THE CLIENT PRINCES OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE

THE main part of this essay deals with the acts and functions which constituted the clientship of the kings who came under the influence of the Roman Republic. The vagueness of this clientship made it necessary to prefix a discussion as to the technical position which the kings occupied by treaty, as friends or allies. A bare outline of the clientship of the more important kings of Africa and Asia is supplied by the collection of quotations in the larger of the two Appendices.

While this essay was in course of preparation for the press, there appeared in the Classical Quarterly (July, 1907) a thesis by Miss L. E. Matthaei, which discussed the classification of the Roman allies in general, and since some of her conclusions were arrived at independently in Part I of this essay, it may be as well to mention in what respects the two dissertations coincide. The main conclusions common to both, but reached by different methods, are (1) that the ‘ socii et amici’ of Rome were identical with the ‘amici,’ and

were not a class intermediate between the ‘ socii ’ and the ‘ amici,’ as Mommsen supposed; (2) that the aid rendered by these ‘ socii et amici ’ was quite voluntary.

For much information on tribute, on the gifts sent to the kings, and on the position of the kings regarded as outside the ‘ imperium Romanum,’ besides various other details, this book is indebted to a treatise by Oscar Bohn (Haack, Berlin, 1876), which deals with the period of the Empire, but also contains allusions to the Republican period. On the question of coinage,— too vague and wide to be treated successfully in an essay of these proportions,—the scanty notices of Bohn, supplemented by Mommsen’s Miinzwesen, have had to suffice. A dissertation by Virgil Ferrenbach (Kayser, Strassburg, 1895) supplied many references in Part I, but the large majority of the quotations throughout the book were collected in a complete but hasty survey of the principal ancient authorities. The modern historians mainly consulted for the historical materials involved were Niese, Holm, and Mommsen. On the position of the dependent states of Rome I have consulted Mommsen’s Staatsrecht, the Dictionary of Daremberg and Saglio, Pauly’s Encyclopaedia, and Bruns’ Fontes Iuris Romani. Most of their information however applies only to republican states and to municipalities, and analogies drawn from these to the position of the kings do not always hold good. Other works consulted are mentioned in the notes.

I have to thank Mr L. Whibley of Pembroke College, Cambridge, and Mr T. R. Glover of St John’s College for many valuable criticisms and corrections. The rearrangement of my materials was carried out to a great extent in accordance with their suggestions. To Mr Glover I am also indebted for the reading of the proof-sheets, and for a large measure of encouragement bestowed at those times when the need of it was chiefly felt. The guidance and assistance of Professor J. S. Reid were placed at my disposal from the first, and he has informed me on points too numerous to be always acknowledged in the notes. For all his kindly attention I cannot thank him sufficiently.

Friendship and alliance, 10. Temporary allianees, 11. Agreements with Republics, 12. Evidence from official sources, 12. Decrees quoted by Josephus, 14. Terminology of various authorities, 15. Formulae Amicorum, Sociorum, 40. Summary, 42.

Methods of ‘ Recognition,' 57. Causes of its necessity; nature of the Mediterranean kingships, 61. Duration of the Roman foedus, 65. Nature of the Roman kingship, 67. Circumstances attending ‘Recognition,’ 71. Gifts, 75. Effects of ‘Recognition,’ 76. Settlement of the succession by Rome, 77. Roman arbitration, 78. Control over the king, 81. Refusal jaf-ijjecognitien^; and annexation, 83.

iii. Foreign policy of the Client .... 88 Roman friendship paramount, 88. Rome’s consent required for war, 95. Roman arbitration between Clients, 95. Senate’s policy in Asia, 98. Commissions of inspection, 100. Services of

the kings in war, 103. Voluntary nature of service, 107. Duty of Rome in return, 110.

iv. Internal affairs of the Client . . . . 114 Eiagd.oms.lay .owfcekle''tKe Roman ‘ imperium,’ 114.

King’s ownership of his territory, 117. His power absolute, 118. Power over Roman residents, 119. Rights of coinage, 120. Control of his army, 122. Right of bequest, 122.

as friends of Rome, 127. Tribute peculiar to conquered and provincial soil, 128. No instances of tributary kings under the Republic, 130.

Personal Relations of the Kings . . . 139-142 Private friendships, 139. Privileges, 140. Treatment when conquered, 141. Kings as Roman citizens, 142.

Bequest of Kingdoms and Annexation . . 143-151 Senate’s abstention from annexation, 143. Occasions of annexation; bequests of Pergamum,

Egypt, Bithynia, and Cyrene, 145. Their genuineness, 146. Treatment of annexed territory, 147. The term ‘freedom' applied to the people of the annexed country, 149.

The Roman Protectorate and Roman Interests . 154-162 Rome self-interested in dealing with attacks upon

her Clients, 154; also in neglecting the welfare of her Clients’ subjects, 157. Protected chiefs in British India; British interveution against rebellion and oppression, 159. Differences between the Roman and British Protectorates,

163-228

163

165

174

180

182

184

190

196

200

207

209

211

216

218

221

222

viii. Bithynia: Prusias I, etc. . . ix. Cappadocia: Ariarathes IV, etc. . a. Pontus: Mithridates V and VI . . .

Pages 2 (n. 1), 49 (n. 2), for xxi. read xxm. Page 28 (n. 3), for xxxii. 16 read xxxii. 17. Page 152 (n. 2), for xxii. read xxxii.

§ 1. A client in Roman civic life could not do certain things in his own name and by his own right.

He required a patron to act for him and represent him with full authority. He owed this patron certain duties, but on the other hand the patron owed him protection. By client-princes therefore may be understood those rulers, who in one or more directions were limited in their power of initiative, and had either to receive Rome’s sanction for their actions or let Rome act for them; who owed Rome certain services, but in return received her protection. The incompleteness of this clientship and protectorate will be pointed out from time to time later.

§ 2. The first king of importance who became in Hiero of any measure Rome’s client was Hiero of Syracuse in 263 b^C.c!^C’ 263 B.C.¹, the reason being twofold. In the first place when he left the side of Carthage to join the stronger power of Rome, he needed thereby the latter’s protection against his late ally. In the second place he was ¹ Appendix A, i.

thrown upon that protection by his unconstitutional position in Syracuse. “ Seeing the Syracusans indignant,” says Diodorus¹, “at the ill success of Carthage and of himself, he sent to the consuls to treat for peace,” with which we may compare the statement of Polybius² that “king Hiero put himself under the protection of the Romans, and while he constantly administered to their necessities ruled over the Syracusans without anxiety.” When Carthage was beaten and Rome had little to fear from Hiero, he found it politic to ingratiate himself still further with the victor.

§ 3. The situation of Masinissa³ whose clientship commenced in 206 B.C. was very similar, but his need of protection was the greater because Rome was further away, and Carthage, which had already helped to expel him from his kingdom, lay upon his borders. With the second defeat of Carthage in 202 B.C., he became entirely dependent upon Rome’s generosity. From Rome he received back his kingdom largely extended and to no other power could he look for its safety and increase. It was moreover only as Rome’s client that he increased it at the expense of Carthage and the neighbouring tribes. The final downfall of Carthage in 146 B.C. imposed on Numidia for good the overlordship of the Romans, who now possessed territory in Africa itself.

§ 4. In Asia, where Rome’s next struggles befell, more clientships were instituted under similar conditions. The smaller kingdoms of Asia, situated between the two aggressive powers of Macedonia and

the kings of Pergamum, Bithynia and Lappadocia, and padocia, the princes of Galatia². It is then that Eumenes goes g⁹®^-188 to Rome in person to state his requests, accepts a gift of territory as Rome’s protege, and appeals to her arbitration against his neighbours; that the king of Cappadocia is compelled to pay a price for Rome’s friendship; and that the Galatian princes submit to Eumenes at her command.

§ 5. All these smaller monarchs had much to gain from Rome’s support. Antiochus III and Philip had little³. They were still too strong to be used as dependents nor could the motive of interest induce them to put themselves at her service, for they knew that the Power, through which they had lost so much, was anxious to see them weaker still. It is true that Philip helped Rome against Antiochus but not in the

same way as the smaller monarchs. He helped not as one whose interests were bound up with those of the Republic, but from motives of retaliation against Antiochus III, and then only where some immediate reward was held out to him. Nor did Rome consider him in her truces with the enemy¹. Perseus², his successor, sought upon his accession to gain time for the accumulation of his resources by a renewal of the friendship with Rome, but apart from this act he steadily resisted the senate’s authority until his fall. Antiochus Ill’s successor, Seleucus IV³, continued to pay off the indemnity due from his father, but there is little in his relations with Rome indicative of clientship. Syria Upon his decease, however, Antiochus IV⁴, his brother, ochus IV) by the very manner in which he obtained the kingdom, 175 b.c. _Was compelled to secure the goodwill of the Roman senate. While Demetrius, the son of Seleucus, was in Rome as a hostage, Antiochus crossed from Greece and seized the Syrian throne by the aid of Rome’s client, Eumenes (175 B.C.). The possibility of Demetrius appearing as a rival in Syria, and winning the support of many of his subjects rested in the discretion of the senate, and constantly exposed him to the interference and supervision of that body. The situation of his successors was similar owing to the frequent rise of rival claimants to the throne.

dates V), became to some slight extent dependent upon Rome, lire^B °’ ^w^^en Mithridates V sought her friendship and helped her against Carthage in 147 B.C. His son, Mithridates

Eupator, taking advantage of the situation of his kingdom, and the inactivity of the senate, practically maintained his independence, so that Velleius¹ cited him as “ the last of the independent kings except those of Parthia.”

| 7. In Egypt the Ptolemies² until 204 B.C. enjoyed Egypt friendly intercourse With Rome on equal terms, and in that year the guardians of Ptolemy V seem to have renewed the friendship. Soon after came the arrangement between Philip and Antiochus III, to divide Egypt between them. Rome, again concerned to preserve a balance of power between the kings, declared war on Philip and tried to appease Antiochus by negotiation. The latter however meanwhile pressed the Egyptian regents so hard that they came to a secret understanding with him³. When Rome-, after beating Philip, demanded the restoration of Coele-Syria to Ptolemy V, Antiochus was able to shew that Egypt had managed without Roman protection. The date of Egypt’s clientship was therefore postponed, though there are certain traditions which disregard the above facts and aim at representing the authority of the senate as already established in Egypt². The occasion (Ptolemy upon which the Egyptian kings really became clients ¹⁶⁸ of Rome (“in fide populi Romani,”—Livy) was the intervention of the senate against Antiochus IV who had nearly reduced the kingdom to dependence upon himself, 168 B.C. Ptolemy VI had previously sent to renew ‘the friendship,’ and explain his attack upon Syria (171 B.C.), and on meeting with reverses at the

hands of Antiochus, sent to Rome for help. The senate, after waiting for news of the victory of Pydna, intervened with such strong, almost arrogant diplomacy as to shew that she claimed henceforth to be arbitress of all quarrels of importance in the Mediterranean coasts.

§ 8. The protectorate established by the senate over the Asiatic kings was far more pronounced when the so-called province of Asia was acquired in 133 B.C. by the bequest of Attalus. The effect of this was largely counteracted by the inactivity of the senate. Still the presence of her magistrates in the immediate neighbourhood led to that closer subordination of the kings that we find in the last century of the Republic. The Jewish high-priests¹ began about this time to send their often repeated requests for aid against Syria and renewals of friendship with the Republic, but at first Rome was not sufficiently interested in them to shew much activity on their behalf. Pompey was the first Roman general to approach them in person, in 63 B.C., but made them subject rather than client. Caesar after Pharsalia ameliorated the position of Hyrcanus, but not until Herod was set up as king, and Judaea thus freed from the interference of the Syrian governor, were the relations of the Judaean ruler such as to put him upon the same footing as the other client-kings.

§ 9. Further clientships ensued from new wars in Africa and Asia. In 105 B.C. the Mauretanian Bocchus² found it necessary to assist Rome and profess himself her servant in order to escape the penalty for rendering aid to Jugurtha. It was made quite clear to him by

Marius’s lieutenant, Sulla, that he would not be allowed to preserve neutrality. In 66 B.C. Tigranes², as a result Armenia of assisting Mithridates VI, succumbed to Rome and retained his kingdom on a similar condition. Also^{66 B}-°-during the war with Mithridates, Commagene² was Comma-admitted to friendship and clientship (68 B.C.), while Sis)™¹' Parthia³, though treated haughtily by Pompey, never ^{68 B}-°-became dependent under the Republic, owing to its situation.

§ 10. The institution of the Roman protectorate in the Mediterranean was thus accomplished by a gradual and indistinct process. Rome’s power came to be felt without being definitely enunciated or formulated by treaty or ordinance. The influx of dignity and renown that rewarded on successive occasions the conquests of Carthage, Macedonia, and Syria, and the readiness with which she assumed that dignity, made it quite unnecessary for her to subdue smaller powers. The latter from hope of reward or fear of injury were as ready to acknowledge Rome’s paramount position as she herself was to adopt it, and Rome content with this acknowledgment chose to express her sovereignty not in definite terms made with each particular country after the manner of modern protectorates, but in successive acts of protection or aggression to suit the moment, in every part of the Mediterranean. It is easily seen what an amount of freedom, whether to interfere or to abstain, this vague and undefined position left her; what an advantage it gave her for the pursuance of her own interests, what a laxity of obligation towards any

king or country that had sought her protection. For instance, the excuse of Pompey, which he made for the annexation of Syria, whose rulers had through several generations been recognised by Rome, disavows the existence of any protectorate at all¹. She thus escaped the indignity of retreat from responsibilities which she could not meet, or from a position which she could not hold. Acts of protection came from her bounty, and she could proceed as far as she cared, or was able to, on each occasion².

§ 11. The want of terminology expressive of her power was not altogether accidental. Rome seems to have been careful not to offend her dependents by laying stress upon their subordination. It is only Greek and late Roman authorities who call the dependent kings ‘subjects,’ writing moreover of the late Republican period³. When Rome received a king’s allegiance, she did so either by the formal act of

^s We may contrast the manifestoes of the British Viceroys to the client-chiefs in India, which, though applicable only to individual states, serve as precedents for other states in India, and lead to a common policy. These manifestoes and treaties pronounced in explicit terms certain definite obligations on both sides, however comprehensively expressed. Many of the obligations tacitly acknowledged by Rome’s clients, and whan it was convenient, by herself, e.g., the necessity of the Roman recognition, the client’s obligation to assist in war, the duty of loyalty to the Protector, are formulated in writing in the British Indian agreements. (See Warner, Protected Princes of India (passim).)

³ The kings are called vtt-Iikool by Strabo (vi. 4, 2,p. 288), Plutarch (Ant. 61), Dio (xxxvn. 15, 1), and Josephus (Ant. xiv. 77). Diodorus (xxxii. 4, xxxiii. 21) and Josephus (Ant. xiv. 157) speak also of the ijye/iovta of the Romans. Tacitus (Hist. u. 81, 1) also mentions’ Antiochus of Commagene as “ inssrvientium regum ditissimus,” and cf. Dio, xli. 55.

recognising his claim to the title ‘ king,’ or by granting a treaty of ‘friendship’ or ‘friendship and alliance.’ The necessity and significance of the recognition of the royal title will be discussed in a later section. At present the titles ‘ friend ’ and ‘ friend and ally ’ are the most important consideration, because they are practically the sole official indication of the footing upon which the kings were placed, and in whatever degree they became subservient to Rome, they continued to be called by the senate ‘ amici,’ ‘ socii,’ or ‘ socii atque amici.’ The use of these titles varies greatly in the authorities, many of whom apply to the kings without distinction the single title ‘ friend ’ or the double title. Since in modern terminology there is a great distinction between the two, it is necessary to examine them the more closely.

ship ’ and existence of a friendly understanding or even 01 a 'Alliance.’ definite treaty of friendship between two powers does not technically impose upon either of those powers an obligation to help the other. Before one can claim to receive from the other active help, the existing treaty must be converted into one of alliance, by which the two parties bind themselves to render mutual aid under certain specified conditions. These conditions may prescribe obligation for a definite term of years, or against a particular foe; on the other hand they may, . by introducing no such limits, prescribe obligations to cooperate as ally on every occasion and for all time, so long as neither of the contracting parties break the agreement.

The essence of an alliance being this obligation to render aid, when Rome named kings ‘ reges socii ’ or ‘socii atque amici’and granted them so-called alliances, were the terms ‘ socius' and ‘ societas ’ used in their correct and technical sense ? Were these terms employed in virtue of an existing treaty which bound the

two parties to render mutual aid in war ? We hope to shew that this was not so; that a king was styled ‘ socius ’ by Rome even where no treaty existed at all; that where a treaty existed, its terms stipulated no more than friendship, and made no provision for active alliance; that requests for aid were made to and answered by Rome in such terms as plainly indicate the absence of any definite conditions of alliance; that Rome only granted such requests when her own interests were involved, and moreover herself sometimes solicited help only in the name of goodwill or friendship; lastly, that a king who deemed it expedient to procure the Roman recognition of his sovereignty, if successful in his request, was greeted by Rome indifferently by one of three titles, those of ‘rex,’ ‘amicus’ and ‘socius atque amicus,’ and that the terms ‘ friendship,’ ‘ alliance ’ and ‘friendship and alliance’ were interchangeable terms in the definition of his treaty. The conclusion to be drawn is that the loose use of these terms was due to the inequality of the powers who used them, as protector and client respectively. The protector used them as compliments in return for services which the client out of gratitude, fear, or hope of reward had already rendered, and to accustom the client to such voluntary service; the client desired the title ‘ ally of Rome ’ as a moral support against his neighbours, even though Rome rarely vouchsafed him active support. Practically the client’s relation to Rome was simply one of friendship.

The argument must not be confused by the rare Temporary instances of temporary alliances to which Rome con- ^aUlances•

sented for a definite period against a particular foe¹. When the latter came to terms, and the need for cooperation ceased, the alliance also ceased; both parties had fulfilled their engagements and each maintained the same footing as before. Neither can any longer be properly called the ally of the other. When therefore there has been such a temporary alliance between Rome and a foreign king, it will not make the later application of the terms ‘ socius ’ and ‘ societas,’ in speaking of the king’s footing, any the more justifiable either in his case or in that of his descendants. So that the value of the term ‘ socius¹ as a standing title of the client-king must be discussed independently of such temporary alliances.

Nor again must the footing of the kings be judged by evidence relating to the republics with which Rome came into contact. We know for instance that Polybius praises the skill of the Rhodians in having so long avoided an alliance with Rome, though for so many years united by friendship, and speaks soon after of the institution of the closer bond². The distinction is here clearly drawn. So Cicero can class separately the tributaries, the friends and the allies of the Republic³. We shall see however that this distinction is not maintained by either Polybius or Cicero when they speak of the treaties and titles of the kings.

§ 13. There are some passages which preserve almost the actual words of certain decrees and treaties. From these we see that Rome sometimes made a

Evidence

from

Official

Sources.

treaty of mere ‘ friendship ’ with a king, e.g. the treaty with Antiochus III (190 B.C.)³. Other evidence from original sources may be cited in support, though not actually giving the terms of the treaty on which the title ‘ friend ’ or ‘ friendship’ is based. Thus Attalus II desired to renew “ the existing goodwill ” according to an inscription of Pergamum⁴, and in the Monumentum Ancyranum the kings of the Parthians, of the Sarmatae, and of other remote tribes, are said by Augustus to have sought ‘ the friendship ’ of the Roman people⁵.

We further find that Rome made treaties also of so-called ‘ friendship and alliance,’ as, for instance, with Mithridates VI of Pontus (before 92 B.C.)⁶, and with his son of the same name, king of Paphlagonia⁷- With reference to the firstnamed of these, we cannot infer from Appian that the treaty included stipulations about mutual aid. Appian simply represents the envoy of Mithridates as quoting from the treaty the phrase fcal <tvfi/j,a,%os, and as appealing to Rome on the strength of this title⁸.

In official language we also find the title ‘friend and ally’ applied to certain kings, viz. to Antiochus IV⁹, and to one of the Ptolemies of Egypt at the beginning of the first century B.C.¹ The former of these certainly had no treaty containing a definite stipulation about mutual aid, for he renewed “ his father s treaty of friendship²,” and is spoken of elsewhere only as ‘friend³, and though the senate recognised his son Balas and decreed help, they did not aid him themselves but merely granted permission to their friends and allies to befriend him⁴.

Thus neither the treaty of ‘ friendship and alliance ’ nor the title ‘ friend and ally ’ means necessarily that the king was on a footing of close alliance implying mutual obligation.

(Josephus quotes many decrees of the Roman senate and its representatives which include references to treaties of ‘ friendship and alliance' with the Jews⁶-In one of these treaties we actually find a stipulation for the rendering of mutual assistance⁶. The Jewish people however, being peculiarly constituted, always received a peculiar treatment from the Romans, nor again were its high-priests and ethnarchs, as we have pointed out, in the same category with their responsible rulers of Asiatic kingdoms, so that until the time of Herod they hardly fall within the scope of this enquiry⁷. That even in their case, in spite of the stipulation above mentioned, the alliance was purely nominal, is shewn by the following facts: to one of their many appeals for assistance,—appeals always made in vain,— the reply was given that the senate would look into their

complaints when it had leisure from its own private affairs¹⁰; in one of the early treaties the senate renewed the 'friendship’ and accepted a shield as a symbol of 'alliance²’; while Antony in a decree speaks of the Jews simply as an ‘ eOvos j>i\ov^z’.)

§ 14. Among the historians who write of the third Use of the and second centuries B.C. Polybius is the most reliable in his terminology, as being contemporary with many of the events which he relates, and careful in his historical method. The treaties with Hiero and Antiochus III he shews to have been treaties of friendship, in the latter case quoting the actual stipulation concerning With Ptolemy yi Philometor in

171 B.C. he says there was a renewal of ‘ra cj}iXdvOpo)iraⁱ,’ and repeats the phrase, but in speaking of a time within fifteen years later he asserts that the Roman senate resolved to break off the ‘ alliance⁵.’ This might be explained by a fresh treaty having been made in the meantime, but the inconsistency appears also in his account of Ariarathes IV of Cappadocia and his son, Ariarathes V, the former of whom was made ‘ while the latter in 163 B.C. renewed ‘ the friendship and alliance.’ Yet Ariarathes V “ felt safe, because he had secured the Roman goodwill⁶.” To Demetrius I of Syria it was promised by the senate that “ he would obtain rd ^iXdvdpmra if sufficiently deserving ” (160 B.C.)⁷. With Attalus II there was “a renewal of friendship and hospitality” (152 B.C.)⁸, which is con-

sistent with the account of his predecessors. For Attalus I was “ glad because the Romans were mindful of their former alliance,” shewing that that alliance was only regarded as temporary, while Eumenes I, addressing the senate in 189 B.C. speaks of the Roman “ friendship and goodwill,” and “the inclination” of his father which he himself has followed. And the senate judged him, says Polybius, their “first and greatest friend” (166 B.C.)¹. Edeco, chief of the Edetani, was likewise declared ‘ friend,’ and accordingly Scipio contracted ¹ friendship ’ with him (208 B.C.)². Of Masinissa Polybius says simply that he “ kept faith ” with Rome ³-

One other passage must be quoted, in which the Romans are asserted to have renounced their ‘friendship and alliance' with Prusias II (154 B.C.)⁴, though in a passage which speaks of Prusias I’s dealings with Rome, it is not said that any definite alliance was made⁶, nor is Prusias II stated to have formed such a connexion. We also learn that the young Alexander Balas reminded the senate of “ the friendship and alliance that had been with his father⁶.”

Thus it is to be noted that while Polybius in by far the majority of cases used merely ‘ friendship ’ or some corresponding word such as ‘ evvoia,’ the four occasions on which he speaks of ‘friendship and alliance’ refer to a comparatively late time, the years being 163,158 (circ.), 154 and 152 B.C. respectively, and since two of these references are inconsistent with earlier ones, and Polybius himself is so careful a writer, we may infer

(1) that the phrase ‘ (piXia ical av/i, fiays la ’ was taking the place of ‘ <j>iXla ’ in the relations of many of the kings about this time¹¹,

(2) that as the transition is made so lightly by the author, the change in the terms did not put these kings upon a different footing outwardly, but that the treaty was technically no more than one of friendship.

Note also that, according to the passage about Demetrius I, the Romans were beginning about this time to grant their friendship to kings of importance as the reward of loyal service. In the next century there is a parallel in the case of Bocchus.

. § 15. The next authority in point of time is Cicero, Use of the who as an advocate no doubt used technical terms loosely to make his point, but in his constant references to the kings and to Rome’s relations with them must as a whole reflect the views, outlook, and terminology of his own day, especially as he was a senator and politician.

“being friend and ally intended to dedicate a memorial of his friendship and alliance¹².” Ariobarzanes is mentioned by the same title in a public speech of Cicero (67 B.C.)⁸.

In a fragment relating probably to 60 B.C. and dealing with Ptolemy XI Auletes, he protests against this

same title being given for a bribe¹. In 57 B.C. in his speech De Domo he asserted that the former Ptolemies had been ‘socii atque amici².’ In another speech (in 55 B.C.) he declares that Tigranes “reigns and holds the name of alliance and friendship³,” while Deiotarus is included in a general reference to the ‘ socii reges et amici’ (45 B.C.)⁴. In a letter also Tarcondimotus is called ‘ fidelissimus socius amicissimusque,’ evidently the title ‘ socius atque amicus ’ in the superlative degree (51 B.C.)⁵- These cases, in all of which, except the last, Cicero seems to be using a strictly technical expression, shew that the title ‘socius atque amicus’ was in general use in Cicero’s time and applied to a large number of kings.

Yet the kings to whom he applied it do not seem to have enjoyed a very close bond of union with Rome; their treaties did not guarantee them assistance from their so-called ally. Thus Pompey refused to restore Antiochus of Syria to the throne of his fathers after the defeat of Tigranes, on the ground that the family of the Seleucids had forfeited the kingdom by allowing Tigranes to expel them⁶. This plea would have been impossible and ridiculous, had the terms of the Seleucid’s treaty bound Rome to help in case of attack. Again, Ariobarzanes III of Cappadocia asked Cicero as governor of Cilicia for a body of troops, and Cicero, who had received a special commission from the senate to , protect him, pleads this special commission only as the justification for sending it⁷. Deiotarus again is

only referred to by name as ‘ amicissimus,’ or as being in the ‘ friendship ’ of the Roman people, even where it would have suited Cicero’s purpose particularly to be able to refer to the terms of an alliance offensive and defensive. For example in the defence of Deiotarus, Cicero strains the title ‘ socius atque amicus ’ to excuse Deiotarus for joining Pompey, making an elaborate plea which would have been unnecessary, had it been possible to plead in defence a definite stipulation in a treaty¹³. The absence of the latter is confirmed by the language of the senate’s request to Deiotarus for help against Antony in 43 B.C.¹⁴

With Ptolemy XI Auletes no less an authority than Caesar states that an alliance was made by law and ‘ senatusconsultum⁸ ’; also a treaty was struck with him on the Capitol¹⁵. So Cicero calls him ‘ socius ’ in distinction from his Cyprian brother¹⁶. But the last reference when compared with others shews also that the treaty was of the same type as those which had long been granted to kings who sought the Roman recognition. Thus this reference goes on to say of the Cyprian Ptolemy, “ if he had not yet been called ally, he was yet the brother of him who had already attained to that honour from the senate.” Dio¹⁷ says that “ Ptolemy had spent much in order to be called friend and ally” and Suetonius¹⁸ too says that the sympathy in Rome for Ptolemy when expelled from Egypt arose from the fact that the senate had called him friend and ally, and elsewhere names Ptolemy as an instance, in speaking of those to whom Caesar had sold ‘ alliances ’ and kingdoms for bribes². These ‘alliances’ we see from the passages quoted below³ are nothing more than the ‘foedera’ originally granted to kings by way of recognition and described also as treaties of‘friendship’ or ‘friendship and alliance.’ Nor in this particular ‘ foedus ’ with Ptolemy do there seem to have been terms stipulating for mutual aid. From the passage in Suetonius which we have just quoted we see that the help which Ptolemy received was given not on account of definite terms in his treaty but merely as to a client who had so lately been acknowledged in due form.

II is referred to as ‘ rex amicus^; (63 B.C.)⁴. That he was capable of being styled also ‘ socius atque amicus’ is evident from the privileges and services of his predecessors set forth by Sallust⁶, from the fact that he had been recognised by Rome⁶, and that the recognition of his successor was to be given by the award of that title⁷.

(b) “ All the most friendly kings and nations ” are said to have been alienated by the outrage inflicted by Yerres on the son of Antiochus of Syria¹⁹.

(c) Cicero tries to treat Ptolemy of Cyprus as ‘ amicus' and ‘ socius,’ but shews that he lacked these titles through not having been recognised by Rome²⁰.

References in Cicero therefore indicate that kings bore generally the title ‘ socius atque amicus ’ in Cicero’s time, though many of them were still called ‘ amicus ’ or ‘ amicissimus ’; that they were however without a treaty which supported the title ‘ socius ’ by guaranteeing aid in set terms. They were thus practically on the footing of friendship alone. It may also be noticed that all the kings but one whom Cicero has occasion to mention as ‘ socii atque amici,’ ruled over kingdoms which for many years had been under Rome’s protection, and Tigranes had been conquered in war. The use of the title ‘ socius atque amicus ’ in the recognition of a king is seen from the instances of Tigranes and of the king of Cyprus.

58 B.C.)²¹, or of an important ruler like Ariovistus the German²²- That Ariovistus was upon a footing of friendship only, we see plainly from his dispute with Caesar. When Caesar summoned him to a conference, Ariovistus declared that the friendship of the Roman people ought to be to himself an ornament and a protection, and not a source of injury: that he would no less readily reject the Roman friendship than he had desired it²³. Caesar had reproached him merely on the score of ingratitude to one who had procured him the title ‘ friend²⁴.’

It is noteworthy that Cassius Dio, as often as Caesar speaks of Ariovistus as ‘friend,’ adds the term ‘ally⁵.’ Ariovistus however had probably been recognised only by the first title, and Dio has perhaps drawn a wrong inference from the more common custom to this particular case. Had the king been called ‘ ally ’ also, Caesar would almost certainly have laid further stress upon this title in upbraiding him.

The full title ‘friend and ally’ also occurs in Caesar, in connexion with the proposal to recognise Juba⁶. The passage, in which is mentioned the ‘alliance’ formed with Ptolemy Auletes, has already received comment (§ 15).

§ 17. Sallust, who is also reliable as a writer contemporary with the late Republic, is only concerned with the African princes, except in the fragments of the Histories, only one of which however refers to the status of a king, viz. to the ‘ friendship ’ of Eumenes²⁵. In the Jugurtha the expression ‘socius atque amicus’ occurs twice, when Adherbal calls himself by that title²⁶. If therefore Sallust in many other passages only speaks of ‘ friendship,’ sometimes where ‘ alliance ’ would certainly have been added had there been a warrant for its use, this author also shews that the title ‘ socius atque amicus’ was rather a title of honour, in which ‘socius’ did not represent the binding force of an offensive and defensive alliance. Other passages certainly make most consistent reference only to the ‘friendship’ of the Numidian kings²⁷, and in particular even in the plea of Adherbal, where Sallust makes him sum up his claims upon Rome’s protection, no mention is made at all of any treaty of ‘ alliance' or of any terms which bound Rome to render aid²⁸. The term ‘ riocius' therefore in ‘ socius atque amicus ’ was, so far as Numidia is concerned, justified only by the help which the princes rendered to Rome as friends and clients.

As to the relations with Bocchus, Sallust makes Metellus tell Bocchus that he had “ a good chance of forming an alliance and friendship with Rome⁶.” Previously however it is said that Bocchus sent to seek a ‘ treaty and friendship,’ and towards the close it is expressly said and several times repeated that Bocchus was to receive a ‘ treaty and friendship ’ only on condition of doing Rome a service first¹.

The second fact shews that Roman friendship was in his case a thing to be earned by cooperation in war, as it had been previously earned by Attalus and Hiero, and this excludes the notion that the treaty with Bocchus would secure for him anything but friendship. The fullest meaning attributable to the term ‘ alliance ’ in the words of Metellus, is that of a temporary arrangement binding Rome and Bocchus to cooperate until Jugurtha' had been subdued. Such an agreement would at least have testified to the king’s independence, but like the alliance between Rome and Attalus in the first Macedonian war, would have terminated with the submission of the enemy. Moreover, this favoured position was accessible to Bocchus only when the overtures came from Rome. When Bocchus made the overtures, he asked for the ‘ treaty and friendship ’ as one who placed himself among Rome’s client-friends, and sought it as the guarantee of peace, and the only means of preserving his kingdom against Rome’s displeasure. It must be inferred therefore that the treaty with Bocchus, like that with Numidia, was one of friendship only.

§ 18. The remaining authorities are either merely translators or compilers, or not contemporary with the Republic.

Livy in his terminology is most untrustworthy. Sometimes he seems to make no distinction between

‘ amicitia' and ‘ societas.’ Thus he says that Philip consented to send proposals to Rome for ‘ alliance and friendship,’ because he desired to cut off suspicion of sympathy-with Antiochus²⁹. Later hg speaks of Perseus renewing “his father’s friendship³⁰.” He translates Polybius’s account of the treaty with Antiochus III, in which only friendship is mentioned, but tells us that Antiochus IV renewed the “ alliance which had existed with his father³¹.” With Ptolemy II of Egypt, according to the Epitome of Livy, an ‘alliance’ was formed, which is very improbable in itself, and is also contrary to the other authorities, while Livy himself contradicts the statement when he describes the “renewal of friendship” in the case of the succeeding Ptolemies³². Prusias I accepted “ the friendship of Rome,” but Prusias II “sought a renewal of the alliance³³.” The first connexions with Syphax (213, 210 B.C.) were of friendship. In 206 B.C. after an estrangement, friendship, says Livy, was accepted by Syphax, who demanded its ratification by a visit from Scipio. But in 205 and 204 B.C. there is a “ strengthening of the alliance which had been begun⁶.” Similarly, Hiero, Attalus I, and Nabis who became friends on condition of lending assistance, he treats as permanent and genuine allies³⁴.

The terms ‘ socius ’ and ‘ amicus ’ were interchanged even by Caesar in reference to the Aedui, and Cicero also applied them loosely to the Sicilians in the Verrine speeches³⁵. Livy is particularly free in interchanging them, as applied not only to communities but also to kings, so free that his language is perhaps not entirely due to carelessness, but to the fact that in his day, when most kings were obedient to every command of Rome, it mattered little whether they were called friends or allies. The term ‘socius’ he applies to Hiero, Syphax, Masinissa, Ptolemy Philometor, Antiochus IV, and Eumenes³⁶, though the other authorities indicate that they were friends and nothing more.

The term ‘ socius atque amicus,’ we have also seen, was applied by such good authorities as Sallust and Cicero to those who were only friends of Rome, but only so far as we can judge when they refer to times later than the third Macedonian war, and then in relation to kings who had become largely subservient to Rome. Livy himself shews the nature and use of this title in the reply to Yermina, son of Syphax, which he ascribes to the senate, viz. “ that the Roman people had been accustomed to give the honour of that name to kings in return for great services³⁷.” In ascribing this language to the senate, however, on that occasion Livy seems to have been guilty of an anachronism, and to have interpreted the senate’s ancient international dealings by the light of the customs of the later Republic. Certainly up to 202 B.C. Rome had had little occasion for establishing this custom or using this title. Hiero was perhaps the only king who had qualified for the title. The kings of Egypt and Macedonia had not, and Syphax never remained loyal long enough. Masinissa’s claim would date from this year, but even some years later Livy speaks only of his being called ‘king,’ when he is being thanked¹, and here his authorities seem to have followed the senate’s usual terminology.

Livy applies the full title also to Antiochus III before his war with Rome, though certainly the relations of the two powers did not justify the name².

Livy’s divergencies from his authorities bring additional uncertainty to his terminology. In passages, which he translates almost literally from his authorities, he is not careful to preserve the terminology of his original but varies without an object³.

He confirms however the assumption that the title ‘friend and ally’ was granted to kings as a mark of honour, in return for services to Rome, while the very vagueness of his terminology, and the ease with which he interchanges ‘ friendship ’ and ‘ alliance,’ point

¹ xxx. 15, 11; 17, 10. For the significance of this title as conceded by Rome v. §§ 40 f.

³ Thus in the speech of Eumenes; cf. Polyb. xxi. 20, S, * (f>i\las Kal avpfMaxtas,⁷ with Liv. xxxvn. 53, 7, ‘amicitia.’ In the same speech the same phrase of Polyb. used in reference to Boeotia is rendered in Livy by * societas.’ Cf. also Polyb. xxi. 21, 11 with Liv. xxxvii. 53, 28, and Polyb. xxi. 35, 4, *0i\£a,’ with Liv. xxxvm. 15, 6,

to a corrresponding vagueness in the Roman official application of those terms to the status of the client-kings.

§ 19. The references in Diodorus are based chiefly upon Polybius and speak generally of‘friendship,’ as in the cases of Antiochus III, Philip, Ptolemy VI, Demetrius I, Perseus¹. On the position of Masinissa, of whom Polybius only says that he ‘kept faith’ in one war, Diodorus too throws little light, for though Scipio “had the alliance of Masinissa sure for all the remaining time²,” this may allude to the help rendered by that king down to the end of the war, and Diodorus again states that he maintained ‘friendship’ with Rome, where Polybius has 7rtcrrt?³. In regard to Bocchus the account of Diodorus harmonizes with what we learned from Sallust. Bocchus was “ to obtain friendship if he persuaded Marius⁴.” Probably, however, Sallust, whose work was finished before 32 B.C., was the authority of Diodorus for this statement.

Diodorus copies Polybius also in the assertion that Ariarathes V asked to renew his ‘ ical av/j-fia^la ’ with Rome⁵, but it must be on another’s authority that he calls Contoniatus the Gaul ‘ /cat in

the latter part of the second century B.C.⁶ This last passage alone brings fresh evidence. The other passages are only duplicates of those which occur elsewhere, and have no independent value.

may not have much technical significance. Porsena, king of Etruria, “ went away a friend with honour.” Attalus “ became a friend to the Romans." Masinissa “ received much attention on account of his virtue and friendship.” The Parthians “had before this bethought them of the Roman friendship.” Bocchus and Bogud “ held the land, being friends of the Romans.” Arta-vasdes “ was for a time fortunate, being a friend to the Romans³⁸.”

Strabo thus consistently calls the kings ‘ friends.’ Artavasdes, we know, was expected to render help, when called upon (e.g. to Crassus, and to Antony)³⁹, but he gave it at the dictation of irresponsible triumvirs who treated the kings as subjects, rather than in accordance with the stipulations of a treaty made with the Republic. When Artavasdes refused aid to Crassus, and played Antony false, he was not blamed for having broken a treaty⁴⁰ We know also that his father Tigranes bore the name ‘ friend and ally,’ but the nature of this title has already been indicated as compatible with a footing of friendship⁴¹.

Strabo also uses the term ‘ <pi\La kcu not only in reference to the community of the Aedui⁵, but also in a general reference embracing particularly the kings of Cappadocia. " When the Romans were first regulating Asia, and were making friendships and alliances with the peoples and kings, to the oth kings they granted this honour as a personal one, bi to the Cappadocian in common with his people⁴².” E appears to mean ‘friendships and alliances’ to be take as one phrase, for in the same section he continue “the royal family having died out, the Romans we: for granting the Cappadocians autonomy in accordani with the existing friendship and allianceWe ha’ •seen that Polybius speaks of Ariarathes IY of Capp: docia being made ‘ friend ’ about this time, and Ariarathes V renewing the ‘friendship and alliance,’ tl second term being inserted without altering the natui of the treaty². It is evident too that among “tl other kings ” Strabo must include Antiochus II whose treaty we know was one of friendship only The passage therefore is another instance of the use ■ the term ‘ alliance ’ in a sense not strictly technics: Events also shew that Ariarathes V’s treaty must I thus interpreted, for when he was attacked and expelk by a rival, Rome gave him no active support⁴.

§ 21. Of the writers who lived under the Empir Tacitus and Suetonius only concern us in so far as the recall ancient custom, or give us the last stage of tl development in terminology which took place und< the Republic.

The references in Tacitus in the first place fur nig another example of the old practice of bestowing tt title ‘ socius atque amicus' by way of complimeu Thus Ptolemy of Mauretania in return for his servici was “called friend and ally according to ancient custom resumed once more¹.” In the second place they shew the same loose use of the terms ‘ ally ’ and ¹ alliance.’ Thus it is plain that the real relation of Parthia to Rome was one of friendship, Artabanus appealing to the ‘friendship and treaty²,’ the common phrase several times used by Sallust³- This “old and publicly instituted friendship ” is again appealed to years afterwards⁴. Yet the first of these appeals is immediately followed by a discourse of Germanicus upon the ‘alliance’ of Parthia and Rome, and the second is followed by a request of the Parthian nobles to Rome for “ the help that should be given to allies'' Whether this looseness of terminology is that of Tacitus himself, or whether he is representing Germanicus and the Parthian nobles as straining the terminology for their own ends, is uncertain. In the third place Tacitus indicates the final evolution of the term ‘socius,’ the logical outcome of the practice of bestowing the title upon one who had done Rome good service as subordinate. It came to designate those kings who were now counted for practical purposes as part of the Roman Empire, and liable to supply contingents. While therefore under the Republic it represented a position of client-ship, it has now become identified with that of subject. This consummation is shewn in Annals IV. 5, where Tacitus proposes “to review the Roman forces under arms, and the allied kings’’ while in the thirteenth book of the Annals (ch. 8), we read that “the allied

⁴ Ann. xn. 10, 3 and cf. Mon. Anc. 29, 32, where only friendship is mentioned.

kings were ordered to obey as the needs of the war demanded.” It is in distinction to these kings who were thus at the beck and call of the Roman ‘ impera-tores,’ that the author of the Bell. Alex.¹ called Phamaces a ‘ rex externus,’ because in spite of the fact that he had been called friend and ally, he was not under Roman influence in the same degree as clients of such long standing as Deiotarus or the kings of Cappa-docia.

Suetonifis. § 22. Suetonius, like Tacitus, in speaking of ‘the allied kings ’ (‘ reges socii ’ or ‘ socii atque amici ’) evidently regarded them as part of the Roman organisation and subjects of the Emperor². The passage referring to Ptolemy XI has already been quoted to shew the use of the title ‘ friend and ally ’ in the recognition of a king by the senate³, and it was found to be supported by another passage in the same author referring to Caesar’s sale of alliances. The only other noteworthy passage in Suetonius is that in which Claudius is said to have read an old Greek letter of the senate promising Seleucus ‘ friendship and alliance,’ if he remitted the tribute of Ilion⁴. The time referred to is the third century B.C., so that the Seleucus in question was not in any sense a client of Rome. In any case the relations of the powers in the Mediterranean at that time render it unlikely that Rome should for such an object have extended an offer of alliance to Syria, and Suetonius was probably applying

¹ Bell. Alex. 34, Domitius turpe populo Romano esse statuit regna soeiorum atque amicorum ab externo rege oceupari. Cf. Ann.

the phrase, as it was used in his time, to a period when it was not so stereotyped.

§ 23. Josephus constantly interchanged ‘ ’ Josephus. with ‘ Kai avyniayia ’ and ‘ avfi/xa^ia ’ in speak

ing of the agreement existing between Rome and the Jews, from the second century B.C. onwards. Josephus himself clearly made little distinction between the two terms, but it is equally clear from the decrees which he quotes that little distinction was also made officially between them by the Roman Senate¹. The high-priests who procured these agreements with Rome do not fall within the scope of our inquiry, since, though one of them at the beginning of the last century B.C. assumed the title ‘king,’ these rulers were never really separated from their people in international relations, nor did Pompey after 63 B.C. allow the title ‘king' to be retained². Herod, established as king through Antony in 41 B.C., was in full enjoyment of royal rights and powers as they were then understood, and to him after his death we find the title ‘friend and ally’ applied in a speech of his friend Nicolaus⁸. Herod, we know, frequently received help from Augustus’s troops and returned it, but the minute account which Josephus gives of his recognition as king mentions no treaty of offensive and defensive alliance, though asserting that he was intended to serve as a bulwark against Parthia⁴. Evidently no such treaty was necessary, but he gave and received assistance first as the friend of the triumvirs, then as a subject of

§ 24. Plutarch only in a few places speaks of friendship with kings. Masinissa is declared to have been a “ friend of the people from the beginning⁴³.” The case of the Mede, whom Antony “ brought over to friendship,” can hardly be treated as belonging to the Roman State, but as personal to Antony, since the agreement was confirmed by a private marriage alliance ².

Elsewhere Plutarch speaks constantly of ‘ alliance ’ or ‘friendship and alliance,’ sometimes where other sources shew that the term ‘ alliance ’ was not strictly in place. Ariovistus is thus said to have been made ‘ ally ’ by Caesar, and Bocchus to have been “ enrolled as ally ” for his services against Jugurtha, whereas each of these kings according to the testimony of Caesar and Sallust secured nothing but friendship³. In connexion even with Porsena (507 B.C.), in spite of the early date and in contradiction to all the other sources, he speaks of ‘ friendship and alliance⁴.’ We cannot lay much stress on so conventional a terminology. Plutarch’s constant use of the title ‘ friendship and alliance ’ must spring from the prevalence of its use in his own time, and like Suetonius and Tacitus he calls the kings as a body ‘ the allied kings.’

The statement that Bocchus was “ enrolled as ally ” for his services against Jugurtha must be compared

with that which says that, as a reward for services against Antiochus, Philip of Macedon was “ voted ally¹.” Though the terminology is unsatisfactory in either case, the two passages seem to shew at least the connexion between the ‘ appellatio ’ and the enrolment on the ‘formula’ or list of friends. The other passages give the title ‘ friend and ally ’ to Hiero, Machares, son of Mithridates, Phraates the Parthian, and Mithradates his father, and to Ariobarzanes of Cappadocia². Also the king of Gordyene is said to have been called • <rvfifi.axo<; ’ by Lucullus at burial^s. The statement that Mithridates was to be voted ‘ ’ after his

settlement with Sulla must be explained by the fact that the former treaty with Mithridates had been broken and needed renewal⁴.’

§ 25. Appian though writing in the second century Jppian. A.D. does not apply to the kings of the Republican period the terminology of his own day, probably because his work is a compilation from earlier authors. If these authors were numerous, the references are the more important as evidence since they are so generally consistent, and shew a distinction drawn between the terms used respectively in the early and late periods.

The relations of the kings under the Republic are in nearly every case, where the title is applied technically, described as those of ‘ friendship.’ The expression ‘ allied kings ’ occurs twice, both times in reference to the last years of the Republic⁵. One passage alludes to the kings who aided Brutus, the other is the more

valuable as it confirms the distinction drawn in the Bell. Alex, and by Tacitus¹ and states that “the kings as many as were allied had to make great contributions to the Roman generals,” as opposed, presumably, to the more independent kings, such as those of Parthia or on certain remote borders of the Empire. Another passage, which states that Gulussa “was brought over to an alliance” by Scipio², can have no further meaning than that of temporary allied help, when we compare the references of Sallust and others to the Numidian house.

The phrase ‘ friend and ally ’ occurs with some frequency, but in three cases it is applied to Mithri-dates VI of Pontus, the nature of whose treaty has already received comment³. In two other passages it is applied to the kings Hiero and Pharnaces, respectively, who are said to have received the title as an honour in return for their services to Rome, Pharnaces also on the occasion of his recognition as king⁴. Attalus II, again, may also have earned the same title by his services; that he only ranked as ‘ friend ’ by treaty appears from other sources already quoted⁵. A temporary alliance may account for the other reference, viz. to Syphax, if the title has in his case been correctly applied⁶. Elsewhere Syphax is made to speak of himself as “ a friend to both Rome and Carthage.”

The references to ‘ friendship ’ only are very numerous and embrace very many rulers, viz. Ptolemy II of Egypt (250 B.C.) (who moreover when refusing to aid

Carthage against Rome asserts that “ friends ought to help against enemies, not against friends ”)¹, Ptolemy IV (196 B.C.)², Ptolemy V (190 B.C.)³, Ptolemy VI (172 B.C.)⁴, Masinissa (206, 201, 172 B.C.)⁵., Antiochus III (before the Syrian war and also in the terms of his treaty of peace, 190 B.C.)⁶, Antiochus IV (172 B.C.)⁷, Agron’s son, the infant king of Illyria, who by the terms of the treaty made on his behalf was to be called the ‘ friend ’ of Rome, so long as he did not seek to extend his borders⁸, Attalus I (200 B.C.)⁹, Eumenes II and Ariarathes IV (172 B.C.)¹⁰, Mithridates V (before 150 B.C.)¹¹, Viriathus, by the terms of his treaty (141 B.C.)¹², Machares king of the Bosporus (70 B.C.)¹³, Phraates and Tigranes (65 B.C.)¹⁴, Antiochus of Com-magene (64 B.C.)¹⁵, Ariovistus (58 B.C.)¹⁶.

That some of these passages are probably duplicates of those already quoted from earlier authorities is evident. Sometimes too the title is applied without any technical significance, as in the words put into the mouth of Nicomedes¹⁷. Yet all these references in a body confirm the idea which the examination of Polybius, Sallust, Cicero, and Strabo suggested, that the majority of the kings when they came into permanent relationship with Rome entered it as ‘ friends' and by a treaty of ‘friendship,’ not by a treaty of alliance binding the parties to render mutual aid; and that if, on the other hand, the terms ‘ally’ and ‘alliance’ crept in, they arose from

the assistance given by the kings to Rome, at first in expectation of reward, later under compulsion as clients. For this assistance they were rewarded in the second century onwards by the appellation ‘ friend and ally.’ More rarely some aid rendered by Rome as protector may have been thought sufficient reason for describing as ‘ friendship and alliance ’ what was strictly a treaty of friendship.

The use of the verb ‘ avfifiay^eco ’ by Appian means little. The temporary alliance of Attalus with Rome did not put him or his descendants in the position of allies, but merely friends⁴⁴. So when Masinissa swore to help Scipio if he landed in Africa, his connexion with Rome and that of his descendants was still simply one of friendship, as we saw from Sallust⁴⁵ So too the help given by Prusias did not secure for him permanently the position of an ‘ally⁴⁶.’

| 26. The references in Dio and the Epitome of Zonaras in regard to the early kings mention only friendship, or employ some neutral phrase as ‘ agreement.’ Besides the ‘ friendships ’ with Porsena, Hiero and Syphax⁴⁷, we find the statements that “ Pompey consoled Tigranes by the thought that he had gained the Roman friendship,” and that “Phraates renewed his friendship” when Pompey succeeded Lucullus⁵. This last reference must be compared with another which states that the king made ‘friendship and alliance’ with

Lucullus⁴⁸, shewing that the ‘ friendship' and the ‘friendship and alliance ’ in the author’s eyes amount to the same thing. Other sources say of the Parthian connexion that it was one of mere ‘ friendship²,’ and this is confirmed by a subsequent statement of Dio that active cooperation was to be the price of ‘ friendship.’

There remain a number of passages which speak of an award of the title ‘ friend and ally,’ and of enrolment on a list of ‘ friends ’ and of ‘ allies,’ and since all but one deal with the first century B.C., they give good reason to suppose that the practice of conferring the kingly title and of enrolling kings as ‘ friends and allies ’ was by this time general⁸-

It is true that Dio extends the double title ‘ friend and ally ’ erroneously to Ariarathes IV and Ariovistus, who, according to Polybius and Caesar respectively, were only addressed by the title ‘ friend,’ but the frequent occurrence of the full title in Cicero shews that Dio is not merely following the terminology customary under the Empire. Indeed that he chose his terms with some discrimination appears from the frequency with which he denotes the status of the earlier kings by the term ‘ friendship,’ whereas before Dio’s time the client kings had come to be designated ‘ allies.’

That the title ‘ friend and ally ’ does not appear from Dio to presuppose a treaty of defensive and

offensive alliance has been indicated above in reference to Phraates. That it was sometimes given upon the recognition of a king as legitimate monarch appears from the cases of Pharnaces and Ptolemy XI¹. The case of Polemo² who was enrolled on the formula of friends and allies four years after his accession and recognition as king shews that the title was also at times merely an honour, as we have seen from Tacitus and others. More will be said of this in the next section in connexion with the formulae.

We know that for military purposes there was a ‘formula togatorum ’ containing the names of the peoples of Italy liable to supply contingents³- And it is supposed that when peoples outside Italy (e.g. the Aetolians) became bound by treaty to aid Rome with troops this ‘formula togatorum ’ developed into a ‘formula sociorum’ in order to include these peoples. We know also from inscriptions that there was a 'formula amicorum.,’ on which were entered among others the names of those who had rendered Rome service. Moreover the same source shews that the enrolment followed upon the ‘ appellatio,’ or the act of bestowing the title ‘ friend⁴.’

The very nature of these two lists would seem to make it necessary that they should be kept distinct. It might also be inferred that individuals (other than permanent heads of states) who had done Rome service would be enrolled upon the latter list, as ‘ friends,’ since

as members of a commonwealth acting in a private capacity they could hardly be classed with the permanent allies of Rome. Mommsen therefore does not hesitate to say that the ‘ Senatus consultum de Oropiis ’ uses ‘ socius in relation to Hermodorus incorrectly, relying upon C.I.L. I. 203, and he accuses Livy of a similar mistake in relation to Onesimus, i.e. of putting ‘ formula sociorum ’ for ‘formula amicorum⁴⁹.’ A passage in Ap-pian may be quoted in support of this view, according to which the Rhodians and other states of Asia were enrolled by Pompey as friends in return for their loyal services against Mithridates⁵⁰. Since the Rhodians had had for years an offensive and defensive alliance with Rome, as we know from Polybius and from Appian himself⁵¹, they would be on the list of allies already, and therefore on this occasion must have been enrolled for the sake of honour on a separate list, the ‘ formula amicorum.’

That there were two lists appears also from the references to the enrolment of kings in Cassius Dio⁴.

Dio was well versed in state affairs and presumably i the knowledge of official terminology, so that we ma with safety take the wording of these passages literalb They consistently speak of kings at the time of the late Republic being enrolled, “ both among the friends an among the allies of the Roman people,’' i.e. on two s« parate formulae. If Dio calls Ariovistus ‘friend and ally it is because he thought he was enrolled on both lisn whereas Caesar apparently had him entered only amon the ‘amiciV But the passages concerning Ariovistu at least shew us the procedure². As G.I.L. I. 20 shews us that those who received the title ‘friend were enrolled on the ‘ formula amicorum,’ so we se now that any king who was called ‘ friend and ally was enrolled on both lists, whatever was the occasion c _his being called so.

Summtby. § 28. The results of the inquiry into our authoritie may be thus summarised :

(1) The kings are most commonly, except in th last century of the Republic, called ‘ friends,’ and thei treaties are known in many cases to have been treatie of friendship.

Thus the treaties of peace with Antiochus III am Yiriathus stipulated for friendship, and Hiero’s treat; provided for similar relations. According to Polybiu Ariarathes IY and Edeco made—Demetrius I wished t

make—and Attalus II and Ptolemy VI renewed— treaties of friendship. An inscription of Pergamum confirms this in the case of Attalus II. Ariovistus and three kings of Gaul were recognised as ‘ friends' according to Caesar. On the testimony of Sallust Masinissa and his successors down to Adherbal enjoyed friendship only, and Bocchus received a ‘ foedus et amicitia.’ Livy shews how Attalus I received friendship as a reward for cooperation in war, Polybius likewise shewing his alliance to have been only temporary. Tacitus applied the expression ‘ foedus et amicitia ’ to the relations of the Parthian kings, while by Appian and Dio ‘ friendship ’ is all that is mentioned in connexion with many kings of widely distant periods.

(2) The term ‘friend and ally’ was applied to kings in the second century B.C. and onwards with increasing frequency.

(a) We see from the example of Tigranes and Dio’s language about Ariovistus that the award of the title was followed by the enrolment of the king’s name upon the lists of friends and of allies,

(b) It is clear from the references of Dio to Phar-naces, Polemo, and Roles, supported by clear statements of Tacitus in connexion with Ptolemy of Mauretania, and of Livy in respect of Vermina, that the title was given as a reward for services, and was an honour to be earned by loyal clientship.

(c) Thirdly, it appears to have been also conferred in the recognition of a king’s succession (v. § 15, on Ptolemy Auletes), or as a confirmation of the position of a king whether restored to his kingdom after defeat (e.g. Tigranes), or newly set up by a Roman gener, (e.g. Pharnaces, Ariobarzanes, Cleopatra and Ptolem §§ 15, 26). _

The nature of the title is seen especially from tl second of the above deductions (b). A king was calle ‘ ally ’ for having helped in the past, not by virtue of standing alliance binding Rome and himself mutual and equally. His name is entered on the ‘formu sociorum,’ and by that act not only is he thanked fi past services but Rome professes her willingness to u! him in future. His acceptance of the title therefoi puts his services at Rome’s disposal, but we must n< infer that those of Rome were necessarily at his dispose This inequality in the matter of obligations will 1 discussed shortly.

Since the nature of the title is thus established, it natural to find it applied in course of time to all cliei kings individually and collectively.

(3) Since a king who had been ‘ called friend ar ally ’ could claim henceforth to enjoy ‘ friendship ar alliance ’ with Rome, the second term was probably ii serted with impunity in the treaty of that king or h successor, at the first opportunity. Thus Ariarath.es I bought ‘ friendship'; he helped Rome against Persei and probably received the salutation ‘ friend and ally,’: that Ariarathes V “renewed the friendship and alliancc (Polybius). Antiochus III had a treaty of friendshij Antiochus IV is said to have renewed it when seekii recognition on his accession; he promised aid again Perseus and seems to have sent some elephants¹, and ¹ Polyaen. iv. 21.

later spoken of as ‘ friend and ally⁵².’ The case of the Numidian house, as we saw from Sallust, and that of Attalus II, as appeared from an inscription of Per-gamus, seem to shew that the treaty was not always altered by the insertion of the term ‘ alliance.’

The third result then will be that where we find treaties of ‘ friendship and alliance ’ mentioned as existing between Rome and the kings, we must infer that such treaties only bound Rome to friendly interest, and put those who sought them on a footing of clientship, not of strict alliance.

We found that this conclusion was supported (a) by the feet that a transition is so easily made in the narrative from ‘ friendship' to ‘ friendship and alliance ’ without any comment by the authorities. So Polybius treats the cases of Ariarathes V and Ptolemy VI, and Appian that of Mithridates VI, while in Cassius Dio Phraates who was said to have made a ‘ friendship and alliance ’ with Lucullus, yet “ renewed the friendship" with Pompey. The phraseology of Livy and Plutarch is equally uncertain.

('b) The help given by Rome was not usually of an active nature. She did not trouble to enforce her mandates except where her own interest was much involved. In many cases she did not interfere at all. The appeals to her, as for instance that of Alexander Balas, shew their nature that the terms of the treaties did not bi her to assist. When Rome granted aid, she could cla to do so as one who was “ not accustomed to forsake 1 friends¹.”

(c) The help given by those kings who were rec< nised by Rome was theoretically voluntary, as example that given by Deiotarus, Masinissa, and Hier It was not the outcome of the terms of an alliance.

§ 29. Though it has just been said that the h( rendered to Rome by the kings was in theory volunta yet a king, who consented to be called the friend a ally of a vastly superior power, found it difficult to ] fuse assistance when it was requested, whereas t superior power by reason of its strength did not under the same necessity of lending its assistan< Rome therefore, while choosing to assume that the kin would upon occasion put themselves at her servi under penalty of her displeasure, could not be compell to assist in turn. When a king, then, accepted frc Rome the title ‘ friend and ally,’ he accepted therewi a position of inferiority. It is therefore natural that should find that kings were generally recognised on as ‘ friends ’ until after the battle of Pydna, in 168 B. when Rome’s power became paramount in the Medite ranean, and then accepted with increasing frequen the additional title ‘ ally,’ as motives of interest necessity compelled them to acquiesce in a positi<

¹ Caes. B. G. i. 33, 2; 35, 4; 43, 8. For the nature of the Rom aid and instances v. §§ 60, 88, 90, inf.

subordinate to Rome. Thus it is only in decrees or inscriptions after this date that we find the full title ‘ friendship and alliance ’ applied to the treaties with kings, whereas Masinissa and Perseus had been recognised by the title ‘ king¹,’ Antiochus III, Ariarathes IV and Ptolemy VI acknowledged as ‘ friends ’ and Philip received peace without any such title of recognition². When the double title is applied to Hiero and the ‘ friends ’ of the third century B.C. the authorities are late as Appian, and they draw a false analogy from the practice of later times, or use the title in a different or non-technical sense.

§ 30. We have already distinguished the temporary alliance as having no influence on the permanent relations of a king with Rome, but as simply earning for the king ¹ friendship.’ This equal or temporary alliance was the rule when Rome so needed assistance that she could not but consent for a time to a footing of equality, as in her first dealings with Attalus I and Masinissa. Bocchus had a chance of securing a temporary equality but he delayed until Rome was free from her main difficulties, and then he had to be content with a subordinate position.

The client-king’s treaty, then, was one of friendship, sometimes designated ‘ friendship and alliance.’ Nearly all the client kings helped Rome at various times, and sooner or later earned the title of honour ‘ friend and ally,’ if not by active service, at least by expressing

¹ Liv. xxx. 15, 11 ; 17, 10; xl. 58, 9 ; xli. 24, 6. On this confirmation of a king’s sovereignty v. § 40 f.

their subservience and readiness to help. Since tl title was then also employed in recognising the pow of a new king, it is thus explained how the kin; though unbound in most cases by any definite trea of offensive and defensive alliance, and though she\ to be in reality simply ‘ amici ’ with a treaty ¹ amicitia,’ came to be designated 'first ‘ reges socii atqi amici,’ and finally ‘ reges socii.’

§ 31. Beneath that vague terminology which has just been discussed, and those titles which outwardly suggested equality, there was a very real subordination of the weaker ‘ friend ’ to the stronger. This subordination or clientship must, as has been said above, be deduced from occasional acts and functions. It was of a ‘ de facto ’ nature and developed in most cases gradually. Thus in the terms of the several ‘ foedera ’ between kings and the Roman people which have come down to us, there is no outward expression of the real inequality of the contracting parties. The treaty with Hiero did little more than arrange for a cessation of [Hiero.) hostilities. The king was to restore captives and pay a hundred talents as indemnity¹. Diodorus² adds that he was to be recognised as lord of the Syracusans and the towns then under his sway; peace was made for fifteen years but the treaty when renewed at the end of that period stipulated everlasting friendship³.

§ 32. Philip of Macedon in 197 B.C., when h surrendered unconditionally and his kingdom ws restored to him by Flamininus, was bound by th terms of his treaty (1) to evacuate Greece, (2) to pa an indemnity, a thousand talents down, and a thousan in ten yearly instalments (not a tribute therefore), an

(3) to give up all his warships but four¹. None < these terms implies clientship or dependence, excej that the third was meant probably to restrain him froi a naval policy. Livy² adds two stipulations, the secon of which would at once make the king a client, (4) nc to keep more than five thousand armed men, nor an war-elephants, (5) not to wage war outside Macedoni without leave. Livy’s authorities however have her evidently made an error, perhaps in trying to excus Rome’s subsequent treatment of Philip and Perseui The latter frequently made war outside Macedoni without a protest from the senate³. Niese points ou that Philip had no war-elephants. Nor can Livy account be accepted in contradiction to that of Polybiui Plutarch⁴ moreover, while differing from Polybius as t the number of ships which Philip was to keep, agree with him in the omission of the last two stipulations.

§ 33. A short time after this treaty Philip is sai to have been invited to make ‘ friendship and alliance with Rome, to shew that Antiochus III need not loo to him for support⁵. This friendship and allianc Perseus is said to have renewed upon his accession Unless therefore this renewal was made conditions

upon the observance by Perseus of the terms of the peace of 197 B.C., those terms did not affect his position at all. Livy¹ however makes the Roman envoys claim that Perseus like his father was bound not to wage war without Rome’s consent, and in his whole account confuses the treaty of peace with the later treaty of friendship which he says was made by Philip and renewed by Perseus. Even supposing that there had been this binding clause in the treaty of peace, it is very doubtful whether it would have applied to Perseus.

Since the evidence has been shewn to be against the existence of such a clause, we know of nothing that expresses in definite terms the clientship of Perseus.

§ 34. The terms of the peace with Antiochus III (Antio-of Syria, who surrendered to Rome in 190 B.C., provided ^chus according to Polybius and Livy² (1) that there should be everlasting friendship between Rome and the king;

(2) that Antiochus should evacuate Asia west of Mount Taurus, abstain from war in Europe, and be confined by sea within the promontory Sarpedon and the river Calycadnus; (3) that he should pay an indemnity, part down, and part in ten instalments; (4) should surrender his elephants and warships, and keep no elephants and only ten warships in future. Corn also was to be given to the Roman army while in Asia, and hostages were to be sent to Rome. The second stipulation was a limitation placed upon his foreign policy, but merely to preserve intact the sphere of Rome’s influence. Antiochus was to abstain as from another’s territory.

of the indemnity. If Rome detained Demetrius, son c Seleucus, after it was paid, she did it to oblige Antic chus IY and allow him to keep control without a riva while he remained loyal. The fourth term however wa a restriction put upon the development of his resources He was to be cut off from a naval policy and to b weakened in his land forces. Since the friendship wa to exist so long as he kept the terms intact¹, he wa so far dependent upon Rome, as without their consen he might not build a fleet or strengthen his army witl elephants.

So long however as he did this, and abstained fron aggression in a westerly direction, he was perfectb independent of Rome. The treaty also provided fo. arbitration in disputes between himself and Rome’: allies², but this was necessary to make the abov< restrictions effectual. If an ally of Rome assailed him he was free to repel his attack³. This last clause is worthy of notice. Conquered Carthage did not receivt this freedom but had to refer in each case to Rome Antiochus was free from this severe restriction whicl brought the republic of Carthage to the verge o: slavery.

Since friendship with Rome is in this case includec in and dependent upon the terms of peace, Seleucus, ir renewing the friendship in 187 B.C., was doubtless bound by all the terms of the above treaty, unless il were otherwise provided. In particular he had tc

⁹ For an instance see Liv. xxxix. 22, 9 (dispute between Eumenef and Antiochus said to have been settled by L. Scipio).

§ 35. Tigranes of Armenia in 66 B.C. surrendered (Tigra-unconditionally but received back his kingdom on^nes^ certain conditions⁶. The only expressed limitation to his sovereignty was the condition of leaving his kingdom to an heir named by Rome, his son Tigranes, and even this lapsed in consequence of the latter’s disgrace and execution. The other conditions were the surrender of

The ‘foedus’ first made with Attalus I, which, as has been pointed out, differed from the other ‘ foedera ’ above mentioned, in that it lasted only during the war against Philip, need not here be quoted. It was essentially an alliance on equal terms, and provided for the manner of cooperation during the war, and what share each should have of the booty.

§ 36. We cannot find then any expression of clientship in those ‘ foedera ’ and agreements of which the terms have come down to us². The only such expression found in any treaty of friendship or alliance is that which occurs in the treaty with the Gaditanians and other commonwealths, “ Maiestatem populi Romani comiter conservanto³.” Cicero has much to say upon this stipulation. Besides rejecting his opponent’s explanation that ‘ comiter ’ is an archaic form of ‘communiter,’ he says that the imperative ‘conservanto’ represents an order, not a request. And “when,” he adds, “ the majesty of one people is bidden to be preserved, and no mention is made of the other, that people whose majesty is defended by the sanction of a treaty, is placed upon a higher footing.’' It is in the first place therefore an expression of clientship. He further states that “ this clause does not occur in every

² The treaty with Agron’s infant son, king of Illyria, may also be mentioned. He was to be a friend of the Romans so long as he did not seek to acquire land or power outside his present boundaries (App. Illyr. 7).

³ pro Balb. § 35, 37 (Cicero contends that the Gaditanian treaty was not really a ‘ foedns ’).

treaty,” implying that it was not uncommon. We know that it occurs in that with the Aetolians of

187 B.C.⁵⁴ But it is not safe to infer that it appeared in a treaty with any king. It is absent from those made with Philip and Antiochus, although they were humbled about the same time as the Aetolians. The treaties with the Ptolemies, renewed by each successor in turn, dated back from a time when Rome was certainly not in a position to claim such a superiority. Nor were the first relations of Masinissa and Eumenes with Rome compatible with such a claim upon the part of their friend and ally. Ariarathes IV of Cappadocia, and Prusias I of Bithynia, it is true, adopted of necessity a more humble attitude, but there is no mention of such a clause in connexion with these kings⁵⁵. What happened in the case of the ‘ foedera ’ granted to newly made kings in the first century B.C. by the demagogues and triumvirs is uncertain⁵⁶, but those who simply received the title ‘ friend and ally' without a treaty were not exposed to such an express stipulation.

greatly in other ways. Cicero says that but for the treaties.) addition of the above clause there was nothing in the Gaditanian compact but the stipulation that there should be ‘ pia et aeterna pax.’ In other treaties with republics, e.g. the Foedus Cassianum⁵⁷, and that with the Astypalaeans⁵, the terms of peace and friendship are

expressed at much greater length. We cannot therefore form any general conclusion as to the contents of the treaties of friendship with the kings; they may have varied considerably in contents and length. It may however be suggested that sometimes they contained merely the clause providing for friendship or friendship and alliance, with the addition of such stipulations as that the territorial rights of each party should be respected by the other, that no hostile acts should occur nor succour be given by one to the enemies of the other¹; that in other cases, in view of the desire to secure merchants and traders, arrangements were made for the security of that class, and for the settlement of disputes as regards contracts between the subjects of each country. Such arrangements we find in the Foedus Cassianum, in a Carthaginian treaty², and in one with Thisbae³, and the large number of Italians present in various kingdoms for trading purposes makes it likely that similar provisions stood also in treaties with kings, e.g. with those of Numidia⁴.

§ 38. We next come to the principal acts and functions which constituted these ‘ de facto' clientships. They were as follow:

¹ Cf. App. Hisp. 69-70 (treaty with Viriathus), Polyb. in. 22, 25 (those with Carthage), and v. Append. A, i. 3 f.

(c) Rome sends commissioners to inspect the relations of the kings with their neighbours, and examine their attitude towards herself. (This became unnecessary when Rome gained territory in their neighbourhood, as in 133 B.C. in Asia.)

(3) Obedience to the summons (evocatio) of a Roman general, who demanded the king’s presence at his quarters. (This custom was of late growth, arising in the last few years of the Republic.)

(4) Though no regular tribute was exacted from the kings by the senate, the irregular exactions to which they were liable were not the least prominent feature of their clientship.

In declaring her own obligations as protector Rome seems to have been content with the profession that she did not allow her friends and allies to suffer any loss or injury. How far she was serious in this profession will be discussed later.

§ 39. We have seen that in the second century B.C. and onwards a king, who accepted the title ‘ friend ’ or ‘ friend and ally’ of Rome, placed himself in the position of a client, and was expected to help Rome in emergencies ; that even if he had a treaty with Rome, this treaty implied the same relationship; that both title and treaty could be granted by Rome upon the first accession of a king, whether the kingdom had been inherited by him in the ordinary way or entrusted to him by a

Roman general⁵⁸. Whereas therefore in the third century B.C. certain kings (e.g. the Ptolemies) formed friendships with Rome without parting with any of their freedom, it was quite a different matter, if, when the term had come- to bear a stereotyped meaning and implied special obligations, every king who had regard for his security, sought Rome’s friendship above all others as the main guarantee of his sovereignty. We are not confronted merely with the case of kings renewing their predecessors’ relations with a foreign power, but we have presented to us the phenomenon of all the crowned heads in the Mediterranean coasts feeling themselves secure upon the thrones, to which they have succeeded, only when their authority has been recognised by the predominant power.

Hiero’s⁵⁹ sovereignty over the Syracusans was recognised expressly by a clause in the treaty of peace, but generally the recognition was conveyed in a treaty of friendship, or else by the process called ‘appellatio⁶⁰,’ and in many cases it was awaited with evident anxiety and courted in the most humble language. Perseus in 178 B.C., Antiochus IV in 175 B.C., Ptolemy Philometor in 171 B.C. sent to renew the friendship that had existed with their respective predecessors². Antiochus, as one who had seized the throne in the absence of the heir, then a hostage at Rome, accompanied his request with the promise that he would never come short in any act of service²- Ariarathes V of Cappadocia in

164 B.C., when he obtained the renewal of the friendship which his father had been compelled to 'buy, “ thought his sovereignty secure because he had won the goodwill of Rome, and sacrificed thank-offerings to the gods⁶¹.” Demetrius I, who seized the Syrian throne in the senate’s despite, in 162 B.C., could only extort the promise that “he would gain friendship, if he did everything in his power to satisfy the senate¹.” Alexander Balas, again, before attempting to eject Demetrius took care first to secure Rome’s sanction, which was given him as “the son of a king, friend and ally¹.” Mithri-dates VI also appeared to have renewed the friendship and alliance that had existed with his father.

Another feature of the recognition is that it was frequently secured beforehand for the reigning king’s heir. Attalus II was thus introduced to the senate by Eumenes with that object, and Attalus in turn sent his nephew “ to renew (on his own account) the friendship that had been with his father.” Ariarathes V and Prusias II likewise sent their sons to Rome professedly for the same purpose⁶² It was a variation of that precaution when Masinissa entrusted to Scipio the division of the kingship between his three sons, and when, in the last century of the Republic, Ptolemy Auletes made the senate guardian of his children and executor of his will².

g 40. There is still surer evidence of the clientship ‘Calling of the kings in the other form of recognition, whereby ‘

the senate claimed the power even of confirming or bestowing the royal title. That this bestowal had the same effect as the grant of the title ‘ friend and ally ’ is shewn by a comparison of two passages in Polybius about Demetrius I⁶³. In several cases, e.g. those of Perseus⁶⁴ and Ariovistus², both titles seem to have been conceded. We hear of the Syrian usurper Tryphon⁶⁵ that “ he was anxious to confirm his sovereignty by a decree of the senate,” in which presumably he would have been addressed as king. Perhaps the most striking instance is that of Masinissa⁶⁶, who, although he had regained the sovereignty of his tribe and had cooperated with Rome, was “ called king by Scipio,” and then “sought that the royal name and the other benefits of Scipio might be confirmed by the senate⁶⁷.” Further, as the title ‘friend and ally’ could be repeated by way of honour in the case of a king already ‘ called friend ’ by the senate, so one who had been already recognised as king might, like Ptolemy of Mauretania under Augustus, receive the title once more as a compliment for services he had rendered⁶⁸.

Even the repetition of the name in a decree was thought to bring additional honour, though it had only occurred incidentally. Thus Cicero speaks of the senate having frequently called Deiotarus king in the most honourable decrees⁶⁹

§ 41. The necessity of this formal recognition is Causes of not explained merely by the predominance of the Republic in the Mediterranean. Even if the desire thU Recog-to stand well with so overshadowing a power were sufficient to account for the regular request made by successive kings for the renewal of friendly relations, it is yet to be explained why the royal title should have been thought to possess full authenticity when it was conferred by the senate. The necessity of the recognition lay also in the special character of the kingships of the period, and further in the notions entertained by the Romans with respect to sovereignty and the ‘foedus.’

A special feature of these kingships was their (a) (Na-absolutism. The successors of Alexander held their ^editer-

Pergamum, Bithynia and Cyrene could bequeath their kingdoms to Rome when they were without an heir of their own body. In this and other matters the people are not considered; the only person with whom relations can be established is the master of the country and people, and the exception of Cappadocia noted by Strabo¹ only confirms the general practice. The tribal kings of Numidia seem to have been similarly independent of their subjects. Masinissa bequeathed to his three sons not only his private possessions but the sovereignty of the country, and it was as the adopted son and heir of Micipsa that Jugurtha received his share of the kingdom.

There could therefore be no continuity of relations between the countries of these kings and foreign powers such as is possible through the modern idea of kingship, namely that the king merely represents the

“Egypt was for the Ptolemies a great, landed estate from which as much profit as possible is extracted, and the submissive inhabitants of which are well treated, because the more ready they are to work, the greater the return from the property. The Ptolemies viewed their rule over Egypt from the standpoint of individual right.” Even in Asia, where the Seleucids governed on different lines, these sovereigns, says Holm (p. 118), “ sought to play the part of absolute rulers.” The cities of Greek type founded and encouraged by them in such numbers did not affect the relations of the king to the whole empire. Their independence was confined to internal affairs, and though they could insist on this with the boldness of Greeks, they had no voice in the king’s disposal of the country as a whole. At the same time it is not denied that these communities were a disintegrating force and contributed to the break-up of the empire.

In Bithynia even as early as 250 B.C. we find King Nicomedes leaving his kingdom by will, and requesting, not the people of Bithynia, but certain neighbouring powers to see that his will is carried ont (Holm, Gk. II. lv. ch. 9, p. 199).

people, so that his death does not interrupt the existing treaties between his people and another. In the ancient theory, when the lord of the country died, and his heir succeeded, the latter might be liable to pay debts incurred by his father, as Seleucus IV and Antiochus IV discharged the indemnity which the senate laid upon Antiochus III, but, as a perfectly irresponsible being, he could repudiate any other engagements contracted by his predecessor. Perseus¹ thus claimed that “the treaty concluded with his father had nothing to do with himself,” and he would have been in the right, had he not confessedly renewed the treaty of friendship upon his accession.

Another feature of the kingship of Alexander’s (6) (Title successors is the manner in which the royal title was ^not separate for the most part from any territorial basis, tonal.) Holm² has pointed out that the Diadochi, in order to secure the position they had won by force, propagated the doctrine that j3a<ri\eia was not necessarily hereditary but belonged to the ablest; that, on the other hand, when no less than nine generals had established themselves with the title, they again made use of the hereditary claim, and all professed to be descended from the Macedonian house. The sovereignty therefore of these kings was that universal sovereignty of Alexander the Great, claimed in full by each ruler, though he possessed only a fragment of Alexander’s empire. How far from being territorial in the eyes of the Greeks was _ Alexander’s sovereignty appears from the absence of any special Greek word for empire, the idea that a

large territory could be under a single government beinj foreign to their notions¹- It is seen also in the circum stance that two could bear the royal name at the sam< time in the same country, as the son of Antiochus II! bore it with his father². So in Sicily Gelon was callec king and reigned jointly with his father Hiero³.

Since the kings of our period were in most cases descended from those who had seized the title foi themselves without any hereditary justification, whc moreover did not possess the title as a territorial one but, having possessed their territories some time before they assumed the title, could only regard the latter as an adjunct to their position, it is not strange to fine that they were prepared to look for confirmation ol their kingship to a foreign power. Even if the continuous succession to the sovereignty by two 01 three generations of the same family might be expected to have removed in the descendant’s mind any need foi such a confirmation, yet the character of that kingship was the same in essence at the beginning of the second century B.C. as at the beginning of the third, viz. it was absolute, and the king did not derive his title from the vote of a council or popular assembly but assumed it as an adjunct to the inheritance. To gain therefore from a power as great as Rome a formal address by his royal name was valuable to him, not only as a moral support against the aggressions of neighbouring peoples, but as a guarantee of his proper succession and dignity in the

eyes of his people, and thereby a deterrent to rival claimants. Nor were such rival claimants infrequent.

Whether their claims to be related to the late king were true or false, the personal nature of the kingship, and the fact that the people, having no share in the government, cared little who ruled them, provided that he was not too harsh, often enabled them to prove formidable to the legitimate heir. We may again extend the argument to Masinissa and his descendants, whose kingship was above shewn to be similarly absolute, and in whose experience rivals were just as formidable.

§ 42. It was inherent therefore in the nature of those kingships that every sovereign on his accession should seek not only to be recognised by Rome as friend and ally, but to be addressed by the royal title, and that both forms of recognition became so common that other kings, even the German chief, Ariovistus, became subject to the same necessity. We have so far discussed -the question from the standpoint of the kings. From the Roman standpoint too the recognition seems to have been equally necessary.

About the duration of the Roman ‘ foedus ’ the (c) (Dura-evidence that is forthcoming has been generally divided, according as it related to a treaty of ‘friendship' or one 7^0C(te-’) of ‘ alliance⁷¹.’ In the case of the kings the difficulty is increased by the fact that a nominal alliance was frequently coupled with friendship, and now inserted, now omitted, without any apparent rule. Treaties of

friendship made with republics were permanent (ei airavra rov xpovov)¹. Three references shew that thi applied also to treaties with kings² A grant of th Roman friendship to a private individual was generall; more than permanent; it was hereditary. But . special clause was inserted securing the grant and th privileges attaching to it in favour of the children am descendants³. On the other hand no such clause was so far as we know, inserted in any of the treaties wit! kings, and we find the son of Antiochus III sending ti renew the friendship that had been made with hi father ‘ for all time.’ And if stress may be laid b; analogy upon the relations between Tarquin and thi Latins, we may cite the reply of the latter to Tarquin to the effect that the treaty made with his grandfathe: had lapsed at that monarch’s death, because no clause had been inserted extending the arrangement to his posterity⁴.

When we pass to treaties of alliance we art reminded by Paulus⁶ that " an alliance can be formec ‘ in perpetuity,’ i.e. while the contracting parties live, oi for a time.” This is followed later by the statemenl that “ no alliance can be contracted ‘ for ever⁶.’ ” A republican government however may be said never tc die, so long as the state exists, so that we find thal those treaties⁷ of alliance which are not made as i

² Polyb. xxi. 45, 1 (Antiochus III); Diod. xxvn. 8 (Masinissa) Zonar. vm. 16, 2.

⁷ In this section the word ‘ treaty ’ will only refer to ‘foedera,’ th< strictest type of Roman compact. The agreements made with all tli<

temporary expedient continue in existence for some centuries when they are contracted with a republic.

The treaty with the Latins¹, for instance, which contains provisions for alliance, prescribes peace so long as heaven and earth continue. The treaty of alliance with Rhodes instituted in 167 B.C.² is appealed to by Cassius after 125 years³. So the treaty with the Astypalaeans institutes peace, friendship, and alliance for all time⁴- On the other hand, in the case of kings it is obvious, if we follow Paulus, that the ‘ foedus,’ so far as it can be called one of alliance, terminated with the life of the king, and did not extend to his posterity, but needed renewal⁵. The treaties with the kings were shewn to be treaties of friendship, in which the term alliance was frequently inserted, but without being supported by clauses providing for that alliance. Whether of friendship therefore or of friendship and alliance, they seem to have been regarded by the Romans as terminating with the life of the king.

§ 43. Again, this theory of recognition is closely (d) (The related also to the nature of the kingship, as it existed kingship.) in Rome. It was elective, and the ‘ imperium ’ had to be conferred upon each successor by a vote of the curies before he could hold office⁶, just as, under the Empire,

kings, whom Rome met in the first century of her expansion, were of that type. An attempt is made to shew that though ‘Sacrosanct⁵ the ‘ foedus,’ whatever were its terms, naturally was ended with the king’s life,

all the powers of the emperor had to be conferred upon him by a special law. The late emperor’s heir succeeded to his property, but not to his ‘ imperium ’ until that law had been passed. The ‘imperium’ is a thing apart, incapable of being bequeathed. Rome cannot therefore recognise a king’s heir and successor as king, merely because he has inherited and succeeded to his father’s domain. With the latter succession she does not profess to interfere save indirectly; it is to the former that she claims to be able to withhold her consent. Thus she could leave Demetrius I in possession ol Syria as his inheritance, but at the same time refuse to call him king¹. The refusal of course did ultimately act upon Demetrius’s safe possession of the inheritance, in that it encouraged a rival claimant to come forward, who, having procured his recognition by Rome, expelled Demetrius with foreign aid. Again, under the Empire Herod Archelaus was careful to refuse the title ‘ king,' until he had received it from Augustus². Augustus in fact allowed him to retain a third part of the old kingdom as one of the three surviving sons of Herod, but withheld the title ‘king,’ “until he should have deserved it³.” That the Romans, in contemplating the authority of the kings of the Mediterranean, mentally referred to their own ‘imperium,’ appears from the custom of presenting them with all the insignia of their highest magistrates. As the title was shewn to be non-territorial from the Greek standpoint, so it will appear that the Romans mainly so regarded it, because

their own ‘ imperium ’ was likewise of a non-territorial nature⁷². It is true that Deiotarus is called ‘ rex Armeniae ’ by Caesar, and that the grant of the royal name was often accompanied by an extension of territory⁷³, but on the other hand, apart from the practice, illustrated above, of separating the title from the inheritance, we may compare the methods by which Rome used the name. On the principle that the power of ‘imperium’ was indivisible, but could be conferred in its entirety upon two or more without diminishing its force, Rome could, as arbitrator, cause the two Ptolemies, Philometor and Physcon, to reign in Alexandria simultaneously, each with full and undiminished sovereignty⁷⁴. So Scipio could divide the power of Masinissa between his three sons, without dividing the territory, in such a way that each received full sovereignty and the title king, but confined himself to certain departments of the state executive. The son of Deiotarus of Galatia, and Ptolemy of Mauretania were each called king in his father’s lifetime⁷⁵. Deiotarus, Yonones of Parthia, Antiochus Philopappus kept the title after losing their kingdoms⁷⁶ JBrogitarus and Contoniatus seem to have received the title without an addition of territory⁶. Ariobarzanes and Deiotarus gained honour according to Cicero by the mere repetition of the name in the ‘senatus consulta⁷⁷.’ Even Ariovistus, outside the Roman sphere of influence, received it in confirmation of an authority that he had long possessed⁷⁸, and Masinissa, when for some time already he had been in unchallenged possession of his ancestral territory, laid stress upon obtaining the ‘ royal name.’ as well as the extension of territory granted by Scipio⁷⁹. Perseus when captive, it is true, “had to forget the name of king,” but probably not because he had lost his territory, but because by war he had broken the treaty, which had confirmed his sovereignty⁴. Certainly Tigranes, even while ‘ alxfj.d\coro<t,’ had been addressed by the title ‘king of kings,’ probably before his kingdom was restored to him⁵.

§ 44. When Rome therefore came into contact with these kings, the inherent nature of their sovereignty coincided in its effects with the Roman conceptions of kingship. The renewal of ‘foedera’ was necessary from the standpoint of the kings because, though their kingdoms and in some measure their kingship were inheritable, the absolute and personal nature of their power prevented a perfect continuity of relations. From the Roman point of view a fresh recognition was necessary because the successor, before assuming the full position occupied by his predecessor, had to receive his sovereignty by a special measure, and was not until then king in the proper sense. Our own modern theory of kingship would not only have removed the necessity

for recognition but have secured a continuity of rela-. tions. In the first place the king being viewed as a ‘ corporation sole,’ the kingly office may be said to be permanent, and the individual holder is lost sight of in it⁸⁰. There is no interruption caused by death. The eldest son is ‘ ipso facto ’ king and is proclaimed immediately. In the second place, the king not being the absolute lord of the country, relations can be established with his people and thus be continuous.

§ 45. Every king then upon his accession, if he Gircnm-wished to have behind him the support of Rome, sought Attending recognition in one of three ways. If his predecessors ‘Recogni-had made a treaty with Rome, he sent to seek for a ' renewal of that treaty. If no such treaty existed (and not all kings received such a privilege), he asked to be called friend, or friend and ally. Or, again, he requested the senate to call him king by a decree of honour. No hard and fast limits can be assigned to the use of each method. At first, however, the treaty was the usual way of initiating friendship⁸¹. When a request is made for friendship, ‘ foedus et amicitia ’ is the usual expression employed, though we have seen that later custom first added, and then sometimes substituted, the expression ‘ societas.’

Capitol and was attended with such formalities as the slaughter of a sow in the forum and the pronouncement of an ancient formula by the ‘ fetiales⁸².’ These old formalities afterwards fell into disuse and were only revived by the emperor Claudius. It is almost certain, however that, in the second century B.C. and onwards, kings were sometimes merely called ‘ king and friend ’ or ‘ friend and ally ’ by the senate without the additional safeguard of a treaty, and that the publication of the decree containing the title took the place of the latter, as in the case of Hyrcanus, when his position had been settled by Caesar⁸³. Thus there is no mention of a ‘ foedusin the cases of Ariovistus and of Herod, only of decrees of the senate, though the relations of the one, and the institution of the other as king, are described at length and with care by Caesar and Josephus respectively⁸⁴. Cicero does not mention a renewal of treaty with Ariobarzanes III, but only frequent ‘ appellations ’ by the name of king in the decrees for his safety. Moreover Cicero’s communication to Ariobarzanes, viz. the decree by which he himself as proconsul was empowered to look after the king’s safety, was evidently in place of the more formal recognition⁸⁵. In the civil war the senate recognised Juba, but manifestly without a treaty, for the latter required to be sanctioned by a law of the people⁸⁶. Conquered kings also, restored to their thrones, were

sometimes bidden to reign on certain conditions without a treaty of peace being granted. This fortune befell Tigranes, who nevertheless was consoled by Pompey because he had gained the Roman friendship⁸⁷.

The kings who were acknowledged without a treaty were in much the same position as ‘ civitates sine foedere liberae et immunes.’ Those who gained a treaty were not called ‘ foederati⁸⁸,’ probably, as Bohn suggests, because in their case the ‘ foedus ’ was temporary in so far as it ended with their death.

Between the use of the title ‘king’ and that of ‘ friend ’ in the recognition formalities we have seen that there was no essential difference. The full title ‘ friend and ally ’ however, it has been suggested, was of later use, as an expression of the clientship of kings and the services which they came to be expected to render Rome⁸⁹.

There are two instances in which Rome allowed the Title title ‘ king of kings ’ to be borne by her clients, those of Tigranes and of the Bosporan kings⁹⁰. The latter instance belongs to the Empire, and the title was borne in virtue of the tribal kings under the Bosporan’s sway. Tigranes probably did not continue to bear it officially, but Pompey after his victory, in accordance with the Roman principle ' parcere subiectis,’ honoured him

with it while a captive, though he refused it to the Parthian, whom he wished to humble.

It may be mentioned that when certain disturbances occurred in Rome, states, whose relations had lately been affected by wars in their neighbourhood, sent to Rome to have their treaties and privileges confirmed. This would certainly be the case rather with cities and republican states (as for instance those of Asia after Sulla’s victory⁹¹), but a dynast also, the Jew Hyrcanus, after Caesar’s death likewise petitioned that Caesar’s decrees might be laid up in the treasury²

The acknowledgment of a king at first rested with the senate. Demetrius I failed to obtain it from that body, though he had obtained it from the commissioners³ Later the people also granted the title, encouraged by the tribunes⁴ If a ‘ foedus ’ were made, we have said above that a law passed by senate and people was necessary.

The practice followed by the emperors of placing the diadem on the king’s head, when granting him the royal dignity, was not established under the Republic. The nearest approach to it was the act of Pompey, who, when Tigranes laid aside the diadem as suppliant, replaced it on his head as a sign that he was to be restored to his place⁵. The act of Lepidus, as guardian of young Ptolemy V, represented on the well-known coin, is legendary⁶. The presence of ‘diademata’ in the passage of Dionysius⁷ about gifts is a mistake, for

the diadem is nowhere else mentioned as sent to kings, though the gifts sent are frequently enumerated.

§ 46. In connexion with the present discussion Gifts. may be mentioned also the senate’s custom of sending gifts to their friends among the kings. It is true that gifts were sent generally only to a king of tried loyalty who had done Rome service¹, but in the case of Ariovistus at least, of Ptolemy VI, and seemingly of Masinissa², they accompanied the first formal recognition of the royal dignity, and the loyalty of the recipient had not been tested. These gifts were originally intended as an honour to kings ‘ sui iuris,’ and did not in any way imply the superiority of Rome⁸. But the ascendancy of the giver could not fail to be emphasized, when the king humbly petitioned for a renewal of such attentions, as Antiochus of Commagene begged for the “ renewal of his toga praetexta⁴.”

The full king (rex) received the ‘ insignia' of triumphing Roman magistrates, the embroidered toga and tunic (at other times the ‘ toga purpurea ’), the sella curulis and ivory staff, a gold crown, a gold dish, and sometimes military gifts, horses in trappings, arms, and military cloak⁵. A gold seal, and gold and silver

" Dionys. v. 35 (Porsena received them). Appian (Pun. 32) calls them ‘ xapioTijpia Trjs o-vti/iaxlas. ’

⁵ Liv. xxx. 15 (when presenting the gifts ‘toga picta’ etc., Scipio says, ‘ ‘ neque magnificentius quicquam triumpho apud Romanos neque triumphantibus ampliorem eo ornatu esse Cf. also Liv. xxvii. 4, xxx. 17, xlii. 14 ; Diod. xxxi.' 28 ; Caes. B. G. I. 43, 4; Tac. Ann.

iv. 26. In Tac. Hist. i. 54, n. 8, ‘iunetae dextrae,’or a pairof clasped hands made of gold or silver, are mentioned as a symbolic gift, but not in reference to kings.

vessels were also sent to Masinissa at various times¹. The ‘reguli’ received only the ‘toga praetexta,’ the garb of the curule magistrate when not triumphing. A distinction was in this way made between king Syphax and the ‘ reguli ’ in Africa². Antiochus of Commagene, though entitled ‘ rex,’ received the ‘ praetexta,’ because of his unimportance³. The custom seems to have fallen into abeyance for many years before the consulship of Caesar, who revived it in favour of Ariovistus⁴, perhaps as profitable for his pocket. Before this, the last mention of it is in the case of Ariarathes V (160 B.C.). It again fell into abeyance however, for Tacitus refers to it as obsolete, when he speaks of its revival in honour of Ptolemy of Mauretania⁶. the^Re-^ § 47. Having discussed the circumstances of the cognition.’ ‘ recognition,’ and the necessity for it, we must shew its effect upon the position of the kings. Nothing contributed more to their increasing dependence upon Rome than this necessity attending every succeeding heir of securing the Roman goodwill and countenance. There fell to Rome in consequence three main prerogatives. In the first place, when disputes occurred as to the succession, appeals were made to her as the only possible arbitrator. Secondly, she was enabled to threaten the reigning monarch with the transference of her favour to another member of his house. Thirdly, she reserved to herself the right of withholding her recognition with a view to the annexation of the kingdom.

In order to understand the first of these powers Settlement reference must be made once more to the nature 0i°_s{^g_ssi0n these ancient kingships. Since the people were not % Home. regarded as the source of the royal power, they had no claim to arbitrate between rival claimants either through a vote of the majority or by any other peaceable means. They could support this or that claimant by arms, and the one who had the stronger following drove out the other, but his claim was not thereby established, nor his position permanently secured. How long such a struggle could continue without the strong intervention of an outside power is seen in the. history of Syria¹ from 118 B.C. onwards, and of Parthia and Armenia over a century later. On the other hand when Rome was willing to arbitrate (and nothing suited her policy better), an authoritative decision was given which frequently settled the claims of the competitors as though by legal right in the eyes of all concerned. She thus divided Cappadocia between Ariarathes Y and Orophernes, the Egyptian sovereignty between Ptolemy Philometor and Ptolemy Physcon, Numidia between Adherbal and Jugurtha² In all these cases her decision was accepted, and held good until fresh quarrels broke the peace, and fresh influences came into play. Other occasions upon which Rome intervened were when Sulla established Alexander II, son of Ptolemy Soter, on the throne of Egypt in 81 B.C.³, and when Caesar, on behalf of the Roman people and senate, settled the succession in 48 B.C. after the death of Ptolemy Auletes, that king having named the senate

executor of his will and specially requested it to accept the heirs named therein¹ Rome was, as has been said, the only possible arbitrator, not only because of the authority that accrued to her from the practice of conferring the royal title at the request of the kings, but because she alone had the strength requisite to support her decisions. Whether she was willing to use her strength is another matter, and here she was often dominated by her own selfish policy. Divisions in a strong kingdom were always to her advantage, tending to make the country more and more subject, and though it may be said that the senate was far too preoccupied to restore peace in every family struggle, it is noteworthy that her decision was almost invariably in favour of dividing the inheritance, even though she had previously confirmed it in the possession of one², and thereby she encouraged petitioners; further, that when her decision was disregarded, she frequently remained content to see the strife continue, in the hope, probably, that it would weaken the country’s resources. There seems to have been in her mind in these as in Italian questions the maxim ‘ Divide et impera.’ Her mode of arbitration was doubtless influenced also by certain principles of the Roman law of inheritance. In the first place “ the Roman idea of sovereignty became very lax owing to the part played in its transmission by testament and adoption³.” Thus it was through her influence that Micipsa adopted Jugurtha and left to him as to his own sons a share in the kingdom⁴. Later, the emperors made constant use of succession by adoption. Further,

in Roman law no regard was paid to primogeniture in wills. When the succession was ‘ab intestato,’ the children succeeded in a body¹ Moreover the identity of the individual who succeeded was only of importance in so far as he represented the family and preserved the continuity of the ‘gens’ or clan². Even a whole family or ‘ corporation ’ could inherit the sum total of rights or ‘ universitas iuris ’ which constituted an inheritance. With these ideas the Roman practice in dealing with the succession among the kings was altogether in harmony. While she respected the family succession, she had little respect for the particular individual who should succeed. Thus on the one hand, when Rome confirmed a new king in possession, stress is laid on the fact that his was an a/3%^ nrarpwa, e.g. in the case of Alexander Balas of Syria³, Nicomed'es III of Bithynia⁴, Pharnaces of Bosporus⁶. Strabo says that in Syria the Romans were ashamed to put an end to the family succession (tijv Kara <yevos ScaSo^r/v) in the line of Seleucus Nicator, since they themselves had ratified it⁶. Caesar adjudged to Mithridates of Perga-mum a tetrarchy of Galatia on the ground of his family relationship (iure gentis et cognationis)⁷. Herod of Judea was surprised at receiving the kingdom from the Romans “since their custom was to give it to those of the same family (to£<? etc tov yevov;)⁸." Augustus claims to have shewn similar consideration for the royal stock of Armenia⁹.

On the other hand, that it mattered little what individual member of the royal family succeeded appears from the readiness with which the senate divided an inheritance between two or more brothers, or transferred its favour from one to another. Ariarathes V, having succeeded his father as sole heir, had been duly recognised by the senate, but when some time after Orophernes, his half-brother, claimed the kingdom as heir, the senate had no hesitation in cutting off for him a portion of the kingdom as a separate inheritance. When Eumenes II had reigned alone for many years, the senate, as a token of displeasure against him, wished to transfer to Attalus part of his territory as a separate kingdom and was disappointed when the good sense of Attalus and his advisers led to a courteous rejection of the offer¹. In Egypt Ptolemy Physcon was raised to an equality with his brother, though the latter had been long before recognised as sole sovereign². Micipsa, as said above, would not have made Jugurtha co-heir with his sons, if he had not seen that the wishes and perhaps intentions of the senate were directed towards such a settlement³. The whole history of Syria⁴ from the death of Seleucus IV is sufficient proof in itself how careless Rome was in respect of the claims of the individual. Antiochus IV was recognised as king— though the son and heir of Seleucus was at the time in Rome—nominally on the ground of the latter’s infancy. When Demetrius came of age, and Antiochus IV had left an infant son to succeed him, Rome preferred to detain Demetrius and leave the boy upon the throne

under the care of regents. Demetrius escaped and set the boy aside. Rome was content to withhold her recognition until Demetrius should have deserved it. Meantime, as soon as a suitable rival appeared, she recognised him as the son of Antiochus IV, and blessed his enterprise. Between the two branches of the family the strife continued without any attempt on the senate’s part to effect a settlement until Tigranes annexed the country. Though Rome’s abstention was largely dictated by self-interest, it is plain that she settled the succession of the kings without respecting rights of primogeniture, and regarded not the individual but the family.

§ 48. The second of the powers which resulted to Control Rome from the practice of recognition was the control ^ng. over the conduct of any king who was compelled by his position to set any store by that recognition. He would be tractable until he had procured it, and could always be kept in fear of renunciation and of the transference of Rome’s favour to another member of the royal house if he offended his patron, the senate.

Here again, as the kingship was of a personal nature, and the king’s relations with Rome also personal, it was particularly easy for the senate without any trouble to itself to exert an influence upon his fortunes. Rome had no need to treat him as an enemy, that is, as an equal, by declaring war upon him. She could simply transfer her patronage to another member of his family and thus separate the ruler from his people. She could shew disfavour to him, while preserving good relations with the rest of the family. The latter she could regard as permanently under her influence and favour, s. 6

the ruler as temporarily so, that is, while he deserved it. While she could so easily encourage a rival without labour to herself, the reigning monarch was bound to cultivate her goodwill. The truth of this may be seen from the cases already mentioned, of Eumenes and the Syrian kings, viewed from another standpoint. Eumenes had no alternative but to submit to the most galling treatment at the hands of the Roman commissioner, who even established a court of inquiry against him in the centre of his own kingdom (165 B.C.)¹. Had Attalus been willing to dissociate himself from his brother, he would have found, at the' senate’s signal, many supporters not only among the Pergamenes, but especially among the cities which Rome had placed beneath the jurisdiction of Eumenes. The senate never took steps against Demetrius of Syria in 162 B.C. While it excited his zeal to secure recognition by leaving him some hopes of it, a hint was given to the neighbouring kings, e.g. Ariarathes, through ambassadors, not to form any ties with him, that he might be isolated. This was quite sufficient to encourage a rival claimant in the person of Alexander Balas. The senate had evidently been awaiting such a contingency, and recognised him, though his claim to be the son of the late king was most improbable. He did Rome’s work for her, and justified the attempts of Demetrius to silence intending rebels by securing the Roman warrant for his title²- After the death of Demetrius, the senate for years never interfered in Syria, but by the judicious use of the recognition always retained the

Syrian kings at her beck, as several acts of homage on their part bear witness¹. In Egypt too the senate tried to bring pressure to bear in a similar way, when Philometor at its bidding refused to receive back his brother, and so forfeited the Roman friendship. Here however the attempt failed owing to the weakness of Physcon and his want of popularity among the Egyptians².

§ 49. The third possibility presented to Rome by~^ the practice of recognition was that of paving the way nit ion’ to the annexation of a kingdom upon the death of its Nation. king by withholding her recognition from his successor.

This power she did not attempt to exercise until the last century B.C., and even then there seems to have been, at least during the senate’s regime, much feeling against it, especially where there was a successor who could prove any title to the throne. The annexation of Egypt and Cyprus³ was the first to be mooted and Egypt < much was alleged in its justification. In the first place those who had assumed the diadem in each country were not of the royal stock, and the Cyprian, at least, not kingly in character⁴- It was also claimed that the last king had bequeathed Egypt and Cyprus to the Romans, but the genuineness of that bequest was much discredited, and little stress seems to have been laid upon it⁵. To confuse the issue the annexation of kingdoms was at this time one of the main items of the democratic programme⁶, and political strife ran high between the popular party and the senate upon

this same question. Egypt was scheduled in 63 B.C. for annexation, in the agrarian law of Rullus. More-, over the country was so strong through its situation that neither party wished its opponents to secure control of it, while the prospect of gain excited a keen personal struggle for the right of restoring the king. The matter was thus left in suspense, and from 80 to 59 B.C. neither king could by any representations obtain a confirmation of his title. At last the triumvirs, seeing a chance of profit, took up the matter and confirmed Ptolemy of Egypt in return for a huge bribe⁹². The Cyprian Ptolemy was less generous and therefore less fortunate, and was left at the mercy of Clodius, whose proposal to confiscate the king’s possessions was carried in the assembly in 58 B.C., and Cato was sent to take over the same. The king committed suicide. Cicero drew a pathetic picture of the king in all his regalia thus coming ‘ under the auctioneer’s hammer⁹³.’ The principle however was laid down in this way by at least one party in the state, that Rome had a right to annex a kingdom, if she judged the reigning heir unsuitable and unworthy of recognition.

In 64 B.C. took place the annexation of Syria. The weakness of its rulers had been recognised by the Romans, says Strabo, but, as we quoted above in another connexion, “ having themselves ratified the family succession in the line of Seleucus, they did not like to take it away⁹⁴.” This again shews that there was considerable prejudice against annexing a kingdom

while the royal house had living representatives. Lucullus therefore, when he took away Syria from the defeated Tigranes, restored it, after a lapse of fourteen years since its occupation by that king, to another Antiochus of the Seleucid dynasty, an act quite in accordance with the old senatorial policy, which had left Syria to its own weak kings find domestic strife, so long as from time to time they acknowledged the Roman supremacy. Pompey saw that a change was necessary to secure peace and safety to the Empire’s borders, and since interference with the internal management of a kingdom was, as will be shewn later, inconsistent with the Roman idea of imperium, his only remedy was annexation¹- His claim that Rome had more right to rule Syria as the conqueror of Tigranes than the Seleucids whom Tigranes had expelled, cut the knot of Rome’s responsibility as nominal protector of the Seleucids, but it was at the same time only another way of saying that his government was not bound to recognise a new member of a family which had proved to be incapable of protecting itself.

The next case was that of Numidia. The proposer Numidia. of the annexation, Curio, was evidently for the time associated with the demagogues who sought to further their agrarian schemes by the confiscation of kingdoms and royal treasures. This policy Cicero mildly rebukes in his speech against the agrarian law of Rullus², quoting opinions to the effect that “ the Roman people ought not to seem covetous of every kingdom.” But in this case others besides demagogues were opposed to

the establishment of Juba, the optimate Marcellus vetoing a senatorial proposal to recognise him as friend and ally¹, and the senate who wanted Juba’s aid in the coming civil war had to leave the matter for a time ' suspense.

§ 50. The above facts at least shew that, until a was recognised, his kingdom was not safe from annexation, and that with the object of annexation in view recognition might be withheld from him altogether. If so little advantage was taken of this principle under the Republic, that we do not find a single case of annexation actually carried out, save when the kingdom had been forfeited by right of conquest, or the title of the new king to his in‘ Recog- heritance was invalid, the practice of the emperors nition ana ¹ .

cipate. depended upon his good pleasure. He made Galatia a province on the death of Amyntas, though the latter left sons to succeed him²- He was angry, says Josephus, with Aretas of Arabia for not communicating with him before taking the sovereignty, and his annoyance was the greater because he had not intended to continue the succession but wished to give the country to Herod³. Upon the death of Herod in Judaea, though Augustus had previously granted him permission to settle the succession as he liked⁴, Sabinus the legate seized the royal possessions to take account of them temporarily until the late king’s will should

have been confirmed by Augustus, and Archelaus not only refused the title ‘ king' until the latter had given his sanction but finally received Judaea only as ethnarch with the promise of the higher title if he deserved it¹.

In A.D. 7 he was tried and banished for misgovernment and his country annexed². That a change had come old and over the Roman policy is indicated by Augustus himself when he claims that he could have made Armenia a province but followed the ‘ mos maiorum ’ instead by ‘ giving a king ’ from the royal stock³. A notable instance of the older policy, opposed to annexation, was the recognition of Hiempsal II as king of Numidia after the Jugurthine war, when an annexation of the country as conquered territory might have been expected⁴. The different treatment of Syria by Lucullus and Pompey has already been mentioned. Lucullus viewed the question as a follower of the old school, to whom the dignity of kingship and the claims of descent were not things which could be lightly and contemptuously overridden. Pompey in the light of more advanced ideas, who had himself in his youth summarily put to death Hiarbas of Numidia⁵ and had witnessed the frequent falls and restorations of the Cappadocian and Bithynian kings, had little more respect for royalty than the leaders of the socialist and democratic party.

One further case must be noticed in connexion with recognition and annexation. The Cappadocians, as we have already quoted from Strabo, were so specially favoured by Rome above the other peoples of Asia

under monarchies, that a treaty was made with them as well as with their king¹. The same writer continues that when the royal family became extinct, the Romans were for granting the people freedom in accordance with the existing friendship and alliance with them, but the latter refused it and were allowed to choose a king for themselves. In this case therefore the permanence of the treaty with the people as a people, prevented the possible consequence of the extinction of their line of kings, viz. annexation. A second time they enjoyed the effects of this safeguard when the line of Ariobarzanes also became extinct in 42 B.C. The treaty however was disregarded under the Empire, for upon the death of Archelaus in 17 A.D., Tiberius made I__the country a province².

§ 51. Not as allied to Rome by treaty nor yet simply as her friend, but because the superiority of Rome claimed complete deference to her wishes in return for her friendship, that is to say, because the prince was ‘in fide populi Romani³,’ the ruler who sought the Roman recognition studied Rome’s interest in his foreign policy.

(a) Roman In the first place the king made no friendship at para^dSkip one who was not a friend of the Romans.

mount. Hiero, having helped Rome against Carthage in the first Punic war, felt himself at liberty to succour

Carthage after the peace of 241 B.C. because that city was then friendly to Rome⁹⁵, but when war again broke out there was no question which path Hiero was to pursue, and the friendship which he had resumed with Carthage was again broken off. After Thrasimene he despatched help to Rome, saying through his representative that “ he had been so grieved by the disaster that had befallen C. Flaminius that no catastrophe to himself and his kingdom could cause him greater distress².” Following the instructions and example of Masinissa, the kings of Numidia professed “ to trouble about no ties with any other people save the Roman, and to accept no new alliances or treaties, on the ground that they would find ample protection in that one friendship: if the fortune of the Roman Empire changed, the Numidian house was to fall along with it³.” Micipsa again instructed his sons to consider the Roman people in the light of kinsmen⁴. Adherbal claimed that after the fall of Carthage in 146 B.C. his house had no enemy except perchance someone whom the Romans bade them so consider⁶. When Prusias II had offended Rome and forfeited her friendship, the senate called upon all the states of Asia to withdraw from friendship with that king⁶- Ariarathes V of Cap-padocia on the advice of Roman envoys broke off his friendship and marriage connexion with Demetrius I of Syria, whom the senate had refused to recognise⁷. Ariobarzanes I assumed the surname <E>i\opc6fj,aio<;, indicating that Rome’s friendship was judged paramount and sufficient, the source of dignity and safety, to the exclusion of other friendships. The same title was assumed a little later by Antiochus of Commagene¹.

That the Numidian house did not seek the friendship of any other power was due probably to their isolated position, and the fact that they possessed no navy. Most of Rome’s clients exchanged tokens of friendship with other states that were friendly with Rome. Hiero had a cordial understanding with many, to whom he also zealously sent aid in their various difficulties. To Egypt he sent corn, fish and wool in time of famine². Rhodes he helped likewise with money and presents after the earthquake there in 224 B.C., and remitted tariffs in her favour³. He also helped Carthage, as already mentioned⁴, against the rebel mercenaries. Moreover he made a marriage alliance between his son, Gelon, and a grand-daughter of Pyrrhus of Epirus⁵, and cultivated the friendship of other Greek states⁶. The goodwill of the Greeks was sought also by the Ptolemies⁷, and by the Syrian⁸ and the Pergamene kings⁹. Eumenes II and Antiochus IV, Attalus II and Alexander Balas acted in cooperation to secure the Syrian throne for Antiochus and Balas respectively¹⁰. Other connecting links were the intermarriages which took place between the various royal houses. Examples

¹ Append. A, ix. 23; xm. 3 ; ef. the assumption of the title #tXoiccu<rap by the Bosporan kings under the Empire; C.I.G. 2123 ff.

are numerous and need not be specified. The kings rarely married below their rank, and even Herod who rose from a private station, amongst his less honourable marriage connexions, formed one with the Cappadocian house¹.

§ 52. In the second place the client of Rome was (6) Cannot allowed to make war and peace without the consent ^S]^_m⁰/_re_ of the senate. His foreign policy came under the quiredfar senate’s supervision. There are however limitations to peace. this statement.

(1) The kings were generally allowed to subdue Three revolts within their own dependencies and put down _tions_' rebel chiefs. Antiochus IV for instance, who was (4 checked so imperiously when he attempted to secure a depen-hold over Egypt, was allowed to subdue the Jews who had been dependent upon his predecessors⁸. Coele- may be Syria, also a former dependency of the Syrian kingdom, ^reduce(l-he likewise recovered with impunity, and he suppressed a revolt of his satrapy Persis⁴- Ariobarzanes III was urged by Cicero to learn his first lesson of sovereignty in preserving his own life, and securing himself against the rebels among his subjects⁵. Juba⁶ and Herod⁷

² Suet. Aug. 48 : Reges soeios etiam inter semet ipsos neeessitu-dinibus mutuis iunxit, promptissimus affinitatis cuiusque atque amicitiae conciliator et fautor. When under the Empire Agrippa II arranged for a friendly meeting between the kings, they were quickly dismissed to their kingdoms by the nearest Roman governor (Jos.

188 B.C. Manlius had subordinated Galatia, was not prevented from re-asserting his suzerainty by force of arms in 167 and 166 B.C., but in accordance with that arbitrariness and injustice which sometimes marred her policy, to punish Eumenes for alleged disloyalty, Rome then took it upon herself to award the Gauls their independence⁹⁶. If it suited the senate to espouse the cause of a state in subjection to another, it was in vain to point out that the subject state could not legally establish relations with Rome or that Rome had no right to intervene when she had previously recognised the sovereignty of the superior. As however she offended the Achaeans by encouraging the secession of one of the cities of their league, after acknowledging that the internal affairs of the league were beyond her province, so she arbitrarily declared the Galatian subjects of Eumenes independent, reversing her former decision. Similarly she essayed by remonstrances to protect the Jews from the aggressions of the Syrian kings who succeeded Antiochus, though in this case it was on the assumption that the Jews had a title to freedom². Not only had kings however the right to subdue their own dependencies, but they occasionally helped friends to subdue theirs, as when Eumenes helped Rhodes against the Lycians and Carians³, and was himself succoured by> Ariarathes V against the Gauls⁴.

(2) The second limitation to the above state- (²) ^Dei i i * t i t • i _rfensive

war, is the fact that a client king who was attacked ^a'i^alnstun-’ _t p . ’provoked

by a neighbour could defend himself for the time attacks. being, but had to confine himself strictly to the defensive, until the senate’s pleasure was known.

Such a right was expressly conceded to Antiochus III in the terms of his peace¹. Eumenes with his friend Ariarathes IV, Attalus II with Ariarathes V, did no more than defend themselves when attacked respectively by Phamaces of Pontus, and Prusias of Bithynia². Mithridates also followed the same moderate course when attacked by Nicomedes of Bithynia in 89 B.C., until the evident corruption of the Roman officer at Nicomedes’ court made it clear that no redress would come from the Roman quarter. It was just the refusal to allow Carthage any right to defend herself at all, that so degraded her at the expense of Masinissa.

(3) A third facility the kings enjoyed was the right (3) Rome’s to extend their conquests in certain directions, if Rome Merest. did not feel herself concerned to prevent them. This liberty was obviously enjoyed only by those kings who

were not surrounded on every side by friends of Rome. Antiochus IV for example attacked the inner states of Asia, as Parthia; Attalus II assumed the offensive against the Thracian chief Diegylis who had attacked his possessions ; and Bogud waged war against the Ethiopians³.

rov Midpidarrjv i^aTrearaXKdrcov aim# ffrpanav hnriwv Kai ire^Qv Kara ttjv crvfifiax^av, Cov ijyeiro Ayjfi'fjrpcos ⁹ApiapaBov.

the authority claimed by Rome to stop any aggression of a client king even against strangers is clearly seen. The first case is that of the special law which gave Masinissa freedom from supervision, and power to extend his borders by war against the native tribes, privileges which were evidently regarded as exceptional¹. The peoples, against whom Masinissa then warred in his own right, had no appeal to Rome. This law did not embrace Carthage, but only, as we said, the native tribes in the neighbourhood; otherwise Carthage too would have been debarred from appealing to Rome. Kings for- The second case is a special prohibition which the crossln⁰ senate issued to the effect that no king should cross arms from j_{n arm}s from Asia to Europe. In the treaty with

Europe. Antiochus III, one of the terms forbids Antiochus to wage war against any of the islands or peoples in Asia², but the general prohibition is found in Appian³, where it is said to have been ignored by Mithridates. That no Asiatic power should set foot in Europe, is an extension of the previous principle laid down and successfully maintained by the senate, that no foreign r>ower should set foot on the soil of Italy.

Client f In connexion with the above limited facilities kings as' which the kings enjoyed of extending their conquests,

of the we may also add that kings were sometimes expressly frontiers. _ent_ru.sted with the duty of keeping peace upon their borders and repelling attacks from robbers or tribes not included in the sphere of Rome’s suzerainty. This practice was especially followed by Caesar, but the law passed in favour of Masinissa, as mentioned above, had

the same object. We find a general injunction given by Caesar to those who sought his friendship after Pharsalia, “ to guard the province⁹⁷,” while a particular instance is that of the institution of Mithridates the Pergamene as king of the Bosporus “to secure the Roman provinces (in Asia) against the barbarian kings⁹⁸.” For this purpose Mithridates must have had the liberty to repel attacks on the spot. Cicero pleads in defence of Deiotarus of Galatia that he had never had forces large enough to attack the Roman people but only sufficient to guard his territories from raids and plundering excursions⁹⁹- Under the Empire the kings seem to have had the defence of the frontier imposed upon them as a duty¹⁰⁰, but Herod at least had to seek permission from the governor of Syria even to . repress robbers, if they were outside his own territory⁵. J

S 54. Under such restrictions were the client C^cf^Arii-. n i , i i a • tration

war waged by one friend of Rome against another was ^clients-invariably checked at once by the senate’s intervention, generally upon the appeal of the party that was attacked. The senate then arbitrated between the two, the strife being meanwhile suspended. Thus Masinissa, when at strife with Carthage, was ordered to send ambassadors to the senate as soon as possible, to answer the complaints of the Carthaginians, and the latter were likewise ordered to appear at the investigation⁶- Rome professed to “ guarantee Carthage peace

not only from herself hut from king Masinissa¹.” Prusias I, who attacked Eumenes II on one occasion, was compelled by Rome to make peace with him, so that Eumenes sent a crown in gratitude to the senate². Attalus II, when attacked by Prusias II, forbore to make reprisals, and waited for the decision of the senate³. It was some time however before his enemy came to his senses, not in fact until the senate had renounced the treaty with him. The same Attalus waited for the senate’s permission before he attacked Prusias II on behalf of and in conjunction with the latter’s heir, Nicomedes. The war was at first stopped by envoys, but in this case, as in the one last quoted, the distance of the senate from the scene of action prevented it from clearly ascertaining the rights of the case, and those senators who were friends of Attalus and Nicomedes managed so to arrange matters that the pair obtained a free hand, while the arbitration proved abortive through the incompetence of the Roman ambassadors⁴. In the dispute between Adherbal and Jugurtha an appeal from the former procured the appointment by the senate of ten commissioners to carry out a division of the kingdom between the two claimants. Later the senate sent word that “its wishes and decision were that Adherbal and Jugurtha should cease from armed strife, and decide their controversy rather by law than by war, in a manner more worthy of Rome and of themselves⁵.”

There are many other instances illustrating this insistence of the senate upon arbitration between her

clients¹. If one of the disputants rejected or ignored the arbitration, then the Romans generally renounced their connexion with him and allowed his opponent to prosecute his claims by war. When Pharnaces would not listen to reason, Eumenes and Ariarathes IY brought the war to a close and dictated the terms of peace without further interference from the senate² The disobedience of Ptolemy Philometor and of Prusias II, the former in his quarrel with his brother Physcon, the latter as an aggressor against Attalus II, was followed by a renunciation of friendship on the part of the Romans. When in such cases the senate deemed it possible, and was sufficiently interested, it also sent help to the aggrieved party in order to confirm its own decision. Physcon received five ships, sufficient only for an escort³, but Attalus was so far befriended that he received instructions to act only on the defensive until the Romans should be able to appear in his support⁴. When Adherbal was slain by Jugurtha pending the arbitration and contrary to the strict injunctions of the senate (“ contra denuntiationem ”), war was declared by the senate to uphold the principle of arbitration as well as to avenge the dead prince⁵.

Augustus enforced this principle still more strongly, and an offence against it entailed serious consequences. Herod, accused by Syllaeus on such a count, with difficulty made his peace with his patron⁶.

¹ Append. A, ix. 16, Ariarathes V and Orophernes; ii. 9, the Ptolemies, Philometor and Physcon; ix. 21, x. 6, Mithridates and Ariobarzanes of Cappadocia.

§ 55. The task of keeping the peace between the kings and of enforcing arbitration was borne entirely by the senate, but it was not always discharged with the same strictness. When Rome’s prosperity was bound np with the maintenance of a balance of power between her greatest rivals in the East, the senate, wherever it could, was very careful to suppress any strife that might offer occasion for interference to such formidable neighbours as the Syrian and Macedonian sovereigns, or lead to the undue aggrandisement of one client at the expense of the rest. Pergamum, Cappadocia, Bithynia, Pontus and Galatia were to be weighed against one another and indebted only to Rome. After 190 B.C. Rome’s greatest anxiety was to prevent Syria from again exerting a paramount influence in Eastern affairs. Hence the prompt action taken against Antiochus IV in Egypt in 168 B.C., when, not content with defending himself against the aggression of Ptolemy Philometor, he had so improved upon his victory as to have almost annexed his opponent’s kingdom. Antiochus had in the first place appealed to Rome, but the senate, not feeling strong enough to take action while Perseus was yet a menace, had to wait impatiently for the result of the battle of Pydna, and when that came, it was Egypt, and not Syria that needed the intervention¹. After the death of Antiochus IV, when intestine strife made Syria too weak to be feared, the Attalid house seems to have been the most formidable. To remove as far as possible from the scope of the Perga-mene rulers any opportunity for further aggrandisement, the senate took the Gauls into friendship on the one side, so that their dealings with Eumenes became subject to arbitration, and on the other side, where the constant enmity between the Bithynian and Pergamene kings broke out from time to time, insisted on peaceful settlements and appeals to itself.

In the last century of the Republic, however, the nobles were engrossed in their own interests, and the senate’s foreign policy lost strength and consistency. During the strife between the orders that followed the death of the Gracchi, the senate seems as far as possible to have avoided wars, as likely to raise influences in Rome antagonistic to its own regime. As it did all in its power to abstain from war with Jugurtha in 111 B.C., so when Mithridates, a professed client, extended his conquests to the north of the Black Sea, the senate disregarded the breach of that principle, which, as already mentioned, it had laid down a century before, that no king should cross in arms from Asia to Europe¹. It is true that through Sulla it checked the aggression of Mithridates in Paphlagonia, but the latter’s presence there was an open breach of the peace². The senate’s action was further weakened by the trouble of the social war and by the corruption of its magistrates. The commissioner Aquillius in 89 B.C., to whom Nicomedes had promised money for his restoration, and could make no payments, compelled the king against his will, and without the authority of the senate, to attack Mithridates⁸. Murena in 83 B.C., for the sake of a triumph, created a similar breach of the

peace no less inopportune for the senate. In Africa before the outbreak of the civil war in 49 B.C. the absence of the old well-defined policy of arbitration is seen in the fact that the kings of Mauretania and Numidia were engaged in the fiercest strife without exciting any notice from the senate¹. The fact that these kings had not, like their predecessors, been recognised by the senate hardly explains the circumstance, but rather confirms the weakness and vagueness of the senate’s later policy under the stress of civil discord.

§ 56. Even small matters of dispute between two clients of Rome came before her for arbitration, during the second century B.C. We find that the king of Cappadocia was sued by the Gauls, his neighbours, for having caused a deluge by his attempts to make a lake out of a tributary of the Euphrates². For the damage caused to their territory the senate made him pay the Gauls three hundred talents. An extant inscription testifies to the settlement by the same body of a land dispute between the Thracian king Cotys and the town Abdera³. Another border dispute between Ariarathes V and the Gauls was settled by the senate’s commissioners in 164 B.C.⁴

missions of _ci_oseiy establish its supervision of the foreign reinspection. . ^J . . ^r . ⁰

under the leadership of Tiberius Gracchus, went, says Polybius, “ as spies¹,” “ to examine the relations of the kings.” Of Ariarathes they gave such a good report that his son, who succeeded him three years after, is said to have owed his instantaneous recognition to their statements². They also sought to ascertain the feelings of Eumenes and Antiochus IV, the latter being, naturally suspected of entertaining a grudge in consequence of his dismissal from Egypt in 168 B.C. Both kings however so disguised their feelings and received them with such kindness and humility that the ambassadors “ were no better informed than when they left Rome³.” Another commission, therefore, that of G. Sulpicius and M. Sergius, went with the same object in 164 B.C., “ to interest themselves (ttoXv-irpary/j,ov>]crovTa<;) in the relations of Eumenes and Antiochus, lest there should be some understanding between them and conspiracy against Rome⁴.” C. Gallus considered it within his powers to invite complaints against Eumenes from all the chief towns in Asia, and to receive such complaints during a ten days’ sitting in the very gymnasium of Pergamus itself⁶. In 162 B.C. Gnaeus Octavius with subordinates received instructions to investigate the affairs of Macedonia, to settle the dispute between Ariarathes V and the Trocmi, and thence to proceed to Syria to regulate the affairs of that kingdom⁶. The irregular and unscrupulous acts of this commission, e.g. the burning of the Syrian fleet, accomplished in accordance with specific

instructions from the senate, achieved the purpose of the senate in weakening the resources of the country but cost the chief commissioner his life. The senate, satisfied with the effect upon Syria, did not trouble to avenge the death of their representative¹.

The last important commission was that of Scipio Africanns the younger, which about the year 140 B.C. made a tour round the eastern Mediterranean, “ to see that the kingdoms were in proper hands²,” and according to Diodorus, “ having visited kings and peoples and renewed with them all the existing friendships, they won for their hegemony a greater measure of goodwill, so that all, kings and peoples alike, having received settlements in conformity with their wishes, sent ambassadors to Rome and praised Scipio’s embassy³.” In particular they went to Egypt, “ to view the whole kingdom.” They there reconciled Ptolemy Physcon to his sister, and under the guidance of the king inspected all the works and resources of the country⁴.

Commissions sent for the special object of inspecting the relations of the kings towards Rome and towards one another were no longer necessary, when the kingdom of Pergamus, bequeathed to the Romans in 133 B.C., brought them into the immediate neighbourhood, and enabled them to keep a constant watch over the neighbouring peoples. The territory acquired after the destruction of Carthage gave them a similar basis in Africa. Commissions purely for the purpose of arbitration continued to be sent, as for instance before the Jugurthine war in 117 B.C.

The commissions above described were not merely embassies sent by one power to another as to an equal.

They were bound up with the Roman supremacy. The work done by them in settling the relations of the kingdoms and peoples was not that of an embassy.

Their other duty, to examine the attitude of the kings to Rome and to one another, did come within the scope of the ordinary diplomacy of ambassadors; yet their visits to the kings were sometimes paid in the course of a general tour of inspection from state to state, while the reception accorded them by the kings, in particular the subservience with which Antiochus IV and Ptolemy Physcon shewed them over their territories, making it their chief care to prove their loyalty to Rome, implies that these commissioners came, and were recognised as coming, from an overlord, whose right of entry into the kings’ territories was undisputed.

| 58. By no better test can the clientship of the (_e) Services kings be estimated than by the services which they ^{m war}' rendered to the Romans in war. It has been stated that the clientship was of a ‘ de facto' nature, and its most practical result will be found in the readiness with which those kings, whose interests were closely bound up with the Romans, volunteered their support as occasion demanded. In the third and second centuries B.C., Hiero, Masinissa and Micipsa, the Pergamene, Gappadocian and Bithynian kings, were the most zealous in this office. The advantage of so doing was in their case not far to seek, and has already been indicated in our Introduction¹. They were small

powers situated between great and mutually hostile powers, and had much to hope from a Republic whose avowed object was the exalting of the humble, and the humiliation of the great. The Bithynian, Prusias II, it is true, for a time failed to grasp the situation, but when he saw his mistake, he surpassed all in servility of demeanour.

Egypt and Syria on the other hand, having nothing to gain and much to lose, were lukewarm, and the senate rarely invited their cooperation. According to Livy they made great professions of their readiness at the beginning of the third Macedonian war, but these, if really made, were obviously insincere, and a disguise for their own designs against one another. Rome relied upon her humbler clients, and, bent upon the isolation of Perseus, was probably quite content to see the two greater powers so preoccupied. They were still too formidable, even after Pydna, for the senate to strain their loyalty too far, and even in the first Mithridatic war, when Sulla sent Lucullus to ask aid from Ptolemy Alexander Soter, the latter, after first giving some ships, “ left the alliance,” says Plutarch, “ and shrank from the war¹.” It was the strong position of Egypt, doubtless, which allowed him such latitude, just as it had enabled Ptolemy Philometor to despise the senate’s injunctions to receive back his brother, Physcon, in 160 B.C.² Similarly, Mithridates was enabled by the strength of his resources and position to refuse to assist the Romans in expelling the Cappadocian usurper, when ‘ ordered ’ to do so by the senate⁸- Syria, meanwhile, was too distracted by the quarrels of the Seleucids to be able to afford assistance to another. With the weaker clients that help, which was at first rendered from motives of interest, became afterwards a matter of necessity, as the power of Rome grew greater and nearer, and in the last century they were invited or ordered to assist as a matter of course. Such a request was made to Masinissa in the third Punic war. Appian narrates that Masinissa, offended because the senate had not communicated its plans to him beforehand, answered that he would send aid, if he saw that it was necessary; to which the senate replied that, if it were necessary, Rome would command the aid¹. The story is inconsistent with the general attitude of Masinissa, and with his subsequent action and friendly message and summons to Scipio, but, whether true or not, it represents the changed condition of affairs. When Rome was sure of her supremacy, she rarely used the same preliminary courtesies, with which she had formerly preferred her requests. Again, according to Appian, Micipsa was ‘ ordered ’ by Fabius Maximus to send him elephants with all speed². To Marius, just before the Cimbrian war, “ the senate gave authority to send for help to the nations beyond the sea. So Marius sent to Nicomedes, king of Bithynia, for help³.” This was equivalent to a command; the senate assumed that Mithridates could be put upon the same footing, when, as already mentioned, it “ ordered him to help against the usurper in Cappadocia.” It was altogether imperative for a king to help when a Roman general was in the neigh-

bourhood, and in the last century in the civil wars, it became the duty of every king to help the nearest party leader or the one who seemed likely to win. Deiotarus, when upon his defence before Julius Caesar, pleaded that he had been compelled to help Pompey, as the nearest imperator¹. Caesar, though he pardoned him, refused to accept the excuse, replying that Deiotarus “ ought to have known better who was really in possession of Italy, where the senate and people of Rome were, and where was the Commonwealth.” Under the Empire most of the kings were on the footing of subjects, and owed assistance as such. Plutarch shews that this stage was really reached as early as the Mithridatic wars, when Pompey, by the senate’s permission, not merely requested aid but “ sent word to the subject kings and dynasts to repair to him in person,” with their contingents².

The help was generally rendered in consequence of letters from the senate³. Sometimes however a general was allowed to enlist volunteers from the kingdoms and cities by writing letters in which he asked for them on behalf of the Roman people. This course is twice mentioned as followed by Scipio⁴ In the last days of the Republic, generals, especially the triumvirs, took matters into their own hands. Crassus, on his expedition to Parthia, used this power to increase his fortune, exempting kings from sending contingents on the payment of money, which he kept for himself⁶-

² Pomp. 31 (Pompey) : /xeTe7r^u7rero roi>s vtttjkoovs Svv&aTas Kal /SatTiXet? a5s eavrov.

§ 59. In theory the help rendered by the kings was Help theo-voluntary throughout, nor based on any clause in their treaties or any express stipulation. It has been shewn that the introduction of the term ‘ ally ’ into the treaty sometimes took place after the king had already lent his services, as a mark of honour. It has been suggested that the recipient of this title, or the king into whose treaty it was introduced, professed himself, by the acceptance of it, ready to help in future emergencies also. But only in the case of Attalus I do we find such assistance given in accordance with a stipulation in the treaty itself, “ petitum ex foedere ab Attalo est ut mille milites praestaret¹⁰¹,” and, as it has been pointed out already, this treaty was only of temporary • duration and did not concern his permanent relations with Rome². The passages which shew that the services rendered by the client kings were of a voluntary nature, that is to say, that they were the services of an interested client to a patron, are numerous and clear. Polybius states that the Roman generals Services of accepted Hiero’s proposals for peace, “ supposing that ^H,e,°-he would be of great service to them in the war³.”

No stipulation on that point appears in the treaty subsequently made with him, but nevertheless Hiero did “henceforth constantly minister to their necessities⁴.”

“ In return for the services rendered in this war,” says Appian, “ Hiero was made friend and ally⁵.” In the second Punic war, the senate, according to Polybius, sent to Hiero for assistance and received some troops⁶.

Hiero sent, unasked, gold, corn and men, “ which he urgently begged the senate not to refuse.” Hiero sometimes also received a price for the com he had supplied, as at the end of the Celtic wars¹, which again shews that this supply was not imposed upon him by an alliance. On the other hand, that the senate was in the habit of accepting from him, without compensation, voluntary contributions, appears from the reply of Hieronymus to the Roman ambassadors, in which he promised to remain loyal, “ if the Romans returned to him first all the gold, which they had received from Hiero, his grandfather, and secondly, the com, all that had been given from the beginning, and the other gifts received from him².”

Masinissa. Masinissa’s first treaty with Scipio was one of friendship. This was followed by an engagement to cooperate, if Scipio made a campaign in Libya³. Thus the engagement to cooperate was distinct from the treaty of friendship and did not permanently affect his position, being limited to the second Punic war. Later, however, he rendered many services, as one whose welfare was bound up with that of his patron. During the third Macedonian war he told the senate that “ two things had caused him shame, one that the senate had asked him for help by envoys instead of commanding it, the other that it had sent him money for the com⁴.” Micipsa. Micipsa is said to have told Adherbal that “ those who cherished the Roman friendship undertook much labour but were the safest of all⁶.” “ So far as had lain in his family’s power, it had contrived ever to be at their service in every war®.”

Bocchus again was not even a ‘ friend ’ of the Bocchus. Romans when he first lent his services. He was thus to " earn his treaty of friendship¹.”

Perhaps no one was a more constant helper or a Deiotarus. more interested client than Deiotarus, tetrarch of Galatia in the last century B.C. The motive for his cooperation is given by Cicero as nothing more than goodwill (‘benevolentia’)². Because of this goodwill he “not only was an ally of the Roman commanders but led his own forces in person³.” Cicero in his letters writes, “The goodwill and all the forces of Deiotarus I regard as ours. The other kings...are unreliable both as to their resources and their goodwill⁴.” This language is hardly consistent with the existence of a special provision in a treaty. So the language of a decree of the senate in 44 B.C. implies only good clientship on the part of Deiotarus as the motive for his active cooperation: “ The senate has resolved that if Deiotarus and his son shall help Cassius the proconsul with all their power, as they have frequently aided the empire of the Roman people in many wars, they will please the senate and people of the Romans; and if the other kings shall do the same, the senate and people will not forget their loyalty (‘ officium ’)⁵.” We may add the following reference in Sallust to the kings in general, bearing upon the preparations of Metellus for the Jugurthine war: “By the senate’s authority the allies and the Latins, the kings by their spontaneous contributions,

every state, in short, with the greatest zeal, did its utmost to secure the end in view¹.”

These quotations will suffice to confirm the conclusions drawn in Part I that the terms ‘ alliance ’ and ‘ friendship and alliance,’ which we find so freely interchanged with that of ‘friendship/ do not imply that the kings were bound to assist Rome by the stipulations of a regular treaty of alliance. The assistance given was dictated by motives of interest or the fear of Rome’s displeasure, and in every case was the sign of good clientship. The aid afforded by the kings was in many kinds. It rarely included heavy infantry, though Deiotarus equipped and trained infantry in the Roman manner after the style of the legionary². Masinissa and Antiochus IV sent elephants³. Cavalry came at different times from Masinissa⁴, Vocio, king of a Norican tribe⁶, and Malchus, king of the Nabathaei⁶, light infantry from Hiero⁷, corn and money from Hiero and Masinissa⁸. Information as to the enemies’ movements was also frequently expected from loyal clients, as when Antiochus of Commagene sent Cicero, proconsul of Cilicia, notice of the approach of the Parthians⁹.

| 60. ¹⁰ Rome’s duties to her clients in return for their services were never clearly defined. While however she generally consulted her own interests, she claimed according to Caesar that her friends and

allies should never lose anything of what they already possessed, but on the contrary be exalted in influence, dignity and honour¹. Scipio Africanus Maior, when he was trying to remove the fears, which Prusias I entertained of the Roman power, pointed out how Rome had exalted petty dynasts into kings for their loyalty². Micipsa claimed that Rome’s friends were the safest of all, and that while it was their duty to help in all wars, they could at any rate entrust the Republic with their safety and peace³. At the same time it was significant that a senate’s decree of 59 B.C., which Caesar quoted in replying to Ariovistus, directed the governor of Gaul to defend the Aedui and other friends of the Roman people, “ so far as he could do so with advantage to the state⁴.” The senate sometimes displayed the same lukewarmness in rendering active assistance, when a client was attacked by an external enemy, as when he was expelled from his kingdom by a rival from within. It did no more for Antiochus IY, when Ptolemy VI attacked Coele Syria in 171 B.C.⁵, than it did for Physcon, when he sought to.regain Cyprus in 162—160 B.C. and his Egyptian kingdom later⁶ But as a rule the Roman protectorate was to the client a valuable support against external foes. Those kings especially, who attached themselves more closely to her, could always appeal to Rome in difficulties, and if they needed it, they received active assistance. Ariobarzanes I against Mithridates in 92 B.C.⁷, Deiotarus and Ariobarzanes III against

Pharnaces in 47 B.C.¹⁰² received such assistance from Sulla and Caesar respectively, and when Prusias II attacked Attalus II in 154 B.C., only his submission at the eleventh hour stopped the Roman preparations for war². Rome included her friends in treaties. Philip for instance was forbidden “to injure Attalus...or any other friend of Rome³.” Hiero was specially included in the peace with Carthage in 241 B.C., and also in the peace with Philip just quoted⁴. In the second treaty of peace with Carthage Rome similarly guaranteed the integrity of Masinissa’s kingdom against Carthage, and later charged the Carthaginians with a breach of this stipulation⁶. On the other hand she guaranteed Carthage peace in 181 B.C. not only from her own side but that of Masinissa⁶ Manlius imposed on the Gauls conditions of peace with Eumenes in 188 B.C.⁷ The reputation of her protectorate was at least high in the eyes of the Numidian kings⁸.

If help were given to a client, it resulted from a vote of the senate. Pompey refused to help Tigranes against Phraates on the plea that he had no authority⁹. Caesar however in his first consulship sent aid to kings for bribes without consulting the senate¹⁰.

to cliehts. her clients with additional territory. This indeed was ' the chief incentive to loyal service. The acceptance of such gifts at her hands was in itself an acknow-

ledgment of clientship, since the recipients knew well that the lands were given on trust. Masinissa, while acknowledging that “ his kingdom had been received, increased, and multiplied through the Roman power,” professed “to be content with the usufruct of it¹⁰³.” The building up of Eumenes’ kingdom was far out of proportion to his services, and necessarily entailed further services. Ariarathes V won for his successor parts of Lycaonia and Cilicia by his death on the battlefield while fighting against Aristonicus the Attalid pretender². " Many were the steps,” says Cicero, “ climbed by Deiotarus, before his services were crowned by the title of king along with the country of Armenia³.” In the case of Herod the services were prospective. He was made king that he might be useful against the Parthians⁴

Rome claimed however for her gifts that she could resume them at will, that they remained with the king during the senate’s pleasure. Such was the reply of Manlius to Jugurtha⁵, and the same principle is expressed in an extant inscription, where the senate bids a client retain some property, “dum populus senatusque Romanus vellet⁶.” In accordance with this principle Greater Phrygia was taken away from the son and successor of Mithridates V at his accession⁷. Finally, knowing this custom of the senate, Hiempsal II attempted to gain the sanction of a ‘foedus’ for his

possession of some land, which Scipio had adjudicated to the Roman people, but which Hiempsal and his predecessors had been permitted to retain

perium.’ of the magistrates authority, and the kingdoms are both expressly mentioned along with the ‘ provinciae,’ and contrasted with them. Cicero accusing Yerres describes “ the grief of all the provinces, the complaints of all the free peoples, the outcries from the kingdoms².” ‘ Provinces, free states and kings ’ was the usual order in which he summed up the countries which owned the Roman supremacy³. ‘ Kings, tyrants, and dynasts of the province’ are mentioned in the Bellum Alexandrinum, where the last named are the petty princes whose small territories were enclosed by the province on every side⁴. The kingdoms are also referred to as being outside the whole Roman Empire. Suetonius says that “ Augustus cared for the allied kings, as a body, no less than for the members and parts of the Empire,” shewing that the kings were not properly regarded as parts of the Empire⁵. Cassius Dio speaks too of “ all the kings and dynasts who were neighbours to the Empire of the Romans ” (31 B.C.)⁶.

When therefore a kingdom was subjugated, in the first place it was “ reduced into the form of a province”;

in the second, the ‘ imperium Romanorum ’ was said to be enlarged in consequence. “ Nero,” says Suetonius, “ was not moved by the wish to increase or extend the empire;...only the kingdom of Pontus, yielded up by Polemo, and that of the Alps, on the occasion of the death of Cottius, did he reduce to the form of a province¹⁰⁴.”

Another fact also may be cited in confirmation, namely, that with kingdoms the ‘ ius postliminii ’ was valid according to Festus, since they ranked with ‘populi liberi ’ and ‘ foederati².’ The jurists of a later period disputed the validity, but the classification of kings among ‘ foederati ’ and ‘ liberi ’ remained.

§ 63. In accordance with this principle a Roman magistrate was^- specially forbidden by laws against extortion “ to enter a kingdom and leave his ‘ pro-vincia,’” without the consent of the senate and people ⁸. The real object of these laws was not so much perhaps to protect the kings from a magistrate’s extortions as to prevent a conspiracy against the commonwealth by a magistrate who had at his back the resources of one of the kingdoms. How well founded this fear was we may judge, if we bear in mind the attempts of Caesar to gain Egypt as his province, lest one of the nobles should hold it⁴, also if we remember the care of Augustus that no senator should enter Egypt without his leave, and the support that Juba I gave to the senatorial refugees in 47 B.C.

Under some such law of extortion Sulla was prosecuted for having taken money out of the friendly kingdom of Cappadocia¹, and Gabinius, when he was acquitted on the charge of having waged war in Egypt illegally, was condemned on account of extortion and oppression². The generals who received bribes or promissory notes from the kings for their services and financiers who had lent sums to a royal exchequer avoided this law. They could not collect the debt themselves, but they brought pressure to bear upon their debtor, through some magistrate, whose commission allowed his entry into the kingdom, while they left their servants, private ¹ procuratores,’ to remind the king of the extent to which he was indebted. In this way Pompey and Brutus hoped to use Cicero, when governor of Cilicia, Pompey in order to obtain the sums promised him by the late grandfather of the reigning king of Cappadocia for his restoration and other services; Brutus to recover the money with which he had financed that monarch³. It was a breach of the principle upheld by the laws upon extortion, when Caesar entered Egypt in 48 B.C. with the ‘ fasces ’ or signs of his magistracy carried before him. The multitude of Alexandria raised a tumult against this disparagement of the majesty of their king⁴; Caesar could enter the kingdom as general but not as civil administrator. It was usual to lay aside the ‘fasces’ as Antonius did in Alexandria⁶, and Germanicus in Athens⁶.

⁵ -A-PP. B.C. y. 11 : ’Avrducos ix^e^f^J'^a^^€V ivravOa avev (njfxeLw 7fyefj.ovlas...ei0’ ws iv aWorpl$ re apxw kclI (3aai\evo£<jr) iro'Xet.

⁶ Tac. Ann. zz. 53, 3: hinc ventum Athenas, foederique sociae efc vetustae urbis datum -ut uno lietore uteretur.

§ 64. The kings therefore, as situated outside the Roman ‘ imperium ’ and free from the control of the provincial governors, enjoyed all the privileges of the ' civitates liberae ' and ‘ civitates foederatae.’

They were the owners of their own land, whereas (<*) Kings the provincials enjoyed only the usufruct of theirs¹, their own It was flattery on the part of the Numidian kings ^land-when they professed themselves content with the usufruct, while the real ‘dominium’ belonged to Rome ² It represented however the facts to some extent, namely, that the greater part of their territory was Rome’s gift, and Rome claimed the power to resume such gifts⁸. Of the original territory however the king was master and owner. He could develop it as he liked, whether agriculturally, as Masinissa did with much distinction⁴, or with cities, fortifications and great public works, as did Herod⁵ The client kings under the Empire vied with one another in building cities named after Caesar⁶. It is significant moreover that while Judaea was attached to the province of Syria, its high priest was not allowed to fortify Jerusalem, but that as soon as Julius Caesar restored to Hyrcanus his temporal power as ethnarch, he allowed him to rebuild the walls of Jerusalem and “retain it as he liked⁷.” The account of Herod in Josephus shews also how freely a king could order his own revenues⁸.

¹ Gaius n. 7: cf. Mommsen’s note on G.I.L. i. 99, viz.: “ it is peculiar to a ‘ civitas libera ’ to have its own land.”

⁶ Jos. Ant. xv. 331 ff.; Bell. i. 407; cf. also Strabo xvii. 3, 12; ib. xrv. 5, 6, which describe the independence of Juba II, and Herod Archelaus respectively in this connexion.

§ 65. In the second place the client kings enjoyed complete powers of jurisdiction in their own kingdoms. Strabo speaks of dynasts, phylarchs, and priests subject to the Romans, and living “ according to their ancestral laws¹⁰⁵.” The settlements of Pompey in Asia in 63 B.C. confirmed autonomy to the free states in Asia², and Caesar allowed Commius as ruler of a ‘ civitas immunis’ to retain his own ‘iura legesque³,’ a privilege which we know to have been also enjoyed by the free state of the Chians⁴. This distinction according to Dio was preserved by Augustus, who “ regulated the subject communities (to virrjKoov) according to the customs of the Romans, but allowed the federated (to evairovhov) to be governed in their own ancestral manner⁶.”

The power of the kings over their own citizens was complete. “ To do what one wills with impunity, that is kingship,” is a definition Sallust puts into the mouth of Memmius⁶, and the character of the Eastern monarchy was not modified by the senate. The only cases where Roman interference against regal oppression took place, belong to the period of the Triumvirate or of the Empire, and Antony, though he at first received the complaints of some of Herod’s subjects, then acknowledged Herod’s independence and put to death his opponents; for “ if one demanded an account from a king of the acts of his sovereignty, he would no longer be a king⁷.” Rome thus professed to ignore complaints of misrule brought against client princes under the Republic¹⁰⁶, and Cicero urged Ariobarzanes to use ‘his royal right¹⁰⁷.’ Herod was likewise reminded that he had full power to execute his sons, as king, though he accused them before Augustus¹⁰⁸ The emperors however, who looked upon the kings as subjects and took an interest in their kingdoms, departed from this principle. Augustus, as early as 29 B.C., condemned Antiochus of Commagene to death for slaying an ambassador whom his brother had sent to Rome, and thus insisted on the right of the king’s subjects to communicate with himself¹⁰⁹. He also not only instructed Herod the Great’s successor Archelaus to rule his people mildly, but removed him when he failed to do so⁵.

Even over Romans resident within their kingdoms the rulers enjoyed similar unlimited powers under the Republic. A Roman who entered a kingdom without a safe conduct, as Rabirius entered Egypt under Ptolemy XI, placed himself in the power of the king, and was in the position of a royal subject⁶. The Roman citizens in Cirta relied for safety upon the “magnitude of the Roman people⁷.” Since the Roman magistrate could not enter the kingdom as civil administrator, citizens in the kingdoms were outside any Roman jurisdiction. On the other hand a king’s subject, when he entered Roman territory, became liable to Roman jurisdiction. Thus

Bomilcar, the servant of Jugurtha, might very properly have been tried for the murder of Massiva under ordinary circumstances; it was because he was included in the safe conduct of the king (“ comes eius, qui Romam fide publica venerat ”), that his trial was said to have been “ magis ex aequo bonoque quam ex iure gentium.” There was no infringement of Jugurtha’s rights as king, but merely of international law¹.

Civil cases too between Romans and the king’s subjects arising in the kingdom would go before the king’s courts, unless otherwise stipulated by the ‘ foedus.’ This much we may infer from the fact that ‘ civitates foederatae ’ were thus favoured², and sometimes, as, for instance, Chios, ‘ civitates sine foedere liberae³.’

§ 66. Kings also possessed the right of coinage. Mommsen says that the cessation of gold coinage in the states ruled by the ' Diadochi ’ cannot be ascribed to Roman influence⁴, and this is apparent in the case of Parthia, since no Parthian gold coins are found of the Republican period, and yet the Parthians were certainly not during that time dependent on Rome. He thinks however that in Macedonia, since the time of King Perseus, and in those autonomous states which were under Roman influence, it cannot have happened in the natural course of things, and that Macedonia lost its gold coinage by the treaty of 197 B.C. A too close analogy, however, may be drawn here between the Republican dependent states and the kingdoms. Though they are rare, gold coins are extant of several

kingdoms under the Republic, e.g. the Thracian chief Coson issued some gold coins in 42 B.C.; Amyntas of Galatia, when Antonius was in the East, and Micipsa, according to Miiller¹, issued gold staters; also of Mithridates Eupator gold coins survive belonging to three different years, 89, 85, 76 B.C., but these were the years when he was at war with Rome. Others, however, have no year marked on them ; there are also some gold coins of Mauretania. Under the Empire the Bosporan kings also coined in gold.,

The gold coinage of the Ptolemies stopped, according to Mommsen, after 150 B.C. ,

The question whether the kings as a rule resigned the right of gold coinage is very obscure, and only inferences from the dearth of such coins are possible. The coins of Coson and Amyntas may have been issued by special permission.

Rome herself coined little in gold, owing, says Mommsen, to the preponderance of the silver standard in her coinage.

There is no doubt as to the silver and bronze coinage. Silver coins survive from Cappadocia even down to 17 A.D.², and from the other kingdoms there is a good supply. The Numidian kings are shewn by Muller to have had the same right⁸, and the like appears too of the Mauretanian kings⁴. The absence of Judaean coins from 63—39 B.C., whereas the years before and afterwards are represented by many, has led to the inference that Judaea under Hyrcanus II was without the right of coinage. But Judaea was not a separate

kingdom or ethnarchy during that time, but attached to the Roman province¹¹⁰- It is very doubtful therefore whether any king was without the right under the Republic. In the last century of the Republic the Numidian coins were based upon the Roman standards. Denarii and quinarii are extant, with Latin-Numidian inscription. Bohn infers that this alteration came in after Jugurtha’s death, when the Numidian family was allowed to reign with the partial sacrifice of their right.

§ 67. The client princes under the Republic not only controlled their own military regime within their kingdoms, but frequently led the forces which Rome requested as auxiliaries. The only limitations placed on their military power are such as occur in treaties of peace,' in connexion with the conquest of great kings such as Antiochus and Philip, who were forbidden to keep a fleet. The rest were not sufficiently rich in money or subjects to be formidable to Rome. The personal leadership of his forces when serving as auxiliaries was considered a sign of extra zeal in Deiotarus¹¹¹. Deiotarus and Juba were so progressive as to introduce Roman arms, discipline, and order amongst their troops ¹¹²-

Under the Empire the ‘ regia auxilia ’ preserved their distinction from the other ‘sociae cohortes¹¹³.’

§ 68. The kings under the Republic, though their successors had to be recognised by Rome, yet had the

right of bequest, and of choice of successor. This is-seen in the case of Ptolemy Auletes’ will, which he begged Rome not to change. Rome became guardian of the prince named in the will and kept a copy of the will itself under Pompey’s care¹. But that the king had in theory the right to make his dispositions without consulting the senate, is implied in the language of Cassius Dio, which describes Caesar’s action in Alexandria. Caesar claims that as consul he has the power to assume the guardianship of Ptolemy’s children and “ to carry out their father’s resolutions².” When Scipio was requested by Masinissa to superintend the division of his inheritance, Masinissa nevertheless was assumed to have himself settled who should be the heirs (“quum commune eis (sc. liberis) regnum pater reliquisset ”)³. Also the kingdoms bequeathed to Rome were entered by Rome on the strength of the will of the testator. Some stress was thus laid upon a supposed will of Ptolemy Alexander of Egypt. Attalus III however when bequeathing his kingdom to Rome inserted a statement that the will must be ratified by the legatee, presumably since in the will he left freedom to certain towns, and wished this to be secured⁴. We have seen too that the king’s power to leave the kingdom to his. heir is the necessary consequence of the nature of the kingship, which was hereditary, and not elective⁵. That power the Roman senate did not take away, though it did not bind itself to renew the friendship with the successor, nor salute him as king in a special decree of honour. The emperors identified

the question of recognition more closely with that of the will, by insisting on their right of confirming the latter¹¹⁴. But the senate did not abstain from using its influence to secure the succession of a favourite. The notorious case of Jugurtha has already been mentioned, while the diplomacy used in favour of Philip’s son, Demetrius, was defeated by the machinations of Perseus.

(/) Ab- § 69. Kings could as a rule absent themselves from their ling- their kingdoms, but if the senate thought fit, it pointed doms. out to the king that it was to the interest of the state, that is, the Roman state, that he should remain in his kingdom, as it did not hesitate to point out to Masinissa¹¹⁵. Kings driven from their kingdoms by rebels or external foes went to Rome at once to complain¹¹⁶.

Hiero visited Rome in 237 B.C. to be present at the Ludi Romani¹¹⁷. Eumenes went to discuss the settlement of Asia in 189 B.C. and make requests on his own behalf¹¹⁸, Prusias with excuses in 168 B.C.⁶, and the young princes of Syria with requests in 75 B.C. (circa)⁷ Herod frequently left Judaea for the last-named object, or to shew his zeal and friendship for the emperor and his friends⁸. Suetonius states that it was a general practice of the kings under the Empire to leave their kingdoms, and pay their duty to Augustus not only at Rome, but when he was traversing the provinces⁹ The ‘ senatus-consultum ’ passed against such visits to Rome in 167

B.C. was devised for the occasion against Eumenes¹, and must have been repealed or become obsolete later, since Ptolemy Physcon and other kings came to Rome afterwards to push forward their interest with the protecting power. At the same time it was the decree of a state claiming overlordship, and only conceivable in the case of princes who had been accustomed to pay their respects and solicit favours.

§ 70. The only occasions upon which the senate Occasions intruded upon the domestic affairs of the kings were torial in-when the kingdoms had been disturbed, or when the ^terf^erence-kingship did not seem safe, and the object of the senate was to strengthen it against outside influences. Scipio’s commission in 140 B.C. was to see that the kingdoms were in proper hands, though on its journey it did much in the way of arbitration. The previous commission of Octavius to arrange the affairs of Syria had really an object affecting that kingdom’s foreign policy²-Pompey did much work of organisation in Cappadocia in 63 B.C., but only to repair the damage of the war in the matter of destroyed cities, and to strengthen the kingdom against its neighbours. The special instructions given to Cicero in 51 B.C. were directed towards the same object, the strengthening of the kingdom of Cappadocia against Parthia, and the preservation of its kingship³.

171. The summons to a king, bidding him leave his kingdom and render an account of some alleged misdemeanour, was a feature of the emperors’ rule.

The generals of the Republic frequently summoned kings to join them with forces, but the judicial summons was more rare. Bituitus was thus summoned in the second century B.C. ‘ to satisfy the senate¹,’ but he was only a ‘regulus.’ Caesar failed to get obedience from Ariovistus, when he summoned him to a conference. Ariovistus answered in terms that claimed for himself equality: “ If Caesar wishes to say anything to me, let him come to me, for neither am I in any other way his inferior, and the one who has any need must himself go to the other².” During the civil wars the summons was successful, whenever the Roman general had the means of compulsion. In Alexandria Caesar caused a great outcry, when he summoned the children of Ptolemy Auletes before him to submit to arbitration. The minister, Pothinus, complained of it as an attack upon the royal dignity³. Antony gained obedience from Cleopatra, when he summoned her to give an account for helping Brutus⁴, and later also from Herod, who had been accused of misgovernment in his tetrarchy⁵. With Artavasdes of Armenia he failed, and not even a siege could make that king confess his error⁶. The ‘ evocatio’ of Jugurtha in 112 B.C. cannot be regarded from the same standpoint as those above mentioned. In the first place he came as ‘ dediticius,’ one who had surrendered into the general’s power. Secondly, because the corruption of the general had spoiled the effect of that ‘deditio,’ a safe-conduct had to be granted to Jugurtha, which robbed the ‘evocatio’ of its essential character⁷.

§ 72. Tribute was not laid upon free states which ¹Free were bound to Rome by a treaty of friendship or alliance. Thus we find in Cicero the ‘tributary’ states frequently contrasted with the ‘ allied ’ states¹, and Appian notes that the Mithridatic war was specially burdensome to Asia, in that the ‘ allied ’ kings, and ‘ the cities which had a sworn treaty with Rome,’ and ‘ those which were tribute-free on account of alliance or special service,’ had exceptionally to make contributions along with cities which were ‘tributary².’ The same contrast is preserved in another passage of Appian, in which he speaks of the tributary Greeks paying nine years’ tribute in two, during the civil wars of 43—42 B.C., and then goes on to say that the kings and free peoples also suffered³. Further, the allied states and those which had done Rome service were specially excepted in Gaul, when Caesar reduced the country into the form of a province, and imposed upon it the payment of a definite tribute⁴. Sallust again supports Appian in classing the kings with the free peoples as those who paid their money, not in tribute to Rome, but in tribute to individual nobles⁵.

¹ Cic. de imp. Pomp. 8, salvis populi Romani sociis atque integris vectigalibus; cf. ib. 5, regnum Ariobarzanis quod finitimum est vestris vectigalibus ; Leg. hi. 41, quos socioa respublica habeat, quos amioog, quos stipendarios. Also of. Cic. Balb. 24; Leg. Agr. 98.

from tribute to Rome as well as from taxation in his own state¹¹⁹. Now Festus classes kings with the ‘populi liberi’ and ‘populi foederati².’ Since therefore immunity from tribute was enjoyed not only by ‘foederati/ and by those who were ‘ sine foedere liberi,’ but was extended also to private individuals who received the title ‘ friend/ it may well be inferred that not only those kings whose ‘ foedera ’ remained intact, but those who were called and treated as friends without the formality of a definite treaty, enjoyed the same immunity from tribute.

Tribute § 73. This inference may be supported by other Conquered considerations. It has already been shewn that the and pro- king owned his land, whereas the provincial only enjoyed viriciaZ _usuf_ruct of his, the land itself being Rome’s³. In

the king’s case therefore the land could not be a basis of taxation. Tribute, we find, was imposed only on conquered territory, and accompanied the imposition of the ‘ ius Romanorum,’ or the reduction of the land into the form of a province. This is clear from two passages of Cicero and Tacitus respectively. According to the first, “ on the provinces either a fixed tribute was imposed, which was called ‘ stipendiarium/ as for instance, upon the Spaniards and most of the Carthaginians, a kind of reward of victory, and an indemnity for the war; or a censorial contract was instituted, as for Asia, by the Lex Sempronia⁴.” According to the other, a general of Nero boasted that he “would impose upon the conquered (the Armenians) tribute, laws, and

instead of the shadow of a king, the jurisdiction of the Romans (ms Romanorum¹²⁰).”

The jurisdiction referred to here is that of the proconsul or propraetor, and it was intended that Armenia should be made a province. Tribute therefore was essentially a feature of provincial administration and not to be associated with the condition of kingdoms.

These possessed all the outward signs of independence and were shewn above to be contrasted with the provinces and to lie outside the sphere of the magistrate’s ‘ imperium¹²¹.’

This was not only so in theory. Velleius expressly Tribute states that Syria and Egypt were first made tributary ^b^f^_the when the kingship ceased and they became provinces¹²², formation In Judaea no tribute seems to have been paid to Rome ^ “ into'a during the reign of Herod. Thus it is stated by province. Josephus that Herod taxed for his own revenue public sales¹²³, and since later it is shewn that Vitellius released the Jews of Jerusalem, when no longer under a king, from taxes on fruits bought and sold⁵, it appears that Herod’s taxes were continued when Judaea became a province, and that Rome had not been receiving tribute during his reign. It is still more clearly indicated that the tribute began again after Herod’s death when Judas of Galilee “ excited the people to rebel, abusing those who should endure to pay tribute to the Romans, and after the God (Herod) suffer mortal masters⁶.”

Even where a whole country became a province, special districts in it, which retained the privileges of alliance and autonomy, retained also exemption from tribute, as appears from the example of Gaul cited above from Suetonius¹. It is significant therefore that when Caesar put the Atrebates under a king (Commius), he seems at the same time to have conferred immunity from taxation and restored to that state autonomy².

§ 74. It might happen to a state that had surrendered at discretion, that until the time was ripe for making it into a province, it retained a measure of autonomy but paid a tribute as indemnity for war expenses. But this arrangement was only meant to be temporary, and in the case of kingdoms a definite arrangement was more quickly arrived at. The arrangement, which was made by the consul and ratified later by the senate, either prescribed the deposition of the king, or restored the king to his former position, perhaps with the loss of certain territory. The restoration was not a temporary one, but kept its force during the king’s lifetime, if he behaved well to Rome. In all the cases known under the Republic, where kings and not chieftains are concerned, the restoration of the king is paid for only by a fixed indemnity, not by a permanent tribute. When Mithridates VI offered to Pompey to pay tribute for his kingdom, in order to avoid an unconditional surrender, his offer was refused. Hiero, Philip, Antiochus III made payments only

during a fixed number of years. Tigranes was fined in a fixed sum besides paying the large gratuity which Pompey divided among his army¹. Mommsen, describing the settlement of Asia by Pompey, speaks of the “conversion of clients into subjects,” and the “new property tax which all those princes, priests, and cities had to pay to Rome/' But this is too general a statement, if it is meant to include the kings of Cappadocia, Galatia, Pontus, Armenia, Commagene, and others. The evidence of Appian does not go so far. That writer includes the Cappadocians among those who then became subject to Rome, along with the Bithynians, Cilicians, Palestine, Coele-Syria, Phoenice, and the inland districts towards Euphrates. “On some of these,” he says, “they imposed tribute straightway, and on others later.” The Cappadocians may be well included in the latter, and Appian be referring to the time of their annexation. He then says that Paphla-gonia, Galatia, Phrygia, Mysia, Lydia, Caria, Ionia, Greece, Macedonia, and other parts were recovered from Mithridates, and “on the majority of them, not yet being tributary, they imposed tribute².” The kings of

Of Teuta, queen of Illyria, it is said in Polybius (n. 12, 3) that she “ agreed to pay the tribute (<popovs) that had been ordered.” This may have been a regular tribute, for it was being paid by her successor about twelve years afterwards, and had apparently fallen into arrears (Livy xxn. 33, 5). But it is possible too that an indemnity is here meant, and that, as Antiochus IV of Syria was paying off the last instalment of his father’s indemnity after the lapse of twelve years, so the payments in this case extended over the same period or even longer. In any case Teuta ranks rather with tribal chiefs, than with important rulers of kingdoms, and need not therefore be treated as an example bearing upon our inquiry.

Paphlagonia and Galatia from what we know of the other districts may well be excepted in the minority. The circumstances of the Cappadocian and Galatian kings confirm this conclusion.

In all the references to the finances of Ariobar-zanes III there is no mention of tribute to Rome, even where such mention could hardly have been avoided, had the tribute existed. Cicero, as proconsul of Cilicia entrusted with the safety of Ariobarzanes, writes of the large sums which that king owed to Pompey and Brutus, of the poverty and insolvency of the king, and of the impossibility of squeezing money out of him for his creditors, but he never mentions tribute owed to Rome. He also speaks of the king’s attempt to raise revenue on the method followed by a certain Roman provincial governor, but in connexion with its failure he discusses only the loss of Pompey and Brutus, not that of the Roman treasury¹.

Many references are made to the contributions of Deiotarus to the members of the first triumvirate, especially to Caesar, but these contributions are evidently irregular, depending on the caprice of the general, or the generosity of the king, who at first made them as presents. They were not fixed by agreement or due to the Roman state².

Again, Caesar, when the kings and princes flocked to him to swear loyalty after the battle of Pharsalia, dismissed them without imposing on them any other condition than that of protecting the Roman provinces³-

³ [Caes.] Bell. Alex. 65 : condicionibus impositis provinciae tu-endae ac defendendae.

Josephus, though frequently describing the finances of Herod, makes no mention of tribute to Rome or to the emperor¹, for the bribes of Herod to Antony and Augustus in the shape of contributions of money or crowns cannot be regarded as tribute in the proper sense. Nor does any mention of tribute occur in the account of his institution as king². Ptolemy XI of Egypt and Artavasdes of Armenia, and the kings and princes generally are also only mentioned as contributing to the war-chests of various generals, but not as owing a regular tribute to Rome³. The money paid by kings to individuals who secured them titles of honour or support in war, is obviously excluded from consideration as a source of public revenue⁴.

§ 75. Even after the Mithridatic and civil wars therefore we do not find that the kings of Asia paid a regular tribute. Nor is it anywhere mentioned that the kings of Africa lay under such an obligation. The chieftains of Spain and Gaul on the contrary were not, and could not be, on the same footing. These tribal chiefs were rather leaders than rulers of their peoples, and the tribute imposed was not personal to the chief, as that imposed on the absolute monarchs of Africa and Asia would have been⁵. The tribes still elected

¹ Jos. Ant. xv. 365; xvn. 204 f., 307 f., 318 f. ; Bell. u. 97 f. The fourth passage describes the revenues of each of Herod’s sons, without any mention of tribute to Rome, which would have materially lessened them.

⁵ Liv. xxviii. 34, 11 speaks of tribute being imposed on the Spanish chief Mandonius. In xxix. 3, 5 the further imposition of tribute is described in the very paragraph that speaks of the capital punishment of Mandonius and the other chiefs.

Judaeanot Judaea after Pompey’s settlement was not a kingdom. tributary j£_{yrcanus was not a}H₀wed the title of king nor even of republic, ethnarch till later, for the country was largely under the control of the Syrian governor, and Josephus distinctly calls the government an aristocracy¹²⁴. Hence the inscriptions speak consistently of the tribute as payment imposed upon the people and not upon the high priest². The case of Judaea therefore is not that of a tributary kingdom. Under Herod the tribute to Rome seems to have ceased, as has already been mentioned.

§ 76. A passage of Appian after stating the heavy exactions made by Antony from kings and cities says that he also set up certain kings upon condition of paying fixed tributes³- Antony, however, did many irregular acts, which were contrary to Roman custom, and these do not affect the main question. So far as Herod is concerned, the passage seems to shew that he paid tribute to Antony for additional tracts of territory, Idumea and Samaria, whereas his kingdom proper, Judaea, had been given to him by the senate free of tribute on the joint motion of Antony and Augustus⁴

Examples under the Empire so far from pointing back to an existing practice under the Republic of imposing tribute upon kings, do not indicate the practice as common even under the Empire. For of the two references extant, while one shews that the Bosporan kings paid tribute¹, the other shews that Armenia was exempt from it². The Bosporan kings moreover were upon a different footing from the rest, for they were allowed to bear the title /3aa-t\eu? ftamXewv and to coin in gold.

§ 77. The kings, however, though not paying irregular regular tribute, made for various purposes frequent contributions which lost their voluntary nature under the late Republic.

Hiero sent sums of money on many occasions⁸. In 186 B.C. the kings and states in friendship with Rome supplied the money for games vowed by L. Scipio in the war with Antiochus⁴. In 148 B.C. Micipsa and Mastanabal promised Scipio Africanus the younger money and arms for the Carthaginian war⁵. Pompey in 66 B.C. was empowered by the senate to collect money as well as to enrol forces, and the kings were ordered to help him in everything⁶, and throughout the Mithridatic war the kings had to make frequent contributions owing to the poverty of the Roman treasury through the civil wars⁷. Ptolemy XI again supplied money to Gabinius on the pretext of military support⁸, while Crassus in 54 B.C. wrote to kings for auxiliary troops but accepted money instead⁹. So too for the purposes of the civil wars the two opposing

leaders made great and frequent demands upon the kings. Pompey “ had exacted much from all the kings, dynasts, tetrarchs, and free peoples of Achaia¹²⁵.” This shews the unusual nature of the exaction, if it is laid on the free peoples also. Other money, which had been promised Pompey, Caesar exacted later to the full, “not so much through knavery but because his expenses were so great².” He pardoned kings for giving help to Pompey, “merely taking money from them⁸.” Deiotarus especially was often called upon. Cicero speaks of many such contributions by Deiotarus to Caesar⁴- This money went to defray the cost of Caesar’s armies⁵. Hyrcanus the high priest ordered his minister Antipater to supply corn, arms and money to Scaurus, on his Arabian expedition⁶, to Gabinius when going to Egypt⁷, to Mithridates of Pergamum when collecting help for Caesar in Egypt⁸. Brutus and Cassius in Asia, and later Antony levied from the “ kings, dynasts, and free peoples ” contributions which are contrasted with the regular tribute of the Greeks⁹. Lastly, Herod presented Augustus with 800 talents when confirmed by him in his kingdom, and later with 300 talents to go towards his public shows and largesses¹⁰.

These contributions therefore were at first voluntary, to secure Rome’s goodwill, but in the last century of the Republic were dictated by the senate, apparently without the amount being fixed, in order to supply the

expenses of wars; and finally they were dictated by the leaders of the Roman state in the civil wars, or made as presents to them in order to win their favour.

§ 78. There was another kind of contribution to Bribes which the kings were liable, though this did not concern the treasury of Rome, but only individuals. In the last century of the Republic the kings paid great sums to individual citizens to secure themselves against deposition or to purchase honours and titles. As early as the Jugurthan war it was an established practice, Memmius complaining “ that kings and free peoples paid tribute to a few nobles¹²⁶.” Sulla set up Alexander as king of Egypt in hopes of great pecuniary remuneration to himself¹²⁷. Cicero protests against this traffic on many occasions. The restoration of Ptolemy XI, the agrarian law of Rullus, and the sale of the royal title and of ¹ foedera,’ which marked the tribunates of Yatinius and Clodius¹²⁸ in 59 and 58 B.C., all came beneath his censure. Plutarch and Suetonius mention the sums squeezed out of Ptolemy XI by Caesar and Pompey in return for his treaty and title¹²⁹.

His brother of Cyprus fell through lack of a little generosity to Clodius. Cicero mentions the hopes of money from Juba which caused Rullus and his party to exempt Numidia from the consequences of their agrarian measure¹³⁰, and the same hopes probably prompted the proposal to call Juba ‘friend and ally⁶.’

Ariovistus doubtless paid for his title secured through Caesar in 59 B.C.¹ The petty king of Commagene obtained the gift of a ‘ toga praetexta ’ from the same source, and probably on the same condition². All the princes set up by Pompey, besides paying money to Pompey himself, were probably called upon to pay also to his allies of the triumvirate, since their establishment or extensions of power, as part of Pompey’s Asiatic settlement, could only be confirmed by the support of Pompey’s fellow-triumvirs. A chief of Galatia, Brogi-tarus, similarly obtained the royal title from Clodius³. Though no other particular instances of the practice are mentioned by name, it is obvious that since any petty chief, even the owner of one small town (e.g. Contoniatus)¹³¹, could become king by a senate’s decree, the scope of the dishonest tribunes was unlimited.

Bribes were also necessary during the last civil wars and the later triumvirates to appease any Roman potentate to whom the king had given offence, or before whom he was accused by his neighbours or people. Herod thus twice bribed Antony, as tetrarch and as king⁵.

§ 79. It was also an early custom of those kings who wished to shew themselves good friends of Rome, to send crowns of gold to the senate, or statues of Nike as a good omen; also to make dedications in Roman temples. Among other instances of this

³ Cic. Har. Resp. 29 : hunc Deiotarum...tu etiam regem appellari cum Brogitaro iubes; alter est rex iudicio senatus per nos, peeunia Brogitarus per te appellatus.

common practice are those of Attalus I, in gratitude for help¹³², and of Ariarathes V, Demetrius I, and Diodotus Tryphon when seeking for recognition². Since, however, it was also customary for gifts to be sent to Roman generals (as, for instance, when they were sent to Scipio at Numantia by Attalus III³), and in the last century the generals could do more for the king than the senate could, these crowns came to be sent to individuals instead. Thus Machares sent one to Lucullus, asking for recognition⁴, Pharnaces and many other kings simultaneously to Caesar⁵, Hyrcanus to Antony⁶, Cleopatra to Augustus⁷, all on the pretext of complimenting those generals upon their victories⁸.

| 80. Some facts are forthcoming as to the personal Private relations of the kings, the most noteworthy feature being the private friendships which they enjoyed with individual Romans, whom the kings sometimes respected as patrons. Deiotarus had many such connexions, namely with Cato, to whom he entrusted his children and family in virtue of his ancestral hospitium⁹, Pompey¹⁰, Caesar¹³³, Cicero, whose son he entertained in

his kingdom¹³⁴, and generally with all important Romans¹³⁵. Juba enjoyed a ‘paternum hospitium’ with Pompey, because the latter had restored his father¹³⁶, and the sons and daughter of Ptolemy XI had a similar connexion with Pompey for the same reason¹³⁷. Bogud was a close friend of Caesar¹³⁸, and lastly Herod enjoyed a private friendship with Antony and Augustus, from whom he had received his kingdom, and also later with Agrippa¹³⁹

§ 81. The personal dignity of the kings was consulted not only by means of gifts, as already described¹⁴⁰, but also by means of the special entertainment accorded to them or their ambassadors in Rome (in particular in the matter of seats among the senators at the games)¹⁴¹; further by the right of sitting on the tribunal with Roman magistrates⁹- Their dignity was thus counted equal to that of a Roman magistrate, but where three sat together, the Roman claimed the seat of honour in the middle, as did Sulla in 92 B.C. between the Cappadocian king and the Parthian envoy¹⁰. Juba was considered extremely arrogant when he took the middle seat between Scipio and Cato, and Cato moved his seat to place Scipio in the middle¹¹. This honour however of a seat near the magistrate was only granted to those kings whom the senate had recognised¹². The

§ 82. The life of kings was generally safe when Treatment they came into the power of Rome after a conflict. A ‘ regulus ’ like Gentius might be punished with death, or one who had done such crimes as Jugurtha and had refused to surrender. Kings, if deposed, were imprisoned in Italy, as Perseus was, but if they ‘surrendered at discretion' they were sometimes restored. The Cyprian king was promised an honourable safety by Cato¹⁴².

There was even a Roman tradition against putting to death a king who had been made captive¹⁴³. Violations of it are noted in terms which only prove the general custom. When Dio speaks of the scourging and crucifixion of Antigonus by Antonius, he is careful to add that no other king had experienced such treatment at Roman hands⁴- Tacitus in describing the severity of Tiberius states that even Tigranes, once ruler of Lesser Armenia, when under accusation, “did not escape through his royal name the punishments meted out to citizens⁵.” Antonius bound Artavasdes in silver chains, on the ground that “ it was a shame for one who had been a king to be bound in chains of iron⁶.”

Kings in captivity lost under the Republic their royal title, just as Perseus was told by Aemilius Paullus “ to forget the name of king, now that he was conquered.” Pompey granted Tigranes the title ‘ king

of kings' before he restored him, but it is noted as being contrary to custom¹. Under the Empire, when the emperor annexed a kingdom, he sometimes allowed the royal name to the one whom he deprived of his inheritance, as Augustus did to Antiochus Philopappus and his sons². Kings who found refuge in Roman territory when expelled from their own country, retained the royal title. Thus Vonones of Parthia was guarded in Syria “ manente luxu et regio nomine³.” Antony did more harm than anyone to the royal dignity, for he not only slew many kings⁴, but also made kings of private persons of ignoble birth, as Amyntas of Galatia⁵. The senate and emperors however generally paid respect to royal blood, as has been mentioned already in the case of the Syrian succession.

The act of putting a king upon trial was as rare as ‘evocatio’ during the rule of the senate. “So unusual is it,’^: says Cicero of Deiotarus, “that a king should be tried on a capital charge, that until now it has never been heard of⁶.”

A special honour given to kings was the Roman citizenship. Under the Republic, says Mommsen, the citizenship required residence in or near Italy, and that was out of the question for the kings. M. Antonius Polemo (as he appears on coins), if he was the one set up by Antony⁷, was the first to receive it. Under the Empire many kings bore Roman names as citizens.

⁶ Deiot. I. The great reverence for the royal name among the Romans may be seen too from such passages as Cie. Leg. Man. 24; ib. Deiot. 40; Suet. Jul. 5.

§ 83. Much stress has frequently been laid upon ^natorial the hesitation displayed by Rome in acquiring territory ^t^tion beyond the seas¹⁴⁴. This appears not only in her from an-

ment of Macedonia after the fall of Perseus; in the restoration of the Numidian house after the fall of Jugurtha; and of Tigranes to the throne of Armenia in 65 B.C.; also in the comparatively small share of Carthaginian land which she took to herself in 140 B.C.

It appears also in her partial or total abstention from annexation when a kingdom had been bequeathed to her by testament¹⁴⁵ or left without a ruler through failure of the royal line. For example the eastern portions of the domains of Attalus in 133 B.C. were conceded to the neighbouring kings, and when the senate seemed to have made a mistake, at least in respect of Greater Phrygia, the revised settlement left that country practically independent¹⁴⁶. Cyrene, bequeathed to Rome in 92 B.C., was made into a province only after the lapse of thirty years. No advantage was taken of the extinction of the Egyptian dynasty in 81 B.C. until three years had elapsed, when Cyprus only was annexed. Cappadocia, on two occasions left without a member of the royal line, was in either case supplied with another dynasty. Even in Syria, where Pompey abolished the monarchy, Lucullus had previously set up a fresh

representative of the Seleucids. And though Rome claimed Bithynia as soon as it was bequeathed to her by the will of Nicomedes, in this case there was not only a formidable neighbour and rival claimant whose growth it was necessary to suppress, but Roman traders-and slave-dealers had even in the king’s lifetime overrun the country, and, apparently counting it Roman territory, had hardly left the king any subjects to govern¹

In some cases this abstention was due to the failure of the opposing political parties to agree upon a common policy, as in the case of Greater Phrygia², and of Egypt and Cyprus⁸, but generally it seems to have been the consistent aim of the senate to save themselves the expense and trouble of maintaining abroad such contingents of troops as would have been necessary to protect such oversea dominions. The senate had not at its service the standing armies and the professional soldiers of the Empire. To station a legion abroad on garrison duty for a considerable number of years was contrary to the terms of the soldier’s service, for the army under the Republic never really lost its character of a citizen army. Instead the auxiliaries of the neighbouring kings were expected to cope with emergencies, and thus it was that Asia was instantly lost at the sudden onset of Mithridates, and that Jugurtha was able to accomplish his aggressions without any check from Roman Africa⁴- Pompey when he made

⁴ This, as I have been reminded, was also due to the fact that a Homan governor could not operate outside his own province under the Republic without special leave.

new provinces of Bithynia and Pontus, Syria, and in an enlarged form Cilicia, was yet careful to remove the need of legionary garrisons. To this end he strengthened Cappadocia and Commagene, assigned the eastern half of Pontus to Deiotarus, and left to Tigranes and Pharnaces respectively Armenia and the Bosporus¹.

In this way he disposed of all the outlying districts to client kings. Henceforth, when a Parthian host threatens, notice of the danger is invariably sent by the king of Commagene or of Armenia, and Cicero’s bare handful of Roman troops in Cilicia in 51 B.C. would have served him only for a bodyguard, had they not been swelled by the auxiliaries of Galatia.

§ 84. Of the occasions of annexation one has been Occasion$ already mentioned; a new king refused recognition °{₀^^nnexa' upon his accession might fear the absorption of his kingdom². Annexation could also follow conquest or a bequest by the last king of the country in Rome’s favour. There are four notable instances of such Bequest. bequests—those of Pergamum, Cyrene, Egypt and Cyprus, and Bithynia. If Mommsen is correct in his supposition that the testament in the third of these cases was that of Ptolemy Alexander II, and not of Alexander I³, in every instance the testator was the last of his race, dying childless. Whether any influence was brought to bear upon the kings is doubtful. In any case, in view of the above considerations as regards the Roman policy, any proposal to procure the bequest of the above kingdoms cannot have come from the main body of the senate but rather from the Equites and

commercial classes, who sought extension of their trading facilities¹ There is no evidence however that these royal testators yielded to influence from without. Nor is it strange that the last of a line of kings, at a loss whom to choose as his heir, should surrender his kingdom to the full control of a power which had for so long wielded an indirect sovereignty. Whether this or other considerations influenced Attalus III is unknown², but his act probably set the fashion and suggested the course to the other monarchs mentioned above. The enemies of Rome went so far as to dispute the genuineness of his will, but an inscription of Pergamum proves its validity³ Much more doubtful was the will of Ptolemy Alexander. Cicero himself said that he dared not pronounce an opinion upon it, though acknowledging that the senate’s authority had gone out in its behalf⁴- It is even uncertain whether it is to be attributed to Alexander I, who died in 88 B.C., or to the second of the name who died in 81 B.C. That the former should have willed the country to Rome, when he was not the last scion of the ruling family, is, as Mommsen points out, unlikely in view of the custom followed in the cases of Pergamum, Cyrene, and Bithynia. Yet it is unlikely too that the second Alexander should have had time to meditate upon the selection of his heir, when he was slain within nineteen

¹ This is supported by another fact that has been brought to my notice, viz. that in 65 B.C. Crassus, the champion of the Equites, moved a proposal to subject Egypt to tribute. Plut. Grass. 13 ; Cic. Leg. Agr. ii. 17, 44.

Genuineness of the wills of Attalus and

Ptolemy

Alexander.

² For the latest review of the situation at this time v. Greenidge, Rom. Hist. i. 176.

days of his arrival in Egypt¹. Further, Strabo, in giving the reasons for the deposition of the Cyprian Ptolemy in 58 B.C., does not even mention the will²-The existence of any real will becomes yet more doubtful when we consider the actual course of events.

Sulla as master of Rome set up Alexander II in Egypt, “hoping to get money from so wealthy a king³.” The king soon perishes, and Sulla, evidently eager for nothing but his money, makes use of a rumour about a will or more probably originates one, and makes the senate at once act upon it by sending to take the royal treasures deposited in Tyre. True to the senatorial policy of abstention he does nothing further, and later we find the party of the Optimates, as represented by Catulus and Hortensius, directly opposing further intervention, the latter even insisting on the recognition of Ptolemy Auletes. The democrats, on the contrary, remembering the attitude of their party under the leadership of the Gracchi towards the possessions of the Attalids, had after Sulla’s death asserted the genuineness of the will, and tried to bring the kingdom within the scope of their agrarian scheme. Cicero, when speaking against the scheme, in view of the senate’s action under Sulla, can do no more than hint at the real absence of any testament⁴.

The validity of the wills of Nicomedes of Bithynia and of Ptolemy Apion of Cyrene seems not to have been disputed.

§ 85. When the inheritance of a kingdom was The an-accepted and followed by annexation, the estates ^territory

which the late king had kept for his personal enjoyment became (in addition to the royal treasures) the property of the Roman people and were leased to private contractors¹⁴⁷. Though, however, Rome generally contented herself with asserting her exclusive right of ownership to the royal estates, we find frequent indications that there was nothing to prevent the whole kingdom bequeathed from being treated as Roman domain land. “ Who is ignorant,” says Cicero, speaking against the scheme of Rullus, “ that that kingdom (Egypt) is said to have become the property of the Roman people by the will of the late king ?...This man (Rullus) by his law will sell Alexandria, nay Egypt itself¹⁴⁸?” The case of Bithynia receives the following comment: “ That inheritance we have accepted; the kingdom of Bithynia has certainly become the property of the Roman people¹⁴⁹. Is there any reasou why the decemvirs should not sell all its estates, cities, waters, harbours, in fact the whole of Bithynia ? ” Thus though in his scheme Rullus had only scheduled the ‘agri regii’ of Pontus and Bithynia, Cicero implies that to the rest there was just as good a title,*and lays special stress on the scope left to the commissioners in Egypt, where they were to have power to discriminate between what should be sold as Roman, and what left to the inhabitants. Tacitus again speaks of the estates “ once possessed by king Apion and left to the Roman people

along with his kingdom V’ Apparently therefore, though Rome might have pushed her rights of inheritance to the utmost, it was only the extreme or confiscating party of democrats to whom the possibility of such action could be ascribed. C. Gracchus set them an example when he originated the severe taxation of Asia through the ‘ publicani ’ by an arrangement which had probably until then only prevailed for the estates actually claimed as domain land. It is not as Mommsen² asserts, that Gracchus first established the definite principle that all the land of provincials became Roman property. The contention of Holm³, that no such principle was as yet outlined, is supported by the words of Cicero and the action of Rullus quoted above, which shew that ideas even in 63 B.C. were unsettled on the subject. It is confirmed too by the vague use of the term ‘ freedom,’ as applied to the condition of the people of the acquired kingdom.

It might he thought that this term was correctly Meaning used of the Greeks left free by Flamininus in 197 B.C.; perhaps of the Macedonians divided into four in- as applied dependent districts in 167 B.C.; of the Cappadocianspjpieof who were offered their ‘ freedom ’ in 93 B.C., after the ^{the at}}~

death of the last Ariarathes, “ according to their friend- country. ship and alliance ”; finally, of Greater Phrygia, when it was taken away from the heir of Mithridates V, and its only dependence upon Rome was possibly in the form of a loose attachment to the province of Asia.

the senate “ ordered to be free,” and abstained from making into a province for thirty years

On the other hand, when Livy’s epitome² speaks of the seizure of Asia by Aristonicus, “whereas it had been bequeathed to the Roman people, and ought to have been free,” and when the Pergamenes claimed that Attalus in dying had “left their country free,” subject to the ratification of the will by Rome, little more than local independence (Bq/AOKparia, says Mommsen) can be meant,—the independence which Pergamum and probably the other cities would enjoy in the midst of a district which was to be supervised as a whole by Rome. Again, there seems to have been little doubt from the first that Cyprus was to be made into a province in 58 B.C.; yet the people there “ welcomed Cato, expecting to become friends and allies of the Roman people, instead of slaves (of the king)³.” Since Cicero calls the Sicilian states ‘ friends and allies,’ though part of a province⁴, the liberty to which this friendship and alliance was akin, was again no more than urban self-government.

The acquisition of a kingdom by conquest entailed similar treatment to that described above, Rome taking to herself the domain land, and the rest being generally left to its possessors⁶. With the organisation of these districts as provinces we have not here to deal, nor with the question what improvement the transference

of government made in their condition. When a kingdom was once annexed, the romanization of the country went on apace. Twenty-one years was sufficient so to change the order of things in Numidia that Augustus forbore to instate the heir of the last king, and gave him Mauretania instead¹⁵⁰ The position of a king who survived the loss of his kingdom has been noticed in a previous section². ■

§ 86. Though the manifestations of the protecting General power of Rome in the Mediterranean were so inter- ₀/Bome. mittent, her attitude towards the kingdoms with which she came into contact was fixed in one particular at least. The main feature of her expansion was a habit of claiming a permanent influence over the foreign policy of those who had opposed her unsuccessfully, whether great or small. To each of her opponents in succession, first in Italy, then in every part, she adopted a tone of superiority based on a knowledge of her own force, even before events had had time to confirm it.

When once her right to dictate had been acknowledged by the victim, that right was never withdrawn. Neither the terms of peace, nor the final payment of the indemnity put an end to the connexion between conquering and conquered³. Whether it was so

expressed in the treaty or not, the ‘majesty of Rome’ was ever in practice to be henceforth observed. Those whose first contact with the Republic had been by way of friendship, were little more fortunate. The greater the intimacy of friendship, the greater the need of flattering ‘the majesty.’ Under the garb of this friendship, the Roman supremacy was disguised by the senate, as the superiority of the ‘ princeps ’ to the rest of the citizens was disguised by Augustus, and it might have been described in the words of the Monumentum Ancyranum : “ From that time onward I surpassed all in dignity, but had no more power than those who were my colleagues in each office¹.” It was in 190 B.C., the year of the defeat of Antiochus, that the sound of her note became so pronounced. Until then kings and cities had gone over to her hegemony because of its mildness², but after this date she claimed to supervise all important affairs between states in the Mediterranean. “The Romans,” said Polybius³, “have made it plain that they are so far from repudiating or despising foreign business, however little appertaining to themselves, that on the other hand they are even indignant, if everything is not referred to them, and everything is not administrated according to their judgment.” No one but Rome had the right to be proud. Cato, in speaking for Rhodes, asked the senate if they were angry that there should be someone prouder than themselves⁴. “To spare the weak and pull down the proud ” became her motto, and Sulla in his overtures to Bocchus remarked that “the Roman people had

always preferred to seek friends rather than slaves, thinking it safer to command the willing than those who had to be forced¹.” ‘Volentibus imperitare’ represents the position which the enemies of Rome bluntly called ‘ servitus².’

§ 87. If Rome found it so easy to command, the General i » i • j 11 • i • i i attitude of

According to Livy the guardians of Ptolemy Philometor declare that they will not succour the Greeks except by will of the Roman people (‘nisi ex auctoritate’)⁸. Antiochus IY in 168 B.C. declared that he had “ obeyed the instructions of the senate’s ambassadors as the commands of gods,” and when asked for help, the same king and Eumenes " guarantee to supply whatever aid Rome should impose upon them⁴.” The professions of Masinissa were in the same strain. “ His kingdom was not his own but belonged to the Roman people,” and “ he blushed to think that Rome should have asked for help instead of commanding it⁵.” All these expressions are quoted from Livy, but even if we allow for some exaggeration on the part of his authorities, biassed by the conditions of a later period, other authorities shew that as early as 168 B.C. the attitude of certain kings reached the depths of servility. So great was the impression made by Rome’s victory over Perseus that “ there was no city,” says Polybius⁶, “ or dynast or king that did not send an embassy at that time to congratulate the Republic/' and in particular Prusias II appeared in Rome in person, where he assumed the

garb of a freedman, and even shaved his head to make the resemblance complete¹- Adherbal, in the speech attributed to him by Sallust, said that he had been instructed by Micipsa “ to consider his kingdom only as held in trust, the jurisdiction and control of it as being in the hands of Rome².” Rome’s task therefore of establishing her overlordship was considerably lightened by the kings themselves.

Coincidence of the Roman protectorate with Roman interests. Disinterestedness in modern protectorates.

§ 88. From the account in a former section of Rome’s duties to her clients and the extent to which she discharged those duties, it would not incorrectly be inferred that in establishing her protectorate Rome consulted her own interests first and last³- The protectorate, we have pointed out, was confined to the foreign affairs of the kings and their international relations. The senate’s object was at first to maintain a balance of power between the Mediterranean kingdoms, then to prevent any disturbance or war that might lead to her own supremacy being threatened by another’s aggrandisement. The only altruistic motive actuating Rome is that suggested in the assertion of Adherbal, that Rome’s custom was “ not to suffer the

³ § 60. N.B. the decree there quoted, limiting the general’s action in support of the Aedui, “quoniam senatus censmsset uti quicunque Galliam provir.ciarn obtineret, quod commodo rei publicae facere posset, Aeduos ceterosque amicos populi Romani defenderet.” kingdom of anyone to grow by crime,” and in Caesar’s threat that “ he would not neglect the injuries done to the Aedui¹⁵¹,” as though Rome were a sentinel against wrongful aggression. It would not be hard to deduce from the number of occasions upon which Rome overlooked wrongful aggression against her clients, or neglected to take decisive action, that her willingness to intervene did not spring from a sense of the ‘ iniuria,’ and the desire to right the wrong committed, but depended upon the degree in which her own interests were affected¹⁵².

It is hardly possible to approve of this carelessness on the part of the senate in suppressing attempts made upon the security of her clients. In the Jugurthan crisis the popular party may seem blameworthy for insisting upon the correction of Jugurtha’s misdoings, and driving the senate to meddle with some “ quarrelsome tribal chiefs.” But it must be remembered that the senate had expressly recognised Adherbal and his predecessors for nearly a century past; that the admission to Roman friendship had, since the time of Hiero, entailed serious and tangible effects upon the relations of the Romans towards him whom they admitted; and finally that the senate had often by its action, and by the wording of at least one treaty¹, encouraged the inference that it upheld the kings whose royal title and claim to friendship it had recognised. In that one sphere at least, therefore, the security of her friends against attack and immunity from wrongful war², it was Rome’s duty to make some return for the advantage of being able to use her friends’ services at need. It suffices to add that the senate, like the Spartans, tended to identify duty with utility³.

On two occasions under the Republic Rome went so far as to lend troops to a king to establish his position, and in both cases the action was due to the influence of triumvirs who had been paid for their support, while in the second case, that of Herod, the object openly avowed by his supporters at Rome was to employ his services for Rome against the Parthians⁴. On one other occasion when the senate gave a commission to its general warranting a loan of troops, namely to Cicero in respect of Ariobarzanes of Cappadocia, Rome’s own interest was again the leading motive, a desire to strengthen her border against an impending Parthian attack⁵.

³ Thuc. v. 105, 4 : ra fiiv T)d4a K<x\a po/iJfowri, ra Be l-vfKpipovTa Skaia. ¹ Append. A, n. 26; xvi. 1, 3, 4. ⁶ ib. vm. 27, 32.

§ 89. If Rome tended to consult her own interests Rome self-when danger threatened her clients from enemies without, or from rivals and rebels within, and could ing the

refrain from assisting one whom she had recognised as her clients' king, still less did she make it her interest to see that *«&jects. he, whom she had recognised, justified that recognition by governing his subjects wisely and with moderation.

No inquiry was made into the extravagant conduct of Attalus III, and his cruelties towards his court. Ptolemy Physcon’s despotic acts, in particular the murder of his relatives, were allowed to work out their own consequences, nor was any account taken of the complaints against the administration of Prusias II, until the rebellion headed by his son troubled the peace of Asia.

It has already been shewn that Rome had no concern with the subjects of a king; that the Roman conception of kingship precluded intrusion into the internal government of a kingdom; that the king was absolute in his own country, master of his subjects’ lives, and owner of his territories. But when we consider that Augustus could so lightly and suddenly set aside such conceptions, hear complaints against a king¹, and even punish him with exile, we are led to seek another motive for such abstention from interference. The motive of the emperor’s interference seems to have been the interest which the absolute master of an empire feels in the welfare of each and every part of it, since even the client kingdoms, save those on remote borders, as the Bosporus, owned the absolute control of the emperor, and their rulers became more and more the emperor’s tenants.

This motive was absent in the policy of the senate. In fact the condition of Bithynia in 107 B.C. and of Cappadocia in 51 B.C. shews that the senate was even ready to surrender the welfare of peoples to individual Roman magnates or to the commercial class. The senate was not interested in a country’s internal regime until it became Roman, and passed beneath a Roman magistrate.

In the Roman protectorate therefore one cannot fail to notice the absence of a force which has in modern times been very prominent in the relations of certain protectors towards their clients, the absence of a moral force, or the desire of a more highly civilized people to raise the standard of government in the less civilized dependent state, to prevent “ offences against the natural laws of justice and humanity¹,” to secure the happiness of a number of human beings, and almost to enforce government in the interests of the governed. It is not our intention to point to Rome’s carelessness about her client’s government of his people as a defect in the character of her protectorate, so much as to call attention to the contrast with modern protectorates and the ideas of modern civilization. The civilization of the Romans was in many points inferior to that of the Hellenized kings, whose foreign affairs they controlled, and a government which allowed such oppression of its own provincial subjects, could hardly be expected to teach the kings any lessons of humanity². It is how-

¹ Lee*Warner, Protected Princes of India (1894), pp. 191-192. This work is also the authority for the following statements in relation to the British Protectorate in India.

² One must dissociate the Roman people, or at least a section of it, from the policy of the government. Though the treatment of its ever at least instructive to find that an attempt of a chiefs in modern power to abstain, like the Roman senate, from

broke down because of the moral force mentioned above, check The attempt referred to belonged to the first policy of °PP^ression-non-intervention pursued by the British in India, of which it has been said that its advocates “ forgot that India must live under the eye of modern society, which cannot tolerate oppression and corruption¹.” It therefore ensued that the protecting power assumed the right to check inhuman practices and offences against natural laws or public morality; that more than one manifesto certified the protected chiefs that their authority would not be blindly supported, if its measures proved ruinous to the country's prosperity, or the inhabitants’ happiness². In the case of a certain Maharajah, while the British invested him with absolute powers of life and death over his own subjects, and undertook to receive no complaints against him, the prince engaged on his part “ to execute justice and promote the happiness and welfare of his people³.” Moreover in the event of the breach of such an engagement, the British Government reserved the right not only to step in and correct such abuses, but to assume a temporary control of the state⁴.

slaves is hardly compatible with a high standard of humanity amongst the people in general, I have been reminded that public opinion was frequently manifested against the senate’s neglect of regal misgovern-ment. The popular outcry against the Jugurthan business and against the restoration of Ptolemy Auletes seems to have been the expression of a constant force of public sentiment, which often voiced itself through tribunes, bat was generally helpless against the widespread corruption of the ruling class.

checkⁿ^{t0 w}hich led the English to intervene on behalf of a rebellion chief against rebellious subjects, and to uphold an mbjectsf * authority which it has once recognised, though here again, if the chiefs oppression is at the root of the outbreak, he may be called upon temporarily to surrender much of his prerogative to a British officer¹. The Roman senate on the contrary seems not to have disliked such disturbances, as they tended to weaken the country and place it more at Rome’s mercy². With the same motive the senate divided kingdoms when occasion offered, whereas the British Government has intervened at times to prevent the disintegration of a client state, by setting aside clauses in a chief’s testament apportioning parts of his territories to younger sons³.

It is needless to take the comparison further or one might point out other practices, in which the modern protecting power has gone beyond the ancient, sometimes as much to its own advantage as to that of the protege, for example, in instituting a separate jurisdiction of its. own for British and European subjects resident in a protected kingdom, or in establishing cantonments of soldiers in the protected country⁴- Not only was the ancient king free from such encroachments from the side of Rome, but the whole connexion was of a far looser nature, insomuch as the protected states of Rome enjoyed international rights and privileges, and nominally preserved their entire sovereignty. Whereas

it was necessary for the senate to declare war upon the disloyal Cleopatra, an Indian prince to-day may be tried and punished for misconduct by the British, and it is many years since one of them received the compliment of a declaration of war¹⁵³. Without dwelling longer on differences between the Roman and the British protectorates, that will be apparent to all, we may add as a primal cause of the difference of treatment the fact that while the Roman client-kingdoms lay almost without exception upon the borders of the Empire, the Indian client-kingdoms are in most cases surrounded by British territory. It is significant that the only state which enjoys any large measure of independence, Nepal, is a frontier state¹⁵⁴.

In connexion with this same question of disinterestedness, it has been pointed out by Mr Lee-Warner that the Romans had hit upon no expedient whereby to preserve the sovereignty of the kings while at the same time conferring on the kingdoms the benefit of Roman methods, and Roman law and order; that their only substitute for absolute non-intervention was annexation; that the British on the contrary resorted at last to the plan of a divided sovereignty, or the strengthening of the royal authority by a strong executive supplied by British political agents¹⁵⁵- Under the Roman protectorate, Numidia after its annexation was, as we have seen, so quickly transformed by the introduction of Roman civilization that Augustus could not safely restore it to the heir of the late monarch. The states in British India, on the contrary, present the phenomenon of a joint rule by British and native powers, which has allowed the development of the country and the improvement of the people’s welfare to proceed in the name of the native government. English officers acting for and with the native power are the solution of the difficulty that also confronted Rome, the customs and principles of the protector being introduced into the subject state without any necessity for annexation.

Note.—The view of the Roman protectorate and the Senate’s selfcentred policy put forward in the last section is clearly enunciated hy Polybius. “ The Senate,’' he says, “ wishing to break up tbe Egyptian kingdom by diplomatic means, agreed to the demands of the younger Ptolemy (Physcon) for its own advantage. For this kind of manceuvre plays a large part in the counsels of the Romans. Through the ignorance of their neighbours they increase and build up their empire by diplomacy, while at the same time they oblige and pose as the benefactors of the party that is in the wrong.” (xxxi. 10 (18). 6.)

1. Polyb. I. 16, 5 ff. : 'leptov.. .Suirefiirero.. .irrrep elpr/vr/s kat Troiovfj.evos rotis Xoyous. ol 8« 'Pou^iatoi rrpotrtSefavro, Kai /iaXterra Sia ras xoprjyias... SioVep un-oXa/Joi/res rov'l€pa)va jjieyd\rjv tls tovto to /rtpog avroig irapit;to-6a.i xpelav da/icvais Trpa(T(&e£avTO rrjv tjiikiav¹.

2. Polyb. I. 16, 9 : TrotrjtTdfjLcvot St <rvv8ij Ka^ i<fS <5 ra /rer al^fi.a\u/ra X^WP¹^ Xvrpwv aVoSoSi/ai rov f3a(ji\(_a 'Pw/u.aiois, apyvpCov <S« irpcHjO(_7vai TaXan-a tovtois «arov, Xoirrov ry8r/ Pou/muoi fx\v <os <£t\ois /cal (ru/ti/tia^ots ixpuivTo rots SupaKotrioi?.

¹ The chapters quoted from Polybius follow the numbering of the Teubner text. The same is true of the references from Diodorus, but since the fragments of that author have been differently arranged in various Teubner editions, a list will be found on p. 231 shewing the corresponding references according to the respective arrangements of Bekker and Dindorf. Bekker’s numbers have been followed in this Appendix.

6. Diod. XXIII. 6 : opwv Se tovs SvpaKocrious ayavax-roSira;. irpe&fiei.s aireoreiXe irpos rois viraTovs irepi SiaXvcreios.

7. App. /Sic. 2 : 'Iepcui-a Se rov SupaKocriW rvpavvov, dvO’ u>v avro'LS es TovSe tov iroX.tp.ov <Tvveireirpa)(ei, (jiiXov Kai (TVfi-fia^ov eOevTO. (1st Punic war.)

8. Diod. XXV. 19 : 'leptov S’ els tov KcXtikov TroXepov 'Piapaiois eritov airetTTeiXe, /3orj6wv 'Pioj^aiois, or Kai rrjv npr/v eXafie p. it a rrjv tov iroXep-ov KardXvirtv. (225 B.C.)

9. Polyb. III. 75, 7 : eirep.if/av Si Kai irpos "Ieptwa irepl fiorjdetas, os xai TrevTaKO&wvs avrois i^airevj eiXe Kpryra? Kai ^iXious 7rt/\ro(/jonoL^!9. (218—217 B.C.)

10. Liv. xxii. 37, 3 : does not say Rome asked for help but states that Hiero sent, unasked, gold, corn and men ‘quae ne accipere abnuant, magno opere se patres conscriptos orare.’

Hiero helped also with a fleet, Liv. xxi. 49, 3; 50, 8. He probably assisted Rome in the Illyrian and Gallic wars, for he received spoils from both, Lav. xxiv. 21, 9.

iv Ta'is <rw8t]Kais, eav avriS irpwrov u.tv to xpwior airoSiocri 7rav, o 7rap’ 'Iepwvos eXa/3ov tov 7ra7r"roL^!, Sevrepov Se tov (TITOV Ik 77 a i'to s' airoKaTao’Djo'coci ro5 xpovov Kai ras aXXas Siopeds, us ei^ov Trap Ikcivov... Cf. 1 and 5 SMjO.

13. (1) Right of embassy, Liv. xxn. 37. (2) Right to make friendship, if not contrary to Roman interests, and to assist his friends, e.g. Egypt, Athen. v. 209 A, b ; Rhodes, Polyb. v. 88, 5; Carthage, ib. i. 83, 1 ff. Cf. also Polyb. i. 16, 10. (3) Settled the succession without reference to Rome. (4) Autonomy in domestic affairs, e.g. in remission of tariffs, Polyb. v. 88, 5.

1. Ptolemy II was the first Egyptian king to make friendship with Rome. This friendship was renewed by his successors, who remained on terms of equality with Rome till 204 B.C., Dio fr. 41, Eutrop. n. 15, App. Sic. 1 (where Ptolemy II is said to have tried to reconcile Rome and Carthage), Liv. xxvn. 4, 10, Polyb. IX. 11 (44) (where Rome begs for a supply of corn, 210 B.C.), Dio fr. 56 (Ptol. IV tries to reconcile Rome and Philip). In 204 b.c. the guardians of Ptol. V probably renewed the friendship on the king’s behalf.

2. Egypt did not yet come under Rome’s protection in spite of certain traditions of late origin. Philip and Antiochus III having agreed to divide Egypt, Rome declared war on Philip, but tried to appease and restrain Antiochus by negotiation, Polyb. xvi. 27, 5. Antiochus however pressed Egypt hard and brought it to terms. Holm (iv. chap. 17, n. 2) thinks he received the Asia Minor dependencies of Egypt by secret compact. When Rome, after beating Philip, demanded the restoration of Ptolemy’s territory, Antiochus was able to shew that Egypt had managed without Rome’s protection. Jos. Ant. xii. 154; App. Syr. 3, 5; Polyb. xvm. 51, 10; Liv. xxxm. 39, 4; and cf. Holm I.e.

(a) an embassy from Ptolemy’s guardians in 200 B.C. asking for Rome’s sanction to their helping Athens, Liv. xxxi. 9. Egypt was not in a position to help, since Philip was snatching her Asiatic possessions, and Antiochus III was preparing to attack her at home.

(ib) the guardianship of the young Ptolemy by Lepidus as ‘tutor,’ Justin, xxx. 2, 8; Val. Max. vi. 6, 1; Tac. Ann. ii. 67; Eckhel, Coins v. 123. Mommsen (Bk. hi. ch. 8) accepts this tradition, and yet in the same sentence says that Egypt was unwilling to give Rome occasion for interfering in the East. Niese (Bk. x. § 11, n. 2) rejects it as legendary on the ground that (a) Polybius says nothing of it, though giving a detailed account (xvm. 5-3), and that Livy mentions no ‘ tutela ’; (b) events of the next few years are quite against it; (c) there is no room for it in Egyptian history, since Agathocles is the king’s first guardian, then Tlepolemus, then Aristomenes; (d) the tradition varies in its details, in one case ascribing the ‘tutela’ to the case of Ptol. "V", in another to that of his children, Ptol. VI and Ptol. VII. M. Lepidus was the youngest of the ambassadors who went to Egypt according to Polybius and Livy, and from the general intercourse of Rome with Egypt at this time, which resulted in Lepidus going more than once, arose the story of the special ‘tutela.’ (Liv. xxxi. 2, 3; xxxn. 33, 4; Polyb. xvi. 27, 5; xvm. 1, 49, 53 give the various embassies from Rome.) The commemorative coin, moreover, representing Lepidus as ‘tutor reg. s. c. pont. max.,’ and as putting the diadem on the head of the boy king of Alexandria, is put down by experts to 54 B.C., and would be the outcome of the legend, made much of by his posterity.

unlikely, at a time when Ptolemy was bound to Antiochus III by friendship and a marriage alliance, but the offer may not have been sincere. On these traditions

3. In 171 B.C. Ptol. VI Philometor sought to renew the friendship, Polyb. xxvm. 1 (ra <f>i\dv6pu>Tra renewed), Diod. xxx. 2.

4. Liv. xliv. 19, 10 : legati (sc. Ptolemaei) orabant senatum, ut opem regno regibusque amicis imperio ferrent. Ea merita populi Romani in Antiochum, earn apud omnes reges gentesque auctoritatem esse, ut si legatos misissent, qui denuntiarent non placere senatui sociis regibus bellum fieri, extemplo abscessurus esset (sc. Antiochus). Quod si cunctentur facere, brevi extorres regno Ptolemaeum et Cleopatram Romam venturos cum pudore quodam populi Romani.

5. Polyb. XXIX. 2 : f] oTjy/cAijros TYVvQavojilvq rov ’Av-rio^ov Trjs KlyviTTov Kvpiov yeyoveVat, /carecmjo’e 7Tf)£(rfic\nas rov T€ TroXcfiov Xvtroira^...

6. ib. XXIX. 27 : Kal 'Po/uaToi oaov oviria Ka.Ta.TT£Trovr]fj.£vr)v TTjv UroXe/Jiaiov fiatTiXelav tovtu) t<2 rpoTrw SUcriocrav.

7. Liv. xlv. 13, 7 : regibus Aegypti...senatum datu-rum operam, ut regni sui maximum semper praesidium positum esse in fide populi Romani ducant.

Ptolemy’s legates reply ‘ Plus eos (reges Aegypti) senatui populoque Romano quam parentibus suis, plus quam diis immortalibus debere...’

8. Polyb. XXIX. 27, 9 : oi St ire.pi rov YlowiKiov KaTaa-rqtra-fievOL Tct Kara tt]v ’A.\efjdv8peiav Kal ■7rapaKa\«ravT€s toiis [}a<T tXttS Ofl.OVO€LV. (168 B.C.)

9. In 164 B.C., Liv. Ep. 46, 47 ; Zon. ix. 25, 3; Trog. Pomp. Prol. 34 ; Euseb. Ghron. i. 161 ff. (gives date); Polyb. xxxi. 2 f. (12-14). Physcon receives a separate kingdom, viz. Libya and Cyrene.

In 160 B.C. Physcon presses his case personally at Rome, Polyb. xxxi. 10 (18). ‘Alliance' broken off with Philometor, Polyb. xxxi. 20 (xxxii. 1). Physcon’s unaided attempt to get Cyprus, Diod. xxxi. 44 ff. ; Polyb. xxxix. 7 (18), 6; Liv. Ep. 47; Zon. ix. 25, 4. In 154 B.C. Rome even sent five penteconters to escort him to Cyprus, Polyb. xxxin. 11 (8).

Egypt under Ptol. VI never assisted Rome. The promises of Ptolemy were insincere:

10. Liv. xlii. 29, 7: (Ptolemaei) tutores et bellum adversus Antiochum parabant, quo vindicarent Coelen Syriam, et Romanis omnia pollicebantur ad Macedonicum bellum. Cf. 2 (c) sup.

11. Makes war, where Rome is not concerned, e.g. in Syria, helping Alex. Balas, Polyb. iii. 5, 3 ; App. Syr. 67, 70. In Crete acts as arbitrator between Cretan towns, Inscript, of Magnesia, 65, and has a garrison in Itanos, C. I. G. Add. 2561 b and I. G. Ins. in. 466. The fear of Rome however helped to make him act moderately towards his brother when victorious (Diod. xxxi. 44), and probably forego the annexation of Syria when he seized it for Demetrius II, Jos. Ant. xm. 109 ; Diod.xxxn. ll,xxx—XL. 19 (Supplement, Teubner).

UroXc^Aatos, a7ro0avovTOS avrm tov d8e/\f/j0L 11 TaXeuiuot,¹ tov (Pt.\ourj~opo<;...

13. Diod. xxxin. 21 (arrival of Scipio’s commission) : KaracrKtipo/jLtvoi Ttjv oXr/v Pa<ri\uav...

14. ib. : Koi 7ravT€s (sc. kings and peoples, including the Egyptian) Tais aipe<T€<Ttv oj/ceicos i^airicrTetXav

iirgveaav. Cf. also Justin, xxxviii. 8, 8; Polyb. fr. 166; Plut. Apophth. 200 e and r.

KOTes Si /3cL<rih.evcrL Kill Srju.oi'-i, kcu ttjv 7Tpov7rdp\ovaav avTOii <f>i\iav irpo'S amn/Tas avavtuKra/xevoi, Trpo's evvocav ttjv ■qytfiovia.v iTrrjvlrjaav.

16. Physcon is on no occasion said to have sent aid to Rome, e.g. at Numantia. Nor did Rome help Physcon. When expelled by Cleopatra, he was not restored till 127 B.C., and then only by his own means, Liv. Up. 59. He was free in his foreign policy, where Rome did not concern herself, Justin, xxxix. 1 (action in Syria); Jos. Ant. xiii. 9.

116—88 b.c. Schisms in Egypt between Ptol. VIII Lathyrus and Ptol. IX Alexander. One of these was called by Rome ‘ friend and ally,’ and as client of Rome exempted from tariffs in Judaea :

aaluiv \wpaq rj twv ki/llvwv airwv itayow fiaaiXtvs rj Srjfxos, rj jU-oVos nroAe/xatos o ’ AXecavSpiinv f3a<ri\evs Sia to elvau {tv/i/ki^os rjfxeTtpo'; Kal <f>lAos¹-

18. In 86—85 B.C. Sulla sent for aid against Mithridates, but with little result, Plut. Luc. 2, 3.

Plut. Luc. 3 : a7reA.i7re rrjv crvfifia^Lav o IlToA.EjU.atos² 7rpos tov 7roA.CjU.or a7roS€tAtacras.

19. App. Bell. Civ. I. 102 : SwAAas 8c Kal ’A\e£av8pov... iij/rjcjilfraTO f3a<ri\evuv ’ A\e£av&p£u>v, cpr'ifiov rrjs ' Ake£av8pe<av <lp_x?j< avSpos ov<Trjs. ,.Z\.irIcras \pnqfx.aTiil(rdat 7roAAa Ik jSacriAttas iro\v)(pvo-ov.

This Alexander was slain a few days after his establishment, but Rome took no notice.

20. Cic. Leg. Agr. n. 41 : quis enim vestrum hoc ignorat dici, illud regnum testamento regis Alexae populi Romani esse factum 1 Hie ego consul populi Romani non modo nihil iudico, sed ne quod seutiam quidem profero. Magna enim mihi res non modo ad statuendum, sed etiam ad

¹ The exact date of the decree is uncertain, but it must have been in the time of the first Hyrcanns, rnler of the Jews, i.e. towards the end of the second century B.C. For under the second Hyrcanns there were no Syrian kings to threaten the Jews, and the decree mentions an Antiochus, son of Antiochus, oppressing Judaea. The only Antiochus answering to this description and suiting the chronology was Ant. IX Cyzicenus, king of Syria 112—96 B.C., son of Antiochus VII Sidetes. Moreover from 80 to 59 B.C. the Egyptian ruler was not recognised by Bome.

² Plntarch calls the king * /j.apdKiop, ’ antedating the reign of Ptolemy Anletes. (Letronne, Inscr. of Egypt, lxxxvii ff.) dicendum videtur esse. Video qui testamentum factum esse confirmet; auctoritatem senatus exstare hereditatis aditae sentio, turn quando Alexa mortuo legatos Tyrum misimus, qui ab illo pecuniam depositam nostris re-cuperarent. Haec L. Philippum saepe in senatu con-firmasse memoria teneo... Dicitur contra nullum esse testamentum, non oportere populum Romanum omnium regnorum appetentem videri. Cf. n. 38.

21. Cic. Verr. II. 76 : decernat bellum Cretensibus, liberet Byzantios, regem appellet Ptolemaeum, quae vult Hortensius, omnia dicat et sentiat.

22. Dio XXXIX. 12, 1 : 71-oA.A.a ricri Tali' 'T’ui/j.aiwv y^fynjUir<L ra /ief oiKO&ev, ra 8« Saveicrayctevos, 07T<ds tyjv tc apyifv y8e— jSaidJo-ijrai koX <j>i\os Kal (ju/t/xa^os' ovojiaxyOyj. KaravaXajKt(.

24. Suet. Jul. 11 : (Caesar) temptavit...ut sibi Aegyptus provincia plebiscito daretur...quod Alexandrini regem suum socium atque amicum a senatu appellatum expulerant, resque vulgo improbabatur.

25. Strabo xvn. p. 794-5: (Pompey) tov hvkrjy^v... Sc^a/Aei/os !Tvi’i(TT7j(ji -rrj tTvyxXr/TM «ai ?)i<i~paTTCT(ii KadoSov fxkv toutoi...

27. Caes. B. G. iii. 108 : haec uti fierent, per omnis deos perque foedera, quae Romae fecisset, eodem testamento Ptolomaeus populum Romanum obtestabatur. Tabulae testamenti unae per legatos eius Romam erant allatae, uti in aerario ponerentur—hae, cum propter publicas occupa-tiones poni non potuissent, apud Pompeium sunt depositae —alterae eodem exemplo relictae atque obsignatae Alex-andriae proferebantur. Of. 28 f. inf.

28. Lucan v. 58—60: En tibi...Ptolemaee...Cingere Pellaeo pressos diademate crines Permissum. (Poetical paraphrase for the process of ¹ calling king.’)

Confirmed as king by Caesar (48 B.C.), who claimed to represent the Roman people, the executor of Ptolemy XI’s will, Dio xlii. 35, 4. Enrolled as friend and ally along with his sister, ib. xliii. 27, 3.

Caesar in Alexandria settled disputes as representative of a ¹ protecting ’ power :

29. Caes. B. G. iii. 107 : interim controversias regum ad populum Romanum et ad se, quod esset consul, pertinere existimans... ostendit sibi placere regem... atque eius sororem ...de controversiis iure apud se potius quam inter se armis disceptare.

30. Caes. B. G. iii. 106 : Caesar...concursum ad se fieri videt. quod fasces anteferrentur. In hoc omnis multitudo maiestatem regiam minui praedicabat.

<rtj/j.tlo)v rjytjjLOvias—ti6’ o5s dWorpia Tt ap\fj Kal fiacriktvovti-Q TroXtL)

31. Parties in Rome receive aid from Egypt, App. B. G. ii. 71 (the Senatorial party); iv. 63 (Cassius and Brutus, later Octavian and Antony).

32. Caes. B. G. m. 108: Pothinus...queri atque in-dignari coepit regem ad causam dicendam evocari.

33. Plut. Ant. 25 : (Antony) tTreiiij/t irpos avrrjv (i.e. to Cleopatra) KtXeviav tls Ki\ikiW dirav7rj<rai \oyov vcj)t£ovcrav wv ivtKaXtiro...

34. Justin, xxxix. 5, 4: quo pacto et Syriae et Aegypti regna Romana vicinitate coartata, quae incre-menta de finitimis quaerere solebant, adempto vagandi a/rbitrio vires suas in perniciera mutuam converterunt.

etretr^at Trpon’SoKJjo'u.iTts, ecreBe^avro. Cf. Cic. Scst. 57 J App. B. G. ii. 23.

Kvwpov eTrttde tov IlroXe/xatov avev /Aa^s cikciv, oh ovre XPVlActTajv oi;re TifJLrjs ei/Sea ($Uti<rop.evov‘ lepoio’vvyjv yap avTw rrjs iv 11 aif^,w Oeov Sajtreiv tov S77/AOV.

39. Gyrene was bequeathed to Ptolemy Apion by Ptol. VII Physcon, and by Apion was bequeathed to the Roman people (96 B.C.). It was not made into a province till 30 years later.

40. Liv. Ep. 70: Ptolemaeus Cyrenarum rex, cui cognomen Apionis fuit, mortuus heredem populum Romanum reliquit, et eius regni civitates senatus liberas esse iussit. Cf. App. Mith. 121 ; Justin, xxxix. 5; Butrop.

41. Tac. Ann. xiv. 18, 2 : agrorum (of Cyrene) quos regi Apioni quondam habitos et populo Romano cum regno relictos proximus quisque possessor invaserant.

4. ib. xxx. 17, 10: petere ut regium nomen ceteraque Scipionis beneficia senatus decreto confirmaret.

5. ib. xlv. 13, 13: Masinissam meminisse se regnum a populo Romano partum auctumque et multiplicatum habere; usu regni contentum scire dominium et ius eorum, qui dederint, esse. Cf. Sail. Jug. 14, 8: verum ego (sc. Adherbal) iis finibus eiectus sum, quos maioribus meis populus Romanus dedit.

6. Sail. Jug. 14, 18 : Masinissa nos ita instituit, Patres Conscripti, ne quem coleremus, nisi populum Romanum, ne societates, ne foedera nova acciperemus; abunde magna praesidia nobis in vestra amicitia fore ; si huic imperio fortuna mutaretur, una nobis occidendum esse. Cf. Liv. xlv. 14, 3.

7. Val. Max. vii. 2, 6: senatus...cum...eum in dila-tando regno avidiorem cerneret, legem ferri iussit, qua Masinissae ab imperio populi Eomani solutam libertatem tribueret. Quo facto...Mauretaniae et Numidiae cetera-rumque illius tractus gentium nunquam fida pace quies-centem feritatem a valvis suis repulit.

8. Liv. xlii. 23, 24 : (Senate decreed) Gulussam placere ...nuntiare patri, ut de iis, de quibus Carthaginienses querantur, legatos quam primum ad senatum mittat, de-nuntietque Carthaginiensibus ut ad disceptandum veniant.

9. For such disputes v. App. Pun. 67 8.; Liv. xxxiv. 62 (land dispute, 193 B.C.); Val. Max. ii. 10, 4 (Scipio called in); Polyb. xxxi. 21 (xxxn. 2) (Rome’s partiality as arbitrator).

10. Liv. xl. 24, 14 : pacemque iis (the Carthaginians) populus Romanus non ab se tantum sed ab rege etiam Masinissa praestitit. (181 B.C.)

11. Sail. Jug. 14, 12 : ego (sc. Adherbal) sic existi-mabam, Patres Conscript), ut praedicantem audiveram patrem meum, qui vestram amicitiam diligenter colerent, eos multum laborem suscipere, ceterum ex omnibus maxime tutos esse. Quod in familia nostra fuit, praestitit, uti in omnibus bellis adesset vobis; nos uti per otium tuti simus, in vestra manu est.

12. Liv. xxxi. 11, 8 : legati Masinissae iussi...nun-tiare...bellum cum rege Philippo susceptum...peterentque ut ad illud bellum mitteret auxilia Numidarum equitum. (201 B.C.)

13. Liv. xxxn. 27, 2 : equites cc et elephanti x et tritici modium cc milia ab rege Masinissa...pervenerunt. Cf. xlii. 29, 8; App. Mac. 11 (against Perseus 170 B.C.); ib. Hisp. 46, 89 (in Spain); ib. Lib. 94, 105 (3rd Punic war).

14. Liv. xlv. 13, 12: duas res ei rubori fuisse, unam quod rogasset eum per legatos senatus, quae ad bellum opus esscnt, et non imperasset, alteram, quod pecuniam ei pro frumento misisset.

15. Liv. xli. 22, 2: certius...quae Carthagine acta essent, ab rege rescierant quam ab ipsis Carthaginiensibus.

16. Liv. xxx. 15, 1 : cum se quidem (Masinissa) in potestate futurum imperatoris dixisset (in relation to Sophonisba).

17. Liv. xlv. 14, 3 : ipsum (sc. Masinissam) relinquere regnum et Africa excedere...non esse e re publica populi Romani senatum censere.

18. Liv. Up. 49 : placuit...quod socio populi Romani et amico Masinissae arma intulissent (sc. Carthaginienses) ...bellum iis indici.

19. Polyb. xxi. 21 : Macravvacrav.../3a(rtAea tiSv —\cur-tu>v fuepwv T-ijs Ai(3vrjs TrtTroirjKaTn. Cf. App. Pun. 106; Sail. Jug. 78; Liv. xxx. 44, 12; and n. 5 sup.

Masinissa in Rome’s confidence; according to Appian offended in 149 B.C. by Rome’s withholding plans of campaign :

oti rrjv KapxrjSovLwv Svvap.iv av-os is yovv fiaXaiv aWovs iuipa T(3 67rtypaju.ju.aTt avrrj's ortT/De^oi/Tas Tt kat ov /cotvcucravTas avrw Trpiv i-rreXdeiv, aSs iv Tots TraXai TroXe/xoi'S liroiovv.

21. Liv. Up. 50 : inter tres liberos eius (sc. Masinissae) ...P. Scipio Aemilianus, quum commune eis regnum pater reliquisset, et dividere eos arbitro Scipione iussisset, partes administrandi regni divisit. Cf. App. Lib. 105, 106.

22. Sail. Jug. 14, 1 : Micipsa, pater meus, moriens praecepit, uti regnum Numidiae tantummodo procuratione

23. Sail. Jug. 14, 1: (Micipsa...praecepit) uti...eniterer domi militiaeque quam maximo usui esse populo Romano, vos mihi cognatorum loco, vos affinium ducerem: si ea fecissem, in vestra amicitia exercitum, divitias, munimenta regni me habiturum.

24. Sail. Jug. 14, 10: (after 146 b.c.) hostis nullus erat, nisi forte quem iussissetis.

24a. Services to Rome in war : App. ffisp. 67 (in Spain); Sail. Jug. 7, 2 (against Numantia); Micipsa said to have hung back from assisting against Carthage in 148 B.C., App. Lib. 111.

26. Sail. Jug. 8 f. : Scipio to Jugurtha says ‘potius publice quam privatini amicitiam populi Romani coleret ...ultro illi et gloriam et regnum venturum.’

To Micipsa he writes ‘Nobis ob merita carus est; uti idem senatui sit et populo Romano summa ope nitemur.’ The result: ‘ Micipsa Jugurtham statirn adoptavit, et testa-mento pariter cum filiis heredem instituit.’

27. Sail. Jug. 25, 10 : (Adherbal is alleged to have said) regno Numidiae, quod vestrum est, uti libet, con-sulite. Cf. ib. 14, 25.

28. Sail. Jug. 16 : decretum fit, ut decem legati regnum ...inter Jugurtham et Adherbalem dividerent.

29. Sail. Jug. 21 : velle et censere (sc. senatum) eos ab armis discedere; de controversiis suis iure potius quam bello disceptare; ita seque illisque dignum fore.

30. Liv. Ep. 64 : contra denuntiationem senatus ab eo occisus est (sc. Adherbal), et ob hoc bellum Jugurthae indictum.

31. Liv. Ep. 64: Jugurtha fide publica evocatus ad indicandos auctores consiliorum suorum. Cf. Sail. Jug. 31, 19.

32. Sail. Jug. 35 : fit reus magis ex aequo bonoque quam ex iure gentium Bomilcar comes eras, qui Romam fide publica venerat (after the murder of Massiva).

33. Numidia after 104 B.C., though in theory Roman territory by conquest, was restored to the house of Masinissa. Hiempsal II was however ejected by the Marian party. Pompey shortly restored him and slew the rival Hiarbas, 82 B.C., App. B. G. l. 62, Plut. Mar. 40 ; Sail. fr. I. 41 ; [Caes.] Bell. Afr. 56; Liv. Ep. 89; Oros. v. 21.

34. Hiempsal excepted in agrarian scheme of Rullus, Cic. Leg. Agr. il. 58. Services in war, App. B. G. I. 42.

35. Caes. B. C. ii. 25 : simultas cum Curione inter-cedebat, quod tribunus plebis legem promulgaverat, qua lege regnum Iubae publicaverat.

36. Caes. B. C. i. 6 : refertur de rege Iuba, ut socius sit atque amicus. Marcellus vero passurum se in prae-sentia negat.

Assists exiled senate (Lucan iv. 690; Dio xli. 41, 2), which recognised him as king :

37. Dio XLI. 42, 7 : ’Io/3as irpos /xev toO IIo/Mn/iov twv re aXXwv twv iv Ma/ceSovia ftovXtvrwv n/u,as re evpero Kai

77po(TrjyOf)Cs':0rj' 7rpos 8e Srj tov KaiVapos twv re iv rrj TroXtL alriai cl^e Kal aireSeiX^V-

38. Caes. B. C. n. 38 : Jubam revocatum finitimo bello et controversiis Leptitanorum.

40. Dio LIII. 26, 2 : i-ti-tp es tov twv T’oj/mfoiy Kocrfxov ol irXeiovs avrwv (sc. twv Noua^cov) iatyayfxioaro.

1. Sail. Jug. 104 f. : (senatus) Boccho, quoniam poenitet, delicti gratiam facit. Foedus et amicitia da-buntur cum meruerit.

arayeypa/i/iei'os t<jTij<rtv iv Ka7ru-u>Aia> Ni/cas rpoTraiotfiopovs «ai irap' avrals iv uko<ti xpuo-ais 'JoyovpOav iy\e.ipit,6jxevov vtto avrov 2vAAa.

3. Sail. Jug. 102: populo Romano.. .visum amicos quam servos quaerere; tutiusque rati volentibus quam coactis imperitare (words of Sulla to Bocchus).

5. In 82 B.C. Bogud, son and successor of Bocchus, was reigning, Oros. v. 21, 14. Cic. SuU. 56 mentions a business connexion between this king and a B.oman, Sittius (cir. 65 B.C.). In 49 B.C. Mauretania was already divided between Bogud (the Western half) and Bocchus (the Eastern), Pliny, N. H. v. 2,19; Strabo xvn. 3, 7. These kings were probably not at first recognised by Rome, since P. Sittius Nucerinus, a Catilinarian exile, found refuge with them, App. B. C. iv. 54, and their fierce civil wars received no notice from Rome (ib.). As in Juba’s case, the first recognition of them seems to have been when their aid was needed in the civil wars.

6. Dio XLI. 42, 7: o T€ Bd/c^os k<u d Boyovas /Sa<nA.^s, ori i^dpol avriS (sc. ’Io/3a) rjCTOLV, (m'oaaafiyjiray.

7. Services to Caesar in war, [Caes.J Bell. Alex. 59; rewarded by Caesar, Suet. Jul. 52 (Bogud), App. B. C. iv. 54 (Bocchus).

8. Strabo xvn. 3, 5 : Boyov Se tov fiatnXio, riov Mav-pov(TLU)v avafiavja ctti tovs ccnrepious A16lottos.

9. When Bogud was slain by Agrippa in the civil wars, Bocchus was confirmed by Augustus in possession of the whole of Mauretania. Upon his death in 33 B.C. bis kingdom became a Roman province, but in 25 B.C. was given to Juba, son of Juba of Numidia, App. B. C. v. 26 (where Bocchus is put by mistake for Bogud), Dio xlviii. 45; xlix. 33.

1. For Philip’s terms of peace with Rome v. Polyb. xviii. 44; Liv. xxxiii. 30, 6; Plut. Tit. 9.

2. Liv. xxxm. 35, 5 : (On. Cornelius legatus) ei (sc. Philippo) suasit, quoniani pacem impetrasset, ad societatem amicitiamque petendam mitteret Romam legatos, ne, si quid Antiochus moveret, exspectasse et temporum opportunitates captasse ad rebellandum videri posset.

3. Philip maintained his independence, and never really became a client of Rome. Thus (a) he only aided Rome where some immediate reward was promised him or from motives of retaliation against Antiochus; v. Liv. xxxvi. 8,

4 ff., App. Syr. 16, Zon. ix. 19, 3, for the latter motive; Liv. xxxvi. 33, 1, xxxix. 23, 10 ; 28, 3, for the former. For his operations along with the Romans v. also Liv. xxxvi. 14; 23, 6 ; 25; 34, 9. He did the Romans good service in the march through Thrace, but when they had crossed to Asia, he sent no contingents, and only volunteers from Macedonia are mentioned in Liv. xxxvil. 39,12. The account in Livy xxxvn. and xxxvm. and Polyb. xxi. and xxii. shews also among other facts that the Aetolians helped the Atbamanians against Philip, while themselves at truce with Rome; that the Atbamanians had been entrusted to Philip’s sole disposal and yet were pardoned by Rome in spite of Philip ; that the Consul negotiated with Aetolia without consulting Philip ; shewing that while Philip helped Rome for hire, Rome did not hesitate to act without him, as if he were warring independently, and had no alliance or close connexion with herself.

(b) He carried on extensive wars and added to his kingdom without remonstrance from Rome. The passages quoted below shew his full right to do so, and Livy’s language contradicts his account of the terms of the treaty. Moreover these wars were conducted while Philip was on trial for offences alleged against him by Rome’s friends, 186-182 B.C.

liv. xxxix. 35, 4 : interim (184 B.C.) per speciem auxilii Byzantiis ferendi, re ipsa ad terrorem regulis Thracum iniciendum profectus, perculsis iis uno proelio et Amadocum duce capto in Macedoniam rediit.

ib. 53, 12 : avertendos etiam animos a suspicione talium consiliorum (of war against Rome) ratus, mediam in Thraciam exercitum...duxit. Of. XL. 21, 1 ; Polyb. xxiii. 8, 3.

His foreign policy therefore is certainly not subordinated to Rome’s interest.

(c) Even the arbitration imposed on him was not accepted by Philip as a client, but with protests against his false position, cf. Liv. xxxix. 24, 13; 28, 13; Polyb. xxiii. 8; 9.

(d) Philip formed alliances with other powers than those which were friendly to Rome, e.g. with the Bastarnae, Liv. xl. 57, 7 ; Polyb. xxv. 6.

(e) He resists Roman influence in his choice of a successor, Polyb. xxiii. 3, 8 f.; Liv. xl. 11, 1 ; App. Mac. 9.

The formalities of friendship were however kept up between Rome and Philip, cf. Zon. ix. 19, 8 (Philip sends a crown); Plut. Tit. 14 (Philip voted ‘ally’).

res, legatos Eomam ad amicitiam paternam renovandam petendumque, ut rex ab senatu appellaretur, misit.

5. Maintains the alliance with the Bastarnae, Polyb. xxv. 6 ; forms marriage connexions with Seleucus of Syria, and Prusias of Bithynia, Polyb. xxv. 4, 8, Liv. xlii. 12, 3 ; friendly with Rhodes, Polyb. xxv. 4 (xxvi. 7), G. I. G. 2275; also with the States of Greece, being a member of the Delphian Amphictiony, S. I. G. I². 293; makes a treaty with the Illyrians, Liv. xlv. 33, 8. He subdued the Dolopians and helped Byzantium, Liv. xlii. 13, 8 ; 41, 11. Attacked Abru-polis, Liv. xlii. 41, 10, Diod. xxix. 36, App. Mac. 11, 6¹⁵⁷. He thus pursued his foreign policy, the chief test of client-ship to Rome, quite independently of Roman interests.

1. Liv. xxvi. 24, 8: igitur conscriptae condiciones, quibus in amicitiam societatemque populi Romani venirent, additumque ut, si placeret vellentque, eodem iure amicitiae ... Attalus... esse(n)t. (211 b.c.)

Cf. xxix. 11, 2 : cum Attalo rege propter commune adversus Philippum bellum coeptam amicitiam esse.

2. Liv. xxxi. 46, 3 : petitum ex foedere ab Attalo est, ut mille milites praestaret, tantum enim numerum bellum gerentibus adversus Philippum debebat. Liv. ib. 16 shews arrangements were also made about the division of booty.

25, where it is spoken of some years later as a ‘ -n-poye-ytvrjfiivri Koivoirpayla. ’also v. 1 sup.

3. Attalus included in the Roman peace with Philip, 204 B.C., Liv. xxix. 12, 14.

4. App. Mac. 4 : &l\.nnrov Se fJLTjBiv es.. "ArraXoy 7/ cs JAA.or nva 'PoD^.aiaji' <f>L\ov aujifnai'CU'. (200 B.C.)

5. In the second Macedonian war the clientship is foreshadowed. Attalus appeals to the Romans, who bid Philip submit to arbitration, Liv. xxxi. 2, 1; Polyb. xvi. 27. The peace negotiations are conducted in Rome, whither Attalus sends representatives, Polyb. xvm. 10. His claims are put forward, but the Roman senate dictates the terms, and the king of Perganmm has no part in the final decision, Liv. xxxii. 33, 4¹⁵⁸.

6. Consulted by Rome as ally, Polyb. xxi. 10; Liv. xxxvn. 37. Signs of clientship in the peace negotiations with Antiochus (190 B.C.), which were all carried on in Rome, and Eumenes went thither to state his requests,

Liv. xxxvii. 45, 21. Rome decided without appeal what each state should have, Liv. ib. 56, 1-4; Polyb. xxi. 18: 24; 46.

Polyb. xxi. 18, 4 : (the senate) elcreKaXecravro irpwrov rcV j3a<riXea, ko1 Aeyeiv rj^tovv fitra irappt)crta^ wv po{\<LTat. a.v itapa rr/s (rvyKkijrov. Eumenes’ first reply was :

ib. 6 : a pur tov uvat vou.iCti. to SiSoyai rrjv kiriTpoiTrjv €K€iVoiS Kat Trif 'i avrov kat 7T€pI tojv dSeA-^aJv.

7. Rome in granting to Eumenes the towns taken from his father by Antiochus ordains that they shall pay the same tribute to Eumenes as formerly to Attalus, thus to some extent limiting his power of regulating his dependencies, Polyb. xxi. 24 ; 46.

8. Liv. xxxviii. 37, 6 : Gallis responsum, cum Eumenes rex venisset, turn daturum (sc. Manlium) iis leges. (188 b.c.)

9. ib. 40, 1 : Manlius evocatis eo regulis Gallorum leges, quibus pacem cum Eumene servarent, dixit.

10. Liv. xxxix. 22, 9 : legatum eum (L. Scipionem) post damnationem missum in Asiam ad dirimenda inter Antiochu m et Eumenem reges certamina, Valerius Antias est auctor.

cogerent. Cf. Liv. xxxix. 46, 9 ; Polyb. hi. 6, 3. Eumenes later sent a crown in gratitude to Rome, Trog. prol. 32.

TroXefjLov... Cf. ib. 5 and 14 ; Liv. xl. 20; Diod. xxix. 25. A free hand was at last given to Eumenes, Polyb. xxiv. 1 (xxv. 2). (183-2 b.c.)

14. Assists Rome against Perseus, App. Mac. 11 ; Liv. xlii. 14; 26, 7. That he helped Rome to the end of the war appears from Liv. xuv. 28, 7, contradicting a former statement of Livy (xliv. 13, 9; 20, 6) that he stopped helping after 169 B.C.

15. Some suspicion that Eumenes had had dealings with Perseus caused Rome to assume a higher tone from 168 B.C. onwards. Thus she declared his Galatian dependents free, Polyb. xxx. 28 (xxxi. 2, 6); Trog. Prol. 34¹.

16. Commissions sent to hear complaints against him and to arbitrate, Polyb. xxx. 27 ; 30, 7; xxxi. 1, 8 ; 3, 4 ; 6; Diod. xxxi. 10.

17. Liv. Ep. 46 : Eumenes rex Romam venit; qui, quia Macedonico bello medium egerat, ne aut hostis iudicatus viderefur, si exclusus esset, aut liberatus crimine, si ad-mitteretur, in commune lex lata est, ne cui regi Romam venire liceret.

Polyb. XXX. 19 (20): UJsyap KaOoXov <)v<rune<r-orutvci rals TtZv jio.<jiX{ti)v eVi8?j/uai?, Soy p. a ti tolovtov i^eftaXov, p-rjSiva [iaaikla Trapayiyveo-dai wpos avrovs. The decree reached Eumenes at Brundisium.

¹ For the subjection of the Gauls to Eumenes, v. 8, 9 sup. A thousand Gauls served under him against Perseus, Liv. xlii. 55, 7; 57, 7. Eumenes was also overlord of Pessinus, v. 18.

18. Part of Eumenes’ kingdom offered by Rome to Attalus, his brother, Polyb. xxx. 1, xxxi. 1 (9); Liv. XLV. 19.

19. Treaties with Cretan towns, S. I. 6. I². 288; Polyb. xxix. 6, 1; 7, 8. Garrison lent to Cydon, ib. xxvin. 14 f. Friendship with two Armenian chiefs, Artaxias and Mithridates, who were included with Eumenes in the peace with Pharnaces, Polyb. xxv. 2 (xxvi. 6). Later Mithridates sends help to Attalus II against Prusias, ib. xxxin. 12, 1. War against Pharnaces, v. 13 (end), and Selge in Pisidia, Polyb. xxxi. 1 (9), 3; Trog. Prol. 34. Helps Rhodes to suppress her rebel subjects, the Lycians, Polyb. xxiv. 15 (xxv. 5, 13), and Antiochus IV to seize the Syrian throne, App. Syr. 45, and cf. Liv. xlii. 6, 6.

But when his friends came into collision with Rome, they had to be deserted by Eumenes; thus he broke off friendship with the Aetolians, when they joined Antiochus, and renewed it later (S. I. 6. I². 295 f.). He also made an offensive and defensive alliance with Ariarathes IV, when the latter became a friend of Rome, Polyb. xxiv. 1 ; Liv. xxxviii. 39, 6.

20. Attalus paid several visits to Rome on behalf of his brother Eumenes, cf. Polyb. xxx. 1, xxxi. 1 (9), and probably, as the future successor of Eumenes, who was long childless, made friendship with Rome on his own account before his brother’s death. He seems to have borne the title ‘king’ as early as 169 B.C., and sent an embassy to Rome at that time, Suet, de Gram. 2. In 159 b.c. he succeeded Eumenes as regent for his nephew, Strabo xm.

4, 2. Renewed friendship with Rome, Polyb. xxxin. 18, 2; Frankel, Inschr. von Perg. 224 Z, 17 f.

21. Milnchener Sitzungsberichte (1860) p. 180 (quoted by Momms. Bom. Geschichte, Bk. iv. ch. 1, note) gives a letter of Attalus shewing that in his state council it had been resolved to do nothing in respect of Galatia without consulting Rome. [Found also in Michel, Recueil, 45 Oz. 9 ff.]

22. Polyb. xxxm. 12 : ol Si 'Pwuiuoi, tov /xiv ^vAtt<iAoi' ixeXevov.. .avrov fj.lv uij Karap^eiv tov woXlfiov. Cf. XXXII. 16 (28), XXXIII. 1.

23. Polyb. XXXVII. 6 : 'Pco/xaioi eire/Ai^av wpecrySeuras tow l—iktjil'ouet'ov'; trjs bpfjjrjs Trjs tov S lkouyjSov^ Kal kidXotovtos tov "AxTaAoi' Troktfia.v t<S 11poxHTia. Cf. App. Mith. 6 • Diod. xxxii. 20; Liv. Ep. 50.

24. Helped against Andriscus, the Macedonian pretender, Strabo xm. p. 624, and against the Achaeans, Paus.

vii. 16, 8, where he is said to have received some Achaean spoils through his general.

25. Sends his nephew to secure Roman recognition beforehand, Polyb. xxxm. 18, 2.

26. Alliance with Ariarathes V, S. I. G. i¹. 224 f., Plut. de Frat. Amor. 18, Polyb. xxxii. 12 (22), xxxm. 12 ; with Mithridates of Armenia, Polyb. xxxm. 12; and with Crete, as a decree of Aptera shews. Suppressed Selge in Pisidia, Trog. Prol. 34, and supported Alexander Balas against Demetrius I of Syria, whom Rome would not recognise as king, Liv. Ep. 52 ; Justin, xxxv. 1, 6. Rome’s consent was first obtained by Alexander, Polyb. xxxm. 18.

indicating that Rome’s friendship was judged paramount and sufficient, the source of dignity and safety, to the exclusion of other friendships. The same title was assumed a little later by Antiochus of Commagene¹.

That the Numidian house did not seek the friendship of any other power was due probably to their isolated position, and the fact that they possessed no navy. Most of Rome’s clients exchanged tokens of friendship with other states that were friendly with Rome. Hiero had a cordial understanding with many, to whom he also zealously sent aid in their various difficulties. To Egypt he sent corn, fish and wool in time of famine². Rhodes he helped likewise with money and presents after the earthquake there in 224 B.C., and remitted tariffs in her favour³. He also helped Carthage, as already mentioned⁴, against the rebel mercenaries. Moreover he made a marriage alliance between his son, Gelon, and a grand-daughter of Pyrrhus of Epirus⁶, and cultivated the friendship of other Greek states⁶. The goodwill of the Greeks was sought also by the Ptolemies⁷, and by the Syrian⁸ and the Pergamene kings⁹. Eumenes II and Antiochus IY, Attalus II and Alexander Balas acted in cooperation to secure the Syrian throne for Antiochus and Balas respectively¹⁰. Other connecting links were the intermarriages which took place between the various royal houses. Examples

¹ Append. A, ix. 23; xm. 3; of. the assumption of the title $i\oKcu<rap by the Bosporan kings under the Empire; G.I.G. 2123 ff.

² Append. A, i. 13. ³ ib. ⁴ ib. ⁵ Justin xxtiii. 34 ; Polyb. vii. 4, 5. ⁶ Append, ib. ⁷ ib. ii. 11. s _VII_

§ 52. In the second place the client of Rome was (6) Con-not allowed to make war and peace without the consent ^s£^j_n^_re. of the senate. His foreign policy came under the quiredfor senate’s supervision. There are however limitations to peace. this statement.

(1) The kings were generally allowed to subdue Three revolts within their own dependencies and put down _tions-" rebel chiefs. Antiochus IV for instance, who was checked so imperiously when he attempted to secure a depm-hold over Egypt, was allowed to subdue the Jews who had been dependent upon his predecessors³. Coele- may be Syria, also a former dependency of the Syrian kingdom, ^reduced-he likewise recovered with impunity, and he suppressed a revolt of his satrapy Persis⁴. Ariobarzanes III was urged by Cicero to learn his first lesson of sovereignty in preserving his own life, and securing himself against the rebels among his subjects⁵- Juba⁶ and Herod⁷

² Suet. Aug. 48 : Eeges soeios etiam inter semet ipsos necessitu-dinibus mutuis iunxit, promptissimus affinitatis cuiusque atque amicitiae conciliator et fautor. When under the Empire Agrippa II arranged for a friendly meeting between the kings, they were quickly dismissed to their kingdoms by the nearest Koman governor (Jos.

6. In his quarrel with Egypt, he first appealed to Rome, Polyb. xxvn. 19. Rome being too busy to intervene, Antiochus assumed the aggressive. On the point of reducing Egypt, he was confronted by Popillius, the Roman envoy, and promised unconditional submission to Rome’s wishes, Polyb. xxix. 27. Compare

7. Liv. xlv. 13, 2 : venerunt Antiochi legati referentes omni victoria potiorem pacem regi, senatui quae placuisset, visam, eumque haud secus quam deorum imperio legatorum Romanorum iussis paruisse.

8. Liv. xui. 26, 7 : redierunt legati qui renuntiarunt Eumenem...Antiochum...pollicitos omnia, quae populus Romanus imperasset, praestaturos (against Perseus), ib. xlv. 13, 2 : si quid imperatum foret, adiuturum regem fuisse. Cf. App. Mac. 11, Rome’s request for aid.

10. Polyb. XXX. 27 (xxxi. 5): r/KOi'.. .irpta Kara-ctko 7rcov t<1£lv ... (Antiochus) irpos Tots aAAots /cat Trjs avXrjs Trape)(o>pt]cre Tots 7rpecr/3euTous, fxiKpov Si Kal tov Sia-SrjjjMTos, Kara trjv £7ri'<^acrtv {i.e. in speciem quidem).

11. Made war upon the Jews and subdued them, Jos. Ant. xn. 236 ; attacked Coele Syria, as a former dependency (cf. Hieronym. Daniel xi. 21 f., simulatione clementiae obtinuit regnum Syriae), and the rebellious satrapy of Persis, Tac. Hist. v. 8, Jos. Ant. xii. 293 f.,

Armenia and advanced beyond, App. Syr. 45, 46 ; Diod. Fr. xxx.—xl. (supplement) 9. For his friendship with Greek states v. Polyb. xxvi. 1; Liv. xli. 20.

12. That he evidently did not hold himself bound by the treaty of Ant. Ill appears from his maintenance of a fleet and many elephants, Polyb. xxxi. 2 (12).

13. For his institution of Roman customs in his kingdom, learnt by him when a hostage, v. Polyb. xxvi.

Antiochus IV, having died on his Eastern expedition, left a young son upon the throne. (164 B.C.)

14. Polyb. XXXI. 2 (12), 9 : irpe<r/3evTa<s tovs irepl Fvaiov ’Okthoviov.. . iitTTt/iipav tovs Sioi/ojcrovras ra Kara rrjv /SacrtXctar, <us avrr/ ttporjpt:ito Sta to /xrjSiva tov eyu.7roS<uv ujquojievov eli at Tots iiriTaTTOfievois. Cf. Cic. Phil. IX. 4.

The ambassadors were charged to weaken the resources of the kingdom by burning the ships and ham-stringing the elephants (Polyb. ib. § 11), and to help to establish the boy as king (§ 6) that the government might be feeble (§ 7). Octavius was murdered by one of the enraged populace (ch. 11 (19)), and the senate then left the kingdom to itself, giving no answer to the excuses of Lysias, the king’s guardian, in connexion with the murder of Octavius.

15. Seized the Syrian throne two years after the death of Ant. IY, having made his escape from Rome. He put to death the young son of Ant. IY, but Rome took little notice, merely refusing to recognise Demetrius.

18. Arrested and sent to Rome Andriscus, the Macedonian pretender, Justin, xxxv. 1 ; Liv. Ep. 49.

19. i. Ariarathes Y breaks off relations with him (v. ix. 11 inf.). ii. Rise of rivals, Timarchus, Diod. xxx.—xl. (supplement) 13; App. Syr. 45, 47 : Alexander Balas, who at last gained Rome’s sanction to seek the crown, and finally defeated and killed Dem., Just. xxxv. 1, 6; Liv. Ep. 52; App. Syr. 67, 70.

jSacrtActos vtot, <j>t\ov Kal (Tu/Xtid^ov 7j/xcrIpov yey€V7ffi€V0V €7reA$orT€s bri ttjv (TvyKXrjrov Aoyovs £7r0ir](ravT0. ij Sc o'vyKA^TOs avrots e^oucjtai/ cScukcv ttt! ttjv 7raTpa>av apxrjv KaTa7rop€V€(r9aL Kat fiorjOe tv avVots, to 5 yj^iovv, e8o£ev. (150 B.C.)

(Polybius says that the claimants asked for Rome’s active support or, failing that, her permission to others to help them. Eventually Attalus II, Ptolemy Philometor and Ariarathes combined to establish him. Rome did not carry out her promise to the full.)

21. Alexander was slain four years later by Demetrius II, supported by Ptolemy VI (146 B.C.). Rome took no notice, Diod. xxxn. 10 ; xxx.—XL. (supplement) 19; App. Syr. 67.

22. Demetrius II was expelled by Tryphon in 142 B.C., who acted at first on behalf of a young son of Balas, and then set the boy aside.

23. Diod. XXXIII. 20: Tpvtfimv... Zcnrcvoe rrjv SvvaaTclav ai'Tijj Sia Soyfiaros o-vyK\r)TiK.ov /3e/3a«3crai.

24. The senate ignored him, but accepted the gift in the name of the murdered child. Syria was still left to itself.

25. Civil wars reigned in Syria from 128 B.C. onwards, Liv. Ep. 62, 68, 70. In 83 B.C., upon the death of Antiochus XII, the Syrians, weary of the Seleucid broils, invited Tigranes of Armenia to annex the country, App. Syr. 48, 49 ; Mith. 105.

26. In part of Syria the Seleucid house seems to have continued a little longer. Compare :

Cicero, Verr. iv. 61 : reges Syriae, regis Antiochi filios pueros, scitis Romae nuper fuisse, qui venerant non propter Syriae regnum (nam id sine controversia obtinebant ut a patre et a maioribus acceperant), sed regnum Aegypti ad se et ad Selenen matrem suam pertinere arbitrabantur.

27. The senate contented itself with recognising the Seleucids by renewing friendship with them, as a decree cited by Josephus shews (Ant. xiv. 209), but the following passage sums up Rome’s attitude :

28. Strabo XIV. 5, 2 : ovSe 'Pm/xaloi 7ru> toctovtov i<f>pov-ti£ov t<2v tov Tavpov... iyvmaav Se kciklo. tiSv ap%ovtojv

29. In 69 B.C. Lucullus established Antiochus XIII, whom Pompey deposed four years later, App. Syr. 48, 49.

ib. 49: (Pompey deposes Ant.) ov’Sev Is 'Pw/Wous d/xapr6vra...X6y<o, on tovs %eXevKiSa<;, vtto Tiypavovs ixire-O’Ol'Ttt? OVK 61K09 TjV OTL 'Sv/ilOS ap)(tlV /J.S.XXoV rj 'PatyMUOUS Tlypdvrjv V£VLKIjKOT(1\.

Rome first came into contact with Prusias, when she was seeking to isolate Antiochus in 192 b.c. Prusias after some hesitation promised Rome his assistance, App. Syr.

1. Liv. xxxix. 51, 1 : ad Prusiam regem legatos T. Quinctius Flamininus venit, quem suspectum Romanis et receptus post fugam Antiochi Hannibal et bellum adversus Eumenem motum faciebat.

2. J ustin. xxxii. 4, 8: missi a senatu legati, qui utrumque regem in pacem cogerent. Cf. Polyb. in. 6, 3; Liv. xxxix. 46, 9; 51, 1 ■ Trog. Prol. 32.

Prusias II probably renewed the friendship begun by his father, for it was evidently as a friend of Rome that he was expected to assist against Perseus *.

3. liv. xlii. 29, 3 : statuerat (Prusias) abstinere armis et eventum exspectare. Nam neque Romanos posse aequom censere adversus fratrem uxoris se arma ferre, et apud Persea victorem veniam per sororem impetrabilem fore.

TTis subsequent apologias in 167 B.C. for his late neutrality and his complete self-abasement, are a sign that he was regarded as having come short of his duties as client, not as ally.

4. Liv. xlv. 44 : Polybius eum regem (sc. Prusiam)... tradit pileatum, capite raso, obviam ire legatis solitum, libertumque se populi Romani ferre, et ideo insignia ordinis eius gerere; Romae quoque, cum veniret in curiam, summisisse se, et osculo limen curiae contigisse. (He also asked for some land, ib.) Cf. Polyb. xxx. 18 (19); Diod. xxxi. 22; App. Mith. 2.

5. Polyb. XXXIII. 1 : irptafievTas trwe(sc. j] oT/y»cA.r/Tos)...evToXas Sowa KtoXvecv tov Upovoiav 'ArTuAjn 7ro\€/t£tv. Prusias did not yield until Rome renounced her friendship with him, ib. xxxm. 12; 13. (154 B.C.) Cf. also ib. xxxii. 16 (28).

¹ Contrast the conduct of the Bhodians, who, we know, had not yet a defijiite alliance either with Borne or the kings: ‘ earn (amicitiam) (sc. with Persens) qnoniam ita Bomanis visum sit in societatem se belli trahere, interrapisse,’ Liv. xmv. 14, 8. (169 B.C.)

6. Polyb. xxxvi. 14 (xxxvil. 6) : 'Ptopuoi €ir€/j.ij/av 7rpecr-jSevtas to-us ... KOjA.wTOi/Tas tov "ArraAoi' iroXe/j.eiv tu> Ilpoucrta. Attalus’ friends in Rome arranged that the matter should be decided by the senate too late, and Prusias was slain, Liv. Ep. 50. Rome had some difficulty in ascertaining the merits of the case, Polyb. xxxii. 16 (28). (149 B.C.) Cf. also App. Mitli. 6; Diod. xxxii. 20.

7. (e) Nominally sought recognition for his son Nicomedes by sending him to be brought up in Rome (according to Livy xlv. 44 in 167 B.C.). He apparently sent him a second time as a young man, for fear that his subjects should make Nicomedes king in his stead.

8. Zon. ix. 28, 1 : ravra (sc. the murder of Perseus) rjvtacre fj.lv tovs 'Pcu/xatous, oO fj.rjv Kal sis ttoXe^ov i^rjpedtae. Rome even recognised Nicomedes.

10. Services to Rome in war against Aristonicus, Strabo xiv. p. 646; Eutrop. iv. 22; Oros. v. 10, 2. He was even invited to send troops to Italy:

Diod. xxxvi. 1 : Kara ty/v IttI rows Ki/x/3pous tov Mapiou crrparctav eSiokcv ry (TvyKXr/Tos e£ovcriav tw Mapta) €K twv iripav

6a\aTTt)<; idvusv pera7rep7re<r0ai (rv/j./j.a)^(av. o fj.lv ovv Mdpios €^eTT€/j.ijj€ 7rpos NtKOp.ijSjjy tov rrjs Bt^wtas ySacrtXea irtpl jioy]6tia s.

11. Diod. xxxvi. 1 : when Marius sent to Nicomedes for contingents, he replied ‘Tovs ttXuovs twv Bi#wc3v vtto twv Srjjj.0<jiwvwv Siapiraylvras SovXeveiv ev Tats £7rap^iats.’

12. For the licence allowed to Nicomedes between 100 and 92 B.C. through want of firmness on the part of the senate, and for his encroachments upon Paphlagonia and Cappadocia, v. Momm. Rom. Geschich. Bk. iv. ch. 8.

14. ib. 13 : wSe M iO pidarr/^ es S LKopj/drj iirpai^ev, ov v/xeis, w 'Poip.aioi, Bidwwv hiTipKujOt fiaviKeutiv.

15. Julius Caesar as a young man was sent to JSfico-medes’ court by M. Minucius Thermus to fetch the fleet (Plut. Caes. 1; Suet. Jul. 2, 49). ‘ The fleet ’ was possibly that of Rome wintering in Bithynia, but in any case would probably contain a Bithynian contingent. Under the Empire Tacitus (Ann. iv. 5) speaks of ¹ sociae triremes apud idonea provinciarum.’

16. Restored on several occasions, App. Mith. 11 ; liv. Ep. 74, 83. Attacks Mithridates under pressure from M\ Aquillius, who thus replies to Mith.’s protests :

17. App. Mith. 14: ovtg Niko/ht/Sovs dvel;6/j.e&a iroX.eiJ.ov-lilvov, ov yap ijyoviitOa 'Pco^aiois <rviitfiepeiv f3Xaineu6aL Niko-

(The use of ‘ crvp.<^ipeiv ’ excludes the possibility of the existence of an offensive and defensive alliance between

Rome and Nicomedes. Rome’s obligation was evidently that of protector to client, not that of an ally.)

18. Liv. Ep. 93: Nicomedes.. .populum Romanum fecit heredem, regnumque eius in provinciae formam redactum est.

App. Mith. 8 : mtovos TouSe (sc. Nicomedes, grandson of Prusias II) 'Pioyiiaiois rr)I' apxrjv kv 8ia0r/KaLS a.7reAnrev.

7 a A a ft a irpa^ajaevos irapa Apia.pa.6ov <f>CKov avrov ETrotrycmro Poi/xaia) v.

2. Liv. xxxviii. 39, 6 : Ariarathes rex parte dimidia pecuniae imperatae beneficio Eumenis...remissa in ami-citiam est acceptus. Cf. Zon. ix. 24, p. 321, who states that he was ‘ called friend and ally.’

3. Strabo XII. 2, 11 : £vvi/3r) Se, rjviKa Trpmrov 'I³wf/Jiiol ta Kara rqv 'Atrlav Slwkovv, viK7j(ravres ’A vtlo^ov, <f>i\ias Kal av/jL/jLa^ias (ttolovvto irpos re Ta Z6vrj Kal toiis /3acriAe'as, tois [Lev aAAois fiauiXniATiv avrols Kad’ eauTovs SoO'fjvai rrjv Tijiyjv ravrrjv, tw Si KainraSo/a Kal avt<3 Se t<2 edvei Koivfj.

4. Henceforward the Cappadocian house maintained a close alliance with the Attalids, and followed a similar policy of obedience to Rome, v. n. 5 infra.

5. Liv. xl. 20, 1: legationes...in sen a turn introduxerunt regum...Eumenis et Ariarathis...et Pharnacis; nec ultra quicquam eis responsum est, quam missuros qui de contro-versiis eorum cognoscerent statuerentque. Cf. Polyb. xxm.

6. Liv. xlii. 29,4: Ariarathes, Cappadocum rex, praeter-quam quod Romanis suo nomine auxilia pollicitus erat, ex quo est iunctus Eumeni adfinitate, in omnia belli pacisque se consociaverat consilia. Cf. Liv. xlv. 13, 2; Justin, xxxm. 1, 2 ; xxxviii. 6, 3.

7. Liv. xlii. 19, 4 : (legates sent by Ariarathes) quorum oratio fuit regem educandum filium Romam misisse, ut iam inde a puero adsuesceret moribus Romanis homini-busque. Petere ut eum non sub hospitium modo privatorum custodia, sed publicae etiam curae ac velut tutelae vellent esse.

8. Polyb. XXXI. 3 (14), 1 : iraptytvovTQ. ..Trap’ ’Apiapadov tov veaxjTt SiaSeSey/xevov Ttjv Ka7r7ra8a/caJv /3a<riA.6iav TTptaSfiis, avai/6a)(TO/x6vot ttjv t€ d'liXiav Kal av/xfjia^Lav... Kal KilOoXov TrapaKakiao'.'TCi rrjv <JvyK\rjTov (lirobltauOai rijv tov $a<r lXouis evvoiav Kal ~pof)vji[av, rjv e^ei Kal Kotvrj Kal Kar 18Lav Trpbs airavras 'Payiaiovs.

9. Liv. Ep. 46 : (Ariarathes) regnum accepit et amicitiam cum populo R...renovavit.

KiurOm. Trjv 3a(n.\eiai' avr<2, sireiSrj KadiKTai Trj<; 'Ptofiaitov eii/oias, eOve rots Oeois y^ipuyrrjpia t<5v yeyovorwv.

11. Diod. xxxi. 39 : (sends envoys) 8iao-a<£owras trjv evvoiav tov fSao'iXeio'; rjv €^€i irpos 'Pm/xaiovs, eri 8e rrjv 8i tKei-vous yevopevrjv a.7r6pprj(Tiv tov yduov /cat irpos ^rjp,rjrpLov.

12. Perhaps because he knew how Rome would regard the action, he refused to join Artaxias of Armenia in a partition of Sophene, Diod. xxxi. 32; Polyb. xxxi. 16 (17).

13. Perished fighting for Rome against Aristonicus (Strabo xn. p. 534; xiv. p. 646 ; Oros. v. 10, 2; Eutrop. iv. 22; Justin, xxxvn. 1, 2).

14. Polyb. xxxi. 8 (13), 4 : Trapayevopevwv trpecrfievTiav t<liv Trepl IVaiov KraovLou Kal 8iaXeyop.eva>v ra /3a(riXei irepl t<Zv ■trpos tovs TaXaras ai™ 8ia<f>ep6vT<ov,.. . <£if<ras (sc. o ’Apiap.) eisirayojyos elvai irpos to KpiOiv____

15. In another dispute with the Gauls either this Ariarathes or another Cappadocian king of the same name was sentenced to pay damages to the Gauls for injury to their land caused by his engineering operations, Strabo xn. 2, 8.

16. Liv. Ep. 47 : Ariarathes, Cappadociae rex, consilio Demetrii regis Syriae et viribus pulsus regno, a senatu restitutus est. Cf. Polyb. xxxn. 10 (24); App. Syr. 47.

The senate however in arbitrating only restored him to half his original kingdom, allowing Orophernes to keep the other half. Moreover he was left to regain even this half himself with the aid of Attalus II (Polyb. m. 5, 2). Orophernes was soon expelled by his subjects (Polyb. xxxn. 25) and Ariarathes resumed control of the whole of Cappadocia.

18. Made war on Priene to recover money deposited there by Orophernes. Priene appealed to Rome in vain (circ. 156 B.C.), Polyb. xxxin. 6. Restored Mithrabarzanes to his throne instead of dividing Sophene with Avtaxias the Armenian, Diod. xxxi. 32 ; Polyb. xxxi. 16(17), 5. Close friendships with Greek towns ; introduced Hellenic culture into Cappadocia, and his name appears on Attic coins,

For the murder of Ariarathes V’s successor of the same name and also that of his son at the instigation of Mith. VI of Pontus, v. Momms. Rom. Gesch. Bk. iv. ch. 8. Rome did not avenge them save by expelling the usurper nominated by Mithridates.

19. Strabo XII. 2, 11 : IkXiitovto'; Sc tov fiacriXiKov yevovs, ol p.iv Pa/xaloi crvvexiopovv avrols avTOvo/j.u&8ai Kara Ttjv cmyKUfi.iv'qv <f>iXlav tc nai (rvfifia^tav irpos to edvos, ol Sc 7Tptcrf]eucrd[i£voi tt]V /xiv iXevOepiav 7rapr]T0viT0 (ov yap SvvacrOaL <j>tptiv avrrjv e<j>acrav), ftao’iXea S’ ij^LOvv avrots dno-8ei)(6rjv<u. ol Sc. ..circrpei/'av avrols c£ iav ran iXicrBai Kara \uporoviav, ov av [iovXuivrai. Kal eiXovro ’Apiof3ap£dvr]v. Cf. Justin, xxxviii. 1.

20. Plut. Sull. 5 : Xeyerai (so. o SuAAas) Tpel? Si^jpous Trpo6ijjL(vo<s, tov p.iv ’ApLof3ap£avri, tov Si ’Opo/3a£a>, tov Si avr<3, jxiaoi ap.(f>oiv KaOt£o juevos, X[njj).o.TiCi.tv. icj>’ <S tov jJ.lv ’Opofiatpv vcrTepov o ti2v Hdpduiv /3a<xiAeJis dbreKTeive.

21. Restored by Sulla, when expelled by Mithridates, Plut. Sull. 5; Liv. Ep. 70 ; restored by Aquillius (88 B.C.), Liv. Ep. 74; by Sulla according to the treaty with Mithrid. (84 B.C.), Liv. Ep. 83 ; Plut. Sull. 22. Soon after he was expelled by Tigranes, but was finally confirmed in his kingdom by Pompey, receiving additional territory.

22. App. Mith. 105: ’Apto/3ap£avri S’ aireStSov jSacnXa'av K tt—TraSoKf'tts, Kal irpocre7r£8<iiK.e ~%m<fyqvr)v Kal TopSvrjvrjv.

25. Ariob. I having resigned in his son’s favour, the latter was confirmed in the kingdom by Pompey, Yal. Max. v. 7, 2 ; App. Mith. 105.

Of this son it is only known that he had friendship with Athens (C. I. G. 357) and died through a conspiracy about 52 B.C. (Cic. Earn. xv. 2, 5).

26. Cic. Fam. xv. 2, 8: regem quem vos honorificentis-sime appellassetis, nullo postulante; ib. ii. 17 : Ariobarzanem quia senatus per me regem appellavit.

27. Cic. Fam. xv. 2, 4: cutn enim vestra auctoritas inter-cessisset ut ego regem Ariobarzanem Eusebem et Philo-rhomaeum tuerer, eiusque regis salutem incolumitatemque regni defenderem, regi regnoque praesidio essem, adiunxisse-tisque salutem eius regis populo senatuique curae esse, quod nullo unquam de rege decretum esset a nostro ordine. Cf. xv. 2, 8.

29. Cic. Fam. xv. 2, 7 : cohortatus ilium ut in sua vita conservanda primum regnare disceret. (The King was very weak, and his father had died through a plot.) _

30. Cic. Fam. xv. 4, 6 : Metram et eum quem tu mihi diligenter commendaras Athenaeum, importunitate Athenaidis exilio multatos, in maxima apud regem auctori-tate gratiaque constitui.

31. ib. : cumque magnum bellum...concitaretur, si sacerdos armis se...defenderet...ego tuto iis, qui novari aliquid volebant, perfeci ut e regno ille discederet, rexque sine tumultu ac sine armis omni auctoritate aulae com-munita regnum cum dignitate obtineret.

. 32. Cic. Fam. xv. 2, 7: cum rex a me equitatum cohor-I tesque de exereitu meo postularet, etsi intellegebam vestro senatus consulto non modo posse me id facere, sed etiam debere,

33. “'Protected also later by Caesar’s lieutenant against Pharnaces, [Caes.] Bell. Alex. 34, 36, 37.

35. Helped the nearest Roman general in the Civil wars, Lucan ii. 592, hi. 244; Dio xlii. 48.

[Caesar] Bell. Alex. 66 : Fratrem Ariobarzanis, Ariara-thern, cum bene meritus uterque eorum de republica esset, ne aut regni hereditas Ariarathem sollicitaret, aut heres regni terreret, Ariobarzani attribuit, qui sub eius imperio ac ditione esset.

He evidently gave Ariarathes little land. Cf. Cic. Att. xiii. 2 : ‘Ariarathes...Romamvenit. Vult, opinor, regnum aliquod emere a Caesare. Nam quo modo nunc est, pedem ubi ponat in suo, non habet.’

37. Cic. Att. vi. 1, 3 : ei (Pompeio) sic nunc solvitur (sc. ab Ariobarzane)...nec id satis efficit in usuram men-struam. Sed Gnaeus noster clementer id fert.,.Alii neque solvit cuiquam, neque potest solvere. Nullum enim aera-rium, nullum vectigal habet. Appii instituto tributa imperat. Ea vix in fenus Pompeii, quod satis sit, efficiunt. Amici regis duo tresve perdivites sunt, sed ii suum tam diligenter tenent quam ego aut tu...Nihil illo regno spolia-tius, nihil rege egentius. Itaque aut tutela cogito me abdicare aut fenus et impendium recusare.

38. Caesar pardoned Ariobarzanes for assisting Pompey and even gave him Lesser Armenia, Dio xlii. 48, but in 42 B.C. he was put to death by Cassius, App. B. C. iv. 63; Dio xlvii. 33. Archelaus, son of the priest of Comana, was then made king by Antonius, and confirmed in his sovereignty by Augustus, Strabo xn. p. 540.

1. App. Mith. 10 : o ye tol 'Po>jU.aiois 7rpcl)TOS iv (f>iXia yevopevos, /cat vavs rti/as eirl Kap^Soi/tovs Kal oTJ/i/ia^iav okiyfjv Trapacrx<iv, /SacrtXevs Hovtov, Mi^ptSaTrjs o Evepyenjs ilTLKX-qfTLV.

3. Assisted against Carthage, 148 B.C., v. n. 1 supra, and Aristonicus, 132 B.C., Strabo xiv. p. 646 ; Eutrop. iv. 22; Oros. v. 10, 2.

4. Received Greater Phrygia, 128 B.C., in return for large bribes, Justin, xxxvn. 1,2; C. Gracchus fr. quoted by Momms. Rom. Gesch. JBk. iv. ch. 3, note. After his murder in 120 B.C. Rome at once resumed control of Greater Phrygia, uniting it with Asia, Justin, xxxvm. 5, 2; App. Mith. 11, 56.

6. Mithridates VI never really came under Rome’s overlordship. He evacuated Paphlagonia at the instance of Sulla in 92 B.C., but his presence there was an open breach of the peace (App. Mith. 57). He extended his kingdom to the North of the Black Sea, disregarding a previous manifesto of Rome :

App. Mith. 13 : tm S’ airtS Ao ya> kckcAcukotojv vpMv to is iv ¹A o'lcl l3<i<Ti\ev<Ti Trjs Evj0(07TT;s fir/Sc ifiau ca, Ta 7roAAa X cpptivrjirtni 7rcf) tttrjraaci’.

App. Mith. 11 : Kal 0-uAAa/3cu'... intcmiXav.. .r<3 MiOpi-SaTr/, aAA’ o fj.ev...oii fn.TeTrparrc.'*

9. Sail. i'V. 413 : quid ego me appellem ? quem diiunc-tum undique regnis et tetrarchis ab imperio eorum, quia fama erat divitem nec serviturum esse, per Nicomedem bello lacessiverunt.

10. Veil. ii. 40 : (Mithridates) ultimus omnium iuris sui regum praeter Parthicos.

11. Even his treaty with Sulla in 84 B.C. did not increase his dependence. He was not even forbidden, as

Antiochus III had been, to keep a fleet, Plut. Sull. 22. He surrendered 70 ships only, whereas his fleet in 89 b.c. numbered 300 ships, App. Mith. 13. In 65 B.C. he offered to pay tribute for his kingdom but could not trust himself to an unconditional surrender, App. Mith. 107.

1. Mithridates VI had received under his protection the king of the Bosporus, whom the Scythians were threatening, App. Mith. 78; Strabo vii. pp. 309—312; G. I. G. 2103. Later he established his son Machares in the Bosporan kingdom, App. Mith. 113, and sent to him for contingents against the Romans, ib. 78. Machares however in 69 B.C. sent to Lucullus seeking friendship, Plut. Luc. 24; Liv. Ep. 98, and on that account was put to death by Mithridates and succeeded by his brother Pharnaces. He too plotted against his father, sent to tell Pompey of his death, and sought Rome’s recognition of his claim to the Bosporus, 63 B.C.

2. Plut. Pomp. 41 : ra S’ eKei Trdvra —payfiaja KaT€K\jjp(0<jaT0, Kal e<j> taura Kat Pa)/natois yeypa<j>e ttoiov-jxe vos.

3. App. Mith. 113 : 5>apvaKrji Sc HofXTrrjiu)... iirejxire... Seo/xevtK yj rtjs Trarpwas apxV^ V Bocnropau ye f3am\eveiv jxovov. IIo/A7r?jios 8e...$apvaia]v...aTraWd£avTa ttovov ttoWov rrjv iTaXtav Kal Pw/naLOLs tTroiyaaro Kal ySaert-Xcwctv eSuiKev aura" Bocnropov.

4. Strabo VII. p. 310 : ei eKe&ov S’ (sc. Mith. VI) rj ySaeriXeta yeyevrjrai ‘Pw/xaiots vtttjkoo*;.

5. This recognition Pharnaces earned by sending to Pompey the betrayers of M’. Aquillius, the corpse of Mith. VI, and hostages, App. Mith. 113.

6. N.B. Pompey exempted the Phanagoreans from his rule—Pharnaces received only what Rome chose to concede him, App. ib.¹

7. Owing to the position of his kingdom he was regarded as a ‘ rex externus.’

[Caes.J Bell. Alex. 34, 2 • Domitius turpe populo Romano esse statuit regna socioruni atque amicorum ab externo rege occupari.

For the same reason he was able to remain neutral in the civil wars, but tried to seize Pontus for himself. His downfall followed at Ziela in 47 B.C., and a private enemy, Asander, slew him, [Caes.J ib. 65-67; App. Mith. 120; Dio xlii. 45.

8. [Caes.J Bell. Alex. 78 : Mithridatem Pergamenum ...regem Bospori constituit, quod sub imperio Pharnacis fuerat; provinciasque populi Romani a barbaris atque inimicis regibus, intcrposito amicissimo rege, niunivit. Eidem tetrarchiam Gallograecorum iure gentis et cogna-tionis adiudicavit.

9. Asander, who after defeating Mithridates of Pergamum took command of the Bosporus as ‘archon’ in

¹ Livy (Ep. 113) calls Pharnaoes king of Pontus, but be can only have held a very reduced portion of it. Cf. Ep. 102 : On. Pompeius in provinciae formam Pontum redegit.

47 B.C. and was probably recognised by the Bosporaus and barbarians as king soon after, seems only to have dated his kingship officially from 36 B.C., 23 being the greatest number of years that appears on his coins, which are numerous, aud he died in 14 b.c., C. I. 0. Vol. n. Introd. to Part xi., 1, 13 ; Strabo vn. p. 308. This year therefore, 36 B.C,, was probably that in which Augustus recognised him as king instead of ethnarcb, Lucian Jfacrob. 17.

10. A certain ScriboHuts took the kingdom in 14 B.C. after Asander’s death, saying he was a descendant of Mithridates VI and ‘had received the kingdom from Augustus,’ Dio liv. 24.

11. Pohmo, whom Agrippa sent against Scribonius, was onlv able to take over the kingdom, when Agrippa came to Sinope, aud frightened the Bosporaus by his approach. Polemo then married Dynamis, the widow of Asander, the marriage ‘being sanctioned by Augustus,’ Dio ib.

1. When Rome first came into contact with Galatia (1SS B.C.), the three tribes of Galatia were each divided into four tetrarchies, each tetrarehy having a tetrarch, a judge, and a general. Strabo says that within his memory there were three supreme chiefs, then two, and finally one, viz. Deiotarus, after the death of whose successor, Amyntas, the whole became a province, Strabo xn. 5, 1. When Deiotarus received from Pompey Lesser Armenia and the title king, he kept his tetrarehy and chieftaincy.

2. The Gauls after the victory of Attalus I (in 230 B.C.) were long under Pergamene influence, and in 1S9 B.C. Manlius consulted Eumenes in imposing terms

upon them, Polyb. xxi. 41 (43); but he exacted indemnities from them for Rome, Liv. xxxvm. 18, 2; Polyb. xxi. 34;

36. He also left them so far under Eumenes’s supremacy, that they were bound to keep the peace with Eumenes, and not quit their borders under arms, Liv. xxxvm. 40, 1; Polyb. xxi. 41 (43). Manlius had to subdue the various chiefs separately.

3. When Eumenes displeased Rome, the Gauls were encouraged to assail him and accuse him to the senate, and after his victory over them, Rome stepped in and made them dependent immediately upon herself, granting them autonomy on condition of keeping within their boundaries, Polyb. xxx. 28; 30; xxxi. 1 ; 32 (xxxi. 2 ; 6 ; 9; xxxii. 3).

4. Their contingents constantly helped Rome in her wars in Asia, and Cicero [Alt. vi. 5, 3) speaks of them as being the most reliable part of his auxiliaries.' (51 b.c.)

We hear of the bestowal of the titles ‘king’ and ‘ friend and ally ’ upon a Galatian prince :

5. Diod. XXXIV. (XXXV.) 63 : KovTtdi/iaros ns o fiacnXevs trjs TaXanK-rjs ttoAcojs rijs...’Iovrtopas crvvicrei...Sid<f>opo'S r/v, <j>iXos 8k Kal <TVjXjxaxos 'PwjwaiW, o5s av iv rois ZfjLirpocrdcv Xpovois 8iaT€rpi0ojs iv ... Sia 'PayiaiW Se TrapeiX.T)<f>M’s TTjV iv YaXan'a {3acri\aav.

6. We hear too of the deposition of another prince by Murena, who joined his land to Lycia, Strabo an. 4, 17.

In the last century of the Republic the history of Galatia centres in Deiotarus, who for zealous service was rewarded by Pompey with the kingdom of Armenia Minor, while keeping his tetrarchy.

7. Cic. Deiot. 27 : multis ille quidem gradibus officio-rum erga rem publicam nostram ad hoc regium nomen ascendit. Cf. Cic. Att. v. 17.

8. Caesar when he took away D.’s Armenian kingdom left him the royal title, Cic. Deiot. 36.

Cf. ib. 25 : a quo (Caesare) regem et se et filium suum constitutes esse meminisset.

9. Cic. Deiot. 37 : ab omnibus (sc. imperatoribus) est omatus, qui, posteaquam in castris esse potuit per aetatem, in Asia, Cappadocia, Ponto, Cilicia, Syria bella gesserunt.

10. ib. Phil. xi. 33 : cuius benevolentia in populum Romanum est ipsius aequalis aetati: qui non solum socius imperatorum nostrorum fuit in bellis, verum etiam dux copiarum suarum. Cf. ib. 34.

11. liv. Ep. 94: Deiotarus, Gallograeciae tetrarches, praefectos Mithridatis bellum in Phrygia moventes cecidit.

Cf. App. Mith. 75; [Caes.J Bell. Alex. 68 (where Caesar is said to have ‘commanded’ his aid), 77. As king of Armenia, he guarded the frontier, sending Rome notice of the approach of the Parthians, Cic. Fam. vm. 10, 1; Att. v. 21, 27. In the Civil wars he aided Pompey (v. n. 14 infra), and later Brutus and Cassius, Cic. Phil.

These services were clearly those of a client, and not rendered by the terms of an alliance :

12. Cic. Fam. xv. 1,6: regis Deiotari et voluntatem et copias, quantaecunque sunt, nostras esse duco. Reliqui reges...neque opibus satis firmi nec voluntate sunt.

13. Cic. Phil. xi. 31: senatui placere: regem JDeiotarum patrem et regem D. filium, si ut multis bellis saepenumero imperium populi Romani iuverint, item C. Cassium pro consule copiis suis opibusque iuvissent, senatui populoque Romano gratum esse facturos, itemque si ceteri reges... fecissent, S.P.Q.R. eorum officii non immemorem futurum.

14. Cic. Deiot. 13 (Deiotarus ad Pompeium): venit vel rogatus ut amicus, vel arcessitus ut socius, vel evocatus ut is qui senatui parere didicisset.

15. ib. 9 : nunquam tu ilium accusavisti ut hostem, sed ut amicum officio parum functum, quod propensior in Cn. Pompeii amicitiam fuisset quam in tuam.

16. Cf. also Deiotarus’ excuse of himself in [Caes.J Bell. Alex. 67 : ‘ neque enim se iudicem debuisse esse con-troversiarum populi Romani, sed parere praesentibus imperiis.’ It is thus a case of friendship or compulsion as subordinate, and ‘ socius' is applied to him as one who had so often helped Rome and had earned the title ‘socius atque amicus.’

18. Cic. Phil. xi. 33 : quae de illo viro Sulla, quae Murena, quae Servilius, quae Lucullus, quam ornate, quam honorifice, quam graviter saepe in senatu praedicaverjint.

19. ib. Deiot. 37 : senatus vero iudicia de illo tam multa tamque honorifica, quae publicis populi Romani litteris monumentisque consignata sunt.

20. ib. 10: is rex quum senatus hoc nomine saepe honorificentissimis decretis appellavisset.

21. [Caes.J Bell. Alex. 67 : Deiotarus, depositis regiis insignibus neque tantum privato vestitu sed etiam reorum

22. Cic. Deiot. 1 : dico pro capite fortunisque regis; quod ipsum, etsi non iniquum est, in tuo dumtaxat periculo, tamen est ita inusitatum regem capitis reum esse ut ante hoc tempus non sit audituru. Cf. Tac. Oral. 21, 6 (Brutus as advocate of Deiotarus).

23. Cic. Deiot. 27 : quidquid a bellis populi Romani vacabat, cum hominibus nostris consuetudines, amicitias, res rationesque iungebat; ut non solum tetrarcha nobilis, sed optimus paterfamilias, et diligentissimus agricola et pecuarius haberetur.

24. [Caes.J Bell. Alex. 34: adiungit Cn. Doruitius legioni tricesimae sextae duas ab Deiotaro quas ille disciplina atque armatura nostra complures annos con-stitutas habebat.

25. In App. Mith. 75, 114 he is mentioned among a number of tetrarchs. With this cf. [Caes.J Bell. Alex. 67 : Deiotarus tetrarches Gallograeciae tunc quidem paene totius, quod ei neque legibus neque moribus concessum esse ceteri tetrarchae contendebant, sine dubio autem rex Armeniae minoris ab senatu appellatus... (This contention

Bell. Alex. 78 shews that Deiotarus had seized some time before another tetrarchy, which Caesar in 47 B.C. gave to Mithridates the Pergamene. Deiotarus seems to have aimed at absorbing all the other tetrarchies. Until Caesar cut down his territory in 47 B.C., he seems to have been regarded as supreme in Galatia. The title king, which Caesar left him, would probably cause him to rank

above the other tetrarchs, and his successor Amyntas was evidently overlord of all Galatia, Dio liii. 26; Strabo xii.

26. Deiotarus’ son of the same name, who reigned jointly with him for some time (v. n. 8 supra), seems to have died before his father. Amyntas, a former clerk of Deiotarus, was appointed king by Antony, Strabo xii. 5,1 ; Dio xlix. 32, 3. He died in an expedition against Homonada in Cilicia, Strabo ib. Augustus then made Galatia a province, though Amyntas had sons, Dio liii.

1. Antiochus of Commagene, who in 68 B.C. made friendship with Lucullus¹⁵⁹, seems to have had the title king (Cic. ad Qu. Fratr. n. 10, 2 : multa dixi in ignobilem regem), though Cicero frequently speaks of him without the title, contrary to his usual respectful way, and the ‘ praetexta ’ with which he was presented was generally given to ‘ reguli,’ as distinct from the royal gift of the ‘ toga purpurea’ (liv. xxvn. 4, 9). Cicero (ib.) contemptuously makes him the inferior of a tetrarch, ‘Vos autem, homines nobiles, qui Bostrenum praetextatum non fere-batis, Commagenum feretis?’

2. Dio XXXVI. 2 : (o AoukovMos) tov re rrjs Ko/ifiayyjvyjs jSacrtAea An-io^ov Kai two. 'Apdfiiov 8vva(TTr]v...iiriKT)pvKeu(Ta.-fxevovs ol e8e£aro.

3. Antiochus assumed the surname ¹ $i\op«i/iaios,’ Bas-Waddington, Inscript, in. 2, n. 136 d.

4. Kept watch against the Parthians, and informed Cicero of their approach, Cic. Fam. xv. 1, 2 ; 3, 1; 4, 3. Aided Pompey in Civil wars, Caes. B. C. m. 4; 5; App.

5. It was considered a breach of his clientship, when he received Parthian fugitives in 38 B.C., Plut. Ant. xxxiv.

2, but Antony, who went to punish him, failed to reduce him by siege, and could only impose upon him merely nominal terms of submission.

6. Cic. ad Qu. Frat. ii. 10, 2 : de Commageno mirifice mihi blanditur Appius. Videt enim, hoc genere dicendi si utar in ceteris, Februarium sterilem futurum. Eumque lusi iocose satis, neque solum illud extorsi oppidulum eius quod erat in Euphrati [Zeugmate], praeterea togam sum eius praetextaui, quam erat adeptus Caesare consule, magno hominum risu cavillatus. ‘ Quod vult,’ inquam, ‘renovari honores eosdem, quo minus togam praetextam quotannis interpolet, decernendum nihil censeo.’

fJ-eT£TTCfujjaTO oti Tiva Trp£<rf$evrr]v vito tov a8eA.<^)oC 8ia<f>6pov ol oj/tos (rraXevra es T7JI' ^r PdJ/j.T/v l6o\o7pov‘f]<rc /cat es T€ to ctvv-eSpiov iarjyaye Kal kilta\l"r]’j>:(r6lira d~eKTetie. (29 B.C.)

1. Dio XXXVI. 52, 4: IIo/x.7n;tos 8e (Ti.ypavqv) ttape-fjLvdqcraTO el tt u iv aXXa re /cat OTi...Trjv t<Sv 'P tofiaiuiv <f> iXiav irpoaei\ri<t>ws clrj. ib. 53, 5 gives the enrolment of Tigranes by Pompey as friend and ally.

2. Cic. Sest. 59 : regnat hodie (Tigranes) et amicitiae nomen ac societatis, quod armis violarat, precibus est consecutus.

3. App. Mith. 104 : e8t8ou ITOjx.77jp.ui avru> raXavra e^a/ao^tA-ta, rrj (rrptirUL 8c Spa^uas irevTYjKovTa l/caorai /cat Xo^ayw ^tXtas /cat ^tXtap^M /j.Lyuas. /cat o [ rou;T'j]tos avrul (rvveyiyvw(TKe rwv yeyovorwv * /cat 0(.'rjT'rj(TC tov /xev i/toi* ap\€LV rtfs ~w<pr]vys Kal TopSvijvijs.. .tov 8e ttotepa tt;s aUt|s Ap-

Cf, also Plut. Pomp. 33; Strabo xi. p. 530; Cic. /Sesi. 38; Veil. ii. 37 in/!; Dio xxxvi. 53. All the authorities shew clearly that the money paid by Tigranes was an indemnity (jroLvrjv...Trji a8t/ctas, Plut.), with the addition of a donative to Pompey’s army.

4. Veil. ii. 37 : servatus regi honos imperii sed multato ingenti pecunia, quae omnis, sicuti Pompeio moris erat, redacta in quaestoris potestatem ac publicis descripta litteris.

5. Cic. Sest. 58: hunc Cn. Pompeius...certis rebus imperatis regnare iussit, nec minus et sibi et huic imperio gloriosum putavit constitutum a se regem quam constrictum videri. Cf. Liv. Ep. 101.

6. Submits to arbitration in his quarrel with Parthia, App. Mith. 106 ; Dio xxxvn. 7.

... Trai’Ttt to 7rpos aAA.ijA.ous SieXixravTO, ofiyiZo/Levos fiev o Tiypanjs oti rrjs eiriKovpia.% ovk /8oi>Ao'p.evos Sc o $paaTTjs

mpieivai tov 'Ap/j.iviov...Kal yap eS TjTrujrai’TO dp,<£oTepoi, oti, 07T0T€p0S CLVTO)V TOV tTtpOV KpCLTyjfT€t€, T(i>V T€ TTpay/AaTtDV TOIS "Pto/Wois 7T/)OKOi//Ei Kai ai’ros eixeipioToVepos crcjucri yevTycrcTttu

8. For the refusal of -Tigranes’ request for aid, ». Dio supra, and cf. App. Mith. 106 : (oi Tiypavous Trpecr/^et?) <os <£i'Aw OTjppo^etv tov IIo/tmyiov a^iowres...Kai o Ilop.m;ios o£k a^iaiv Ilap^uaiois 7roXe/teii/ aveu 'Paipaiaji/ \p7]cj>[crfj.aT0S |jrep.ij/iv a/ic^orepois SioAAoktos.

9. Strabo XI. p. 532 : SiaSe£ap,evos S’ "ApTttOL'aVSry? Ikuvov TC(OS /A€V J]VTV)(£l <f>(\os <3v 'Pa)p.aiois.

10. Plut. Grass. 19 : ijKiura S’ avrov ’AprafSdfcrjs o ApjumtDV /Sao’iAeiis €7reppa>o'ej'. yap eis to o‘TpaTd7reSov

Cf. Dio xl. 16, 2 (Artav.’s advice disregarded by Crassus); Plut. Grass. 22 (Artav. delays to operate).

11. Dio xlix. 25, 1 : Antony persuaded by Artav. to attack the Median king. Of. Strabo xi. p. 524:

’ApTaovdo’Srj'; ov ckclvo'; (sc. o ’Ai'ramos).. .cruyu./JouXoi' eiroieiTO Kal Kvpiov Trjs irepl tov iroXefiov yvtofiYjs. The war was conducted from Armenia but Artavasdes finally deserted Antony, Plut. Ant. 37—39.

12. Dio XLIX. 33, 2 : tov S’ ovv ’Ap/j-dviov irporepov p.ev fs T7jv Aiyvtttov, tos Kal (f>iKov Kal tus ivTavda avTov airovws irepiXafiuiv KaTcpyaa-rjrai, /x6T67T6|/.(i/aro. ijrel S’ viroTotnjcra'S tovt ov% virr/K0v<rev...

13. Antony finally secured him by cunning, and after imprisoning him for some time put him to death, Dio ib.

39, 6; Tac. Ann. ii. 3, 2; Plut. Ant. 50; Liv. Ep. 131; Jos. Ant. xv. 104; Strabo xi. p. 532.

14. Dio XLIX. 39, 6 : eStjcrev avTov apyvpals aKvtrecTLv alo'xpbv yap, Zolkcv, r/v /3aa-ikea avTov yeyovoTa o’&jpais SeOijva i.

15. Armenia was then assailed by Parthian influences, seen in the institution of Artaxias as king in place of Antony’s son by Cleopatra, Tac. Ann. ii. 3 ; Jos. Ant. xv. 104; Dio xlix. 39, 5. Augustus however drove out Artaxias and established Tigranes, Mon. Anc. 27¹.

¹ Later emperors, in dealing with Armenia and similar difficult regions, sometimes followed the policy of the senate of old, that namely of escorting a rival to the border and leaving him to be joined there by his faction and establish himself. Their chief care was to keep the border nations distracted and weak.

17. Mon. Anc. 27 : Armeniam maiorem, interfecto rege eius Artaxe, cum possem facere provinciam, malui maiorum nostrorum exemplo regnum id Tigrani regis Artavasdis filio...tradere.

1. Thus in the time of Sulla the reigning king protested his equality by putting to death his ambassador for suffering Sulla to take the seat of honour between himself and Ariobarzanes, Plut. Sull. 5.

2. His successor replied to the slights of Pompey by declaring war upon Armenia, a friend of Rome. For his motive in submitting to arbitration v. xiv. 7 supra.

Solus et e numero regum telluris Eoae Ex aequo me Par thus adit. Nec munere Magni Stant semel Arsacidae.

5. Mon. Anc. 29: Parthos trium exercituuin Ro-manorum spolia et signa reddere mihi supplicesque amicitiam populi Romani petere.

6. ib. 32 : ad me rex Parthorum Phrates Orodis filius filios suos nepotesque omnes misit in Italiam, non bello superatus sed amicitiam nostram per liberorum suorum pignora petens.

The king of Parthia only sought the friendship of Augustus that he might send his children to Rome out of his way, as possible rivals to himself in the future. He did not send them as a pledge of his friendship.

Until 64 B.C. Rome only had dealings with the Jews so far as to respond to the requests of their successive high-priests for ‘friendship’ or ‘friendship and alliance,’ Jos. Ant. xiii. 163, 164, 259 etc. The first active interference of Rome in Judaean affairs was in 64—63 B.C. when Pompey restored Hyrcanus as high priest. This Hyrcanus and Herod the Great are the only two Judaean rulers that concern us.

The settlement of Pompey in 63 B.C. practically converted Judaea into a province. It was at any rate subordinated to the governor of Syria, almost as an ' attributa regio.’ Thus

(a) Hyrcanus lost the royal name and dignity and received back simply the priesthood, Jos. Ant. xiv. 73, 90 f.

(b) Tribute was levied from the Jews, not from Hyrcanus as ruler, Jos. Bell. I. 154; Ant. xiv. 74 f.; Dio xxxix. 56, 6. _

Jos. Ant. XIV. 91 : ...7reVre Sc ctweSpia Karacrnjcras,...Kal o'l ply aTnjXXay/JLivoL tt}<; Swacrrctas iv apitTTOKpaTia oirjyov.

Ammianus xiv. 8, 12 : ultima Syriarum est Palaestina; has quoque regiones Pompeius.. .in provincias rectori delata iurisdictione formavit (mss. have ‘provincias reciem delata aurisdictione ’).

(e) The right of coinage seems to have been taken away, for though a number of coins are extant belonging to former and later periods, none are forthcoming from this period.

(/) The governors of Syria constantly interfered in the internal control of the nation, and treated it as part of their ‘provincial Thus i. Pompey seems to have included it in that of Scaurus, Jos. Ant. xiv. 79. ii. Gabinius besides his other acts rebuilt cities in Judaea, ib. 87. iii. Crassus, on his way to Parthia, visited Judaea as part of his ‘ provincia' and interfered in many matters, ib. 119. iv. Cassius took a city of Judaea and enslaved certain seditious inhabitants, and also punished other rebels at the request of Hyrcanus and his minister Antipater, ib. 120.

(g) Hyrcanus was likewise forbidden to rebuild the walls of Jerusalem. It was to be as accessible to Roman intervention as the rest of Judaea, ib. 82, 144, 146.

Hyrcanus as high priest still dictated to the Jews in all religious matters, and his sphere would be wide amid such a religious nation. His minister in temporal matters, Antipater, acted as subordinate of the Syrian governor, ib. 101, and at Hyrcanus’ order furnished him with corn and money, ib. 80 (Scaurus), 99 (Gabinius), 127—136 (Mithridates of Pergamum when sent by Caesar).

Caesar however in 47 B.C. (a) restored to Hyrcanus much of his power with the title ‘ ethnarehV He was to ‘bear rule over the nation of the Jews," ib. 151, 194, 314, 317.

(6) Allowed him in accordance with this power to rebuild the walls of Jerusalem, and ‘ retain it in the manner he himself pleased,’ ib. 146, 199.

(c) Restored him full criminal jurisdiction, and confirmed his jurisdiction in religious matters and Jewish customs; ib. 177 : trial of Herod by Hyrcanns. For his religious jurisdiction r. i 195.

(<0 Set up Antipater as dynast of Judaea under Hyrcanns, and gave him and his sons the governorship of the nation. The governor of Syria did not now intervene, ib. 143. Antipater’s subordination to Hyreanus appears in 157, 162, 168.

(e) Hyrcanns’ restoration however did not bring to the Jews freedom from tribute¹⁶¹, but this tribute was still paid by them separately, not by Hyreanus as their ruler. Moreover Caesar specially confirmed Hyrcanns’ power to receive the sacred tithes as before, ib. 203. He also gave him control of his tariffs, ib. 249.

(/') Caesar also granted him protection by letters to the cities and kings, guaranteeing the integrity of his territory. Hyreanus was therefore under Rome's protection in his foreign relations, so far as he had any, but this very act of protection shews that he enjoyed the dignity of a ruler, and was not under the Roman provincial governor, ib. 147, 14$.

(g) As the ruler of a nation not within the Roman ‘ provincia,’ he was to have for his land freedom from military exactions in the way of auxiliaries or money, ib. 195, 204. A Roman commander could march through his land and encamp there as ally, but the expenses were not to be borne by the Jews, nor could they be enlisted against their will.

(h) He received the privilege of kings in respect of the treatment of his envoys, ib. 210.

It was a special concession to Jewish custom when Caesar granted that the high priesthood should be confirmed to his sons also, and not pass out of the priestly family, ib. 194.

The clientship of Hyrcanus in all these departments of his sovereignty as ethnarch is manifest.. He received everything from Rome, in several separate decrees.

The help which Hyrcanus rendered to Rome in her wars, as client, would be given through his ministers in temporal matters, Antipater and his sons.

Though Caesar so far restored Hyrcanus to the ruler-ship of the nation, the following facts remain to shew that Rome still dealt largely with the Jewish people itself, as after the Pompeian settlement:

(a) the mention of the Jews as friends or allies in several decrees, along with Hyrcanus, Jos. Ant. xrv. 207, 214, 216;

(b) the bestowal of the citizenship of Rome on many Jews. These were specially exempted from service on account of their religious views about the Sabbath, ib. 228, 232, 234-5, 237, 240 ;

(«) the payment of tribute by the Jews to Rome, besides the sacred tribute which they paid to Hyrcanus.

The relations of Hyrcanus were thus less personal than those of the kinHe was ethnarch, vf. according to Josephus (xiv. 117) ‘ ruler of a free republic.’

Herod appeal's first as an independent ruler with the name of tetrarch, which he received from Antony. From the time when this title was given to him and to his brother Phaselus, the high-priesthood declined rapidly in authority and lost its temporal power.

In 11 B.C. the Parthians drove out Herod, and took away captive Hyrcanus. Herod went to Rome for help and returned a king.

1. Jos. Ant. xiv. 38o : (Antony) iSiSaa-KO' cirrous (the senate) ok Kal ~pOs ror Kara HapOtay TToXcpjLOv "Hpo>SrjV j3atTl-Aevetr (nifitfxpei, Kal 8o£ay tovto —ucti \fnq<j>i£ovTat. Confirmed later in his kingdom by Augustus, ib. xv. 200.

2. ib. XIV. 386 : ov yap iro/iifctv avr(i> rous 'Potyiaiovs irapc£en. to is cic tov yeYors i&os I^oitos airnjv SiSovau

In Jos. J »t. xiv. 386 it is stated that for the above reason Herod had not requested the honour, but in § 382 he is said to have bribed Antony to propose it.

3. Received Roman contingents to serve under him and assist him, ib. 391, 410. A Roman legion remained to support him for some time after he had established himself in Judaea, ib. xv. 72. His opponent Antigonus was beheaded by Antony, ib. xv. 9.

4. At his appointment it was understood that he was to assist Rome, r. 1 gtipr. For instances of such assist-

ance cf. ib. xiv. 420; xv. 109. Herod was even sent by Antony against Arabia at the prompting of Cleopatra, ib. xv. 109 f.

5. ib. XV. 64 : ’Avromos ire/jLira KeXe.vtav 'HpmS^v iXOoi'Ta t<Sv eh ApixrrofiovXov a.iroXv(racr6aL.

6. ib. xv. 76 : ov yap (sc. o ’Avtgjvios) Ko\w<i ... f}axrikea. tre.pl toiv Kara rrjv ti[>xV^v yeyevrmaxav evOvvas airaneiv-ovto>s yap av ovSe /SacrtXeiis elrj- SoVras he rijv Tip.r)v Kal Trjs efoucrtas KaraftoicravTas eav avrfj xprjo-dai.

7. Appointed and deposed high-priests, ib. xv. 22, 39. Settled his own revenues, ib. 365; xvi. 64; xvii. 317. Developed and improved his kingdom, ib. xiv. 136-149.

8. His condition under Augustus was much the same, but his homage was accentuated. He thus consulted Augustus before putting his sons on trial, whereupon Augustus allowed him to decide about them as he thought fit, ib. xvi. 90, 98, 99. This permission Herod felt it more necessary perhaps to secure, since he had already commended them to the ‘ princeps ’ as his future heirs, ib.

xv. 343. So likewise he tried Antipater with the governor of Syria as his assessor, and waited for Augustus’ sanction of the condemnation, ib. xvn. 89, 145. He had however power to put them to death himself, ib. xvi. 98, 99.

9. He was not allowed to make war without Augustus’ consent. He fell into disgrace on an alleged offence of having attacked Arabia, ib. xvi. 284. The king of that country however had relations with Rome. Herod could maintain order on his borders, but even to repress robbers he needed the Syrian governor’s permission when they were outside his own land, ib.

10. His will had to be sanctioned by Augustus, ib. xvii. 195, 202, though Herod had previously obtained permission to settle the succession as he liked, ib. xv. 343 ;

xvi. 129. His successor could not take the title king until Augustus gave it him, ib. xvii. 195, 202.

The above details are sufficient to shew that with one master instead of many the king became far more dependent and responsible than he was under the senate’s rule.

1. Cic. Frag. B. xvi. iii. 2 : non patiar hanc exaudiri vocem huius imperii, ego te, nisi das aliquid, hostem, si quid dederis, regem et socium et amicum iudicabo.

2. Cic. Leg. Agr. 98 : cum omnem pecuniam...ex vecti-galibus redegissetis, ab omnibus regibus...coegissetis.

3. Cic. Fam. I. 9, 7 : tota interrogatio mea nihil habuit nisi reprehensionem illius tribunatus ; in quo omnia dicta... de vi, de auspiciis, de donatione regno rum.

4. Cic. Att. ii. 9, 1 : improbitate istorum qui...regna, qui praedia tetrarchis, qui immanis pecunias paucis dederunt.

5. Cic. Dom. 129: uno tempore...foedera feriebantur provinciarum, regum appellationes venales erant... Reges appellati a populo qui id nunquam ne a senatu quidem postulassent.

6. Cic. Vat. 29 speaks of the plundering of the treasury by Vatinius, and of his making foedera with kings and tetrarchs.

8. Cic. Sest. 66 : qui locus orbi terrae iam (58 B.C.) non erat alicui destinatus 1 quae regio orave terrarum erat latior, in qua non regnum aliquod statueretur 1 quis autem rex erat, qui illo anno non aut emendum sibi, quod non habebat, aut redimendum, quod habebat, arbitraretur?

9. Cic. Ear. Resp. 58 : reges qui erant, vendidit, qui non erant, appellavit (Clodius).

11. Cic. Quint. Frat. n. 10, 2 mentions Appius’ expectations of presents from the kings who sent in requests to the senate, as for instance Antiochus of Commagene.

12. Cic. Phil. v. 11, 12 : decreta falsa vendebat, regna...in aes accepta pecunia iubebat incidi...Foedera facta; regna data...Quibus rebus tanta pecunia una in domo coacervata est.

14. Diod. xxx.—xl. 13 (supplement, Teubner) : o Ti-!^laPX⁰^ (^sc- ^Tjp.rjrpiov (TUTpaiT'rfi) eis rrjv ’i:³<Of 17jI’ efaTrecrraA/y.eVos 'n’peo'fievnjs iroXXa /ca/ca Stepyacraro Trjv crvyKXrjTov

yap irXrjOos ko/j. i£mv, eStopoSoKec to is crvyKXyjTiKOvs Kal fjLaXtxrTa rous tois Ptots acr(?evets.

The following table contains passages which we have quoted from Diodorus, as they appear in the editions of Bekker (Leipsic, 1853) and Dindorf (Paris, 1844).

Polyb. xxi. 45, 1-27. Polybius used a copy of the actual treaty. Cf. also the treaty with Viriathus which seems to be reported from an original source by Appian’s authority (App. Iber. 139).

⁶ App. I.e. TrapanaXei M.i0pi8&T7]S tfiihos wv vfiiv Kat ffififiaxos (pDiOVS ovTas i'ads Kal avfifi&xov s (w5c yap a I (Ji'vOrjKai \tyovaiv), hr iKOvpew

Compare especially the decree, quoted in the text, which calls Antiochus IV ‘friend and ally,’ though Antiochus III his father was merely ‘ friend ’ ; also the relations of Ariarathes IV and of his son.

Cic. Deiot. 13, venit vel rogatus ut amicus, vel arcessitus ut socius, vel evocatus, ut is qui senatui parere didicisset.

Cic. Phil. xi. 31, senatui placere regem Deiotarum patrem et regem Deiotarum filium, si...copiis suis...iuvissent, senatui populoque Bomano gratum esse facturos; itemque si ceteri reges...fecissent, s.p.q.b. eorum officii non immemorem futurum.

⁵ Jug. 24, Adherbal calls himself ‘ socius atque amicus.’ ib. 14, (Adherbal) iam ab stirpe socius atque amicus populi Romani.

⁶ As appears from the reference given in n. 4, and from Caes. Bell. Afric. 56. ⁷ Append. A, hi. 36.

Caes. B. G. i. 3, 4 (Cat.); iv. 12, 4 (Piso’s ‘avus’); vn. 31, 5 (Oil.), ¹ amicus a senatu appellatus.’

xxii. 37, 4; xxiv. 6, 4 (Hiero) and of. xxiv. 28, 6: xxxn. 8, 9 (Attalus) and of. xxix. 11, 2; xxxvii. 53, 7 : xxxiv. 31,13 (Nabis) and cf. xxxii. 39, 10; xxxiv. 32, 3.

Caes. B. G. I. 35, 43, 45 ; y. 3 ; vii. 39. Cie. Verr. v. 115; div. Gaec. 17. Cf. Verr. ii. 2 ; v. 83 ; v. also ib. hi. 127; De imp. Pomp. 4.

XXII. 37, 4 (Hiero) ; xxxi. 11, 15 (Syph.); xlii. 26, 7 (Masin., Ptol., Ant. and Eum.).

Strabo v. 2, 2, p. 220 (Porsena); xm. 4, 2, p. 624 (Att.); xvn. 3, 15, p. 833 (Mas.); xvi. 1, 28, p. 748 (Parth.); xvn. 3, 7, p. 828 (Bocch.); xi. 14, 15, p. 532 (Art.).

³ Dio xxxvi. 53, 5 (Tigranes) ; xxxvn. 14, 2 (Pharnaces) ; xxxvm. 34, 3 (Ariovistus) ; xliii. 27, 3 (Cleopatra and Ptolemy); liii. 25, 1 (Polemo) ; li. 24 (Roles) ; and cf. also xxxix. 12 (Ptolemy XI).

⁵ Dio xxxvm. 34, 3, Tty re Kipamv rijs /WiXefas Tapi, rd Pw/wW el\7?0ei Kal isTovs <[>i\ovsto\jsre av/j./j.axovs avruiv...Iveylypann Other passages mark the separation more emphatically by sue phrases as “ is re rous <j>L\ovs Kal is robs av/i.” “ <f,L\os re iirl toi5t *ol <7iW’ “ «al 0. Kal <7.” etc. v. § 26, n. (Dio xxxvi. 53, 5 etc.).

The connexion between the title ‘friend and ally’and the wording of the treaty may be gathered from a comparison of Cic. frag. xvi.

iii. 2 with Suet. Caes. 54. Cicero’s protest against giving the title ‘ socius et amicus ’ for a bribe evidently refers to the ‘ societates ac regna ’ sold by Caesar and other demagogues.

⁰ Cic. pro Sest. 58, hunc Cn. Pompeius...certis rebus imperatia regnare iussit.

In some eases at least the sole effect of the eompaet was the recognition of the princes as ‘ reges.’

Polyb. xxxii. 4, 3: (Demetrius) irdvra woi^creLv 'FujfiaLois avadexo-/xevos 4£eipyd<ra.T0 (SaaiXevs V7r’ ai’jt&v (the commissioners) irpoaayo-pevdrjvai. He sends to procure the senate’s confirmation of this title, and receives the reply ^ti rei5£erae rStv (frCKavOpibirwv iav to Uavbv iroiy tt} avyK\'r)T(p. ”

Scipio, Rome had made kings from weak and unimportant dynasts (Polyb. xxi. 11). According to Livy he bore the title king in Africa before he was honoured by Rome (Liv. xxix. 3, 10; 24, 8). ° ‘ ‘

Of the peculiar kingdom of the Attalids, an estate seized by its steward, this goes without saying. In Egypt part of the king’s revenue came from assessments on the land, i.e. the land in general, not merely his own separate estates. Holm iv. ch. 5, p. 122. Holm says,

It has been pointed out to me, however, that the ‘ imperium ’ was limited in the ease of the Roman provincial governors, except when it was specially provided otherwise.

Besides the treaties of peace stipulating also friendship, which were made with Hiero and Antiochus III (v. Append. A), we find treaties of friendship made also with the kings of Egypt from Ptolemy II onward (ib. n. 1, 3), with Philip, with the Pergamene kings, the Cappadocian Ariar. IV, Mithrid. V of Pontus, Ptolemy XI, and Parthia. Such a treaty was promised to Bocchus. Many also were sold by demagogues in the last days of the Republic (v. § 78). _

He was enrolled as friend and ally by Pompey, but this enrolment probably followed upon a simple decree ; v. Append. A, xiv. 1.

Dio xxxvn. 6; G.I.G. 2123, 2124. Antony also granted the title to Caesarion, but without warrant. Dio xlix. 41.

⁴ Ariarathes and his father had a permanent alliance with the Attalids; cf. Polyb. xxxm. 12, ^vArraXos...ra;^ irepl rbv ’Aptapa.Oyv Kal

⁵ App. Num. 4 : dtddvai' Vu)(xaiovs ras §u>peas ?x^av^T0« hapovaip, fas av ry (3ov\rj icai ru Styuy dotcrj.

⁷ Jos. Ant. XV. 76; cf. Hor. Carm. in. 1, 5; Cic. Of. i. 70; Suet. Jul. 6 on the nature of ‘ kingship.’

We may compare the remonstrances of Scipio Maior that Rome should not interfere in the home politics of Carthage, by receiving complaints against Hannibal (Val. Max. iv. 1, 6).

Bohn, p. 73, quotes Tae. Ann. xni, 8, 38; xv. 26; Hist. n. i, 76 ; v. 1; Yell. n. 112.

Tac. Ann. xv. 6, cf. ib. ii. 56 : Commagenis Q. Servaeus prae-ponitur turn primum ad ius praetoris translatis.

⁴ Jos. Ant. xiv. 384, Bell. i. 284 f., shew that Herod was made king of Judaea ; from the fact that Pompey in 63 B.C. took away from Judaea all its late acquisitions of territory (Jos. Ant. xiv. 76), and that Herod put a procurator in Idumea in 37 b.c. (ib. xv. 254), Bohn infers that Idumea was given to him by Antony. For in xiv. 209, it is shewn that Idumea had not been restored to Judaea until Herod’s accession as king.

¹⁰ Cic. Deiot. 13: quocum erat non hospitio solum verum etiam familiaritate coniunctus.

Cic. Leg. Agr. ii. 50: agros Bithyniae regios quibus nunc publicani fruuntur. Ib. ii. 51: regios agros Mithridatis. Cf. also Tao. Ann. xiv. 18, 2 quoted infra (Oyrene).

⁶ Cf. Cic. Leg. Agr. ii. 51 (Pontus). So iD Macedonia, ‘regii agri’ were Roman domain land; cf. also Mommsen, R. G. bk iv. ch. 11.

v. Append. A, ii. 9, Physcon aided only by Boman diplomacy, not by troops; ii. 19, Alexander recognised by Sulla, but unavenged by the same; vn. 6, Antiochus IV compelled to right his own injury; vn. 14, weakening of Syria; vu. 15, murder of Antiochus V unavenged ; vn. 20, promise of assistance to Alexander Balas not carried out (cf. similar promise to the Jews, § 13); vii. 21, murder of Balas, who had been recognised by Rome; vn. 28, general attitude of the senate to Syria ; vm. 8, attitude towards death of Prusias II; viii. 17, injury to Nicomedes III ‘ inconvenient ’ to Rome; ix. 16, Ariarathes V left to recover his share of Cappadocia unaided by Rome; ix. 25, Ariobarzanes II’s murder unavenged ; xi. 8, Mithridates of Pergamum unavenged by Caesar; xiv. 8, Tigranes unaided by Pompey.

In this last case Pompey pleaded the necessity of a mandate from the senate. The rule by which a propraetor or proconsul was forbidden to leave his province, no doubt accounted frequently for the abstention from interference, while the senate’s mandate was not easily procured owing to the distance from the scene of action. The senate however clung to diplomacy.

ib. pp. 5, 8—10. When it is said (p. 5) that “the introduction of Roman law into the protected states of the Republic was the precursor of annexation,” the term ‘ protected states ’ must not be made to include kingdoms. While a king was on the throne, no attempt was made hy the senate to introduce any part of the Roman system, or prescribe for any portion of his territory.

That Philip should have accepted the title ‘ally’ is inconsistent with the passages about to be enumerated. On Livy’s terminology v. Part I.

Rome’s protest against this action was made on the ground tha Abrupolis was her friend and ally; not on the ground that Perseus had no such freedom of action under any circumstances.

A passage in Livy (xxxii. 8,9), which, if true, seems certainly to savour of exaggeration, makes Attalus in 198 b.c. ask for a release of his forces, because Antiochus III has attacked his kingdom, and if Bome is unwilling, for help against him instead. Eome replies in grand language and sends a finely worded message to Antiochus, which persuades him to desist. Attalus later sends to Eome a crown of gold in thanks. Besides the fact that the language used is quite inconsistent with the real relations of the two kings to Eome, Antiochus was in 198 b.c. attacking Coele-Syria, and could only have troubled Attalus by a 'winter campaign. We must not therefore rely upon the passage as illustrating the dependence of Attalus upon Eome. -u. Niese, Geschich. der Hell, und Mac. St., Bk. x. § 8 n.

The statement of Appian (Mith. 106) that Pompey ‘ made war upon Antiochus until he came to seek friendship,’ is probably a mistake (v. Momms. Rom. Gesch. Bk. y. ch. 4). Pompey even trusted him with the newly conquered Mesopotamia (App. Mith. 114), indicating that he had remained faithful since 68 b.c.

This Beetion is inserted to shew that Hyrcanus, though the successor of rulers who assumed the royal title, and predecessor of King Herod, must be placed upon a different footing from that of the kings treated in this essay. Bohn’s remarks on the position of the Jews during this period were found of great assistance.