The Specter over the Rock

* A HE summer of 1939 Franco was master in Spain. The remnants of the broken Republican forces took refuge in wretched camps across the Pyrenees, while their leaders scattered the world over. The small elements of opposition remaining in Spain were repressed without mercy.

Germany and Italy had given Franco vital aid in the battle; Germany had flown Franco's troops into Spain and then provided tanks, planes, instructors, and technicians. Italy had smuggled a large army into the field. These forces from abroad had enabled Franco finally to break the resistance of the ill-equipped Republican forces, exhausted by their struggle against the Moors. Their contribution created a lien to Hitler and Mussolini, a lien which the Fascist leaders sought to spin into an eternal bond. Thus Serrano Suner, the leader of the Executive Committee of the Falange (and Franco's brother-in-law), waved off the Italian legions on the quay at Cadiz on May 31st with the words:

"Every time the war- or battle-cry resounds on the Italian shores of the Mediterranean, the Spanish people from the Iberian shores of that sea will answer with the shout of 'Rome, Rome, Rome'; in this immortal word is our common destiny both Latin and Mediterranean. If Italy were threatened, a forest of Italo-Spanish bayonets would defend our common spiritual inheritance. . .

Still, all in all, Franco had no real reason to resent the way that Great Britain and the United States had behaved during the years of his war. Neither had put obstacles in his way. Rather the contrary. The British government had evaded all claims of the Republican government for aid by a deceptive program of "non-intervention." The United States, in a hasty action, had

prevented the government under assault from buying arms in the United States. Despite some distress of spirit the two governments had allowed the Republic to be destroyed. At the time, it had seemed to them part of the price of peace. And for the Conservative British government the prelude to friendship. Chamberlain wrote on the eve of Franco's victory (February 1939):

"I think we ought to be able to establish excellent relations with Franco who seems well disposed to us. . „ ¹

He was self-deceived. Franco and his circic felt no thanks for the helpful conduct of the democracies. A forced tribute-it was taken to be—to the virtue of their cause and the power of their allies. If any thanks were due, it was to Germany and Italy for recognizing his valiant fight against the evil movements that threatened the whole world. Of all forms of popular rule the new ruler of Spain felt a passionate distrust-as a wild seed-bed of opposition, anarchy, Communism, as it so often had been in Spain. Only as long as Hitler and Mussolini lived to dominate these forces could he feel safe. The obverse of this fact of fortune was that he might share in the triumph of the others.

The governments of the Allies came, in the midst of the war, to rue their consent to Franco's victory. For Spain became a specter—a dark, brooding form that might, in their time of weakness, pounce upon Gibraltar and the coast of Africa. But not until the fall of France, Before then it was sentenced to watch and tend its weakness. The Spanish islands in the Atlantic and even in the Mediterranean were exposed to attack by the British and French fleets. The Spanish colonies in Africa could not long have been defended, The invasion of Spain itself from the sea or across the Pyrenees was possible. The imports of food, fuel, and raw materials into all parts of the Spanish Empire were subject to an effective set and land blockade. By these facts, as long as France was in the battle, the Allies were protected against any vital wound, Spain was a suspect center of enemy action but not a menace,

*Keith Fciling: Life of Neville Chmthtrlmn, pjagc 394. The biographer adds: "On no conclusions was Conservative opinion more united man on these: that this had been a cml war, that *noa4ntervention/ with all its falsity had stopped it from beeoming European, that recognition was a question not of ideology but of fact, and that Franco was, if we allowed him to be, well disposed," Ibid., page 39*.

But when France fell, the specter was released, or so it seemed in that fearful period. All of Britain's strength was needed in the desperate struggle to defend its island and to keep the sea lanes open. There was none to spare to meet an attack by or through Spain. A strong and free German Army camped along the Pyrenees frontier. Gibraltar could not defend itself against a well-organized assault. Even though the Rock was held, the airfield and naval base could be made useless and passage through the western Straits impossible. If Britain lost the entry into the Mediterranean, the battle for Malta, Suez, and the whole of the East would be lost.

Thus the Spanish government seemed possessed of the power to decide whether Britain could continue to resist outside its island—perhaps even of the power to decide whether it could continue to fight at all. For if Germany could use the Spanish coasts in Africa and the Spanish islands in the Atlantic, the sustaining flow from the United States might be broken.

The British and American governments took the measure of these dangers. The struggle to influence or control Spanish action became crucial to their battle plans and hopes. To quiet the specter, or keep it confined, they used all their arts and powers. Spain became the focal point of their diplomacy. Every day the Rock remained unsurrounded was a day gained—until there was no further need to count the days gained. Their allies were Spanish misery and the internal divisions over which the Franco government ruled.

The Plight of the Country

On May 19th Franco celebrated his entry into Madrid. The sun was warm and the crowds in the Plaza Mayor were moved with thanks. The gruesome Civil War was at an end; those who •were unharmed and free could hope that life would again become calm and orderly. But entwined between the places at the official fepst, dislike ran like a table decoration. Spaniards, within and outside the government, were bitterly separated from one an- other. Many senior officers in the Army despised their new political associates. They were scornful of the ruffian and vulgar spirit of the Falange, being wont to say in private that the Army did the fighting while the Falange did the cheering and the profiteering. The industrialists, bankers, and merchants opposed the doctrines of state control of economic life, propounded by the political professors. Most of the aristocracy had little regard for the upstart government; even though it had returned their lands, they wished the monarchy restored. Elements in the Catholic clergy were openly or silently out of sympathy, being repelled by the intimate association between members of the new government and the un-Christian band of National Socialists. But most telling of all was the widespread covert hostility among the workers and the peasants. Add to these the sectional differences such as those which kept the Basques, the Catalonians, and the miners of Asturia apart from the rest of Spain. As Sir Samuel Hoare has said:

"Franco and Franco alone held together these differing elements."

In every move he had to take care not to lose the support of any ^; large faction, not to displace or displease any too greatly. The sustaining combination was like a country stone wall; undisturbed it might long endure and contain the land; but if a few large stones fell out, the whole might tumble.

Among the people of Spain there was but one common wish- that there be no renewal of fighting, They were tired and grieving, weary of killing and destruction. The crowd that stood beneath the brightly colored banners were mostly clothed in black. Proud Spaniards they were, but in no mood to suffer war again in pursuit of lost glories or lands. Like Sancho Panza, if asked they would have said:

"Not for me, for I have been bombasted by more than four hundred Moors, which have hammered me in such sort as the bruising of the pack-staves was gilded bread and spice cake in comparison of ic."

They had been glad to see the foreign legions depart. Their grim memory still contained tales of the cruel conduct of Napoleon's men, etched forever by Goya. They had found nothing to like about the Italian and German auxiliaries. Now the struggle was over, and they were gone,. Useful as they had been, none wished to have them come back

Many had been hungry for a long time and were still hungry. There was a serious shortage of bread; those who stood in the long bread lines, which formed hours in advance of the opening of the stores, were often turned away. They did not know from one day to the next whether they could get enough bread, olive oil, beans, or rice. Meat and milk were scarcer still.

Nor was the production of such essentials increasing. Many farms were still vacant and on others there were still not enough hands to do the work. Few had the fertilizer and tools needed to produce fully. Many factories were closed or half idle, since the machinery was out of order, or they lacked the cotton, copper, leather, rubber, or steel. The streetjcars and buses on which they rode to work were old, dirty, unrepaired. On some railroads the bridges were still down and the rails worn out; the cars were too few and the engines so old that they broke down on each trip. There was not enough room in the passenger coaches even to carry the wounded veterans back to their homes; nor enough room on the freight cars to carry necessities.

The Spanish government lacked the means of buying what it needed from other countries. It had few surpluses to export and no gold.

The Franco regime entered office with an intellectual wardrobe borrowed from Italy—tissue-paper patterns of state direction of economic life. One of the features was that Spain should be made self-sufficient in food, raw materials, and manufactures. During the first spell of office an attempt was made to shape Spanish life according to this pattern. Obscure decrees filled the columns of the badly printed newspapers. The main results were to hinder private efforts and to cram everyday life with paper forms. The production of food, coal, cloth, shoes, and fertilizers, all remained very low. Whatever propaganda can do, it cannot plow or fertilize the soil. Coal seams cannot be broken down by police standing in the entrance to the mines; broken locomotives and trucks cannot be made to run by the dirty grease of oratory; cotton mills cannot spin threats. These things the ministries under Franco began to find out.

They soon found themselves compelled to look outside again for help. They were forced to ask foreign governments to supply Spanish needs on credit, to seek goods in return for promises. The

German and Italian governments were not pleased that Spain was so necessitous. They were not willing to regard their previous aid to Franco merely as a gift to a joint cause. They had kept careful accounts of the cost. Germany had deformed its economic life to accumulate the means for war. The rulers of Germany were not willing to give away any of these reserves; they expected rather that the Spaniards would sweat and hunger to pay for the glorious revolution. The same was true of Italy, though that country had little to spare.

Thus the Spanish government had to turn toward the detested democracies, to make advances to the overseas world. It had to seek ways of obtaining products from the British Empire, the United States, and South America. These countries, and these countries alone, had the cotton, the wheat, the oil, the fertilizers, the rubber, and the machinery that were wanted. The simple law of need cut across the kinship of the conniving dictators.

Thus in the summer of 1939, even before the war had commenced, Spanish representatives in Britain and the Dominions, in the United States, Argentina, and Brazil, were asking for goods and for credit. The Spanish question facing the democracies took the form which it was to have throughout the war years: whether they wished a hungry or a thriving Spain, whether they dared trust the Spanish government enough to help its people.

NEED CLOTHED BY PRIDE AND PREJUDICE

Spain Turns to the Land of Cotton

The American government had recognized Franco as the ruler of Spain in April of 1939. The spacious Spanish Embassy on Sixteenth Street changed occupants. The black-bearded former professor of literature, Fernando de los Rios, whom the Republic had sent, left the house in which he had pleaded the popular cause to a circle of liberal journalists and officials. He had never pleased the State Department and was never at ease with it. The career diplomat, Juan Cardenas, returned with an air of easy habitude. In the patio of his well-graced home the influential and the social had spent many congenial hours. Their friendship had served him well in serving Franco well. During the years of the Civil War he had remained in the United States, pleading with quiet effectiveness the cause against the Republic and gaining material help for Franco's forces. With none of the brutal or domineering airs of Fascism in or about him, and at heart drawn more to Britain than to Germany, he was a well-selected agent for Madrid within the Washington diplomatic circle.

His first important errand was to secure American cotton on credit for the Spanish mills. This errand took him upon a visit to the Under Secretary of State on May 18th. He entered the Department with a complaint in hand. His government, he told Welles, wished him to make known its displeasure over the fact that the wife and the mother of the President had permitted their names to be used as sponsors for an exhibition of Picasso paintings in New York. This exhibit was for the benefit of Spanish refugees in the Civil War. One of the paintings expressed the terror of the bombing of Guernica. The exhibition, C&rdenas asserted, was being used to stir up and organize opposition to his government,

That it was bringing together many who detested the cruelty through which Franco had gained power, he was correct in perceiving. That Picasso's picture created repulsion against the regime of which he was the official defender, many visitors would attest. But most Americans would have told him that it was the deed, not the evocation of the deed, that should be suppressed.

Welles kept his lips dry. He did not apologize for the conduct of the Roosevelt ladies. He also refused to discuss the political propriety of the exhibition. The Ambassador had registered his protest and therefore performed his official duty; the Under Secretary had ignored the protest and therefore performed his.

Cardenas then turned to the real business that had brought him to the State Department. He asked if it was possible for the Spanish government to secure a two-year credit from the Export- Import Bank to buy 300,000 bales of American cotton. A loan of this kind, he calmly remarked, would improve the sentiment of the Spanish government and reopen the channels of normal trade between Spain and the United States.

The Ambassador was aware that there might be angry objections within the American government—particularly the Treasury. For the Franco government had brought an irritating lawsuit in the American courts to recover some fifteen million ounces of silver bought by the Treasury from the Bank of Spain in 1938. These purchases had provided dollars for the Republican government when in the utmost straits. It had had to pay cash for everything, The Ambassador entered into explanations of why the Franco government thought itself in the right. Welles refuted the justifying points and added that he was certain that the American courts would also reject them.¹

The State Department dealt with the loan request gingerly, with a wish to turn it into a trifle of no account except to the cotton trade. The men at the desks were divided between those who regretted that we had permitted Franco to come into power and those who were convinced that we had acted wisely. But they had entered into an armistice of opinion in regard to the event; all were, by then, willing to avoid an antagonizing revival of the argument.

Thus, the request was transmitted to the Export-Import Bank with the simple comment that the State Department had no objections if the bank found the business attractive. The credit seemed to fit the trade advantage of both countries. The American government controlled a large amount of cotton of which it was eager to be rid; the Spanish people needed to be clothed. The Spanish mills had almost no cotton and were equipped to use American growths. They were located in sections of Spain in which the masses had been supporters of the Republican government and remained unreconciled. If given work, they would have less time to nourish their sullen regret, and more to eat.

The officials of the bank were ready to do the business. This was the type of loan they preferred—short-term financing for the export of an American farm product. But a contrary will entered the meeting of the Board of Directors. Even though a spokesman for the State Department made known that the President approved the credit, as he had, the Treasury flatly refused approval. No loan would be granted—if it could prevent—to a foreign government that was bringing it before the bar for a transaction so just and legal. The silver suit was baseless and some of the language of the accusations insolent. Who was Franco to appeal to—and by so doing misuse—the American courts?

The Board did not act in the face of so intense an objection, knowing it would flare back from outside. Jesse Jones, the Federal Loan Administrator, who mostly ran the bank, tried to compose the question. He suggested to Cardenas that the Spanish government agree to drop the suit if the bank made the requested advance. But the Ambassador evaded by saying that this was a political matter. Perhaps he was made bold to reject Jones's terms by some tip that the loan would be made anyhow.

For on June 12th Welles informed the Ambassador that the President had decided the cotton loan should not be connected with the question of the silver suit. The thought was that this legal question should be permitted to take its course in the courts. The Secretary of the Treasury had evidently been rebuffed. But, as both the Ambassador and the State Department were to learn, he was not fazed.

The shunting of the silver suit, however, did not at once clear the way for the cotton loan. Another obstacle was now advanced, this time by the State Department. The Spanish government was being unfriendly to American business interests. It was hindering their efforts to restore trade connections, ignoring debts owed to them, and on the verge of casting out the most important of them —the telephone company. Why, it is now easy to understand, since we know that the Spanish government had promised to reserve all the good economic chances for Germany.^{^[1]}

To ignore this situation would have been almost equal to consent. The State Department therefore decided to require assurances of fair treatment for American business interests before the cotton loan was given. Welles so stated in a talk with C&rdenas on June 12th. His remarks bore upon the troubles of the largest American venture in Spain, the National Telephone Company, a subsidiary of the International Telephone and Telegraph Company. The system which it had built and run was, by common testimony, efficient and honest. Throughout the Civil War the whole working organization had, as several officers of the State Department could personally attest, conducted itself with caution and impartiality. Yet the Franco government had taken control of the property and would not permit the owners even to enter the country. Welles pointed out that if the American government gave credit to Spain while American property was being taken away, criticism, and just criticism, would follow.

The Ambassador skillfully wondered aloud whether the troubles of the Telephone Company might not be of a special kind rather than a Spanish policy towards the United States, Stories were mentioned for which, the Ambassador said, he would not vouch. Had not the president and other officials of the American-owned Telephone Company been on congenial terms with the leaders of the Spanish Republican government, and had not the company building in Madrid been put to use defending that city against

Franco's attack? ³ Welles dismissed both the stories and their meaning. The talk made clear that the American government intended to give protection but left the issue for another day. The fight to reclaim this American property turned out to be long and underground.

Thus the loan was held up and again (during June) Jones, after talking with the President and the Secretary of State, tried to find a way to free the business from the clamps of circumstance. This might be done by shrinking it and cutting it into sections. He suggested to the Ambassador that the credit be limited to the amount needed to pay only for Spain's most proximate need for cotton- some forty to sixty thousand bales. Who could raise a hue and cry about so small a sum; who would promote questions of principle? But the Spanish government did not hurry to grasp this way out of the difficulty. No answer was made to the American request to be assured that American interests in Spain would be given fair and friendly chances. The State Department waited, saying nothing more. The Spanish government professed not to understand why; as so often later, it tried to appear completely unaware of any possible reason for our difficult behavior. Spanish diplomacy often cultivated an air of innocence.

On June 28th Cardenas returned to the theme. This talk with Welles was a delicate minuet in which each knew well the steps

3 Later talks between the American Ambassador in Madrid and officials of the Spanish government revealed the variety of reasons that influenced the Spanish government in its refusal to restore the property to the control of the International Telephone Company. Among those that emerged were: (r) that during the Civil War Franco had asked Sosthenes Behn, president of the company, for various forms of help and Behn had not acceded; (2) the company had continued to furnish service to Madrid throughout the Civil War-, (3) various government officials and members of the Falange longingly eyed the important and profitable posts within the company; (4) the German government was urging the Spanish government to expel the American company and to transfer the property to a Spanish company in which Germany could count upon having important influence; (5) Serrano Suner, Minister of the Interior, was eager to destroy any and all American influence in Spain.

The property was, as will be told in later pages, presently restored to American ownership. This action was followed, by an offer of the Spanish government to buy the property with gold, which could only have come from German sources. At the request of the American government, the company refused to sell.

and turns. He said that he was instructed by his government to state that if the reasons for the delay could be solved by action on its part, the action would be taken; but otherwise it would have to change greatly the whole of its cotton-buying policy. The Ambassador gave point to this remark by recalling that the Spanish mills were equipped to use those lengths of cotton which were grown in the United States, especially in Texas. However, if Spain could not secure American cotton, it would begin to modify the looms and the United States might lose the Spanish market permanently. The American fear of loss of export markets, it may be observed, was one upon which all the dictators of Europe at one time or another wrongly counted. They mistook our eagerness to do business for a readiness to put aside both justice and patriotism in order to do business.

Then Cardenas progressed to another type of appeal. By making the loan, he suggested, we could influence the direction of Spanish political policy. For, he said, if the Foreign Minister, Count Jor- dana, and other moderate colleagues could point to this cotton loan as proof, they would be the more able to defend their view that it was best for Spain not to cling to the Axis. Lessen the necessity to do so, was the essential argument, so often to be repeated later, and those many elements in Spain who wished to remain outside the Axis orbit might be helped to prevail. The reference to the Foreign Minister's purposeful effort was valid; he was at this time rebuffing Italian proposals for military and political pacts. Shortly thereafter (August i ith) he was dismissed from office, but will reappear again as a leading figure in this narrative—a fighter for Spanish independence.

Welles, who in previous talks had been inclined to take an easy, friendly view of the matters under discussion, became more formal. But his response did not follow C&rdenas's traces into Spanish foreign policy. It stayed within the bounds of direct American concern as then conceived- He said that obstacles had arisen of which only the President could dispose and added the hope for a quick decision. He then once again repeated our misgivings in regard to the treatment of American interests in Spain. The Department was being currently advised by the Embassy in Madrid that the German government had submitted a program for entrusting the telephone-telegraph system to a company to be manned by Germans. Cardenas, who was about to leave for Madrid, promised that he would make another effort to obtain the assurances asked by us.

It may be presumed that he did his best. But the diplomatic minuet went on through July. The Department was determined that it would not permit the American enterprise in the communications field to be despoiled and possibly replaced by a German one. It was a test of whether Spain was prepared to ignore our just rights and interests. And besides, it was a test of whether Serrano Suner and other intimates of the Axis were strong enough to lead Spain into the coming conflict. Further, the American government now began to want something else before it would make the loan. Americans who had fought in the Republican Army were still being held as prisoners. Our repeated requests that they be permitted to return home had been evaded.

The American Ambassador in Madrid, Weddell, alertly took up our cause. He made the circuit of the Spanish Cabinet— with the exception of the member who was causing the trouble, Serrano Suner, the Minister of the Interior. That official controlled internal communications and was plainly bent on taking the property over. Weddell made his tour under formal orders from Washington not to bargain. The American government maintained the formal position that its .requests were just in themselves and that we would not buy satisfaction by promising a loan. If the Spanish government wished to obtain the loan, it would be well advised to remove legitimate causes for objection. Thus there was no bargain. There was merely a related succession of actions- some to be taken by the Spanish government, some by the American.

For the need for cotton prevailed. On July 24th Ambassador Weddell talked with Franco and the new Foreign Minister, Beigbeder. Franco agreed to release the former American members of the Republican Army. He also agreed to permit the American owners of the telephone company to enter Spain; this gave them at least the chance to fight for their property. It also meant that the danger that Germany might gain control was postponed and probably ended. The company officials were admitted at the end of July. Shortly thereafter the loan was approved. The first consignments of cotton left New Orleans for Spain. The way seemed to have been opened to the resumption of regular trade between the United States and Spain. The Export-Import Bank announced on August 7th that it would provide 80 per cent of the credits, totaling 13,700,000 dollars. This sum was to be used to buy 250,000 bales of American cotton to be shipped in ten monthly lots.

The State Department made as little as possible of the transaction. Secretary of State Hull had passed by all earlier queries of the press, with an annoyed glance at those who implied that a loan might have a moral and political tinge. This attitude was maintained. Welles, then Acting Secretary, at his press conference of August 7th, disposed of questions by stating that the matter was entirely a commercial transaction. The State Department would not be drawn out further. Pretense or obtuseness? But not grave or without reason. The deal was small; it might incline Spain to a friendlier course; if it failed to do so, little would be lost; the Spaniards under Franco would have a few more shirts, dresses, tablecloths, while to give an account of what had been obtained in return might put our Spanish friends in a corner. So the reasoning ran.

But within a few weeks the world was at war. Much as the American government might, for a while longer, wish our trade with Spain to remain a matter of only commercial significance, it could not be so. Each item became a factor in the war strength of nations. By what standards or purposes should the exchange henceforth be guided? How, under the unsettled circumstances within Spain, could we best achieve them? These questions lay in wait They were to become, after the fall of France, knotted strings around papers that grew damp with fingering. But before trying to unravel them, it is in order to follow Spain's career, as a restless neutral, through the winter of 1939-40.

Ill

SPAIN THE RESTLESS NEUTRAL (SEPTEMBER 1939-JUNE 1940)

The Clamp of Circumstance

During the first period of the war Juan Beigbeder was Foreign Minister for Spain. He was a voluble and supple man, bold in his beliefs that Britain would win and that Spain must be kept out of the conflict. These became the more determined as he found the authority of his office usurped by a colleague, whose longing it was then to make Spain part of the Axis. Serrano Sufier had been a provincial lawyer from Saragossa. An avid gift for political agitation, power to hate in a time of hate, and marriage to the sister of Franco's wife had brought him to the top of the heap. He was head of the Executive Council of the Falange, the sole political party in Spain, and Minister of the Interior. The first office put him in working companionship with the leaders of the Fascist Party in Italy and the National Socialists in Germany, a figure in their celebrations. The second office placed him in control of the press and the police of Spain. Franco used him, not his Foreign Minister, as liaison with the rulers of Germany and Italy. The lines of attraction, and repulsion between Spain and these men wbve through the sheaves of his nature.

In June 1939 Serrano Suner drove through the streets of Naples with his friend Ciano, the Italian Foreign Minister. The latter has left behind an impression of his companion as he then appeared in Axis eyes:

"He is a slender, sickly man—one of those creatures notable for study and reflection; a very conscientious man, honest and full of enthusiasm. Having been caught in the whirlpool of the revolution, he has become both actor and author, and brings to his task a passionate faith. Intelligent, but still somewhat inexperienced, he wavers in his judg-

merit between the results of the practical knowledge he has acquired and the vague and metaphysical expression of his reflections. But it is always feeling that dominates him: he hates and loves impetuously."¹

On this man (and the elements about him) the Axis leaders based their policy in Spain. They relied upon him to prod Franco into the making of a government fit and eager for their kind of revolution and war. His ambition-to become Minister for Foreign Affairs—sought its path through them. It was to be the clasp by which Spain and the Axis would be joined together. Pleasing by tribute and promise, he sought their help in getting the chance to please them more. Ciano advised his chief that Serrano Suffer wished to become Foreign Minister and that it was in the interest of the Italians that this should happen, adding that Serrano Suner would be grateful if Mussolini persuaded Franco to that end. Before the war was over, the Axis leaders—particularly Hitler- came to think themselves bitterly deceived by this Spanish agent. For he turned out to be more daring in word than in deed; giving as a suitor, but ungiving when Spain's help was wanted; an independent and scornful Spaniard in his crooked way; and quite unable to make the Spanish people feel as he felt about the Axis cause. Neither actor nor author, but an upstart guardian of his own career.

Serrano Suner, on this June visit to Italy before the war, described to Ciano the elements in the Spanish situation that doomed it for the time being to the role of neutral

"We touch on many points: war, Spain fears a war in the near future because she is today at the end of her resources. In certain regions there is famine. If she can have two or preferably three years' time, she can reconstitute herself and complete her military preparations. Spain will be on the side of the Axis because she will be guided by feeling and reason. A neutral Spain would, in any event, be destined to a future of poverty and humiliation. Furthermore, Franco Spain intends to solve the problem of Gibraltar; as long as the British flag flies on Gibraltar, Spain will not be a completely free and sovereign nation. The youth of Spain lives in the desire and hope of pushing the English into the sea, and is getting ready to do so. Spain also has accounts to square with France, that 'dishonest and dishonorable France/ and

* The Ciano Diaries 1939-43, entry for June 5, 1939.

these accounts are called Morocco and political and economic independence." ²

Thus Ciano paraphrased Serrano Suner, recording at the same time that

"Serrano Suner was very happy to learn that we and the Germans also wish to postpone the conflict for some years."

In July Ciano returned Serrano Suner's visit. Dinners, receptions, parades, and toasts all seemed to point to the conclusion of a full military and political alliance. But when the emptied orators and soldiers parted, and the uniforms were put away, talk had not been turned into troth. Franco held aloof from any decisive engagement. He had expressed a wish for five years of peace—during which Spain might recover and prepare to identify herself with the system of the Axis—and had welcomed Ciano's confirmation of Serrano Suner's report. Thus Spain remained unengaged, though far from free.

For Franco had joined the Anti-Comintern Pact and sworn common cause. He had, during the maturing time of victory, entered into a Pact of Friendship with Germany. This provided that in case one of the contracting parties got into war, the other would avoid everything in the political, military, and economic spheres that could accrue to the disadvantage of the treaty partner or to the advantage of the latter's opponent.⁸

This accord was supplemented by various secret pacts which provided for close co-operation with Germany in the direction of the Spanish police, press, and propaganda. An agreement between the navies provided for help to German naval and blockade- running operations. In short, the Spanish government was pledged to observe, should war come, a favorable, a more than favorable neutrality. So, in any case, these pacts were taken by the Italian and German governments to mean, as confirmed by Ciano after his talk with Franco on July 19th.

But though placing himself in this fashion on the Axis side if war should come, Franco's real and dominating wish—as has been

² Ciano, op. cit.

* Article VI, German-Spanish Pact of Friendship, signed March 31, 1939, ratified November 29, 1939.

said-was for a long period of peace, so that Spain might recover and his regime become well enough established to stand the stress of war, perhaps to profit by it. Spain—he let Berlin and Rome clearly know—was unhappy over the danger of war in Europe and unready to enter into it. Hitler permitted him to go through the summer with the consoling belief that war would be avoided; and that the vows of loyalty and help for Germany would not be soon tested.

The event was in shocking disregard of these hopes. The Spanish government could only watch and wait. Geography, economic conditions, and the misery of the people would have defeated even an ardent wish to enter on the Axis side. But the wish was reserved and tinged with bitterness. Hitler had ignored the requests for time. He, for his own ends, had entered into a pact with the Communists, deeply feared and hated by many of the Spanish leaders. The vaunted paladin in that crusade had turned out to be no paladin at all.

On September 4th the Spanish government announced its neutrality in the most correct language:

"Officially recognizing the state of war which unfortunately exists between Poland, Britain and France on the one hand and Germany on the other, I ordain by the present decree the most strict neutrality on the part of Spanish subjects in accordance with contemporary laws and principles of international law."

Franco accompanied this announcement by an appeal "to the common sense and the responsibility of the rulers of the nations" to direct the efforts of all to the localization of the conflict. American policy at the time is reflected in Secretary Hull's quick and warm response to this plea for neutrality, which said that Franco's "moving appear' had been read with "deep interest" ⁴

The German government did not protest or complain. Franco gave assurances that he would do what he could, within the practical limits of the situation, to show his friendship, Germany could be sure, he sent word, that Spanish neutrality would be benevolent. The German Ambassador in Madrid assured the Foreign Minister that Germany also had a great interest in the

⁴ §tate Department Press Release No. 393, September 5,

observance of Spanish neutrality and wished only that the Spanish government would shut its eyes from time to time.

But it was not easy during the first months of the war to deviate from an honest, neutral course. The Spanish government did not dare, even if it had truly wished, to serve Germany. British sources in Spain seemed to learn of most projects before the anchor was hoisted or the disguise completed. British and French ships kept most vigilant watch along the Spanish coasts and among the Spanish islands. They sometimes failed to gauge closely the limits of Spanish territorial waters, without serious reproof. Extensive plans, drawn up by Germany before the war, to outwit the blockade and supply German submarines with Spanish aid, had mainly to be deferred. Irked and depressed, Franco devoted himself to the urgent tasks of getting the means needed by the Spanish people to live and work, order within his government, and the suppression of his domestic enemies.

ALL SIDES DEAL WITH A HUNGRY SPAIN

First Germany, then the Allies, then the United States

lHE Spanish government had also pledged itself to show special regard to Germany in economic matters. In their Pact of Friendship (March 1939) the two governments had written that they were unified in the wish to increase the economic relations between their two countries as much as possible.¹

The Spanish government did not disclaim this wish, but it found it necessary to subordinate it. After the advent of war Germany was not able to supply the products that Spain most wanted. The Spanish government was compelled to seek francs, sterling, and dollars and the goods they would buy. For a time after the outbreak of the war it tried to reward special allegiance with special favor—sending to Germany goods that the Spanish people needed. But there was no easy and safe transport route from Spain to Germany. Then, frightened of a revolt of hunger, it began to bargain with Germany in the same way as with the Allies.

The trade missions of all countries were welcomed in Madrid; no suitor was rejected because of early vows. But the banns with Germany were drawn up first. A series of economic accords was signed on December 22nd. The German officials were able to report at the end of their mission that the Spanish government pursued a policy that was basically friendly to Germany, But they also observed that among the Spanish negotiators there were some who opposed ideas of joining the Spanish economy too closely with Germany.

¹ This supplemented the provision in the Secret Protocol of July i6> 1937, signed at Burgos, which provided for German collaboration in the economic reconstruction of Spain, especially in the development of minerals and raw materials.

In these accords the Spanish government agreed to take pains to reserve to Germany the greatest possible margin of exports, especially of those products in the delivery of which Germany was particularly interested.^{^[2]} It also promised to try to comply with Germany's import demand for Spanish commodities, except those needed by Spain and those which in view of the foreign- exchange situation Spain felt it had to reserve for export to other countries. But these loose promises were hedged around.

The needs of Spain were so many and so great, its representatives insisted, that it had /to obtain goods of the same value as it sent to Germany; and at the same time. This was expressed in a provision that the trade was to be in balance. The German government took this blend as the best procurable and set its state trading organization (Sofindus) to work to extract the utmost. For several years it secured far more than it gave; Germany was until 1942 a drain upon Spanish economic life.^{^[3]}

The French and British trade missions were just as industrious as the German. In January 1940 the Spanish government signed an agreement with France which stipulated an extensive trade in designated goods, some of which Germany wanted. This accord had two attractions for the Franco regime; it contained a promise of greatly needed goods, and it was a kind of assurance that France would not support domestic enemies.^{^[4]} To the French government the accord was a payment for Spanish quiet and a means of reducing the volume of products that Spain might send to Germany. These aims smothered doubts as to whether a fire was being kindled for the devil.

The talks with Britain were longer drawn out despite the fact that the Civil War had not cut established trade ties with Spain, The British bargained patiently for the war supplies they wanted, counting on Spanish needs of goods from the Empire. Unlike the French, they would not accept an accord with patches of Spanish sky; they wanted to know just how it would work, because the French agreement was failing. Without success, they tried to get promises that Spain would use its ships to carry products to Britain through dangerous waters.

The British-Spanish agreements were concludcd on March r8, 1940. They formed a mechanism for trade rather than an exact program of trade.^{^[5]} Old debts were adjusted and Britain agreed to advance Spain 2,000,000 pounds for future purchases. Spain promised not to re-export products sccured from the sterling area and to limit or prohibit the export of certain other goods to the Axis.

The British government was, no doubt, aware that this war trade agreement might later make it possible for Spain to give Germany greater help. It decided to overlook this aspect of the deal and to use the resources of the British Empire as a weight in the future struggle for influence,

Churchill, on becoming Prime Minister, did not dispute this policy.⁰ Indeed, after the disaster in France he clung to it tenaciously. For the economic bond became the only substitute for divisions of tanks and squadrons of planes. Thus, when in May 1940 Sir Samuel Hoare was rushed to Madrid on the anxious errand of keeping Spain out of the war, he was told particularly to press forward with the trade arrangements envisaged in these agreements. There was no other way in which Britain at the time could so clearly show its usefulness, its command over the seas, and its power to carry on.

In these ways, then, the poor neutral, Spain, arranged to obtain essentials from the nations at war. Each found it best to give that

it might get, and to keep Spain out of the clutches of the others.

During this cycle of negotiation the American government pursued a semi-detached course. It did not interfere with the flow of private trade between the United States and Spain. This was limited only by Spain's power to pay and the Allied naval control. A few American exports, oil above all, grew greatly, but they passed through the British blockade. The State Department was still trying, during this period, to sustain rights claimed as a neutral. As late as January-February 1940 it lurched into and out of a series of quarrels with the British government over what we chose to regard as infringements of these rights, especially the rough handling of American mails and ships. The American government was not ready to control trade with other neutrals to serve the defense of Britain and France. The Executive had no legal authority to do so; Congress had refused to grant it. Besides, were these countries not trading with Spain?

But the State Department abstained from attempts to foster American trade with Spain by negotiating a trade agreement. The traffic was unpopular. In any newspaper office tales could be heard of secret funneling to the Axis. Further, the Spanish government was still punishing American commercial and investment interests. The fight for control over the Spanish telephone system was not at an end. The Spanish government, despite the gesture it made while the cotton loan was being arranged, prevented the American group from resuming actual direction of their property.

Weddell pleaded with patience but he was put off time and again. The State Department made clear through the Spanish Ambassador in Washington that Spain could expect no economic help until right was done in this matter. The tedious dispute was relieved a bit in December (1939) by a turn in Spanish tactics. The Minister of Finance hinted broadly that if the American government would expedite (by an advance or otherwise) the minting of a great quantity of Spanish coins in the United States, the telephone company might get a favorable hearing. The operation would have yielded the Spanish Treasury a good profit. Upon Weddell's advice, the hint was ignored.

For the American government had concluded that it could not count on goodwill to produce justice. That, it was gradually realized, would come into sight only if and when Spain could not get along without us. Economic conditions within Spain were growing worse as winter went on. Wheat, cotton, and oil became scarcer. Spanish reserves of foreign exchange became smaller. Franco had foreseen that this was likely to be so.

In a radio broadcast on New Year's Eve of 1940 Franco tried to clear himself of any blame because the sacks and stores were empty. He passed it out with virtuous complacency. Most of all to blame were the countries which had refused to bow to the regenerative doctrines of Germany and Italy, and thus brought about the war. Next were the Spaniards who had fought him with consequent harm to the nation's economy. And next were those

"unscrupulous merchants who trade on the miseries of others."

Here he took a fling in defense of the anti-Semitism of his friends:

"You will now understand the persecution of certain races which other countries, to safeguard their historic destinies, were forced to persecute and isolate because they had become a national peril. Thanks to God and clear vision of our Catholic King and Queen Ferdinand and Isabella, we were once freed of such a dangerous burden as all those speculators attached to easy gains and sinister speculations."

The Spanish people were not moved to join in the praise of persecution, for they knew that the most talented traders in misery were members of the Falange.

By speeches such as this the Spanish leaders sought to teach their people to endure their troubles, They thought to make hunger less gnawing by spicing it with hatred and contempt for the well-fed plutocracies. But as they became aware that the next harvest was not going to be good, pride fell before fertility. In the spring of 1940 the Spanish government began to hint that it would be greatly pleased to obtain succor from the United States.

FRANCO ASKS US FOR A LOAN, THEN PAUSES (MAY-JUNE 1940)

The Request

During the spring of 1940 the protests over the shortage and dearness of food in both the cities and the provinces of Spain became louder. Imports had just made it possible to maintain a too small ration, which was poorly distributed. The harvest prospects were bad. It became clear that Spain would have to secure from overseas at least a million tons of wheat as well as other foodstuffs.

The government was so absorbed with these problems of need and internal order that it was glad to stay on its edge of the war. Both civilian and military leaders repeatedly affirmed that Spain would maintain its position of neutrality unless directly attacked. They continued to do so during April and even into early May, while the German armies conquered Norway and began to sweep over Belgium, Holland, and France. In fact, these swift successes at first seemed to alarm rather than exalt the Spanish government. A sudden fear appeared that Italy might not only strike against France, but also seize the Balearic Islands. At the same time, so the current of fear expanded, the large German Fifth Column in Spain might spring into action to gain control of the government. The dictators had not yet had a full chance to become familiar with each other's ways; but what knowledge they had was enough to make them watchful.

Under these combined trials—hunger, weakness, and fright—the Spanish government was impelled to improve its relations with the United States. Early in May Serrano Suner at last seemed to relent in regard to the telephone company. On the 15th he signed an agreement with the American owners whereby they would be

²7

permitted to regain control of the property and management. Or so both they and Weddell, the American Ambassador, construed the deed. In reporting progress on this matter Weddell had let the State Department know that both Franco and Serrano Suner had broadly hinted that the time was ripe for the United States to give further help to Spain, but that he had said nothing.

The German economic delegation had written in the January (1940) report upon their return to Berlin that Franco did not wish to borrow from any belligerent government since Spain was pursuing a neutral policy and did not wish to impair its painfully acquired independence.

But now he felt compelled to turn, not to a belligerent, but to another neutral whose sympathies were plainly on the other side. On May 15th Cardenas told Welles, with a veiled air, that he had received a rather vague and indefinite instruction to find out if the Spanish government could secure in the United States a credit of between 120 and 200 millions of dollars. Welles replied at once that it was out of the question that the American government could extend a credit of anything like this size in view of the limited resources of the Export-Import Bank.

But this call left agitation in its wake. The answer did not dispose of the issue within the American government. It was not easy, even for a participant like myself in the agitated discussion, to know what was going on. The sense prevailed, when our relations with Spain were in question, of watching a sleight-of-hand act from the second row. Now the hat was empty; now the ears of the rabbit were visible; now they were out of sight. At one moment the performance took place on the right of the stage. The next it took place on the left. And all the time the performers were anxiously watching the audience.

To all except a few of the officials concerned, the idea of helping Franco was unpleasant—to be avoided if possible. But there were a few, chiefly in or about the European Division of the State Department, who did not seem to mind this concession to his power to survive; while aligned against them were others who would not grant him aid, no matter what the consequences. The Secretary of State was more the arbiter than judge. The attitude of the President seemed to quiver between distaste and the tales of caution that were carried to him. Until the United States was almost in the war, Britain's wishes often swayed the uncertain quorum.

But besides the matter of judgment there was a question of popular feeling. The Franco regime was disliked; suspect to most and hated by many. The liberal press was excitedly alert to every rumor of intended American aid, suspicious of the State Department, and skeptical of the idea that such aid could serve the Allied cause. Sources within the government kept this section of the press well supplied with "dope," which was at times more arousing than accurate.

In retrospect, as the following narrative will show, the prevailing judgment of the press that it would have been foolish to have substantially helped Franco at that particular time (May-June 1940) seems correct. But much of the press comment was unfair in one respect. It tended to view the willingness of the State Department to consider such action as indicative of a positive design to help Franco to remain in power. No wish of this kind was avowed even in closed and discreet sessions; and if it had been, it would have been disregarded. The central question that engaged attention was different; would help, or the mere prospect of help with conditions, serve to guard against the danger of Spanish entry into the war on the side of the Axis? That was the only focus of debate. But it is true that advisers tended to cluster around the answer that matched their feeling about Franco and his fate.

The failure of Cardenas to receive any encouragement on his first call did not cause the Spanish government to quit the attempt to get a loan. The Minister of Finance, who had hitherto shown no interest in trade with the United States, took the matter up next.¹ After admitting on May 24th that there had been a difference of opinion within the government as to whether to resort to borrowing, he said it was now recognized to be necessary. Without foreign credits Spain would not recover. Howard Buck- nell, the Charg6 d'Affaires, remarked that our response was certain to be influenced by Spain's course in the war. The Minister

The Spanish shortage of dollars at this time was shown by the fact that the proceeds of the Spanish gold shipments to the United States were spent even before the gold reached this country. The gold itself was assayed at only about 60 per cent and included a lot of old gold and jewelry.

stated earnestly that Spain was determined to maintain her neutrality and had given no contrary promises. There is every reason to think him sincere, a worried Secretary of Treasury trying to get money to pay for supplies. France was not yet at this date clearly beaten. The rich Moroccan lands had not yet fallen on the gaming table of war.

The officials in the State Department argued, under the cool guidance of the Under Secretary, about the response to be made to the Minister of Finance. They were reading with dismay that series of cables in which Ambassador Bullitt vividly told—often with news and insight in advance of the press—of the crumbling of French resistance. When the forecast end came, who could foresee how Spain would behave? But all agreed that until the situation was clearer, it was wise to hold out hope that we might take care of Spanish needs. It seemed foolish to put Franco in a position to justify entry into the war by telling the Spanish people that it was essential if they were to live and work. Later, the intention was reserved, we could give further thought to the conditions of aid.

Ambassador Weddell was then on his way to Washington. The State Department therefore cabled the Charg<5 on May 27th to tell the Spanish government that the loan request was before us, that Weddell would fly back at once with our reply, and to ask Franco to see him as soon as he arrived in Madrid. With quickness unusual in Madrid, the answer was given that Franco would see the Ambassador between June 6th and roth.

Weddell found that the State Department was disposed to grant aid if Spain behaved well. But it was not ready—pending further knowledge of Spain's intention-to talk dollars and cents, or bushels of wheat and bales of cotton. There was a wish to reserve any firm or clear promise, and a groping for a form of help least open to popular criticism. These thoughts shaped WeddelYs instructions* He was authorized to inform the Spanish government that we were ready to consider credits, particularly for the purchase of products such as cotton and corn of which the American government itself possessed a surplus. We were also willing to give sympathetic attention to such further proposals as the Spanish government might care to make. This guarded tender—if it may be so called-was trimmed with cautions and conditions.

The kind and amount of help, it was specified, would depend upon our available surpluses and credit facilities. The Spanish government in return was to be asked to promise to treat our trade fairly. And, above all, Weddell was told that he should make it daylight clear that credit in any form could only be arranged if Spain remained neutral. This notice was not merely a careful word from a lender to a borrower, lest the proceeds of the loan be wastefully used. It was the center of purpose.

This instruction, as the reader may have gathered, was as tangled a ditty of yeses and noes as puzzled group talent could produce. The State Department added a verse while Weddell was on his way back—a discursive postscript which said that we would make a loan only if Spain entered into a trade agreement with us, and that it was improbable that Spain could do so.

Weddell held his head in perplexity. But the swift movement of events relieved him of the task of unraveling the tangle. For by the time that his talk with Franco came around, the whole outlook of the world had changed, and with it Spanish policy. Franco ceased to care about the American response. Other chances beckoned, other golden gates seemed about to open.

The Ominous Pause

At about the same time (June 1) that Weddell was rushing back to Madrid, Britain's new Ambassador to Spain, Sir Samuel Hoare, arrived. The haze of anxiety over the western Mediterranean was reflected in the questions that he asked himself while flying to his post:

"What could now stop the Mediterranean from becoming the Mare Nostrum of Mussolini and Hitler? Was it not inevitable that our communications with the Far East would be completely severed, and an irreparable breach made in the British front? Could Malta and Suez hold out, and would the fortress of Gibraltar be of any value if the naval and air bases under the shadow of the rock now became untenable? Would not Hitler seize this unique opportunity of pushing through Spain and North Africa and of creating for himself an irn- pregnable base from which to dominate the African continent and threaten the Atlantic highway?"²

As Hoare stood by the windows of the Embassy he could hear the organized cry of the Falange mob:

"Gibraltar for Spain." He could see the bright posters that were being pasted over the blank street walls with the messages;

"So that Spain may be great: Gibraltar, Tangier, Casablanca, Fez, Oran, Algiers." ^ ^v

Those elements in Spain that stood in with the Axis were certain that the hour had come; they were calling out for a military action that seemed all but begun. Could they fail in their attempt to force an actual beginning?

Weddell, while waiting to get clearer instructions, tried to find out if there was any sense left in an offer of American aid conditioned on the maintenance of Spanish neutrality. He asked the Foreign Minister on June 10th whether the United States could assume that this would be so. The Minister replied in the language of indirection that it was to be presumed. But was it? The formal Italian declaration of war was in the morning's newspapers.

Two days later, on June nth, Franco announced that Spain henceforth would be a "non-belligerent." Italy had once said the same, interpreting it to mean all aid to Germany without declaring war; then, when it saw a chance that seemed safe, hitched on to victory. The Spanish government was plainly excited by this example.

Yet even so, both the British and American governments decided that it might be persuaded to wait, if not to desist. Spain was still an invalid, an invalid of divided mind and body. It could not move more than a short step by its own strength, and could not face strain. An offer of aid in recovery might still attract, and keep it quiet if only the better to act later on. Therefore, it seemed best not to show alarm, to impress by going forward as though nothing of final account had happened.

So (on the 13th) Weddell was told to talk with Franco as arranged, taking guidance from the Caudillo's answers. But Franco *Sir Samuel Hoare: Complacmt Dictator, pages 9-10.

was otherwise engaged. Weddell's appointment was put off from the 15th to the 22nd. Even Beigbeder, the hitherto helpful Foreign Minister, ceased to be in any hurry to know what the American government might or might not do for Spain. The reasons for this delay and the lapse of interest have since become known. The finality of French defeat had become clear. The German troops were on their way to the Pyrenees. Franco was turning to hail them. He was poring over France's collapse and qualifying Spain as heir to its African lands. Germany was being asked whether it would supply the goods Spain needed, as the first part of a joint plan for the capture of Gibraltar and the Straits. If the reply was generous, Spain would no longer need to beg of the United States and the British Empire.³

While Weddell was still waiting, the French Army surrendered. Weddell cabled on June 17th that the Spanish reaction to the news was quick and jubilant. On the part of many Spaniards this was relief at the prospective ending of the war that touched and isolated Spain. On the part of others, however, it was an excited sense that the collapse of the democracies would bring Spain the chance to become great again.

Weddell was granted an interview with Franco for the 22nd. Just before the scheduled hour, Serrano Suner asked him to call —before going on to see the Chief of the Government. Hardly had Weddell taken his chair when the Minister of the Interior remarked that he regarded the agreement with the telephone company as invalid. In fact, he said, while drawing in the smoke of his cigarette, none existed. Weddell calmly affirmed the opposite, without arguing the matter through. The intent was obviously to provoke. Serrano Suner wanted us to be out of the way, sulking and distant, when the expected bid arrived from Berlin. He wished to leave Spain no chance to go on except at Germany's side.

Weddell, undeterred, went on to his appointment with Franco. The Caudillo did not like talk that contained questions and answers. A mind reputed to be slow revealed a gift for enigmatic reply, for phrases of several meanings. Thus when Weddell inquired

8 The dealings between Spain and Germany during this period are told in detail in Chapters xii and xiii.

about the import of the declaration of non-belligerency, he said it was as a form of national sympathy with the cause of the Axis. When Weddell then asked bluntly whether Spain would enter the war, he remarked that the United States was nearer war than Spain. The rest of the talk did not make it easy to interpret these answers. Franco said German victory was certain and imminent. With a steady tone of satisfaction he exposed the troubles in store for England and France. The division of these empires among Germany and other countries, he avowed, would promote the general good. Hitler, he said, was a very human (sicftman and would be reasonable in his demands* This was, we now know, the blithe hour of Franco's hopes.

Weddell edged toward the matter of possible American aid by observing that European food needs would soon become critical. No longer, Franco said. It was plain that the compass of his economy had swung; that he thought he had located food close by. The deviation could not be corrected by the dull instructions Weddell carried in his briefcase. But he left behind a message that might help to correct it later; that if Spain should decide to remain out of the war, the American government would be glad to listen to Spanish suggestions for an extension of their trade relations.

The disturbing impression left by this talk was deepened by word of an immediately following talk between Hoare and Franco. True, the Caudillo explained to Hoare also that Spain's announcement of non-belligerency did not mean a change in the policy of staying out of the war. But when the chance was given to discuss terms with Britain, Franco was silent. Hoare's bid was in the form of a remark that there was no question between the Allies and Spain which could not be settled by negotiation, even if the agreement could only be made effective after the coming of peace. This was almost an invitation to Franco to discuss Gibraltar, French Morocco, and similar subjects. But Franco did not accept the chance. The reason, it seemed probable, was that Germany had already promised satisfaction of Spanish wishes. This we now know was not so. Franco had asked to be given, but Germany had not yet responded to his request. One other point in the talk seemed to confirm the fear that Spain was about to join the Axis. Franco brushed aside Hoare's mention of the economic situation and said that Spain needed no-thing from the British Empire.⁴

Still the British government continued to cling to the thin edge of hope. Like a trained mountain-climber, it would hold harder and not look down. Hoare concluded that while Spain might enter the war, Franco's first hope was that the war might end quickly and that he might play a main part in the peace negotiations.

The American government thought otherwise, that he had about decided to better his claims by joining the action. On June 24th the whole staff of the American Embassy in Madrid, military included, joined in a report on the situation, which stated that the probability of Spain's entry into the war was increasing and outweighed, if it did not preclude, the contrary view. The complete indifference, this message concluded, of all elements in the Spanish government from Franco down, toward potential and conditional help from us pointed, if not to an actual accord, at least to the belief that Spanish needs would be met by Germany. This message marked the low point in the belief of the State Department that Spain could be induced to stay out of the war; lower even than in later days when Franco was openly meeting with Hitler. For Britain's defense in the western Mediterranean seemed so weak, Germany's attacking forces so strong.

But almost at once a reason for believing the situation was not yet settled and could not easily be settled emerged. Germany showed its fear of losing control over Morocco and of having the French fleet join Britain. A promise to satisfy the aims flaunted in Spanish propaganda would carry the risk of French revolt. Failure to satisfy them might cause the Spanish government to be resistant. Perhaps disputes over the disposition of the French Empire among France, Italy, and Spain would yet prevent the combination of all of these countries in a joint assauk upon Britain.

In this connection, attention may be drawn to one of those paradoxes which so often in history have made leaders look foolish. There can be no doubt that Franco, during that middle period of June when France was going down, was intent upon snatching French Morocco for Spain in some way or other. The better to

⁴ Hoare, op. cit., page 30.

seize any chance that came along, he increased the Spanish armed forces in Morocco. But the action destroyed his prospects. For it discouraged the French Military Commander in Morocco, General Nogues, from carrying on the fight against Germany. He concluded that resistance was impossible, since the weak French armies would be attacked at once on the Riffian front.⁵ Had the war spread to Morocco, it is almost certain that Spain and Germany would have come to terms. But this is all surmise in the light of later knowledge.

The State Department at the end of June studied its contradictory collection of estimates and guesses—without reaching any firm conclusion as to whether Spain was about to enter the war or not It was not to be known at first sight, nor at second sight; and none had second sight. But all agreed that the United States could not then bribe Spain to refrain from joining in what might be the fatal blow against England. Nor could it threaten Spain. This country was not ready, willing, or equipped to plunge into the vortex of what might be an already lost war. But it was no longer reconciled to having events take their course. Thus the government searched for some form of action that might be telling but safe. It stumbled upon one suddenly. We began to pinch off the flow of oil from this hemisphere to Spain and its colonies. Begun with the wish to absolve ourselves from possible criticism, this measure hindered the fusion of German and Spanish desires.

⁵ Lc Froces du Marechal Pmin, page 304, testimony of Commandant Le Rock

the flow of oil is pinched

Why did Spain Want So Much?

On MAY 12th of this year 1940 the President told the British Ambassador in Washington that he would be willing to consider any other ways, beyond those already in use, by which the American government might assist the Allied governments. Among the wishes expressed in the British response of May 20th was that the United States deny supplies to the enemy direct or through neutral channels. By June we were ready to try to do so, ready to lay aside the mask of neutrality.

The gaze of suspicion fell upon the flow of oil from the United States and the Caribbean to Spain. That country had been permitted to secure as much oil as it was able to pay for and have transported. With the consent of the nations at war, the cargoes moved untroubled through the blockades. The Spanish government oil monopolies in Spain (Campsa) and in the Canary Islands (Cepsa) were amply and smoothly served under contracts with American companies. The volume of imports grew and grew again.

About the middle of June the French and the British governments both placed a finger upon that fact. On the 14th of June the French Ambassador called to Under Secretary Welles's attention the fact that twenty-one ships, mostly of American registry, were then on their way to Spain with oil; some of this oil, the French government believed, was en route to Italy. A few days later the British government, in a note passed on by its Ambassador in Washington, expressed great concern over this concentration. The figures cited traced the recent abnormal rise in Spanish imports. They were taken to prove that Spanish reserve stocks were excessive, and rapidly increasing. The statistical graph had an

ominous hook; it curved toward the Straits of Gibraltar.

Here it may be commented that the figures then in hand were necessarily rough estimates. When, much later, the actual record was compiled, the bulge in shipments was greater than had been surmised. In June American exports of fuel to Spain were triple the usual rate, and of lubricants an ample half year's supply. But the estimate of the size of Spanish reserve stocks was much too high and later corrected by the British.¹

A substantial part of the oil for Spain was carried in neutral tankers, mostly American. The Texas Company arranged many, if not most, of the shipments. The British note stated that the British government had the dearest possible evidence that the chairman of the Texas Company had arranged with the manager of the company's Italian affiliate to assist Spain in every possible way to charter neutral tonnage for the transport of oil—part of which seemed to be intended for Italy. This charge, it may be interjected, had a basis in fact.³

The British government asked us, in view of these facts, first, to restrict the use of American tankers for the transport of oil to Spain; second, to limit shipments from the United States to Spain of lubricants and aviation gasoline. These latter products were carried by ordinary cargo vessels. The British government had no sure way of checking them, even if it were to try; and it feared that any try might cause unwanted trouble with the Spanish government.

The First Furtive Turns of the Valve

The French and British requests were first put in the cooler of routine. There they were treated merely as minor complaints by the Allies concerning evasions of their blockade. As such they might long have been ignored, since some branches of the State Department, particularly a corner of the Legal Adviser's Office, were still bent upon preserving our neutral trade and supporting the "neutral" rights enumerated in the textbooks of an earlier era.

But after a few days the papers were taken away from the lawyers. It was perceived that the size of the shipments to Spain itself and of the Spanish stocks was the main question of interest —not that of diversion to the Axis. A search began for means by which the excess flow might be prevented without noise or detection. Secretary Hull was not eager to hear a cry from Congress that the Administration was taking sides in the war. He was even less eager to incite an internal row over our relations with Franco. Therefore the British suggestion that we openly control the export of oil to Spain was rejected, as too likely to cause a fight. It was not foreseen that all the oil of Texas would soon be needed for our own defense.

But a number of other steps were taken to serve the same end. First, the Maritime Commission ruled that this trade with Spain was a dangerous one, and that American tankers should not engage in it. Even tankers chartered to foreign buyers of oil were included in this order. Second, the Department arranged with the Treasury to have all oil cargoes labeled for Spain inspected—in order, it was said, to guard against diversion to other destinations. The Secretary of the Treasury, who knew of the British and French notes, had been urging stiff control. His Department at once set about inspecting every tanker in reach, including those already loaded, from keel to cabin. The crews of ships calling at Port Arthur, Texas, to secure oil for Spain became very well acquainted with the look of the harbor.

These measures were put into effect as quietly as possible. The Secretary of State in the few troubled moments that he gave to the matter had shown his hope that the purpose could be achieved without admitting the intent. But the Spanish government quickly sensed that someone was shutting the valve. Spain had no dollars to spare. Behind the decision to use so much of the short supply to buy oil, there was a pressing reason. Whether for peace or for

of 1939; and 50,000 barrels of lubricants as compared with 34,000 during the whole second half year of 1939.

For analytical comment on the state of Allied knowledge on the subject and a summary of the real situation, see Supplementary Note II.

2 See Supplementary Note I on the activities of Thorkild Rieber, chairman of the Texas Company.

war, no one in Washington, and perhaps in Madrid, could then be certain. Probably the enlarged buying orders were first placed as a cautionary economic move; they were in part intended for Italy. Then when the German assault on the western front surged forward, new great values were seen in having large stocks. They were the fee for opportunity—the ticket for Gibraltar and Africa, Germany was being asked to supplement, as a condition for entering the war, what Spain could buy elsewhere.³

The Spanish government took swift heed of the delays in tanker sailings from the United States and the cancellation of contracts. The head of the Petroleum Monopoly inquired of the American Embassy in Madrid at once. The Spanish Ambassador in Washington tried to quiz the Under Secretary of State on June i8th» His answer was opaque-consisting merely of a statement that the Maritime Commission was of the opinion that it would be dangerous for American tankers to enter European waters at that time.

³ See Chapter xii.

THE PINCH GROWS TIGHTER

What Next and How? Secretary HULL relapsed into a relieved belief that the

needs of the situation had been met. But he soon learned otherwise. On July io-ii the Treasury refused to clear two tankers of the Texas Company loaded with oil for Spain on the ground that it was safer for the preservation of American neutrality that they should not be seized carrying contraband.

In accounting for this action to Secretary Hull, the Secretary of the Treasury, Morgenthau, referred to reports that Spanish imports were still excessive. This was so; the rate of flow had been reduced, but it was still enough to enable Spain to add to reserves. Morgenthau then asked orders in regard to the future clearance of tankers for Spain—in such a way as to seem to give orders. The Secretary of State did not welcome this pushful interest. The cut in his skin left by the quarrel over our denial of arms to Spain during the Civil War still pained. He felt ill-treated and was quick to take offense at any hint, no matter how soft or indirect, that there was anything to regret in our record. Were critics, ignorant of his worries, again to force the same quarrel upon him in regard to oil? Britain would bear the brunt of the consequences of whatever was done, let it take the lead! All these ideas could be glimpsed in the comments that he dispersed with tired irritation.

After they had failed to agree on the matter in talk over the telephone, the two Cabinet officers met, only to part in sulky anger. Secretary Hull resented the pressure to act—sustained by those who would not be held responsible for error—without more time and chance to gauge the situation. He disliked quick decision. Secretary Morgenthau was convinced that there was no time to wait, since Spain was on the verge of joining Germany. Secretary

Hull tried to shake himself free by proposing that Morgenthau should act as he saw fit. But then the latter seemed to become afraid that if Spain rebuked us or entered the war, he would be exposed to blame.

Relations between the two departments were unhappy. Differences in policy separated them, and mistrust made the separation angry. The State Department was aroused over stories in the press and on the radio which were thought to originate in the Treasury. These gave inaccurate accounts of action and prejudiced views of motive. Thus the State Department participants in any meeting with their colleagues from the other side of the White House came to fear the experience. For it was all too likely that when it was over, versions that did them no crcdit would shortly circulate. The State Department, it should be added, was not defenseless. Journalists also called there, and the more faithful ones at the Carlton Hotel as well.

While the departments argued, tankers moved, though not in the same numbers as before. The President was consulted, but he would offend neither one nor the other of his Cabinet. The thought of reducing the flow of oil further was encouraged, but the Secretary of State was left to decide how. Within the next fortnight (in the first part of July) his slowly traveling judgment arrived at the next action station* But he remained anxious lest a mistake be made, and possibly a grave one. We might incite or hurry the Spanish government to do what it otherwise might not do. We might be accused in Congress of thrusting the country toward war; for if Spain entered we could not ignore the fate of her Atlantic islands. We did not know, but could guess (and correctly) that Hitler had his eye upon them.¹ Therefore the hunt continued for an unobtrusive means. The Secretary conveyed to his staff, as a kind of pendant to his talk, his assent to the idea that the oil companies might secretly be asked to reduce shipments.

For about a fortnight longer this idea hung suspended in the void of doubt Secretary Hull's hints of action seemed to dissolve in mid air. The political officers concerned, who had handled this question of Spanish oil since it first came up, were dubious of the finality of the Secretary's wish and avoided the chore, It was suggested to me, on a holiday in New York (on July 19th),

¹ See Chapter xiii.

that I drop in on the oil companies and let them know that the Department would be pleased if they sent less oil to Spain. This seemed to be a futile step. In view of the size of the trade and the contracts under which it was conducted, I argued, upon my return to Washington, for more impressive action by the State Department. The Texas Company would surely want to be certain that the government was in earnest, and almost as surely would have to explain to the Spanish government why it did not fill orders.

At this point the situation might have had a dramatic solution. For the question of oil for Spain became mingled with the greater question of oil for Japan. We were pouring into that aggressive Empire increasing quantities of oil, including great quantities of those grades used in aviation. This nourishment of a likely enemy became in July the subject of anguished talk between the members of the Cabinet and with Lord Lothian, the British Ambassador. Congress, on July 2nd, had given the Executive legal authority to control all exports.² We had informed the British government that we did not feel that we could justify the use of this power to control the flow of oil to Spain—on the grounds of defense. But on July 2 5th the President signed an order to do so, as part of a program to regulate the supply to all countries except Britain and its Allies.

All the night before, the cables and wires had sluiced their reports of battle and anxiety into the receiving room on the fourth floor of the State Department. On the morning of the 25th the stream was of exhausting dimensions and, save for the report of England's courage, all of it of bad meaning for the United States. Acting Secretary Welles was intently reading through the neat stack of cables on his desk when an assistant entered. The White House, she explained, asked that he countersign the Presidential proclamation that she held in her hand. One glance was sufficient to extract the essential meaning from its formal phrases; the American government would thereafter subject all exports of oil, scrap iron, and other metals to license. The cables were thrust aside and colleagues hastily summoned to discuss the meaning of this order.

While they were on the way down to Welles's office, it was learned that the White House had already announced the is-

² National Defense Law, July 2, 1940.

suance of the proclamation. The group took their chairs with perturbed wonder, especially those who were immersed in the crisis in the Far East. Almost at once they learned that it would be of little use to ask the urgent questions that were in their minds. For Welles said that he had not known how it was to be applied. If he could surmise, he did not choose to. His habitual coolness resisted the contagion of excitement. Fie was not inclined to retell talcs out of the Cabinet or White House until they were condensed into succinct orders.

Thus he listened with blank expression to the points and queries of his staff. Of these the Chief of the Control Division, Joseph C Green, was the most obviously disturbed. That was not unusual, since this harassed official was by nature easily aroused. Further, his place within the government subjected him to all the detailed consequences of the sudden moves above. He knew that within the hour every oil company in the United States would be on the other end of his telephone asking what the order meant. This was a spur to his detective faculties. They led him to the conclusion that the manner and form of action had been conceived within the Treasury. His evidence for that opinion was not bad. Clipped to the draft proclamation was a small piece of paper on which the word "Treasury" was typed. Further, he asserted that in response to his inquiry the White House told him that it thought that the Treasury had cleared the proclamation with the other branches of the government, including the State Department. The basis of this impression remains even today obscure. With whom the matter might have been discussed, no one present knew or could find out,

Whatever the originating source and intention, the questions presented were urgent and of consequence. What would the regulations be and how would they be applied? How the President decided to end, or greatly curtail, the shipment of vital materials to all whom we regarded as aggressors and potential enemies? Were we about to take this crucial step? Both the manner and the language of the proclamation seemed to indicate that we were.

Like observers of an atomic bomb test stretched out on the ground, the conferring officials sought to discern what shape the fiery cloud took. Upon the meaning of this order depended the chances of war with Japan and of Spanish entry into the war against Britain. The more safely to face the glare, some put on the dark glasses of discretion. The Secretary of State, they knew, doubted whether it was wise, as yet, to invite the strains and dangers that would follow if we directly denied vital supplies to countries not included in the British blockade. His mouth had seemed to sag at the corners with worry whether Congress or public opinion would support him in that course, and whether the American Army and Navy were prepared for the struggle. But he was absent.

Welles, after hearing the review of anxieties felt in various divisions of the Department, said that he would try to persuade the President to confine the order to oil of grades useful in aviation, and to scrap iron of the highest type only. That afternoon he did so. Whether or not this was a reversal of the idea that the President had in mind when he signed the order was not discussed. But it probably was. The Treasury's slip was removed, the State Department's appended.

The currents toss and twist where fast rivers join. Now one, made turbulent by the night's rainfall, runs more swiftly and strongly than the other and dashes over it with high foam; now the other, having washed away some obstacle, suddenly pours out in greater depth. So the streams of desire within the government clashed and whirled about in the years before the war; the will to prevent Axis victory, the wish to remain out of war, and the longing for time in which to strengthen ourselves for whatever struggle was ahead. The breakers of decision constantly foamed as they rolled on.

The reduced order (issued on July 26th) was of little importance—except to Japan. It did not affect the question of whether and how we would further reduce the flow of oil to Spain. Welles decided to consult with the heads of the oil companies concerned. They came to Washington around August 1st. They were asked to keep their shipments to Spain within previous customary limits and cautioned to be sure that none of it was passed on to Germany or Italy. This caution was directed particularly at Captain Thorkild Rieber, head of the Texas Company. His close associations with Nazi Germany were at that very time being exposed in the public press.³

Thus by some quiet turns of the wrench of authority during the summer of 1940, the flow of oil to Spain was reduced. At first the hands that grasped the tool had been lax and doubtful. But they grew firmer as American policy evolved into one of open opposition to the Axis. During the next few months, while Britain's fate was being clecidcd, the tanker sailings were few; the quantities of gasoline, fuel oil, and lubricants were insufficient even for ordinary needs. Spain had to begin to empty its tanks and to worry about what would happen if the shrinkage went further.⁴

3 See Supplementary Note I, already cited. * The extent of reduction is shown by the following table:

Exports from US. to Spam

THOUSANDS OF BARRELS

Gasoline Fuel Oils Lubricants

Second ialf year 1939 1,267 830 34

First half year 1940 1,165 1,403 no

Second half year 1940 357 891 76

From unpublished records of the U.S. Department of Commerce.

the spanish government pivots

The Failure of a Threat

The Spanish government tried to loosen the valve by reviving the threat against the American-owned telephone company. Serrano Suner, it will be recalled, had on June 22nd, in an attempt to irritate, denied his promise to allow the owners to resume control. Weddell took up the case again with zeal, but Franco took no notice of his scattered appeals. Weddell concluded that the Spanish government was trying to use our protective concerijt^o force us to supply all the oil wanted. The State Department instructed him to make clear that it would not consider any such bargain. He was told to insist upon the restoration of American control as a matter of right and given promise, and to let it be known that the American government would not discuss any other matter of interest to Spain (meaning a loan) until this was done.

Weddell expounded these views in a number of rasping talks with Beigbeder, Serrano Suner, and Franco. On July 29th, August 3rd, and again on August 6th the Ambassador and the Foreign Minister exchanged complaints. Each of these talks roamed far. Beigbeder said that the attitude of the Spanish government was misunderstood. Spain, he averred, had no thought of entering the war unless attacked; the time for any such action in conjunction with Germany had gone by. These comforting words were wholly unlike the versions of the ideas of the Spanish government —since become known—which the German Ambassador in Madrid was making to Berlin. For example, in a memorandum that Stohrer prepared for the German Foreign Office on August 8th, he stated that the Spanish Foreign Minister had several times reminded him of the offer made by Spain in June to enter the war.¹ The only

¹ Stohrer wrote as follows: "The Spanish Foreign Minister and also the
way to acquit Beigbeder of duplicity at this juncture is to believe that he believed that the offers to Germany were not genuine.

These avowals were spread like a carpet to deaden the tread of suspicion, but they did not do so. The Foreign Minister pleaded for gasoline, but the State Department continued to doubt that it was needed for peaceful purposes. Its opinion was shaped by estimates provided by the British government of Spanish reserves and by the record of shipments during the previous year. True, the restrictions imposed on the use of oil within Spain were severe and ordinarily would have been taken to connote a genuine shortage. But the available facts suggested another meaning, that the restrictions were being used as a means of hoarding for war, or possibly even as a measure of deception.

The truth of the situation is still not easy to decipher. The opinion that Spanish stocks were excessive and that the need was not critical was in some measure valid. So were reports that certain shipments had been turned over to Italian and German ships. But the estimates of stocks which influenced decision were wrong. Spanish reserves were smaller than was thought. The exercise of tracing out the facts in detail is carried on further in a Supplementary Note.^{^[6]}

The next requests of the Minister of Foreign Affairs for oil were met by Weddell with the placid reply that the American government was waiting for a settlement of the telephone dispute. Our wish to wait for clearer proof of what lay ahead was strengthened by attacks in the controlled Spanish press, which grew more and more harsh. An evident attempt was being made by spirits hostile to us to prepare the minds of the Spanish people for entry into the war. At this juncture (August), Serrano Suner, who controlled the press and radio, was doing his utmost to arouse the Spanish people against Britain and the United States. Hence he was glad of any quarrel, and ready to risk the loss of overseas supplies in the thought that Germany would take care of Spanish needs.^ffie refusal of Germany to do so during the next three months was to prove one of the reasons why the drive for intervention finally failed.

Franco, we know now, was testing through Serrano Suner what he could hope for from Germany. But with ever-present instinct to take from each day whatever might be had, he guarded himself against the loss of American products. On August 6th the Foreign Minister met Weddell at the door of his office and stated that the telephone matter was settled at last. Weddell, acting on orders in hand, then stated that the American government would permit Spain to obtain such quantities of oil as it could transport and the British would navicert.

Of the circumstances of this midsummer Spanish pivot we now know much more than the American government knew at the time. But we are still left to guess at the thoughts that made Franco's bargaining mind go around, made it give in to get oil. Was it foresight that Germany would refuse to supply his needs except on objectionable terms? Was it fear that the whole Spanish economy would collapse if he remained at odds with us? Spain might find itself deprived not only of oil but of fertilizers, cotton, and wheat. The Spanish government was about to pick up again the dropped request for a large credit to buy these products. Or was he afraid that the American government might welcome the growth of the quarrel as a pretext for attacking the Canary Islands?

Or was it because of a wish to preserve Spanish oil reserves while he waited the approach of his chance to inherit—by default or by arms—Gibraltar and Morocco? Had he not on July 17th publicly declared that:

"It is necessary to make a nation, to forge an empire. To do that our first task must be to strengthen the unity of Spain. There remain a duty and a mission, the command of Gibraltar, African expansion, and the permanence of a policy of unity."

As Hoare has written, these words were not merely rhetoric. Even after close scrutiny of the record (reviewed in later chapters) of the exchanges between Spain and Germany during this period, it is difficult to know what was in his mind. At all events, in conceding to us, he had given but little, and nothing that could not be taken back.

britain's lead (the autumn of 1940)

Our Action Gives Britain Its Chance

The cold and untrustin^ wind that blew across the Atlantic made good weather for British sailing. The American pinch upon the flow of oil to Spain gave the British government a prized chance to display its influence and usefulness. With quick insight Britain made the most of it. Shrewdly, seeing behind the posters that called for war at once, Hoarc wrote home to Ix>rd Beaver- brook about this time (August 7th):

"My own impression is that the Spaniards arc sitting on the fence until they see haw the Invasion |of England, and possibly Egypt, goes. They are convinced that they will get something for certain out of the war in Africa and an arrangemcnr about Gibraltar, But they are terribly short of everything that is needed for fighting and on that account they would only come into the war if they were convinced that it was virtually over."

His conclusion, accepted by his government, was that

^u. . . to treat Spain as an enemy k playing into the hands of the Germans, who are determined to force the country into war against its wish/*¹

Britain in that summer was too close to mortal danger to choose its enemies or friends* Most of the Spanish people might be counted on, it thought, to be friends if not driven by injury or necessity; they had not been drilled or beaten into supine obedience. The government—even if it wi$hed-»coutd not ignore them. Thus Britain strove to maintain the flow of trade from the Empire

* Letter do Lord Hankey, July ty, 1940, printed £** Hoare, Md^ page 23.

into Spain and to advertise the fact in all parts of the needy land. After the first gust of alarm in June, it quickly set about to make clear that it had no wish to see the Spanish economy collapse for lack of oil. Once assured that Spanish stocks were not excessive, British tongues would speak of Spanish needs, make sure they were not neglected.

Thus, while invasion talk filled the air, British representatives sat down with Spaniards to prepare a long-term program of supply that would take care of Spanish requirements but not permit the accumulation of great stocks. The American government gave assent. By September the schedules were approved; the oil question was, for the time being, settled.

At this time Spain could have had more oil had it wished. Britain offered more if the Spanish government would end the restrictions on consumption. How better, the British thought, to pamper the Spanish people in a season of shortage? But the offer was refused on the ground that Spain could not pay for more. The program envisaged an inflow equal to Spain's usual past imports, so scheduled as to enable Spain to maintain a safe level of stocks—two and a half months' supply but no more.

The American government, while (as it will be shortly related) refusing to lend Spain the dollars needed to pay for this oil, favored the operation of the agreement with Britain. We permitted American-owned tankers sailing under foreign flags to carry oil to Spain—after obtaining a promise from the British government that they would not be hauled within the combat zone. We raised no objections to American tankers sailing under British or Norwegian flags. We issued cargo licenses for Spain and the Spanish colonies.

These arrangements regulated, although not without some breaks in the schedule, the flow of oil to Spain and the Spanish colonies during the rest of 1940. They were maintained in the face of frequent and anxious rumors that Spain was about to enter the war. Each time that Serrano Suner went abroad, to Berlin, Rome, Berchtesgaden, the regulating hands quivered. Each time a new report was received of the fueling of a German ship, they tightened in anger. But they continued to match our oil against German promises.

This policy was justified by events. After scrutiny of the secret record of Spanish negotiations with Germany these conclusions seem warranted: the opposite course, a refusal to permit Spain to secure oil, might quite possibly have caused the Spanish government to come to terms with Germany; and the continued receipt of food and oil from overseas nourished Spanish popular opposition to the Axis. Oil was a universal particle in the stream of Spanish life. It enabled the fishing boats to bring in their catches, the factories to operate, the railroad locomotives to make their runs, the buses to move through the city streets, the trucks to bring food to market. Britain was effective, despite the many forms of censorship, in making it known that it was the guardian of this particle.

Our interference had saved the American telephone company in Spain, ended diversion to the Axis, depleted the Spanish reserves (for whatever purpose accumulated), given Britain a chance to bring home its usefulness, and brought future supply under control. In all these ways it hindered the junction of Spanish and German policies.

The dialogue of difficulties between the Spanish and German leaders was soon to become routine. At each meeting the Spaniards argued that Spain could not properly prepare or start to fight unless supplied in advance with oil and food. The reply was always that Germany would provide enough when, and only when, Spain began to fight; it could not spare such essentials merely to earn goodwill. This difference was never spanned. Franco waited in the hope that military events would make it possible for him to gain his aim without a fight or in so short a one that he would need no outside help. In the meantime, while he refused to promise to remain at peace, he also refused to go to war except at a time of his own choosing. The oil supplies of the Western Hemisphere made it possible for him to assume that position; British resistance made it advisable for him to maintain it; German lust for power made it perilous for him to do otherwise. But of this, much more later.

During the autumn of 1940 the American attitude toward the war changed rapidly. We moved from stunned alarm toward determined action. The United States was becoming ready to see

Britain's lead—autumn of 1940 53

England through the fight at no matter what risk. The State Department, free of the fear of punishment, moved along with the country. Sessions within the office of the Secretary of State ceased to be searches for tactics that would cover the movement with an invisible or reversible cloak.

food or empire; or both?

The Crisis of Decision (Autumn of 1940)

In TELLING of the attempt to prevent Spain from accumulating an excess supply of oil, we have outdistanced the main story of American relations with Spain during the second half of 1940.

Franco and his Cabinet, it will be recalled, had in June met our offers of economic help with disdain. The State Department had correctly assumed that he was measuring the lures and risks of war. As the United States went forward with aid to Britain, it was hoped that our meaning would be understood in Spain. The summer of hushed waiting passed. The beam of invasion still pointed straight at the cliffs of Dover. The Italian assault toward the Suez Canal started. But the uneasy quiet over the western Mediterranean was unbroken. It might—the hope persisted—remain so for as long as Britain held a battle line; the future decided on distant battlefields and in the remote reaches of the sky. No matter what the ultimate turn, Britain was gaining that which the military governors of Gibraltar begged—time, time, more time.

Late summer reports from Madrid confirmed that the people in Spain wanted no part in the war. They remained dully unmoved by Fascist appeals, growing more hungry and troubled. The harvest was worse than expected. The Spanish government admitted that domestic wheat supplies would be 1.3 million tons less than minimum needs. This gap was one of the vital facts of the war. Spain had to find both the food and the means of paying for it. Supplies of many essential raw materials were similarly low. In the case of cotton, for example, there was only enough to permit some mills to work two days a week. The Spanish government, using both British facilities and the secret help of German banks, was arranging for small imports from Brazil and

Argentina, but the amount in sight was far from enough. There was not enough coal for the steel mills. The stocks of gasoline for which the Spanish government had laid out so much of its foreign exchange were being used up.

In summary, unless the Spanish government received help from somewhere, the coming winter was certain to be one of great distress, and possibly one of disorder. Would the help come from Germany or from the Allied world? Or could they both be induced to contribute? Would Spain have to go to war to obtain what it needed? Or would it have to renounce hopes of an empire?

The Spanish government, as already stated, had explained its plight to Germany as early as June. It had submitted schedules of its wants as a feature of a proposed joint program looking toward Spanish entry into the war. But Germany had sent nothing. It had not solicited Spain's help and showed no signs of willingness to pay for it. In late August Franco began to knock harder at the German door, to describe his needs to Hitler with greater fervor. But he must have gathered from Hitler's summer silence that Germany would measure his requests carefully and ask much in return. He dared not wait for the reply. He had to search for food at once, wherever it could be found. The British government was eagerly striving to provide whatever could be spared from its areas of supply, but that was not enough. The only country with enough, and to spare, was the United States. Leaving Serrano Suner to explain to Ribbentrop that it was an act of expediency, the Spanish government resumed its attempt to secure aid from the United States. Now it reached for the chance it had renounced in June, when Franco had told Weddell and Hoare that Spain would need nothing from their countries.

On September 7th the Minister of Industry and Commerce advanced the idea that the American government should extend a credit of about 100 million dollars. Of this, he explained, Spain would like to use about 22 million to buy wheat, 20 million to buy gasoline, 20 to buy cotton, and the rest for machinery, rubber, scrap iron, and other materials. The Minister reviewed Spain's good record as a debtor and tried to show that the loan would be advantageous to the United States. Weddell recalled the snub of June. But he said that he would be glad to transmit the request to Washington. He added that he was sure that, as before, we

would wish a clear view of the Spanish attitude toward the war.

Weddell urged Washington to give a favorable answer. The risks of rejection, he judged, were greater than those of acceptance. The Spanish course in the war was still fluid, he thought; the pessimism of June had given way to a half-hope. Therefore we would be wise to free the Spanish government of any need to yield to German pressure. Further, he warned that internal conditions in Spain were becoming dangerously bad; unless the people secured more food and other essentials, there might be riots or rebellions; in which event the Spanish government might choose or be compelled, as the price of obtaining German aid, to enter the war; while, in contrast, he thought that if the United States gave help, Spanish resistance to the Axis would grow stronger and firmer. Lastly he reported that the British government favored the grant of substantial help. Even if later it should enter the war, according to Hoare, the gamble would not have been entirely lost because the Spanish people would be on Britain's side.

The State Department did not find these judgments easy to appraise. Certainly the two Ambassadors should know better than anybody in Washington the struggle of forces and feelings in the Spanish government and among the Spanish people. But it was possible, even on the basis of their reports of the Spanish situation, to disagree with their strategy. It was plainly unwise to prevent Spain from securing food. It also seemed clear that Britain was well advised to keep import channels free and to give help in finding minimum amounts. But was it wise quickly and generously to relieve Spain's troubles? Franco's intention could not it was felt, be trusted. Certainly he would march if German troops landed in Britain, no matter what promise had been given. Would he not trifle with us as Mussolini had with Britain in April? Was not weakness—if not too desperate—more likely to keep him at peace than obligation? Was it not best therefore to permit Spanish troubles to protract themselves?

The Madrid version of probabilities was taken up in some sections of the State Department; the opposed version in other sections. The opposing lines of conjecture met in several agitated conferences. Both, in retrospect, seem partly spun out of feeling or fancy.

The Riddle of Necessity

Secretary Hull supervised the argument, in so far as he could in the midst of many other matters. Discussion was tinged with the knowledge of the general American loathing for the Spanish regime. When opinion seemed to be running too strong in one direction, it was subtly offset. When it seemed to be becoming too assertive, it was quenched by long pauses or oddments of anecdote.

The officers of the European Division stood staunchly behind Ambassador Weddell. They urged that we offer a loan, but in such a form that we would control its use during the period of expenditure. This was a clever combination of those two standard tools of diplomacy—the "carrot" and the "stick." But those of us concerned with economic matters were doubtful that the idea would work as conceived. It might cause a worse quarrel than refusal. Besides, their books seemed to show that financial measures seldom bought off evil intentions.

Norman Davis, then president of the American Red Cross, was close at Hull's side whenever the map of European diplomacy was under inspection. He proposed a way out. Instead of making a loan, he suggested, the President might use part of a special relief fund of 50 million dollars which Congress had voted. This would suffice as a first step to show our willingness to help the Spanish people. But it would not provide Spain with the means for supporting a war. And, hardly less in point, it could be done without a mean fight within the United States. The Secretary of State grasped the suggestion, but specified that the Spanish government should be asked for assurances that it intended to remain at peace.

The discussion had consumed almost a fortnight (September 7-19). When the draftsmen set about the task of conveying these thoughts to Madrid, they found themselves submerged in rumor, which seemed to make the instruction out of date before it was sent. British sources reported that Germany was about to occupy all of France. If Germany did so, it was probable that French Morocco would revolt, and that Spain with German help would try to seize that territory. Then, too, Serrano Suner set off (on

September 12th) upon his quest in Berlin and Rome. Despite the denials of the Spanish Foreign Secretary, this mission seemed in Washington to have an ominous similarity to other special meetings of Axis leaders-before they threw their strength in battle. Who could doubt that Franco shared deeply in the wish to accomplish Britain's defeat?

Serrano Suner's talks (September 16-27), we know now, etched clearly for the first time the differences between Franco's ideas of what Spain should give and receive, and Hitler's idea. They did not fit at all with each other. But the group of American officials who were drafting the reply to the Spanish loan request could not foresee that, or at all events did not. Thus caution grew with every revision.

As sent to Weddell on September 19th, the response authorized him merely to state that the American government was disposed to consider ways and means of helping, provided the Spanish government promised to stay at peace. The rest of the message sent was for WeddelTs mind only; it explained that a large loan such as Spain asked could not be arranged in a hurry, that time seemed of the essence, and that therefore the State Department and the Red Cross were discussing the possible provision at once of a substantial amount of wheat and other products for relief. We were building a fire with the smoke of straws.

Weddell sent back word (on the 20th and 26th) that such a message could not have an effect on Spanish policy in the critical weeks ahead. For that, he said, the proffer of aid would have to be more concrete and the demand for assurances more flexible. Weddell was seeking some substantial counterproposal to those which Serrano Suner was expected to bring back.

The current reports regarding Spain had grown so grim that the State Department would probably have refused even to discuss the idea of aid any further, had it not been for the affirmations of the Spanish Foreign Minister, Beigbeder. Every time others said Spain was going into the war, he said it was not. On September 26th he told Weddell that Serrano Suner's current visit to Berlin had been made on his private initiative, inspired by vanity and a craving for publicity, and that it would not produce any change in the situation. The Foreign Minister's forecast turned out to be correct. But later knowledge shows that his version of Serrano

Suner's mission was short of the fact.^{^[7]} Either he was misled by- Franco or he felt justified in deceiving us for a benevolent purpose. The United States and Britain must not know, the Foreign Minister may be imagined to have said to himself, that the Cau- dillo is engaged in cold plots with Hitler; in the end I think that they will come to nothing; and they can be made to fail if the United States and Britain can be induced to help Spain now. Thus it may be possible to acquit him of double purpose. Certainly both Weddell and Hoare were impressed with his brave and buoyant support of the Allied cause.

Weddell compounded his pleas. So did Hoare. In doing so, in a letter written to Lord Halifax, the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, on September 27th, he described the situation as follows:

"Colonel Beigbeder is convinced that we are on the brink of a turning point in Spanish policy. Hitherto, there have been two contending parties in the Government and the country, the party of the short war led by Serrano Suner, and the party of the long war led by the Minister for Foreign Affairs. Serrano Suner and the young men of the Falange have staked their fortunes upon the war ending this autumn and ending with a complete German victory. Colonel Beigbeder has equally staked his fortunes upon the war not ending quickly and not ending in a complete German victory. According to the Minister for Foreign Affairs there seems now an excellent chance of his own policy being confirmed and of Serrano Suner's being discredited. . . ²

We may pause for a note upon the ingratitudes of history. Serrano Suner believed that a quick German victory was certain; he tried his utmost to govern Spanish policy in this belief; he was wrong; he failed in his effort; and he became the next Foreign Minister. Beigbeder believed that Britain would be able to sustain resistance; he tried his utmost to shape Spanish policy in that belief; he was right; he was effective; and he was dismissed from office. In a large sense Beigbeder made his own belief come true; for by deterring Spain's entry into the war in the autumn of 1940, he prevented it from being a short war. But this is a privileged sally into what was then the unknown future—an interruption of the narrative of American response to the Spanish request for a loan.

on the trail of assurance

Within Our Grasp

TChE pleas from Weddell and Hoare did not cause Secretary Hull to become freer in his gestures. He replied that he could not just then define more clearly what might be done for Spain, and that he would await firm assurances before trying. Anyhow, Weddell was told, the American government would not be able to consider a loan in the amount asked.

Weddell—when he saw the Foreign Minister on September 30th—tried to make his lecture material sound like a substantia] program. Beigbeder's answer was direct and quite free of the usual dust. The Foreign Minister, making'it clear that he was speaking for his colleagues as well as himself, said that while it was impossible for political reasons for the Spanish government to make a public statement or sign an agreement defining its future policy, he could give official assurance that Spain would remain out of the European war until or unless attacked. He then asked Weddell to let Washington know that Spain would have to obtain at least 800,000 tons of cereals before the next crop in June. Unless shipments started at once, the bread ration would have to be promptly reduced by one third.

Weddell became more convinced that the tide was turning toward peace. Serrano Suner's visit to Berlin had ended a few days before. Nothing had happened. There were no signs that Spain was about to send its Army into action. But there were rumors that Franco would soon meet Hitler. Weddell urged the State Department, on the basis of Beigbeder's statement, to supply the needed cereals on liberal credit terms at once, and then concern itself quickly with other Spanish needs. The British government also earnestly pleaded for a generous response. This

was the hour, it said, to wear all ribbons and medals. A vigorous effort was begun, using every means of publicity, to let the Spanish people know of the help Britain was giving; to pass the knowledge through and over the German press and radio control. The Prime Minister took part in this campaign through a speech in the House of Commons. On October 8th Churchill said:

"There is no country in Europe that has more need of peace and food and the opportunities of prosperous trade than Spain. . . . Far be it from us to lap Spain and her own economic needs in the wide compass of our blockade. All we seek is that Spain will not become a channel of supply to our mortal foes. Subject to this essential condition, there is no problem of blockade that we will not study in the earnest desire to meet Spain's needs and aid her revival."

Before the State Department made up its mind how to act, still another and more pointed appeal was made by the Foreign Minister. On the 3rd of October he told Weddell, saying his words over slowly and solemnly, that President Roosevelt could change the policy of Spain and Europe by a telegram announcing that wheat will be supplied to Spain; that the psychological moment for such action had come.

Secretary Hull did not doubt that critical decisions were in the making. But he still doubted whether we could sway them by a show of friendship. He still found it hard to believe that Franco's Spain-once fed-would not strike at Britain if her defenses failed. Perjury was so common in Axis circles, with no fee to conscience or to the critics; why should it not be practiced for a loan?

The whole tenor of the American press showed that if this government granted a loan, and that if later Spain entered the war, those who made the mistake would not long remain in office. So caution continued to guide. Red Cross relief might be sent, to show American sympathy. But no firm promise of a loan until Franco gave conclusive proof of his intentions. This decision seemed dumb to the political officers in the State Department. They thought that Weddell's program deserved full faith and support.

On October 4th the Ambassador was told to inform Franco that President Roosevelt was ready to ask the Red Cross to ship a quantity of wheat for the urgent needs of Spanish civilians. The text of this paragraph, as sent across to the White House for approval, contained mention of a large specific amount (100,000 tons). When it came back, the figure was cut out. As for the credit that Spain asked, we would let Franco know later; we would watch him as he watched others.

Weddell told the Caudillo of the President's offer on October 8th. Franco accepted with thanks.¹ The Ambassador supplemented his report of the talk by a repetition of the advice that loan talks be started without further delay. For he thought the present Spanish government could be counted upon, if given real support, to resist Axis pressure up to threatened or actual invasion by Axis troops. It was wise to improve the chance.

This opinion was in one way wrong, in another right. Franco, during this whole period, was busy with a plan of participation in the war; or rather with a plan to join in the final phase of the assault if and when he was certain that Britain was beaten. He was offering Hitler a pledge to enter the war if given supplies, help, and rewards. But he was insisting on the right to select the time and conditions for action—which was equivalent to the right of deciding whether or not he acted at all. And he was indignantly becoming aware that Italy and Germany firmly intended to hold on to parts of the African lands to which he professed Spain to be entitled; in the event of victory her colonies would have new neighbors. Into this, however, we will enter more carefully later on, when the record of the secret Spanish-German talks is reviewed.

Weddell's views, supported by British sources, impressed. The President and the Secretary of State decided to act more boldly. On October 12th Weddell was advised that the American Red Cross would send its first wheat shipment at once. He was also told that he could inform Franco that the American government was ready to discuss a credit for Spain. But again on a conditioned basis—Franco was to be asked to confirm his intention of staying out of the war and of so using a loan that it would have a genuine and lasting economic result.

In framing this offer, ignorance was a handmaiden to hope. Had the American government known how far, by then, Franco

iHe also accepted the various conditions attached: no export of wheat, Red Cross participation in the distribution of our gift, fair publicity. But the last two were not observed.

had gone in arranging with Hitler upon the means and measures for a campaign against Gibraltar and the Straits, it would not have made the effort. Lack of knowledge permitted a hopeful reading—and as it turned out in the end, a correct reading— of recent favorable signs. Among them were the repeated statements of Beigbeder and Franco's swift acceptance of our relief aid. It seemed MSfrlikely that even Franco would take the gift and then at once turn against the giver.

Weddell hastened along the talks about the credit with the two members of the Cabinet who were on our side—the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Industry and Commerce. Both were glad. They begged for further details and urged that we hurry with the public announcement. Even now it is not possible to be certain of their thoughts. But it is likely that, knowing of Franco's plan to meet with Hider in the near future, they were seeking to prove that German help was not needed; and maybe beyond that, to whet resistance to any action that might end all chance of food and peaceful work.

Weddell on October 16th echoed both their requests for details regarding the amounts and terms of the possible loan, and their sense of the need for speed. He urged that we begin to discuss these matters at once and let the action be known; our conditions could be made plain in the course of the talks. Serrano Suner, then, would have to do battle against our offer. It is doubtful whether the Secretary of State would have adopted this strategy in any case. He could not have explained it to an opposed public. The assurances asked of Franco were both his aim and his safeguard. Without them criticism strong enough to defeat the loan was likely; even with them it would be great. A draft maintaining the previous instruction was in the typewriter when news arrived that ended all thought of haste.

And Out Again; Serrano Suner is Made Foreign Minister

Beigbeder was dismissed from office. He had spent the evening of the 15th in first-name talk with the Caudillo, which had touched upon the need to secure oil, cotton, and wheat from the United States. Franco had found no fault with his conception of Spanish independence. Beigbeder had taken his hat with no sense that the talk had been held under the ax. The morning newspapers of the 17th first let him know otherwise. Neither Weddell nor Hoare had foreknowledge of the action.

Beigbeder had been the guardian of Spanish neutrality and an outspoken advocate of the opinion that Britain would in the end win. Now he was gone, dropped without regard for the effect in Allied circles. Nor was that the worst of it. Serrano Suner, fresh from his secret talks in Berlin and Rome, was put in his place. Hereafter we would have to deal with that scheming and twisted associate of the crews that met at Nuernberg, and saluted under the S&ABt&a. Nor was that the whole of it. The Minister of Industry and Commerce, Luis Alarcon de la Lasta, was also removed from his office. He was a moderate and peaceful man, a merchant of Seville. His successor, Demetrio Carceller, was reputed to be a tough and active Falangist. A capable, self-made man of business, whose affairs had flourished under Franco; director of the oil monopoly in the Canary Islands. He had gone to Berlin along with Serrano Suner, in charge of the talks on economic matters. The changes were generally taken to mean, at best, that the Spanish Cabinet would thereafter be ruled by men with an eager will to work with, or under, Germany and Italy. At worst, that Franco had agreed to enter the war (as in a conditional way he had) and these men were selected to carry out the final steps.

A shiver ran down the spine of all who studied the map of the western Mediterranean in this October 1940. It interrupted the frail chain of discussion regarding a possible credit from the United States. But there was one feature of the change within the government that somewhat allayed anxiety, and suggested another meaning. Franco took over from Serrano Suner the control of the Junta Polftica of the Falange Party. Perhaps—the idea was not to be dismissed until tested—the shift would turn out to be a move by Franco to "appease" Germany for failure to satisfy its wishes. He had once before dissembled his love by kicking a Foreign Minister downstairs. Jordana had been dropped in the summer of 1939, after the refusal to link Spain inseparably with Germany and Italy.

Hoare was inclined to interpret the event in this way. Accordingly he advised that the talks under way about relief and loans be merely suspended, not put out of mind. Weddell gave the same counsel. The political officers of the State Department supported their line of belief: that the battle was not lost; that Franco, even if he wished, would not dare take the final plunge until the war was all but over; and that a continuation of our talks might still serve a useful purpose-to show that Spain need not have recourse to Germany. Secretary Hull was doubtful whether anything could be gained by going on with associations so disliked at home. It was decided to ask Weddell to tell Franco directly that our decisions in regard to relief and credit would depend upon our conclusions about his intentions. The language of the cables to Weddell, so instructing him, had a firmness of tone that came from the White House. Unlike most previous messages, they were tinged with a sense of our power rather than our helplessness.

But Franco and Serrano Suner were not disposed at that moment to discuss their intentions. What could they say that they might not wish to change? Would they say the same to Hitler a few days hence, when they talked with Hitler? For the meeting at Hendaye was only a few days off (the 23rd). Were they to admit that they had not made up their minds? That they were waiting to see how the battles of Britain and the Suez Canal ended, waiting to hear what Germany bid and asked? Such plain speech would butter no bread.

To get through the turnstile of circumstance Franco used his gift for language that could mean several things. Hoare saw him before his departure for Hendaye and Weddell relayed the substance of their talk. He said that the Cabinet changes did not connote any change in the foreign policy of Spain-leaving Hoare to form his own notion of what that was. For he also expressed great wonder that Britain should continue so exhausting a war in which it could have no hope of victory. Serrano Suner echoed Franco's statement regarding Spanish foreign policy, adding that its aim and will was to be independent. He had then entered into bitter complaints about the effect of the British blockade system on the Spanish economy.

The State Department and the White House waited to see what message would emerge from the parlor car standing near the little railroad station of Hendaye. Along the platform there the diplomats of the world had so often walked on their way to their holidays. It was a place-name that reminded of days of sunny pleasure. Was it hereafter to be remembered for another reason: as a point of surrender to Hitler—Vienna, Munich, Berchtesgaden, Bordeaux, Compiegne?

Only now are we gaining real knowledge of the earlier dealings between the men that met at Hendaye on October 23rd. They form a strange and eventful tale, hidden from the American government at the time. It has become possible to compare the picture and ideas that guided American policy as reported thus far with what actually went on. Possible too, in part, to judge the reasoning behind our policy.

Thus before going on with this narrative of American diplomatic action, it is well to peer backward into the other side of the mirror of events.

the other wing of the mirror

June among the Dictators

American government had little sure knowledge of the Spanish-Axis relations. It knew this. All attempts to learn ended only in nervous impressions, not calm conclusions. These had only overnight value.

Learning was the harder because the only really open door in the official mansions of Madrid was the Foreign Office. Though this department formally managed Spanish foreign policy, it often did not govern decision. Or at times even know of it; the Foreign Minister seemed to learn of certain steps only after they had been taken. Vital affairs between Franco and the Axis were conducted outside the purview of the Foreign Office, perhaps even of the Cabinet. The dictators mistrusted their professional diplomatic staffs. Trained in suppleness the professional might be, but averse to planned betrayal. Many of them were, by taste or training, on Britain's side. Franco, like Hitler, found it more satisfactory to use men who accepted duplicity as a natural weapon, who practiced it with ardor; and so he consigned secret business to chosen party and military leaders. While leaving the Foreign Office to deal with Allied countries, he sluiced his talks with the Axis through special agents—such as Serrano Suner and General Vigon.

Thus, American decisions about Spanish matters were haunted by an awareness of ignorance, a fear of being trumped. They were conceived in a haze of surmise in which even the rainbows were suspect. Basically they rested (during this period) on the British will to believe that Franco would not go to war as long as there was any kind of peril in doing so. This belief turned out to be correct.

The accords between Franco, Hitler, and Mussolini were made and kept in secrecy. Such thorough secrecy that the full text of the most important one has not yet turned up in the mounds of German and Italian diplomatic records now, like the seven cities of Troy, under excavation. They were buried in the deepest level. For Franco the secrecy must have seemed useful no matter what turn future Spanish policy might take. On the one hand, it made it possible to avoid trouble with the Allies and the United States while seeking their help for Spain; on the other hand, it left him freer to squirm out of these accords—should he ever wish to do so. Hitler and Mussolini had equally strong reasons for concealment. First among them was the wish for military surprise. But the silence in which the liaison was shrouded made it easier for Spain to detach itself when the attraction passed. It was a method of managing that in the end left the Axis with only a discarded plan, a bitter reflection.

The Spanish government during its enforced trial of neutrality had restlessly scanned the horizon of opportunity. Who knew, at a time when old empires fought, what fragments might not fall a prize for the deserving and the adroit? In June 1940 Franco wrote out vows of fealty to the apparent victors. Thus he put Spain in the line of deserving heirs. He edged nearer the battle but with care not to come too close. The country was still miserable; the people were still opposed to war; the Army was not equipped to fight; the administrative machine of government was failing; and there were many discontented elements.

On June 3rd Franco wrote Hitler a note. In this he reviewed the hindrances that had compelled Spain thus far to adopt an official policy of neutrality and constant watchfulness. But, he hinted, he might soon be free to act. In closing he wrote that he felt he need not assure Hitler of the sincerity of his wish not to be aloof from Hitler's needs and how greatly it would please him to perform at that moment the services that Hitler esteemed the most.

The letter was followed up by messenger and by memorandum. General Vigon (about to be made Chief of the Spanish Air Ministry) went to talk with Hitler and Ribbentrop on June 16th at Castle Acoz. He informed them that Spain intended to attack Gibraltar and received the Fuehrer's approval. But, Vig6n made clear, there were difficulties in the way of turning intention into action; that Spain could not live without the food supplies due to arrive from the Western Hemisphere; and Franco was afraid of an American landing in Morocco or Portugal. Hitler tried to dispose of these reasons for hesitation by saying that Spain could count on Germany's utmost aid. But he avoided discussion of Spanish claims in Africa, suggesting that they should be talked out with Mussolini first. Germany, Ribbentrop added, had no interest whatsoever in the Mediterranean; an attitude which, it will be seen, did not last long.

But military events went too fast for the paces of diplomacy. Petain asked for an armistice the very next day (June 17th). Decisions might soon be taken that would settle Spanish claims once and for all. Franco moved swiftly to endow them with formal standing. Through the Spanish Ambassador in Berlin, he put before the German government a statement of his position, needs, and claims.¹

"The Spanish government" declared itself "ready, under certain conditions, to give up its position as a 'non-belligerent' state and to enter the war on the side of Germany and Italy."

The conditions were: First, that Spain be promised satisfaction of a set of territorial demands, to wit:

". . . Gibraltar, French Morocco, that part of Algeria colonized and predominantly inhabited by Spaniards (Oran), and further the enlargement of Rio de Oro and of the colonies in the Gulf of Guinea. . .

Second, that Germany and Italy provide the military and economic supplies that Spain needed for carrying on a war. Important among the needs were large amounts of wheat and oil. At this very time, it will be recalled, Franco was showing indifference to American and British offers to assist Spain to obtain these products. Weddell and Hoare had not even been given the chance to spell them out; no doubt the Caudillo perceived that the

¹ This probably was presented on June 19th, though it may have been the day before or the day after. Its main features are explicitly mentioned in the memorandum prepared by the German Ambassador to Spain, Stohrer, on August 8j 1940, already cited.

United States, anyway, would seek to pledge him to continued

neutrality and peace.

Franco must have been confident that Hitler would send a quick and favorable answer to his proposals. But he did not. The papers were sent to the experts for study and reflection^ For Hitler's hope and wish in the weeks ahead was "to act quickly to end it all." As he walked up the steps of the Madeleine, what need could he feel for costly Spanish help? What reason was there then to hurry to promise Spain rich lands in Africa and the means to occupy them? Spain could wait while he took the last steps to mastery, completed his arrangements with France, and arrived at a settlement with England-by treaty or by arms. When these matters were clearer, there would be time to reckon what place and space Spain should have in the New Order.

The waiting was disturbing to Franco and Serrano Suner. No two men were more sure that Germany had won the war. It is safe to credit them with the thought that the nearer the actual end drew, the smaller the value that would be attached to Spanish action. Further, as they waited, Spain grew weaker, less able to endure even a short military action by itself. The import of grain from the Western Hemisphere had come almost to a halt for lack of funds. The United States was reducing oil shipments. The people would soon be short of food, and industry of oil. If these could not be obtained as premium for a promise to enter the war—as essential to make the promise good—the Spanish government would have to deal elsewhere. Then who would get Gibraltar, who Morocco, who Oran?

Thus the Spanish government besought an answer. Serrano Suner (and Beigbeder, too, according to the German Ambassador in Madrid) during the summer repeatedly called the Spanish proposal to German attention.² General Vigon supplied his German associates with details as regards military needs. Other Spanish officials did the same for economic needs. Franco solicited Mussolini's assent and favor. On August 5th he sent a letter from Madrid, parts of which read:

"Since the beginning of the present conflict, it has been our intention to make the greatest efforts in our preparations, in order to enter the

² State Department Document No. 1, already cited.

foreign war at a favorable opportunity in proportion to the means at our disposal. . . .

"The rapid and devastating victories in Flanders altered the situation; the defeat of France liberated our frontiers, lessening the grave tension which we along with our Moroccans have been bearing since our Civil War.

"From this moment, our horizon became brighter, our operation became possible and could become very effective, once the difficulties of provisioning have been removed. . . .

"The consequences which the conquest of France is to have for the reorganization of the North African territories have made it advisable for me, now that the time has come, to charge my Ambassador in Rome with transmitting to your Excellency the Spanish aspirations and claims traditionally maintained throughout our history. . . .

"In this sense, we have requested from Germany the necessities for action, while we push forward the preparations and make every effort to better the provisioning situation as far as possible.

"For all these reasons, you will understand the urgency of writing you, to ask your solidarity in these aspirations for the achievement of our security and greatness, while I at the same time assure you of our unconditional support for your expansion and your future." ³

This letter was probably sealed with genuine hope that Mussolini would cause the Germans to warm up. Franco attributed to Mussolini a certain grandeur of view and generosity of nature to which he could appeal. But the note was flicked with concern lest Italy would demand part of the French territories for which he longed—if Germany would turn them over to their last-minute soldiers. There were points of conflict in the scheme of division which Ciano had sketched out in his Diary on June 14, 1939:

"The Duce desires that we begin to define with Spain the future program for the western Mediterranean: Morocco would go completely to Spain; Tunisia and Algeria would go to us. An agreement with Spain should insure our permanent outlet to the Atiantic Ocean through Morocco."

Franco had, more likely than not, become aware of these Italian ideas. Ciano had explained them to Ribbentrop some weeks before—pleading the primacy of Italian strategic and political interests over Spanish. Ribbentrop had responded merely by observing how strong a combination Germany, Italy, and a ^c<sat-

⁸ State Department Document No. 2.

isfied" Spain would be, how able to guard their joint conquests. Germany, he mentioned before leaving the subject for another day, also had historic aspirations in Morocco. Hitler and Hitler alone would have the power to decide who might get what. He was going to try to postpone the decision until the war against Britain was won; to plead with both to fight first and divide the gains later. In the meantime his Naval Staff advised him not to permit Italy to assume first place in French Africa and to act as "impartial guardian" of Spanish and Italian claims.⁴■/Mussolini replied to Franco's letter on August 25th. His bland phrases made it clear that Franco would have to fight his own battle. Mussolini said that he was certain that events would not permit Spain to choose its own time to enter the war; and if Spain did not enter the war, it could hardly expect satisfaction. The main paragraph must have left the author of the plea with the sense he had wasted his time:

"I should like to say to you, dear Franco, that I, with these my practical considerations, do not wish to hasten you in the least in the decision that you have to make, for I am sure that in your decisions you will proceed on the basis of the protection of the vital interests of your people and I am just as certain that you will not let this opportunity go by of giving Spain her African Lebensraum." ⁵

All the phrases of brotherly salutation in this message did not blur its clear meaning. The German and Italian governments would measure their treatment of Spain by the need for, and value of, Spanish help; and they intended to ask a return for anything they gave.

While Mussolini was composing this reply, the German authorities in Berlin continued to scrutinize the Spanish proposal. Whether on his own or by request, Stohrer, the German Ambassador in Madrid, on August 8th drew up for Hitler and Ribbentrop a strictly secret note on the subject. This weighed the advantages against the costs and risks. The final section of his analysis, summarizing the strategy to be followed if Germany decided to enlist Spain, throws much light on later events:

4 "Fuehrer Conferences," a collection of records of meetings between Hitler and the heads of the German Navy, published by the U.S. Navy Department. Papers for the year 1940, Vol. I, page 27.

5 state Department Document No. 3, Letter Mussolini to Franco, August 25, 1940.

"If the operation is undertaken, it is in any case necessary:

"1. To have the preparations go forward in as camouflaged a manner as possible, to make available in Spain supplies of gasoliiie and war materials (ammunition, bombs) which can be unobtrusively transported by railroad and truck, and, not until the last moment, to bring the heavy guns collected in the south of France across the border by fast transit and into the prepared emplacements, while the air arm is absolutely not to make its appearance until the operation begins in earnest.

"2. The moment for initiating the preparations and the operation itself must be adjusted to the expected development of things in England itself, in order to avoid a too early entry of Spain into the war, that is to say, a period of war unendurable for Spain, and thus under certain circumstances the beginning of a source of danger for us." ⁶

While this memorandum went round the circuit of the German ministries, the Spanish government continued to explore how, and how far, it would attain its aims. The Spanish Foreign Minister on August 20th again sought a reply from Berlin in terms that led Stohrer to inform the German Foreign Office that he had the definite impression that the Minister considered Spain's participation in the war an absolute certainty.⁷

This was quite contrary to the impression that Beigbeder was giving Weddell and Hoare; and it is most doubtful that the German Ambassador had valid grounds for it. General Vigon reviewed further with Admiral Canaris (Chief of the German Military Intelligence) the Spanish estimates of the military" aid and supplies that were needed. Serrano Suner contrived through Stohrer to be asked to visit Germany to discuss the conditions of Spain's entry. Then he sought Franco's backing for his mission. The available documents contain a hint that Franco was hesitant to sponsor that errand which his ardent brother-in-law arranged. But he did so—giving orders, later events seem to prove, to stick stubbornly and strictly to the terms contained in the Spanish memorandum just cited. On August 26th the German

6 State Department Document No. 1, already cited.

7 Stohrer added that the extent to which the Spanish government was calculating on its participation in the war was shown in the highly confidential information given to him by the Minister of Foreign Affairs that at the signing of the Spanish-Portuguese agreement supplemental to the Non- Aggression Pact, it was orally and secretly agreed that Portugal would give Spain an entirely free hand in the event of an attack on Gibraltar.

government extended an official invitation to Serrano Suner to come to Berlin for the purpose that he so ardently longed to serve.

Between this date and the meetings in Berlin three weeks later, it became clear that Britain would not negotiate a peace. Churchill convinced the world that Britain would fight on. The noise and sight of planes falling over England began to show that it would. If a careless risk was taken, Spain, or its islands, might be caught in a long war. Hoare, and Weddell, as recounted, did their utmost to impress that danger. The people of Spain read of Serrano Suner's travels in Germany with uneasiness—which gradually turned to hate.

Franco, without waiting for Serrano Suner to go and return with a promise of the food and raw materials, put before the American government (on September 7th) the loan request, the reception of which has been described in the earlier chapters on the Washington scene.

THE OTHER WING OF THE MIRROR: FURTHER SCENES

The September of Dissension

The German government, awaiting Serrano Suner, put its ideas about Spain in order. These were not at all the same as the notions that Franco and the Falange had been pasting on the minds of their followers. Berlin planned to create a system of authority reaching over Europe and Africa, every part of which would be subject to German will and serve German advantage. In this scheme Spain would be a useful particle.

The Foreign Office sketched out possible German offers. Spain might be promised Gibraltar, the district of Oran, and much of French Morocco. But within the expanded Moroccan territory Germany should retain two main ports and their adjacent regions; also control over large Moroccan mining and other enterprises. Within Spain itself Germany should acquire the French and English properties and be granted special economic rights. Thus the new Spanish colonial lands would be fitted into the German "raw-material empire," and Spanish production and trade would enrich Germany.

There was still another item of German desire on the list, one that turned out to be more troubling to Spain than any other; Germany wished Spain to cede one of the Atlantic islands.

"The Fuehrer," read the minutes of his meeting with Raeder, Commander in Chief of the Navy, on July 17th, "would like to acquire one of the Canary Islands in exchange for French Morocco. The Navy is to establish which of the islands is the most suitable, aside from the two main islands." ¹

¹ Conference July 11, 1940, Hitler, Raeder, and Jodl. "Fuehrer Conferences," 1940, Vol. I, page 69.

Opinion in the United States was waking up to the meaning of Axis control of the north and west African coasts. German staff memos began to show serious concern over the possibility that we would seize the Azores and Canary Islands-particularly if Spain or Portugal were drawn into the war. It was deemed imperative to act first, as Germany always had.^{^[8]} Spain should be asked to permit Germany to protect itself against these mischances.

As regards supplies for civilians and soldiers both, German ideas diverged just as much from Spanish proposals. The lists forwarded from Madrid were torn apart by experts in sparse living for others. The amounts of military material asked were deemed far too great. The German Army expressed itself as convinced that it would be more effective to supply complete German military units than to send great stores of German weapons. The quantities asked of such products as oil and wheat were judged to be hugely overstated. Spain wrote large and carelessly.^{^[9]}

Germany was not inclined to indulge lavish wishes. Any products sent to Spain would be drawn from stores too small to suit the managers of the German economic and military programs. To supply even a substantial part of what Spain asked would spoil other plans, both the Economic Ministry and the Ministry for War advised Hitler.^{^[10]}

Exports to Russia under the Soviet-German economic agreement of February 11, 1940 had been held back by Germany in order to retard Russian production of war materials. Russia had sent notice it would end its shipments unless Germany corrected the situation. But it could not, according to the experts in the Economic Ministry and the Ministry of War, be corrected soon enough without scanting the Fuehrer's armament program. The prospect was, therefore, that Russian deliveries would soon fail. This meant:

"that the large imports [into Germany] of raw materials, especially of grain, mineral oil, cotton, rare metals and non-ferrous metals, phosphates, will at least temporarily cease and at best will be resumed later upon a much lower scale and with great sacrifices in German deliveries. In the opinion of the Reich Food Ministry this would be especially serious in the case of the grain supply. . . . The Reich Food Ministry points to the fact that the national grain reserve will be used up during this grain production year so that we would start the next grain year without such a reserve." ^{^[11]}

The supply of other products was short of what eager minds wanted for their many projects. They were running a strict rationing system, not a banquet table. The Spanish seemed to regard themselves not as holders of ration books, but as esteemed guests.

To adjust so large a spread in political vision and to agree upon the sharing of goods so greedily sought, a deep sense of mutuality would have been needed. This did not—in September 1940—exist. Hitler in exultant mood was not kind to the pretensions of others; nor was he given to the art of gentle deflation. As for Ribbentrop, only vain bluster came out of that loose mouth. Serrano Suner was too flawed and driven a man to win from that pair respectful regard for the great claims he was about to present. He was of their own impudent scheming breed.

He set out for Berlin on September 12th. Among his working staff was Demetrio Carceller, of whom notice has already been taken. While Serrano Suner spent his time upon military and political topics, Carceller guided the discussions of economic matters.

It will be recalled that reports of Serrano Suner's trip had caused the American government to hesitate over its response to the Spanish loan request of September 7th. The Foreign Minister, as has been noted, tried to ward off any adverse effect on his attempts to secure overseas supplies; he gave Weddell and Hoare to understand that the mission had no serious official sponsorship. This was not so. Serrano Suner had, in truth, thrust himself forward. In truth, also, he lacked the support of many groups in the Spanish government and Army for the program that he advocated in Berlin. But once on his way, he was authorized by Franco to advance that program, and to obligate Spain in Franco's name.

Serrano Suner in the first talk with Ribbentrop on September 16th described himself, not as a diplomat, but as a representative of the Spanish government sent by Generalissimo Franco as his personal confidential representative and charged with a specific mission. The correctness of this designation is shown by a letter sent by Franco to Hitler on September 22nd in which Serrano Suner was described as "my envoy." ⁶ Later on, when recounting to Mussolini at Bordighera what had occurred, Franco said that Serrano Suner, like a good envoy, had kept him informed from day to day.

Serrano Suner entered the talk on the first day (September 16th) full of good graces, which gradually slipped away. He began as Franco had before him: Spain had wished to enter the war from the beginning and had only been constrained by economic wants and a lack of weapons with which to defend itself. Now it wished to participate if it could be supplied with the necessary requirements. There was in Spain even a certain disagreeable surprise, he went on to remark, because the material necessary to wage war, especially artillery, had not yet arrived from Germany.

A pilgrim he was. But no Don Quixote, it soon appeared, madly bent on serving a noble cause. Carefulness—defined in Madrid—enclosed every side of the Spanish position. No door was

® State Department Document No. 5. Letter from Franco to Hider, September 22,1940. This letter was not delivered until September 27th.

to be left open to the drafts of danger or failure. It was essential, he said, that Spain should be able to prevent or defeat possible attack anywhere in its domains, upon the Atlantic islands or the African coastal colonies, or upon the Cantabrian coast where the rebellious elements were strong. All these vulnerable points must be so well defended before Spain moved that enemies would not be likely to dare an assault; and if they did, that the attempt would fail. The requests for arms were drawn up to provide that certainty. Besides there must be adequate supplies for the Spanish people before the action was begun. These, and a firm promise of the areas that Franco had already named, were Spain's terms for entering the war. In return, it would grant Germany certain special and valuable economic privileges both in Spain and in the lands to be ceded. The Spanish proposals were the dream of any soldier: no uncalculated risks, the chance to select the time for action, and assured rewards for victory. Could Franco have really believed that Germany, in its most victorious season, would accord these terms for Spanish aid or to cement the Spanish connection? It is hard to believe. But he is, as Sir Samuel Hoare and others found him, a complacent man.

Ribbentrop tried to correct the Spanish perspective. He thought the Spanish reckonings of danger unreal and the Spanish demands —political and economic—excessive. The situation, he deftly pointed out, was wholly different from what it had been at the (start of the war. German armies had destroyed France; England would be thoroughly beaten—London would soon be only ashes and rubble. German and Italian victory was sure. Still he did not spurn Spain's wish to join them nor challenge Franco's wish to choose his own time.

As for Spain's territorial demands, they were, he said, "in principle" acceptable. But the details would have to be adjusted. Germany planned to acquire for itself middle Africa, and the contour pf German aims would have to be taken into account. Spain could fairly be asked to complete the German scheme by yielding the points that would make the great new German Empire immune to any and all possible future attacks. Defined, these were two. First, Germany wished to have two Moroccan ports as bases, and the regions around them. Such an arrangement, Ribbentrop, being the geopolititian, said, would bring Germany,

Italy, and Spain together in a three-headed control of the destinies of Europe and Africa. Second, Germany wanted Spain to cede one of the Canary Islands as an outlying base against distant enemies.⁷

Serrano Suner argued on many points—and upon one with rough fervor. Throughout the conversation he firmly refused to discuss the possible cession of one of the Canary Islands. There is no need further to trace the other veins of differences that were revealed.

This first talk between Serrano Suner and Ribbentrop—and the further talks with Hitler and Ribbentrop that followed— showed how far apart were German and Spanish terms. But more than that, it signified that Franco's ideal was out of grasp, no matter how complete the victory over the Allies. For the German will to hold the uppermost place in all parts of the European world was made plain. Thenceforward it would have been strange had there not been somewhere in Franco's mind fear of any deal with a triumphant Germany.

Ribbentrop and Serrano Suner had brushed the ground for Hitler; the next day (the 17th) he walked over it. They had discussed the terms and conditions of action; it was the plan of action itself that engaged Hitler. The basic elements of his argument were simple; they were the same that had guided him in his ascent and trumphs, the same that were to take him and Germany to ruin. They were, in short, though he never stated them in ₄ short, that if the will to action existed, the means were sufficient; that if the direction of the action was bold, victory was certain; and that success in action would be sure to yield enough advantage to satisfy all partners. The conclusion was pointed; there was no need to settle in advance what each should get. In these ideas he led Germany, in them he sought to lead the whole Axis- ruled world. Spain could join, take its place, and accept its allotted share, or stay out and remain poor and weak. But this is

⁷ This was in accord with the recommendations that had been submitted by the Naval Staif (June 20, 1940), "On the Policy of Bases—the creation of la large united German Colonial Empire in Central Africa (from French Guinea and Sierra Leone via Togo, Nigeria, the Cameroons, the French Congo, the Belgian Congo, to German East Africa), which is necessary for national and economic reasons, necessitates bases on the coast of the colonial territory." "Fuehrer Conferences," 1940 Vol. I, page 65.

an interpretative summary of Hitler's position—as revealed in this and later talks with the Spanish leaders—not a decalcomania of what he actually said on this occasion to Serrano Suner.

On the military problems Hitler was precise and dogmatic. First he devoted himself to proving that the conquest of Gibraltar and the Straits was easy. Spain would, therefore, not need as much military strength or equipment as suggested or of the types that Spain most seemed to want. This, Hitler said, was the view of his most expert and experienced officers. His discourse went into all points of the combat operation. He dismissed the fear of a successful British landing anywhere on the continent as an absolute chimera; German dive bombers would ruin any attempted landing in Spain or Portugal. Further, by the same machines, the harbor of Gibraltar could quickly be made useless and the English fleet driven away from Gibraltar and the entire vicinity. Spanish plans for the conquest of the fortress of Gibraltar rested mainly on the use of heavy artillery for bombardment. The fortress could best and most quickly be taken by an attack from the air and by specialist troops particularly trained and equipped—like those who had taken Fort Eben-Emael. Apparently assuming that this would create no misgiving, Hitler promised that Germany would provide the air force for the attack on the Rock and the expulsion of enemy ships from the Straits; it would also make available the specialist troop formations.⁸ This exposition impressed Serrano Suner. He asked to have it written out for Franco.

At the end, Hitler switched to the politics of conquest. He painted the great colonial raw-material empire that Germany planned to create for its permanent security. Like Picasso's later works, the eyes looked in all directions. One rested on the Spanish islands in the Atlantic. These must be under the protection of a strong power which could frighten off or defeat any other imperial tendencies—such as those which were coming to the fore in the United States.

Serrano Suner's rejection of this suggestion the day before had not sufficed. In a final talk with Ribbentrop he made it rudely plain that Spain would not agree. Before doing so it is probable

⁸ State Department Document No. 4. Talk between Hider and Serrano Suner, September 17, 1940.

that he had spoken with Franco on the telephone. Serrano Suner said that it was absolutely impossible for Spain to cede islands that historically belonged to and formed part of Spain. But he advanced a substitute, that Germany seize instead the Portuguese island of Madeira. As for the German wish, Serrano Suner added, to retain two large areas within Morocco, as well as control over the most important sources of raw material, if Spain gave these up, Morocco would be nothing more than an empty shell.

Serrano Suner could not resolve issues such as these. The claims he had brought were those of an equal in an association of conquerors; the answers he had been given were fit for a minor dependent. Spain's hopes were drawn out of Spain's past, which was real only to Spain. They were out of accord with the division of power illustrated by the presence of German troops at the Pyrenees. Thus gloomily he set off upon a tour of France and Belgium while Ribbentrop went to Rome to see Mussolini. Hitler promptly sent a summary of his ideas by courier to Franco, a summary written with easy assumption of mastery of military matters. His genius shone in the sky and Franco, like his own military staff, would, he was sure, come to admit it. His letter was one of instruction rather than command, for he still did not attach great importance to the Spanish decision.

On economic matters, it should be noted, the Serrano Suner mission had failed as completely to reach accord with their German colleagues. Spain wanted Germany to send foodstuffs and raw materials at once, to scatter this bread upon the Spanish waters. The Germans, found the request almost absurd. They were not willing to dispense their hoards carelessly or in return for a vague promise. They wanted payment in the future for what could not be paid in the present. Their view is shown by the text of one of the draft proposals that they placed before the Spanish government. In this the Spanish government was asked to grant Gex^nany the dominant position in Spain's economic life with the exception of possible agreements still to be reached with Italy. It was asked also to promise primarily to use German co-operation in the reconstruction and, expansion of Spanish industry, agriculture, mining, transport, and finance, and particularly to consider German supply needs for raw materials and keep open possibilities for German exports. Regarding participation in the exploitation of any raw-material sources Germany was to get first priority.

The basic split in attitude that emerged is displayed in the sulky exchange between the senior Spanish and German representatives on September 19th. The Spaniard remarked that for Spain the objective of this war would be the elimination of foreign rule, and that it would not make a good impression if Germany should take the place of England. According to the German proposition, he said, Spain would have to bear the entire expenditure of the administration of Morocco, but would not secure the benefits. The joy over the heritage would be considerably decreased and could even change suddenly into the opposite. If Germany, he concluded, should insist on her severe demand, it would be better if she kept Morocco for herself. To which the German representative replied that nobody in Germany or the world would understand if Germany waged a war of life and death with two major powers and did not secure her raw-material requirements after victory.

Here was the proof of what Weddell and Hoare so often told Spanish officials; that if Germany won, Spain would become a German province. The remark had always been rebuked. But the mind is left to wonder whether, after reading such texts as these, the Spaniards did not admit to themselves that it was true. Such demands must have made it clear that while American and British offers would not make Spain great, they would leave her free. Carceller, in particular, seems to have returned from Berlin with changed ideas. He seems to have concluded that German and Spanish claims would not be reconciled, and thereupon became an active seeker of American help.⁹

The Germans went over the Spanish statement of needs with a scythe. The Spaniards had reckoned them with a free hand. To be sure of enough, to bargain, or possibly to make a bargain impossible? The riddle remains. But the first guess is the best. Some of the Spanish requests, as for rubber, could not be met at all. Others, such as that for oil and wheat, the Germans offered to meet only in part.

Despite the deep differences in desire, the German and Spanish economic experts did not wish to part without leaving some ⁹ See Chapter xxi.

basis for further discussions. They therefore presently subscribed to a series of gaping texts. These dealt with the provisioning of Spain for war, the exchange of goods during and after the war, and the economic privileges to be granted Germany in Spanish domains. But they turned out to be only the raw material for further argument.

Such was the outcome of Serrano Suner's first excursion to Berlin. Spain was offered the scant minimum necessary for a military campaign modeled after the lightning-like German successes. The planned German military action would be powerful enough to win. But by the same token, as Franco was shrewd enough to perceive, the German Army would have to be given, or would take, charge of the combat operations. If the campaign should lag, Spain would be dependent upon continued German help; and with it German control over Spanish life. Then, even if victory were won and Spain secured Gibraltar and territory in Africa, Germany would retain in the center of Morocco two great bases and many special economic privileges. In Spain itself, clawlike German economic enterprises would have been promised full freedom. And lastly, even if Germany did not insist upon the permanent cession of one of the Canary Islands, who could know when its soldiers, ships, and airmen would leave them?

It is not hard to understand Franco's wish to bargain longer and firmly. Nor to understand why the Spanish government showed so much patience, during the fall months, in its negotiations with Britain and the United States about oil, food, and other raw materials. Germany would be taught that Spain had a choice. Spain's needs would be met. If only it did not prove necessary, in order to get what was wanted, to cast away the chance to join in the war—if and when that could be done safely!

Franco showed himself a master of the alphabet of hesitation. The condition of Spain supplied the first letters. The failure of Germany to invade Britain and of Italy to rout the British in the east supplied the middle group. German proposals supplied the end letters. The combination of British and American policies during the summer and early autumn of 1940 fostered the hesitation. They furnished Spain with enough of such essentials as oil, coal, and food to struggle along, but not enough to carry it through a war without becoming vitally dependent on Germany. They held open a prospect of plenty if Spain stayed at peace. Thus they served as an incentive to be wary and independent in the next stage of argument with Germany about what Spain was to get and do.

THE OTHER WING OF THE MIRROR: STILL FURTHER SCENES

The Worth of Spanish Friendship

In THE middle of September Franco was not ready to commit himself either to the Allies or to Germany. With skill he would keep Spain safe and draw advantages from each side while watching the outcome of their battles. Thus, as recounted, he permitted Beigbeder, the Foreign Minister, to continue to assure us and Britain that Spain would stay out of the war. Thereby he preserved the chance to obtain grain and oil, fertilizers, cotton and rubber. But despite Serrano Suner's reports of difficulty, the hope of gaining an empire gleamed. Britain's downfall might yet be brought about in one fortnight tof clear weather and calm seas. It would be folly to cast away the chance to gather for Spain the African lands just across the narrow sea. A victory of the Axis in which Spain did not share might be more unhappy for Spain than its defeat. Italy and Germany would be fearsome as close colonial neighbors.

So he took over from Serrano Suner the task of winning the right of admission to victory without paying too high a price. But the Germans then (and later) were sure that he would pay what was asked. Ribbentrop, on his way to see Mussolini after his talks with Serrano Suner, had no doubt that fortune was smiling on Germany everywhere, and that Franco would decide to place himself within the orbit of success. Ciano has recoorded the mood with which he entered this new series of talks:

"In the car Ribbentrop speaks at once of the surprise in his bag: a military alliance with Japan, to be signed within the next few days at Berlin. . . . He thinks that such a move will have a double advantage: against Russia and against America. ... As for England . . . the

weather has been very bad and the clouds even more than RAP have prevented final success. However . . . the invasion will take place ,anyway as soon as there are a few days of fine weather. The landing® is ready and possible. English territorial defense is non-existent. A single German division will suffice to bring about a complete collapse." ¹

With bubbling candor Ribbentrop related to II Duce the talks with the Spaniards in Berlin and Hitler's ideas concerning the conquest of Gibraltar. The Spaniards, he said, wanted to conquer Gibraltar themselves. But in order to prevent any failure, Germany would provide Spain with special troops equipped with special weapons and a few squadrons of planes. With these the Fuehrer was convinced that the conquest of the Rock was "absolutely possible." He then explained the Spanish territorial demands. According to the German record of this talk, Mussolini said that the Spanish wishes did not clash with the Italian. Had he decided to renounce his conflicting claims with Spain? Did he hope thereby to ensure acceptance of his greater claims on France? The answer is obscure.

Then Ribbentrop informed Mussolini that upon his return to Berlin, where Serrano Suner would be waiting, he intended to sign a secret protocol dealing with Spanish entry into the war and its requisites. The time of entry would be left for Spain to decide —on the understanding that it would be as soon as preparations were complete, and particularly as soon as German special weapons, troops, and planes had arrived in Spain.²

Ribbentrop's optimism was catching, for Ciano wrote in his Diary on the date of September 20th:

"A second conversation with Ribbentrop. It has to deal principally with Spanish intervention, which now seems to be assured and imminent."

The wheels of Axis diplomacy did seem to speed up toward a junction of the German and Spanish programs. On September 22nd Franco sent a reply to the plan of military strategy that Hitler, at Serrano Suner's request, had transmitted. This letter

1 Entry in Ciano Diaries, September 19, 1940.

2This summary is drawn from the incomplete record of the conversation of September 19, 1940, printed in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Vol. IV, page 477.

was not delivered until the 27th. In the interval Serrano Suner had resumed his talks in Berlin. Together the letter and the talks must have seemed to travel far toward decision.

Franco's letter warmly endorsed Hitler's ideas as regards the best way to capture Gibraltar. Later, it may be noted, he was again to change his mind on this matter. Even estimates of military situations may be affected by sentiments; Gibraltar could be easy to take on the day one was assured and pleased, it could be very hard to take on the day one was not. But for the day, Franco agreed that the attack could be safely and quickly carried out with the type of military help that Germany was ready to promise. In so saying, he added:

"For our part, we have been preparing the operation in secret for a long time. . .

The other features of Hitler's program, however, Franco firmly refused. While agreeing to the use of German dive bombers and destroyer planes for the defense of the Canary Islands, he wrote that he would not turn over one of the Canary Islands to Germany as a base. He also rebuffed the German request for military locations within Morocco as

"Unnecessary in peacetime and superfluous in wartime."

He evaded the German request for special economic privileges. He put aside suggestions for future economic arrangements as a deviation from the main subject.

Thus trying to dodge through the barbed-wire fence of Ger- * man wishes, he sought to reach his own points of desire. He closed the letter with the hope that he would

"be able to renew the old bonds of comradeship between our armies" ³

in the cause for which Hitler fought.

While this letter was in course of delivery (September 22-7), Serrano Suner was leading even the Germans in zeal to sign some accord, even though it had blanks and obscurities. It would at least, he said, prove Spain's firm wish to enter the war and dispel rumors. His inner thought is traceable; if Franco entered into a

³ The preceding summary is taken from the text of the letter as printed in State Department Document No. 5.

treaty that pledged Spain to enter the war, no matter how guarded, his struggle for mastery in Madrid would be won. He, Serrano Suner, would be the keeper of Franco's word. Beigbeder would be the resister, the rebel.

But the design did not affect his efforts to secure for Spain unclouded and individual title to the whole domain of desire— the Africa that lay across the Straits. Serrano Suner, in talks with Ribbentrop on the 26th and with Hitler on the 27th, drummed on Spanish needs and whistled when German claims were being sung. Why, it may be imagined the Germans asked themselves, had this man proposed himself for this mission if he was unwilling or unable to give in to them? They lost patience and became rudely abrupt—as when Ribbentrop dismissed Spanish objections to German claims in Morocco by saying that there was no point in talking about the mistrust caused by German claims for bases in Africa. If Germany wanted them, he rubbed in, she would get them since she wanted to establish a great colonial empire in central Africa. Furthermore, he added, defense against America required bases in Morocco and one of the Canary Islands.

These talks brought Serrano Suner's long mission in Germany to an end. They had settled nothing. Even on supply matters the gap had been sealed only with foam. On the 27th, the same day that Hitler received Franco's letter, a senior German interdepartmental committee completed its study of this field. It found almost all the Spanish requests excessive, and it reported that Germany could not meet them—particularly the demand for oil. The conclusion was that Spain must be ready herself to promise Germany the delivery of everything possible, while Germany could not supply the quantities that Spain had asked.

The Allies need not have been as worried as they were about the offers that Serrano Suner would bring back from Berlin.^{^[12]}

Ciano was in Berlin to take part in the ceremonies of Japanese entrance into the Tripartite Pact. The note in his Diary for the day on which the talks ended (September 27th) records without anguish the German disenchantment:'

"He [Hider] spoke ... of Spanish intervention, to which he was opposed because it would cost more than it was worth. . . . Toward us Italians the Germans are impeccably courteous . . . with the Spaniards on the other hand, the Germans are less courteous. Generally speaking, Serrano Suner's mission was not successful, and the man himself did not and could not please the Germans."

Hitler on the next day (the 28th) summed up his thoughts on the situation for Ciano. After telling of the long list of Spanish requests, he remarked:

"Spain is to promise to Germany, in return, her friendship. One must," he continued, ''think it over thoroughly if one ir-cds to enter into such obligations and if one is to bar other possibilities from oneself." ⁵

To make Ciano understand how painful the whole discussion had been, he said:

. . and as a German one feels toward the Spanish almost like a Jew who wants to make business out of the holiest possessions of mankind." ⁶

The "other possibility'⁷ in Hitler's mind was France. He had not managed to secure control over the French fleet or the French Empire in Africa. Now he was growing aware of how much difference they might make. If they went over to Britain, the war would be greatly prolonged. If he could win them over, Britain would be defeated even without invasion. It would be reckless, certainly, to fling them into the arms of Britain by promising Franco what he asked, Spanish help, as he said, was not worth it—certainly not till he knew more of the outcome of his attempt to subdue Britain from the air. Among the notes on Hitler's talk in Ciano's Diary on September 27th there is to be found:

"No more invasion of England. No more blitz destruction of England. From Hitler's speech there now emerges worry about a long war."⁷

5 The Navy was urgently advocating the seizure of Gibraltar as soon as possible. Hitler agreed that it was highly important to clear up the Mediterranean question but showed reserve in his talk with Raeder at this time. "He will have to decide," he said, "whether co-operation with France or with Spain is the more profitable; probably with France since Spain demands a great deal (French Morocco) but offers little." Meeting Hitler-Raeder, September 26, "Fuehrer Conferences," 1940, Vol. II, page 24.

6Interview between Hitler and Ciano, Berlin, September 28, 1940. State Department Document No. 6.

7 On August 1st Hitler had ordered that an attempt be made to be ready for the invasion by September 15th. The decision whether the operation was to be begun then or delayed till the spring was to be made after the Air Force had concentrated its attack on England for a week. On the 14th of

During the first twenty-six days of the battle above England (according to the current British communiques) the Germans had lost 1,008 planes and 2,927 airmen, while Britain had lost 286 planes and 135 pilots.^s The defenses of central London had proved so good that the bulk of German raiders were being driven out to the suburbs. Both Germany and Spain had been, no doubt, keeping the score of this battle while they talked to one another.

Serrano Suner, before going home, went to Rome to see what help might be had from Mussolini. He had recovered his blithe- ness. Once again he avowed that despite all the difficulties he was convinced that war would unite all factions of Spain in a single group because the objectives—Gibraltar and Morocco—were so deeply felt by all and especially the young. Mussolini contented himself by repeating what he had already written—that he was convinced that Spain would be drawn into the struggle by its vital interests. Italy could spare no grain, but its Air Force would help make the battle for the western Mediterranean short and the outcome certain.

Hitler seems to have been both puzzled and balked at the Spanish refusal to see that he could not meet their wishes. When he met with Mussolini at the Brenner Pass on October 4th, he reverted to the Spanish problem with turgid intensity. Again he stressed his deep concern lest the remaining fighting forces of France go over to Britain. He was, he explained, reaching for an accord with Vichy and a compromise with Spain which would permit the formation of a coalition against Britain. Mussolini was undisturbed by this account of the trouble with Spain, but annoyed at the portended deal between Germany and Vichy.^{^[13]}

Nothing could have incensed Serrano Suner more than the signs that Hitler was turning to France. He hated that land beyond measure. He was sure—and this conviction he shared with Franco —that, no matter what deals were made, it would in the end be Spain's enemy. But he did not retreat with injured anger. His job was still to get out of the situation all that he could, no matter how it turned. Thus, on the surface, he posed as faithful as before to the Axis connection. Down deep, however, he probably felt Spain released from faithfulness; now justified in betraying not only one side but both. He had arrived at the "independence" of the disillusioned crook.

In this spirit, it may be surmised, the arrangements for the meeting between Hitler and Franco at Hendaye were completed. Serrano Suner sent buoyant messages 'to Ribbentrop promising complete counterproposals, including one for a ten-year military alliance with Germany and Italy. These were to be kept from the knowledge of the American and British governments, so that they would not cut off Spain's supplies.

"We believe," he wrote, "that all of these should be negotiated with the utmost secrecy in order not to jeopardize the several shipments of Argentine and Canadian wheat which we are endeavoring—with great difficulty—to acquire. All of this is for the good of the common cause. This will be done in such a way that when the rank and file of our diplomatic service, while they continue keeping the balance in order to obtain the greatest possible quantities of wheat and gasoline, our negotiations will be carried on through our personal contacts and through secret correspondence between the Fuehrer and the Caudillo." ^{^[14]}

At this point both lines of this dual strategy were put in his hands, or so it seemed. As already told, on October 17th Beigbeder, who had stood out against him, was dismissed. Serrano Suner was made Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. The American government, as already recounted, abruptly paused in discussions of a possible loan. Serrano Suner was glad rather than disappointed.

THE OTHER WING OF THE MIRROR: STILL FURTHER SCENES

Hitler and Franco Sign a Pact—to Seal a Vacuum

FoR Hitler the meeting at Hendaye was only one step in a quest for a coalition against England. He was seeking to draw France, Spain, ancf Italy together in a joint program for attack against England under his leadership. To Mussolini and Franco he would offer parts of Africa, but ask that map-making await victory. For what might be taken from France, he would offer Petain compensation at Britain's expense. All were to trust his wisdom and fairness. He held the power to support or crush any of them. They would, he assured himself, fall into line. The main source of his error was in failing to see that they could not, even if they chose, compel their people to accept his leadership.

The first quick talk he held with Laval on the 22nd, just before meeting Franco, encouraged his belief that the French would be subservient. He was ready to offer Vichy a sharing partnership in the new Europe, a promise that France would retain a colonial empire equivalent to its present one.¹ Later on, when victory was won, he could undeceive France, if necessary. But he must not throw away the chance to deceive. Therefore he could not at that moment give a pledge in black and white to transfer to Spain large sections of the French colonial empire. If it became known, his plan would fail; the French forces in Morocco and elsewhere might even rebel and join England.

All this meant that Franco's claims would have to be reduced or deferred. Hitler was less ready to accede to them than he had

¹ William L. Langer: Our Vichy Gamble, pages 89 et seq., gives an interesting account of the meetings with Laval and Petain and important extracts from the official record of the talk at Montoire on October 24th.

been the month before in Berlin. But he still tried at this Hendaye meeting to fix the Spanish decision to enter the war, or at least to sanction a German attack upon Gibraltar and the Straits.

The meeting was held in Hitler's spacious parlor car near the little railroad station. Their talk was a curtain of discourse behind which their assistants sewed upon the seams of various secret agreements.^{^[15]} Ribbentrop had brought along new texts dealing with the diplomatic, military, supply, and economic elements of the proposed greater alliance (for it was to include Italy). These he and Serrano Suner worked upon while and after the two dictators explored each other's minds. Franco was not afraid. He had not come to capitulate but to bargain and to preserve his freedom to act as best suited his own purposes.

He, the official record seems to show, took the lead in the talk by plunging into a review of the difficulties he faced in placing Spain on Germany's side in the war—a review as long as those which left his Cabinet blinking and bored. Hitler tried to convince him that they were manageable, that Spain's needs would be taken care of if it entered the war, that the time had come to d<Tso, and that victory would be quick and sure. But he made it clear that he regarded Spanish entry as an opportunity for Spain, not as a relief measure for the Axis. He went into details with regard to the great strength of Germany. He sought to dispel any mistaken impression Franco might have that England had not been wiped out on schedule. Germany would not begin the offensive against Britain until satisfied regarding the weather; he had waited for the weather he wanted before attacking France-, the result was known; so now he would wait for the weather that would permit him to make the great attack upon England with certainty of success. In the meanwhile he assured Franco, as he had Serrano Suner the month before, that Britain was being shattered by his planes and isolated by his submarines.

Yet, he went on, it would be foolish to disregard French feelings. His long address on this point was, in substance, a plea that Franco act without waiting for a clear delineation of the lands to be given to Spain. This was not the moment to settle the changes that would be made. It was the time to form a union for the quick defeat of Engand, after which all partners would gain much. The dialogue reminds one of Don Quixote's effort to quiet Sancho Panza's wish for details about the kingdom that would be his at the end of his loyal services:

"I have already said to thee, Sancho, that thee shouldst not trouble thyself in any wise about this affair; for if an island were wanting, we have then the kingdom of Denmark, or that of Sobradisa, which will come as fit for thy purpose as a ring to thy finger."

On and on went the talk for nine hours—each entranced talker explaining himself in heedless stretches, recognizing no interruption or answer. Late in the night Franco broke off on the plea of fatigue. But his lava-like outpouring of talk left its mark upon Hitler. When a few days later, in Florence, Hitler told Mussolini of the pact that had been completed, he said that the exertion of reaching a conclusion had been so great that rather than have the conversation over again, he would prefer to have three or four teeth pulled out. Franco's subordinates could have warned him.

The Germans had thought that the talk would be resumed the next day, between Ribbentrop, Franco, and Serrano Suner— for Hitler was off to meet Petain. But when morning came, the Spaniards did not appear at Hendaye. A German searcher found them in San Sebastian, still tired and disgruntled. Franco left for Madrid.

So the dictators parted, leaving the chilled professions of their mutual esteem behind them. Franco had agreed to enter into an accord that would seal the unity of Spain, Germany, and Italy, But one that could be kept in storage as long as he wished. Serrano Suner stayed behind to watch over the terminal work on the drafts. It was agreed that publication of the pact must be postponed until the actual Spanish entry into the war. Spain, Serrano Suner observed, had an even greater interest than Germany in maintaining secrecy, for if the existence of this pact became known, England would prevent the delivery of 100,000 tons of corn and 150,000 tons of wheat for which Spain had already signed contracts with Canada.

To the last moment Serrano Suner tried to get an exact definition of what was to be given Spain, but failed. Spanish demands had grown under the moon which guided British bombers to Berlin. He was now asking, according to what Hitler soon afterwards told Mussolini, for boundary changes along the Pyrenees and laying claim to French Catalonia.

The text of the so-called Protocol of Hendaye has not become available. But without too great risk of vital error a summary of its main features and parts may be identified. Its basic section contained some kind of political and military alliance between Spain, Italy, and Germany. Mussolini, on first reading the text, remarked that it represented the secret adhes^;on of Spain to the Tripartite Pact.

This accord was to be made public when Spain's preparations were complete and it was ready to enter the war. In his jubilance at having accomplished his task of persuasion, Hitler proposed to Mussolini that on that day the three of them meet in Florence —and together announce the pact as a signal for the assault on Gibraltar and the Straits. But when would that day be? The text did not state; no year, no month, no day, or any well-defined mark of circumstance.

The other sections of the pact dealt with preparations for Spanish participation and the terms of settlement after victory. They concerned: first, the plan for combining Spanish and German military preparations and operations; second, the provision by Germany of war materiel and supplies; third, German rights in certain of the economic resources of Morocco and the French and British properties in Spain; and fourth, the Spanish claims for territory in Africa.³

Of the section dealing with the last point, the language is known, along with evidence of the objection with which it was blotted. The Axis powers declared their consent to the reincorporation of Gibraltar within Spain, and their readiness in concluding peace after the defeat of England, to effect the transfer to

³ It is not clear whether all these subjects were dealt with in the one instrument of agreement, named "The Protocol of Hendaye," which appears to have been an instrument of some seven or eight paragraphs. The detailed arrangements for military co-operation, supplies, and economic rights were relegated to supplementary accords or annexes, which were to have been completed later.

Spain of certain parts of Africa—in the measure that France could be compensated by grants of other African territories of equal value. German claims on France, .it was specified, were to remain unaffected by this promise.

The honor of signing this pact was passed on by Serrano Suner to the Spanish Ambassador in Berlin, de los Monteros. Ribbentrop tried to have Serrano Suner include its text in the formal covering letters that they exchanged. Serrano Suner chose not to. But he had ink for a postscript. In this he wrote that he should not like to refrain from letting Ribbentrop know that both Franco and himself felt bitter because, despite friendship, the trifling changes that they had sought were rejected—changes that would have caused Spain to feel more assured without changing substance or lessening Hitler's freedom of action.

The Germans were not worried by this reproach. Ribbentrop, during a stop on the railway trip home, telephoned to let Ciano know what happened. He was, he said,

"On the whole satisfied with the results achieved . . . the program of collaboration is heading towards concrete results." ⁴

To the German Ambassador in Rome he wired that Spain had shown itself well disposed in general but difficult in regard to particulars; and that as for France, Petain and Laval would cooperate with Germany.

A pact existed. That its authors wished it to come into effect, there can hardly be a doubt. But they remained free to hurry or to tarry, and in the end to act or not to act. The bridge of decision was not really crossed.

Franco waited and talked, measuring the risks of the bargain. Germany was offering supplies for action; Britain, with the United States alongside of it, was offering supplies to delay or prevent action. Franco tried to collect both premiums at the same time. The Allied supply program enabled him to do so while counting his fears. There were many. There was fear that the British might be able to seize the Atlantic islands or even land on the Peninsula. Hitler might tell him they could not, but how often they had before! The bones of British sailors buried in Spain rattled. There

⁴ Entry in the Ciano Diaries, October 24,1940.

was fear that in a real campaign a hungry and angry people would turn against him; fear that he would be cheated of the African territories he wanted; and, though Spanish officials always denied it, fear that victory would turn out to be a German, not a Spanish one; if he had to use German forces to fight his own people it would certainly be so.

The pattern of negotiations between Franco, Hitler, and Mussolini that has been traced was to repeat itself with rising intensity during November and December. As it did, all Franco's fears became stronger. He formally endorsed the pact to join the Axis and make war on Britain. But even as he did so, he appears to have grown more determined not to be pushed into a decision. He began to reach and plan for some independent Spanish action —if ever a wholly safe moment should arrive. But an account of this evolution in Spanish policy must be postponed while the narrative reverts to the American and British wing of the mirror.

washington again: after the hendaye conference

A Penny for Franco's Thoughts

The American government learned little about the outcome of the Hendaye Conference. No word leaked out of the accord that had been signed. The comment that traveled through the government offices in Madrid after Franco's return hinted that there were still barriers to Spanish action—as indeed there were. But how strong and durable were they? Had Franco refused to engage himself to act, or had the conspirators merely agreed that Spain should take further time to get ready?

Weddell and the British government, from high to low, concluded that the situation was unchanged and that the reasons for helping Spain were as good as ever. But the Secretary of State had never found these without flaw. If the shadow of hunger and revolt was lifted, would not Franco be freer to be bold? Would not Franco find excuses to betray the giver if the fortunes of war turned against Britain? Further, popular dislike and mistrust of Franco was still keen; large sections of the American press loathed the notion of trying to buy him off and were certain that he would not stay bought.

Between the inside whispers and outside shouts, Secretary Hull continued to waver. But we did not interfere with the purposeful expansion of Britain's aid. In fact, we quietly sustained British measures to help Spain obtain food from the Argentine and Canada, and oil from the United States and the Caribbean.

Weddell, it will be recalled, had been instructed after the discharge of Beigbeder to reserve any mention of American aid until we could judge the meaning of the event. He had his first serious talk with the new Foreign Minister on October 31st, a week after
the meeting at Hendaye. Serrano Suner evaded all queries as to what had taken place at that spot or after. But he made use of the turn in the talk to remark that he could assure us that there had been no pressure or even hint by Hitler or Mussolini that Spain should enter the war. This statement Weddell caused him to repeat thrice. Was it true? What did it mean? To make the riddle worse, the Foreign Minister proceeded to state that he could assure the American government of the political solidarity of Spain, Germany, and Italy. Murk within murk; half truths twisted around a bent branch of fact. Before the meeting ended, Serrano Suner, probably with an inner smirk, said that the Cau- dillo had expressed extreme surprise that the shipments of wheat that we had promised had not yet arrived.

Weddell suspected that he was not being told all. But he did not guess how craftily phrased had been that aspect of the truth which he had been told. In any case, he remained of the opinion that, no matter what Serrano Suner said, our ends would best be served by making a show of helping Spain. Thus he proposed: first, that if Franco agreed to the pertinent conditions that had been attached to Red Cross aid, news of the first wheat shipment should be announced at once; second, that we should discuss a possible credit for other supplies freely, with the realization that they might not be shipped. His thought was that we also might play a bit with open promises.

But Washington reached the sterner conclusion—for the moment it would frown, not tease or tempt. The White House had observed the jewel that Serrano Suner had proudly pasted upon his chest, the sparkling declaration of solidarity with the Axis. Thus, on November 5th, Weddell was told not to resume his attempts to talk with Franco. If an interview was granted in response to previous requests, he was to make it bluntly clear that the American government paid for the Red Cross supplies; that our offer had been based on the notion that Spain would follow an absolutely neutral policy; and that if the conception of political solidarity meant that Spain planned to aid Germany in any way, we could not use public funds to help Spain.

Weddell's quick and agitated replies (of November 6th and 7th) to this message showed that he thought a mistake was being

made, caused by a misreading of his report. He hastened to make #

clear that he thought Serrano Suner's assurances went as far as could be expected then, and that despite Serrano Suner's vain statement, no change in Spain's status was in sight. He found support for this opinion in a statement made on November 8th by Franco to Hoare—that if German troops crossed the frontier, force would be met by force. The Secretary of State did not know that a courier was then en route from Berlin to Madrid with the formal text of the pact joining Spain to the Axis, already signed by Ribbentrop and Ciano; a pact based on the anticipation that German and Spanish troops would march together, at a time of Franco's choosing. But he was tired of riddles and antics. The thinly carved phrases that were served did not satisfy. Nor did they seem to rhyme with the rest of the Spanish conduct. Only a few days before, it had expelled, without apology, the international administration of the Tangier Zone.

Welles, on November 8th, sent a message to Weddell even more blunt than the previous one. Franco was to be told that the American government could not justify any aid, even Red Cross relief, unless he made it publicly known that Spain would not help Germany in the war. Further, if Weddell could find an expedient way, he was to tell Franco that American opinion was deeply aroused over recent political executions, and that we hoped he would show mercy to political prisoners and refugees. For the first time since the war started, a cable went out to Madrid that was not tinged with fear. It contained some hint of the feeling that Serrano Suner should be swept off the boards. But who was to do the sweeping? Britain was doing the fighting. If our directness was a mistake, it was Britain who would pay first.

The British government knew that full well. It reacted swiftly. As soon as Hoare learned of this message—and he learned of it very quickly through Washington-^he sounded a loud alarm. Twice (on November 9th and nth) before Weddell could act, the British Embassy in Washington begged the State Department to reconsider. For, in its views, Franco was sincere in the statement that he had made to Hoare about Spanish policy. While, on the other hand, the British thought it of little use to delay offers .of aid in the pursuit of verbal assurances of uncertain value. For famine was imminent; and the British government was afraid that if we refused to give help unless the Spanish government openly separated itself from Germany, it would be driven into German arms. Why or by whom the British argument did not make clear. But it urged the State Department to hurry the relief and the credit talks. The British government was about to show its faith by opening negotiations at once with Spain for another loan of two million pounds.

The State Department was swayed by British anxiety, but still unconvinced that help was a better guarantee of Spanish neutrality than need. Therefore it took its time to reply. Weddell, while waiting to see Franco, tried out his orders upon the new Minister of Foreign Affairs (November 12th) and the new Minister of Commerce and Industry (November 19th). Serrano Suner showed again how well he could mislead without telling an outright lie; or can he be said this time to have flatly lied? He described Spain's situation vis-a-vis Germany as being identical with America's relations to Britain, except that Spain had nothing to give the Axis. When Weddell asked whether, if German or Italian troops crossed the frontier, Spain would resist by force, he said it would—to the last man. Again a chosen phrase spoken out of the side of the mouth. A few days before (November nth), he had signed the pact of alliance with Germany and Italy; and certainly he regarded it as a compact for war, to be begun quickly.

By means of such responses Serrano Suner managed to give Weddell the impression that his taunting remark about political solidarity was a matter of mind and sentiment—hardly convertible into Axis aid. Having done this, he hurried off to talk again with Hitler at Berchtesgaden, leaving Weddell's request for an interview with Franco to await his return.

Carceller took up the task of maintaining the twisting trail. His talks in Berlin had brought him no gifts of supplies, no promises of aid until Spain went to war. He told Weddell on the 19th, with an air of objectivity, that it was an error to suppose that Spain saw eye to eye with the Axis in all respects. Some of its ambitions were, he said, clearly contrary to those of Germany and Italy. But, he added, any such public declaration as the American government sought was out of the question; we were forgetting the powerful German Army along the Spanish frontier. The Army was certainly there; in fact, certain of its units were there in accord with the tactical plans devised by the Spanish and German military staffs being trained for an assault on Gibraltar and the Straits. Carceller ended by saying that Franco knew of our proposals and that he was not pleased. Presumably we were to make a further study of how to please him, how to ease his way.

In these two talks Weddell stood on the letter of his instructions. But in his reports to the State Department he urged that the request for a public declaration be given up. Equivalent private and personal assurance might, he thought, be obtained. He warned that the food situation was becoming worse; that a crisis of hunger might bring internal trouble; and that if the present Spanish regime were threatened, German forces would move into Spain. At the same time the British government resumed its pleading. It was most worried lest by asking Franco to put his hands on the top of the table, we should incline or force him into the arms of Germany. Was he or was he not already there?

the winter of indecision (1940-1)

Franco Refuses to Foretell the Future

'IhE President, besieged by this advice, agreed to drop the attempt to secure a public assurance. Weddell was told that he need not insist upon one. We would accept words spoken in private if they were formal and clear. The message, of course, expressed our ignorance of the pledge that Franco had already permitted his Foreign Minister to sign.

Meanwhile Serrano Suner had gone to Berchtesgaden in response to Hitler's summons. There he had squirmed and pleaded for delay, giving Spanish hunger as a main reason. On quitting Ribbentrop he had told him that, in order to obtain supplies, he would foster the illusion that Spain would not enter the war. Upon his return to Madrid (on November 22nd) he made merely the cryptic remark to Weddell that Spain would secure wheat wherever it could be found. A few days later (November 26th) he followed up this remark by stating that Franco was convinced that the United States had no real wish to help Spain; that in fact, it wished Spain to starve.

These comments seemed an ominous overture to Weddell's talks with Franco, which finally took place on November 29th. To Weddell's surprise, he was received with warmth, almost with cordiality. Who, at the moment, could know why? Was it merely to lure the food and oil wanted? Was it fear that the United States might seize the Atlantic islands? Was it because Franco had decided to resist the German bidding, at least till the Spanish people were no longer hungry and all risk was past?

Weddell lost no time in stating that his government wanted light upon Spain's relations with the Axis before going forward

104

with gift shipments of wheat or considering a possible credit. Franco volunteered only bits and pieces about his recent contacts with Hitler. Then he appended to them the straightforward remark that no one could foretell the future.

Weddell seems to have tried to place words in Franco's mouth —hoping, no doubt, that they would take root there. He asked whether he might report to Washington that Spain did not envisage any departure from its present international attitude, or the extension of any aid to the Axis. Franco assented. But at once added that Spain could not help the Axis if it wished, and repeated that no one could foresee what the future might bring forth.

Weddell reported to Washington all these remarks dutifully. He stated that there was no use in trying to get Franco to declare himself more conclusively. He urged us to proceed with faith. Neither the President nor the Secretary of State knew of the way in which Franco had associated Spain with the Axis—on paper— for the conquest of the Mediterranean. But they did not trust him, or their power to attract him toward a faithful neutrality. They let the days go by despite the rapid flow of cables from Madrid that called upon the fear of internal trouble and German invasion. The Secretary turned aside another British plea by suggesting that Britain might arrange to ship wheat from Canada. He made no comment on the news of further British efforts to feed hungry Spain. Thus passed the first fortnight of December.

During this period we now know that Franco refused, with set will and an infinity of excuses, to fix a date for the start of operations against Gibraltar. Only six months before, he had written Hitler that he was eager to serve the Axis cause at the time when his help might be most wanted; the time had come; the request had been made, and Franco said that he could and would not enter the war. The decision was, he vowed, against his deepest wish; and whether this was so or not, the result was the same. Britain was spared a vital engagement—with odds against her. Gibraltar, the Straits, the Mediterranean, and North Africa remained open grounds for Allied operations.

Serrano Suner's conduct began to reflect this decision, though, of course, that was not understood at the time. He hustled to put into form a suitable public announcement about the Red Cross help. His pleas to Weddell for food and oil ceased to carry a note of boastful disdain. They sounded almost like a whimper. But, as Welles had pointed out to the Spanish Ambassador on December 2nd, the Press and Propaganda Services of the Spanish government were sending scandalously false stories about the United States throughout Latin America.

Weddell's agitation over our coldness sprouted again. The European Division of the State Department took fright at the vision of trouble brewing in Spain—which might bring in the Germans. Once again it proposed that we throw out a line to Spain, but hold it loosely, so that we could drop it quicldy if it began to burn our hands. The Secretary of State nodded and the President approved. A new offer was cabled to Weddell on December 19th.

This was to make our first Red Cross shipment as soon as Britain announced its arrangements for sending wheat from Canada and the Argentine. Britain—it turned out only for a brief spell—had suspended aid till Spain should promise not to fortify the coasts of the seized Tangier Zone.^{^[16]} Then, the State Department's message continued, Weddell might also inform the Spanish government that we were ready to discuss a possible credit, and we would so state publicly. Our statement would—with Spanish consent—make clear that we felt that our purpose in making the loan would only be achieved if Spain remained out of the war.

Subtlety of subtleties; we were to say for Spain what its government would not or dare not say. Thus we would let the Spanish people know we wanted to help, and also outwit opposition in the United States. In good conscience, for in the course of discussing the credit it was intended to ask satisfaction of-many-wishes. These included assurances that Spain would remain out of the war and did not intend to aid the Axis, and a promise that Spain would cease its press attacks upon the United States, not only in Spain but throughout the American hemisphere. These conditions were correctly called, by the Secretary of State in talk with his staff, "mountainous."

Franco is Left to Make up His Mind

This brightly conceived plan of December 19th was never acted upon. Doubts and objections sprang up from many directions. Weddell did not think it wise to wait on the British. Some of Secretary Hull's staff were against even the feint of a loan to Spain, and were not sure it was a feint. Norman Davis was unhappy at the thought that if we went forward with the relief shipment and hedged on the loan, the Red Cross might suffer from American dislike of the operation. Lastly, the willingness to brave criticism was weakened by twisted stories in the press concerning "inside" events connected with the Spanish loan request. Feelings were hurt, suspicions were sown within the government. For the time being, it became too troublesome to help Spain, for no matter what reason.^{^[17]} The school of thought that counted on Franco's weakness rather than his appreciation prevailed.

The State Department scrambled back. Secretary Hull reverted (December 23-30) to his earlier position that we could not justify any offer of a loan unless we knew first that Spain would remain at peace. He also decided that any action on our part must await action by Britain.

Messages to that effect were drafted with dejection. For each day's assortment of cables contained reports that unless we found a way to prevent it, Germany would soon enter the western* Mediterranean. The Vichy government, so well-sponsored rumor went, was about to permit the Germans to go to Tunis, while Franco would permit them to march toward Gibraltar and Morocco.^{^[18]} The momentum toward association in such a program seemed in Washington at the time almost irresistible. Only since have we learned of the clefts between. As will shortly be recounted, while we wavered, the Spanish government was sliding out of the liens granted in earlier days. Franco had made up his mind; he would not throw open the road to Gibraltar and Morocco to the German forces. He refused to risk disaster for a victory that might leave Spain in the thrall of Germany. It is even possible to imagine that he did not think our conduct at this time strange, since he knew better than anyone else how much past cause he had given for it.

The State Department on January 7, 1941, in a gesture that had by then lost importance, agreed to have the first shipment of Red Cross wheat move forward. Serrano Suner made another effort to frighten us into doing something more. On January nth, talking to the National Council of the Feminine Section of the Falange, he said:

"However, the problem must be solved now. We need bread that the people may eat, we need raw material that the people may work, not one day or two days, but every day! And if to these needs persons should remain insensible, and if to our requests they should deny us bread or make it impossible for the Spanish people to work, or should they require our honor as the price, then, Comrades of the Falange, what risk, what suffering, even what death! . .

The Spanish press gave first place to this menacing discourse. It came, we now know, out of a spasm of disappointed desire. Hitler had refused to supply the needed food and raw materials unless the Spanish government entered the war at once. This Franco in turn had refused to do; and with the refusal vanished the chance of feeding the hungry Spaniards with grain from the East.

Thus Spain remained dependent upon what could be brought from overseas. Almost a million tons of cereals were still needed to fill out a meager diet for the people; a hundred thousand tons of oil each quarter to enable them to earn their own living; fertilizers, insecticides, tools, and tractors so that the next harvest might be good. Thus several times again in January and February the Americans were asked for credits and the goods Spain lacked.

ening reports about pending German marches to Africa. The most alarming of all seemed to have originated with Marshal Petain.

But still being without direct knowledge of the turn of events, and without pledges, we ignored the hints. What reason was there to trust, what hope of gratitude? Not enough, the answer still seemed to be, after Colonel William Donovan talked with Serrano Suner the last day of February. Serrano Suner made no attempt to hide his views. He said that he hoped for and believed in the victory of Germany. When asked what he thought Spain would gain from the German victory, he answered that it would get Gibraltar together with a further recognition of Spain's natural rights in Africa.

Weddell tried to make sure that the Department would not be thrown off its balance by these remarks. He urged that American policy should not be deflected by such words, which might mean little or much. The Secretary of State agreed. But he remained skeptical of assuring Spain's good behavior by calculated generosity. However, the American government took no measures to prevent Spain from meeting its needs where it could. We allowed the cash purchase of all American products that were to spare. We abetted the arrangements made by the British government to move wheat from Canada and Argentine to Spain. But otherwise we permitted these months to run by despite Britain's pleas that we were neglecting a crucial chance. On March 20th the British Embassy made a more formal request than ever before that we share in a new inclusive program of assistance.⁴ Another period of debate whether to do so or not began.

But before carrying this account of American action further, let us revert to the record of what had been going on between Spain and the Axis—while we had agonized and stood aside.

⁴ At about the same time Lord Halifax presented to the Secretary of State another memorandum advocating an extension of our supplies for France. A passage of this memorandum follows: "His Majesty's Government feels that the most immediate danger is the penetration by German experts of French North Africa, which they know is being actively pursued and which, they fear, will pave the way either for the entry of German troops into French North Africa from Tripoli or for the collapse of Spanish resistance to Germany. His Majesty's Government thinks that the latter would certainly occur if Spain felt that Germany had succeeded in taking her in the rear, and there are already signs that Spanish resistance to German pressure is likely to weaken if German infiltration into the Mediterranean area is permitted to continue." Quoted in Langer, op. cit., pages 137-8.

the other wing of the mirror again: after hendaye

The Fuehrer Pleads for Haste

All through the winter of 1940-1 food was short in Spain. The previous harvest had been bad and prospects for the next were not good. Many factories remained idle for lack of raw materials. Trucks and buses broke down for want of parts. Railroad equipment was short, old, and overused. The Spanish people continued to be miserable. As just recounted, Franco could have, by one straight statement to us, obtained relief. But he held his tongue. The men around him hinted, though Franco himself never said so squarely, that this reserve was a refuge—against the powerful German Army along the Spanish frontier. But they did not say that certain units of that Army, in accord with plans to which Franco had given assent, were being trained to seize Gibraltar and the Straits. Of the existence of some engagements there were many signs, but no one in Washington was sure how firm they were or how far they went. The actuality was buried in crevasses from which only now it can be extracted.

At their meeting at Hendaye (October 23rd), Franco and Hitler, it will be recalled, had approved a written agreement about the basis and plan for Spanish entry into the war. This was a tangled mesh. On some points obligations were vaguely defined. Future steps to be taken by one party were left dependent on measures to be taken by the other. Parts contained obscure conditions. Essential supplements were unfinished or unsigned. In short, even a court of truthful and honest men would have found it hard to construe the abortive pact.¹ It is clear, however, that Franco reserved the right to decide when he would enter the war.

1 Still, as Sir Samuel Hoare has pointed out, it greatly strengthened German influence in various phases of Spanish life. Germany was granted a free

X IO

The planning and preparation for action went on outside and inside Spain. Hitler hastened with the next measures in his scheme of combination. Even before Article 5 (that dealing with Spanish territorial claims) of the Hendaye Protocol was signed, he had rushed off to lure Petain into the cell assigned to France. Next was the ritual act of obtaining Italy's formal assent. Mussolini at Florence had already expressed his approval. On November 2nd Ciano wrote in his Diary: "on my way to Sudetenland." There he and Ribbentrop went hunting. How many of the Axis pacts were concluded by spirits refreshed by the sight of dead stag or boar! The hunters at eventide put their names to the secret protocol, drawn up in triplicate. It was, except for some minor changes, the pact worked out at Hendaye.^{^[19]} Ciano described it, in the memorandum that he made of this meeting at Schoenhof on November 4th, as a secret protocol for Spain's entry into the Italo-German alliance and the Tripartite Pact of Berlin.

Up to the last hours of this meeting between Ciano and Ribbentrop it had been hoped that Serrano Suner would meet them at Vienna and add his name to theirs; but Hitler telephoned that it could not be arranged. Thus the three copies were sent by courier to Stohrer at Madrid. He was told to have Serrano Suner sign them in his presence. On doing so, he was to inform Serrano Suner that Hitler had told Petain that France had lost the war but now had a way to ease its lot by working with the two Axis powers during the final conquest of England; that Petain and Laval had professed themselves "in principle" ready to do so; but that the Spanish government was to know that all the discussions concerning Africa were kept within the terms of the agreement of Hendaye.^{^[20]} Whether or not this message pleased Serrano Suner, he signed (November nth).

Lacking the text of this accord, it is impossible to be certain as to whether its terms were more incisive than the earlier draft composed at Hendaye. But it is safe to surmise that there were still several large vacuums beneath its phrases. The largest was that intent could be turned into action only upon the completion of measures deemed adequate to assure safe success; and the Spanish government remained the judge. Franco retained the right to delay decision until such time as he felt wholly ready. And both he and Serrano Suner intended to wait until "the hour of the last cartridge." ^{^[21]}

But Hitler believed that the accord reached was a reliable basis for action. He seemed almost sure that permission for German forces to move through Spain would be granted whether or not Spanish forces joined in the attack. Only a few days before, Franco had assured Hoare that if German troops crossed the frontier, force would be met by force.^{^[22]} Was this said behind Hitler's back? If it was repeated to Berlin was Hitler told that it was a DS^feic utterance? Or that it was intended to soothe until the day of action came? Who was deceiving whom? In any case, Hider was in mid-November confident that he was about to gain a new ally. And certainly he had grown desirous of commencing the action against Gibraltar quickly.

On the same day (November 4th) that Ribbentrop and Ciano signed the protocol, Hitler reviewed the situation created in the eastern Mediterranean by the Italian defeats with the heads of the German Navy and Army.

"The Fuehrer," the record of this meeting reads, "is determined to occupy Gibraltar as soon as possible."

Then the record states an opinion that could have come only from Hitler:

"Franco is obviously prepared to enter the war on Germany's side within a short time; the Army General Staff has already made preparations to send the necessary troops." ^{^[23]}

On November 12th—the day after the tripartite agreement was signed by Serrano Suner—Hitler issued a directive summarizing the advance measures to be taken by the German High Command for the conduct of the war in the near future.⁷ The outline of the program began with the sentence:

"Political steps have been taken to bring about an early entry of Spain into the war."

In this directive the plan of the Iberian military campaign was set forth in much detail. It seems—to the amateur student—that the authors supposed that Spanish forces would play a part in the action, but allowed for the chance that they might not. It was a German plan, not a joint Spanish-German one. But there was an intimate secret liaison at the time between the German and the Spanish staffs, and it may be presumed that the latter knew its main features.

"The object of the German intervention in the Iberian Peninsula (code name 'Felix') will be," the directive read, "to drive the British from the western Mediterranean."

Gibraltar was to be taken, the Straits seized, and the British forces prevented from landing either on the Peninsula or the Atlantic islands. Both strategy and tactics were outlined from the first phase of reconnaissance to the final phase of assault. The reconnaissance was to be carried out by German officers in civilian clothes. The assault on Gibraltar was to be carried out by German units mainly.

"The units," the directive read, "earmarked for Gibraltar must be strong enough to capture the Rock, even without Spanish assistance."

The Straits were to be closed by Spanish forces with German naval, air, and ground assistance; German planes would disperse and pursue the British fleet. The defense of the Canary Islands was apparently to be left to Spanish forces with German support; but the German forces were to seize immediately the Cape Verde group of islands.⁸ These military details have now lost interest as

7 This was Directive No. 18, November 12, 1940, issued by Hider as Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. It is printed in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Vol. VI, pages 957-60.

8 According to the naval minutes, "It is planned to strengthen the defenses such, but they show that if the plan had been carried out, the German Army would have become masters within Spain as they were in France.

The Fuehrer ordered that the contents of this directive should be closely guarded.

"Special measures," its final paragraph reads, "will be taken to ensure secrecy. . . . This applies particularly to the operation in Spain and to the plans relating to the Atlantic islands."

It was soon brought home to Franco that the plan was tagged for quick application. Serrano Suner was, as related, invited to Berchtesgaden. According to his own account, before leaving he informed Franco and the military men who were called in council that the summons probably meant a demand to close the Straits; that if he went he might be able to persuade Hitler to postpone the move; that if he did not go, German troops would cross the Pyrenees within forty-eight hours; and so was told to go and

of the Canary Islands primarily by Spanish action. Spanish resources will be reinforced by German measures." The Chief of the Operations Division opposed the plan for seizure of the Cape Verde Islands, and Raeder thought it "unnecessary, but with luck possible." Minutes of meetings of senior naval officers with Hitler, November 4th and November 14th. "Fuehrer Conferences," 1940, Vol. II, pages 32 and 40-1.

In passing, it may be noted that there is much scattered evidence to show that the Germans would have in fact assumed direction of military operations in and about the Atlantic islands of both Spain and Portugal. The proposals advanced by Hitler to Serrano Suner revealed the German wish.to retain one or more of them permanently. Hitler was not only thinking of the risk that, if these islands were captured by Britain or the United States, the operations against the Straits might suffer. He was looking forward to the time when the United States might challenge his rule over Europe and Africa.

This train of thought is illustrated in a memorandum prepared on October 29, 1940 by General'Staff Major Freiherr von Falkenstem, Luftwaffe Liaison Officer with the Operations Staff of OKW, called "A Brief R&sume on Military Questions Current Here." "The Fuehrer," this memorandum reads, "is at present occupied with the question of the occupation of the Atlantic islands with a view to the prosecution of the war against America at a later date. Deliberations on this subject are being embarked upon here." Printed in Nazi Conspiracy" and Aggression, Vol. Ill, page 376.

When questioned by the International Military Tribunal at Nuernberg in regard to this matter, Goering explained that . . it was connected with a study of the occupation of Gibraltar, North Africa, and perhaps of the Adantic islands—first of all, bases for combat against England, secondly, in case—and I underline 'in case'—in case America should enter the war. . . Mimeographed transcript of the proceedings, pages 5958 et seq.

win delay.^{^[24]} At all events, he went, leaving Weddell and Hoare to hang about with unanswered questions.

On arrival (November 18th) Serrano Suner was confronted by Hitler and Ribbentrop with direct assertions that the time for action was at hand. The Italian troubles in Greece and the British occupation of Crete, the Germans explained, made it imperative to close the Mediterranean both from the east and from the west.^{^[25]}They urged Spain to enter the war as soon as possible. January and February, they said, would be good months. For thereafter German troops would be needed for other purposes. Hence Spanish preparations for closing the western strait should be quickly completed. Apart from the defense of the Canary Islands, Hitler said, there was no military problem to worry about.

Hitler tried to forestall a plea for delay till Spain had enough food and other vital supplies. It was foolish to think, he averred, that Spain could obtain them from the Allies; conditions would not improve with waiting; there was plenty only on Germany's side in the war. The British policy in supplying Spain, it will have been observed, had been shaped to prove the contrary. It prevailed. The Spanish government decided to import awhile longer rather than fight.^{^[26]}

With far more vigor than at Hendaye, Serrano Suner opposed the demand that Spain should enter the war early in the new year. While seeming to swing with Hitler's talk, he unhinged its conclusions. The man who had a few months before admitted no obstacle now saw many. His assurance had been shaken—by Britain's continued resistance. His impulses had been checked— by Franco and the generals. His animosity had been aroused—by German refusal to grant Spanish territorial claims. His self-importance (or pride for Spain) had been hurt—by the German refusal to court. He has made known the way in which he felt himself (and Spain) treated in this talk:

"The decision [to attack Gibraltar and the Straits] had been taken and it was being communicated to me through mere courtesy just as a colonel might in passing salute the farmer whose crop would have to be destroyed by being turned over to the passage of troops." ¹²

First and foremost among his objections was the need of more time to secure food from overseas. As if to prove that this was not merely a pretext, he beguiled his listeners with an account of his deceiving ways. The widespread hunger, he said, had made it necessary for him to foster the illusion that Spain would not enter the war; even then he was seeking at least 400,000 tons of Canadian wheat without which Spain's entry into the war would be foolhardy.¹³ Therefore, Serrano Suner continued, he, as Foreign Minister, had had to navigate with great astuteness. His staunch loyalty to the Axis had cost Spain 30,000 tons of wheat, which the American government had been about to send. The American Ambassador, Serrano Suner said, had impertinently asked Franco publicly to state that Spain's foreign policy would remain unchanged and that Spain would not enter the war. Naturally he had refused. What greater proof that he was in earnest, though not ready for the war?

When Hitler outlined how Spain's needs would be met with German help, when Spain was in the war, Serrano Suner harked back to another grievance. He complained that both he and Franco, ever since Hendaye, had been depressed because in the secret protocol Spanish claims had been dealt with in so vague a manner. If the Spanish people knew how vague, he said, they would be even less inclined to enter the war.

Hitler ignored this complaint as he had at Hendaye. He answered that any other way might cause the loss of North Africa

12 Interview Paris-Presse, already cited, October 27, 1945.

There never was a chance that Spain might have secured so large an amount of Canadian wheat. Did Serrano Suner speak carelessly or choose to mention Canada as the chief source of supply since it was so clearly under British control?

and that he would prefer to have Gibraltar in English hands and have North Africa remain with Petain. Spain should trust his policy and not insist upon a more definite written agreement. But he implied that the last trick had not perhaps been played; his strategy, he said, would be satisfied if the agreements with France remained valid until the conquest of Gibraltar, after which the danger of revolt in Morocco would be greatly lessened.

No differences were settled, but none were admitted to be insoluble. Hitler again spoke of his promise that Germany would leave the glory to Spain and provide the best equipment and soldiers.¹⁴ Serrano Suner explained that upon his return to Madrid he would inform the British Ambassador that Germany had agreed to deliver wheat. He would thus incite Britain to speed up deliveries; he would, Hitler might be sure, use the time spent for military preparations in getting as much Canadian, American, and Argentine wheat as possible for Spain.

The results of these turns and twists of Serrano Suner's on Spain's food situation, I may pause to comment, was this: greater amounts of imports from the British Empire were scared into Spain than would otherwise have been sent; but supplies from the United States were scared away.

In farewell, Ribbentrop said they would await word that Franco had agreed to Hitler's proposal. But if Hitler expected decisive word to arrive by return courier, he was disappointed. Perhaps in part because of the different reading in Berlin and Madrid of recent military occurrences. Hitler had cited the Italian difficulties in Greece as a reason for haste; to Franco they must have seemed a reason for delay.

A week later (November 25th) Franco gave his answer. He maintained the position that Serrano Suner had taken at Berchtes- gaden and asked again for more definite written assurances from Hitler regarding Spanish claims. He wished for further study and discussion of the military problem. But these signs of a lagging will were followed by a more hopeful message. The German

¹⁴ Serrano Suner later, and without directly saying that Hitler threatened to invade Spain without consent, sought to give the impression that such action was imminent and that he, Serrano Suner, had staved it off by telling Hitler, . . just as did Napoleon, you are going to awaken Spanish national sentiment and run up against a savage resistance. . . Interview Paris-Presse, October 27, 1945.

Ambassador reported on November 28th and 29th, relying on Serrano Suner's notes of a talk with Franco, that Franco agreed that Germany should go ahead with the preparations even though he would not now designate an exact date for the start of operations; and that he urged the secrecy of all preparations be most carefully guarded lest Britain take alarm and retaliate or attack. It was about then (November 29th) that Franco told Weddell that no one could foretell the future.

Franco's message seemed compliant enough to cause Hitler to try again for an instant decision. The Spanish operation would have to be begun soon or abandoned. For all German forces would be needed before long for other tasks. The Greek invasion was to be launched before early spring. The attack on Russia was scheduled in Hitler's mind, though further months of preparation for this would be required. There was still time, but only enough time, to close the western Mediterranean without postponing or giving up these other major campaigns. About him were men, first among them Goering and the Supreme Naval Commander Raeder, who were earnestly advising against any plan to turn to the east before the west was won.¹⁵ Goering's disappointment was the sharper for he was so sure that all of west Africa could be taken in a brief and easy expedition.

"The attack on Gibraltar by the air force was so methodically prepared that according to all expectations no failure could be thought of. The British air forces on the small airfield north of the Rock were irrelevant. The attack of my paratroopers on the Rock would have been a success . . . the exclusion of the Mediterranean as a combat area, the key point of Gibraltar, North Africa down to Dakar, Suez, and possibly in the south . . . could have been possible with small forces." ¹⁶

¹⁵ In a file of the High Command of the Navy there is a minute of a discussion with Hitler on November 14, 1940 of the Russian operation. It reads: "Naval Supreme Commander with the Fuehrer: Fuehrer is 'still inclined* to instigate the conflict with Russia. Naval Supreme Commander [Raeder] recommends putting it off until the time after the victory over England. . . Printed in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Vol. VI, page 977, and again in a minute of a meeting December 27, 1940, "Naval Supreme Commander voices serious objections to Russian campaign before the defeat of England," page 990.

Mimeographed transcript of Nuernberg trial, page 5958.

Dewitt C. Poole has given in foreign Affairs of October 1946 a full account of the laments that Goering made to American interrogators.

This would be true if Spain consented, and quickly. Otherwise Germany would have to defer or weaken the scheduled operations in the Balkans, give the USSR time to grow stronger and the United States more chance to act first and seize the Atlantic islands. Time was the meter of strategy.

the other wing of the mirror again: the separation between hitler and franco

The Rock is Left Alone

On December jth Hitler wrote Mussolini:

"I therefore propose to address a new strong appeal to Franco to set a date for Spanish entry into the war so.that the necessary military preparations may be carried forward. The sooner the better for all concerned, as I cannot keep German forces scattered on the periphery¹

Admiral Canaris was sent to Madrid to extract the answer.

The Admiral's proposal (made on December 7th) was in the following terms:

"[the] Admiral presents [the] Chief of State [the] Fuehrer's greeting and conveys Germany's wish to undertake [an] attack upon Gibraltar within a short time in connection with which German troops are to march into Spain on January 10. . . . [The] Admiral reports that as soon as [the] march of troops begins, the economic co-operation would at once begin."

The essence of Franco's reply was:

"That it was impossible for Spain, for reasons duly presented, to enter the war on the suggested date." ²

The main reasons he advanced were: risk that Britain would seize the Canary Islands and Spanish Guinea; incomplete military preparations; lack of food and inadequacy of transport. When Canaris suggested that it might be possible to fix a later date,

1 Letter, December 5, 1940, printed in Les Lettres secretes echangees -par Hitler et Mussolini, page 100.

2 State Department Documents No. 11.

Franco answered that since the removal of the difficulties did not depend only on the will of Spain, he could not do so. However, he tried to soften his answer by adding that his attention and his effort would be directed toward hastening and completing Spain's preparations.^{^[27]}

Almost at the same time another section of the program that Hitler had carried to Hendaye and Montoire began to crumble. On December 13th Petain dismissed Laval. Even though Petain might write, as he did two days after, that this action did not mean an end of the policy of collaboration, it showed how unfirm the ground was.^{^[28]}

Hitler concluded that he could wait no longer for the unwilling, faltering collaborators of the west to fall into line. They would come running when he had finished off his last great enemy on the continent; he would not have to woo or bargain with them then. A few days later (December 18th) Hitler issued the fateful order for the start of serious preparations for an attack on Russia (Operation Barbarossa). These, according to the original schedule, were to have been concluded by the May 15th following.^{^[29]}

Vague reports began to circulate in Madrid about Franco's refusal to take the decisive step on the road to war along which he had gone so far. In reporting them the American Embassy offered creditable, if not complete, explanations. His Cabinet was deeply divided; some of its members, including the Minister of Marine, threatened to resign if Franco moved in haste. Some generals in the Army went further—they spoke of open revolt. The Navy was afraid of the loss of the Spanish islands; the Army afraid that ill-equipped divisions could not stand up against an Allied landing. Neither wanted to fight under German command. Further, between the leaders of the Falange there were bitter feuds. But above all else, the Spanish people wanted peace and would not be subserviently brought into a world war to help the (jErmaas, whom they did not like.

Even Stohrer had about this time become aware of the lethargy of Spain. His notes to Ribbentrop began to tremble with comments on the terrible economic conditions and the widespread dislike of Serrano Suner. Even making allowances for the fact that these might excuse failure, they were in substance correct. Stohrer's advice, timidly advanced, began to resemble Sir Samuel Hoare's; Germany should court the Spanish people and government by sending larger amounts of supplies. But Hitler had no thought of doing so unless Spain adopted his program. All parts of his war organization were clamoring for the carefully measured stocks of oil, food, and steel.

How promising the strategic chance seemed, and how keen the disappointment at having to give it up, is vividly shown in the minutes of the meeting between Raeder and Hitler on December 27th. The Naval Staff reported that in view of the events in Greece, Albania, Libya, and East Africa:

"The significance of the German occupation of Gibraltar is increased by the recent developments in the Mediterranean situation. Such occupation would protect Italy; safeguard the western Mediterranean; secure the supply lines from the North African area, important for Spain, France, and Germany; close the British sea route through the Mediterranean to Malta and Alexandria; restrict the freedom of the British Mediterranean fleet; complicate British offensive action in Cyrenaica and Greece; relieve the Italians; and make possible German penetration into the African area via Spanish Morocco."

The passivity of Hitler's response to this strong summary reflects the fact that by then his intense purpose was centered elsewhere.

"The Fuehrer answers that he is in full agreement regarding the significance of the occupation of Gibraltar. At the moment, however, Franco is not ready; his decision is delayed by British promises of food supplies. One day these will prove to be a fraud and Spain will find itself without supplies. The Fuehrer will once more try to influence Franco through the Foreign Minister via the Spanish Ambassador." ⁶

The minds and energies of the German government were beginning to be absorbed into other operations: the conquest of

0 "Fuehrer Conferences," 1940, Vol. II, page 69.

Greece, the domination of the Balkans, and the invasion of the USSR. The troubles in the east had become heavy. No longer could it be thought that a swiftly executed march on the Straits might end the war. But Hitler did not cease to regret the lost opportunity.

On the last day of 1940 he wrote to Mussolini that he was:

"deeply disturbed by the situation, which Franco believes changed. Spain has refused to collaborate with the Axis powers. I fear that Franco is about to make the greatest mistake of his life. I find extraordinarily naive his idea of getting raw materials and cereals from the democracies as a kind of compensation for staying out of war. They will keep him talking until the last bit of grain has been eaten and will then commence the fight against him. I deplore all this since, on our side, we had completed our preparations to cross the Spanish frontier on January 10th in order to attack Gibraltar at the beginning of February." ⁷

Franco, despite his rebuff of the German request, did not cease the preparations of which he had again spoken to Canaris. Or from then on should they be called "exercises"? The steps first planned in September had been carried far along. German spe- . cialists in Spain had finished the mapping out of a route for the march. Their study of the tactics for assault had maps of the fortress of Gibraltar as exact as those of the streets in Berlin. German paratroop and assault divisions had completed their practice outside of Spain; a mountain resembling Gibraltar had been found in the French Juras upon which specialized German units had trained at length and with particular enthusiasm and energy. At the same time Spanish assault divisions were being trained in Spain.⁸ Supplies had been collected near Bordeaux and Hendaye. Bridges over the Spanish-French frontier and on the road to Gibraltar had been strengthened. Roads leading to Gibraltar had been broadened. New gun installations had been made at points commanding the Straits. The works within Spain Franco continued to extend. But the pace of effort gradually became Spanish.

7 Lettres secretes echangees entre Hitler et Mussolini, pages 106-7.

8 See the story in the New York Times, March 16, 1946, based on captured German documents, and the July 1, 1946 issue oi the New Times_ypublished by the newspaper Trud of Moscow containing the testimony of Colonel General E. Jaenecke, Chief Quartermaster of the German troop units organized for the assault on Gibraltar.

The momentum began to wane. Presently Canaris's "hunting" trips to the estate of General Vigon grew fewer and shorter. The design for war began to gather dust.

But not all at once. Hitler tried again directly and indirectly. Franco repeated what he had said in December. Wheat in advance was his standard reply. So he answered when, on January 20th, Stohrer informed him that Hitler was dismayed at the postponement and that he was under orders to demand that Franco make up his mind at once and for all, within the next forty-eight hours.^{^[30]} Upon receipt of word that Franco would not do so, Rib- bentrop blustered. Stohrer was told to remind Franco that without Mussolini's and Hitler's help Franco would not be Chief of the Spanish State, and to say that if he now refused to enter the war at once, the refusal would be taken to mean doubts of German victory. Germany, the Foreign Minister wound up, must have an answer at once, and for all.

Stohrer, after securing permission slightly to soften the language of his order, did his best. But Franco on the 2jth, after repeating his previous replies, cited a new hazard—the weather- observing that the climate was very bad; in January there is too much snow, while in February there is too much rain.

Thereupon Hitler gave up the plan of entering the western Mediterranean before the fighting in the east began.^{^[31]} Preparations for Operation Felix had already been slowed up, shunted aside to clear the way for other operations which the Army had in prospect. Now they were definitely displaced.¹¹ In a conference summoned by him on February 3rd to assess the progress made in the plan for the Russian invasion, the Chief of the Army Staff reported:

"Felix is no longer possible as the main part of the artillery is being entrained." ¹²

Hitler's feeling found outlet in a long letter sent to Franco on the 6th of February. This letter was compounded of warning, contradiction, and reproach.¹³

Warning:

. . If your struggle against the elements of destruction in Spain was successful, it was only because the democratic opponents were forced to be cautious by attitude of Germany and Italy. You will be ;forgiven, Caudillo, but never for this victory"

Contradiction:

. . If it later should be asserted that Spain could not enter the war because she received no supplies, that would not be true!"

Reproach:

. . It is clear that, on January 10, if we had been able to cross the Spanish border with the first formations, Gibraltar would today be in our hands. That means: two months have been lost, which otherwise would have helped decide|world history §

Franco in his reply tried to assuage the German resentment and to cling to the chance of sharing in German victory. He informed Stohrer that he was fully in accord with Hitler's conceptions. He denied that he had intended to suggest that Spain would not enter the war until the autumn or winter; he had merely thought it sensible to call attention to the weather. Sancho Panza had hold of his tongue again:

"You will have no cause to weep, for I will entertain you with the telling of histories until it be day, if you will but alight and take a nap upon these green herbs, as knight errants are wont, that you may be the fresher and better able to attempt the monstrous adventure which you expect."

11 "Fuehrer Conferences," 1941, Vol. I, page 3.

12 The record of this meeting is contained in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Vol. I, page 801.

13 State Department Document No. 12.

Hitler had some weeks before asked Mussolini to try to inspire Franco to action—"to bring back home the Spanish Prodigal Son."¹⁴ The two men met—with purpose already dimmed—at Bor- dighera on February 12th. Mussolini did not appear greatly upset by Franco's conduct. He spoke as a sympathetic man who could hear a comrade's excuses without passing judgment. He presented the case for action in Hitler's name, then listened calmly as Franco blamed the Germans for not accepting the proposals that he had made in the previous June and September, when there was still enough to eat in Spain. At the end of a rambling morning of talk, Mussolini summed up what he had gathered of Franco's attitude. The terminal point of this conversation might be summarized in dialogue form as follows:

Duce:

Spain, then, will enter the war when these two conditions are recognized: first, the sending of sufficient grain, and second, agreement with her colonial aspirations.

Caudillo: That is just the way it is.

Duce:

Should the Germans suspect that Spain did not wish to enter the war because the German invasion of Great Britain did not come off, or because of the Italian setbacks in Libya, can I assure the Fuehrer to the contrary?

Caudillo:

Absolutely, the faith of the Spanish people in the victory of the Axis is the same as on the first day.

In the course of the talk, Franco managed to bring out a new wrinkle in his thought. The admiring assent given in Franco's letter of September 27th to Hitler's tactical plans for capturing the fortress and the Straits was now withdrawn. Spain, Franco explained, was convinced that she must seize Gibraltar by her own forces and her own methods. He also reverted to his earlier view that this was a job for artillery rather than for bombing planes. The meaning of this talk on tactics was made quite clear. For Franco said that since the capture of Gibraltar was a Spanish

1⁴ Entry, Ciano Diaries, January 21, 1941.

venture, the Spaniards would never allow foreign troops to do what it fell upon Spanish troops to do. Hitler's later comment on this plan was rude:

"Franco's statement that the assault on Gibraltar should be carried out by Spanish troops can be regarded only as an ingenious way of exaggerating the strength and potential offensive of the Spanish Army." ^{^[32]}

Perhaps it was more than that; perhaps it was the surest way to beep German troops out of Spain, the hardest evasion to challenge as disloyal to a common vow.

Franco did not (at this Bordighera meeting) conceal his hurt that Hitler had chosen to file down Spanish requests to French taste. France, he avowed, would never collaborate; it was the lifelong enemy of Spain as well as of Germany. Then stopping off in Montpellier, on his way back to Madrid, he told Petain that Hitler had been asking permission to cross Spain to attack Gibraltar and move against the Straits. He asked Petain to support his refusal. He did not, of course, reveal the rest of his dealings with the leader of Germany.^{^[33]} Presumably by this talk Franco was trying to safeguard Spain against the risk that Petain would permit German forces to enter Algeria or French Morocco, hemming in Spanish Morocco from the rear.

After studying a copy of the record of the talk at Bordighera, Ribbentrop instructed Stohrer to bring up the subject no more. If the Spaniards, he added, ask about supplies, be reserved about the whole question, since they have refused to set a date. A few days later (February 26th) Hitler received Franco's formal reply to the letter he had sent three weeks before. Amidst its vows of loyalty, it conveyed a message of separation:

". . . the facts and their logical development have today left far behind the circumstances which in the month of October had to be taken into consideration . . . and the Protocol then existing must at present be considered outmoded."^{^[34]}

Thus while the American government kept its hand in its pocket until it knew what Franco was about, the immediate danger that the war would be carried into the western Mediterranean went by. The British and American Embassies, as already observed, gathered an impression that a crisis had been passed. They were fairly sure that Germany had asked consent to pass through Spain and had been denied. But the full 'measure of divergence between German and Spanish wishes was well hidden. Even had it not been, the American and British governments could not have felt tranquil about the future.

Franco stayed behind his hedge, while favoring Germany in various ways. A deal for payment on the Spanish Civil War debt was known to be under discussion. The new harvests were due in June. If they were good, Spain would have enough food for a short war. If the German attacks in the east, expected in the early summer, succeeded, Spain might still join Britain's enemies. Spanish military preparations were being carried forward, though at a pace—some watchers said—more suited for the Peninsular War than for the present one.^{^[35]} Time, essential time, had been granted, but the future remained in hazard.

patience in the face of affront: the first half of 1941

The Spring of Rumor

Each passing day of the Washington spring of 1941 was drenched by a rain of rumors. The news was saturated with foreboding that Germany would gain control of the western entry to the Mediterranean and Africa. Either Petain would yield consent to enter the French colonies or Franco would agree to a march against Gibraltar and the Straits. One would lead to the other. These were the thoughts that the German government wished us to think. Lazar, Press Attache of the German Embassy, used every channel provided by the compliant Spanish government to spread these fearsome stories.¹ The purposes were several: to disguise the plan to attack Russia; to deter us from giving friendly aid to Spain; and to keep Spain mindful of German power.

Now we know that by the spring of 1941, Germany had moved its attacking force elsewhere; that its whole war program would have been spoiled by a campaign in the Peninsula until it won in the east. But this was not known at the time. American and British opinion remained on edge. The extreme state of nervous gloom is illustrated by the April 30th issue of the New York tabloid PM. Across the whole front page ran these short but immense lines:

"THE MEDITERRANEAN IS LOST SUEZ AND GIBRALTAR DOOMED''

These headlines were followed by the following statement over the initials of the editor: l See Thomas J. Hamilton: Appeasement's Child, page 242.

129

"We are so certain of these terrible facts that for us it is as if they had already happened."

German armies swarmed over Greece and the Balkans. Their successful air-borne conquest of Crete hurt hardly less; for it showed that a dominant air power could skip over water. The British in order to support the Greeks had weakened their forces in North Africa and were soon falling back before the Afrika Korps. Germany, it seemed probable, would soon have near-by air bases on both sides of the Mediterranean to attack the British fleet off Egypt. These events seemed to warrant the editor's forecast.

The American and British governments were worried, but they did not accept the sentence of doom. Weddell continued to affirm that Spanis,h policy remained in the balance and that the condition of the Spanish people would compel Franco to keep Spain out of war. The British government did not permit itself to doubt; it maintained the belief that Spain would remain quiet unless Suez fell, and the grim determination that it should not fall. The German line in Spain was met with more open advertisement of Britain's will and ability to help the Spanish people regain a normal life. Bread in the basket, oil in the jar, wine in the bottle, shirt on the back, men in the fields, children at play, trucks on the road, priests in their parish, nights in bed; could the brightened prospect of these repel the thoughts of war? Britain thought so, and acted without waiting for us to come round to the same view.

Thus the British government relaxed its blockade restraints. It culled the Empire for those products which Spain most wanted, such as wheat, tin, rubber, and cotton. And finally, in April, it announced the large new sterling credit of which it had spoken to the American government the previous autumn.

The British during March and April scoured every crevice of influence to find new means. As already told, it urged the American government, first on March 20th and almost daily thereafter, to announce that we also would provide foods and raw materials for Spain, would increase our purchases, and grant a credit. But the prevalent view in the United States was different from the British; Americans in general were averse to helping

Franco and did not believe that either generosity or the resistance of the Spanish people would influence his course.

The State Department veered between these two streams of feeling and opinion. It did not like to go contrary to the popular view—which most of its officials shared. But British experience in such matters was impressive. A half-hearted search was begun for some type of offer that would supplement Britain's appeal to the Spanish people. But nothing would have come of it had not a new reason emerged. It became expedient to devise an appealing way to remain in touch with the Spanish government. For Serrano Suner was trying his utmost to create a vacuum.

With Animosity Added .

He tried to turn a light taunt of Weddell's into a break with the American government. The American Ambassador had adapted himself well to our hesitant course. He had conveyed American sympathy for the welfare of the Spanish people and with practiced calm had shown faith that they would respond. He had tried hard to read a decent meaning into Franco's purposes and excused his reticence.

Weddell called upon Serrano Suner on April 19th to make a grave affirmation—as instructed by the Secretary of State. The message was short but meaningful; the American government wanted the Spanish government to appreciate that the United States was determined to see the war crisis through to a successful end, no matter what the cost or how hard the struggle. Weddell spoke as told. The Minister made no reply. Weddell then turned to current business.

He protested against the increasingly hostile tone of the Spanish press, denoting, perhaps, some change in Spanish policy. This Serrano Suner denied, but Weddell did not let him off. He said that he was sorry that the Minister had chosen, in a recent speech, to take credit for what appeared in the press.^{^[36]} For, Weddell explained, he had drawn comfort from a comment of the Minister's predecessor in office, that the Spanish press represented neither the Spanish government nor public opinion. Serrano Suner still made no reply. Weddell went on; he remarked that when he read the newspapers these days, he sometimes had the impression that their articles were translated from some foreign language, perhaps from German. The tone of this remark was easy, as of a man who was curious about a vagary of nature, but Serrano Suner winced. The truth hurt-for it smashed the image of self- esteem. He had to believe that he was leading Spain in a great common cause. Any suggestion that he was sacrificing Spain's independence was, as he answered, disagreeable.

The talk ended in a cold separation. For six months thereafter Serrano Suner barred the way to Franco. At first this may have been only a way of hurting the Ambassador; he hated the cool ease of the Virginian. But gradually it was used as a way of keeping the American and Spanish governments apart. This was the time of Serrano Suner's greatest influence with Franco, and Franco took no step to heal the breach. It suited his purpose, as he watched the unclear course of battle in Russia and Africa, to keep the prying American government at a distance. For he knew that before granting aid, we intended to insist upon having from him a firm promise to stay out of the war and reduce aid to the Axis. This promise he was not yet ready to give. Suez might yet fall, and Axis power become free to sweep the whole length of the African shore of the Mediterranean. The Germans in Madrid were boasting that Rommel would have the Canal by May 1st.

It was no time, the British insisted, for us to permit ourselves to be put off by the unpleasant behavior of a scheming Minister. Churchill was expounding his policy in the House of Commons (April 22nd):

"This policy has been most carefully considered ... we do not wish to do anything which could give any excuse for a breach at the present time between us and the Spanish government; and I certainly consider that the starving condition of the people of Spain fully justifies assistance being given by Great Britain and by the United States, if she

with great satisfaction taken credit for the way the controlled press served Germany.

chooses so to act, irrespective whether any expressions of gratitude are forthcoming or not." ³

Despite Serrano Suner's repulse, Weddell urged Washington to fall in with British policy and display its willingness to help the Spanish people. It was not enough, he said when reporting his talk of April 19th, merely to discourse to Franco about our ultimate determination. If we wanted to sway Spanish policy, some alluring offer should be made, even though we might not go through with it. Both the British and Weddell, at the time, were afraid of battle movements which, we now know, neither Spain nor Germany was in a position to make. The rain of rumors wet the windowpanes through which they looked; and not only they, also the opponents of aid to Spain; vide the front page of PM.

Secretary Hull was persuaded, but not flurried. On April 29th he gave Weddell leave when he saw Franco to state that the American government was ready to consider at once the means whereby it might be possible for Spain to secure goods in surplus supply in the United States, such as wheat, corn, and cotton. The looseness of the language was intentional. The United States, it was pointed out, might not be able to provide much or any of certain other products in scarce supply and needed for defense. Weddell was told to bear in mind, when making this restrained offer, the conditions that we had previously attached to our aid to Spain. By then, it may be observed, the variety of conditions that had been typed into and out of the dozens of cables were difficult for anyone even to identify. But the essential one remained: we asked Franco to state in some form or other

³ This speech apparently was made as a desperate attempt to prevent an event that Churchill, at the moment, thought imminent. According to Langer (op. cit., page 145), he warned President Roosevelt that he thought the situation of Spain to be hopeless and feared Gibraltar would be lost or at least demobilized. If he used the word "hopeless" it must have been to impress the President with Britain's plight and to influence us to act faster. For he never actually gave up hope of keeping Spain out of the war as long as Britain held Suez. Certainly at no time did Hoare; on May 1, 1941, after reviewing the events that made the picture black, he reported that all his best sources of information united in supporting the view that there was no change in Spanish policy and that Franco did not want the Germans in Spain. Hoare, op. cit., pages 110-11.

that Spain would remain out of the war and would not aid the Axis. This we wanted said "in the space of a creed."

Our offer was a test rather than a business bid. It was intended to enable Weddell to stay in the game rather than to play the hand. The Ambassador tried to have it made more tempting. He wanted to lure rather than drive Spain to declare itself; and to do so by making our offers worth more, by promising goods in short supply, vitally needed by Spain. The list of such products was getting longer as the Spanish industrial plant ran down—scrap iron, lubricants, carbon black, chemicals, electrodes for steel furnaces, ferromanganese, tin plate for canning, machine tools, rubber, were all urgently wanted. We had repeatedly denied export licenses for anything more than the smallest quantities of them. To permit Spain to obtain them now might be a real lure to the courted Caudillo.

The State Department yielded slightly. It agreed to shorten and simplify the conditions attached to American help. But it refused to promise goods in short supply. They were being rationed out sparsely to all countries except those actually fighting Germany. Furthermore, even the continued flow to Spain of goods of which we had an adequate supply was still under animated attack. The Secretary of State had to ask the Senate and the House to table a vigorously sponsored resolution to investigate the trade in oil.⁴

The officials of the Department need not have stayed overtime to rewrite their proposal. For Weddell could not see Franco. He was repeatedly put off by notes that Serrano Suner phrased with decorous rudeness. They were construed both by Weddell and by the Department as a sign that the Spanish government had come to think it would not have to pay attention to our views much longer. The loss of Crete was being taken in Spanish military circles to forecast the capture of Suez. This gloomy reading of the situation seemed confirmed by the fact that Franco was also refusing to see Hoare, canceling three appointments in close order. And reports from other sources were of the same blue tenor. For example, Admiral Leahy, after talking with Petain, at the beginning of May, cabled:

⁴ S. Con. Res. 10, known as the Gillette-Coffee Resolution. Congressional Record> May 5, 1941. Vol. 87, Part 4, page 3550.

"The Marshal expects an early advance of German troops through Spain with the purpose of either taking Gibraltar or occupying some place on the coast from which the Straits can be controlled by gunfire and from which troops can be sent to Spanish Morocco." ⁵

Was Petain misled, misleading, or merely wrong?

It was not easy to know what to do next. If the American government merely waited, Serrano Suner would be pleased. If it did the wrong thing, an unwanted break might result. After consultation Weddell sent, on June nth, a note intended to try the edge of Serrano Suner's influence. It asked him to inform the Chief of State that the Ambassador's purpose in seeking an interview was to discuss the possibility of increasing trade between Spain and the United States. By so long denying him the chance, despite his repeated requests, the Spanish government seemed willfully to be disregarding the rights of an Ambassador. If this conduct marked a change in the views of the Spanish government, the American government wished the Chief of State to know that it would have to reconsider its own policies.

This note drew a touchy and studied rejoinder. Serrano Suner posed as a defender of Spain's affronted honor. It was his duty, he said, to prevent anyone from speaking before the Chief of State in such inadmissible terms as the Ambassador had used in recent visits to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This, Serrano Suner said, was the only reason for what had occurred and he wished the American government to know it. Weddell's recall would probably have served Serrano Suner's purpose—though perhaps not his final advantage. The Secretary of State therefore decided to continue to be patient—in the face of affront.

Weddell was told to deliver a formal note stating that he had been ordered to make of record the fact that each step he, the Ambassador, had taken to see Franco had been with the full knowledge and approval of the American government. This stiff little notice was to make clear to Serrano Suner that he was in for a stubborn fight. But not much was hoped for from this slight ' snap of the will. Franco, it was known, was well acquainted with the situation. Informed agents explained his remoteness by a wish to avoid our probing. It was also, they implied, a way of giving

⁵ Quoted from Langer, op. cit., page 144.

satisfaction to Germany without serving it in other ways. He still was eager to stand well with that powerful German force which might, at the end of the summer's campaign, be master of all.

The Summer of Recrimination

Now came the event that made Spanish conduct of smaller account. Germany invaded Russia (June 22nd). The Spanish government was excited, but half-dismayed. Fear and hatred of Communism increased its longing for German victory. But hope that its chance for empire might be close at hand vanished. Spain could do nothing but await the outcome of the fighting in the east and recruit a miserable division or two to send to the front.

The new surge of hostility against Britain and the United States was permitted to register itself. On July 4th all the invited Spanish officials stayed away from Weddell's reception. And on July 17th, the day of Franco's annual speech to the Falange, he gave free rein to his resentment at having to take heed of British and American power—especially the power to grant or deny what he wanted. "The war," he orated, "was badly planned and the Allies have lost it." The United States had no just reason to intervene, and if it did so, would be guilty of "criminal madness."

"I would speak to you with this crudity," he went on, referring to our attempts to pledge him to neutrality, "because the time has come to take steps against these snares, pretexts, and maneuvers. . . For whenever

"it seemed that the prospects of help and collaboration were appearing for Spain, there always appeared behind the generosity of a credible operation the effort of political intervention, uncongenial to our sovereignty and our dignity as free people."

Finally he accused the American government of having prevented shipments of wheat that Spain had already bought; this was the same as telling the Spanish people that we had tried to starve them into submission.

This was indeed, to borrow a phrase of Justice Holmes, "churning the void to make cheese." But why? Did he wish to mark time or make a break? Or, as Carceller shortly thereafter implied, were the words intended to gratify Hitler while Spain withheld effective co-operation? Or, as rumor went, had he spoken so to please an extremist audience that had been tending lately to look to Serrano Suner as its true leader? A piece of political oratory, nasty and troublesome, but nothing more?

The American and British governments could not tell. Anthony Eden, British Foreign Secretary, in an address before the House of Commons on July 24th, mingled correction with gentle warning. After viewing the facts, he concluded:

"If economic arrangements are to succeed there must be good will on both sides, and General Franco's speech shows little evidence of such good will. His statement makes it appear that he does not desire further economic assistance for his country. If that is so, His Majesty's Government will be unable to proceed with their plans, and their future policy will depend on the actions and attitude of the Spanish government."

The American government decided to keep silent, to continue with its aid to Britain, and with slow reflex to apply its controls over exports, ships, and funds more stringently.

In the light of later knowledge, it seems clear that all the bother about the course of trade with Spain during this first half of 1941 made little difference one way or another. What really counted were the tanks, planes, and soldiers that were hurried during this period out to the Suez region. When the British held the line there, it was held in Spain.

THE DISMAL AUTUMN (1941)

Spain tuas Still Grubbing to Meet History

Prudence, not pride, had governed American policy through the first half of the year 1941. Spain had been permitted freely to supply itself with all products not in short supply, including all ordinary grades of oil. The only limits to this economic transfusion had been the lack of dollars and the British blockade. Spanish and foreign tankers under charter for Spain had moved across the ocean with fair regularity for wartime.

But by summer the dislike for trade with Franco's Spain began to find new ways of expressing itself. The list of American products subject to export control had been extended to include most of those desired by Spain. Even before Franco made his offensive speech of July 17th, delays began to ensue in the clearance of oil cargoes for that country. This happened without any explicit order. There was an unarranged click of attitude between various sections of the American government whose consent was required. The rude treatment of Weddell caused the political officers of the State Department to be less alert than usual to clear away obstructions.

After Franco's speech the restraints were applied with more system. A newcomer in the Department, Dean Acheson, began to guide the strategy of gradual pressure. On August 1st it was announced that exports of oil to all points except the British Empire and the Western Hemisphere would be limited to "usual pre-war quantities." This formula could easily be twisted on the statistical wheel. Then on August 3rd Welles fell in with the idea advanced by Secretary Ickes that in view of the growing scarcity of tankers, none that were American-owned or controlled should carry oil to Spain or to the Canary Islands. Whatever Ickes's

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intention in advancing the idea, the State Department's purpose in accepting it was to cause the Spanish government to behave more decently, not to force a collapse. The restraints were relaxed whenever a risk appeared that Spain might completely run out of oil. But the amount received during the summer was small; and the gauge of Spanish stocks fell low.¹

About this time the first signals of a possible turn of mind came into sight. They were hoisted in an unexpected spot, by the Ministry directed by Carceller, the former close working associate of Serrano Suner. First the Under Secretary of Industry and Commerce and then the Secretary himself showed sudden interest in that vague trade proposal which Weddell had vainly been trying to present to Franco. Carceller, it will be recalled, had formerly been head of the oil monopoly in the Canary Islands. The failure of tankers to arrive on schedule would not have escaped him. On July 31st he put himself out to persuade us that we should ignore Franco's spray of animosity and refusal to see Weddell. The American government, he counselled, should examine actions, not words—implying that Franco's speech had been designed to rejoice the German heart without satisfying the German wish. Why should we not, in fact, join in the deception? For example, he asked, why should we not send Spain 500 tons of coffee and allow the Spanish government with a great show of secrecy to smuggle it into Germany? The scheme would be sure to work, he suggested, because there was not an intelligent man in the German Embassy; he could, he boasted, fool them all.

Coming so quickly after Franco's speech, these advances caused surprise, though they did not greatly please. The relations between the Minister of Commerce and Industry and the Minister of Foreign Affairs had evidently become crossed. Rogues had clearly fallen out. But Carceller's purpose seemed dark and his authority dubious. It was, in reality, simple and practical; to get as much as he could from both sides for Spain. A few weeks later he advised the Germans to pay no heed to what Franco might

¹ During July and August and September 1941 the United States sent only 185,000 barrels of gasoline (less than one half of normal), and 156,000 barrels of fuel oil (about two thirds of normal). Unpublished records of the U. S. Department of Commerce.

say to Weddell, that the words would be merely suction pumps.

The State Department, after some delay, decided to explore the meaning of Carceller's talk about trade. But it did not promise to send the 500 tons of coffee, the better to help Carceller fool the Germans. There was no practical way of putting poison in it.

The discussions that ensued were inhibited and confused. Neither government was really of a mind to give anything to the other. The Spanish government was pledged to send most of its available surpluses to Germany. The American government was mistrustful and afraid of critics. We soon began to find the Spanish ideas of a bargain annoying, since, as the State Department informed Weddell on September 18th, we were not willing to supply scarce and essential goods merely to retain Spanish goodwill. The products that Spain was asking were in urgent demand elsewhere; what favors or advantages would Spain grant in return?

September, and Rommel was still not in Cairo, nor Hitler in Moscow. The oil of Europe was being spilled into the Mediterranean, or hauled over the long Russian plains. Civilians and Military both, leaning over empty gas tanks, had begun to mock at Serrano Suner's clamor. For throughout this period of empty talk with Carceller (August to October 1941) our contact with both Serrano Suner and Franco remained broken. Serrano Suner sulked in haughty spite. The American government permitted the situation to develop, the Spanish oil reserves to fall. The German armies were moving deeper into the USSR—maybe to victory, maybe to death. The dispute with Japan over its expansion in the Pacific was showing itself to be an irresolvable conflict. The hardening American spirit grew less inclined to try to buy peace for a short night longer.

In September, Cardenas, the Spanish Ambassador in Washington, took upon himself the task of conciliation. Secretary Hull, after plainly showing his feelings, blessed the peacemaker's errand. Cardenas earnestly busied himself to find a way to end the quarrel. Carceller was doing the same, and had prepared the German mind for a make-up meeting. They prevailed. On the 28th Weddell informed the State Department that Cardenas, who was in Madrid, said Franco intended to invite him to call. In the same cable Weddell reported that Cardenas had also said the Spanish need for gasoline was desperate.

Weddell met with Serrano Suner on September 30th. Only- brief allusions were made to the origin of their angry alienation. The main accent of the talk was on the improvement of economic relations, a subject in which Serrano Suner had never before shown an interest. He had belonged to that school of political alchemy which preached that a furious will to greatness will always find the necessary material means; a school whose leaders always end with charges of betrayal. Now he said that Spain felt it was being strangled and could not understand why oil shipments failed to arrive. Weddell defended the American record firmly without provoking a fresh dispute.

A few days later (October 6th) Weddell was admitted to Franco's presence. Despite Serrano Suner's sniping, the talk was affable. It centered upon Franco's statement that Spain was finding it very difficult to obtain wheat, cotton, oil, and foreign exchange. Weddell rebutted any notion that it was our fault. At the end it was agreed that the trade talks should go forward.

Amiable talk this was, but it did not have anv result. The formulas did not mix. The State Department found the Spanish offers without interest. They would have contributed very little to our defense and taken very little from the Axis. Further, many of the departments represented on the Economic Defense Board were by then decidedly opposed to increasing the flow of oil to Spain. There was animated and well-based suspicion that some of it was being used to fuel German submarines and merchant ships.

Oil became again the primary Spanish worry. The reserves were, as Serrano Suner now pleaded, dangerously low. Weddell, who fretted during these weeks of confused bargaining, now began to repeat his warnings of the danger of internal disorder and German occupation.

The Spanish tanker fleet was barely adequate to haul the needed supplies when in full and effective use; and the time consumed in making the round trip between Spain and the United States was drawing out toward Nirvana. Drags and delays occurred in the stream of consent necessary to the quick and smooth transport of oil. Now the Navy objected to some tanker movement or action; now the Treasury took a very long time to examine a cargo or its financial cover; now the Coast Guard delayed a sailing order to quiz the crew; now the records of the Export Control Administration became confused; now the State Department suspended its approval because of reports of diversion to Axis use. Each delay meant loss of sailing time. Then, too, the Spanish authorities wasted tonnage. Orders regarding the kind of oil to be obtained were changed while tankers were en route. Tankers showed up at loading points where they were not expected, and did not show up where they were. Little wonder that Spanish tankers during the last half of 1941 often swung idly for long days inside American harbors.

During the autumn the chore of deciding what should or should not be sent to Spain was shifted again. It glided out of the hands of the diplomats to the officials concerned with economic and defense matters. This transfer in management was followed by a change in the character of the program that was put together bit by bit toward the end of 1941. It ceased to be only an extension of the British policy of providing goods lest an angry or threatened Spanish government would bring the country into war, and to make the Spanish people more resistant to any attempt "to do so. The American government began to bargain for reciprocal benefits.

After long weeks a memorandum based on this idea was stitched together—with haste because another crisis was near. Lack of oil was bringing the whole Spanish economy toward a halt. About a week before Pearl Harbor, Cardenas was given a Statement of our terms as provider of essential goods to Spain. Given without warmth, given because the American government did not think it could afford disorder in Spain.

The reports of current Spanish activities still contained many displeasing facts. Fortifications at many coastal points bearing on Gibraltar and the Straits (Cadiz, Tarifa, and Algeciras) were being made stronger, with German help; a new bridge had been built at Hendaye with the aid of German troops: two reputedly strong and well-equipped Spanish army units (one at Andalusia and the other at Huelva) were being trained in assault tactics; staff contact with the German army was still intimate; the pro- duction of war weapons in Spanish factories was growing under German guidance; lookout stations on the islands and coast of Spanish Morocco were transmitting intelligence to Germany; the German airline Lufthansa acquired a large interest in the network of airlines operating from Spain to Portugal and the Spanish colonies. Some of these measures were designed to,help Germany in the war. Others could be construed as features of defense in case of attack, or as preparations to snatch first if the moment came when Britain and Russia were down. Their utility would be settled by the fighting in the frozen fields of Russia, the seas and skies of the Atlantic, and the deserts of Africa.

Spain, under Franco, was at the end of 1941 still grubbing to take advantage of history. But grubbing by itself. By small steps, with glance concentrated on safe pay dirt, Spain had been edging farther away from Germany's side. With the help of the captured documents, it is possible to mark briefly some of the points of withdrawal.

SPAIN AND THE AXIS DURING 1941

Fortune and the Wiles of Men

Fortune and the wiles of men had failed to bring Spain into the war when the step would have been most damaging. During the spring of rumors (1941), which kept the British and American governments so on edge, Germany and Spain in fact were tending toward separation. But that was not permitted to show. The diplomats of the Axis kept up the appearance of close association.

The exchange of favors went on. During the early months of 1941 the trade accord between Spain and Germany was broadened. The Spanish government bid constantly for German military equipment, especially airplanes and artillery. It secured some, but less than bargained for and later than promised. In return it shipped substantial amounts of raw materials like mercury, wolfram, and hides. But the bargainers were becoming annoyed at each other's stinginess.

Of more value to Germany than these raw materials were the other forms of Spanish obligingness. The Spanish government lent itself freely to German purpose in the fields of secret intelligence, press, and propaganda. It entered into an agreement with the German government on March 12, 1941:

"To organize an office to represent the Spanish and German news and press-political interests in South America."

In June of 1941, shortly before the invasion of the USSR and in ignorance of it, Mussolini again urged Spain to cast in its lot wholly with the Axis.¹ The Spanish government again refused. One of Serrano Sutler's reasons for not doing so is of special in-

¹ Ciano Diaries, entry June 3, 1941.

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terest. Such action, he observed, would hasten American entry into the war, since Roosevelt would regard it as a threat to the Western Hemisphere. Spain was still afraid of losing its Atlantic islands.

Yet, as recounted, Serrano Suner was permitted to keep the United States at arm's length and to prevent the British program of economic aid from impressing itself well on the minds of the Spanish people. The (nominally) Spanish press and radio varied their abuse against the enemies of Germany by predictions that their doom was at hand^ The Foreign Minister assured Stohrer that he was using any and all means to provoke Britain and the United States. Serrano Suner and Franco were, it has since become known, at this time scheming against each other for the loyalty of the Falange. Perhaps Franco's reproachful and insulting speech of July 17th—the speech that anchored Spanish tankers in American ports—should be read as his way of keeping that following. The whole Spanish people paid the cost of this courtship of the mob.

In August, as related, Carceller, the Minister of Commerce and Industry, emerged as an opponent of Serrano Suner's tantrums, if not of his plans. He wanted American products and began to devote his talents to draw them into Spain. For us, bland confidences that Spain would stay at peace and curtail aid to the Axis, whispers that Spain's services to Germany were intended to deceive. For the Germans, soothing assurances that his main purpose in dealing with us was to enable Spain to help Germany more.

Early in September, Carceller went off to the Leipzig Fair and found himself in Berlin. As a result of the pro-German attitude of Spain, Carceller explained to the German officials, it was becoming more difficult to bring in essential overseas imports. He therefore intended to try to patch up economic relations with the United States. This should not bother Germany, he said, since it would be the means whereby Spain would strengthen itself for war. Moreover, Spain could secretly pass on to Germany part of what it got—he mentioned tin, not coffee. Germany, he said, should assent to such acts of conciliation as might be necessary to get the goods. The first of such steps would be to tone down the press and radio attacks on Britain and the United States. Then

Franco might receive Weddell, if only for a quarter of an hour. He would not, Carceller went on to explain, have to give Weddell any definite promise; he could manage merely by stating that the Spanish government intended to continue with its present policy; the Americans would take the remark to mean that Spain would continue to be neutral, while its real meaning would be obedience to German wishes. The man was enjoying himself. He left Berlin without receiving either assent or rebuke.

The Spanish government, as recounted, then proceeded with the effort to come to terms with us. Germany watched with chagrin, but without formal protests. No great concern was shown over the possible Spanish trade concessions to the democracies.

But over an occurrence of another type it showed itself really hurt. Two German ships, the Corrientes and the Charlotte Schlie- mann, had, by agreement between the German and Spanish navies, remained at anchor in the outer harbor at Las Palmas. They were supply ships for U-boats. The purpose of their presence at that spot had long been suspected, but actual proof came to hand only in September. Then the British government demanded their removal. The Spanish Minister of Marine, without prior notice to the German government, ordered them to withdraw into the inner harbor. In Berlin this was regarded as a great blow to U-boat warfare in the Atlantic.

The German Foreign Office informed Stohrer on October 9th that the transfer to the inner harbor was directly harmful to the effectiveness of the German submarines in the battle of the Atlantic. The German Navy, therefore, requested the Foreign Office to make every diplomatic effort to cancel the measures of the Spanish government. The German government reproached Spain for its infidelity, the same message recalling that Franco, after a thorough examination, had promised that Spain would make possible such aid for German submarines. Germany, it continued, had been most considerate of Spain in using this privilege, and took it for granted that Spain would not go back on its word.

The reproach did not avail. The Spanish government said it did not dare permit the ships to move back to the outer harbor lest the British t.orpedo them. The German government had to be satisfied with the statement of the Spanish Minister of Marine on

October 14th that he was willing to continue to protect other supply measures in the Spanish mainland harbors.²

The incident illuminates a later event. It makes clear why the Spanish government was so disturbed by one feature of the trade arrangements that the American government proposed in November. That was a request for permission to supervise the use and distribution of oil within Spain and the Spanish colonies. As long as it could, the Spanish government refused—until its oil stocks were near exhaustion. That story carries the narrative back to Washington.

² The agreement for such supply measures in mainland harbors was reported to the Foreign Office by Stohrer on December 5, 1940, as follows: "In reply to proposal made by [German] Embassy as instructed [the] Foreign Minister has now informed [me] that the Spanish government has agreed to the placing in readiness of German tankers in out-of-the-way bays of the Spanish coast for the supplying of German destroyers with fuel. [The] Foreign Minister vigorously requested that we observe the greatest caution in carrying out the measure." State Department Document No. 10.

THE .SHARP POINTS OF A BARGAIN (WINTER OF 1941-2)

No Longer for Political Effect Alone

The disturbing November 1941 crisis in Washington as to whether, and on what terms, to continue to send oil to Spain developed something like this: in October several Spanish tankers were sent over without forewarning; doubtfully, but in accord with the rule of "usual pre-war" quantities, they were given cargoes. The radical press began another slashing campaign against the whole traffic. Statistics given out by the Treasury seemed to tell of large recent shipments of aviation-grade gasoline and lubricants to Spain. This would have been contrary to both public orders and public statements. The figures were taken as proof of some devious plan to work with Franco against the popular will. After some days the Treasury publicly explained that its records were wrong, that no oil of these types had been sent. But the stories caused the already strong protests against what was conceived to be State Department policy to become stronger.

The pressure gauge by which it had guided our trade relations with Spain broke down. There were too many pressures. Too many groups, inside and outside the government, thought the State Department was making false readings. Surrounded by a negative disposition, it had to come forward with an affirmative program, one that rested on something more than the fear of consequences. The British government believed that the strategic and political usefulness of supplying Spain was enough, but American public opinion did not.

The State Department took heed. Though the diplomats were worried, it decided that oil should be sent only if Spain made some useful return. Also that it was time, and more than time, to

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make really sure that we were not helping Germany. These were the thoughts that shaped the new terms that the State Department in November put before the Spanish government. But the primary motives in proceeding with any program at all remained strategic and political; the economic-warfare gains sought were, as they had to be until the Allied position was stronger, incidental.

To place an unclothed proposal in the hands of Serrano Suner might doom it without trial. Therefore the State Department decided to transmit it through Cardenas, the Spanish Ambassador in Washington, rather than through Weddell. On November 29th he was given an aide-memoire containing our terms for the continued conduct of wartime trade. The text had been much fought over between those who wished it to be firm and plain and those who wished it to be loose. In both language and structure it was patched. But it is the business of diplomats (and lawyers) to read between the patches.

In this case, they found that:

1. The American government offered to supply Spain with enough, and just enough, oil "to meet Spain's requirements for transportation and other essentials."

2. This oil was not to be used "in any manner useful to Italy or Germany, directly or indirectly."

3. Its distribution and use within Spain and the Spanish colonies was to be subject to our supervision—to prevent diversion to the Axis. American agents were to be given free access to all Spanish facilities for receiving, shipping, storing and refining oil.

4. The American government also offered to permit Spain to obtain such other American products as could be freely bought in the American market.

5. In regard to goods in short supply, we promised to see what we could do to provide such amounts as were necessary for a low wartime level of economic activity. These were not to be used in ways that would benefit Germany or Italy or countries under their rule.

6. In return, Spain was asked to obligate itself to assist us to secure various Spanish products—wolfram, cork, mercury, zinc, lead, fluorspar, olive oil, and various roots and drugs.

7. The Spanish government was to try to transport these prod. ucts in Spanish ships.

The Department advised Weddell of this proposal. In doing so, the Department explained that our primary purpose in putting it forward was strategic; we thought it well to permit Spain to secure minimum amounts of what it needed to get along, so that it would not be dependent on Germany and bitter against us; but our need for the Spanish products that we asked was not vital; we did not wish to enlarge the trade for its own sake; and we had no thought of nursing Spain's friendship by close attendance upon its wants. Later on, the State Department was, at times, going to find it hard to make this attitude clear to Weddell's successor, Hayes. One more comment on this American proposal: the attempt to draw a line around our supply offer where it might overflow to Axis benefit was somewhat unreal. Anything that enabled Spain to maintain production made it more possible for Spain to trade with Germany, except in such avenues as were blocked. More and more energy and money had presently to be spent in building blocks.

The longer Cardenas studied our offer, the more depressed he seemed to become. No doubt he foresaw that his government could not accept it without mending its ways and amending its vows to Germany. This would be, he knew, far from agreeable and perhaps even unsafe. Over one feature in particular he shook his head: the request for the privilege of watching over the use of the oil we sent. This, it was appreciated, might be felt to be humiliating; and it was certain to make Germany fume. But how else to make sure that the oil might not kill our own men; how else reconcile the American people to the risk? The Spanish government had forfeited trust, as well as the right to have its feelings considered.

Or so it seemed after the receipt of Weddell's report on his talk with Serrano Suner on December ist. The Foreign Minister was again under the spell of recent contact with his Axis associates.¹

i He had been in Berlin meeting with representatives of the signatories of the Anti-Comintern Pact. The meeting had not been completely harmonious. Ciano recorded in his Diaries on November 24, 1941: "The atmosphere of the anti-Comintern meeting was truly singular. The state of mind of the delegates differed very much. Serrano Suner was aggressive and sharp but quite pro-Axis."

Serrano Suner on November 25th delivered a speech in Berlin which promised that millions of Spaniards would fight to save Germany from

He accused the United States of creating Spain badly. With an airy and detached manner he rubbed in his view that the Axis was invincible and showed how pleasant he thought it would be to be among the future rulers of the world. Weddell met point by point with cold dislike. He dismissed the thought of German victory. But he also warned that if Serrano Suner was right and Germany should win, Spain would lose its independence.

Cardenas in Washington spoke in a gentler tone. After a few unhappy days he accepted the idea that we should maintain watch over the use of our oil. But he urged changes in our language. These changes would make it easier to swallow the dose. New phrases were found which made it appear that our request was a practical aid to the supply program; a means of minimizing delays by reason of inadequate information. For this purpose the American government was to appoint agents who, in consultation with the Spanish and the British, would carry out the necessary observation.

Having so rounded the point, Cardenas presently passed it on to Madrid. An anguished argument, we know now, ensued within the Spanish government. No answer was made for many weeks. In the interval cargoes were sought for Spanish tankers waiting at Port Arthur, Texas, and on their way to Venezuela. The Spanish tanker fleet was growing.

In the midst of these talks about oil, the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor. The Spanish government reaffirmed its position of nonbelligerency. But the Spanish press glowed with praise of Japanese patience and sparkled with accounts of Japanese naval and air victories in the Pacific. As before, the Germans and their friends cheated themselves. The American government read summaries of these stories with cold anger. Besides, Secretary Hull was on the

Russia. In the course of his speech he called the Russians "cannibals." It is possible to guess the origin of these remarks from an entry in Ciano's Diaries on November 25, 1941. He notes that Goering "was impressive when he spoke of the Russians, who are eating each other and have also eaten a German sentry in a prison camp. He recounted the incidents with the most absolute indifference. . . . Goering told me that hunger among the Russian prisoners had reached such an extreme that in order to start them toward the interior it is no longer necessary to send them under armed guard; it is enough to put at the head of the column of prisoners a camp kitchen, which emits the fragrant odor of food; thousands and thousands of prisoners trail along like a herd of famished animals." alert in regard to a possible German march through Spain and Portugal. What a blunder if German armies on their arrival on the Spanish coast were met by Spanish tankers full of the oil of Texas!

Thus for some weeks after Pearl Harbor the American government simply sat tight. For the time being, it ceased to concern itself lest Spain might suffer and resent the deprivation.

The Spanish tankers in American ports were kept there for the time being; the British government was asked to deny navicerts; the Dutch, Venezuelan, and Mexican governments were asked to consult us before providing cargoes in the Caribbean, and so were thelAmerican oil companies. The Navy disliked the presence of three Spanish tankers anchored just off the harbor of Port Arthur. These ships had been using their radios for the probable purpose of reporting other ship movements in and out of the port. The Navy therefore asked that all three be denied clearance, and they were.

But as the December days passed, fears of a German attack faded and reports of trouble within Spain again began to grow loud. Spain's oil reserves were rapidly being used up. The heads of the oil monopolies pleaded that soon all transport and fishing would come to an end. They asked for interim shipments while they were getting together the information sought and the Spanish government was making up its mind. Both Weddell and the British government begged us to accede.

On December 29th a representative of the British Embassy called upon Ray Atherton, chief of the Western European Division to plead for a more yielding attitude. Atherton implied that the stubborn vine ran across Executive Avenue. He suggested that if the British wanted to make sure that their views were understood, Churchill's presence in Washington provided an excellent chance. The Prime Minister is believed to have grasped it. On the same day the British Ambassador called upon the Secretary of State. He explained once again that the British still felt it wise to do everything reasonable to encourage Spanish opposition to the possible entry of the German Army into Spain on its way to French Morocco.

Whosesoever the decision, the Under Secretary shortly thereafter approved cargoes for three Spanish tankers that were waiting in

Venezuela. Again it had been decided that the time for a flat showdown had not come, that the risk was still too great.

We reverted to the parcel-by-parcel method of trading with Spain. The inclination to compromise was favored by well- founded reports from Weddell that the Spanish government was sending less to Germany and was seeking German consent to use Spanish ships to carry goods to the United States. The State Department did not then know that this stubborn Spanish front toward Germany was part of a tactic to force the delivery of arms; Germany was being scared into equipping the Spanish Army on the score that it might be necessary to resist an Allied landing.

No sooner had these tankers received cargoes than a fourth came. From somewhere (and the best guess was the British Embassy in Madrid) the belief was being sowed that the American government would not insist upon all the demands contained in its November memorandum. The Spanish government was complaining sadly over what we asked. To Germany it promised that it would concede the least possible, though it had to have oil.

The diplomatic officers of the State Department, reporting to the Under Secretary, had again assumed charge of the situation. Theirs was the duty, they thought, to see that a blunder was not made. The Secretary of State, when sounded, did not seem to want to ease the ban on oil until we had our way. But his view was not pressed; it was an exhalation that did not condense itself into a firm order.

In January a new report arrived that German ships were being fueled in Spanish ports and waters. The British Naval Attache in Spain, on going aboard a captured German submarine, found that the crew was carrying Spanish matches. Members of the crew admitted that the ship had obtained supplies in Vigo harbor. But the incident was not pursued to its depths. Hoare's view was accepted, that even if the fact was so, it was an isolated case made possible by the corruption of local officials. But now it is known not to have been.

Six weeks had passed since Cardenas was first given our proposals. Then doubts arose as to whether he had ever passed on its full text. Therefore on January 8, 1942 Weddell was told to do so. He was reminded that we did not believe that economic favors would win over the Spanish government, and that we would therefore require a tangible and substantial benefit in return. We would match, and presently overmatch, Germany in the tactics of pressure. Weddell began to work along these lines while urging greater liberality. The British government did the same.

The pass reached in January 1942 could be easily identified on the strategic map. Two paths were open. One was to maintain a minimum program of supply for Spain without insisting upon much return advantage in our own war effort. Thereby we might lessen the chance that distress and disorder would in one way or another cause the Spanish government to line up more closely with Germany. The British favored this path. The other was to insist upon an adequate return and to leave Spain to suffer if it was not given. There still seemed to be—in the spring of 1942— several dangers in going all the way down this path. The Spanish government might so resent the terms of the bargain that it would risk its chances on the German side. Or attempts to meet our demands might so strain relations with Germany that an ultimatum would result, to which Spain would yield.

The American government went as far down the second path as it dared. But every now and then some noise or sign caused it to halt, look about, and take shelter in compromise. Hoare, anxious over the effect of the British retreat in Africa, seemed more disturbed by our stubbornness than did the Spanish government. Later knowledge shows that his worry, and those of the American government at this time, were excessive. They counted too little upon the Spanish resolution to be independent and to stay out of the war.

THE SHARP POINTS OF A BARGAIN (Continued)

Like a Game of Bagatelle

THE three-cornered game went on into the spring of 1942. Now only a few of the major points and phrases remain of interest. The shortage of oil was proved when, in February, the Spanish refinery at Teneriffe was forced to close down. The Spanish government tried to keep its tankers in motion. Cargoes were provided from time to time, enough to keep the bargaining alive, enough to keep the Spanish economy going. Similarly, from time to time we approved the export of other goods that the Spanish wanted—like fertilizer and tin plate.

The most troublesome point was our wish to exercise watch and ward over the Spanish oil situation. The Spanish government did not want us to have the right to poke into every corner of its oil-supply situation and follow every ton to its final use. Furthermore, it seemed genuinely afraid that if it agreed to permit our agents to carry on such activities (and what else might they not do?) Germany would demand the same permission.

True, Germany was allowed privileges of a more intrusive kind —not only in the trade field but in the direction of the Spanish press and radio. But the Spanish government waited to reduce rather than extend them. At first it ignored our request; next it suggested a poor substitute; but -finally, early in February (1942), it agreed to the proposal in principle. But with the plea, spoken in every office, for the greatest of discretion.

The Spanish government, we now know, went through a difficult ordeal. It was not easy to persuade Ribbentrop and the German Naval Command that Spain had no choice. By the end of February the necessity was accepted. Germany could not, and it knew it, supply the oil that Spain wanted. The utmost that a
disheartened Stohrer could get from Berlin was a promise that Berlin would send a skeleton economic mission in order to give a psychological satisfaction.

Germany was at this time suffering from a critical shortage of fuel oil, which affected even its military operations. Thus in December 1941 the quota for the German Navy had been reduced to 50,000 tons per month, about one half its requirements, causing drastic cuts in all naval uses except submarine training. Urgent Italian requests for supplies for operations in the Mediterranean had to be partly refused. This shortage itself put out of the question any extensive German operation in the western Mediterranean in this first period after Pearl Harbor.¹

Thus Spain had to accept our demand for a supervisory watch. But other hard corners had to be rounded before our program could be made effective. How were we to buy and fetch the Spanish products we demanded? Within this problem there were three kinds of difficulties, not entirely of Spain's making.

First, the American government was asking for certain products the whole surplus of which had hitherto been reserved for Germany. Of some of these, for example zinc and cork, the Spanish government was ready to share the supply. About others, such as wolfram and mercury, it was reluctant. Whatever was sent to us, it seemed at the time, would be taken away from the Axis. The American request required change in Spain's contribution to the opposed sides. But the Spanish dodges were not wholly due to the wish to arrange this smoothly. It saw a chance to gain from the rival bidders for these products and wished to make the most of it.

Second, the American government was not in a position to acquire some of the products sought. These were not to be had by ordinary business methods. Their prices were much higher in Spain than outside the blockade. Further, they could only be obtained if the buyer was willing to enter into long-term contracts; private buyers would not take the risk of doing so. Because of these and other elements in the situation, wartime trade with Spain in scarce materials could be conducted only by a govern-

1 Memorandum on The Fuel and Diesel Oil Situation of the Navy as of <5 December 1941," Annex 4 to Minutes of Meeting between Hitler and Raeder, December 12, 1941. "Fuehrer Conferences," 1941, Vol. II, pages 90-1.

ment organization. As will be related, earlier efforts to create such an agency had come to nothing. But now that the need was showing itself so clear, another effort was begun. In the meanwhile, however, we were asking the Spanish government to do what we alone could do.

Third, there was the question of whether and how we could move the Spanish products that we sought to the United States. We were not willing to send American ships to Spain. The Spanish government did not dare to ship war materials in Spanish vessels without prior German consent. Germany had brought that lesson home by one or two torpedoes. Even a partial solution of this difficulty took time. The Spanish government during this period tried hard to obtain German consent to the use of Spanish ships on the ground that it was essential to the maintenance of Spanish economy. But Germany would not agree to give safe passage to such products as wolfram, zinc, and mercury.

These were the compounded problems that caused the negotiations with Spain to string out so long. Only the pertinacity of Weddell and his staff, and Hoare's grave laments, kept them going. By March (1942) brittle bits of a trade agreement were approved. But it required many more months to plane and fit them together. In the meanwhile the movement of goods between Spain and the United States resembled a game of bagatelle. Someone pushed the plunger from time to time and the marbles bounced off the pegs until they settled into a hole.

The Spanish leaders did not always make it easy to carry on even such a game. American anxieties focused on the question of whether Russia would prove itself able to withstand the German assaults. The Spanish leaders freely ^pressed their hatred of Russia and wish for German victory. Thus Franco told the officers of the Spanish Army on February 14th:

"... if there were a moment of danger, if the road to Berlin were open, it would not be a division of Spanish volunteers who would go there but a million Spaniards who would offer themselves."

This declaration coincided with Rommel's rapid advance in Africa and the fall of Singapore. And Serrano Suner as usual outdid Franco. The American public could not know that in between speeches he was now telling Beaulac, Charge of the Amer- ican Embassy, that Spain's foreign policy was directed toward staying out of the war. When reporting these voluntary assurances, Beaulac reminded the State Department that almost exactly a year before Serrano Suner had said to Colonel Donovan that Spain would remain aloof until its honor, interests, or dignity- were in question.

The Revolt at Port Arthur

The oil chart at this time was shaken up by a revolt at Port Arthur, Texas. German submarines had been cruelly busy off the Atlantic coast and in the Caribbean. During February they sank some American tankers while the Spanish tankers went safely on their way. They also attacked the islands of Aruba and Curasao, where the great refineries were located. In these attacks they had sunk other Allied tankers and shelled the tank farms. Many in the crews of the sunken ships came from the towns along the coast of Texas.

By order of the Navy, all loadings at Port Arthur for Spain had been suspended after Pearl Harbor. But at the special request of the State Department two cargoes had been provided at this point in February. Another Spanish tanker, the Campechano, was loading in the harbor on February 25th.² The news of these shipments was restricted, but word spread among all classes in the vicinity. Sailors from the tanker were loud and hard in their remarks about the company. They were aroused by the memory of having seen, while on their dangerous vovages, Spanish tankers sailing through the Gulf of Mexico, lit up like a Christmas tree. They were convinced that these Spanish ships were serving as spy or signal ships for the submarines. The whole town of Port Arthur joined in their angry words.

The Texas Company became afraid to complete the loading even though it was officially authorized. It decided to break its contract with Campsa rather than accept the bad name and the

2 This particular shipment was, in fact, destined for Portugal.

risk of sabotage to its loading gear. It arranged to have the Cam- pechano proceed empty to New Orleans (where, to follow the incident one step further, the Treasury for other reasons long held the ship in port).

This revolt ended the visits of Spanish tankers to American ports. Thereafter, they went for their oil to Venezuela and the Dutch West Indies. This made no difference in regard to the actual movement of oil to Spain, for we continued to control all shipments. This change in point of supply would have been made anyway. American war needs were growing so great that the Texas fields no longer had oil for other uses.

steps toward an effective program

Many Minds with as Many Purposes

The agreement of March 1942 with the Spanish government was, as remarked, a thing of loose bits and pieces. It included a promise to send enough oil to meet Spain's most urgent needs. When the American government said that it would send only 63,000 tons during the current quarter, the Spanish government was appalled.¹ But it accepted the figure as better than nothing. The oil-inspection system quietly found its place.

But at the American end confusion reigned. Besides the State Department, the Board of Economic Warfare, the Navy, the Treasury, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, the Office of Strategic Services, the Petroleum Administrator for War, and the War Production Board were all concerned in one way or another with the Spanish program. Closely joined judgment and action within and between all these branches of the government were needed. But it did not exist. No one was in charge of the whole. : Inside the State Department it was hard to tell who was doing what. The Secretary did not concern himself with details and the Under Secretary gave orders only now and again. Spanish diplomats, men from oil companies, officials of the British Embassy, swung in and out of a dozen different doors. Spokesmen from other branches of the government, such as the BEW, scattered their views wherever they thought they would be best regarded. The Petroleum Adviser, Thornburg, and his staff, seemed to be passing out hints and half promises on their own. The diplomatic officers of the Department, under Atherton, were in worried col-

¹ This total was not to include any crude oil, since Washington was not satisfied regarding stocks at Teneriffe, the distribution of the products of the refinery there, or the situation in North Africa.

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loquy with their Spanish and British colleagues. Intelligence reports from the Navy seemed to be short-circuited at the wrong points. Jones and Clayton, of the RFC, who controlled the funds that might be used to buy Spanish products, still waited to be told what to do; then they did what they thought best. In short, the scene, in its way, resembled the beaches of Morocco on the afternoon of the landing.

Nor was the outward prospect much less confused. The State Department did not know precisely what Spain had offered us. The Spanish Embassy in Washington was of little help, for its exchanges with its own government were mixed up. The only thing that was clear was that the Spanish government was stating in frantic language that our failure to provide oil was imperiling its existence. Half its tanker fleet was either in or on its way to American harbors. The British government from high to low was beseeching us to hurry. Churchill was expounding the reasons for doing so to the President in round phrases.

But besides the confusion there were other deterrent causes. Franco and Serrano Suner were still placing wreaths on the doorsteps of the dictators, and it was suspected that they were still slipping notes through the slots. Spain was completing a new trade and loan agreement with Argentina; the Argentine Ambassador to Spain puffed it up into a plan for the joint conduct of banks, shipping companies, and airlines. This Axis-tainted deal worried the Treasury. For it seemed designed to improve the channel for re-exports to Germany, the carriage of contraband goods, and the smuggling of looted valuables from Europe. American public opinion was as displeased as ever. Despite Presidential advice, several of the departments represented on the BEW would have preferred to let Spain riot or rot.

If the Spanish program was ever to be more than a game of bagatelle, it was apparent that some new measure of order was necessary. The Under Secretary of State asked me to organize and act as chairman of an interdepartmental committee to manage economic relations with the Iberian Peninsula. This group (which was named the Iberian Peninsula Operating Committee) was formed by appointment from several branches of the State Department, the BEW, and the United States Commercial Corporation (of which more later). A liaison officer from the British government was present at all of the meetings. Each of the two governments could thus know what the other was doing. Gradually this group, which became known as IPOC, became the main Washington bearing in what developed into a very large supply- purchase program for Spain and Portugal. Its system later became the rough working model for other groups set up to deal with other countries, particularly Turkey and North Africa. The Committee held some hundreds of meetings during its lifetime.

But the account has jumped in advance of the story. It was essential that the Committee have a confirmed basis for its assignment. Acting Secretary Welles approved the idea of submitting to the President a full statement of what was planned. If approved, all the straggling branches of the government could be brought into line. Then perhaps individual initiative would be a bit subdued.

While this statement was being drafted (March 5-14) many things were done. Plans for the creation of a government organization to do the buying in Spain (and elsewhere) were, after a rough tussle, settled. A State Department officer, Labouisse, who had been immersed in this work, was sent to Spain to start off its work. The American Embassy in Madrid was instructed to begin, along with the British, to arrange for the purchase of wolfram and other strategic materials. The Office of Strategic Services was asked to recruit a group of men to act as oil observers in Spain, to which task it turned with gusto. All these and other steps were hurried along in the thought that the basic statement of policy would be placed on the President's desk as soon as written. It was completed by March 14th.

But before it was sent to the White House the whole bustle of preparation was brought to a chilled halt. For Atherton and Thornburg, who had hitherto been the most constant advocates of oil for Spain, now combined to produce a strange chit. They took a look at the sky and discovered rings around the moon.

Spain, they noted, was chartering tankers to Portugal and these were in American waters. There was no other Spanish ship in our ports, and clearances in our direction had been suspended. The Spanish diplomatic mission in Havana was sending identical messages to the other Spanish missions in Latin America telling them so. The trade agreement with Argentina was being hurried. The

STEPS TOWARD AN EFFECTIVE PROGRAM 163

Spanish Chief of Staff and the Chief of the Spanish Air Force were in Berlin. There was unusual cable activity in the Spanish Embassy in Washington. Such were the evil portents.

Acting Secretary Welles ordered a halt until we could find out what was afoot. Along with my colleagues on IPOC, I was puzzled by this swift burst of alarm. I could not resist the thought that its authors were trying to show either how right they had been in the past or how wrong it was to transfer authority to the new Committee. However, the alarm soon ended. All of the signs had innocent meaning.

When this became clear, the Acting Secretary submitted the program to the President (March 20th). Approval was given at once. A summary was thereupon, "upon direction of the President and with his approval," sent to all other branches of the government concerned. The IPOC was formally entrusted with the management of the daily details. The way was open, in conjunction with the British government, to strive for a ruling place in the economic fortunes of Spain.

Up to then we had had only one good weapon, the power to provide, or to refuse to provide, American products. From this time on we were to have another: great sums with which to buy Spanish products of use to the Axis. But the voucher for these sums was stained with the blue-black ink of office warfare in Washington. This flowed freely in the battle over the creation and control over the new organization that was to conduct our economic program in the Iberian Peninsula and elsewhere. This was named the United States Commercial Corporation.

the hard birth of the uscc: wallace and jones fall out

Were We About to Buy the Sky?

The birth of the United States Commercial Corporation was long and hard. To minds soaked in the salt of sound private finance, it never became legitimate. Differences over its necessity and policies caused a break between Vice President Wallace and the Federal Loan Administrator, Jesse Jones. The tale is worth the telling—at the risk of interrupting the main narrative. To do so, it is necessary to turn back from the spring of 1942 to the end of 1940.

The task to be done was to deprive the Axis of vital war materials heedless of cost. Operations to this end came to be known as "preclusive." The British had begun them early in the war. On November 19, 1940 a memorandum prepared in the Office of the Economic Adviser of the State Department had recommended to Secretary Hull that the American government should do the same. The American program for the purchase of strategic and critical materials was hobbled. We were buying only such products, and in such grades and quantities, as were thought necessary for our own defense program. The estimates were on the scanty side and the buying slow. We were permitting the Axis to secure war materials which could be put out of its reach —particularly in Latin America. Large amounts of such products as copper, tin, mercury, chrome, and mica were being sold to Japan, whence part was passed on to Germany. The United States, it was urged, ought to be buying up the whole supply.

Patient attempts were made to persuade Jones to do the job. He seemed to respond and said that he would gladly consider specific suggestions for action. Leon Henderson, busying himself

164

with economic preparations for war, was known to have proposed to the President that a new organization be created which, among other duties, would assume charge of the raw-material buying program. Other officials of the State Department, especially Thomas Finletter, Chief of the Defense Material Branch, held similar talks with Federal Loan Administrator Jones and with his deputy, Will Clayton. They too found what they thought to be receptive listeners. But the weeks passed and nothing much was done. Our buying stayed within the safe, low limits of our own defense needs.

And so Secretary Hull had been persuaded by his staff on January 29, 1941 to try again himself. In a long letter addressed to Jones, he summarized the reasons for action and listed the neglected situations. This letter brought a useful response. Jones undertook to deal with the situations mentioned. But he showed himself unconverted. Our purpose, he wrote, should not be to buy merely to keep someone else from getting the same materials, but rather to have on hand an ample supply of what we might want.

Following upon this exchange of letters the various agencies run by the Federal Loan Administration had begun to be bolder, to consider longer-term contracts, and to be less apt to hang back in order to get the best price.^{^[37]} But still there was a lag in buying both for defense and for preclusive ends. It should have been" carried on with the wish to get everything that could be had. Instead, it was still restrained by the wish not to buy what might not be needed, and not to take avoidable loss.

During the winter months various officials of the State Department managed to draw the Federal Loan Agency into this or that activity. But the effort was like carrying firewood through a gate that latched itself after each armful. Weariness is reflected in a memorandum prepared for the Under Secretary of State on May 7, 1941: "It cannot be said that the program for the acquisition of available supplies of strategic and critical materials produced in the Latin American countries is making satisfactory headway."

Some deals of great value—either for supply or for preclusive purpose—were arranged in the summer of 1941. We agreed to buy all the copper produced in Latin America, all of the Bolivian tin and wolfram ore, to secure control of most of the zinc production of Argentina and the manganese production of Brazil. But many parts of the purchasing program (as recommended by the Interdepartmental Committee on Strategic and Critical Materials) were still "in a rather frustrated state" ^{^[38]} at the end of the summer. While Jones and Clayton gave much time and patience to it, their temper was not aggressive. Their habit was just to keep pace with the obvious national danger rather than to get in front of it.

By renewed persuasion, in which Welles took a leading part, the effort was carried forward. During the autumn the attempt to acquire an inclusive command over the resources of the hemisphere was made effective. We arranged with the governments of all important Latin-American sources of supply, except Argentina, to buy all their production of critical and strategic war materials.^{^[39]} These agreements were a real achievement. They greatly cut the flow of war materials to Japan. They marked the transition from a buying program kept within the limits of identified defense needs to one that overflowed into the unknown in order to keep supplies away from the enemy. As a matter of record it may be observed that almost all the materials bought from Latin America under these contracts were later needed in the war.

Still, in this phase we did not stray far from ordinary bases of trade in wartime. We devised ways to limit government purchases to such quantities as private American buyers did not purchase. We did not found organizations within foreign countries to seek out supplies. We remained careful about the prices that we paid. Some of them seemed high and were much higher than prices before the war. But they were within familiar commercial range and proved to be much lower than the prices which have prevailed since. In other words, these Latin-American arrangements did not lead to risks that would make a banker quiver.⁴^But the strange jobs that lay ahead in Spain and Portugal, in I urkey and elsewhere, were of another kind. There, within the dual blockade area, the rival sides were bidding wildly for vital materials; they were also plotting to get control of the'sources of production. There, governments controlled exports, and used that control to bargain for supplies wanted from the nations at war. Buyers had to provide goods as well as cash. Trucks carrying these materials might be waylaid or ships sunk. To enter these situations another attitude was called for, another kind of organization, and tactics that used money as a tool rather than an asset. Ralph Ackerman, the Commercial Attache of the American Embassy in Madrid, had, in several able dispatches, made amply clear that this was true of Spain.

The dragging differences in Washington as to how far to move into this field came into the open—became stuff for the press—in November 1941. The British government asked us on November 4th to share in a wolfram-ore buying program. This had been begun in an effort to injure German war production by depriving it of a vital metal. But it was becoming too burdensome for Britain to carry alone. Would the United States, Britain now asked, join? Would it share the expense and stake out a claim for part of the Portuguese production? To do so, we would have not only to spend a substantial sum but also to provide American

⁴ For example, the prices specified in some of the important agreements were as follows: 54 cents per pound for Mexican lead, 8.25 cents per pound for Mexican zinc, 12 cents per pound for Mexican and Chilean copper, 48 to 50 cents per pound for Bolivian tin, 21 dollars per unit of Bolivian wolfram ore. All of these are much lower than current (October 1947) prices—e.g., lead at 15 cents per pound, copper 21.5 cents per pound, tin at 80 cents per pound.

products in scarce supply. What we might do in Portugal, it was foreseen, we should also be called upon to do in Spain.

It was entirely in order to doubt whether an expensive fling in Portuguese wolfram was justified even as a war measure. Neither its value nor its feasibility could be proved.^{^[40]} In this field statistics were doubtful and the course of the future supply unpredictable. The only convincing basis for the view that we might achieve a significant military result was the behavior of the German government. It was making the utmost diplomatic effort to obtain and export Portuguese wolfram ore. It was bidding for mines and their ore in disregard of cost. In June 1941 the unit of wolfram in which the trade was ordinarily conducted was selling for $19.50 within Portugal. By September 1941 the price was up to $123 per unit, and toward the end of October the Germans had bought some lots at between $300 and $370 per unit. The price for the same product in the United States was at the time about $21. The British officials concerned with economic warfare were convinced that the German buying policy proved, first, that the ore served a vital purpose in German military production and, second, that the Portuguese (and Spanish) sources of supply were vital to Germany.^{^[41]}

But these evidences of intense German interest did not dispose of the causes of doubt. Could not, if absolute need be, Germany substitute other metals for most of its uses? Could we and the British together, in the light of the diplomatic and military situation, engross so much of the Portuguese supply as really to hurt Germany—no matter how much we spent? How much might we ultimately have to buy?

No one found it easy to gulp down these doubts. But the officials concerned in the State Department and the BEW agreed that it was worth while to pay to test them. If billions could be spent to wreck war plants from the air, millions might be ventured to deprive them of such vital material. But they could not convince the Federal Loan Administrator, Jesse Jones. Vice President Wallace as chairman of the Economic Defense Board took over the pleading of the case. A few days before Pearl Harbor he called upon Jones in an attempt to induce him to go all out for the greatest part of Portuguese wolfram. Jones said the idea was silly; he would not squander money on it. The question was one almost certain to divide these two men angrily. The one so impetuous in working for a desirable end that he would not pause to count cost or practicability, or even to address himself persuasively to a man who did; the other so measuring and concerned with questions of expense and return. Even Secretary Hull, who had supported every previous initiative in the buying field, seemed to share the opinion that this one was foolish. Wolfram at the price of moon-dust!

Thus the matter stood for many weeks longer (November 1941 to February 1942). The officers of the State Department badgered their bosses. They went further, time and again pointing out to Jones and Clayton the need of a suitable organization for jobs of this sort—one equipped to conduct economic warfare, to spend freely, to act quickly and secretly, and to bargain with American goods as well as money. The British government had an organization of this kind, the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation (UKCC).

In February Finletter and I were joined in our efforts to accomplish this by Assistant Secretary Acheson, who thereby spoiled his reputation for stability in the buildings on Vermont Avenue that housed the Federal Loan Agency. Notice was given that if that organization continued to balk at the assignment, others would be found to take it up. Harry Hopkins had promised to ask the President to provide the necessary funds out of an emergency appropriation. These would be managed by a new subsidiary of the newly created Board of Economic Warfare. That agency, of which Henry Wallace was Chairman, was eager to do tne job.

Faced with this choice, Jones and Clayton agreed to accept the assignment. Henceforth they supported the preclusive program, no matter what their doubts. The USCC was brought into existence. The wolfram buying program, for better or for worse, was launched. It had caused one of the deepest splits in the wartime government.⁷ Later it was almost to divide the Allies.

On February 10th the State Department informed the British Embassy that:

^a. . . it has been determined that the loan agency will establish ... a corporation which will be prepared from time to time to conduct preclusive operations."

It also stated that the American government would enter into a joint program to acquire certain Spanish materials of importance that could not be had by commercial methods or at commercial prices.

Before many months had passed, the USCC had a competent group in Spain hunting for whatever the Axis wanted. It was signing drafts for tasks licit and illicit. These were directed by Walton Butterworth, a Foreign Service officer who knew how to find three ways around an obstacle. "Indestructible" his col-

⁷ The BEW before long won control of the new organization away from the Federal Loan Administrator.

The actual transfer of control over foreign buying was made by Executive Order No. 9128, issued on April 15, 1942. The meaning of this order was stretched to its fullest in the rules and regulations issued on April 17th by the Executive Director, Milo Perkins, of the BEW. These authorized him to issue orders to any agency (including the State Department) in regard to foreign buying, production, and the financing of the same.

These rules and regulations caused several months of anguished struggle between the RFC and the BEW. But the latter gradually secured effective control over expenditures, which had been Jones's particular province of power.

The State Department had exercised control of another sort, both negative and positive, over buying policies. In order to effectuate the large buying programs already in existence, the State Department had to use all our diplomatic and military resources. It felt it necessary that all economic warfare activities, including buying operations, should be adjusted to its pattern of purpose. This narrative illustrates clearly how they may involve the question of war or peace. But Milo Perkins was loath to recognize these facts.

For a while the authority of the Secretary of State seemed threatened, but it was confirmed by the issuance on May 21 of a Presidential statement "to clarify certain relations and functions of the Department of State and the Board of Economic Warfare in the administration of the President's Executive Order No. 9128. . . This specified that the Board should "continue to recognize the primary responsibility and position, under the President, of the Secretary of State in the formulation and conduct of our foreign policy and our relations with foreign nations." leagues had nicknamed him, after he had emerged from a Pan American clipper beneath the waters of the Tagus—resting on his briefcase. He worked under the gaze of the Ambassador and in good accord with the Embassy staff. Weddell had left Madrid, retired at his own request after the crucial battle over Spain's role .in the war had been won. His successor, Carleton J. H. Hayes, at once took an active interest in the whole economic program.

^{^[1]} Under an Economic Agreement signed in July 1937 at Burgos and tfa® Pact of Friendship, March 1939.

^{^[2]} Among the more important products designated were iron ore, zinc, lead, mercury, wool, hides and skins, and wolfram.

^{^[4]} Earlier in 1939 Spain and France had signed an accord restoring to Franco

^{^[5]} Many parts of the agreement between Germany and Spain were kept secret. In contrast these British agreements were published in full Board of Trade Journal, March 30, 1940. A good interpretative analysis k to be found in Hansard Debates, House of Commons, Volume 358, March 18, 1940.

But in May 1940 Chamberlain lost his faith. When, shortly after his displacement as Prime Minister, Hoare consulted him about accepting the special mission to Spain, Chamberlain told him not to expect success in the midst of defeat. Sir Samuel Hoare: Complacent Dictator, page xii of the Introduction.

Minister of the Interior have up until the last few days repeatedly pointed out the Spanish offer to me* so mat it may be assumed that Spain even today will keep its promise made in June." Doctments Concerning Relations between the Spanish Government and the European Axis, No. i. Published by the State Department. They will hereinafter be cited m State Department Documents.

³ See Supplementary Note No. IL

^{^[8]} The subject was discussed at length at a meeting of Hitler, Raeder, and Jodl on September 6th. "The danger," the record of this discussion concludes, "of a British or American occupation of the Azores and Canary Islands is particularly great in the event that Spain or Portugal enters the war. The Fuehrer therefore considers occupation of the Canary Islands by the Air Force both expedient and feasible." "Fuehrer Conferences," 1940, Vol. II, page 19.

^{^[9]} For example, it asked for about 800,000 tons of oil products (which was far greater than normal), about 800,000 tons of wheat, 100,000 tons of cotton, 25,000 tons of rubber, 625,000 tons of phosphates and other fertilizers.

time they permitted themselves to become completely dependent on Shell and Standard. . . . The result is that the Ministry of Economics has neglected to provide oil supplies for ^industry." "Fuehrer Conferences," 1940, Vol. I, page 28.

^{^[11]} This secret memorandum, dated September 28, 1940, explaining the situation is to be found on pages 276-7, Volume VI, Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Document No. 3579—PS.

^{^[13]} This annoyance became stronger after Hider began his talks with Laval and Petain—shortly after which Ciano remarked in his Diary that he hoped "that Hitler will not offer us a cup of hemlock because of our claims against France." Ciano Diaries, entry October 25, 1940.

^{^[14]} Letter from Serrano Suner to Ribbentrop, October 19, 1940. No. 7, State Department Documents.

^{^[16]} As well as the restoration of various British rights within the zone. For an account of this important episode, see Hoare, op. cit., pages 64-5.

^{^[17]} These stories, which appeared in the greatest of detail in a column edited by Drew Pearson and Robert Allen called the "Washington Merry-Go- Round," dramatized a supposititious conflict over Spanish policy between the Secretary and the Under Secretary in a way that damaged their reladons.

^{^[18]} On December 14th Admiral Darlan in talking with H. Freeman Matthews of the American Embassy at Vichy, after renewing assurances regarding the French fleet and bases, remarked that if the British blockaded France, "we may attack Gibraltar and with Spanish and German help the Rock wouldn't hold out long." Langer, op. cit., page 117. Chapter iv of this book, called "Alarums and Excursions," is an animated and detailed record of the fright-

^{^[19]} Ciano asked and obtained a change in Article 5, but whether in favor of Italy's claims or Spain's, or both, is not clear.

^{^[20]} For .an account of the Hitler-Petain-Laval talks at Montoire, see Langer, op. cit., pages 89-96. He concludes that although "Petain had agreed that the defeat of Britain at an early date was most desirable, and he had accepted a program involving colonial readjustments at Britain's expense ... all this was in very general terms. All the details were to be worked out later and so the door was left wide open. ... So Montoire settled nothing" (page 96).

^{^[21]} As expressed by Serrano Suner in an interview after the defeat of Germany, "It was my intention to enter the war at the moment of the German victory, at the hour of the last cartridge. . . Interview with Charles Favrel,

^{^[23]} See page 101.

⁶ "Fuehrer Conferences," 1940, Vol. II, page 32.

^{^[24]} Interview Paris-Presse, already cited, October 27, 1945. No available document indicates that Hitler considered entering Spain without the consent of the Spanish government—unless the United States or Great Britain attacked either Spain or the Canary Islands.

^{^[25]} In the November 12th directive already cited, Hitler had also outlined the plan of the campaign in Greece. This began: "The Commander in Chief of the Army will make preparations for the occupation from Bulgaria of the Greek mainland north of the iEgean Sea, should the necessity arise. . .

^{^[26]} It is of interest to record that during the year between the 1940 and the 1941 harvests, Spain managed to import from overseas about 800,000 metric tons of cereals, mainly from Argentina. For the calendar year 1940 the official Spanish statistics record imports of 674,000 metric tons of wheat, 31,000 tons of flour, 32,000 tons of corn, 55,000 tons of rice, and 6,000 tons of barley, as well as substantial quantities of potatoes, fruits, beans, and other vegetables.

^{^[27]} The German record of this conversation is printed as State Department Documents No. 11.

^{^[28]} Le Proces du Marechal Petain, testimony of General Doyen, Chief of the French Mission on the Armistice Commission, page 95.

^{^[29]} Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Vol. VI, page 990.

^{^[30]} It has since become plain why each day of delay interfered with the German military planning. Two large operations, one to overcome resistance in Greece, the other to drive the British Army out of eastern Africa, were scheduled to start in the first weeks of spring. The vast task of organization for the invasion of the USSR was also under way; for many reasons this could not be delayed beyond early summer. The German timetable for conquest contained no allowance for delay or failure. This was a vital mistake in German planning. The operations had to start on schedule or be abandoned. The program did not permit the indefinite retention in idleness of special German units and equipment while waiting for Spanish decision.

^{^[31]} But the plan of campaign was kept in the action file to be used when the eastern wars were over. How soon this was expected to be is illustrated in the letter (sent by the German Naval War Staff to the Commanding Generals of Groups West, North, and South). One line of the section entitled "Objectives for the further Conduct of the War upon the Termination of the Campaign in the East" read: "Plan 'Felix' must be executed still in 1941." Nuernberg Trial Document 57, USSR 336.

^{^[32]} Letter Hider to Mussolini, February 28, 1941, Lettres secretes, pages 115-16.

^{^[33]} Le Proces du Marechal Petain, testimony of General Serigny, page 174.

^{^[34]} Letter Franco to Hider, February 26, 1941, State Department Documents, No. 13.

^{^[35]} The reports of the meetings between Hitler and the German Navy during 1941 show that the defense installations in the Canary Islands and certain Spanish ports (El Ferrol and Cadiz, which the German Navy hoped to use) were weak and lacking in many respects. Notes on the situation at various times in 1941, as viewed by the German Navy, may be found in "Fuehrer Conferences," 1941, Vol. I, page 64, Vol. II, pages 26 and 29—particularly the Annex "Defenses of the Spanish Harbors of El Ferrol and Cadiz and of the Canary Islands." In contrast to these weak situations this report (August 26, 1941) stated that "On the south coast of Spain and on the coast of Morocco coast artillery is well placed and work is progressing satisfactorily." There seems to have been a lack everywhere of special equipment such as anti-aircraft guns, mines, searchlights; and the supplies of oil, and probably even of ammunition, would not have lasted long in serious battle.

[36] Serrano Suner, in opening a German press exhibition at Madrid, had

^{^[37]} Mr. Jesse Jones was both Federal Loan Administrator and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC). That organization had created three new subsidiaries to buy critical and strategic materials, the Defense Supply Corporation, the Metals Reserve Company, and the Rubber Reserve Company. Mr. Jones and the Deputy Loan Administrator, Will Clayton, supervised the activities of all these organizations closely and personally.

[38] Memorandum by Feis, Chairman of this Committee, to the Secretary of State. ⁷

[39] In order to do buying that went beyond evident defense needs, the

[40] Wolfram, or tungsten as it is more commonly known in the United States, provides an alloy invaluable for hardening steel, and in many other processes and products. It was one of the most vital of materials for military purposes, and distincdy limited in supply. Command of the wolfram supply of the Iberian Peninsula was to become later the main object of Allied economic-warfare policy. A full account of this struggle, its meaning, and its outcome will be found in later chapters.

^{^[41]} At that time Spanish production was about one tenth of Portuguese production. Shordy thereafter it began to increase extremely rapidly.

^{^[43]} This would appear to be borne out by the entry that Ciano made in his Diaries for September 4, 1942: "A governmental crisis in Spain. It had grown to be inevitable. I was convinced of this in Leghorn when I heard how Serrano was talking about Franco. He talked of him as one speaks of a moronic servant. And he said this without caution, in the presence of everybody. It is too early to say what the consequences of this development will be. The only indication might be the choice of Jordana, and this is not favorable. Jordana has always been a man not whole-heartedly with the Axis and a sympathizer with France and Great Britain."

^{^[44]} For pre-emptive operations the United States and Great Britain on joint account alone spent about 75 million dollars in Spain from January 1, 1942 to July 1, 1943. Both the UKCC and the USCC independently spent besides substantial sums for products desired to meet genuine needs—the so- called "supply purchases." In addition, privately arranged trade, especially with the United States, went on.

^{^[45]} German exports to Spain in the first half of 1943 were 98,500 tons (value about 30 million dollars) as compared with 47,400 tons (value about 16 million dollars) in the first half of 1942. Spanish exports to Germany rose from 239,500 tons (value about 24 million dollars) in the first half of 1942 to 283,500 tons (value about 54 million dollars) in the first half of 1943. These figures do not include arms deliveries, and are only rough approximations.

^{^[46]}Stohrer, a recognized failure, had been replaced by Moltke as German Ambassador in Spain. The latter died a few months after being assigned to this post and was succeeded by Dieckhoff, former German Ambassador to the United States.

^{^[47]} By doing so it tried to soften resentment at its refusal to allow Germany to increase its debt under the German-Spanish clearing. At one time this debt had been allowed to rise to 220 million reichsmarks. But Spain had reduced it to 70 million. Carceller, a practical man, did not permit sentiment to push his pencil. But he was ready to help Germany to find another means of continuing its buying rivalry with the Allies, one that could be justified as a proper Spanish obligation.

^{^[48]} The Spanish government required miners of wolfram ore to obtain a license. But there was widespread unlicensed and illegal mining of small deposits. The ore obtained was turned over to licensed producers, who sold it as their own.

^{^[49]} The value of officially recorded exports of wolfram ore had risen from 2.1 million gold pesetas in 1940 to 102.4 million in 1943, and in the early months of 1944 was at the rate of almost 200 millions per year. Estadfstica del Comercio Exterior de Espana, 1940-4. This was increased by the proceeds of smuggled ore. The values are exclusive of the heavy tax. The official value of the gold peseta during this period was about 3 gold pesetas to a dollar but the values recorded for customs statistics were arbitrary—being arrived at, unless I am mistaken, by applying a "premium coefficient" of 2.57 to the value in paper pesetas.

According to the records of the USCC the American government spent for Spanish wolfram ore in the years 1942-4 about 58 million dollars, the British government about the same amount.

[50] Hayes, op. cit., page 191. Neither the date of this discussion nor the military authorities are identified. No message from the Joint Chiefs or Combined Chiefs about this particular situation has been found in the records available to me. But the recommendation reported by Hayes is in accord with the attitude maintained by both groups toward the Spanish problem from the beginning to the end of the war.

^{^[51]} Hayes has given his impression of his British colleague at various points in his book (op. cit.), especially on pages 134-5. Hoare in contrast scarcely mentions his American colleague in his book. This was rather characteristic, and a mark of the loftiness of temper which proved so annoying.

^{^[53]} Spanish White Book entitled Reply to the Documents Relative to Spain Published by the State Department (1946). This alleges that the plan was prepared by General Strong and sponsored by General Donovan, and proposed to the other Allied nations at the end of January 1944.

^{^[54]} Jordana's figures were wrong. During 1943, as Carceller stated later, export licenses for between 1,000 and 1,100 tons had been issued to Germany, including 125 tons that the Spanish government had itself requisitioned and delivered. In addition, about 200 tons had been smuggled.

^{^[55]} He might have found confirmation in the message that Dieckhoff had sent on to the Foreign Office on April 4, 1944, reporting that CarceUer had told the Counselor of Embassy that in view of this discrepancy between the English and the American attitudes, the Chief of State, Franco, had directed the Foreign Minister to give the two enemy powers the alternatives of accepting within a short period the informal oral agreement or of refusing it and at the same time considering the negotiations a failure.

Also from the later (April 16, 1944) report that Dieckhoff sent to the Foreign Office, explaining and condoning Franco's fears of a break with the Allies. Franco, he related, had to take into account the strain under which the Spanish people had so long been living; he was afraid of a possible attack on the Spanish islands in the Atlantic; and in the event of a break

251

feared the possible consequences of intensified Allied propaganda or recognition of Negrm. Even Carceller and Asensio, the report added, were afraid of Allied economic, political, and military pressures.

[56] As later related by Dieckhoff to American interrogators, Spain naturally asked what Germany could offer in return for continued shipments of wolfram; for example, Franco wanted 600,000 tons of wheat. He was authorized to offer 60,000.

^{^[57]} The small deliveries appear to have been on a monthly basis. It also seems as though some deliveries were made after the agreement with the Allies ia connection with a wish to secure Vigon's help in smuggling.

^{^[58]} The American government thought this interest was only 24.5 per cent, but it was in reality twice that size, half being in the name of Spanish dummies.

[59] He was simultaneously doing his best to secure planes from Germany and to arrange for German help in training Spanish pilots. ^Germany in 1944 drew upon its scant supplies of aviation gasoline to hold his favor and help in wolfram smuggling.

Dates	Metric Tons
1936	344,000
1937	420,000 (part to Canaries)
1938	478,000 " " ⁴⁴
1939	624,000
1940 (first half only)	432,000