens ; in the latter the number had risen to somewhat more than 394,000.¹ If this increase of nearly 76,000 referred to the whole citizen body, it would be difficult to connect it with the work of the commission, except on the hypothesis that numerous vagrants, who did not as a rule appear at the census, now presented themselves for assessment; but, when it is remembered that the published census list of Rome merely contained the returns of her effective military strength, and that this consisted merely of the assidui, it is clear that a measure which elevated large portions of the capite censi to the position of yeoman farmers must have had the effect of increasing the numbers on the register; and this sudden leap in the census roll may thus be attributed to the successful working of the new agrarian scheme.² A result such as this could not have been wholly transitory; in tracing the agrarian legislation of the post-Gracchan period we shall indeed find the trial of experiments which prove that no final solution of the land question had been reached ; we shall see the renewal of the process of land absorption which again led to the formation of gigantic estates ; but these tendencies may merely mark the inevitable weeding-out of the weaker of the Gracchan colonists ; they do not prove that the sturdier folk failed to justify the scheme, to work their new holdings at a profit, and to hand them down to their posterity. It is true that the landless proletariate of the city continued steadily to increase ; but the causes which lead to the plethora of an imperial capital are too numerous to permit us to explain this increase by the single hypothesis of a renewed depopulation of the country districts.

The distribution of allotments, however, represented but the simpler element of the scheme. The really arduous task was to determine in any given case what land could with justice be distributed. The judicial powers of the triumvirs were taxed to the

¹ Liv. Ep. lix. (131 b.c.) Censa sunt civium capita cccxvm milia dcccxxiu praeter pupillos et viduas. Ib. Ix. (125 b.c.) Censa sunt civium capita ccclxxxxiiii milia dccxxvi. See de Boor Fasti Censorii.

² Mommsen Hist, of Rome bk. iv. c. 3.

132-129 B.C.] DIFFICULTIES OF LAND COMMISSION 151

utmost to determine what land was public, and what was private. The possessors would at times make no accurate profession of their tenure; such as were made probably in many cases aroused distrust. Information was invited from third parties, and straightway the land courts were the scene of harrowing litigation.¹ It could at times be vaguely ascertained that, while a portion of some great domain was held on occupation from the State, some other portion had been acquired by purchase; but what particular part of the estate was held on either tenure was undiscoverable, for titles had been lost, or, when preserved, did not furnish conclusive evidence of the justice of the original transfer. Even the ascertainment of the fact that a tract of land had once belonged to the State was no conclusive proof that the State could still claim rights of ownership ; for some of it had in early times been assigned in allotments, and no historical record survived to prove where the assignment had ended and the permission of occupation had begun. The holders of private estates had for purposes of convenience worked the public land immediately adjoining their own grounds, the original landmarks had been swept away, and, although they had paid their dues for the possession of so many acres, it was impossible to say with precision which those acres were. The present condition of the land was no index; for some of the possessors had raised their portion of the public domain to as high a pitch of cultivation as their original patrimonies: and, as the commissioners were naturally anxious to secure arable land in good condition for the new settlers, ~the original occupiers sometimes found themselves in the enjoyment of marsh or swamp or barren soil,² which remained the sole relics of their splendid possessions. The judgments of the court were dissolving ancestral ties, destroying homesteads, and causing the transference of household gods to distant dwellings. Such are the inevitable results of an attempt to pry into ancient titles, and to investigate claims the basis of which lies even a few decades from che period of the inquisition.

But, while these consequences were unfortunate, they were not likely to produce political complications so long as the grievances were confined to members of the citizen body. The vested interests which had been ignored in the passing of the measure might be

'App. Bell. Civ. i. 18 a/j.e\oivTav Si rav /ceKTTj/ieVwx aAr))v (sc. r%v yrjv) St,Toypi<pe<r6ai, Katr)yipovs lichpvTTov hSeutvivai. Kal royy tA5)0os fir Sucuv xaAfirwj/. ⁸ App. l.c.

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brushed aside in its execution. Had the territory of Italy belonged to Rome, there would have been much grumbling but no resistance; for effective resistance required a shadow of legal right. But beyond the citizen body lay groups of states which were interested in varying degrees in the execution of the agrarian measure: and their grievances, whether legitimate or not, raised embarrassing questions of public law. The municipalities composed of Roman citizens or of half-burgesses had, as we saw, been alarmed at the introduction of the measure, perhaps through a misunderstanding of its import and from a suspicion that the land which had been given them in usufruct was to be resumed.¹ Possibly the proceedings of the commission may have done something to justify this fear, for the limits of this land possessed by corporate bodies had probably become very ill-defined in the course of years. But, although a corporate was stronger than an individual interest and rested on some public guarantee, the complaints of these townships, composed as they were of burgesses, were merely part of the civic question, and must have been negligible in comparison with the protests of the federate cities of Italy and the Latins. We cannot determine what grounds the Italian Socii had either for fear or protest. It is not certain that land had been assigned to them in usufruct,² and such portions of their conquered territories as had been restored to them by the Roman State were their own property. But, whether the territories which they conceived to be threatened were owned or possessed by these communities, such ownership or possession was guaranteed to them by a sworn treaty, and it is inconceivable that the Gracchan legislation, the strongest and the weakest point of which was its strict legality, should have openly violated federative rights. When, however, we consider the way in which the public land of Rome ran in and out of the territories of these allied communities, it is not wonderful that doubts should exist as to the line of demarcation between state territories and the Roman domain. Vexed questions

¹ P. ng.

"Unless we take such to be the meaning of Hyginus (de Condic. Agr. p. 116) Vectigales autem agri sunt obligati, quidam r. p. P. R., quidam coloniarum aut municipiorum aut civitatium aliquarum. Qui et ipsi plerique ad populum Romanum pertinentes. . . . The passage seems to state that some agri which owed vectigal to communities belonged to the Roman people. There might therefore be a fear of their resumption, although it should have been remote, since these lands, as the context shows, were dealt with by a system of lease (for its nature see Mitteis Zur Gesch. der Erbpacht im Alterthum pp. 13 foil.), and leaseholds do not seem to have been threatened by Gracchus.

132-129 B.C.] OPPOSITION OF THE ITALIANS 153

of boundaries might everywhere be raised, and the government of an Italian community would probably find as much difficulty as a private possessor in furnishing documentary evidence of title. The fears of the Latin communities are far more comprehensible, and it was probably in these centres that the Italian revolt against the proceedings of the commission chiefly originated. The interests of the Latins in this matter were almost precisely similar to those of the Romans: and this identity of view arose from a similarity of status. The Latin colonies had had their territories assigned by Roman commissioners: and it is probable, although it cannot be proved, that doubts arose as to the legitimate extent of these assignments in relation to the neighbouring public land. Many of these territories may have grown mysteriously at the expense of Rome in districts far removed from the capital: and in Gaul especially encroachments on the Roman domain by municipalities or individuals of the Latin colonies most recently established may have been suspected. But the Latin community had another interest in the question, which bore a still closer resemblance to that shown by the Roman burgesses. Asthgindividjial T,atiri_might be a recipient of the favour of the commissioners, so he might be the victim of their legaTcIaims. The fact that he shared the right of commerce with Rome and could acquire and sue for land by Roman forms, makes it practically certain that he could be a possessor of the Roman domain.¹ So eager had been the government in early times to see waste land reclaimed and defended, that it could hardly have failed to welcome the enterprising Latin who crossed his borders, threw his energies into the cultivation of the public land, and paid the required dues. Many of the wealthier members of Latin communities may thus have been liable to the-fate of the ejected possessors of Rome; but even those amongst them whose possessions did not exceed the prescribed limit of five hundred jugera, may have believed that their claims would receive, or had received, too little attention from the Roman commission, while the difficulties resulting from the fusion of public and private land in the same estates may have been as great in these communities as they were in the territory of Rome. Such grievances presented no feature of singularity; they were common to Italy, and one might have thought that a Latin protest would have been weaker than a Roman. But there was

'P. 115.

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one vital point of difference between the two. The Roman could appeal only as an individual; the Latin appealed as a member of a federate state. He did not pause to consider that his grievance was due to his being half a Roman and enjoying Roman rights. The truth that a suzerain cannot treat her subjects as badly as she treats her citizens may be morally, but is not legally, a paradox. The subjects have a collective voice, the citizens have ceased to have one when their own government has turned against them. The position of these Latins, illogical as it may have been, was strengthened by the extreme length to which Rome had carried her principle of non-interference in all dealings with federate allies. The Roman Comitia did not legislate for such states, no Roman magistrate had jurisdiction in their internal concerns. By a false analogy it could easily be argued that no Roman commission should be allowed to disturb their peaceful agricultural relations and to produce a social revolution within their borders. The allies now sought a champion for their cause, since the constitution supplied no mechanism for the direct expression of Italian grievances. The complaints of individual cities had in the past been borne to the senate and voiced by the Roman patrons of these towns. Now that a champion for the confederacy was needed, a common patron had to be created. He was immediately found in Scipio Aemilianus.¹

The choice was inevitable and was dictated by three potent considerations. There was the dignity of the man, recently raised to its greatest height by the capture of Numantia; there was his known detachment from the recent Gracchan policy and his forcibly expressed dislike of the means by which it had been carried through; there was the further conviction based on his recent utterances that he had little liking for the Roman proletariate. The news of Gracchus's fall had been brought to Scipio in the camp before Numantia; his epitaph on the murdered tribune was that which the stern Hellenic goddess of justice and truth breathes over the slain Aegisthus:—

So perish all who do the like again.²

To Scipio Gracchus's undertaking must have seemed an act of impudent folly, its conduct must have appeared something worse than madness. In all probability it was not the agrarian move-

'App. Bell. Civ. i. 19.

³ Plut. Ti. Gracch. 21. Horn. Od. i. 47.

131 B.C.] ATTITUDE OF SCIPIO AEMILIANUS 155

ment which roused his righteous horror, but the gross violation of the constitution which seemed to him to be involved in the inception and consequences of the plan. Of all political temperaments that of the Moderate is the least forgiving, just because it is the most timorous. He sees the gulf that .yawns at his own feet, he lacks the courage to take the leap, and sets up his own halting attitude, of which he is secretly ashamed, as the correct demeanour for all sensible and patriotic men. The Conservative can appreciate the efforts of the Radical, for each is ennobled by the pursuit of the impossible; but the man of half measures and indeterminate aims, while contemning both, will find the reaction from violent change a more potent sentiment even than his disgust at corrupt immobility. Probably Scipio had never entertained such a respect for the Roman constitution as during those busy days in camp, when the incidents of the blockade were varied by messages describing the wild proceedings of his brother-in-law at Rome. Yet Scipio must have known that an unreformed government could give him nothing corresponding to his half-shaped ideals of a happy peasantry, a disciplined and effective soldiery, an uncorrupt administration that would deal honestly and gently with the provincials. His own position was in itself a strong condemnation of che powers at Rome. They were relying for military efficiency on a single man. Why should not they rely for political efficiency on another ? But the latter question did not appeal to Scipio. To tread the beaten path was not the way to make an army; but it was good enough for politics.

Scipio did not scorn the honours of a triumph, and the victory of Numantia was followed by the usual pageant in the streets.¹ He was unquestionably the foremost man of Rome, and senate and commons hung on his lips to catch some definite expression of his attitude to recent events, or to those which were stirring men's minds in the present. They had not long to wait, for a test was soon presented. When in 131 Carbo introduced his bill permitting re-election to the tribunate, all the resources of Scipio's dignified oratory were at the disposal of the senate, and the coalition of his admirers with the voters whom the senate could dispose of, was fatal to the chances of the bill.² Such an attitude

¹ Cic. Phil. xi. 8. 18; Liv. Ep. lix.; Eutrop. iv. 19.

² Liv. Ep. lix. Cum Carbo tribunus plebis rogationem tulisset, ut eundem tribunum plebi, quoties vellet, creare liceret, rogationem ejus P, Africanus gravissima

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need not have weakened his popularity ; for excellent reasons could be given, in the interest of popular government itself, against permitting any magistracy to become continuous. But his political enemies were on the watch, and in one of the debates on the measure care was taken that a question should be put, the answer to which must either identify or compromise him with the new radicalism. Carbo asked him what he thought about the death of Tiberius Gracchus. Scipio's answer was cautious but precise ; " If Gracchus had formed the intention of seizing on the administration of the State, he had been justly slain ". It was merely a restatement of the old constitutional theory that one who aimed at monarchy was by that very fact an outlaw. But the answer, hypothetical as was its expression, implied a suspicion of Gracchus's aims. It did not please the crowd; there was a roar of dissent. Then Scipio lost his temper. The contempt of the soldier for the civilian, of the Roman for the foreigner, of the man of pure for the man of mixed blood—a contempt inflamed to passion by the thought that men such as he were often at the mercy of these wretches—broke through all reserve. " I have never been frightened by the clamour of the enemy in arms," he shouted, " shall I be alarmed by your cries, ye step-sons of Italy ? " This reflection on the lineage of his audience naturally aroused another protest. It was met by the sharp rejoinder, " I brought you in chains to Rome ; you are freed now, but none the more terrible for that! " ¹ It was a humiliating spectacle. The most respected man in Rome was using the vulgar abuse of the streets to the sovereign people; and the man who used this language was so blinded by prejudice as not to see that the blood which he reviled gave the promise of a new race, that the mob which faced him was not a crowd of Italian peasants, willing victims of the martinet, that the Asiatic and the Greek, with their sordid clothes and doubtful occupations, possessed more intelligence than the Roman members of the Scipionic circle and might one day

oratione dissuasit. Cic. de Amic. 25. 95 Dissuasimus nos (Laelius), sed nihil de me: de Scipione dicam libentius. Quanta illi, dii immortales 1 fuit gravitas 1 quanta in oratione majestas 1 . . . Itaque lex popularis suffragiis populi repudiata est. Cf. Cic. de Or. ii. 40. 170.

•Vellei. ii. 4. 4 Hie, eum interrogante tribuno Carbone quid de Ti. Gracchi caede sentiret, respondit, si is occupandae rei publicae animum habuisset, jure caesum. Et cum omnis contio adclamasset, " Hostium," inquit, " armatorum totiens clamore non territus, qui possum vestro moveri, quorum noverca est Italia ? " Val. Max. vi. 2. 3 Orto deinde murmure " Non efficietis," ait, "ut solutos verear quos alligatos adduxi ". Cf. Cic. pro Mil. 3.8; Liv. Ep. lix; Plut. Ti. Gracch. 21.

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be the rulers of Rome. The new race was one of infinite possibilities. It needed guidance, not abuse. Carbo and his friends must have been delighted with the issue of their experiment. Scipio had paid the first instalment to that treasury of hatred, which was soon to prove his ruin and to make his following a thing of the past.

Such was the position of Scipio when he was approached by the Italians. His interest in their fortunes was twofold. First he viewed them with a soldier's eye.¹ They were tending more and more to form the flower of the Roman armies abroad : and, although in obedience to civic sentiment he had employed a heavier scourge on the backs of the auxiliaries than on those of the Roman troops before Numantia,² the chastisement, which he would have doubtless liked to inflict on all, was but an expression of his interest in their welfare. Next he admired the type for its own sake. The sturdy peasant class was largely represented here, and he probably had more faith in its permanence amongst the federate cities than amongst the needy burgesses whom the commissioners were attempting to restore to agriculture. He could not have seen the momentous consequences which would follow from a championship of the Italian allies against the interests of the urban proletariate; that such a dualism of interests would lead to increased demands on the part of the one, to a sullen resistance on the part of the other; that in this mere attempt to check the supposed iniquities of a too zealous commission lay the germ of the franchise movement and the Social War. His protection was a matter of justice and of interest. The allies had deserved well and should not be robbed ; they were the true protectors of Rome and their loyalty must not be shaken. Scipio, therefore, took their protest to the senate. He respected the susceptibilities of the people so far as to utter no explicit word of adverse criticism on the Gracchan measure ; but he dwelt on the difficulties which attended its execution, and he suggested that the commissioners were burdened with an invidious task in having to decide the disputed questions connected with the land which they annexed. By the nature of the case their judgments might easily appear to the litigants as tinged with prejudice. It would be better, he suggested, if the functions of jurisdiction

•App. Bell. Civ. i. 19 6 5' h robs voXe/iovs abrots Ktxpriiiivos Trpa8vfioTiTois inrepittiv * * . &Kvi\ff€. ^aLiv. Ep. lvii.

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were separated from those of distribution and the former duties given to some other authority.¹ The senate accepted the suggestion, and its reasonableness must have appealed even to the people, for the measure embodying it must have passed the Comitia, which alone could abrogate the Gracchan law.² Possibly some recent judgments of the commissioners had produced a sense of uneasiness amongst large numbers of the citizen body, and there may have been a feeling that it would be to the advantage of all parties if the cause of scandal were removed. Perhaps none but the inner circle of statesmen could have predicted the consequences of the change. The decision of the agrarian disputes was now entrusted to the consuls, who were the usual vehicles of administrative jurisdiction. The history of the past had proved over and over again the utter futility of entrusting the administration of an extraordinary and burdensome department to the regular magistrates. They were too busy to attend to it, even if they had the will. But in this case even the will was lacking. Of the two consuls Manius Aquillius was destined for the war in Asia, and his colleague Caius Sempronius Tuditanus had no sooner put his hand to the new work than he saw that the difficulties of adjudication had been by no means the creation of the commissioners. He answered eagerly to the call of a convenient IUyrian war and quitted the judgment seat for the less harassing anxieties of the camp.³ The functions of the commissioners were paralysed ; they seem now to have reached a limit where every particle of land for distribution was the subject of dispute, and, as there was no authority in existence to settle the contested claims, the work of assignation was brought to a sudden close. The masses of eager claimants, that still remained unsatisfied, felt that they had been betrayed ; the feeling spread amongst the urban populace, and the name of Scipio was a word that now awoke suspicion and even execration.³ It was not merely the sense of betrayal that aroused this hostile sentiment; the people charged him with ingratitude. Masses of men, like individuals, love a proUgi more than a benefactor. They have a pride in looking at the colossal figure which they have helped to create. And had not they in a sense made Scipio ? Their love had been quickened by the sense of danger; they had braved the anger of the nobles to put power into his

'App. Btll. Civ. i. 19. ²Liv. Ep. lviii (p. 127). »App. l.c.

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hands ; they had twice raised him to the consulship in violation of the constitution. And now what was their reward ? He had deliberately chosen to espouse the cause of the allies and oppose the interests of the Roman electorate. Scipio's enemies had good material to work upon. The casual grumblings of the streets were improved on, and formulated in the openly expressed belief that his real intention was the repeal of the Sempronian law, and in the more far-fetched suspicion that he meant to bring a military force to bear on the Roman mob, with its attendant horrors of street massacre or hardly less bloody persecution.¹

The attacks on Scipio were not confined to the informal language of private intercourse. Hostile magistrates introduced his enemies to the Rostra, and men like Fulvius Flaccus inveighed bitterly against him.² On the day when one of these attacks was made, Scipio was defending his position before the people; he had been stung hy the charge of ingratitude, for he retorted it on his accusers; he complained that an ill return was being made to him for his many services to the State. In the evening Scipio was escorted from the senate to his house hy a crowd of sympathisers. Besides senators and other Romans the escort comprised representatives of his new clients, the Latins and the Italian allies.³His mind was full of the speech which he meant to deliver to the people on the following day. He retired early to his sleeping chamber and placed his writing tablet beside his bed, that he might fix the sudden inspirations of his waking hours. When morning dawned, he was found lying on his couch but with every trace of life extinct. The family inquisition on the slaves of the household was held as a matter of course. Their statements were never published to the world, but it was believed that under torture they had confessed to seeing certain men introduced stealthily during the night through the back part of the house ; these, they thought, had strangled their master.⁴ The reason which they assigned for their reticence was then fear of the people; they knew that Scipio's death had not appeased the popular fury, that the news had been received with joy, and they did not wish by invidious revelations to become the victims of the people's hate. The fears of the slaves were subsequently reflected in the minds of those who would have been willing to push the investigation further. There was ground

¹ App. l.c.

³ Oros. v. io. g ; Cic. de Amic. 3. 12.

³ Plut. C. Gracch. 10.

⁴ App. Bell. Civ. i. 20.

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for suspicion; for Scipio, although some believed him delicate,¹ had shown no sign of recent illness. A scrutiny of the body is even said to have revealed a livid impress near the throat.² The investigation which followed a sudden death within the walls of a Roman household, if it revealed the suspicion of foul play, was usually the preliminary to a public inquiry. The duty of revenge was sacred ; it appealed to the family even more than to the public conscience. But there was no one to raise the cry for retribution. He had no sons, and his family was represented but by his loveless wife Sempronia. His many friends must indeed have talked of making the matter public, and perhaps began at once to give vent to those dark suspicions which down to a late age clouded the names of so many of the dead man's contemporaries. But the project is said to have been immediately opposed by representatives of the popular party;³ the crime, if crime there was, had been no vulgar murder; a suspicion that violence had been used was an insult to the men who had fought him fairly in the political field; a quaestio instituted by the senate might be a mere pretext for a judicial murder; it might be the ruse by which the nobles sought to compass the death of the people's new favourite and rising hope, Caius Gracchus. Ultimately those who believed in the murder and pined to avenge it, were constrained to admit that it was wiser to avoid a disgraceful political wrangle over the body of their dead hero. But, for the retreat to be covered, it must be publicly announced by those who had most authority to speak, that Scipio had died a natural death. This was accordingly the line taken by Laelius, when he wrote the funeral oration which Quintus Fabius Maximus delivered over the body of his uncle;⁴ " We cannot sufficiently mourn this death by disease" were words purposely spoken to be an index to the official version of the decease. The fear of political disturbance which veiled the details of the tragedy, also dictated that the man, whom friends and enemies alike knew to have been the greatest of his age, should have no public funeral.⁶

¹ Plut. Rom. 27 ol /uev auTO/iaVeos Svra (pucret voauSri Ka/ielv Kiyovaiv.

'Vellei. ii. 4 Mane in lectulo repertus est mortuus, ita ut quaedam elisarum faucium in cervice reperirentur notae.

³ Plut. C. Gracch. 10 koI Seivbv oStus epyov eV ovBpl tcj) Ttpdrif koI neylo-Tw 'Pw/ialav TofynjSev ovk erv_Xe Si'kjjj ouS' els e\ey_Xov irporjKBev ■ ivearriaav yap oi ito\\o\ Kai KareKvaav tV Kplaui xmep tov Vaiov (poBriBenres, /iii irepiireT^s rfj alrla tov <p6vov (riTov/ievov yevitrai. Vellei. ii. 4 De tanti viri morte nulla habita est quaestio. Cf. Liv. Ep. lix. ^H ^J

* Schol. Bob. ad Cic. Milon. 7. p. 283. ¹¹ App. Bell. Civ. i. 20.

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The government might well fear a scandalous scene—the Forum with its lanes and porticoes crowded by a snarling holiday crowd, the laudation of the speakers interrupted by gibes and howls, the free-fight that would probably follow the performance of the obsequies.

But suppression means rumour. The mystery was profoundly enjoyed by this and subsequent ages. Every name that political or domestic circumstances could conveniently suggest, was brought into connection with Scipio's death. Caius Gracchus,¹ Fulvius Flaccus,²Caius Papirius Carbo ³ were all indifferently mentioned. Suspicion clung longest to Carbo, probably as the man who had lately come into the most direct conflict with his supposed victim; even Carbo's subsequent conversion to conservatism could not clear his name, and his guilt seems to have been almost an article of faith amongst the optimates of the Ciceronian period. But there were other versions which hinted at domestic crime. Did not Cornelia have an interest in removing the man who was undoing the work of her son, and might she not have had a willing accomplice in Scipio's wife Sempronia ? ⁴ It was believed that this marriage of arrangement had never been sanctioned by love ; Sempronia was plain and childless, and the absence of a husband's affection may have led her to think only of her duties as a daughter and a sister.⁵ People who were too sane for these extravagances, but were yet unwilling to accept the prosaic solution of a natural death and give up the pleasant task of conjecture, suggested that Scipio had found death by his own hand. The motive assigned was the sense of his inability to keep the promises which he had made.⁶ These promises may have been held to be certain suggestions for the amelioration of the condition of the Latin and Italian allies.

But it required no conjecture and no suspicion to emphasise the tragic nature of Scipio's death. He was but fifty-six; he was by far the greatest general that Rome could command, a champion who could spring into the breach when all seemed lost, make an army out of a rabble and win victory from defeat; he was a great moral force, the scourge of the new vices, the enemy of the

¹ Schol. Bob. l.c.; cf. Plut. C. Gracch. io. ² Plut. l.c.

⁸ Cic. ad Fam. ix. 21. 3, ad Q.fr. ii. 3. 3, de Or. ii. 40. 170. Cf. de Amic. 12. 41.

»App. Bell. Civ. i. 20. ⁵ App. l.c.

⁰ App. Bell. Civ. i. 20 oos tvioi Sokovgiv, eK<iov airedave ffvviSwv Uti oi/k tffoero Warbj Kavraax^' ivSffxoiTo. For the theory of suicide cf. Plut. Rom. 27 ol b" aurbv v<f> eavrov tpapp.a.Kois airodaveiv (hiyovffiv), 11

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provincial oppressor; he was the greatest intellectual influence in aristocratic Rome, embellishing the staid rigour of the ancient Roman with something of the humanism of the Greek ; Xenophon was the author who appealed most strongly to his simple and manly tastes: and his purity of soul and clearness of intellect were fitly expressed in the chasteness and elegance of his Latin style. The modern historian has not to tax his fancy in discovering great qualities in Scipio; the mind of every unprejudiced contemporary must have echoed the thought of Laelius, when he wrote in his funeral speech " We cannot thank the gods enough that they gave to Rome in preference to other states a man with a heart and intellect like this ".¹ But the dominant feeling amongst thinking men, who had any respect for the empire and the constitution, was that of panic at the loss. Quintus Metellus Macedonicus had been his political foe; but when the tidings of death were broughft.jhim, he was like one distraught. "Citizens," he wailed, " the Walls of our city are in ruins."² And that a great breach had been made in the political and military defences of Rome is again the burden of Laelius's complaint, " He has perished at a time when a mighty man is needed by you and by all who wish the safety of this commonwealth ". These utterances were not merely a lament for a great soldier, but the mourning for a man who might have held the balance between classes and saved a situation that was becoming intolerable. We cannot say whether any definite means of escape from the brewing storm was present to Scipio's mind, or, if he had evolved a plan, whether he was master of the means to render it even a temporary success. Perhaps he had meddled too little with politics to have acquired the dexterity requisite for a reconciler. Possibly his pride and his belief in the aristocracy as an aggregate would have stood in his way. But he was a man of moderate views who led a middle party, and he attracted the anxious attention of men who believed that salvation would not come from either of the extremes. He had once been the favourite of the crowd, and might be again, he commanded the distant respect of the nobility, and he had all Italy at his side. Was there likely to be a man whose position was better suited to a reconciliation of the war of jarring interests? Perhaps not; but at the time of his death the first steps which he had taken had

¹ Schol. Bob. in Milon, l.c.

Val. Max. iv. x. 12.

131 B.C.] TRIBUNATE OF CARBO

163

only widened the horizon of war. He found a struggle between the commons and the nobles; he emphasised, although he had not created, the new struggle between the commons and Italy. His next step would have been decisive, but this he was not fated to take.

When we turn from the history of the agrarian movement and its unexpected consequences to other items in the internal fortunes of Rome during this period, we find that Tiberius Gracchus had left another legacy to the State. This was the idea of a magistracy which, freed from the restraint of consulting the senate, should busy itself with political reform, remove on its own initiative the obstacles which the constitution threw in the path of its progress, and effect the regeneration of Rome and even of Italy by means of ordinances elicited from the people. The social question was here as elsewhere the efficient cause; but it left results which seemed strangely disproportionate to their source. The career of Gracchus had shown that the leadership of the people was encumbered by two weaknesses. These were the packing of assemblies by dependants of the rich, whose votes were known and whose voices were therefore under control, and the impossibility of re-election to office, which rendered a continuity of policy on the part of the demagogue impossible. It was the business of the tribunate of Carbo to remove both these hindrances to popular power. His first proposal was to introduce voting by ballot in the legislative assemblies;¹ it was one that could not easily be resisted, since the principle of the ballot had already been recognised in elections, and in all judicial processes with the exception of trials for treason. These measures seem to have had the support of the party of moderate reform : and Scipio and his friends probably offered no resistance to the new application of the principle. Without their support, and unprovided with arguments which might excite the fears or jealousy of the people, the nobility was powerless : and the bill, therefore, easily became law. The change thus introduced was unquestionably a great one. Hitherto the country voters had been the most independent; now the members of the urban proletariate were equally free, and from this time forth the voice of the city could find an expression uninfluenced by the smiles or frowns of wealthy patrons. The ballot produced its intended effect more

¹ Cic. de Leg. iii. 16. 35 -Garbonis est tertia (lex tabellaria) de jubendis legibus ac vetandis.

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ully in legislation than in election ; its introduction into the latter phere caused the nobility to become purchasers instead of direc-;ors; but it was seldom that a law affected individual interests 10 directly as to make a bargain for votes desirable. The chief Dribery found in the legislative assemblies was contained in the oroposal submitted by the demagogue.

Carbo's second proposal, that immediate and indefinite re-election ;o the tribunate should be permitted,¹ was not recommended on the iame grounds of precedent or reason. The analogies of the Roman ;onstitution were opposed to it, and the rules against the perpetuity >f office which limited the patrician magistracies, and made even a single re-election to the consulship illegal,² while framed in support )f aristocratic government, had had as their pretext the security of ;he Republic, and therefore ostensibly of popular freedom and con-;rol. Again, the people might be reminded that the tribunate was lot always a power friendly to their interests, and that the veto which blocked the expression of their will might be continued to a second year by the obstinate persistence of a minority of voters. Excellent arguments of a popular kind could be, and probably were, employed against the proposal. Certainly the sentiment which really animated the opposition could have found little favour with the masses, who ultimately voted for the rejection of the bill. All adherents of senatorial government must have seen in the success of the measure the threat of a permanent opposition, the possibility of the rise of official demagogues of the Greek type, monarchs in reality though not in name, the proximity of a Gracchan movement unhampered by the weakness which had led to Gracchus's fall. It is easier for an electorate to maintain a principle by the maintenance of a personality than to show its fervour for a creed by submitting new and untried exponents to a rigid confession of faith. The senate knew that causes wax and wane with the men who have formulated them, and it had always been more afraid of individuals than of masses. Scipio's view of the Gracchan movement and his acceptance of the cardinal maxims of existing statecraft, prepare us for the attitude which he assumed on this occasion. His speech against the measure was believed to have been decisive in turning the scale. He was supported by his henchmen, and the faithful Laelius also gave utterance to the pro-

¹P-155»Liv. Ep. lvi.

129-126 B.C.] NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE ITALIANS 165

tests of the moderates against the unwelcome innovation.¹ This victory, if decisive, would have made the career of Caius Gracchus impossible—a career which, while it fully justified the attitude of the opposition, more than fulfilled the designs of the advocates of the change. But the triumph was evanescent. Within the next eight years re-election to the tribunate was rendered possible under certain circumstances. The successful proposal is said to have taken the form of permitting any one to be chosen, if the number of candidates fell short of the ten places which were to be filled.²This arrangement was probably represented as a corollary of the ancient religious injunction which forbade the outgoing tribunes to leave the Plebs unprovided with guardians; and this presentment of the case probably weakened the arguments of the opposition. The aristocratic party could hardly have misconceived the import of the change. It was intended that a party which desired the re-election of a tribune should, by withdrawing some of its candidates at the last moment,³ qualify him for reinvestiture with the magistracy.

The party of reform were rightly advised in attempting to secure an adequate mechanism for the fulfilment of a democratic programme before they put their wishes into shape. That they were less fortunate in the proposals that they formulated, was due to the fact that these proposals were at least as much the result of necessity as of deliberate choice. The agrarian question was still working its wicked will. It hung like an incubus round the necks of democrats and forced them into most undemocratic paths. The legacy left by Scipio had become the burdensome inheritance of his foes. Italian claims were now the impasse which stopped the present distribution and the future acquisition of land. The minds of many were led to inquire whether it might not be possible to strike a bargain with the allies, and thus began that mischievous co-operation between a party in Rome and the protected towns in Italy, which suggested hopes that could not be satisfied, led to open revolt as the result of the disappointment engendered by failure,

¹ P. i55, ^note ²² App. Bell. Civ. i. 21 zeal ydp tis ifSrj vinos ixeKVparo, el Sii/iapxos eVSeoi rais napayyeAiais, tov Brjfiov e/c irdvrav eiri\4ye<rBai. It is possible that Appian has misconstrued the provision that, if enough candidates did not receive the absolute majority required for election (explere tribus), any one—even a tribune already in office—should be eligible. See Strachan-Davidson in he.

³ Or possibly by securing that some of its candidates should not receive the number of votes requisite for election. See the last note,

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and might easily be interpreted as veiling treasonable designs against the Roman State. The franchise was to be offered to the Italian towns on condition that they waived their rights in the public land.¹ The details of the bargain were probably unknown, even to contemporaries, for the negotiations demanded secrecy; but it is clear that the arrangements must have been at once general and complex; for no organisation is likely to have existed that could bind each Italian township to the agreement, nor could any town have undertaken to prejudice all the varying rights of its individual citizens. When the Italians eagerly accepted the offer, a pledge must have been got from their leading men that the local governments would not press their claims to the disputed land as an international question ; for it was under this aspect that the dispute presented the gravest difficulties. The commons of these states might be comforted by the assurance that, when they had become Roman citizens, they would themselves be entitled to share in the assignations. These negotiations, which may have extended over two or three years, ended by bringing crowds of Italians to Rome. They had no votes; but the moral influence of their presence was very great. They could applaud or hiss the speakers in the informal gatherings of the Contio; it was not impossible that in the last resort they might lend physical aid to that section of the democrats which had advocated their cause. It might even have been possible to manufacture votes for some of these immigrants. A Latin domiciled in Rome always enjoyed a limited suffrage in the Comitia, and a pretended domicile might easily be invented for a temporary resident. Nor was it even certain that the wholly unqualified foreigner might not give a surreptitious vote; for the president of the assembly was the man interested in the passing of the bill, and his subordinates might be instructed not to submit the qualifications of the voters to too strict a scrutiny. It was under these circumstances that the senate resorted to the device, rare but not unprecedented, of an alien act. Following its instructions, the tribune Marcus Junius Pennus introduced a proposal that foreigners should be excluded from the city.² We know nothing

¹ App. Bell. Civ. i. 21 Kal rives i<rriyo€vro robs avmii._Xovs Himvras, ol Sj) irep! T)js yrjs n&Xio-ra avri\eyov, is r^v 'Pa/ialuv iroAiTefai' avaypotyai, Sis fiel(ovt %apiri irepl rr\s yris oil Sioio-o/iivovs. Kal iBi_Xovro dajievoi rov9' ol iTaAitoTai, TrporiBivres rav _Xaptav rfyv iro\iTetav.

² Cic. de Off. iii. 11. 47 Male etiam qui peregrinos urbibus uti prohibent eosque exterminant, ut Pennus apud patres nostros . . . Nam esse pro cive qui civis non sit rectum est non licere; quam legem tulerunt sapientissimi consules Crassus et

126 B.C.] ALIEN ACT OF PENNUS 167

of the wording of the act. It may have made no specific mention of Italians, and its operation was presumably limited to strangers not domiciled before a certain date. But, like all similar provisions, it must have contained further limitations, for it is inconceivable that the foreign trader, engaged in legitimate business, was hustled summarily from the city. But, however limited its scope, its end was clear: and the fact that it passed the Comitia shows that the franchise movement was by no means wholly popular. A crowd is not so easy of conversion as an individual. Recent events must have caused large numbers of the urban proletariate to hate the very name of the Italians, and the idea of sharing the privileges of empire with the foreigner must already have been distasteful to the average Roman mind. It was in vain that Caius Gracchus, to whom the suggestion of his brother was already becoming a precept, tried to emphasise the political ruin which the spirit of exclusiveness had brought to cities of the past.¹ The appeal to history and to nobler motives must have fallen on deaf ears. It is possible, however, that the personality of the speaker might have been of some avail, had he been ably supported, and had the people seen all their leaders united on the question of the day. But there is reason for supposing that serious differences of opinion existed amongst these leaders as to the wisdom of the move. Some may have held that the party of reform had merely drifted in this direction, that the proposal for enfranchisement had never been considered on its own merits, and that they had no mandate from the people for purchasing land at this costly price. It may have been at this time that Carbo first showed his dissatisfaction with the party, of which he had almost been the accepted leader. If he declined to accompany his colleagues on this new and untried path, the first step in his conversion to the party of the optimates betrays no inconsistency with his former attitude ; for he could maintain with justice that the proposal for enfranchising Italy was not a popular measure either in spirit or in fact.

It was, therefore, with more than doubtful chances of success that Fulvius Flaccus, who was consul in the following year, at-

Scaevola (95 b.c.); usu vero urbis prohibere peregrinos sane inhumanum est. For the date of Pennus's law see Cic. Brut. 28. 109:—Fuit . . . M. Lepido et L. Oreste consulibus quaestor Gracchus, tribunus Pennus.

¹ Festus p. 286 Resp. multarum civitatum pluraliter dixit C. Gracchus in ea, quam conscripsit de lege p. Enni (Penni Mutter) et peregrinis, cum ait: " eae nationes, cum aliis rebus, per avaritiam atque stultitiam res publicas suas amiserunt".

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empted to bring the question to an issue by an actual proposal of itizenship for the allies. The details of his scheme of enfranchise-nent have been very imperfectly preserved.¹ We are unaware whether, like Caius Gracchus some three years later, he proposed

0 endow the Latins with higher privileges than the other allies: nd, although he contemplated the non-acceptance of Roman citizen-hip by some of the allied communities, since he offered these cities he right of appeal to the people as a substitute for the status which hey declined, we do not know whether his bill granted citizenship t once to all accepting states, or merely opened a way for a request jr this right to come from individual cities to the Roman people, tut it is probable that the bill in some way asserted the willingness f the people to confer the franchise, and that, if any other steps 'ere involved in the method of conferment, they were little more aan formal. The fact that the provocatio was contemplated as

substitute for citizenship is at once a proof that the old spirit of bate life, which viewed absorption as extermination, was known ;ill to be strong in some of the Italian communes, and that lany of the individual Italians were believed to value the citizen-lip mainly as a means of protecting their persons against Roman fficialdom. That the democratic party was strong at the moment ^rhen this proposal was given to the world is shown by the fact bat Flaccus filled the consulship; that it had little sympathy with is scheme is proved by the isolation of the proposer and by the lanner in which the senate was allowed to intervene. The continent of the franchise had been proved to be essentially a popular rerogative;² the consultation of the senate on such a point might e advisable, but was by no means necessary; for, in spite of the uling theory that the authority of the senate should be respected

1 all matters of legislation, the complex Roman constitution re-ognised shades of difference, determined by the quality of the articular proposal, with respect to the observance of this rule.

'App. Bell. Civ. i. 34 boihovws $\<Iickos fmarevaiv /xiKurra $)i irp&ros SSe is rb apepdrarop ^pe'fljfe robs 'IraKidras eVifli/jiieiV rrjs 'Pauaiaip iroXireias is Koipaipobs rrjs yeftovlas ctprl \mi)it6aiv itropipovs. (Cf. i. 21), Val. Max. ix. 5. 1 M. Fulvius Flaccus Jnsul, . . . cum perniciosissimas rei publicae leges introduceret de civitate Italiae mda et de provocatione ad populum eorum, qui civitatem mutare noluissent, aegre Dmpulsus est ut in Curiam veniret.

² Liv. xxxviii. 36. Four tribunes vetoed a rogatio to grant voting rights to the unicipia of Formiae, Fundi and Arpinum in 188 b.c. on the ground that the :nate's judgment had not been taken, but Edocti populi esse, non senatus jus, iffragium quibus velit impertire, destiterunt incepto.

125 B.C.] PROPOSAL TO EXTEND THE FRANCHISE 169

The position of Flaccus was legally stronger than that of Tiberius Gracchus had been. Had he been well supported by men of influence or by the masses, the senate's judgment might have been set at naught. But the people were cold, Carbo had probably turned away, and Caius Gracchus had gone as quaestor to Sardinia. The senate was emboldened to adopt a firm attitude. They invited the consul to take them into his confidence. After much delay he entered the senate house; but a stubborn silence was his only answer to the admonitions and entreaties of the fathers that he would desist from his purpose.¹ Flaccus knew the futility of arguing with people who had adopted a foregone conclusion ; he would not even deign to accept a graceful retreat from an impossible position. The matter must be dropped; but to withdraw it at the exhortation of the senate, although complimentary to his peers and perhaps not unpleasing even to the people in their present humour, would prejudice the chances of the future. In view of better days it was wiser to shelve than to discard the measure. His attitude may also have been influenced by pledges made to the allies; to these, helpless as he was, he would yet be personally faithful. His fidelity would have been put to a severe test had he remained in Italy; but the supreme magistrate at Rome had always a refuge from a perplexing situation. The voice of duty called him abroad,² and Flaccus set forth to shelter Massilia from the Salluvii and to build up the Roman power in Transalpine Gaul.³ Perhaps only a few of the leading democrats had knowledge enough to suspect the terrible consequences that might be involved in the failure of the proposal for conferring the franchise. To the senate and the Roman world they must have caused as much astonishment as alarm. It could never have been dreamed that the well-knit confederacy, which had known no spontaneous revolt since the rising of Falerii in the middle of the third century, could again be disturbed by internal war. Now the very centre of this confederacy, that loyal nucleus which had been unshaken by the victories of Hannibal, was to be the scene of an insurrection, the product of hope long deferred, of expectations recently kindled by injudicious promises, of resentment at Pennus's

'Val. Max. ix. 5. 1 Deinde partim monenti, partim oranti senatui ut incepto desisteret, responsum non dedit . . . Flaccus in totius amplissimi otdinis contem-nenda majestate versatus est. Cf. App. Bell. Civ. i. 21.

² App. Bell. Civ. i. 34 £o~riyovp.evos 5c r^v yvup/^v Kal eVi/tcVaw ai/rfi Kaprepus, inrh tt)5 Bou\t}s iirl Tiva ffrpareiay i^irefMpdi} Sia r6Se.

³ Liv. Ep. Ix; Ammian. xv. 12. 5.

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[B.C. 125

success and Flaccus's failure. Fregellae, the town which assumed the lead in the movement and either through overhaste or faulty information alone took the fatal step,¹ was a Latin colony which had been planted by Rome in the territory of the Volsci in the year 328 b.c.² The position of the town had ensured its prosperity even before it fell into the hands of Rome. It lay on the Liris in a rich vine-growing country, and within that circle of Latin and Campanian states, which had now become the industrial centre of Italy. It was itself the centre of the group of Latin colonies that lay as bulwarks of Rome between the Appian and Latin roads, and had in the Hannibalic war been chosen as the mouthpiece of the eighteen faithful cities, when twelve of the Latin states grew weary of their burdens and wavered in their allegiance.³ The importance of the city was manifest and of long-standing, its self-esteem was doubtless great, and it perhaps considered that its signal services had been inadequately recompensed by Rome. But its peculiar grievances are unknown, or the particular reasons which gave Roman citizenship such an excessive value in its eyes. It is possible that its thriving farmer class had been angered by the agrarian commission and by undue demands for military, service, and, in spite of the commercial equality with the Romans which they enjoyed in virtue of their Latin rights, they may have compared their position unfavourably with that of communities in the neighbourhood which had received the Roman franchise in full. Towns like Arpinum, Fundi and Formiae had been admitted to the citizen body without forfeiting their self-government. Absorption need not now entail the almost penal consequences of the dissolution of the constitution; while the possession of citizenship ensured the right of appeal and a full participation in the religious festivals and the amenities of the capital. It is also possible that, in the case of a prosperous industrial and agricultural community situated actually within Latium, the desire for actively participating in the decisions of the sovereign people may have played its part. But sentiment probably had in its councils as large a share as reason: and the fact that this sentiment led to premature action, and that the fall of the state was due to treason, may lead us to suppose that the Romans had to deal with a divided people and that one section of the com-

¹ An isolated notice speaks of a rising at Asculum. [Victor] de Vir. III. 65 (C. Gracchus) Asculanae et Fregellanae defectionis invidiam sustinuit.

² Liv. viii. 22. » Liv. xxvii. 10.

125 B.C.] REVOLT OF FREGELLAE

171

munity, perhaps represented by the upper or official class, although it may have sympathised with the general desire for the attainment of the franchise, was by no means prepared to stake the ample fortunes of the town on the doubtful chance of successful rebellion. A prolonged resistance of the citizens within their walls might have given the impulse to a general rising of the Latins. Had Fregellae played the part of a second Numantia, the Social War might have been anticipated by thirty-five years. But the advantage to be gained from time was foiled by treason. A certain Numitorius Pullus betrayed the state to the praetor Lucius Opimius, who had been sent with an army from Rome. Had Fregellae stood alone, it might have been spared; but it was felt that some extreme measure either of concession or of terrorism was necessary to keep discontent from assuming the same fiery form in other communities. In the later w&i with the allies a greater danger was bought off by concession. But there the disease had run its course; here it was met in its earliest stage, and the familiar devise of excision was felt to be the true remedy. The principle of the "awful warning,'' which Alexander had applied to Thebes and Rome to Corinth, doomed the greatest of the Latin cities to destruction. Regardless of the past services of Fregellae and of the fact that the passion for the franchise was the most indubitable sign of the loyalty of the town, the government ordered that the walls of the surrendered city should be razed and that the town should become a mere open village undistinguished by any civic privilege.¹ A portion of its territory was during the next year employed for the foundation of the citizen colony of Fabrateria.² The new settlement was the typical Roman garrison in a disaffected country. But it proved the weakness of the present regime that such a crude and antiquated method should have to be employed in the heart of Latium. Security, however, was perhaps not the sole object of the foundation. The confiscated land of Fregellae was a boon to a government sadly in need of popularity at home.

An excellent opportunity was now offered for impressing the people with the enormity of the offence that had been committed by some of their leaders, and prosecutions were

¹ Liv. Ep. Ix L. Opimius praetor Fregellanos, qui defecerant, in deditionem accepit; Fregellas diruit. Cf. Vellei. ii. 6; Obsequens go; Plut. C. Gracch. 3; [Cic] ad Herenn. iv. 15. 22.

'Vellei. i. 15 Cassio autem Longino et Sextio Calvino . . . consulibus Fabrateria deducta est.

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[B.C. 125

directed against the men who had been foremost in support of the movement for extending the franchise. It was pretended that they had suggested designs as well as kindled hopes. The fate of the lesser advocates of the Italian cause is unknown; but Caius Gracchus, against whom an indictment was directed, cleared his name of all complicity in the movement.¹ The effect of these measures of suppression was not to improve matters for the future. The allies were burdened with a new and bitter memory; their friends at Rome were furnished with a new cause for resentment. If the Roman people continued selfish and apathetic, a leader might arise who would find the Italians a better support for his position than the Roman mob. If he did not arise or if he failed, the sole but certain arbitrament was that of the sword.

The foreign activity of Rome during this period did not reflect the troubled spirit of the capital. It was of little moment that petty wars were being waged in East and West, and that bulletins sometimes brought news of a general's defeat. Rome was accustomed to these things; and her efforts were still marked by their usual characteristics of steady expansion and decorous success. To predicate failure of her foreign activity for this period is to predicate it for all her history, for never was an empire more slowly won or more painfully preserved. It is true that at the commencement of this epoch an imperialist might have been justified in taking a gloomy view of the situation. In Spain Numantia was inflicting more injury on Roman prestige than on Roman power, while the long and harassing slave-war was devastating Sicily. But these perils were ultimately overcome, and meanwhile circumstances had led to the first extension of provincial rule over the wealthy East.

The kingdom of Pergamon had long been the mainstay of Rome's influence in the Orient. Her contact with the other protected princedoms was distant and fitful; but as long as her mandates could be issued through this faithful vassal, and he could rely on her whole-hearted support in making or meeting aggressions, the balance of power in the East was tolerably secure. It had been necessary to make Eumenes the Second see that he was wholly in the power of Rome, her vassal and not her ally. He had been rewarded and strengthened, not for his own deserts, but that he might be fitted to become the policeman of Western Asia, and it had been successfully shown that the hand which gave could also

¹ Plut. C. Gracch. 3.

159-138 B.C.] THE KINGDOM OF PERGAMON 173

take away. The lesson was learnt by the Pergamene power, and fortunately the dynasty was too short-lived for a king to arise who should forget the crushing display of Roman power which had followed the Third Macedonian War, or for the realisation of that greater danger of a protectorate—a struggle for the throne which should lead one of the pretenders to appeal to a national sentiment and embark on a national war. Eumenes at his death had left a direct successor in the person of his son Attalus, who had been born to him by his wife Stratonice, the daughter of Ariarathes King of Cappadocia.¹ But Attalus was a mere boy at the time of his father's death, and the choice of a guardian was of vital importance for the fortunes of the monarchy. Every consideration pointed to the uncle of the heir, and in the strong hands of Attalus the Second the regency became practically a monarchy.² The new ruler was a man of more than middle age, of sober judgment, and deeply versed in all the mysteries of kingcraft; for a mutual trust, rare amongst royal brethren in the East, had led Eumenes to treat him more as a colleague than as a lieutenant. He had none of the insane ambition which sees in the diadem the good to which all other blessings may be fitly sacrificed, and had resisted the invitation of a Roman coterie that he should thrust his suspected brother from the throne and reign himself as the acknowledged favourite of Rome. In the case of Attalus familiarity with the suzerain power had not bred contempt. He had served with Manlius in Galatia ³and with Paulus in Macedonia,⁴ and had been sent at least five times as envoy to the capital itself.⁶ The change from a private station to

¹ It has been supposed that this boy may really have been the son of Attalus brother of Eumenes, a fruit of the transitory connection between this prince and Stratonice, which followed the false news of Eumenes's death in 172 b.c. See F. Kopp De Attali III patre in Rhein. Mus. xlviii. pp. 154 ff.; Wilcken in Pauly-Wissowa Real. Bnc. p. 2170, and for the temporary marriage of Attalus with Stratonice Plut. de Frat. Amor. 18; Polyb. xxx. 2. 6. Livy (xlii. 16) and perhaps Diodorus (xxix. 34) speak only of Attalus's wooing, not of his marriage. If Attalus the Third was not the son of Eumenes, he was at least adopted by the king and was clearly recognised as his heir. The official view made the relationship between the Attali that of uncle and nephew. See note 2.

'For the guardianship of the younger Attalus see Strabo xiii. 4. 2. The recognition of the regent as king is clearly attested by inscriptions (Frankel Inschriften von Pergamon nn. 214 ff., 224, 225, 248. In n. 248 the future Attalus the Third is called by the king 5 raSe\<pov vlbs (1.18, cf. 1. 32 6 8z76s fiov used by Attalus the Third) and has some power of appointment to the priesthood. There is no sign that the nephew was in any other respect a co-regent of the uncle. See Frankel op. cit. p. i6g.

³ Liv. xxxviii. cc. 12, 23, 25 ; Polyb. xxi. 3g.

* Liv. xliv. 36 ; xiv. ig.

⁵ Wilcken in Pauly-Wissowa Real. Enc. p. 2168 foil.

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[B.C. 138

a throne did not alter his conviction that the best interests of his country would be served by a steady adherence to the power, whose marvellous development to be the mainspring of Eastern politics was a miracle which he had witnessed with his own eyes. He had grasped the essentials of the Roman character sufficiently to see that this was not one of the temporary waves of conquest that had so often swept over the unchangeable East and spent their strength in the very violence of their flow, nor did he commit the error of mistaking self-restraint for weakness. Monarchs like himself were the necessary substitute for the dominion which the conquering State had been strong enough to spurn; and he threw himself zealously into the task of forwarding the designs of Rome in the dynastic struggles of the neighbouring nations. He helped to restore Ariarathes the Fifth to his kingdom of Cappadocia,¹ and appealed to Rome against the aggressions of Prusias the Second of Bithynia. He was saved by the decisive intervention of the senate, but not until he had been twice driven within the walls of his capital by his victorious enemy.² His own peace and the interests of Rome were now secured by his support of Nicomedes, the son of Prusias, who had won the favour of the Romans and was placed on the throne of his father. He had even interfered in the succession to the kingdom of the Seleucidae, when the Romans thought fit to support the pretensions of Alexander Balas to the throne of Syria.³Lastly he had sent assistance to the Roman armies in the conflict which ended in the final reduction of Greece.⁴ There was no question of his abandoning his regency during his life-time. Rome could not have found a better instrument, and it was perhaps in obedience to the wishes of the senate, and certainly in accordance with their will, that he held the supreme power until his reign of twenty-one years was closed by his death.⁶ Possibly the qualities of the rightful heir may not have inspired confidence, for a strong as well as a faithful friend was needed on the throne of Pergamon. The new ruler, Attalus the Third, threatened only the danger that springs from weakness; but, had not his rule been ended by an early death, it is possible that Roman intervention might have been called in to

¹ Polyb. xxxii. 22; Diod. xxxi. 32 b.

'For the details of this struggle see Wilcken l.c. p. 2172; Ussing Pergamos p. 50.

³ Ussing op. cit. p. 51. * Strabo xiii. 4. 2.

⁵ Strabo l.c.; Lucian. Macrob. 12. He was sixty-one years old at his accession and eighty-two years old at the time of his death.

133 B.C.] BEQUEST OF ATTALUS III.

175

save the monarchy from the despair of his subjects, to hand it over to some more worthy vassal, or, in default of a suitable ruler, to reduce it to the form of a province. The restraint under which Attalus had lived during his uncle's guardianship, had given him the sense of impotence that issues in bitterness of temper and reckless suspicion. The suspicion became a mania when the death of his mother and his consort created a void in his life which he persisted in believing to be due to the criminal agency of man. Relatives and friends were now the immediate victims of his disordered mind,¹ and the carnival of slaughter was followed by an apathetic indifference to the things of the outer world. Dooming himself to a sordid seclusion, the king solaced his gloomy leisure with pursuits that had perhaps become habitual during his early detachment from affairs. He passed his time in ornamental gardening, modelling in wax, casting in bronze and working in metal.² His last great object in life was to raise a stately tomb to his mother Stratonice. It was while he was engaged in this pious task that exposure to the sun engendered an illness which caused his death. When the last of the legitimate Attalids had gone to his grave, it was found that the vacant kingdom had been disposed of by will, and that the Roman people was the nominated heir.³ The genuineness of this document was subsequently disputed by the enemies of Rome, and it was pronounced to be a forgery perpetrated by Roman diplomats.* History furnishes evidence of the reality of the testament, but none of the influences under which it was made.⁵ It is quite possible that the last eccentric king was

¹ Justin, xxxvi. 4 ; Diod. xxxiv. 3.

² Once, indeed, he seems to have taken the field with some success, as is proved by a decree in honour of a victory (Frankel Inschr. von Pergamon n. 246). A vote of the town of Elaea honours the king operas eveicev Kal dvBpayaQias ttjs koto TriKefiov, KpaT7)crai'Ta ray vntvavTiav (1. 22). The victory is also mentioned in n 24g.

³ Liv. Ep. Iviii. Heredem autem populum Romanum reliquerat Attalus, rex Pergami, Eumenis filius. Cf. ib. lix ; Strabo xiii. 4. 2 ; Vellei. ii. 4 ; Val. Max. v. 2, ext. 3 ; Plut. Ti. Gracch. 14; Eutrop. iv. 18; Justin, xxxvi. 4. 5 ; Florus ii. 3 (iii. 15); Oros. v. 8; App. Mithr. 62.

⁴ Sail. Hist. iv. 6g Maur. (Epistula Mithridatis) Eumenen, cujus amicitiam gloriose ostentant, initio prodidere (Romani) Antiocho, pacis mercedem; post habitum custodiae agri captivi sumptibus et contumeliis ex rege miserrimum ser-vorum effecere, simulatoque impio testamento filium ejus Aristonicum, quia patrium regnum petiverat, hostium more per triumphum duxere.

⁵ The reality of the will is attested by a Pergamene inscription (Frankel Inschr. von Pergamon n. 24g). The inscription records a resolution taken by the Srjfios on the proposal of the STparif/oi. The resolution is elicited after the will has become known and in view of its ratification by Rome (1. 7 5eT 5e iiriKvpuBHyat t^v 5iot?^K7j</ 6irb 'Pu/iaiay). Pergamon has by the death of the king, and perhaps in accordance with the will (see p. 177), been left " free " (1. 5 Attalus by passing away

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[B.C. 133

jealous enough to will that he should have no successor on the throne, and cynical enough to see that it made little difference whether the actu:.l power of Rome was direct or indirect. It is equally possible that the idea was suggested by the Romanising party in his court; although, when we remember the extreme unwillingness that Rome had ever shown to accept a position of permanent responsibility in the East, we can hardly imagine the plan to have received the direct sanction of the senate. It is conceivable, however, that many leading members of the government were growing doubtful of the success of merely diplomatic interference with the troubled politics of the East; that they desired a nearer point of vantage from which to watch the movements of its turbulent rulers; and that, if consulted on the chances of success which attended the new departure, they may have given a favourable reply. It was impossible by the nature of the case to question the validity of the act. The legatees were far too powerful to make it possible for their living chattels to raise an effective protest except by tactual rebellion. But, from a legal point of view, a principality like Pergamon that had grown out of the successful seizure of a royal estate by its steward some hundred and fifty years before this time, might easily be regarded as the property of its kings;¹ and certainly if any heirs outside the royal family were to be admitted to the bequest, these would naturally be sought in the power, which had increased its dominions, strengthened its position and made it one of the great powers of the world. Neglected by Rome the principality would have become the prey of neighbouring powers; whilst the institution of a new prince, chosen from some royal house, would have excited the j ealousy and stimulated the rapacity of the others. The acceptance of the bequest was inevitable, although by this acceptance Rome was departing from the beaten track of a carefully chosen policy. It is hinted that Attalus in his bequest,

Suro\i'\onrev t^v irarpiSa rifiav iXevdepav). The first result of this freedom is that the people extends the privileges of its citizenship. Full civic rights are given to Paroeci (i.e. incolae) and (mercenary) soldiers; the rights of Paroeci are given to other classes:—freedmen, royal and public slaves. The motive assigned for the conferment is public security, and the extension of rights seems to be justified (1. 6) by the liberal spirit shown by the late king in the organisation of his conquests (see p. 175 note 2). The ruling idea seems to be that, if Pergamon was to be free, she must be strong. See Frankel in loc., Ussing Pergamos p. 55.

¹ At the same time the self-governing character of the civic corporation might be recognised : and Attalus, if he made the will, may have been courteous enough to recognise the " freedom " of the city from this point of view. See p. 177.

132 B.C.] REVOLT OF ARISTONICUS

177

or the Romans in their acceptance, stipulated for the freedom of the dominion.¹ This freedom may be merely a euphemism for provincial rule when contrasted with absolute despotism; but we may read a truer meaning into the term. Rome had often guaranteed the liberty of Asiatic cities which she had wrested from their overlord, she had once divided Macedonia into independent Republics, she still maintained Achaea in a condition which allowed a great deal of self-government to many of its towns, and the system of Roman protectorate melted by insensible degrees into that of provincial government. It is possible that her treatment of the bequeathed communities might have been marked by greater liberality than was actually shown, had not the dominion been immediately convulsed by a war of independence.

A pretender had appeared from the house of the Attalids. He could show no legitimate scutcheon ; but this was a small matter, [f there was a chance of a national outbreak, it could best be fomented by a son of Eumenes. Aristonicus was believed to have been born of an Ephesian concubine of the king.² We know nothing of his personality, but the history of his two years' conflict with the Roman power proves him to have been no figure-head, but x man of ability, energy and resource. A strictly national cause vas impossible in the kingdom of Pergamon ; for there was little community of sentiment between the Greek coast line and the barbaric interior. But the commercial prosperity of the one, and the agricultural horrors of the other, might justify an appeal to interest based on different grounds. At first Aristonicus tried the sea. Without venturing at once into any of the great emporia, he raised his standard at Leucae, a small but strongly defended seaport lying almost midway between Phocaea and Smyrna, and placed on a promontory just south of the point where the Hermus issues into its gulf. Some of the leading towns seem to have answered to his call.³ But the Ephesians, not content with mere repudiation, manned a fleet, sailed against him, and inflicted a severe defeat on his naval force off Cyme.⁴ Evidently the com-

¹ Liv. Ep. lix. Cum testamento Attali regis legata populo Romano libera esse deberet (Asia). Cf. pp. 175, 176, notes 5 and 1.

'Justin, xxxvi. 4. 6 Sed erat ex Eumene Aristonicus, non justo matrimonio, sed ex paelice Ephesia, citharistae cujusdam filia, genitus, qui post mortem Attali velut paternum regnum Asiam invasit. The epitomator of Livy (lix.) speaks of him as " Eumenis filius " Strabo (xiv. x. 38) describes him as Sokuv tov yevovs etvai tov t&v jBueriAeW.

³ Florus i. 35 (ii. 20). ⁴ Strabo xiv. 1. 38.

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[B.C. 131

mercial spirit had no liking for his schemes; it saw in the Roman protectorate the promise of a wider commerce and a broader civic Freedom. Aristonicus moved into the interior, at first perhaps as a refugee, but soon as a liberator. There were men here desperate enough to answer to any call, and miserable enough to face any ianger. Sicily had shown that a slave-leader might become a king; Asia was now to prove that a king might come to his own by heading an army of the outcasts.¹ The call to freedom met with an eager response, and the Pergamene prince was soon marching to the coast at the head of " the citizens of the City of the Sun," the ideal polity which these remnants of nationalities, without countries and without homes, seem to have made their own.² His success was instantaneous. First the inland towns of Northern Lydia, Phyatira, and Apollonis, fell into his hands.³ Organised resistance was for the moment impossible. There were no Roman troops in Asia, and the protected kings, to whom Rome had sent an urgent summons, could not have mustered their forces with sufficient speed to prevent Aristonicus sweeping towards the south. Here he threatened the coast line of Ionia and Caria; Colophon and Myndus fell into his power; he must even have been able to muster something of a fleet; for the island of Samos was soon joined to his possessions.⁴ It is probable that the co-operation of the slave populations in these various cities added greatly to his success. His conquests may have been somewhat sporadic, and there is no reason to suppose that he commanded all the country included in the wide range of his captured cities and extending from Thyatira to the coast and from the Gulf of Hermus to that jf Iassus. The forces which he could dispose of seem to have been sufficiently engaged in holding their southern conquests ; there is 10 trace of his controlling the country north of Phocaea or of his 5ven attempting an attack on Pergamon the capital of his kingdom. His army, however, must have been increasing in dimensions as

¹ Diod. xxxiv. 2. 26 rb itapaitXftaiov Se (to the slave revolt in Sicily) yeyove koI caret tV 'haiav Kara robs abrobs Katpobs, 'ApiarovlKov piv avrnroirjo-a/ievov t5)i /ii) rpoo"i\Kovo"i\s Ba<ri\das, rav Si SovXav Sia ras eK rav SeaitorSiv KaKovxlas avvaTrovoi)<ra-livotv iKelvtp Kal Lieydhois cVrux4^uacrt irok\as ir6kets 7repi$a\6vr(i}v.

'Strabo l.c. els Si r^v Liea&yaiav iviav ijBpoure Sia raxetav TrKrjBos iut&pav re \v6pdnav Kal SobKav iir' iKevBepiq KaraKeK\T)iievuv, obs 'HKioiro\iras iKaXecre. For the new that Heliopolis was a merely ideal city deriving its name from the sun-god of Syria, see Mommsen Hist, of Rome bk. iv. c. r ; Biicher op. cit. pp. 105 foil. For ;he hopes of divine deliverance which pervade the slave revolts, see Mahaffy in Hermathena xvi. i8go, and cf. p. 8g.

^s Strabo l.c. ¹ Florus i. 35 (ii. 20).

131 B.C.] WAR WITH ARISTONICUS

179

well as in experience. Thracian mercenaries were added to his servile bands,¹ and the movement had assumed dimensions which convinced the Romans that this was not a tumult but a war. Their earlier efforts were apparently based on the belief that local forces would be sufficient to stem the rising. Even after the revolt of Aristonicus was known, they persisted in the idea that the commission, which would doubtless in any case have been sent out to inspect the new dependency, was an adequate means of meeting the emergency. This commission of five,² which included Scipio Nasica,⁸ journeyed to Asia only to find that they were attending on a civil war, not on a judicial dispute, and that the country which was to be organised required to be conquered. The client kings of Bithynia, Paphlagonia, Cappadocia and Pontus, all eager for praise or for reward, had rallied loyally to the cause of Rome ;⁴ but the auxiliary forces that they brought were quite unable to pacify a country now in the throes of a servile war, and they lacked a commander-in-chief who would direct a series of ordered operations. Orders were given for the raising of a regular army, and in accordance with the traditions of the State this force would be commanded by a consul.

The heads of the State for this year were Lucius Valerius Flaccus and Publius Licinius Crassus. Each was covetous of the attractive command ; for the Asiatic campaigns of the past had been easy, and there was no reason to suppose that a pretender who headed a multitude of slaves would be more difficult to vanquish than a king like Antiochus who had had at his call all the forces of Asia. The chances of a triumph were becoming scarcer ; here was one that was almost within the commander's grasp. But there were even greater prizes in store. The happy conqueror would be the first to touch the treasure of the Attalids, and secure for the State a prize which had already been the source of political strife; he would reap for himself and his army a royal harvest from the booty taken in the field or from the sack of towns, and he would almost indubitably remain in the conquered country to organise, perhaps to govern for years, the wealthiest domain that had fallen to the lot of Rome,

'Val. Max. iii. 2. 12. ³ Strabo xiv. 1. 38. ³ P. 148.

⁴ Strabo l.c. ehBbs a'l te wi\eis en-e/xif/av ir\7j8os, Kal Nuccyi^Srjs <S BiBvvbs eVe/coliprjfl-e (col ol ray Kainmb'iKuv BaaiKels. Eutrop. iv. 20 P. Licinius Crassus infinita regum habuit auxilia. Nam et Bithyniae rex Nicomedes Romanos juvit et Mithridates Ponticus, cum quo bellum postea gravissimum fuit, et Ariarathes Cappadox et Pylaemenes Paphlagon. The Pontic king was Mithradates Euergetes, not Eupator.

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[B.C. 131

and to treat like a king with the monarchs of the protected states around. These attractions were sufficient to overcome the religious scruples of both the candidates; for it chanced that both Crassus and Flaccus were hampered by religious law from assuming a command abroad. The one was chief pontiff and the other the Flamen of Mars; and, if the objections were felt or pressed, the obvious candidate for the Asiatic campaign was Scipio Aemilianus, the only tried general of the time. But Scipio's chances were small. The nature of the struggle did not seem to demand extraordinary genius, and Scipio, although necessary in an emergency, could not be allowed to snatch the legitimate prizes of the holders of office.¹ So the contest lay between the pontiff and the priest. The controversy was unequal, for, while the pontiff was the disciplinary head of the state religion, the Flamen was in matters of ritual and in the rules appertaining to the observance of religious law subject to his jurisdiction. Crassus restrained the ardour of his colleague by announcing that he would impose a fine if the Flamen neglected his religious duties by quitting the shores of Italy. The pecuniary penalty was only intended as a means of stating a test case to be submitted, as similar cases had been twice before,² to the decision of the people. Flaccus entered an appeal against the fine, and the judgment of the Comitia was invited. The verdict of the people was that the fine should be remitted, but that the Flamen should obey the pontiff.³ As Crassus had no superior in the religious world, it was difficult, if not impossible, for the objections against his own tenure of the foreign command to be pressed.⁴ The people, perhaps grateful for the Gracchan sympathies of Crassus, felt no scruple about dismissing their pontiff to a foreign land, and readily voted him the conduct of the war.

The story of the campaign which followed is confined to a few personal anecdotes connected with the remarkable man who led the Roman armies. The learning of Crassus was attested by the fact that, when he held a court in Asia, he could not only deliver his

¹ Cic. Phil. xi. 8. 18 Populus Romanus consuli potius Crasso quam private-Africano bellum gerendum dedit.

² In b.c. i8g (Liv. xxxvii. 51) and 180 (Liv. xl. 42).

³ Cic. l.c. Rogatus est populus quem id bellum gerere placeret. Crassus consul, pontifex maximus, Flacco collegae, flamini Martiali, multam dixit si a sacris disces-sisset; quam multam populus remisit, pontifici tamen flaminem parere jussit.

⁴ Cf. Liv. Ep. lix. Adversus eum (Aristonicum) P. Licinius Crassus consul, cum idem pontifex maximus esset, quod numquam antea factum erat, extra Italiam profectus . . .

130 B.C.] DEATH OF CRASSUS

1«1

judgments in Greek, but adapt his discourse to the dialect of the different litigants.¹ His discipline was severe but indiscriminating; it displayed the rigour of the erudite martinet, not the insight of the born commander. Once he needed a piece of timber for a battering ram, and wrote to the architect of a friendly town to send the larger of two pieces which he had seen there. The trained eye of the expert immediately saw that the smaller was the better suited to the purpose ; and this was accordingly sent. The intelligence of the architect was his ruin. The unhappy man was stripped and scourged, on the ground that the exercise of judgment by a subordinate was utterly subversive of a commander's authority.²Another account represents such generalship as he possessed as having been diverted from its true aim by the ardour with which, in spite of his enormous wealth, he followed up the traces of the spoils of war.³ But his death, which took place at the beginning of the second year of his command,⁴ was not unworthy of one who had held the consulship. He was conducting operations in the territory between Elaea and Smyrna, probably in preparation for the siege of Leucae,⁶ still a stronghold of the pretender. Here he was suddenly surprised by the enemy. His hastily formed ranks were shattered, and the Romans were soon in full retreat for some friendly city of the north. But their lines were broken by uneven ground and by the violence of the pursuit. The general was detached from the main body of his army and overtaken by a troop of Thracian horse. His captors were probablyignorant of the value of their prize; and, even had they known that they held in their hands the leader of the Roman host, the device of Crassus might still have saved him from the triumph of a rebel prince and shameful exposure to the insults of a servile crowd. He thrust his riding whip into the eye of one of his captors. Frenzied with pain, the man buried his dagger in the captive's side.⁶

The death of Crassus created hardly a pause in the conduct of the campaign; for Marcus Perperna, the consul for the year, was soon in the field and organising vigorous measures against Aristonicus. The details of the campaign have not been preserved, but we

¹ Quinctil. Inst. Or. xi. 2. 50. ² Gell. i. 13.

³ Intentior Attalicae praedae quam bello (Justin, xxxvi. 4. 8).

⁴ Cf. Eutrop. iv. 20 Perperna, consul Romanus (130 b.c.) qui successor Crasso veniebat.

⁵ Val. Max. iii. 2. 12; Strabo xiv. 1. 38.

⁸ Val. Max. l.c. Cf. Oros. v. 10; Florus i. 34 (ii. 20). Eutropius (iv. 20) states that Crassus's head was taken to Aristonicus, his body buried at Smyrna.

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are told that the first serious encounter resulted in a decisive victory for the Roman arms.¹ The pretender fled, and was finally hunted down to the southern part of his dominions. His last stand was made at Stratonicea in Caria. The town was blockaded and reduced by famine, and Aristonicus surrendered unconditionally to the Roman power.² Perperna reserved the captive for his triumph, he visited Pergamon and placed on shipboard the treasures of Attalus for transport to Rome ;³ by these decisive acts he was proving that the war was over, for yet a third eager consul was straining every nerve to get his share of glory and of gain. Manius Aquillius was hastening to Asia to assume a command which might still be interpreted as a reality;⁴ the longer he allowed his predecessor to remain, the more unsubstantial would his own share in the enterprise become. A triumph would be the prize of the man who had finished the war, and perhaps even Aristonicus's capture need not be interpreted as its close. A scene of angry recrimination might have been the result of an encounter between the rival commanders; but this was avoided by Perperna's sudden death at Pergamon.⁵It is. possible that Aristonicus was saved the shame of a Roman triumph, although one tradition affirms that he was reserved for the pageant which three years later commemorated Aquillius's success in Asia.⁶ But he did not escape the doom which the State pronounced on rebel princes, and was strangled in the Tullianum by the orders of the senate.⁷

Aquillius found in his province sufficient material for the prolongation of the war. Although the fall of Aristonicus had doubtless brought with it the dissolution of the regular armies of the rebels, yet isolated cities, probably terrorised by revolted slaves who could expect no mercy from the conqueror, still offered a desperate resistance. In his eagerness to end the struggle the Roman commander is said to have shed the last vestiges of international morality, and the reduction of towns by the poisoning of the streams which provided them with water,⁸ while it inflicted an

¹ Justin, xxxvi. 4 Prima congressione Aristonicum superatum in potestatem suam redegit.

² Eutrop. iv. 20. Cf. Liv. Ep. lix. ³ Justin, l.c.

⁴ Justin, xxxvi. 4 M'. Aquilius consul ad eripiendum Aristonicum Perpernae, veluti sui potius triumphi munus esse deberet, festinata velocitate contendit.

⁶ Eutrop. iv. 20; Justin, xxxvi. 4. 'Vellei. ii. 4.

'Eutrop. l.c. Aristonicus jussu senatus Romae in carcere strangulatus est. According to Strabo (xiv. 1. 38) he had been sent to Rome by Perperna.

⁸Florus i. 35 (ii. 20) Aquillius Asiatici belli reliquias confecit, mixtis-nefas-veneno fontibus ad deditionem quarundam urbium. Quae res ut maturam ita

129 B.C.] THE PROVINCE OF ASIA

183

indelible stain on Roman honour, was perhaps defended as an inevitable accompaniment of an irregular servile war. The work of organisation had been begun even before that of pacification had been completed. The State had taken Perperna's success seriously enough to send with Aquillius ten commissioners for the regulation of the affairs of the new province,¹ and they seem to have entered on their task from the date of their arrival.² There was no reason for delay, since the kingdom of Pergamon had technically become a province with the death of Attalus the Third.³The Ephesians indeed even antedated this event, and adopted an era which commenced with the September of the year 134,* the reason for this anticipation being the usual Asiatic custom of beginning the civil year with the autumnal equinox. The real point of departure of this new era of Ephesus was either the death of Attalus or the victory of the city over the fleet of Aristonicus. But, though the work of organisation could be entered on at once, its completion was a long and laborious task, and Aquillius himself seems to have spent three years in Asia.⁵ The limits of the province, which, like that of Africa, received the name of the continent to which it belonged, required to be defined with reference to future possibilities and the rights of neighbouring kingdoms; the taxation of the country had to be adjusted ; and the privileges of the different cities proportioned to their capacity or merits. The law of Aquillius remained in essence the charter of the province of Asia down to imperial times, although subsequent modifications were introduced by Sulla and Pompeius. The new inheritance of the Romans comprised almost all the portion of Asia Minor lying north of the Taurus and west of Bithynia, Galatia and Cappadocia. Even Caria, which had been declared free after the war with Per-

infamem fecit victoriam, quippe cum contra fas deum moresque majorum medica-minibus impuris in id tempus sacrosancta Romana arma violasset.

¹ Strabo xiv. i. 38 Mdvtos 5' 'Ak^Wios, hre\9wv Vnaros Lterd Se'/ca irpeo-QevTuv, BieVaJe t)\v hcapylav els rb vvv en ffvfiLtevov tt)s iroMreias cr^t^a.

² An inscription with the words MaV[i]oj 'A«ii[A.]ios Mav[l]ov vna.To[s] "Pafialwv has been found near Tralles. It probably belongs to a milestone (C. I. L. i. n. 557 = C. I. Gr. 11. 2g2o).

³ Where the rights of city-states were in question the lines of demarcation between " province " and " protectorate " were necessarily vague. Even a protectorate over small political units would demand organisation and justify the appointment of a commission.

⁴ The evidence is furnished by a Cistophorus of 77 b.c. struck at Ephesus. See Waddington Pastes p. 674.

⁶ His triumph is dated to 126 b.c. (628 a.u.c, 627 according to the reckoning of the Fasti). See Fasti triumph, in C. I. L. i.

184 A HISTORY OF ROME [B.C. 129-126

seus, seems to have again fallen under the sway of the Attalid kings. The monarchy also included the Thracian Chersonese and most of the Aegean islands.¹ But the whole of this territory was not included in the new province of Asia. The Chersonese was annexed to the province of Macedonia,² a small district of Caria known as the Peraea and situated opposite the island of Rhodes, became or remained the property of the latter state; in the same neighbourhood the port and town of Telmissus, which had been given to Eumenes after the defeat of Antiochus, were restored to the Lycian confederation.³ With characteristic caution Rome did not care to retain direct dominion over the eastern portions of her new possessions, some of which, such as Isauria, Pisidia and perhaps the eastern portion of Cilicia, may have rendered a very nominal obedience to the throne of the Attalids. She kept the rich, civilised and easily governed Hellenic lands for her own, but the barbarian interior, as too great and distant a burden for the home government, was destined to enrich her loyal client states. Aquillius and his commissioners must have received definite instructions not to claim for Rome any territory lying east of Mysia, Lydia and Caria; but they seem to have had no instructions as to how the discarded territories were to be disposed of. The consequence was that the kings of the East were soon begging for territory from a Roman commander and his assistants. Lycaonia was the reward of proved service; it was given to the sons of Ariarathes the Fifth, King of Cappadocia, who had fallen in the war.⁴ Cilicia is also said to have accompanied this gift, but this no man's land must have been regarded both by donor and recipient as but a nominal boon. For Phrygia proper, or the Greater Phrygia as this country south of Bithynia and west of Galatia was called,⁶ there were two claimants.⁶The kings of Pontus and Bithynia competed for the prize, and each supported his petition by a reference to the history of the past. Nicomedes of Bithynia could urge that his grandsire Prusias had maintained an attitude of friendly neutrality during Rome's struggle with Antiochus. The Pontic king, Mithradates Euergetes, advanced a more specious pretext of hereditary right.

¹ Waddington Fastes pp. 662 foil. Caria belongs to the province of Asia in 76 B.C. (Le Bas-Waddington, no. 4og).

² It is dependent on this province in the time of Cicero (in Pis. 35. 86).

³ Strabo xiv. 3. 4.

'Justin, xxxvii. i. Cf. Bergmann in Philologus 1847 p. 642. ¹¹ Forbiger Handb. der Alt. Geogr. ii. p. 338. ⁰ Reinach Mithridate Eupator p. 43.

129-126 B.C.]

THE PROVINCE OF ASIA

185

Phrygia, he alleged, had been his mother's dowry, and had been given her by her brother, Seleucus Callinicus, King of Syria.¹We do not know what considerations influenced the judgment of Aquillius in preferring the claim of Mithradates. He may have considered that the Pontic kingdom, as the more distant, was the less dangerous, and he may have sought to attract the loyalty of its monarch by benefits such as had already been heaped on Nicomedes of Bithynia. His political enemies and all who in subsequent times resisted the claim of the Pontic kings, alleged that he had put Phrygia up to auction and that Mithradates had paid the higher price; this transaction doubtless figured in the charges of corruption, on which he was accused and acquitted: and, doubtful as the verdict which absolved him seemed to his contemporaries and successors, we have no proof that the desire for gain was the sole or even the main cause of his decision. Had he considered that the investiture of Nicomedes would have been more acceptable to the home government, the King of Bithynia would probably have been willing to pay an adequate sum for his advocacy. He may have been guilty of a wilful blunder in alienating Phrygia at all. The senate soon discovered his and its own mistake. The disputed territory was soon seen to be worthy of Roman occupation. Strategically it was of the utmost importance for the security of the Asiatic coast, as commanding the heads of the river valleys which stretched westward to the Aegean, while its thickly strewn townships, which opened up possibilities of inland trade, placed it on a different plane to the desolate Lycaonia and Cilicia. It is possible that the capitalist class, on whose support the senate was now relying for the maintenance of the political equilibrium in the capital, may have joined in the protest against Aquillius's mistaken generosity. But, though the government rapidly decided to rescind the decision of its commissioners, it had not the strength to settle the matter once for all by taking Phrygia for itself. A decree of the people was still technically superior to a resolution of the senate ; it was always possible for dissentients to urge that the people must be consulted on these great questions of international interest; and Phrygia became, like Pergamon a short time before, the sport of party politics. The rival kings transferred their claims, and possibly their pecuniary offers, from the province to the capital, and

¹ Justin, xxxviii. 5.

186

A HISTORY OF ROME [B.C. 123-122

the network of intrigue which soon shrouded the question was brutally exhibited by Caius Gracchus when, in his first or second tribunate, he urged the people to reject an Aufeian law, which bore on the dispute. "You will find, citizens," he urged, "that each one of us has his price. Even I am not disinterested, although it happens that the particular object which I have in view is not money, but good repute and honour. But the advocates on both sides of this question are looking to something else. Those who urge you to reject this bill are expecting hard cash from Nicomedes; those who urge its acceptance are looking for the price which Mithradates will pay for what he calls his own ; this will be their reward. And, as for the members of the government who maintain a studious reserve on this question, they are the keenest bargainers of all; their silence simply means that they are being paid by every one and cheating every one." This cynical description of the political situation was pointed by a quotation of the retort of Demades to the successful tragedian " Are you so proud of having got a talent for speaking ? why, I got ten talents from the king for holding my peace ",¹ This sketch was probably more witty than true ; condemnation, when it becomes universal, ceases to be convincing, and cynicism, when it exceeds a certain degree, is merely the revelation of a diseased or affected mental attitude. Gracchus was too good a pleader to be a fair observer. But the suspicion revealed by the diatribe may have been based on fact; the envoys of the kings may have brought something weightier than words or documents, only to find that the balance of their gilded arguments was so perfect that the original objection to Phrygia being given to any Eastern potentate was the only issue which could still be supported with conviction. Yet the government still declined to annex. Its hesitancy was probably due to its unwillingness to see a new Eastern province handed over to the equestrian tax-farmers, to whom Caius Gracchus had just given the province of Asia. The fall of Gracchus made an independent judgment by the people impossible, and, even had it been practicable for the Comitia tc decide, their judgment must have been so perplexed by rival interests and arguments that they would probably have acquiescet

^JC. Gracchus ap. Gell. xi. io. Cf. Plin. H. N. xxxiii. ii. 148 Asia primurr devicta luxuriam misit in Italiam ... At eadem Asia donata multo etiam gravius adfiixit mores, inutiliorque victoria ilia hereditas Attalo rege mortuo fuit. Tun enim haec emendi Romae in auctionibus regiis verecundia exempta est.

129 B.C.] THE PROVINCE OF ASIA

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in the equivocal decision of the senate. This decision was that Phrygia should be free.¹ It was to be open to the Roman capitalist as a trader, but not as a collector; it was not to be the scene of official corruption or regal aggrandisement. It was to be an aggregate of protected states possessing no central government of its own. Yet some central control was essential; and this was perhaps secured by attaching Phrygia to the province of Asia in the same loose condition of dependence in which Achaea had been attached to Macedonia. In one other particular the settlement of Aquillius was not final. We shall find that motives of maritime security soon forced Rome to create a province of Cilicia, and it seems that for this purpose a portion of the gift which had been just made to the kings of Cappadocia was subsequently resumed by Rome. The old Pergamene possessions in Western Cilicia were probably joined to some towns of Pamphylia to form the kernel of the new province. When Rome had divested herself of the superfluous accessories of her bequest, a noble residue still remained. Mysia, Lydia and Caria with their magnificent coast cities, rich in art, and inexhaustible in wealth, formed, with most of the islands off the coast,² that " corrupting " province which became the favourite resort of the refined and the desperate resource of the needy. Its treasures were to add a new word to the Roman vocabulary of wealth ;³ its luxury was to give a new stimulus to the art of living and to add a new craving or two to the insatiable appetite for enjoyment; while the servility of its population was to create a new type of Roman ruler in the man who for one glorious year wielded the power of a Pergamene despot, without the restraint of kingly traditions or the continence induced by an assured tenure of rule.

The western world witnessed the beginning of an equally remarkable change. On both sides of Italy accident was laying the foundation for a steady advance to the North, and forcing the Romans into contact with peoples, whose subjection would never have been sought except from purely defensive motives. The Iapudes and Histri at the head of the Adriatic were the objects of

¹ Ramsay, Cities and Bishopries of Phrygia i. 2, pp. 423, 762 ; Reinach Mith-ridate Eupator p. 457.

² For the evidence as to the islands, see Waddington Fastes l.c.

■ ³ Regni attalici opes (Justin, xxxviii. 7. 7); Attalicae conditiones (Hor. Od. i. 1. 12); Attalicae vestes (Prop. iii. 18. 19) etc. (from Ihne Rom. Gesch. v., p. 76).

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A HISTORY OF ROME [B.C. 126-125

a campaign of the consul Tuditanus,¹ while four years later Fulvius Flaccus commenced operations amongst the Gauls and Ligurians beyond the Alps,² which were to find their completion seventy-five years later in the conquests of Caesar. But neither of these enterprises can be intelligently considered in isolation ; their significance lies in the necessity of their renewal, and even the proximate results to which they led would carry us far beyond the limits of the period which we are considering. The events completely enclosed within these limits are of subordinate importance. They are a war in Sardinia and the conquest of the Balearic isles. The former engaged the attention of Lucius Aurelius Orestes as consul in 126 and as proconsul in the following year.³ It is perhaps only the facts that a consul was deemed necessary for the administration of the island, and that he attained a triumph for his deeds,⁴ that justify us in calling this Sardinian enterprise a war. It was a punitive expedition undertaken against some restless tribes, but it was rendered arduous by the unhealthiness of the climate and the difficulty of procuring adequate supplies for the suffering Roman troops.⁵ The annexation of the Balearic islands with their thirty thousand inhabitants ⁶ may have been regarded as a geographical necessity, and certainly resulted in a military advantage. Although the Carthaginians had had frequent intercourse with these islands and a port of the smaller of the two still bears a Punic name,⁷ they had done little to civilise the native inhabitants. Perhaps the value attached to the military gifts of the islanders contributed to preserve them in a state of nature ; for culture might have diminished that marvellous skill with the sling,⁸ which was once at the service of the Carthaginian, and afterwards of the Roman, armies. But, in spite of their prowess, the Baliares were not a fierce people. They would allow no gold or silver to enter their country,⁹ probably in order

¹ Liv. Ep. lix; App. Illyr. io, Bell. Civ. i. 19; Plin. H. N. iii. 19. 129; Fasti triumph. C. Sempronius C. F. C. N. Tuditan. a. dcxxiv cos. de Iapudibus k. Oct.

² Liv. Ep. Ix ; Florus i. 37 (iii. 2); Obsequens 90 (28); Ammian. xv. 12. 5. ³Liv. Ep. Ix; Plut. C. Gracch. 1. 2.

⁴ Fasti Triumph. L. Aurelius L. F. L. N. Orestes pro an. de***/ cos. ex Sardinia vi Idus Dec. (122 b.c.)

⁵ Plut. C. Gracch. 2. ⁸ Diod. v. 17. 2.

'Besides Mago (Mahon), Bocchori and Guiuntum on Majorca, Iamo on Minorca are supposed to be Punic names. See Hiibner in Pauly-Wissowa Real. Enc. p. 2823. On the islands generally (Baliares, later Baleares of the Romans, rv/u^cruu, BaXiopeis of the Greeks) see the same author's Romische Heerschaft in Westeuropa 208 ff.

⁸ Strabo iii. v. ±. ⁹ Diod. v. 17. 4.

123 B.C.] CONQUEST OF THE BALIARES 189

that no temptation might be offered to pirates or rapacious traders.¹ Their civilisation represented the matriarchal stage; their marriage customs expressed the survival of polyandric union ; they were tenacious of the lives of their women, and even invested the money which they gained on military service in the purchase of female captives.² They made excellent mercenaries, but shunned either war or commerce with the neighbouring peoples, and the only excuse for Roman aggression was that a small proportion of the peaceful inhabitants had lent themselves to piratical pursuits.³The expedition was led by the consul Quintus Caecilius Metellus and resulted in a facile conquest. The ships of the invaders were protected by hides stretched above the decks to guard against the cloud of well-directed missiles ;⁴ but, once a landing had been effected, the natives, clad only in skins, with small shields and light javelins as their sole defensive weapons, could offer no effective resistance at close quarters and were easily put to rout. For the security of the new possessions Metellus adopted the device, still rare in the case of transmarine dependencies, of planting colonies on the conquered land. Palma and Pollentia were founded, as townships of Roman citizens, on the larger island ; the new settlers being drawn from Romans who were induced to leave their homes in the south of Spain.⁵ This unusual effort in the direction of Romanisation was rendered necessary by the wholly barbarous character of the country ; and the introduction into the Balearic isles of the Latin language and culture was a better justification than the easy victory for Metellus's triumph and his assumption of the surname of " Baliaricus ".⁶ The islands nourished under Roman rule. They produced wine and wheat in abundance and were famed for the excellence of their mules. But their chief value to Rome must have lain in their excellent harbours, and in the welcome addition to the light-armed forces of the empire which was found in their warlike inhabitants.

¹ Hiibner in Pauly-Wissowa Rial. Enc. l.c.

"They also purchased wine. They were so <pt\oybvat that they would give pirates three or four men as a ransom for one woman (Diod. v. 17).

'Strabo l.c. ol KaTOMOvvres eiprivdtoi . . . Kwoipyuv Se tivuv o\(ywv Kotvwvlas svarriaaiiivuv irpbs robs iv rots ircKdyto-t Ajjoras, Sie/3A^07jcrai' SVavTej, Kal Sie07j MereAAoj eV abrobs & BcthiapMbs itpoaayopevBels.

* Strabo l.c.

"Strabo l.c. tio^iyaye Sh (MereMos) iirolKovs rpicrxiAfous tSiv 4k rijs 'IB-qpias

"Fasti Triumph. (121 b.c.) q. Caecilius q. F. q. N. Metellus a. cXcxxxii Baliaric. procos. de Baliarib.

CHAPTER IV

ROME had lived for nine years in a feverish atmosphere of projected reform; yet not a single question raised by her bolder spirits had received its final answer. The agrarian legislation had indeed run a successful course; yet the very hindrance to its operation at a critical moment had, in the eyes of the discontented, turned success into failure and left behind a bitter feeling of resentment at the treacherous dexterity of the government. The men, in whose imagined interests the people had been defrauded of their coveted land, had by a singular irony of fortune been driven ignominiously from Rome and were now the victims of graver suspicions on the part of the government than on that of the Roman mob. The effect of the late senatorial diplomacy had been to create two hostile classes instead of one. From both these classes the aristocrats drew their soldiers for the constant campaigns that the needs of Empire involved: and both were equally resentful of the burdens and abuses of military service, for which no one was officially directed to suggest a cure. The poorest classes had been given the ballot when they wanted food and craved a less precarious sustenance than that afforded by the capricious benevolence of the rich. The friction between the senatorial government and the upper middle class was probably increasing. The equites must have been casting hungry eyes at the new province of Asia and asking themselves whether commercial interests were always to be at the mercy of the nobility as represented by the senate, the provincial administrators and the courts of justice. It was believed that governors, commissioners and senators were being bought by the gold of kings, and that mines of wealth were being lost to the honest capitalist through the utter corruption of the governing few. The final threats of Tiberius Gracchus were still in the air, and a vast un-worked material lay ready to the hand of the aspiring agitator. In

124 B.C.]

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an ancient monarchy or aristocracy of the feudal type, where abuses have become sanctified by tradition, or in a modern nation or state with its splendid capacity for inertia due to the habitual somnolence of the majority of its electors, such questions may vaguely suggest themselves for half a century without ever receiving an answer. But Rome could only avoid a revolution by discarding her constitution. The sovereignty of the people was a thesis which the senate dared not attack; and this sovereignty had for the first time in Roman history become a stern reality. The city in its vastness now dominated the country districts: and the sovereign, now large, now small, now wild, now sober, but ever the sovereign in spite of his kaleidoscopic changes, could be summoned at any moment to the Forum. Democratic agitation was becoming habitual. It is true that it was also becoming unsafe. But a man who could hold the wolf by the ears for a year or two might work a revolution in Rome and perhaps be her virtual master.

It was no difficult task to find the man, for there was one who was marked out by birth, traditions, temperament and genius as the fittest exponent of a cause which, in spite of its intricate complications that baffled the analysis of the ordinary mind, could still in its essential features be described as the cause of the people. It is indeed singular that, in a political civilisation so unkind as the Roman to the merits of youth, hopes should be roused and fear inspired by a man so young and inexperienced as Caius Gracchus. But the popular fancy is often caught by the immaturity that is as yet unhampered by caution and undimmed by disillusion, and by the fresh young voice that has not yet been attuned to the poor half-truths which are the stock-in-trade of the worldly wise. And those who were about Gracchus must soon have seen that the traces of youth were to be found only in his passion, his frankness, his impetuous vigour; no discerning eye could fail to be aware of the cool, calculating, intellect which unconsciously used emotion as its mask, of a mind that could map and plan a political campaign in perfect self-confident security, view the country as a whole and yet master every detail, and then leave the issue of the fight to burning words and passionate appeals. This supreme combination of emotional and artistic gifts, which made Gracchus so irresistible as a leader, was strikingly manifested in his oratory. We are told of the intensity of his mien, the violence of his gestures, the restlessness that forced him to pace the Rostra and pluck the toga from

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[B.C. 124

his shoulder, of the language that roused his hearers to an almost intolerable tension of pity or indignation.¹ Nature had made him the sublimest, because the most unconscious of actors; eyes, tone, gesture all answered the bidding of the magic words.² Sometimes the emotion was too highly strung; the words would become coarser, the voice harsher, the faultless sentences would grow confused, until the soft tone of a flute blown by an attendant slave would recall his mind to reason and his voice to the accustomed pitch.³ Men contrasted him with his gentle and stately brother Tiberius, endowed with all the quiet dignity of the Roman orator, and diverging only from the pure and polished exposition of his cause to awake a feeling of commiseration for the wrongs which he unfolded.³ Tiberius played but on a single chord ; Caius on many. Tiberius appealed to noble instincts, Caius appealed to all, and his Protean manifestations were a symbol of a more complex creed, a wider knowledge of humanity, a greater recklessness as to his means, and of that burning consciousness, which Tiberius had not, that there were personal wrongs to be avenged as well as political ideas to be realised. To a narrow mind the vendetta is simply an act of justice; to an intellectual hater such as Gracchus it is also a woik of reason. The folly of crime but exaggerates its grossness, and the hatred for the criminal is merged in an exalting and inspiring contempt. Yet the man thus attuned to passion was, what every great orator must be, a painful student of the most delicate of arts. The language of the successful demagogue seldom becomes the study of the schools ; yet so it was with Gracchus. The orators of a later age, whose critical appreciation was purer than their practice, could find no better guide to the aspirant for forensic fame than the speeches of the turbulent tribune. Cicero dwells on the fulness and richness of his flow of words, the grandeur and dignity of the expression, the acuteness of the thought.⁴ They seemed to some to lack the finishing touch;⁵ which is equivalent to saying that with

¹ Plut. Ti. Gracch. 2.

² Quae sic ab illo acta esse constabat oculis, voce, gestu, inimici ut lacrimas tenere non possent (Cic. de Or. iii. 56. 214).

⁸ Plut. l.c.

¹ Cic. Brut. 33. 125 Sed ecce in manibus vir et praestantissimo ingenio et flagranti studio et doctus a puero, C. Gracchus . . . Grandis est verbis, sapiens sententiis, genere toto gravis. His " impetus " is dwelt on in Tac. de Orat. 26.

⁸ Cic. Brut. 33. 126 Manus extrema non accessit operibus ejus: praeclare in-choata multa, perfecta non plane. Cf. Tac. de Orat. 18 Sic Catoni seni comparatus C. Gracchus plenior et uberior; sic Graccho politior et ornatior Crassus.

124 B.C.]

CAIUS GRACCHUS

193

him oratory had not degenerated into rhetoric. The few fragments that survive awaken our wonder, first for their marvellous simplicity and clearness: then, for the dexterous perfection of their form. The balance of the rhythmic clauses never obscures or overloads the sense. Gracchus could tell a tale, like that of the cruel wrongs inflicted on the allies, which could arouse a thrill of horror without also awakening the reflection that the speaker was a man of great sensibility and had a wonderful command of commiserative terminology. He could ask the crowd where he should fly, whether to the Capitol dripping with a brother's blood, or to the home where the widowed mother sat in misery and tears;¹ and no one thought that this was a mere figure of speech. It all seemed real, because Gracchus was a true artist as well as a true man, and knew by an unerring instinct when to pause. This type of objective oratory, with its simple and vivid pictures, its brilliant but never laboured wit, its capacity for producing the illusion that the man is revealed in the utterance, its suggestion of something deeper than that which the mere words convey—a suggestion which all feel but only the learned understand—is equally pleasing to the trained and the unlettered mind. The polished weapon, which dazzled the eyes of the crowd, was viewed with respect even by the cultured nobles against whom it was directed.

Caius's qualities had been tested for some years before he attained the tribunate, and the promise given by his name, his attitude and bis eloquence was strengthened by the fact that he had no rival in the popular favour. Carbo was probably on his way to the Op-timates, and Flaccus's failure was too recent to make him valuable in any other quality than that of an assistant. But Caius had :isen through the opportunities given by the agitation which these nen had sustained, although his advance to the foremost place ieemed more like the work of destiny than of design. When a youth of tw,enty-one, he had found himself elevated to the rank )f a land commissioner;² but this accidental identification with Tiberius's policy was not immediately followed by any action vhich betrayed a craving for an active political career. He is said ;o have shunned the Forum, that training school and advertising irena where the aspiring youth of Rome practised their litigious doquence, and to have lived a life of calm retirement which some

¹ Cic. de Or. iii. 56. 214.

² p. 127.

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attributed to fear and others to resentment. It was even believed by a few that he doubted the wisdom of his brother's career.¹ But it was soon found that the leisure which he cultivated was not that of easy enjoyment and did not promise prolonged repose. He was grappling with the mysteries of language, and learning by patient study the art of finding the words that would give to thought both form and wings. The thought, too, must have been taking a clearer shape ; for Tiberius had left a heritage of crude ideas, and men were trying to introduce some of these into the region of practical politics. The first call to arms was Carbo's proposal for legalising re-election to the tribunate. It drew from Gracchus a speech in its support, which contained a bitter indictment of those who had been the cause of the " human sacrifice " fulfilled in his brother's murder.² Five years later he was amongst the foremost of the opponents of the alien-act of Pennus, and exposed the dangerous folly involved in a jealous policy of exclusion.³ But the courts of law are said to have given him the first great opportunity of revealing his extraordinary powers to the world. As an advocate for a friend called Vettius, he delivered a speech which seemed to lift him to a plane unapproachable by the other orators of the day. The spectacle of the crowd almost raving with joy and frantically applauding the new-found hero, showed that a man had appeared who could really touch the hearts of the people, and is said to have suggested to men of affairs that every means must be used to hinder Gracchus's accession to the tribunate.* The chance of the lot sent him as quaestor with the consul Orestes to Sardinia. It was with joyful hearts that his enemies saw him depart to that unhealthy clime,⁶ and to Caius himself the change to the active life of the camp was not unpleasing. He is said still to have dreaded the plunge into the stormy sea of politics, and in Sardinia he was safe from the appeals of the people and the entreaties of his friends.⁶Yet already he had received a warning that there was no escape. While wrestling with himself as to whether he should seek the quaestorship, his fevered mind had conjured up a vision. The phantom of his brother had appeared and addressed him in these

'Plut. C. Gracch. i.

³ C. Gracchus ap. Chads, ii. p. 177 Qui sapientem eum faciet ? Qui et vobis et rei publicae et sibi communiter prospiciat, non qui pro suilla humanam trucidet. • P. 167. <Plut. l.c.

⁵ Ibid. Cf. [Victor] de Vir. III. 65 Pestilentem Sardinian! quaestor sortitus. ³ Plut. l.c.

26-125 B.C.] GRACCHUS IN SARDINIA

195

ords " Why dost thou linger, Caius ? It is not given thee to raw back. One life, one death is fated for us both, as defenders f the people's rights." His belief in the reality of this warning is mply attested;¹ but the sense that he was predestined and fore-oomed, though it may have given an added seriousness to his life, sft him as calm and vigorous as before. Like Tiberius he was ^rithin a sphere of his father's influence, and this memory must have timulated his devotion to his military and provincial duties. He ron distinction in the field and a repute for justice in his dealings dth the subject tribes, while his simplicity of life and capacity for oil suggested the veteran campaigner, not the tyro from the most usurious of cities.² The extent of the services in Sardinia and ieighbouring lands which his name and character enabled him to ender to the State, has been perhaps exaggerated, or at least faultily tated, by our authority; but, in view of the unquestioned confidence hown by the Numantines in his brother when as young a man, here is no reason to doubt their reality. It is said that, when he treacherous winter of Sardinia had shaken the troops with hills, the commander sent to the cities asking for a supply of lothing. These towns, which were probably federate communities md exempt by treaty from the requisitions of Rome, appealed to he senate. They feared no doubt the easy lapse of an act of .indness into a burden fixed by precedent. The senate, as in duty )ound, upheld their contention; and suffering and disease would lave reigned in the Roman camp, had not Gracchus visited the :ities in person and prevailed on them to send the necessary help.³)n another occasion envoys from Micipsa of Numidia are said to lave appeared at Rome and offered a supply of corn for the Sardinian army. The request had perhaps been made by Gracchus. To the Numidian king he was simply the grandson of the elder ■Uricanus : and the envoys in their simplicity mentioned his name ■s the intermediary of the royal bounty. The senate, we are told, ■ejected the proffered help.³ The curious parallelism between the rresent career of Caius and the early activities of his brother must lave struck many; to the senate these proofs of energy and devo-

¹ Cic. de Div. i. 26. 56 C. vero Gracchus multis dixit, ut scriptum apud eundem 2oelium est, sibi in somniis quaesturam petere dubitanti Ti. fratrem visum esse licere, quam vellet cunctaretur, tamen eodem sibi leto quo ipse interisset esse pere-indum. Hoc, ante quam tribunus plebi C. Gracchus factus esset, et se audisse cribit Coelius et dixisse eum multis. Cf. Plut. l.c.

² Plut. C. Gracch. ⁸ Plut. l.c.

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tion seemed but the prelude to similar ingenious attempts to capture public favour at home : and their fears are said to have helped them to the decision to keep Orestes for a further year as proconsul in Sardinia.¹ It is possible that the resolution was partly due to military exigencies ; the fact that the troops were relieved was natural in consideration of the sufferings which they had undergone, but the retention of the general to complete a desultory campaign which chiefly demanded knowledge of the country, was a wise and not unusual proceeding. It was, however, an advantage that, as custom dictated, the quaestor must remain in the company of his commander. Gracchus's reappearance in Rome was postponed for a year. It was a slight grace, but much might happen in the time.

It was in this latter sense that the move was interpreted by the N(Uaestor. A trivial wrong inflamed the impetuous and resentful nature which expectation and entreaty had failed to move. Stung by the belief that he was the victim of a disgraceful subterfuge, Gracchus immediately took ship to Rome. His appearance in the capital was something of a shock even to his friends.² Public sentiment regarded a quaestor as holding an almost filial,relation to his superior; the ties produced by their joint activity were held to be indissoluble,³ and the voluntary departure of the subordinate was deemed a breach of official duty. Lapses in conduct on the part oi citizens engaged in the public service, which fell short of being criminal, might be visited with varying degrees of ignominy by the censorship: and it happened that this court of morals was now in existence in the persons of the censors Cn. Servilius Caepio and L. Cassius Longinus, who had entered office in the previous year. The censorian judgments, although arbitrary and as a rule spontaneous, were sometimes elicited by prosecution : and an accuser was found to bring the conduct of Gracchus formally before the notice of the magistrates. Had the review of the knights been in progress aftei his arrival, his case would have been heard during the performance of this ceremony; for he was as yet but a member of the equestrian

¹ Plut. l.c.

² Ibid, tthha. /col rots iro\\ois aK\6Korov i$6icei rb rafilav fivra TrpoavoffTTivai roi apxovros.

³ Cic. Div. in Caec. ig. 6i Sic enim a majoribus nostiis accepimus praetorem quaestori suo parentis loco esse oportere : nullam neque justiorem neque graviorem causam necessitudinis posse reperiri quam conjunctionem sortis, quam provinciae quam officii, quam publici muneris societatem.

124 B.C.] RETURN OF GRACCHUS

197

>rder, and the slightest disability pronounced against him, had he seen found guilty, would have assumed the form of the deprivation jf his public horse and his exclusion from bhe eighteen centuries. But it is possible that, at this stage of the history of the censorship, aenalties could be inflicted upon the members of all classes at any late preceding the lustral sacrifice, that the usual examination of the citizen body had been completed, and that Gracchus appeared alone before the tribunal of the censors. His defence became famous ;¹ its result is unknown. The trial probably ended in his acquittal,²dthough condemnation would have exercised little influence on his subsequent career, for the ignominy pronounced by the censors entailed no disability for holding a magistracy. But, whatever may have been the issue, Gracchus improved the occasion by an harangue to the people,³ in which he defended his conduct as one of their representatives in Sardinia. The speech was important for its caustic descriptions of the habits of the nobility when freed from the moral atmosphere of Rome. With extreme ingenuity he worked into the description of the habits of his own official life a scathing indictment, expressed in the frankest terms, of the self-seeking, the luxury, the unnatural vices, the rampant robbery of the average provincial despot. His auditors learnt the details of a commander's environment—the elaborate cooking apparatus, the throng of handsome favourites, the jars of wine which, when emptied, returned to Rome as receptacles of gold and silver mysteriously acquired. Gracchus must have delighted his audience with a subject on which the masses love to dwell, the vices of their superiors. The luridness of the picture must have given it a false appearance^ of universal truth. It seemed to be the indictment of a class, and suggested that the speaker stood aloof from his own order and looked only to the pure judgment of the people. His enemies tried a new device. They knew that one flaw in his armour was his sympathy with the claims of the allies. Conld he be compromised as an agent in that dark conspiracy which had prompted the impudent Italian claims and ended in open rebellion, his credit would be gone, even if his career

'A passage from Caius's speech "apudcensores" is quoted by Cicero Orat. 70.233.

² Plutarch says (C. Gracch. 2) that Caius airri<rdpevos \6yov oilra /iejiari\ae tos yv&nas rav aKovadvTav, u>s tWeAfleiV TjSucijcrflai to /ityurra S6£as. The passage seems to imply acquittal by the censors, although rav aKovadvrav suggests the larger audience. The arguments cited by Plutarch as developed by Caius appeared, or were repeated, in the speech that he subsequently made before the people.

³ Gell. xv. 12.

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were not closed by exile. He was accordingly threatened with a: impeachment for complicity in the movement which had issued i: the outbreak at Fregellae. It is uncertain whether he was forced t submit to the judgment of a court; but we are told that he dissi pated every suspicion, and surmounted the last and most dangerou of the obstacles with which his path was blocked.¹ Straightway b offered himself for the tribunate, and, as the day of the election ap proached, every effort was made by the nobility to secure his defeat Old differences were forgotten ; a common panic produced harmon amongst the cliques; it even seems as if his opponents agreed tha no man of extreme views should be advanced against him, for Grac chus in his tribunate had to contend with no such hostile colleagui as Octavius. The candidature of an extremist might mean vote for Gracchus: and it was preferable to concentrate support oi neutral men, or even on men of liberal views who were known to bi in favour with the crowd. The great clientele of the country dis tricts was doubtless beaten up ; and we know that, on the other side the hopes of the needy agriculturist, and the gratitude of the newh established peasant farmer, brought many a supporter to Gracchu from distant Italian homesteads. The city was so flooded by thi inrush of the country folk that many an elector found himself with out a roof to shelter him, and the place of voting could accommodab only a portion of the crowd. The rest climbed on roofs and tiles and filled the air with discordant party cries until space was givei for a descent to the voting enclosures. When the poll was declared it was found that the electoral manoeuvres of the nobility had beei so far successful that Gracchus occupied but the fourth place oi the list.² But, from the moment of his entrance on office, his pre dominance was assured. We hear nothing of the colleagues whon he overshadowed. Some may have been caught in the stream o Gracchus's eloquence; others have found it useless or dangerous ti oppose the enthusiasm which his proposals aroused, and the for midable combination which he created by the alluring prospect that he held out to the members of the equestrian order. Th collegiate character of the magistracy practically sank into abey ance, and his rule was that of a single man. First he gave vent t the passions of the mob by dwelling, as no one had yet dared to dc on the gloomy tragedy of his brother's fall and the cruel persecutio:

¹ Plut. C. Gracch. 3; [Victor] de Vir. III. 65.

^aPlut. l.c.

123 B.C.] TRIBUNATE OF GRACCHUS

199

which had followed the catastrophe. The blood of a murdered tribune was wholly unavenged in a state which had once waged war with Falerii to punish a mere insult to the holy office, and had condemned a citizen to death because he had not risen from his place while a tribune walked through the Forum. " Before your very eyes," he said, " they beat Tiberius to death with cudgels; they dragged his dead body from the Capitol through the midst of the city to cast it into the river; those of his friends whom they seized, they put to death untried. And yet think how your constitution guards the citizen's life! If a man is accused on a capital charge and does not immediately obey the summons, it is ordained that a trumpeter come at dawn before his door and summon him hy sound of trumpet; until this is done, no vote may be pronounced against him. So carefully and watchfully did our ancestors regulate the course of justice."¹ A cry for vengeance is here merged in a great constitutional principle ; and these utterances paved the way for the measure immediately formulated that no court should be established to try a citizen on a capital charge, unless such a court had received the sanction of the people.² The power of the Comitia to delegate its jurisdiction without appeal is here affirmed ; the right of the senate to institute an inquisition without appeal is here denied. The measure was a development of a suggestion which had been made by Tiberius Gracchus, who had himself probably called attention to the fact that the establishment of capital commissions by the senate was a violation of the principle of the provocation Caius Gracchus, however, did not attempt to ordain that an appeal should be possible from the judgment of the standing commissions (quaestiones perpetuae); for, though the initiative in the creation of these courts had been taken by the senate, they had long received the sanction of law, and their self-sufficiency was perhaps covered by the principle that the people, in creating a lommission, waived its own powers of final jurisdiction. But there were other technical as well as practical disadvantages in instituting an appeal from these commissions. The provocatio had always

¹ Plut. l.c.

²Cic. pro Rab. 4. 12 C. Gracchus legem tulit ne de capite civium Romanorum injussu vestro (sc. populi) judicaretur. Plut. C. Gracch. 4 (v6fwv eioicpepev) elf tis npX&v oKpnov ixKeKTipixot iro\lri\v, kut avTOv StSivra Kplatv Ttf Sii/up. Schol. Ambros. p. 370 Quia sententiam tulerat Gracchus, ut ne quis in civem Romanum capitalem sententiam diceret. Cic. in Cat. iv. 5. 10; in Verr. v. 63. 163. Cf. Cic. pro Sest. 28. 61; Dio Cass, xxxviii. 14.

³ P- 135

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[B.C. 12

been the challenge to the decision of a magistrate; but in thes standing courts the actions of the president and of the judices wh sat with him were practically indistinguishable, and the sentenc pronounced was in no sense a magisterial decision. The courts hai also been instituted to avoid the clumsiness of popular jurisdiction but this clumsiness would be restored, if their decision was to b shaken by a further appeal to the Comitia. Gracchus, in fact, whei he proposed this law, was not thinking of the ordinary course o jurisdiction at all. He had before his mind the summary measure by which the senate took on itself to visit such epidemics of crimi as were held to be beyond the strength of the regular courts, an< more especially the manner in which this body had lately deal with alleged cases of sedition or treason. The investigation di rected against the supporters of his brother was the crucial instano which he brought before the people, and it is possible that, at i still later date, the inquiry which followed the fall of Fregellae ha< been instituted on the sole authority of the senate and had founi a certain number of victims in the citizen body. Practically, there fore, Gracchus in this law wholly denied, either as the result o experience or by anticipation, the legality of the summary jurisdic tion which followed a declaration of martial law.

In the creation of these extraordinary commissions the senab never took upon itself the office of judge, nor was the commissioi itself composed of senators appointed by the house. The j urisdic tion was exercised by a > magistrate at the bidding of the senate and the court thus constituted selected its assessors, who formed f mere council for advice, at its own discretion. It was plain that, i the law was to be effective, its chief sanction must be directed, nol against the corporation which appointed, but against the judge The responsibility of the individual is the easiest to secure, anc no precautions against martial law can be effective if a divisior of authority, or even obedience to authority, is once admitted Gracchus, therefore, pronounced that criminal proceedings shoulc be possible against the magistrate who had exercised the jurisdic tion now pronounced illegal.¹ The common law of Rome wenl even further, and pronounced every individual responsible for illega acts done at the bidding of a magistrate. The crime which th< magistrate had committed by the exercise of this forbidden juris

¹ Plut. C. Gracch. 4, quoted p. igg, note 2.

123B.C] LAW AGAINST SENATORIAL COMMISSIONS 201

diction was probably declared to be treason : and, as there was no standing court at Rome which took cognisance of this offence, the jurisdiction of the Comitia was ordained. The penalty for the crime was doubtless a capital one, and by ancient prescription such a punishment necessitated a trial before the Assembly of the Centuries. It is, however, possible that Gracchus rendered the plebeian assembly of the Tribes competent to pronounce the capital sentence against the magistrate who had violated the prescriptions of his law. But, although the magistrate was the chief, he appears not to have been the sole offender under the provisions of this bill. In spite of the fact that the senate as a whole was incapable of being punished for the advice which had prompted the magistrate to an illegal course of action, it seems that the individual senator who moved, or perhaps supported, the decree which led to the forbidden jurisdiction, was made liable to the penalties of the law.¹The operation of the enactment was made retrospective, or was perhaps conceived by its very nature to cover the past abuses which had called it into being ; for in a sense it created no new crime, but simply restated the principle of the appeal in a form suited to the proceedings against which it wished to guard. It might have been argued that customary law protected the consul who directed the proceedings of the court which doomed the supporters of Tiberius Gracchus; but the argument, if used, was of no avail. Popillius was to be the witness to all men of the reality of this reassertion of the palladium of Roman liberty. An impeachment was framed against him, and either before or after his withdrawal from Rome, Caius Gracchus himself formulated and carried through the Plebs the bill of interdiction which doomed him to exile.² It was in vain that Popillius's young sons and numerous relatives besought the people for mercy.³ The memory of the outrage was too recent, the joyful sense of the power of retaliation too novel and too strong.

¹Schol. Ambros. p. 370 (quoted p. igq, note 2). Cf. Cic. pro Sest. 28. 61 Consule me, cum esset designatus (Cato) tribunus plebis (63 b.c), obtulit in dis-crimen vitam suam : dixit earn sententiam cujus invidiam capitis periculo sibi prae-standam videbat. Dio Cass, xxxviii. 14.

² Cic. pro Domo 31. 82 Ubi enim tuleras ut mihi aqua et igni interdiceretur ? quod C. Gracchus de P. Popilio . . . tulit. de Leg. iii. 11. 26 Si nos multitudinis furentis inflammata invidia pepulisset tribuniciaque vis in me populum, sicut Gracchus in Laenatem . . . incitasset, ferremus. Cf. pro Cluent. 35. 95 ; de Rep. i. 3. 6. For the speeches of Caius Gracchus on Popillius see Gell. i. 7. 7 ; xi. 13. 1.5.

³ Cic. post Red. in Sen. 15. 37 Pro me non ut pro P. Popilio, nobilissimo homine, adulescentes filii, non propinquorum multitudo populum Romanum est deprecata.

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[B.C. 123

All that was possible was a counter demonstration which should emphasise the sympathy of loyalists with the illustrious victim, and Popillius was escorted to the gates by a weeping crowd.¹ We know that condemnation also overtook his colleague Rupilius,² and it is probable that he too fell a victim to the sense of vengeance or of justice aroused by the Gracchan law.

A less justifiable spirit of retaliation is exhibited by another enactment with which Gracchus inaugurated his tribunate, although in this, as in all his other acts, the blow levelled at his enemies was not devoid of a deep political significance. He introduced a proposal that a magistrate who had been deposed by the people should not be allowed to hold any further office.³ Octavius was the obvious victim, and the mere personal significance of the measure does not necessarily imply that Gracchus was burning with resentment against a man, whose opposition to his brother had rapidly been forgotten in the degradation which he had experienced at that brother's hands. Hatred to the injured may be a sentiment natural to the wrongdoer, but is not likely to be imparted even to the most ardent supporter of the author of the mischief. It were better to forget Octavius, if Octavius would allow himself to be forgotten ; but the sturdy champion of the senate, still in the middle of his career, may have been a future danger and a present eyesore to the people : Gracchus's invectives probably carried him and his auditors further than he intended, and the rehabilitation of his brother's tribunate in its integrity may have seemed to demand this strong assertion of the justice of his act. But the legality of deposition by the people was a still more important point. Merely to assert it would be to imply that Tiberius had been wrong. How could it be more emphatically proclaimed than by making its consequences perpetual and giving it a kind of penal character ? But the personal aspect of the measure proved too invidious even for its pro-

¹ Diod. xxxv. 26 i TloirlWios fiera Saxpvav tmb rav 6%Aav irpoeTreLupSri 4K$a\A6pevos Ik rrjs Tr6\eas. Cf. Plut. C. Gracch. 4.

"Vellei. ii. 7 Rupilium Popiliumque, qui consules asperrime in Tiberii Gracchi amicos saevierant, postea judiciorum publicorum merito oppressit invidia. It is a little difficult to harmonise Fannius's account of Rupilius's death (ap. Cic. Tusc. iv. 17. 40) with this condemnation. Here Rupilius is said to have died of grief at his brother's failure to obtain the consulship, and this failure happened before Scipio's death (Cic. de Am. 20. 73). But his brother may have continued his unsuccessful efforts up to the time of Rupilius's condemnation.

³ Plut. C. Gracch. 4 (vS/iov) elcr4<pepe . . . et nvos tcp_Xovroi oe/)?/p7)TO r%v 4pxV ^ Srj/xos, ovk 4avra rodra Sevrepas apxys fierovcrlav eJvai. Cf. Diod. xxxv. 25. Magistrates who had been deposed, or compelled to abdicate, were known as abacti (Festui p. 23 Abacti magistratus dicebantur, qui coacti deposuerant imperium).

123 B.C.] SOCIAL LEGISLATION

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poser. A voice that commanded his respect was raised against it: and Gracchus in withdrawing the bill confessed that Octavius was spared through the intercession of Cornelia.¹

So far his legislation had but given an outlet to the justifiable resentment of the people, and a guarantee for the security of their most primitive rights. This was to be followed by an appeal to their interests and a measure for securing their permanent comfort. The wonderful solidarity of Gracchus and his supporters, the crowning triumph of the demagogue which is to make each man feel that he is an agent in his own salvation, have been traced to this constructive legislation for the benefit of classes, which ancient authors, writing under aristocratic prepossessions, have described by the ugly name of bribery.² The poor of Rome, if we include in this designation those who lived on the margin as well as those who were sunk in the depths of destitution, probably included the majority of the inhabitants of the town. The city had practically no organised industries. The retail trader and the purveyor of luxuries doubtless flourished ; but, in the scanty manufactures which the capital still provided, the army of free labour must have been always worsted by the cruel competition of the cheaper and more skilful slave or freedman. But the poor of Rome did not form the cowed and shivering class that are seen on the streets of a northern capital. They were the merry and vivacious lazzaroni of the pavement and the portico, composite products of many climes, with all the lively endurance of the southerner and intellects sharpened by the ingenious devices requisite for procuring the minimum sustenance of life. Could they secure this by the desultory labour which alone was provided by the economic conditions of Rome, their lot was far from unhappy. As in most ancient civilisations, the poor were better provided with the amenities than with the bare necessities of existence. Although the vast provision for the pleasures of the people, by which the Caesars maintained their popularity, was yet lacking, and even the erection of a permanent theatre was frowned on by the senate,³ yet

¹ Plut. I.e.

² Diod. xxxv. 25 d Tpdicxos Sfiixriyop^ffas ictpl tov KaTdkvffai apiffTOtcpctTiap, SrifioKpariap !>e ffvffTriffai, «al €<piK6ftevos Tyjs hnrdpTup evxpriffTias t&v Liepav, ovtceri a-vvaytapttrras aWct Kaddtrep avdepras eJx^€ tovtovs virep ttjs iSZay t6\litjs. SeSeKaff/xevos ydp etcaffTos tolls iBiais iAiciffip us virep IBitop dyaBwp tG)V eiff<pepofi€p(op v6fiuy ctoi/ios %p irdpTa tciptivpop vKOLtepcip.

³ Liv. Ep. xlviii (155 b.c.) Cum locatum a censorious theatrum exstrueretur; P. Cornelio Nasica auctore, tanquam inutile et nociturum publicis moribus, ex senatus consulto destructum est, populusque aliquamdiu stans ludos spectavit.

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the capital provided endless excitement for the leisured mind and the observant eye. It was for their benefit that the gladiatorial show was provided by the rich, and the gorgeous triumph by the State ; but it was the antics of the nobility in the law courts and at the hustings that afforded the more constant and pleasing spectacle. Attendance at the Contiones and the Comitia not only delighted the eye and ear, but filled the heart with pride, and sometimes the purse with money. For here the units, inconsiderable in themselves, had become a collective power; they could shout down the most dignified of the senators, exalt the favourite of the moment, reward a service or revenge a slight in the perfect security given by the secrecy of the ballot. Large numbers of the poorer class were attached to the great houses by ancestral ties; for the descendants of freedmen, although they could make no legal claim on the house which represented the patron of their ancestors, were too valuable as voting units to be neglected by its representatives, even when the sense of the obligations of wealth, which was one of the best features of Roman civilisation, failed to provide an occasional alleviation for the misery of dependants. From a political point of view, this dependence was utterly demoralising ; for it made the recipients of benefits either blind supporters of, or traitors to, the personal cause which they professed. It was on the whole preferable that, if patronage was essential, the State should take over this duty; the large body of the unattached proletariate would be placed on a level with their more fortunate brethren, and the latter would be freed from a dependence which merely served private and selfish interests. A semi-destitute proletariate can only be dealt with in three ways. They may be forced to work, encouraged to ^emigrate, or partially supported by the State. The first device was impossible, for it was not a submerged fraction with which Rome had to deal, but the better part of the resident sovereign body; the second, although discredited by the senate, had been tried in one form by Tiberius Gracchus and was to be attempted in another shape by Caius; but it is a remedy that can never be perfect, for it does not touch the class, more highly strung, more intelligent, and at the same time more capable of degradation, which the luxury of the capital enthrals. The last device had not yet been attempted. It remained for Gracchus to try it. We have no analysis of his motives; but many provocatives to his modest attempt at state socialism may be suggested. There was first the

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Hellenic ideal of the leisured and independent citizen, as exemplified by the state payments and the " distributions " which the great leaders of the old world had thought necessary for the fulfilment of democracy. There was secondly the very obvious fact that the government was reaping a golden harvest from the provinces and merely scattering a few stray grains amongst its subjects. There was thirdly the consideration that much had been done for the landed class and nothing for the city proletariate. Other considerations of a more immediate and economic character were doubtless present. The area of corn production was now small. Sicily was still perhaps beggared by its servile war, and the granary of Rome was practically to be found in Africa. The import of corn from this quarter, dependent as it was on the weather and controlled purely by considerations of the money-market, was probably fitful, and the price must have been subject to great variations. But, at this particular time, the supply must have been diminished to an alarming extent, and the price proportionately raised, by the swarm of locusts which had lately made havoc of the crops of Africa.¹ Lastly, the purely personal advantage of securing a subsidised class for the political support of the demagogue of the moment—a consideration which is but a baser interpretation of the Hellenic ideal—must have appealed to the practical politician in Gracchus as the more impersonal view appealed to the^-statesman. He would secure a permanent and stable constituency, and guard against the danger, which had proved fatal to his brother, of the absence from Rome of the majority of his supporters at some critical moment.

From the imperfect records of Gracchus's proposal we gather that a certain amount of corn was to be sold monthly at a reduced price to any citizen who offered himself as a purchaser.² The rate was fixed at asses the modius, which is calculated to have been about half the market-price.³ The monthly distribution would

¹ Liv. Ep. Ix.; Oros. v. n ; Nitzsch Die Gracchen p. 393.

² Plut. C. Gracch. 5 d Se ffiTikbs (v6/ios) eirevutvifav tols Trivt\(Xi t\v wyophv. App. Bell. Civ. i. 21 ffiTvp^ffiov efiuyvov bptffas e/caVTCji rS>v S-q^orav anrb ray koivwv XpTlpoWuv, oi itpoWepov elaSbs SioSiSotrfloi. Vellei. ii. 6 Frumentum plebi dari insti-tuerat. Liv. Ep. Ix Leges tulit, inter quas frumentariam, ut senis et triente frumentum plebi daretur. Schol. Bob. p. 303 Ut senis aeris et trientibus modios singulos populus acciperet. Cf. Mommsen Die rbmischen Tribus pp. 179 and 182.

³ Mommsen [Hist, of Rome bk. iv. c. 3) considers it rather less than half. The average market-price of the modius is difficult to fix. A low price seems to have been about 12 asses the modius. See Smith and Wilkins in Smith Diet, of

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practically have excluded all but the urban proletariate, and would thus have both limited the operation of the relief to the poor of the city and invited an increase in its numbers. But the details of the measure, which would be decisive as to its economic character, are unknown to us. We are not told what proportion the monthly quantity of grain sold at this cheap rate bore to the total amount required for the support of a family; whether the relief was granted only to the head of a house or also to his adult sons; whether any one who claimed the rights of citizenship could appear at the monthly sale, or only those who had registered their names at some given time. The fact of registration, if it existed, might have been regarded as a stigma and might thus have limited the number of recipients. Some of the economic objections to his scheme were not unknown to Gracchus; indeed they were pressed home vigorously by his opponents. It was pointed out that he was enervating the labourer and exhausting the treasury. The validity of the first objection depends to a large extent on the unknown "data" which we have just mentioned. Gracchus may have maintained that a greater standard of comfort would be secured for the same amount of work. The second objection he was so far from admitting that he asserted that his proposal would really lighten the burdens of the Aerarium.¹ He may have taken the view that a moderate, steady and calculable loss on corn purchased in large quantities, and therefore presumably at a reduced price, would be cheaper in the end than the cost entailed by the spasmodic attempts which the State had to make in times of crisis to put grain upon the market;² and there may have been some truth in the idea that, when the State became for the first time a steady purchaser, competition between the publicans of Sicily or the proprietors of Africa might greatly reduce the normal market price. He does not seem to have been disturbed by the consideration that the sale of corn below the market price at Rome was hardly the best way of helping the Italian farmer. The State would certainly buy in the cheapest market, and this was not to be found in Italy. But it is probable that under no circumstances could Rome have become the usual

Anliq. i. p. 877. For occasional sales below the market-price at an earlier period see Phn.H. ,N. xvm. 3. 17 M. Varro auctor est, cum L. Metellus (cos. 251 b.c.) in tnumpho plunmos duxit elephantos, assibus singulis farris modios fuisse.

iCic. Tusc. Disp. iii. 20. 48 C Gracchus, cum largitiones maximas fecisset et ettudisset aerarium, verbis tamen defendebat aerarium. ' P. 72.

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market for the produce of the recently established proprietors, and that, except at times of unusual scarcity in the transmarine provinces, imported corn could always have undersold that which was grown in Italy. Under the new system the Italian husbandman would find a purchaser in the State, if Sicily and Africa were visited by some injury to their crops. A vulnerable point in the Gracchan system of sale was exhibited in the fact that no inquiry was instituted as to the means of the applicants. This blemish was vigorously brought home to the legislator when the aged noble, Calpurnius Piso surnamed "the Frugal," the author of the first law that gave redress to the provincials, and a vigorous opponent of Gracchus's scheme, gravely advanced on the occasion of the first distribution and demanded his appropriate sharer¹ The object lesson would be wasted on those who hold that the honourable acceptance of relief implies the universality of the gift: that the restraining influences, if they exist, should be moral and not the result of inquisition. But neither the possibility nor the necessity of discrimination would probably have been allowed by Gracchus. It would have been resented by the people, and did not appeal to the statesmanship, widely spread in the Greek and not unknown in the Roman world, which regarded it as one of the duties of a State to provide cheap food for its citizens. The lamentations of a later day over a pauperised proletariate and an exhausted treasury²cannot strictly be laid to the account of the original scheme, except in so far as it served as a precedent; they were the consequence of the action of later demagogues who, instructed by Gracchus as to the mode in which an easy popularity might be secured, introduced laws which sanctioned an almost gratuitous distribution of grain. The Gracchan law contained a provision for the building of additional store-houses for the accumulation of the great reserve of corn, which was demanded by the new system of regular public sales, and the Sempronian granaries thus created remained as a witness of the originality and completeness of the tribune's work.³

¹ Cic. Tusc. Disp. iii. 20. 48.

² Cic. de Off. ii. 21. 72 C. Gracchi frumentaria magna largitio; exhauriebat igitur aerarium: pro Sest. 48. 103 Frumentariam legem C. Gracchus ferebat. Jucunda res plebei; victus enim suppeditabatur large sine labore. Cf. Brut. 62. 222. Diod. xxxv. 25 to Koivbv rafiieiov els aio~xpas Kal aKalpovs dairdvas Kal ^apiTas avaKlffKcov sis tavrbv irdpras cnroBAe-nety eiroiriffe. Cf. Oros. v. 12.

³ Plut. C. Gracch. 6 iypatye Se Kal . . . xaTotr/ceuafetrflai <riToB6Kia. Festus p. 2go Sempronia horrea qui locus dicitur, in eo fuerunt lege Gracchi, ad custodiam frumenti publici.

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The Roman citizen was still frequently summoned from h work, or roused from his lethargy, by the call of military service and the practice of the conscription fostered a series of grievance one of which had already attracted the attention of Tiberii Gracchus.¹ Caius was bound to deal with the question : and th two provisions of his enactment which are known to us, show spirit of moderation which neither justifies the belief that th demagogue was playing to the army, nor accredits the view that h: interference relaxed the bonds of discipline amongst the legions The most scandalous anomaly in the Roman army-system was th miserable pittance earned by the conscript when the legal deduc tions had been made from his nominal rate of pay. His daily wag was but one-third of the denarius, or five and one-third asses a daj as it had remained unaltered from the times of the Second Puni War, in spite of the fact that the conditions of service were noi wholly different and that garrison duty in the provinces for Ion, periods of years had replaced the temporary call-to-arms which th average Italian campaign alone demanded; and from this quot was deducted the cost of the clothing which he wore and, as ther is every reason to believe, of the whole of the rations which he con sumed. We should have expected a radical reformer to have raisei his pay or at least to have given him free food. But Gracchus con tented himself with enacting that the soldier's clothing should b given him free of charge by the State.³ Another military abus was due to the difficulty which commanders experienced in findinj efficient recruits. The young and adventurous supplied better am more willing material than those already habituated to the careles life of the streets, or already engaged in some settled occupation and, although it is scarcely credible that boys under the age o eighteen were forced to enlist, they were certainly permitted an< perhaps encouraged to join the ranks. The law of Gracchus for bade the enlistment of a recruit at an age earlier than the completioi of the seventeenth year.* These military measures, slight in them selves, were of importance as marking the beginning of the move

¹ P- 135² This view is represented in a criticism preserved by Diodorus xxxv. 25 to!

CTiicLTtctjTctis Sta. tSv vdnusv to. Tijs c\p_Xalas oyay^s abar-ripa Karaxapiadnevos aireiBla

Kal avap_X<av ela^yayev els t)}v troMrelav.

³ Plut. C. Gracch. 5 A Se ffrpaTiuriKbs (v6/ios) eVfljjTd' re Ke\eiav Sriiuxrla x»P1

yeiffdai Kal fjuitiev eis tovto tt)s fxio-ffotpopas vtpaipetffOai tSsv aTparevofiivoiv. ¹ Kal veurepov 4tuv eirraKalSeKa u)] KaTaKeyetrQai ffrpaTiwT-qv (Plut. I.e.).

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ment by which the whole question of army reform, utterly neglected by the government, was taken up and carried out by independent representatives of the people. But a Roman army was to a large extent the creation of the executive power; and it required a military commander, not a tribune, to produce the radical alterations which alone could make the mighty instrument, which had won the empire, capable of defending it.

The last boon of Gracchus to the citizen body as a whole was a new agrarian law.¹ The necessity of such a measure was chiefly due to the suspension of the work of the agrarian commission, which had proved an obstacle to the continued execution of his brother's scheme;² and there is every reason for believing that the new Sempronian law restored their judicial powers to the commissioners. But experience may have shown that the substance of Tiberius's enactment required to be supplemented or modified; and Caius adopted the procedure usually followed by a Roman legislator when he renewed a measure which had already been in operation. His law was not a brief series of amendments, but a comprehensive statute, so completely covering the ground of the earlier Sempronian law that later legislation cites the law of Caius, and not that of Tiberius Gracchus, as the authority for the regulations which had revolutionised the tenure of the public land.³ The new provisions seem to have dealt with details rather than with principles, and there is no indication that they aimed at the acquisition of territory which had been exempted from the operation of the previous measure, or even touched the hazardous question of the rights of Rome to the land claimed by the Italian allies. We cannot attempt to define the extent to which the executive power granted by the new agrarian law was either necessary or effective. Certainly the returns of the census during the next ten years show no increase in the number of registered citizens;⁴ but this circumstance may be due to the steps which were soon to be taken by the opponents of the Gracchi to nullify the results of their legislation.

¹ Plut. l.c. twv Se v6liwv . . . 6 fxev Jjv KKypovxiitbs afxa repay rots irevtiffi t)\v S^iutalav. Liv. Ep. Ix Tulit . . . legem agrariam, quam et frater ejus tulerat. Vellei. ii. 6 (C. Gracchus) dividebat agros, vetabat quemquam civem plus quingentis jugeribus habere, quod aliquando lege Licinia cautum erat. Cf. Cic. de Leg. Agr. i. 7. 21; ii. 5. 10; Oros. v. 12; Florus ii. 3 (iii. 15).

² P. 158.

³Lex Agraria (C. I. L. i. n. 200; Bruns Fontes 1. 3. n) 1. 6. See p. 113, note 2. ⁴ In 125 b.c. the census had been 394,726 (Liv. Ep. Ix), in 115 it was 394,336 (Liv. Ep. lxiii). See de Boor Fasti Censorii. 14

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It is possible, however, that the new corn law may have somewhat damped the ardour of the proletariate for a life of agriculture which would have deprived them of its benefits.

The first tribunate of Caius Gracchus doubtless witnessed the completion of these four acts of legislation, by which the debt to his supporters was lavishly paid and their aid was enlisted for causes which could only indirectly be interpreted as their own. But this year probably witnessed as well the promulgation oi the enactments which were to find their fulfilment in a second tribunate.¹ Foremost amongst these was one which dealt with the tenure of the judicial power as exercised, not by the magistrate, but by the panels of jurors who were interpreters both of law and fact on the standing commissions which had recently been created by statute. The interest of the masses in this question was remote, A permanent murder court seems indeed to have had its place amongst the commissions; but, even though the corruption of its president had on one occasion been clearly proved,² it is not likely that senatorial judges would have troubled to expose themselves to undue influences when pronouncing on the caput of a citizen of the lower class. The fact that this justice was administered by the nobility may have excited a certain degree of popular interest; but the question of the transference of the courts from the hands of the senatorial judices would probably never have been heard of, had not the largest item in this judicial competence had a decisively political bearing. The Roman State had been as unsuccessful as others of the ancient world in keeping its j udicial machinery free from the taint of party influences. It had been accounted one of the surest signs of popular sovereignty that the people alone could give judgment on the gravest crimes and pronounce the capital penalty,' and recent political thought had perhaps wholly adapted itself tc the Hellenic view that the government of a state must be swayed by the body of men that enforces criminal responsibility in political matters. This vital power was still retained by the Comitit when criminal justice was concerned with those elemental fact! which are the condition of the existence of a state. The people still took cognisance of treason in all its degrees—a conceptioi which to the Roman mind embraced almost every possible form o:

¹ Herzog Staatsverf. i. p. 466.

² In 142 b.c. (Cic. de Fin. ii. 16. 54). ⁸ Polyb. vi. 14 (quoted p. 105.).

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official maladministration—and the gloomy record of trials before the Comitia, from this time onward to the close of the Republic, shows that the weapon was exercised as the most forcible implement of political chastisement. But chance had lately presented the opportunity of making the interesting experiment of assimilating criminal jurisdiction in some of its branches to that of the civil courts. The president and jurors of one of the newly established quaestiones formed as isolated a group as the judex of civil j ustice with his assessors, or the greater panels of Centumvirs and Decemvirs. They possessed no authority but that of jurisdiction within their special department; there seemed no reason why they should be influenced by considerations arising from issues whether legislative or administrative. But this appearance of detachment was wholly illusory, and the well-intentioned experiment was as vain as that of Solon, when he carefully separated the administrative and j udicial boards in the Athenian commonwealth and composed both bodies of practically identical individuals. The new court for the trial of extortion, constituted by the Calpumian and renewed later by a Jumah law, was controlled by a detachment of the governing body which saw in each impeachment a libel on its own system of administration, and in each condemnation a new precedent for hampering the uncontrolled power exercised in the past or coveted for the future by the individual juror. This class spirit may have been more powerful^than_Jjribery in jts productiqn_of suspicious acquittals ; and the fact that prosecution was frankly recognised as the commonest of party weapons, and that speeches for the prosecution and defence teemed with irrelevant political allusions, reduced the question of the guilt of the accused to subordinate proportions in the eyes of all the participants in this judicial warfare. Charges of corruption were so recklessly hurled at Rome that we can seldom estimate their validity ; but the strong suspicion of bribery is almost as bad for a government as the proved offence ; and it was certain that senatorial judges did not yield to the evidence which would have supplied conviction to the ordinary man. Some recent acquittals furnished an excellent text to the reformer. L. Aurelius Cotta had emerged successfully from a trial, which had been a mere duel between Scipio Aemilianus for the prosecution and Metellus Macedonicus for the defence. The judges had shown their resentment of Scipio's influence by acquitting Cotta ; and few of the spectators of the struggle seem even to have

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pretended to believe in the innocence of the accused.¹ The whole settlement of Asia had been so tainted with the suspicion oi pecuniary influences that, when Manius Aquillius successfully ran the gauntlet of the courts,² it was difficult to believe that the treasures of the East had not co-operated towards the result, especially as the senate itself by no means favoured some of the features of Aquillius's organisation of the province. The legates of some of the plundered dependencies were still in 'Rome, bemoaning the verdict and appealing for sympathy with their helpless fellow subjects.³ Circumstances favoured the reformer ; it was possible to bring a definite case and to produce actual sufferers before the people ; while the senate, perhaps in consequence of the attitude of some honest dissentients, was unable to make any effectual resistance to the scandal and its consequences.

Had Gracchus thought of restoring this jurisdiction to the Comitia, he would have taken a step which had the theoretical justification that, of all the powers at Rome, the people was the one which had least interest in provincial misgovernment. But it would have been a retrograde movement from the point of view of procedure ; it would not necessarily have abolished senatorial influence, and it would not have attained his object of holding the government permanently in check by the political recognition of a class which rivalled the senate in the definiteness of its organisation and surpassed it in the homogeneity of its interests. The body of capitalists who had assumed the titular designation of knights, had long been chafing at the complete subjection of their commercial interests to the caprice of the provincial governor and the arbitrary dispositions of the home government. Tiberius Gracchus, when he revealed the way to the promised land,⁴ had probably reflected rather than suggested the ambition of the great business men to have a more definite place in the administration assigned them. His appeal had come too late, or seemed too hopeless of success, to win their support for a reformer who had outraged their feelings as capitalists; but since his death ten years for reflection had elapsed,

¹ Cic. pro Mur. 28. 58; pro Font. 13.38; Brut. 21.81; Div. in Caec. 21. 6g; Tac. Ann. iii. 66. Valerius Maximus (viii. 1. 11) can scarcely be correct in saying that the trial took place apud populum. It seems to have been a trial for extortion.

"App. Bell. Civ. i. 22. Cf. Cic. Div. in Caec. 21. 69 [Ascon.] in loc; App. Mithr. 57.

³ App. Bell. Civ. i. 22 ot re irpeV/Beir 01 kot' airav In TmpoVrej <rbv <p<)6v<p touto Trtpu6vTts iKeKpdyeo'ay. ⁴P- 135.

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and they were years which witnessed a vast extension of their potential activity, and aroused an agonised feeling of helplessness at the subordinate part which they played both to senate and people when the disposal of kingdoms was in question. The suggestions for giving them a share in the control of the provincial world may have been numerous, and their variety is reflected in the different plans which Caius Gracchus himself advanced. The system at which his brother had hinted was that of a joint board composed of the existing senators with the addition of an equal number of equites;¹ and we have already suggested the possibility that this House of Six Hundred was intended to be the senate of the future, efficient for all purposes and not exclusively devoted to the work of criminal jurisdiction. The same significance may attach to the scheme, which seems to have been propounded by Caius Gracchus during, or perhaps even before, his first tenure of the tribunate, and appears at intervals in proposals made by reformers down to the time of Sulla. Gracchus is said to have suggested the increase of the senate by the addition of three, or, as one authority states, six hundred members of the equestrian order.² The proposal, if it was one for an enlarged senate, and not for a joint panel of judices, in which a changing body of equites would act as a check on the permanent senatorial jurors, must soon have been seen to be utterly unsuited to its purpose. It is a scheme characteristic of the aristocrat who is posing as a friend of the mercantile class and hopes to deceive the vigilance of that keen-sighted fraternity. To give the senate a permanent infusion of new blood would be simply to strengthen its authority, while_completely cutting away thejmks which bound the new membersto their^riglnal class! Even the swamping of the existing body by a two-thirds majority of new members would have been transitory in its effects. The new member of the Curia would soon have shed his old equestrian views and assumed the outlook of his older peers. It might indeed have been possible to devise a system by which the senate would, at the recurring intervals of the lustra, have been filled up in equal proportions

^1Kl35-

² Plut. C. Gracch. 5 6 5e Suaurrucbs (vinos) to irXeiarov cnreKotf/e rris t&v vvyKAtiriKSiv Swdjiea/s . . . 6 5e TptaKotrlovs ru>v lirirecoy 7rpotr«aTeAe|ev auTO?s oZtrt Tpuwocriois Ka\ tc\s Kptffets Koiyhs rav e|turocriW eVofojcre. Cf. Compar. 2. Liv. Ep. Ix rertiam (legem tulit) qua equestrem ordinem, tunc cum senatu consentientem, corrumperet: " ut sexcenti ex equitibus in curiam sublegerentur: et quia illis tem-poribus trecenti tantum senatores erant, sexcenti equites trecentis senatoribus admiscerentur ": id est, ut equester ordo bis tantum virium in senatu haberet,

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from ex-magistrates and knights: and in this way a constant supply of middle-class sentiment might have been furnished to the governing body. But even this scheme would have secured to the elected a life-long tenure of power, and this was a fatal obstacle both to the intentions of the reformer and the aspirations of the equestrian order. While the former desired a balance of power, the latter wished that the interests of their class should be enforced by its genuine representatives. Both knew that a participation in the executive power was immaterial, and that all that was needed might be gained by the possession of judicial authority alone. Gracchus's final decision, therefore, was to create a wholly new panel of indices which should be made up exclusively from the members of the titular class of knights.¹

It was not necessary or desirable that the judiciary law should make any mention of a class, or employ the courtesy title of equites to designate the new judges. The effect might be less invidiously secured by demanding qualifications which were practically identical with the social conditions requisite for the possession of titular knighthood. One of the determining factors was a property qualification, and this was possibly placed at the modest total of four hundred thousand sesterces.² This was the amount of capital which seems at this period to have given its possessor the right of serving on horseback in the army and therefore the claim to the title of eques, but it was a sum that did not convey alarming suggestions of government by millionaires, but rather pointed to the upper

¹ Vellei. ii. 6 C. Gracchus . . . judicia a senatu transferebat ad equites. (Cf. ^a- ^T3i 3²)- Tac. Ann. xii. 6o Cum Semproniis rogationibus equester ordo in possessione judiciorum locaretur. Plin. H. N. xxxiii. 34 Judicum autem ap-pellatione separare eum (equestrem) ordinem primi omnium instituere Gracchi, discordi popularitate in contumeliam senatus. Cf. Diod. xxxv. 25 ; xxxvii. g ; App. Bell. Civ. 1. 22.

² The qualifications of the Gracchan jurors were probably identical with those required for jurors under the extant lex Repetundarum (C. I. L. i. n. 198; Bruns Fontes i. 3. 10) which is probably the lex Acilia (Cic. in Verr. Act. i. 17. 51; cf Mommsen in C. I. L. I.e.). The conditions fixed by this law are as follows (11. 12, 13):—Praetor quei inter peregrinos jous deicet, is in diebus x proxumeis, quibus h. 1. populus plebesve jouserit, facito utei CDL viros Iegat, quei in hac civit[ate . . . dum nei quem eorum legat, quei tr. pi., q., iii vir cap., tr. mil. 1. iv primis aliqua earum, iii vi]rum a. d. a. siet fueri[tve, queive mercede conductus depug-navit depugnaverit, queive quaestione joudicioque puplico condejmnatus siet quoc circa eum in senatum legei non liceat, queive minor anneis xxx majorve annos I> gnatus siet, queive in urbem Romam propiusve u[rbem Romam passus M domiciliuir non habeat, queive ejus magistratus, quei supra scriptus est, pater frater filiusve siet, queive ejus, quei in senatu siet fueritve, pater frater filiusve siet, queive trani marje erit. (Cf. 11. 16, 17). Unfortunately the main qualification for the jurors which was stated after the words " in hac civitate," has been lost.

123 B.C.]

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215

middle class as the fittest depositaries of judicial power. Not only were magistrates and ex-magistrates excluded from the Bench, but the disqualification extended to the fathers, brothers and sons of magistrates and of past or present senators. The ostensible purpose of these provisions was doubtless to ensure that the selected jurors should be bound by no tie of kindred to the individuals who would appear before their judgment seat; but they must have had the effect of excluding from the new panel many of the true knights belonging to the eighteen centuries; for this select corps was largely composed of members of the noble families. A similar effect would have been produced by the age qualification. The Gracchan jurors were to be over thirty and under sixty, while a large number of the military equites were under the former limit of age, in consequence of the practice of retiring from the corps after the attainment of the quaestorship or selection into the senate. The aristocratic element in the equestrian order, if this latter expression be used in its widest sense to include both the military and civilian knights, was thus rigorously excluded: and there remained but the men whose business interests were in no way complicated by respect for senatorial traditions. The official list of the new jurors (album judicum) was probably to be made out annually; and there is every reason to suppose that there was a considerable change of personnel at each revision, since one of the conditions of membership of the panel—residence within a mile of Rome—could hardly have been observed by business men with world-wide interests for any extended period. The conception which still prevailed that judicial service was a burden (munus), would alone have led the revising authority to free past jurors from the service: and the practice must have been welcome to the capitalists themselves, many of whom may well have desired the share of power and perhaps of profit which jurisdiction over their superiors conferred. We are told that the selection of the first panel was entrusted to the legislator himself;¹ for the future the Foreign Praetor was to draw up the annual list of four hundred and fifty who were qualified to hear cases of extortion.² It is not known whether this was the full num-

¹ Plut. C. Gracch. 6 KctKelvu robs Kpivovvrtts e/c tuv lirniutv iBuKev (b Byfios) KaraAefat.

² The lex Acilia says "within ten days of its becoming law" (p. 214, note 2). If Plutarch (l.c.) is right about Gracchus selecting the original judices, the provision of this lex shows that it cannot be, as some have thought, the law which first created the Gracchan jurors. It must have been passed subsequently to Gracchus's own lex judiciaria.

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[JJ.Vy. 1X0

ber of the new jurors, or whether there were additional members selected by a different authority for the trial of other offences. It is not probable that the judiciary law of Gracchus imposed the new class of judices directly on the civil courts. The judex of private law still retained his character of an arbitrator appointed by the consent of the parties, and it would have been improper to restrict this choice to a class defined by statute. But the practical monopoly of jurisdiction in important cases, which senators seem to have acquired, was henceforth broken through, and the judex in civil suits was sometimes taken from the equestrian order.¹

The superficial aspect of this great change seemed full of promise for the future. The ample means of the new jurors might be taken as a guarantee of their purity; their selection from the middle class, as a security of the soundness and disinterestedness of their judgments. Perhaps Gracchus himself was the victim* of this hope, and believed that the scourge of the nobility which he had placed in the hands of the knights, might at least be decorously wielded. The judgment of the after-world varied as to the mode in which they exercised their power. Cicero, in advocating the claims of the order to a renewed tenure of authority, could urge that during their possession of the courts for nearly fifty years, their judgments had never been tainted by the least suspicion of corruption.² This was a safe assertion if suspicion is only justified by proof; for the Gracchan jurors seem to have been from the first exempted from all prosecution for bribery.³ This legal exemption is all the more remarkable as Gracchus himself was the author of a law which permitted a criminal prosecution for a corrupt judgment.⁴It is difficult to understand the significance of this enactment, for

¹ In the Ciceronian period we find a knight as a judex in a civil case (Cic. pro Rose. Com.. 14. 42), but it is not probable that senators were ever excluded from the civil bench See Greenidge Legal Procedure of Cicero's Time p. 265.

"Cic. in Verr. Act. i. 13. 38.

³ Cic. pro Cluent. 56. 154 Lege . . . quae turn erat Sempronia, nunc est Cornelia (i.e. the law mentioned in note 4) . , . intellegebant . . . ea lege eques-trem ordinem non teneri. Livius Drusus in gi b.c. attempted to fix a retrospective liability on the equestrian jurors (Cic. pro Rab. Post 7. 16). Cf. App. Bell. Civ. i. 35. Yet Appian elsewhere (Bell. Civ. i. 22) says that the equites obviated trials for bribery <rwi<TTd)t€j/oi o-tplcriv airols Kal Bia&Lievoi. It is possible that prosecutions for corruption before ihejudicia populi are meant. See Strachan-Davidson in loc.

⁴Cic. pro Cluent. 55. 151 Hanc ipsam legem ne quis judicio circumveni-retur C. Gracchus tulit; earn legem pro plebe, non in plebem tulit. Postea L. Sulla . . . cum ejus rei quaestionem hac ipsa lege constitueret, . . . populum Romanum . . . alligare novo quaestionis genere ausus non est. 56. 154 Illi non hoc recusabant, ea ne lege accusarentur . . . quae turn erat Sempronia, nunc est Cornelia . . . intellegebant enim ea lege equestrem ordinem non teneri.

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THIS EQUESTRIAN COURTS 217

the magistrates, against whom it was directed, were in few cases judges of fact, except in the military domain. It could not have referred to the president of a standing commission who was a mere vehicle for the judgment of the jury; but Gracchus probably contemplated the occasional revival of special commissions sanctioned by the people, and it is possible that even the two praetors who presided over the civil courts may have been subject to the operation of the law, which may not have been directed merely against corrupt sentences in criminal matters, as was subsequently the case when the law was renewed by Sulla. It is even possible that the law dates from a period anterior to the creation of the equestrian judices; but, even on this hypothesis, the exclusion of the latter from its operation was something of an anomaly; for even the civil judex of Rome, on whose analogy the jurors of the standing commissions had been created, was in early times criminally, and at a later period at least pecuniarily, liable for an unjust sentence.¹ We shall elsewhere have occasion to dwell on the value which the equestrian order attached to this immunity, and we shall see that its relief at the freedom from vexatious prosecution is of itself no sign of corruption. One of our authorities does indeed emphatically assert the ultimate prevalence of bribery in the equestrian courts :²and circumstances may be easily imagined which would have made this resort natural, if not inevitable. A band of capitalists eager to secure a criminal verdict, which had a purely commercial significance, would scarcely be slow to employ commercial methods with their less wealthy representatives on the Bench, and votes might have been purchased by transactions in which cash payments -played no part. But the corruption of individuals was of far less moment than the solidarity of interest and collective cupidity of the mercantile order as a whole. The verdicts of the courts reflected the judgment of the Exchange. It was even possible to create a prosecution³simply for the purpose of damning a man who, in the exercise of his authority, had betrayed tendencies which were interpreted as hostile to capitalism.

The future war between the senate and the equites would not have been waged so furiously, had not Gracchus given his favoured class the chance of asserting a positive control, in virtue of an almost official position, over the richest domains of the Roman world. The

¹ Gell. i. xx. 7 ; Justin. Inst. iv. 5. 2. "App. Bell. Civ. i. 22.

⁵ App. l.c. KUTTiyipovs re iverolis eVl rots TtKovtrlois iviyyovro.

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fatal bequest of Attalus was still the plaything of parties; but the prize which Tiberius had destined for the people was used by Caius to seal his compact with the knights. The concession, which could not be openly avowed, was accomplished by means so indirect that its meaning must have escaped the majority of the voters who sanctioned it, and its consequences may not have been fully grasped by the legislator himself. The masses who applauded the new law about the province of Asia, may have seen in it but a promise of the increase of their revenues; while the desire of swelling the public finances, which he had so heavily burdened, of putting an end to the anomalous condition of a district which was neither free nor governed, neither protectorate nor province, perhaps even of meeting the wishes of some of the Asiatic provincials, who preferred regular to irregular exactions, may have been combined in the mind of Gracchus with the wish to see the equites confront the senate in yet another sphere. The change which he proposed was one concerned with the taxation of the province. It cannot be determined how far he was responsible for the infliction of new burdens on Rome's Asiatic subjects. The increase of the public revenue, of which he boasted in one of his speeches to the people,¹ the new harbour dues with which he is credited,² may point to certain creations of his own; but the end at which he aimed seems to have been mainly a revival of the system of taxation which had been current in the kingdom of the Attalids, accompanied by a new and, as he possibly thought, better system of collection. It could not nave been he who first burdened the taxpayer with the payment of tithes ; for this method of revenue was of immense antiquity in all Hellenised lands and is not likely to have been unknown to the kings of Pergamon. It is a method that, from its elastic nature, bears less heavily on the agriculturist than that of a direct impost; for the payment is conditioned by the size of the crops and is independent of the changing value of money. The chief objection to the tax, considered in itself and apart from its accompanying circumstances, was the immensity of the revenue which it yielded; the sums exacted by an Oriental despot were unnecessary for the economical administration of Rome; and the Roman administratior

¹C. Gracchus ap. Gell. xi. io Ego ipse, qui aput vos verba facio, uti vectigali: vestra augeatis, quo facilius vestra commoda et rem publicam administrate possitis non gratis prodeo.

^a Vellei. ii. 6. 3 Nova constituebat portoria.

123 B.C.]

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219

of half a century earlier might have reduced the tithe to a twentieth as it had actually cut down the taxes of Macedonia to one-half of their original amount. Sicily, indeed, furnished an example of the tithe system; but the expenses of a government decrease in proportion to the area of administration, and Sicily could not furnish the ample harbour dues and other payments in money, which should have made the commercial wealth of Asia lighten the burden on the holder of land. The rating of the new province was, in fact, an admission of a change in the theory of imperial taxation. Asia was not merely to be self-supporting; her revenues were to yield a surplus which should supplement the deficit of other lands, or aid in the support of the proletariate of the capital.

The realisation of this principle may not have imposed heavier burdens than Asia had known in the time of her kings. But the fiction that the new dependency was to be maintained in a state of " freedom," which even after the downfall of Aristonicus seems to have exercised some influence on Roman policy, had led to a suspension of regular taxation for the purposes of the central government, which caused the Gracchan proposals to be regarded by certain political circles at Rome in the light of a novelty, and probably of a hardship.¹ They could hardly have borne either character to the Asiatic provincials themselves. The war indemnities and exactions which followed the great struggle, must have been a more grievous burden than the system of taxation to which they were inured: and it is incredible that during the six years which had elapsed since the suppression of the revolt, or even the three years that had passed since the completion of Aquillius's organisation, no revenues had been raised by Rome from her new subjects for administrative purposes. They probably had been raised, but in a manner exasperating because irregular. What was needed was a methodical system, which should abolish at once the fiction of " freedom" and the reality of the exactions meted out at the caprice of the governor of the moment. Such a system was supplied by Gracchus, and it was doubtless reached by the application of the characteristic Roman method of maintaining, whether for good or ill, the principles of organisation which were already in existence in the new dependency.

¹ Cf. App. Bell. Civ. v. 4 (M. Antonius to the Asiatics) 061 .. . ireAetre <p6povs 'ArrdKa, /ie8t)Ka/iev ip.1v, pevjpl, avSpuv Kal nap' r)pilv yevopevav, iSej)<re <p6puv,

iirel Se (Serjirev . . . pepr) <pepeiv tS>v exdo-Tore Kapiruv iirerd^apev.

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The novelty of the Gracchan system lay, not in the manner of taxation, but in the method adopted for securing the returns. The greatest obstacle to the tithe system is the difficulty of instituting an efficient method of collection. To gather in taxes which are paid in kind and to dispose of them to the best advantage, is a heavy burden for a municipality. The desire for a system of contract is sure to arise, and in an Empire the efficient contractor is more likely to be found in the central state than in any of its dependencies. It was of this feeling that Gracchus took advantage when he enacted that the taxes of Asia should be put up for auction at Rome,¹ and that the whole province should be regarded as a single area of taxation at the great auction which the censor held in the capital. It was certain that no foreign competition could prevail in this sale of a kingdom's revenues. The right to gather in the tithes could be purchased only by a powerful company of Roman capitalists. The Decumani of Asia would represent the heart and brain of the mercantile body; they would form a senate and a Principate amongst the Publicani.² They would flood the province with their local directors, their agents and their freedmen; and each station would become a centre for a banking business which would involve individuals and cities in a debt, of which the tithe was but a fraction. Nor need their operations be confined to the dominions of Rome ; they would spread over Phrygia, rendered helpless by the gift of freedom, and creep into the realms of the neighbouring protected kings, safe in the knowledge that the-magic uame of " citizen of Rome " was a cover to the most doubtful transaction and a safeguard against the slightest punishment. The collectors were liable to no penalties for extortion, for that crime could be committed only by a Roman magistrate : and their possession of the courts enabled them to raise the spectre of conviction on this very charge before the eyes of any governor who might attempt to check the devastating march of the battalions of commerce.

As merchants and bankers the Knights would be sufficiently protected by the judicial powers of their class ; but their operations as speculators in tithes needed another safeguard. The contracts made with the censor would extend over a period of five years,

¹ Fronto ad Verum p. 125 (Naber) Gracchus locabat Asiam. Cic. in Verr. iii. 6. 12 Inter Siciliam ceterasque provincias, judices, in agrorum vectigalium ratione hoc interest, quod ceteris aut impositum vectigal est certum . . . aut censoria locatio constituta est, ut Asiae lege Sempronia.

² Decumani, hoc est, principes et quasi senatores publicanorum (Cic. in Verr. ii. 71. 175).

123 B.C.] NEW BALANCE OF POWER

221

and the keenness of the competing companies would generally ensure to the State the promise of an enormous sum for the privilege of farming the taxes. But the tithe might be reduced in value by a bad harvest or the ravages of war, and the successful company might overreach itself in its eagerness to secure the contract. The power of revising such bargains had once assured to the senate the securest hold which it possessed over the mercantile class.¹ This complete dependence was now to be removed, and Gracchus, while not taking the power of decision from the senate, formulated in his law certain principles of remission which it was expected to observe.²

By these indirect and seemingly innocent changes in the relations of the mercantile order to the senate, a new balance of power had been nraatpd in thp State The Republic, according to the reflection of a later writer, had been given two heads,³ and this new Janus, more ominous than the old, was believed to be the harbinger of deadly conflict between the rival powers. In moments of calm Gracchus may have believed that his reforms were but a renewed illustration of that genius for compromise out of which the Roman constitution had grown, and that he had but created new and necessary defences against a recently developed absolutism ; but, in the heat of the conflict into which he was soon plunged, his vindictive fancy saw but the gloomier aspect of his new creation, and he boasted that the struggle for the courts was a dagger which he had hurled into the Forum, an instrument which the possessor would use to mangle the body of his opponent.⁴

But even these limitations of senatorial prerogative were not deemed sufficient. A proposal was made which had the ingenious icope of limiting the senate's control over the more important pro-

¹ Polyb. vi. 17.

³ Schol. Bob. p. 259 Cum princeps esset publicanorum Cn. Plancii pater, et societas eadem in exercendis vectigalibus gravissimo damno videretur adfecta, desideratum est in senatu nomine publicanorum ut cum iis ratio putaretur lege Sempronia, et remissionis tantum fieret de summa pecunia, quantum aequitas postularet, pro quantitate damnorum quibus fuerant hostili incursione vexati (60 b.c; cf. Cic. ad Att. i. 17. 9).

³ Varro ap. Non. p. 308 G. Equestri ordini judicia tradidit ac bicipitem civi-tatem fecit discordiarum civilium fontem. Cf. Florus ii. 5 (iii. 17).

⁴ Diod. xxxvii. 9 a,Trsi\oio-ris T7ji cruyK\r)TOv ir6\e/toy Tip Tp&tcxt 81a tV neTaSeaiv rav Kpnup'ittiv, Te9app7tK6rws oStos elirev 8V1 kUv airoddvo), oil diaKefyai to %'itpos atrb tt)s nKevpcis tuiv avyK\r)TucS>v 5irjprj,ueVoj. Diodorus has preserved the utterance in a more intelligible form than Cicero (de Leg. iii. 9. 20 C. vero Gracchus . . . sicis iis, quas ipse se projecisse in forum dixit, quibus digladiarentur inter se cives, nonne omnem rei publicae statum permutavit ?).

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vinces in favour of the magistrates, the equestrian order and the people. One of the most valuable items of patronage which the senate possessed was the assignment of the consular provinces. They claimed the right of deciding which of the annual commands without the walls should be reserved for the consuls of the year, and by their disposition in this matter could reward a favourite with wealth or power, and condemn a political opponent to impotence or barren exile. This power had long been employed as a means of coercing the two chief magistrates into obedience to the senate's .will, and the equestrian order must have viewed with some alarm I the possibility of Asia becoming the prize of the candidates favoured i by the nobility. Had Gracchus declared that the direct election to provincial commands should henceforth be in the hands of the people, the change would have been but a slight departure from an admitted constitutional precedent; for there is little more than a technical difference between electing a man for an already ascertained sphere of operations, as had been done in the cases of Terentius Varro and the two Scipios during the Punic wars, and attaching a special command to an individual already elected. jjiut Gracchus preferred the traditional and indirect method. He did not question the righT of the "senate to decide what provinces should be assigned to the consuls, but he enacted that this decision should be made before these magistrates were elected to office.¹ The people would thus, in their annual choice of the highest magistrates, be electing not only to a sphere of administration at home, but to definite foreign commands as well; the prize which the senate had hitherto bestowed would be indirectly the people's gift, and the nominees of the Comitia would find themselves in possession of departments which were presumably the most important that lay at the disposal of the senate. To secure the finality of the arrangement made by the senate, and to prevent this body subsequently reversing an awkward assignment to which it had unwittingly committed itself, Gracchus ordained /that the tribunician veto should not be employed against the 7 senate's decision as to what provinces should be reserved for the

¹ Cic. pro Domo g. 24 Tu provincias consulares, quas C. Gracchus, qui unus maxime popularis fuit, non modo non abstulit a senatu, sed etiam, ut necesse esset quotannis constitui per senatum decretas lege sanxit, eas lege Sempronia per senatum decretas rescidisti. Sail. Jug. 27 Lege Sempronia provinciae futuris consulibus Numidia atque Italia decretae. Cic. de Prov. Cons. 2. 3 Decernendae nobis sunt lege Sempronia duae (provinciae). Cf. ad Fam. i. 7. 10; pro Bafbo 27.61.

23 B.C.] LAW ON THE CONSULAR PROVINCES 223

uture consuls;¹ for he knew that the tribune was often the in-trument of the government, and that the suspensory veto of this nagistrate could cause the question of assignment to drag on until ifter the consuls were elected, and thus restore to the senate its indent right of patronage. The change, although it produced the lesired results of freeing the magistrates from subservience, the nercantile order from a reasonable fear, and the people from the aain of seeing their favourite nominee rendered useless for the purposes for which he was appointed, cannot be said to have idded anything to the efficiency of provincial administration. It may even be regarded as a retrograde step, as the commencement af that system of routine in provincial appointments, which regarded proved capacity for the government and defence of the subjects of Rome as the last qualification necessary for foreign command. The senate in its award may often have been swayed by unworthy motives; but it was sometimes moved by patriotic fears. Of the two consuls it might send the one of tried military ability to a province threatened by war and dismiss the mere politician to a peaceful district. But now, without any regard to present conditions or future contingencies, it was forced to assign departments to men whose very names were unknown. The people, in the exercise of their elective power, were acting almost as blindly as the senate ; for the issues of a Roman election were often so ill-defined, its cross-currents, due to personal influence and the power of the canvass, so strong and perplexing, that it was rarely possible to predict the issue of the poll. On the other hand, if there was a candidate so eminent that his return could be predicted as a certainty, the senate might assign some insignificant spheres of administration as the provinces of the future consuls; and thus, in the one case where the decision might be influenced by knowledge and reason, the Gracchan law was liable to defeat its own ends. A further weakness of the enactment, from the point of view of efficiency, was that it made no attempt to alter the mode in which the designated provinces were to be occupied by their claimants. If the consuls could not come to an agreement as to which provincia each should hold, the chance of the lot still decided a question on which the future fortunes of the empire might turn.

¹ Cic. de Prov. Cons. 7. 17.

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It is a relief to turn from this work of demolition, which in jspite of its many justifications is pervaded by a vindictive suspicion, to some great constructive efforts by which Gracchus proved himself an enlightened and disinterested social reformer. He did not view agrarian assignation as an alternative to colonisation, but recognised that the industrial spirit might be awakened by new settlements on sites favourable to commerce, as the agricultural interest had been aroused by the planting of settlers on the desolated lands. Gracchus was, indeed, not the first statesman to employ colonisation as a remedy for social evils; for economic distress and the hunger for land had played their part from the earliest times in the military settlements which Rome had scattered over Italy. But down to his time strategic had preponderated over industrial motives, and he was the first to suggest that colonisation might be made a means of relief for the better classes of the urban proletariate, whose activities were cramped and whose energies were stifled by the crowded life and heated atmosphere of the city. His settlers were to be carefully selected. They were actually to be men who could stand the test of an investigation into character.¹ It seems clear that the new opportunities were offered to men of the lower middle class, to traders of cramped means or of broken fortunes. His other proteges had been cared for in other ways; the urban masses who lived on the margin of destitution had been assisted by the corn law, and the sturdy son of toil could look for help to the agrarian commission. Of the many settlements which he projected for Italy,² two which were actually established during his second tribunate³ occupied maritime positions favourable for commerce. Scylacium, on the bay ivhich lies southward of the Iapygian promontory, was intended to revivify a decayed Greek settlement and to reawaken the industries of the desolated Bruttian coast; while Neptunia was seemingly the name of the new entrep6t which he founded at the head of the Tarentine Gulf. It was apparently established on the land which

¹ The colonists were to be oi xapieoraToi tZv iroAn-aSi' (Plut. C. Gracch. g).

² Liv. Ep. Ix Legibus agrariis latis effecit ut complures coloniae in Italia deducerentur. Cf. Plut. C. Gracch. 6. App. Bell. Civ. i. 23; Foundations at Abellinum, Cadatia, Suessa Aurunca etc. are attributed to a lex Sempronia or lex Graccana in Liber Coloniarum (Gromatici Lachmann) pp. 229, 233, 237, 238 ; cf. pp. 216, 2ig, 228, 255. It is difficult to say whether they were products of the Gracchan agrarian or colonial law. In either case, these foundations may have been subsequent to his death, as neither law was repealed.

⁸ Vellei. 1. 15 Et post annum (i.e. a year after the foundation of Fabrateria, see p. 171) Scolacium Minervium, Tarentum Neptunia (coloniae conditae sunt).

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iome had wrested from Tarentum, and may have originally formed i town distinct from this Greek city, once the great seaport of Calabria, but retaining little of its former greatness since its partial lestruction in the Punic wars.¹ Its Hellenism was on the wane, md this decline in its native civilisation may account for the fact bat the new and the old foundations seem eventually to have been nerged into one, and that Tarentum could receive a purely Latin :onstitution after the close of the Social War.² Its purple fisheries .nd rich wine-producing territory were worthy objects of the enter-jrise of Gracchus. Capua was a still greater disgrace to the Roman idministration than Tarentum. Its fertile lands were indeed cultivated by lessees of Rome and yielded a large annual produce to the state. But the unredeemed site, on which had stood the pride of southern Italy, was still a lamentable witness to the jealousy of the :onqueror. Here Gracchus proposed to place a settlement³ which Jrrough its commercial promise might amply have compensated for i loss of a portion of the State's domain. Neither he nor his brother lad ever threatened the distribution of the territory of Capua, and t is, therefore, probable that in this case he did not contemplate a arge agricultural foundation, but rather one that might serve better ;han the existing village to focus the commerce of the Campanian olain. But the revenue from the domain, and the jealousy of Rome's jld and powerful rival, which might be awakened in all classes, were strong weapons in the hands of his opponents, and the renewal )f Capua was destined to be the work of a later and more fortunate leader of the party of reform. The colonising effort of Gracchus was jlainly one that had the regeneration of Italy, as well as the satisfaction of distressed burgesses, as its object; none of the three sites, m which he proposed to establish his communes of citizens, possessed it the time an urban centre capable of utilising the vast possibilities )f the area in which it was placed. But this twofold object was lot to be limited to Italy. He dreamed of transmarine enterprise taking a more solid and more generally useful form than that urnished by the vagrant trader or the local agent of the capitalist.⁴The idea and practice of colonisation across the sea were indeed no lew ones; isolated foundations for military purposes, such as Palma md Pollentia in the Balearic Isles, were being planted by the direc-¹ Forbiger Handb. der Alt. Geogr. ii. p. 503.

'L'Annee Epigraphique, i8g6, pp. 30, 31. ³ Plut. C. Gracch. 8.

¹ Vellei. ii. 6 Novis coloniis replebat provincias. This may be wrong as a fact >ut true as an intention. 15

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tion of the government. But these were small settlements intended to serve a narrow purpose; they doubtless spread Roman customs and formed a basis for Roman trade; but, if these motives had entered into their foundation, the experiment would have been tried on a far larger scale. In truth the idea of permanent settlement beyond the seas did not appeal either to the Roman character or to the political theories of the governing classes. It is questionable whether an imperial people, forming but a tiny minority amongst its subjects, and easily reaping the fruits of its conquests, could ever take kindly to the adventure, the initial hardships, and the lasting exclusion from the dazzling life of the capital, which are implied in permanent residence abroad. The Roman in pursuit of gain was a restless spirit, who would voyage to any land that was, or was likely to be, under imperial control, establish his banking house and villa under any clime, and be content to spend the most active years of his life in the exploitation of the alien; but to him it was a living truth that all roads led to Rome. The city was the nucleus of enterprise, the heart of commerce ; and such sentiment as the trader possessed was centred on the commercial life of the Forum and the political devices on which it fed. Such a spirit is not favourable to true colonisation, which implies a detachment from the affairs of the mother city; and it was not by this means, but rather by the spontaneous evolution of natural centres for the teeming Italian immigrants already settled in the provinces, that the Romanisa-tion of the world was ultimately assisted. Consequently no great pressure had ever been put on the government to induce it to relax the principles which led it to look with indifference or disfavour on the foundation of Roman settlements abroad. There was probably a fear that the establishment of communities of Roman citizens in the provinces might awaken the desire of the subject states to participate in Roman rights. It was deemed better that the highest goal of the provincial's ambition should be the freedom of his state, ind that he should never dream of that absorption into the ruling body to which the Italian alone was permitted to aspire. Added to this maxim of statecraft was one of those curious superstitions which play so large a part in imperial politics and attain a show of truth from the superficial reading of history. It was pointed out by the wise that colonies had often proved more potent than their parent states, that Carthage had surpassed Tyre, Massilia Phocaea, Syracuse Corinth, and Cyzicus Miletus. In the same way a daughter

123 B.C.] THE SETTLEMENT AT CARTHAGE 227

of Rome might wax greater than her mother, and the city that governed Italy might be powerless to cope with a rebellious dependency in the provinces.¹ This was not altogether an idle fear in the earlier days of conquest; for at any period before the war with Pyrrhus a transmarine city of Italian blood and customs might have proved a formidable rival. Nor at the stage which the empire had reached at the time of Gracchus was it without its j ustification ; for Rome was by no means a convenient centre for a government that ruled in Asia as well as in Europe. It is more likely that the dread of rivalry was due to the singular defects of the aspect and environment of Rome, of which its. citizens were acutely conscious, rather than to the awkwardness of its geographical position ; but, had the latter deficiency been realised, it would be unfair to criticise the narrowness of view which failed to see that the change of a capital does not necessarily involve the surrender of a government. But, whether the objections implied in this superstition were shadowy or well defined, they could not have been lessened by the choice which was made by Gracchus and his friends of the site for their new transmarine settlement. It was none other than Carthage, the city which had been destroyed because the blessings of nature had made a mockery of conquest, the city that, if revived, would be the centre of the granary of Rome. A proposal for the renewal of Carthage under the name of Junonia was formulated by Rubrius, one of the colleagues of Gracchus in his first tribunate.² The number of the colonists, which was less than six thousand, was specified in the enactment, and the proportion of the emigrants to the immense territory at his disposal rendered it possible for the legislator to assign unusually large allotments of land. A better and an inferior class of settlers were apparently distinguished, the former of whom were to hold no less than two hundred jugera apiece.³ The recipients of all allotments were to maintain them in absolute ownership, a system of tenure which had hitherto been confined to Italy being thus extended to provincial soil.⁴ Caius

¹ Vellei. ii. 7.

² Plut. C. Gracch. 10 'PovBplov tEcv ffvvapx°'^VT<av *^vos oiKl&trQoa KapxfSoVa ypttyav' tos ayvprifiiiiriv imb 2/ctjitWos. . . . Lex Acilia 1. 22 Queive I. Rubr[ia iii. vir col. ded. creatus siet fueritve]. Cf. Lex Agraria 1. 59. Oros. v. 12 L. Caecilio Metello et Q. Titio (Scr. T. Quinctio) Flaminino coss. Carthago in Africa restitui jussa vicensimo secundo demum anno quam fuerat eversa deductis civium Romanorum familiis, quae earn incolerent, restituta et repleta est. Cf. Eutrop. iv. 21.

³ Mommsen in C. I. L. i. pp. 75 ff.

⁴ Mommsen l.c. This was the tenure afterwards called that of the^Ms Italicum.

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Gracchus and Fulvius Flaccus were named amongst the triumvirs who were to establish the new colony.¹ It is probable that Roman citizens were alone considered eligible for the colonies both in Italy and abroad, when these foundations were first proposed, and that it was not until Gracchus had embarked on his enterprise of enfranchising the Latins, that he allowed them to participate in the benefits of his colonial schemes and thus indirectly acquire full Roman citizenship.²

But the commercial life of Italy might be quickened by other means than the establishment of colonies whether at home or abroad. Gracchus saw that the question of rapid and easy communication between the existing towns was all important. The great roads of Rome betrayed their military intent in the unswerving inflexibility of their course. The positions which they skirted were of strategic, but not necessarily of industrial, importance. To bring the hamlet into connection with the township, and the township into touch with the capital, a series of good cross-roads was needed; and it was probably to this object that the law of Gracchus³ was directed. But ease of communication may serve a political as well as a commercial object. The representative character of the Comitia would be increased by the provision of facilities for the journey to Rome; and perhaps when Gracchus promulgated his measure, there was already before his mind the possibility of the extension of the franchise to the Latins, which would vastly increase the numbers of the rural electorate. In any case, the measure 1 was one which tended to political centralisation, and Gracchus j must have known that the attainment of this object was essential to jthe unity and stability of a popular government.

The great enterprise was carried through with extraordinary rapidity during his second tribunate. But the hastiness of the construction did not impair the beauty of the work. We are told that the roads ran straight and fair through the country districts, showing an even surface of quarried stone and tight-packed earth. Hollows were filled up, ravines and torrent beds were bridged, and mounting-blocks for horsemen lay at short and easy distances on both sides of the level course.⁴ Although the initial expense of this construction may have borne heavily on the finances of the State, it is probable that the future maintenance of the roads was provided

¹ Liv. Ep. Ix; App. Bell. Civ. i. 24. » See p. 243, note 3.

"Plut. C. Gracch. 6; App. Bell. Civ. i. 23. ⁴ Plut. C. Gracch. 7.

123 B.C.] THE MAKING OF ROADS

for in other ways. The commerce which they fostered may have paid its dues at toll-gates erected for the purpose:¹ and the ancient Roman device of creating a class of settlers on the line of a public road, for the purpose of keeping it in repair,² was probably extended. Road-making was often the complement of agrarian assignation,³ and the two may have been employed concurrently by Gracchus. It was the custom to assign public land on the borders of a highway to settlers, the tenure of which was secured to them and then heirs on condition of keeping the road in due repair. Sometimes their own labour and that of their slaves were reckoned the equivalent of the usual dues; at other times the dues themselves were used by the public authorities for the purpose. Gracchus may thus have turned his agrarian law to an end which was not contemplated by that of Tiberius.

The execution of the law must have been a heavy blow to the power and prestige of the senate. Its control of the purse was infringed and it ceased to be the sole employer of public labour. For Gracchus, in defiance of the principle that the author of a measure should not be its executant,* was his own road-maker, as his brother Tiberius had been his own land commissioner. He was the patron of the contractor and the benefactor of the Italian artisan. The bounties which he now gave were the reward of labour, and not subject to the criticism which had attended his earlier efforts for the relief of poverty in Rome; but some pretended to take the sinister view that the bands of workmen by which he was surrounded might be employed for a less innocent purpose than the making of roads.⁵

The proceedings of Gracchus during his first year of office had made it inevitable that he should hold the tribunate for a second time. Enough had been performed to win him the ardent support of the masses; enough had been promised to make his return to office desirable, not only to the people, but to the expectant capitalists. The legal hindrances to re-election had been removed, or

¹ Nitzsch Die Gracchen p. 402.

² These are apparently the Viasii vicani of the lex Agraria. Sometimes the service was performed by personal labour (operae), at other times a vectigal was demanded. See Mommsen in C. I. L. l.c.

³ Cic. ad Fam. viii. 6. 5 ; cf. Mommsen l.c.

⁴ This was prohibited by a lex Licinia and a lex Aebutia which Cicero (de Leg. Agr. ii. 8. 21) calls veteres tribuniciae. But it is possible that they were post-Gracchan. See Mommsen Staatsr. ii. p. 630.

⁵ App. Bell. Civ. i. 23 6 Se TpiKX<>s Kal SSovs ere/ivev ivh rriv Ira\iav Liaxpis, wKifdos epyoK&Bwv Kal xe^porexviov l/ip' eavrQ iroiovLtevos, eToifiuv 4s 8 ti KeKevot.

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could be evaded,¹ and the continuity of power, which was essential to the realisation of an adequate programme of reform, could now for the first time be secured. In the present state of public feeling there was little probability of the veto being employed by any one of his future colleagues, although some of these would inevitably be moderates or members of the senatorial party. But Gracchus was eager that his cause should be represented in another department of the State, which presented possibilities of assistance or of mischief, and that the spectacle of the tribunate as the sole focus of democratic sentiment, exalting itself in opposition to the higher magistracies of the people, should, if possible, be averted. In one of his addresses to the commons he said he had to ask a favour of them. Were it granted, he would value it above all things ; should they think good to refuse, he would bear no grudge against them. Here he paused; the favour remained undisclosed ; and he left popular imagination to revel in the possibilities of his claims. It was a happy stroke; for he had filled the minds of his auditors with a gratifying sense of their own boundless power, and with suspicions of illegal ambitions, with which it was well that they should become familiar, but which one dramatic moment would for the time dispel. His words were interpreted as a request for the consulship : and the prevalent opinion is said to have been that he desired to hold this office in combination with the tribunate. The time for the consular elections was approaching and expectation was roused to its highest pitch, when Gracchus was seen conducting Gaius Fannius into the Forum and, with the assistance of his own friends, accosting the electors in his behalf.² The candidate was a man whose political temperament Caius had had full opportunities of studying. As a tribune he had been much under the influence of Scipio Aemilianus,³ and as he rose slowly through the grades of curule rank,* he must still have retained his character as a moderate. He was therefore preferable to any candidate put forward by the optimates : and the influence of Gracchus secured Fannius the consulship almost at the moment when, without the trouble of a canvass or even of a formal candidature, he himself secured his second term of office. His position was further strengthened by the return of the ex-consul Fulvius Flaccus, as one of his colleagues in the tribunate.

¹ P. 165.

³ Cic. Brut. 26. 100.

^aPlut. C. Gracch. 8.

⁴ Mommsen in C. i. L. i. p. 158.

122 B.C.] SECOND TRIBUNATE OF GRACCHUS 231

It was now, when the grand programme was actually being carried through, and the execution of the most varied measures was being pressed on by a single hand, that the possibilities of personal government were first revealed in Rome. The fiery orator was less to be dreaded than the unwearied man of action, whose restless energy was controlled by a clearness of judgment and concentration of purpose, which could distinguish every item of his vast sphere of administration and treat the task of the moment as though it were the one nearest to his heart. Even those who hated and feared Gracchus were struck with amazement at the practical genius which he revealed; while the sight of the leader in the midst of his countless tasks, surrounded by the motley retinue which they involved, roused the wondering admiration of the masses.¹ At one moment he was being interviewed by a contractor for public works, at another by an envoy from some state eager to secure his mediation; the magistrate, the artisan, the soldier and the man of letters besieged his presence chamber, and each was received with the appropriate word and the kindly dignity, which kings may acquire from training, but men of kingly nature receive from heaven as a seal of their fitness to rule. The impression of overbearing violence which had been given by his speeches, was immediately dispelled by contact with the man. The time of storm and stress had been passed for the moment, and in the fruition of his temporary power the true character of Gracchus was revealed. The pure intellectual enjoyment which springs from the sense of efficiency and the effective pursuit of a long-desired task, will not be shaken by the awkward impediments of the moment. All the human instruments, which the work demands, reflect the value of the object to which they contribute: and Gracchus was saved from the insolent pride of the patrician ruler and the helpless peevishness of the mere agitator whom circumstances have thrust into power, by the fact that his emotional nature was mastered by an intellect which had outlived prejudice and had never known the sense of incapacity. By the very character of its circumstances the regal nature was forced into a style of life which resembled and foreshadowed that of the coming monarchy. The accessibility to his friends and clients of every grade was the pride of the Roman noble, and doubtless Gracchus would willingly have modelled his receptions on the informal pattern which sufficed the proudest patrician at the head of the largest

¹ Plut. C. Gracch. 6.

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clientele. But Gracchus's callers were not even limited to the whole of Rome; they came from Italy and the provinces: and it was found to be essential to adopt some rules of precedence, which would produce a methodical approach to his presence and secure each of his visitors an adequate hearing. He was the first Roman, we are told, to observe certain rules of audience. Some members of the crowd which thronged his ante-chamber, were received singly, others in smaller or in larger groups.¹ It is improbable that the mode of reception varied wholly with the official or social rank of those admitted ; the nature of the client's business must also have dictated the secrecy or publicity of the interview; but the system must have seemed to his baffled enemies a welcome confirmation of their real or pretended fears—a symptom of the coming, if not actual, overthrow of Republicanism, the suspicion of which might one day be driven even into the thick heads of the gaping crowds, who stood by the portals to gaze at the ever-shifting throng of callers and to marvel at the power and popularity of their leader.

Had Gracchus been content to live in the present and to regard his task as completed, it is just possible that the diverse interests which he had so dexterously welded together might have enabled him to secure, not indeed a continuity of power (for that would have been as strenuously resisted by the middle as by the upper class), but immediate security from the gathering conspiracy, the preservation of his life, and the probability of a subsequent political career. It is, however, difficult to conceive that the position which Gracchus held could be either resigned or forgiven ; and, although ve cannot credit him with any conscious desire for holding a position not admitted by the laws, yet his genius unconsciously led him to identify the commonwealth with himself, while his mind, as receptive as it was progressive, would not have readily acquiesced in the view that a political creation can at any moment be called complete. The disinterested statesman will cling to power as tenaciously is one devoured by the most sordid ambition: and even on the lowest ground of personal security, the possession of authority is perhaps more necessary to the one than to the other. So indissol-ubly blended are the power and the projects of a leader, that it is

¹ Seneca de Ben. vi. 34. 2 Apud nos primi omnium Gracchus et mox Livius Drusus instituerunt segregare turbam suam et alios in secretum recipere, alios cum pluribus, alios universes. Habuerunt itaque isti amicos primos, habuerunt secundos, numquam veros.

122 B.C.] THE FRANCHISE BILL 233

idle to raise the question whether personal motives played any part in the project with which Gracchus was now about to delight his enemies and alienate his friends. He took up anew the question of the enfranchisement of the Italians—a question which the merest pobtical tyro could have told him was enough to doom the statesman who spoke even a word in its favour. But Caius's position was no ordinary one, and he may have regarded his present influence as sufficient to induce the people to accept the unpalatable measure, the success of which might win for himself and his successors a wider constituency and a more stable following. The error in judgment is excusable in one who had never veiled his sympathy with the Italian cause, and had hitherto found it no hindrance to his popularity ; but so clear-sighted a man as Gracchus must have felt at times that he was staking, not only his own career, but the fate of the programme and the party which he had built up, on the chance of securing an end, which had ceased to be regarded as the mere removal of an obstacle and had grown to be looked on as the coping-stone of a true reformer's work.

The scope of his proposal¹ was more moderate than that which had been put forward by Flaccus. He suggested the grant of the full rights of citizenship to the Latins, and of Latin rights to the^ other Italian allies.² Italy was thus, from the point of view of—^Jprivate law, to be Romanised almost up to the Alps;³ while the cities already in enjoyment of some or all of the private privileges of the Roman, were to see the one anomaly removed, which created an invidious distinction between them and the burgess towns, ham-

¹ The name of the law was probably lex de sociis et nomine Latino. See Cic. Brut. 26. 99.

"App. Bell. Civ. i. 23 Kal robs Aarlvovs «V1 irriWa eKd\ei rd 'Pufialwv, &>s ovk etnrpemSs (rvyyevecri rrjs BovKtjs avriffTrivai Svya/jLeyrjs' t&v fie-erepav ffvitpAxw ots ovk il-ijv \l/rj(pov eV rais 'PwLidtatv x^etP°^TOV^^ais fyipeiv, iMSov (pepeiv anrb rouSe, eVl rep ex^etpKal TovffSe eV tois x^slP°'^rov'^iats ^T&^v vbiuav airrtp ffvvrsKovvTas. The words tyriQov k.t.X. refer to the limited suffrage granted to Latin incolae (Liv. xxv. 3. 16); but the voting power of his new Latins would be so small that the motive attributed to this measure by Appian is improbable. See Strachan-Davidson in loc. Other accounts of Gracchus's proposal ignore this distinction between Latins and Italians, e.g. Plutarch (C. Gracch. 5) describes his law as iffo^^ovs noi&v rots TroKlrais robs ItoAii^toi and Velleius says (ii. 6) Dabat civitatem omnibus Italicis.

³ If we may trust Velleius (ii. 6) Dabat civitatem omnibus Italicis, extendebat earn paene usque Alpis. Cisalpine Gaul was not yet a separate province, but it was not regarded as a part of Italy. The Latin colonies between the Padus and the Rubicon would certainly have received Roman rights, and this may have been the case with a Latin township north of the Padus such as Aquileia. But it is doubtful whether Latin rights would have been given to the towns between the Padus and the Alps. These Transpadani received Latinitas in 89 b.c. (Ascon. in Pisonian. P- 3)

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pered their commerce, and imperilled their landed possessions. The proposal had the further advantage that it took account of the possible unwillingness of many of the federate cities to accept the Roman franchise; such a refusal was not likely to be made to the offer of Latin rights : for the Latin community was itself a federate city with its own laws, magistrates and courts, and the sense of autonomy would be satisfied while many of the positive benefits of Roman citizenship would be gained. Grades of privilege would still exist in Italy, and a healthy discontent might in time be fostered, which would lead all Italian communities to seek absorption into the great city. Past methods of incorporation might be held to furnish a precedent; the scheme proposed by Gracchus was hardly more revolutionary than that which had^in the third and at the beginning of the second centuries, resulted in the conferment of full citizenship on the municipalities of half-burgesses. It differed from it only in extending the principle to federate towns; but the rights of the members of the Latin cities bore a close resemblance to those of the old municipes, and they might easily be regarded as already enjoying the partial citizenship of Rome. The conferment of this partial citizenship on the other Italians, while in no way destroying local institutions or impairing local privileges, would lead to the possibility of a common law for the whole of Italy, would enable every Italian to share in the benefits of Roman business life, and appear in the court of the urban praetor to defend such rights as he had acquired, by the use of the forms of Roman law. The tentativeness of the character of Gracchus's proposal, while recommending it as in harmony with the cautious spirit of Roman development which had worked the great changes of the past, may also have been dictated by the feeling, that the more moderate scheme stood a better chance of acceptance by the mob of Rome. All he asked was that the grievances which had led to the revolt of Fregellae, and the dangers revealed by that revolt, should be removed. The numbers of the added citizens would not be overwhelming; for the majority of Italians all that was asked was the possession of certain private rights, which had been so ungrudgingly granted to communities in the past. Throughout the campaign he probably laid more stress on the duty of protecting the individual than on the right of the individual to power. And the fact that the protection was demanded, not against the Roman State, but against an oppressive nobility that

122 B.C.] OPPOSITION TO THE BILL

235

disgraced it by a misuse of its powers, gave a democratic colouring to the demand, and suggested a community of suffering, and therefore of sympathy, between the donors and recipients of the gift. Even before his franchise law was before the world, he seems to have been engaged in educating his auditors up to this view of the case; for it was probably in the speeches with which he introduced his law for the better protection of the life of the Roman citizen,¹that he illustrated the cruel caprice of the nobility by grisly stories of the sufferings of the Italians. He had told of the youthful legate who had had a cow-herd of Venusia scourged to death, as an answer to the rustic's jesting query whether the bearers of the litter were carrying a corpse : and of the consul who had scourged the quaestor of Teanum Sidicinum, the man of noblest lineage in his state, because the men's baths, in which the consul's wife had elected to bathe, were not adequately prepared for her reception.²Since the objections of the populace to the extension of the franchise were the result of prejudice rather than of reason, they might be weakened if the sense of jealousy and distrust could be diverted from the people's possible rivals to the common oppressors of Rome and Italy.

The appeal to sentiment might have been successful, had not the most sordid passions of the mob been immediately inflamed by the oratory of the opponents of the measure. The most formidable of these opponents was drawn from the ranks of Gracchus's own supporters ; for the franchise question had again proved a rock which could make shipwreck of the unity of the democratic party. His <proUgi, the consul Fannius, was not ashamed to appeal to the most selfish instincts of the populace. " Do you suppose," he said, " that, when you have given citizenship to the Latins, there will be any room left for you at public gatherings, or that you will find a place at the games or festivals ? Will they not swamp everything with their numbers?"³ Fannius, as a moderate, was an excellent exponent of senatorial views, and it was believed that many noble hands had collaborated in the crushing speech which inflicted one of its death-blows on the Gracchan proposal.⁴

The opportunity for active opposition had at last arrived, and the senate was emboldened to repeat the measure which four years

¹ P. 199. ² C. Gracch. ap. Gell. x. 3. 3.

³ Fann. ap. Jul. Victor 6. 6. A speech of Fannius as consul against Caius Gracchus is also mentioned by Charisius p. 143 Keil.

⁴ Cic. Brut. 26. 99.

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earlier had swept the aliens out of Rome. Perhaps in consequence of powers given by the law of Pennus, the consul Fannius was empowered to issue an edict that no Italian, who did not possess a vote in the Roman assemblies, should be permitted within five miles of Rome at the time when the proposal about the franchise was to be submitted to the Comitia.¹ Caius answered this announcement with a fiery edict of his own, in which he inveighed against the consul and promised his tribunician help to any of the allies who chose to remain in the city.² The power which he threatened to exercise was probably legal, since there is no reason to suppose that the tribunician auxilium could be interposed solely for the assistance of members of the citizen body ;³ but he must have known that the execution of this promise was impracticable, since the injured party could be aided only by the personal interposition of the tribune, and it was clear that a single magistrate, burdened with many cares, and living a life of the most varied and strenuous activity, could not be present in every quarter of Rome and in a considerable portion of the surrounding territory. Even the cooperation of his ardent colleague Flaccus could not have availed for the protection of many of his Italian friends, and the course of events so soon taught him the futility of this means of struggling for Italian rights that when, somewhat later in the year, one of his Italian friends was seized by a creature of Fannius before his eyes, he passed by without an attempt at aid. His enemies, he knew, were at the time eager for a struggle in which, when they had isolated him from his Italian supporters, physical violence would decide the day: and he remarked that he did not wish to give them the pretext for the hand-to-hand combat which they desired.⁴One motive, indeed, of the invidious edict issued by the consul seems to have been to leave Gracchus to face the new position which his latest proposal had created, without any external help; but as external help, if successfully asserted, could only have taken the form of physical violence, there was reasonable ground for holding that the decree excluding the Italians was the only means

^JApp. Bell. Civ. i. 23.

³ Plut. C. Gracch. 12 ovte {tAjiKey 6 Td'ios Sidypappa Karnyopdv tou {nrdrov, Kal tois crufi/idxois, i\v ptvatrt, 0ori8r]creiv iTrayyeKhi/ievos. The invective may have been directed against Fannius. According to Appian (l.c.) both consuls had been in structed by the senate to issue the edict.

³ If it had been hampered in this way, the judicial protection oiferegrini against the judgments of the Praetor Peregrinus would have been impossible.

* Plut. C. Gracch. 12.

!2 B.C.] FAILURE OF THE FRANCHISE BILL

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preventing a serious riot or even a civil war. The senate iuld scarcely have feared the moral influence of the Italians on ie voting populace of Rome, and they knew that, in the present ate of public sentiment, the constitutional means of resistance [rich had failed against Tiberius Gracchus might be successfully uployed against his brother. The whole history of the first ibunate of Caius Gracchus proves the frank recognition of the ct that the tribunician veto could no longer be employed against measure which enlisted anything like the united support of the :ople; but, like all other devices for suspending legislation, its nployment was still possible for opponents, and welcome even to kewarm supporters, when the body politic was divided on an tiportant measure and even the allies of its advocate felt their latitude and their loyalty submitted to an unwelcome strain, esistance by means of the intercession did not now require the olid courage of an Octavius, and when Livius Drusus threatened le vetflyL there was no question of his deposition. Some nerve ight have been required, had he made this announcement in the idst of an excited crowd of Italian postulants for the franchise ; it from this experience he was saved by the precautionary measure iken by the senate. It is probable that Drusus's announcement msed an entire suspension of the legal machinery connected with le franchise bill, and that its author never ventured to bring it to le vote.

It is possible that to this stage of Gracchus's career belongs a reposal which he promulgated for a change in the order of voting ; the Comitia Centuriata. The alteration in the structure of this isembly, which had taken place about the middle of the third intury, had indeed done much to equalise the voting power of the pper and lower classes ; but the first class and the knights of the ghteen centuries were still called on to give their suffrage first, id the other classes doubtless voted in the order determined by te property qualification at which they were rated. As the votes ^? each century were separately taken and proclaimed, the absolute lajority required for the decisions of the assembly might be ;tained without the inferior orders being called on to express their idgment, and it was notorious that the opinion of later voters was rofoundly influenced by the results already announced. Gracchus

'App. Bell. Civ. i. 23.

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proposed that the votes of all the classes should be taken in an order determined solely by the lot.¹ His interest in the Comitia Centuriata was probably due to the fact that it controlled the consular elections, and a democratic consulship, which he had vainly tried to secure by his support of Fannius, might be rendered more attainable by the adoption of the change which he advocated. The great danger of the coming year was the election of a consul strongly identified with the senatorial interest—of a man like Popillius who would be keen to seize some moment of reaction and attempt to ruin the leaders of the reform movement, even if he could not undo their work. It is practically certain that this proposal of Gracchus never passed into law, it is questionable whether it was ever brought before the Comitia. The reformer was immediately plunged into a struggle to maintain some of his existing enactments, and to keep the favour of the populace in the face of insidious attempts which were being made to undermine their confidence in himself.

The senate had struck out a new line of opposition, and they had found a willing, because a convinced, instrument for their schemes. It is inconceivable that a council, which reckoned within itself representatives of all the noblest houses at Rome, should not have possessed a considerable number of members who were in-duenced by the political views of a Cato or a Scipio, or by the lessons of that humanism which had carried the Gracchi beyond the bounds of Roman caution, but which might suffuse a more conservative mind with just sufficient enlightenment to see that much was wrong, and that moderate remedies were not altogether beyond the limits of practicability. But this section of senatorial opinion could find no voice and take no independent action. It was crushed by the reactionary spirit of the majority of the peers, and frightened at the results to which its theories seem to lead, when their cautious qualifications, never likely to find acceptance with the masses, were swept away by more thorough-going advocates. But the voice, which the senate kept stifled during the security of its rule, might prove valuable in a crisis. The moderate might be put forward to outbid the extremist; for his moderation would

¹ [Sail.] de Rep. Ord. ii. 8 Magistratibus creandis haud mihi quidem apsurde placet lex quam C. Gracchus in tribunatu promulgaverat, ut ex confusis quinque classibus sorte centuriae vocarentur. Ita coaequatus dignitate pecunia, virtute anteire alius alium properabit.

122 BC] COUNTER-LEGISLATION OF DRUSUS 23d

certainly lead him to respect the prejudices of the mob, while any excesses, which he was encouraged or instructed to commit, need not touch the points essential to political salvation, and might be corrected, or left to a natural dissolution, when the crisis had been passed and the demagogue overthrown. The instrument chosen by the senate was Marcus Livius Drusus,¹ the tribune who had threatened to interpose his veto on the franchise bill. There is no reason why the historian should not treat the political attitude of this rival of Gracchus as seriously as it seems to have been treated by Drusus^!s illustrious son, who reproduced, and perhaps borrowed from his father's career, the combination of a democratic propaganda, which threw specious unessentials to the people, with the design of maintaining and strengthening the rule of the nobility. The younger Drusus was, it is true, a convert to the Italian claims which his father had resisted; but even this advocacy shows development rather than change, for the party represented by the elder Drusus was by no means blind to the necessity for a better security of Italian rights. The difference between the father and the son was that the one was an instrument and the other an agent. But a man who is being consciously employed as an instrument, may not only be thoroughly honest, but may reap a harvest of moral and mental satisfaction at the opportunities of self-fulfilment which chance has thrown in his way. The position may argue a certain lack of the sense of humour, but is not necessarily accompanied by any conscious sacrifice of dignity. Certainly the public of Rome was not in the secret of-the comedy that was being played. It saw only a man of high birth and aristocratic culture, gifted with all the authority which great wealth and a command of dignified oratory can give,² approaching them with bounties greater in appearance than those which Gracchus had recently been willing to impart, attaching no conditions to the gift and, though speaking in the name of the senate, conveying no hint of the deprivation of any of the privileges that had so recently been won. And the new largess was for the Roman people alone; it was not depreciated by the knowledge that the blessings, which it conferred or to which it was added, would be shared by rivals from every part of Italy. An aspirant for favour, who wished to enter on a race with the

¹ Plut. C. Gracch. 8.

² Vir et oratione gravis et auctoritate (Cic. Brut. 28. 109) ijBei Se ko.1 \6y<j> xal whovTif rots niAiara Ti/tw/teVois ko.1 Svvapevois curb Tobrwv ivd/uWas (Plut. C. Gracch. 8).

240 A HISTORY OF ROME [B.C. 122

recent type of popular leader, must inevitably think of provision for the poor ; but a mere copy or extension of the Gracchan proposals was impossible. No measure that had been fiercely opposed by the senate could be defended with decency by the representative, and, as Drusus came in after time to be styled, the " advocate " of that body.¹ Such a scheme as an extension of the system of corn distribution would besides have shocked the political sense both of the patron and his clients, and would not have served the political purposes of the latter, since such a concession could not easily have been rescinded. The system of agrarian assignation, in the form in which it had been carried through by the hands of the Gracchi, had at the moment a complete machinery for its execution, and there was no plausible ground for extending this measure of benevolence. The older system of colonisation was the device which naturally occurred to Drusus and his advisers, and the choice was the more attractive in that it might be employed in a manner which would accentuate certain elements in the Gracchan scheme of settlement that had not commended themselves to public favour. The masses of Rome desired the monopoly of every prize which the favourite of the moment had to bestow; but Gracchus's colonies were meant for the middle class, not for the very poor, and the preliminary to membership of the settlements was an uncomfortable scrutiny into means, habits and character.² The masses desired comfort. Capua may have pleased them, but they had little liking for a journey across the sea to the site of desolated Carthage. The very modesty of Gracchus's scheme, as shown in the number of the settlements projected and of the colonists who were to find a home in each, proved that it was not intended as a benefit to the proletariate as a whole. Drusus came forward with a proposal for twelve colonies, all of which were probably to be settled on Italian and Sicilian soil;³ each of these foundations was to provide for three thousand settlers, and emigrants were not excluded on the ground of poverty. An oblique reflection on the disinterestedness of Gracchus's efforts was further given in the clause which created the commissioners for the foundation of these new colonies. Drusus's name did not appear in the list. He asked nothing for

¹ Suet. Tib. 3 Ob eximiam adversus Gracchos operam " patronus senatus" dictus.

"Plut. C. Gracch. 9.

»App. Bell. Civ. i. 35. See p. 283, note.

122 B.C.]

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241

himself, nor would he touch the large sums of money which must flow through the hands of the commissioners for the execution of so vast a scheme.¹ The suspicion of self-seeking or corruption was easily aroused at Rome, as it must have been in any state where such large powers were possessed by the executive, and where no control of the details of execution or expenditure had ever been exercised by the people ; and Gracchus's all-embracing energy had betrayed him into a position, which had been accepted in a moment of enthusiasm, but which, disallowed as it was by current sentiment and perhaps by the law,² might easily be shaken by the first suggestion of mistrust

The scheme of Drusus, although it proved a phantom and perhaps already possessed this elusive character when the senate pledged its credit to the propounder of the measure, was of value as initiating a new departure in the history of Roman colonisation. Even Gracchus had not proposed to provide in this manner for the dregs of the city, and the first suggestion for forming new foundations simply for the object of depleting the plethora of Rome—the purpose real or professed of many later advocates of colonisation— was due to the senate as an accident in a political game, to Drusus perhaps as the result of mature reflection. Since his proposal, which was really one for agrarian assignation on an enormous scale, was meant to compete with Gracchus's plan for the founding of colonies, it was felt to be impossible to burden the new settlers with the payment of dues for the enjoyment of their land. Gracchus's colonists were to have full ownership of the soil allotted to them, and Drusus's could not be placed in an inferior position. But the existence of thirty-six thousand settlers with free allotments would immediately suggest a grievance to those citizens who, under the Gracchan scheme of land-assignment, had received their lots subject to the condition of the payment of annual dues to the State. If the new allotments were to be declared free, the burden must be removed from those which had already been distributed.³Drusus and the senate thus had a logical ground for the step which seems to have been taken, of relieving all the land which had been distributed since the tribunate of the elder Gracchus from the pay-

¹ Plut. C. Gracch. io. ² P. 229, note 4.

³ Plut. C. Gracch. g A'iBios Se Kal r^v avo<pophv ravrriv (which had been imposed by the Gracchan laws) rHv veipapevuv cupatpuv fipecrKev alnois. The tense of veip.ap.evav seems to show that the Gracchan as well as the Livian settlers are meant. See Underhill in loc. In any case, the reimposition of the vectigal on the allotments by the law of ng (App. Bell. Civ. i. 27) proves that it had been remitted before this date.

242

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ment of vectigal. It was a popular move, but it is strange that the senate, which was for the most part playing with promises, should have made up its mind to a definite step, the taking of tvhich must have seriously injured the revenues of the State. But perhaps they regarded even this concession as not beyond recall, and they may have been already revolving in their minds those tortuous schemes of land-legislation, which in the near future were to go far to undo the work of the reformers.

The senate also permitted Drusus to propose a law for the protection of the Latins, which should prove that the worst abuses on which Gracchus dwelt might be removed without the gift of the franchise. The enactment provided that no Latin should be scourged by a Roman magistrate, even on military service.¹ Such summary punishment must always have been illegal when inflicted on a Latin who was not serving as a soldier under Roman command and was within the bounds of the jurisdiction of his own state; the only conceivable case in which he could have been legally exposed to punishment at the hands of Roman officials in times of peace, was that of his committing a crime when resident or domiciled in Rome. In such circumstances the penalty may have been summarily inflicted, for the Latins as a whole did not possess the right of appeal to the Roman Comitia.² The extension of the magisterial right of coercion over the inhabitants of Latin towns, and its application in a form from which the Roman citizen could appeal, were mere abuses of custom, which violated the treaties of the Latin states and were not first forbidden by the Livian law. But the declaration that the Latin might not be scourged by a Roman commander even on military service, was a novelty, and must have seemed a somewhat startling concession at a time when the Roman citizen was himself subject to the fullest rigour of martial law. It was, however, one that would appeal readily to the legal mind of Rome, for it was a different matter for a Roman to be subject to the martial law of his own state, and for the member of a federate community to be subjected to the code of this foreign power. It was intended that henceforth the Latin should suffer at least the degrading punishment of scourging only after the jurisdiction and on the bidding of his own native commander; but it cannot be determined whether

¹ thrus /mjS' eirl o-rpardas efij Tiva harlvav iaBSois oi/cicaa-floi (Plut. C. Gracch. a).

² The lex Acilia Rcpetundarum grants them the right of appeal as an alternative to citizenship as a reward for successful prosecution. Cf. the similar provision in the franchise law of Flaccus (p. 168).

122 B.C.] PROTECTION OF THE LATINS 243

he was completely exempted from the military jurisdiction of the Roman commander-in-chief—an exemption which might under many circumstances have proved fatal to military discipline and efficiency. There is every reason to suppose that this law of Drusus was passed, and some reason to believe that it continued valid until the close of the Social War destroyed the distinctions between the rights of the Latin and the Roman. Its enactment was one of the cleverest strokes of policy effected by Drusus and the senate; for it must have satisfied many of the Latins, who were eager for protection but not for incorporation, while it illustrated the weakness, and as it may have seemed to many, the dishonesty, of Gracchus's seeming contention that abuses could only be remedied by the conferment of full political rights. The whole enterprise of Drusus fully attained the immediate effect desired by the senate. The people were too habituated to the rule of the nobility to remember grievances when approached as friends; the advances of the senate were received in good faith, and Drusus might congratulate himself that a representative of the Moderates had fulfilled the appropriate task of a mediator between opposing factions.¹

We might have expected that Gracchus, in the face of such formidable competition, would have stood his ground in Rome and would have exhausted every effort of his resistless oratory in exhibiting the dishonesty of his opponents and in seeking to reclaim the allegiance of the people. But perhaps he held that the effective accomplishment of another great design would be a better object-lesson of his power as a benefactor and a surer proof of the reality of his intentions, as contrasted with the shadowy promises of Drusus. He availed himself of his position of triumvir for the foundation of the colony of Junonia—an office which the senate gladly allowed him to accept—and set sail for Africa to superintend in person the initial steps in the creation of his great transmarine settlement.²His original plan was soon modified by the opposition which it encountered ; the promised number of allotments was raised to six thousand, and Italians were now invited to share in the foundation.³

¹ Plut. C. Gracch. p.

'Appian (Bell. Civ. i. 24) says that Gracchus was accompanied by Fulvius Flaccus. Plutarch (C. Gracch. 10) implies that the latter stayed at Rome.

³ App. l.c. Appian represents this measure as having been proposed after the return of the commissioners to Rome. The words of Plutarch (C. Gracch. 8) airripTi)craTO to 7r\rj6os . . . Kak&v . . . eirl KOivtcvlq 7co\tTetas robs Aarivovs probably refer to an invitation of the Latins to share in these citizen colonies.

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[B.C. 122

jth of these steps were doubtless the result of the senate's dalliance th colonial schemes and with the Latins, but the latter may also i interpreted as a desperate effort to get the colony under weigh

any cost. Fulvius Flaccus, who was also one of the colonial mmissioners, either stayed at Rome during the entire period of s colleague's absence or paid but the briefest visit to Africa ; for ; is mentioned as the representative of the party's interests in ome during Gracchus's residence in the province.¹ The choice of e delegate was a bad one. Not only was Flaccus hated by the nate, but he was suspected by the people. These in electing him the tribunate had forgiven his Italian leanings when the Italian use was held to be extinct; but now the odium of the franchise ovement clung to him afresh, and suspicion was rife that the se-et dealings with the allies, which were believed to have led to the itbreak of Fregellae, had never been interrupted or had lately been lewed. The difficulties of his position were aggravated by faults

manner. He possessed immense courage and was an excellent ijhter; but, like many men of combative disposition, he was tact-.s and turbulent. His reckless utterances increased the distrust ith which he was regarded, and Gracchus's popularity necessarily smed with that of his lieutenant.²

Meanwhile the effort was being made to reawaken Carthage id to defy the curse in which Scipio had declared that the soil of te fallen city should be trodden only by the feet of beasts. No ruple could be aroused by the division of the surrounding lands; ie site where Carthage had stood was alone under the ban,³ and had racchus been content with mere agrarian assignment or had he tablished Junonia at some neighbouring spot, his opponents would ive been disarmed of the potent weapon which superstition invari->ly supplied at Rome. As it was, alarming rumours soon began i spread of dreadful signs which had accompanied the inauguration ' the colony.⁴ When the colonists according to ancient custom ere marching to their destined home in military order with andards flying, the ensign which headed the column was caught f a furious wind, torn from the grip of its resisting bearer, and lattered on the ground. When the altars had been raised and ie victims laid upon them, a sudden storm-blast caught the offer-

¹ See p. 243, note 2.

³ Mommsen in C. I. L. l.c.

³ Plut. C. Gracch. 10.

⁴ Plut. C. Gracch. 11.

122 B.C.] GRACCHUS IN AFRICA

245

ings and hurled them beyond the boundaries of the projected city which had recently been cut by the share. The boundary-stones themselves were visited by wolves, who seized them in their teeth and carried them off in headlong flight. The reality of the last alarming phenomenon, perhaps of all these omens, was vehemently denied by Gracchus and by Flaccus ;¹ but, even if the reports now flying abroad in Rome had any basis in fact, the circumstances of the foundation did not deter the leader nor frighten away his colonists. Gracchus proceeded with his work in an orderly and methodical manner, and when he deemed his personal supervision no longer essential, returned to Rome after an absence of seventy days. He was recalled by the news of the unequal contest that was being waged between the passionate Fulvius and the adroit Drusus. Clearly the circumstances required a cooler head than that possessed by Flaccus; and there was the threat of a still further danger which rendered Gracchus's presence a necessity. The consulship for the following year was likely to be gained by one of the most stalwart champions of ultra-aristocratic views. Lucius Opimius had been defeated when seeking that office in the preceding year, chiefly through the support which Gracchus's advocacy had secured to Fannius. Now there was every chance of his success;² for Opimius's chief claim to distinction was the prompt action which he had shown in the conquest of Fregellae_sand the large numbers of the populace who detested the Italian cause were likely to aid his senatorial partisans in elevating him to the consulship. The consular elections might exercise a reactionary influence on the tribunician ; and, if Gracchus's candidature was a failure, he might be at the mercy of a resolute opponent, who would regard his destruction as the justifiable act of a saviour of society.

When Caius returned, the people as a whole seemed more apathetic than hostile. They listened with a cold ear both to appeals and promises, and this coldness was due to satiety rather than suspicion. They had been promised so much within the last few months that demagogism seemed to be a normal feature of existence, and no keen emotion was stirred by any new appeal to their vanity or to their interests. Such apathy, although it may favour the military pretender, is more to be dreaded than actual

¹ App. Bell. Civ. i. 24. According to Appian, the wolf event occurred after Gracchus had quitted Africa.

² Plut. C. Gracch. 11.

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[B.C. 122

icontent by the man who rules merely by the force of character d eloquence. Criticism may be met and faced, and, the keener is, the more it shows the interest of the critics in their leader. :ricles was hated one moment, deified the next; but no man could ofess to be indifferent to his personality and designs. Gracchus ok the lesson to heart, and concentrated his attention on the one iss of his former supporters, whose daily life recalled a signal nefit which he had conferred, a class which might be moved by atitude for the past and hope for the future. One of his first ts after his return was to change his residence from the Palatine a site lying below the Forum.¹ Here he had the very poor as s neighbours, the true urban proletariate which never dreamed of ailing itself of agrarian assignments or colonial schemes, but set ?ery real value on the corn-distributions, and may have believed at their continuance would be threatened by Gracchus's fall from wer. It is probable, however, that, even without this motive, e characteristic hatred which is felt by the partially destitute r the middle class, may have deepened the affection with which •acchus was regarded by the poorer of his followers, when they (v him abandoned by the more outwardly respectable of his sup-rters. The present position of Gracchus showed clearly that the werful coalition on which he had built up his influence had imbled away. From a leader of the State he had become but 3 leader of a faction, and of one which had hitherto proved itself werless to resist unaided a sudden attack by the government.

From this democratic stronghold he promulgated other laws, 3 tenor of which is unknown, while he showed his sympathy with 3 lower orders in a practical way which roused the resentment of I fellow-magistrates.² A gladiatorial show was to be given in e Forum on a certain day, and most of the magistrates had erected mds, probably in the form of a rude wooden amphitheatre, which ay intended to let on hire.³ Gracchus chose to consider this oceeding as an infringement of the people's rights. It was per-ps not only the admission by payment, but the opinion that the closure unduly narrowed the area of observation and cut off all :w of the performance from the surrounding crowd,* that aroused

¹ Plut. C. Gracch. 12.

¹ Ibid, trvvervx* 8* aurtp Kal irpbs robs trvvdpxovras iv opyrj yeviffQai. trvvdpxovras :e is not limited to his colleagues in the tribunate.

³ i^nlo-Bovv (Plut. I.e.), probably to contractors who would sublet the seats.

⁴ Beesly The Gracchi, Marius and Sulla p. 53.

122 B.C.] GRACCHUS FAILS TO BE RE-ELECTED 247

Gracchus's protest, and he bade the magistrates pull down the erection that the poorer classes might have a free view of the spectacle. His request was disregarded, and Gracchus prepared a surprise for the obstinate organisers. On the very night before the *how he sallied out with the workmen that his official duties still placed at his disposal; the tiers of seats were utterly demolished, and when day dawned the people beheld a vacant site on which they might pack themselves as they pleased. To the lower orders it seemed the act of a courageous champion, to the officials the wild proceeding of a headstrong demagogue. It could not have improved Gracchus's chances with the moneyed classes of any grade; he had merged their chances of enjoyment with that of the crowd and violated their sense of the prerogatives of wealth.

But, although Gracchus may have been acting violently, he was not acting blindly. He must have known that his cause was almost lost, but he must also have been aware that the one chance of success lay in creating a solidarity of feeling in the poorer classes, which could only be attained by action of a pronounced and vigorous type. To what extent he was successful in reviving a following which furnished numerical support superior, or even equivalent to, the classes alienated by his conduct or won over by the intrigues of his opponents, is a fact on which we have no certain information. Only one mention has been preserved of his candidature for a third tribunate: and this narrative, while asserting the near approach which Gracchus made to victory, confesses the uncertainty of the accounts which had been handed down of the election. The story ran that he really gained a majority of the votes, but that the tribune who presided, with the connivance of some of his colleagues, basely falsified the returns.¹ It is a story that cannot be tested on account of our ignorance of the precautions taken, and therefore of the possibilities of fraud which might be exhibited, in the elections of this period. At a later period actual records of the voting were kept, in case a decision should be doubted;² and had an appeal to a scrutiny been possible at this time, Gracchus was not the man to let the dubious result remain unchallenged. But the story, even if we regard it as expressing a mere suspicion, suggests the profound disappointment of a considerable class, which had given its

¹ ^■fjcpwy pXv avrip TrKeicrruy yevofievwv, clSIkus 5e Hat Katcovpyus ticv ffvvapxdvrwv iroirjcraLifraiv ti\v avay&pevtnv leal itvdSeigiv. (Plut. l.c.) » Cic. in Pis. 15. 36 ; Varro R. R. iii. 5. 18.

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rourite its united support and received the news of his defeat th surprise and resentment. It breathes the poor man's suspicion

the chicanery of the rich, and may be an index that Gracchus ;ained the confidence of his humbler supporters until the end.

The defeat, although a terrible blow, did not crush the spirit

Gracchus; it only rendered it more bitter and defiant. It was w that he exulted openly in the destructive character of his work, d he is said to have answered the taunts of his enemies by telling em that their laughter had a painful ring, and that they did not t know the great cloud of darkness which his political activity d wrapped around their lives.¹ The dreaded danger of Opimius's ction was soon realised, and members of the newly appointed bunician college were willing to put themselves at the orders of 3 senate. The surest proof that Gracchus had fallen would be 3 immediate repeal of one of his laws, and the enactment which s most assailable was that which, though passed under another's me, embodied his project for the refoundation of Carthage. This ibrian law might be attacked on the ground that it contravened 3 rules of religious right, the violation of which might render any blic act invalid;² and the stories which had been circulated of 3 evil omens that had attended the establishment of Junonia, re likely to cause the scruples of the senate to be supported

the superstition of the people. Gracchus still held an official sition as a commissioner for colonies, if not for land-distribution d the making of roads, but none of these positions gave him the thority to approach the people or the power to offer effective ;al resistance to the threatened measure ; any further opposition ght easily take the form of a breach of the peace by a private lividual and give his enemies the opportunity for which they were tching; and it was therefore with good reason that Gracchus at >t determined to adopt a passive attitude in the face of the pro-sal of the tribune Minucius Rufus for the repeal of the Rubrian v.³ Even Cornelia seems to have counselled prudence, and it s perhaps this crisis in her son's career which drew from her the ssionate letter, in which the mother triumphs over the patriot d she sees the ruin of the Republic and the madness of her house

¹ us 'ZapS6viov yeXuna yeXutriv, ov ytyvucrKOVTes, Zffov avrois ctk6tos 4k tuv aitTov nite'xvTai TToXiTeipaTuv. (Plut. l.c.)

² Cic. pro Caec. 33. 95; pro Domo 40. 106. ⁹ [Victor] de Vir. III. 65.

121 B.C.] DEATH OF ANTULLIUS

249

in the loss which would darken her declining years.¹ This protest is more than consistent with the story that she sent country folk ² to swell the following and protect the person of her son, when she saw that he would not yield without another effort to maintain his cause. The change of attitude is said to have been forced on Gracchus by the exhortations of his friends and especially of the impetuous Fulvius. The organisation of a band such as Gracchus now gathered round him, although not in itself illegal, was a provocation to riot; and a disastrous incident soon occurred which gave his opponents the handle for which they had long been groping. At the dawn of the day, on which the meeting was to be held for the discussion, and perhaps for the voting, on the repeal of the threatened law, Gracchus and his followers ascended to the Capitol, where the opposite party was also gathering in strength. It seems that the consul Opimius himself, although he could not preside at the final meeting of the assembly, which was purely plebeian, was about to hold a Contio³or to speak at one summoned by the tribunes. Gracchus himself did not immediately enter the area in which the meeting was to be held, but paced the portico of the temple buried in his thoughts.⁴What immediately followed is differently told ; but the leading fact* are the same in every version.⁵ A certain Antullus or Antullius, spoken of by some as a mere unit amongst the people, described by others as an attendant or herald of Opimius, spoke some words —the Gracchans said, of insolence: their opponents declared, of patriotic protest—to Gracchus or to Fulvius, at the same time stretching out his arm to the speaker whom he addressed. The gesture was misinterpreted, and the unhappy man fell pierced with iron pens, the only weapons possessed by the unarmed crowd. There could be no question that the first act of violence had come from Gracchus's supporters, and the end for which Opimius had waited had been gained. Even the eagerness with which the leader had

•Cornelia ap. Corn. Nep. fr. 16 Ne id quidem tam breve spatium (sc. vitae) potest opitulari quin et mihi adversere et rem publicam profliges ? Denique quae pausa erit? Ecquando desinet familia nostra insanire ? Ecquando modus ei rei haberi poterit ? Ecquando desinemus et habentes et praebentes molestiis insistere ? Ecquando perpudescet miscenda atque perturbanda re publica ?

^a &s St) Bepicrras (Plut. C. Gracch. 13).

^s Plutarch (l.c.) says that the consul had "sacrificed" (Bicravros) and, if this is correct, Opimius must have summoned the meeting. ⁴ App. Bell. Civ. i. 25.

⁶ Plut. C. Gracch. 13 ; App. Bell. Civ. i. 25; [Victor] de Vir. III. 65. The last author calls the slain man Attilius and describes him as " praeco Opimii consulis ". Cf. Ihne Rom. Gesch. v. p. 103.

250

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[B.C. 121

disclaimed the hasty action of his followers might be interpreted as a renewed infringement of law. He had hurried from the Capitol to the Forum to explain to all who would listen the unpremeditated nature of the deed and his own innocence of the murder; but this very action was a grave breach of public law, implying as it did an insult to the majesty of the tribune in summoning away a section of the people whom he was prepared to address.¹

The meeting on the Capitol was soon dissolved by a shower of rain,² and the tribunes adjourned the business to another day; while Gracchus and Fulvius Flaccus, whose half-formed plans had now been shattered, hastened to their respective homes. The weakness of their position had been that they refused to regard themselves in their true light as the leaders of a revolution against the government. Whatever their own intentions may have been, it is improbable that their suppoiters followed them to the Capitol simply with the design of giving peaceful votes against the measure proposed : and, had Antullius not fallen, the meeting on the Capitol might have been broken up by a rush of Gracchans, as that which Tiberius once harangued had been invaded by a band of senators. Success and even salvation could now be attained solely by the use of force; and the question of personal safety must have appealed to the rank and file as well as to the leaders, for who could forget the judicial massacre which had succeeded the downfall of Tiberius? But the security of their own lives was probably not the only motive which led numbers of their adherents to follow the two leaders to their homes.³ Loyalty, and the keen activity of party spirit, which stimulates faction into war, must also have led them to make a last attempt to defend their patrons and their cause. The whole city was in a state of restless anticipation of the coming day ; few could sleep, and from midnight the Forum began to be filled with a crowd excited but depressed by the sense of some great impending evil.⁴

At daybreak the consul Opimius sent a small force of armed men to the Capitol, evidently for the purpose of preventing the point of vantage being seized by the hostile democrats, and then he issued notices for a meeting of the senate. For the present he remained in the temple of Castor and Pollux to watch events. When

¹ [Victor] I.e. Imprudens contionem a tribuno plebis avocavit. Cf. App. Bell. Civ. i. 25.

' Plut. C. Gracch. 14. ³ App. Bell. Civ. i. 25. «App. l.c.

121 B.C.] A STATE OF SIEGE DECLARED 251

the fathers had obeyed his summons, he crossed the Forum and met them in the Curia. Shortly after their deliberations had begun, a scene, believed to have been carefully prepared, began to be enacted in the Forum.¹ A band of mourners was seen slowly making its way through the crowded market-place ; conspicuous on its bier was the body of Antullius, stripped so that the wound which was the price of his loyalty might be seen by all. The bearers took the route that led them past the senate-house, sobbing as they went and wailing out the mourning cry. The consul was duly startled, and curious senators hastened to the door. The bier was then laid on the ground, and the horrified aristocrats expressed then detestation of the dreadful crime of which it was a witness. Their indignation may have imposed on some members of the crowd ; others were inclined to mock this outburst of oligarchic pathos, and to wonder that the men who had slain Tiberius Gracchus and hurled his body into the Tiber, could find their hearts thus suddenly dissolved at the death of an unfortunate but undistinguished servant. The motive of the threnody was somewhat too obvious, and many minds passed from the memory of Tiberius's death to the thought of the doom which this little drama was meant to presage for his brother.

The senators returned to the Curia, and the final resolution was taken. Opimius was willing to venture on the step which Scaevola had declined, and a new principle of constitutional law was tentatively admitted. A state of siege was declared in the terms that " the consul should see that the State took no harm,"² and active measures were taken to prepare the force which this decree foreshadowed. Opimius bade the senators see to their arms, and enjoined each of the members of the equestrian centuries to bring with him two slaves in full equipment at the dawn of the next day." But an attempt was made to avert the immediate use of force by issuing a summons to Gracchus and Flaccus to attend at the senate and defend their conduct there.⁴ The summons was perfectly legal, since the consul had the right to demand the presence of any

¹ Plut. C. Gracch. 14.

¹ Cic. Phil. viii. 4. 14 Quod L. Opimius consul verba fecit de re publica, de ea re ita censuerunt, uti L. Opimius consul rem publicam defenderet. Senatus haec verbis, Opimius armis. Cf. in Cat. i. 2. 4; iv. 5. 10. Plut. C. Gracch. 14 els to 8ov\evrr)ptoy aireAfloVres tyncpiaavro Kal Trpoaeratpy 'Oiripla rip iwdrcp crt&feiy tt)v v6\iy faras Sbvairo