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THE SCIENTIFIC RENAISSANCE
1450-1630
BY
MARIE BOAS
GENERAL INTRODUCTION
The endeavour to
understand events in nature is as old as civilisation. In each of its three
great seminal areas—the Chinese, the Indian and die West Asian-European—men
tried to find a logic in die mysterious and an order in the chaotic. They made
many attempts, sometimes revealing strange similarities in these totally
different societies, to express general truths from which particular events
would follow as rational, comprehensible consequences. They tried to describe
and, analyse in order to understand, for men could not live in the world
without seeking to assign causes to the things that happen in it.
This series of
volumes on The Rise of Modern Science describes the fruition in Europe of one
of these attempts to describe and analyse nature. Modem science is not merely
European; even before it had entered upon its triumphant age its establishment
in North America and China had begun, and the origins of die intellectual tradition
from which it sprang must be sought in Egypt and Western Asia. But the
revolution in ideas which alone made modem scientific achievements possible
occurred in Europe, and there alone, creating an intellectual instrument so
universal and so powerful that it has by now entirely displaced the native
scientific traditions of non-European societies.
The present volume,
The Scientific Renaissance, describes the early stages of this Scientific
Revolution, beginning with what is traditionally (but somewhat inaccurately)
known as the Renaissance of Learning in the fifteenth century. The Scientific
Revolution was the effect of a unique series of innovations in scientific ideas
and methods; it gave the key to the understanding of the structure and
relations of things. It was (and still remains) the greatest intellectual
achievement of man since the first stirrings of abstract thought, in that it
opened the whole physical universe—and ultimately human nature and behaviour—to
cumulative exploration. Of its practical and moral implications we only now
begin to have an inkling. For this colossal accomplishment Europe owed much to
the Oriental world of which it then knew little. The vehicles of modem science,
paper and printing, derived from China; the language of science is still
expressed in numerals devised in India; Europe drew likewise on the East for
its first knowledge of some phenomena (such as those of the magnetic compass),
of some substances (such as saltpetre), and of some industrial techniques that
relate to experimental science. But Europe did not borrow scientific ideas
from die East, and in any case the borrowings had ceased before the rise of
modem science began.
For this reason these
volumes will make only incidental allusion to science outside the Europeanised
world. Europe took nothing from the East without which modem science could not
have been created; on the other hand, what it borrowed was valuable only
because it was incorporated in the European intellectual tradition. And this,
of course, was founded in Greece. The Greek philosophers, imposing no bounds on
intelligence but those of the universe itself, set at the very root of the
European tradition of science the ideal of an interlocking system of ideas
sufficient to explain all the variety of nature. They were, above all,
theoretical scientists but at the same time they discussed critically the
relationship between theories and the actual perception of events in nature.
They began both observational biology and mathematical physics. Through most of
two thousand years Europe continued to see nature through Greek eyes. Although
the Scientific Revolution ultimately came as a reaction against the dogmatism
inherent in the emulation of antiquity, it too drew its inspiration in part
from neglected aspects of the Greek legacy. As Galileo admired Archimedes no
less than Harvey did Aristotle, so the “mechanical philosophy” that
flourished in the seventeenth century looked back to Epicuros and Lucretius.
The Scientific Revolution did, not reject Greek science; it transformed it.
Therefore the first volume in this series will be devoted to the scientific
attitude of the Greeks, and its relation to the modem achievements of science.
For it is impossible to understand fully what kind of changes in ideas were
required to bring modem science into being, without considering the strengths
and limitations of the Greek outlook.
This outlook reached
the Europe of early modem times in complex ways, pardy direcdy, partly through
the Romans, partly through the Arabic-speaking peoples, partly through the immediately
antecedent philosophy and mathematics of the Middle Ages. In a history of
modem science it is unnecessary to describe the slow and devious process by
which, after the fell of the Roman Empire, Greek science (with some accretions)
was partially recovered and assimilated in Europe. On the other hand, it is
very important to analyse the effect that the fresh exploration of Greek
sources had on the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, when mediaeval science seemed
to have become sterile. Such an analysis is a major interest of this volume. At
the same time—and this also falls into place here—more justice must be done
than the Renaissance allowed to the permanent merits of mediaeval scientific
thought, especially in the study of motion. It possessed, as we can see, a
certain richness which mediaeval philosophers themselves scarcely knew how to
employ, but which gained its true expression in the hands of Galileo and his
contemporaries.
The firm foundations
that Galileo laid are treated in anodier volume of The Rise of Modem Science.
Here, the sixteenth century is poised between die old thought and the new,
between authority and originality, between common sense and wild extravagance.
To some, at this moment, anything seems possible when mathematics shades into
mysticism and experiment promises a key to esoteric marvels. Yet the logic of
science grows stronger, creating while it destroys. The descriptive method in
biology, turned against the ideas of its Greek founders, makes fresh conquests;
Copernicus is vindicated by the mathematical analysis of the very authority he
overturns. If the universe, no longer finite, no longer comfortably spinning
round the earth, seemed a strange and terrifying place; if a new scientific
metaphysic was reducing everything to the play of matter and motion,
nevertheless reason still offered, as in the past, the only road to reality. In
the last resort the universe is to man what he sees in it. The sixteenth
century effected a profound change in the point of view; it was for later
generations to see what that would disclose.
A. RUPERT HALL
CONTENTS
I The Triumph of Our New Age page
II The Pleasure and Delight of Nature
V The Frame of Man and its Ills
VI Ravished by Magic
VIII
The
Organisation and Reorganisation of
IX Circles Appear in Physiology
X Circles Vanish from Astronomy
PREFACE
This book will, I
hope, show that the period from 1450 to 1630 constitutes a definite stage in
the history of science. It was an era of profound change; but the change was curiously
consistent. Equally, this era marks a break with the past. I do not wish to
deny the importance or validity of the mediaeval contribution to science,
especially to mathematical physics; but however much sixteenth-century
scientists drew from the science of the fourteenth century, they were separated
from it by three generations passionate attempt to revive Graeco-Roman
antiquity in fifteenth-century Europe. The attempt to re-discover and relearn
what the Greeks had known dominated men's minds in 1450; the brilliant
innovations of the sixteenth century showed that this knowledge, once
assimilated, had surprising implications. The revolutionary theories and
methods of the 1540’s were fully realised by 1630. Harvey’s work on the
circulation of the blood, published in 1628, and Galileo’s brilliant Dialogue
on the Two Chief Systems of the World, completed in 1630, both mark at once the
culmination of the work of a preceding century and the beginning of a new age.
Both were admired by two quite different generations, for different but equally
valid reasons.
Evidence of my debt
to many scholars is recorded in the Bibliography and Notes. I am particularly
grateful to those who have eased my path by providing English translations of
sixteenth-century authors, though I have compared the translations with die
originals where these were available to me and have not hesitated to make my
own translations where this seemed preferable. Mr. Stillman Drake kindly made
available to me two of his Galileo translations in advance of publication.
Indiana
University
MARIE BOAS
THE SCIENTIFIC RENAISSANCE 1450-1630
In Memoriam R. P. B.
CHAPTER I
THE
TRIUMPH OF OUR NEW AGE
The world sailed
round, the largest of Earth’s continents discovered, the compass invented, the
printing-press sowing knowledge, gun-powder revolutionising the art of war,
ancient manuscripts rescued and the restoration of scholarship, all witness to
the triumph of our New Age.
These words of a
French physician writing in 1545 might have been those of any renaissance
intellectual trying to characterise his age. Happily unaware of our modem
consciousness that history is a continuous process, and that each new
development has its roots in the past, men in the fifteenth century claimed
complete emancipation from their mediaeval ancestors, proud to believe that
they were founding a new stage in history which would rival that of classical
antiquity in brilliance, learning and glory. As a sign and symbol of their
success they could point proudly to two areas of discovery : the exploration of
the intellectual world of the ancients by scholars, and die exploration of the
terrestrial world by seamen. Two technical inventions aided men in their search
for new worlds : the printing-press and the magnetic compass. The first was a
product of the fifteenth century, the second had been introduced into Europe
nearly two centuries before; neither was devised by scientists, yet science
somehow participated in both, and gained in importance as scholarship and
practical geography each flourished in their different ways.
Nothing is more
paradoxical than the relation of science and scholarship in the fifteenth
century. This was the time when a man could become famous in wide intellectual
circles for his profound pursuit of the more arid reaches of philological
scholarship, or for tie rediscovery of a forgotten minor work of a Greek or
Roman author. Humanism had already stolen from theology the foremost place in
intellectual esteem. The term humanism is ambiguous ; it meant in its own day
both a concern with the classics of antiquity and a preoccupation with man in
relation to human society rather than to God. Most humanists were primarily
concerned with the recovery, restoration, editing and appraisal of Greek and
Latin literature (theological literature not being entirely excluded); they
regarded themselves as in rebellion against scholasticism, the intellectual
discipline of die mediaeval schools, which they saw as concerned with logic and
theology rather than with literature and secular studies. Far from rebelling in
turn against this literary and philological emphasis, which seems superficially
more remote from science than the scholastic curriculum with its all-embracing
interest in the works of God, the fifteenth-century scientist cheerfully
submitted to die rigidity of an intellectual approach which was rooted in the
worship of the remote past, and thereby strangely prepared the way for a
genuinely novel form of thought about nature in the generation to follow.
Scientists were ready
to adopt the methods of humanism for a variety of reasons. As men of their age,
it seemed to them as to their literary-contemporaries that the work of die
immediate past was inferior to that of natural philosophers of Graeco-Roman
antiquity, and that the last few centuries were indeed a “middle age,” an
unfortunate break between the glorious achievements of the past and the
glorious potentialities of the present. Humanists were anxious to recover
obscure or lost texts, and to make fresh translations to replace those current
in the Middle Ages, sure that a translation into correct (that is, classical)
Latin direct from a carefully edited Greek text would mean more than a twelfth
or thirteenth century version in barbarous (that is, Church) Latin, made from
an Arabic translation of the Greek original, and full of strange words
reflecting its devious origin. Scientists agreed that to understand an author
one needed correct texts and translations; and that there were many interesting
and important scientific texts little known or not at all understood in the
Middle Ages. Scientists were very ready to learn Greek and the methods of
classical scholarship, and to enroll themselves in the humanist camp. So the
English physicians Thomas Linacre (c. 1460-1524) and John Caius (1510-73) saw
the restoration and retranslation of Greek medical texts as an end in itself, a
proper part of medicine, for the Greeks had been better physicians than
themselves. So, too, the German astronomers George Peurbach (1423-69) and Johann
Regiomontanus (1436-76) happily lectured at the University of Vienna on Vergil
and Cicero, drawing larger audiences and more pay than they could hope for as
professors of any scientific subject; they were nevertheless able and
influential professional astronomers. Scientists of the fifteenth century saw
nothing “unscientific” about an interest or competence in essentially
linguistic matters, and in editing Greek scientific texts they saw themselves
aiding both science and humanism.
Indeed, science was
not, as yet, a recognised independent branch of learning. Scientists were
mostly scholars, physicians or magicians. The practising physician had always
been in demand; with the increase in epidemic disease which had begun with the
Black Death in the fourteenth century and continued with the appearance of
syphilis and typhus in the late fifteenth, there was more need for him than
ever. A physician, especially one with a fashionable practice, was often a very
wealthy man, and the professor of medicine held the best paid chair in most
universities, to the envy of his colleagues. The success of a physician had
nothing to do with his knowledge of anatomy or physiology, for the art was
still almost entirely empirical; but the practising physician had, if he chose,
abundant opportunity for medical research and discovery, either literary or
practical.
A slightly less
respectable scientific profession—but one which was sometimes very
lucrative—was that of the astrologer. For many reasons—as complex and diverse as
the psychological shocks of the great plagues of the fourteenth century, the
shattered prestige of the Church consequent on schism and heresy, the increased
tempo of war, the wider attention paid to observational astronomy, the
popularisation of knowledge through increased education and the role of the
printing-press—belief in die occult flourished exceedingly in the fifteenth
century and showed little sign of decrease in the sixteenth. This was the
height of the witchcraft delusion, especially in Germany. It was a great age of
magic and demonolatry : the age of Faust. Astrology, previously almost the
private domain of princes (especially in the Iberian peninsula, where every
court had its official astrologer) was made available to the masses, again
partly through the medium of the printing-press. (It also transferred its
centre to Germany.) There was soon an enormous demand for ephemerides (tables
of planetary positions), the essential tool of proper astrology :
Regiomontanus, after he ceased lecturing on classical literature, devoted
himself to their production. And every striking celestial occurrence—the
conjunction of planets, the appearance of comets (especially plentiful in this
period), eclipses and new stars (novae)—called forth a flood of fugitive
literature scattered far and wide by the printing-press, prognosticating not
merely for princes but for the masses as well. Even the illiterate enjoyed the
advantages of being assured by astrologers that the future held as certain doom
as the past, that famine, pestilence, war and rebellion would continue to
dominate the Earth; for crude but vivid woodcuts portrayed both the heavenly
bodies which presaged disaster and the inevitable and all-too-familiar disaster
itself. Amid the calamities of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries,
astrologers could hardly fail in their prognostications, as long as they made
them dire enough.
Mystic science was,
in this period, the most widely known : astrology catered for the masses by
whom it was so readily understood that in the popular mind astrologer and
astronomer were one. The alchemist’s dream, too, was widely known. Almost
unheard of in Western Europe before the thirteenth century, alchemy became the
preoccupation of more and more learned and semi-learned men in the Renaissance; yet, rather curiously, it was often viewed with scepticism, as it had been by
Chaucer’s pilgrims. And now nascent experimental science was popularised as
natural magic, properly the study of the seemingly inexplicable forces of
nature (like magnetism, the magnification of objects by lenses, the use of air
and water-power in moving toys), more generally the wonders of nature and the
tricks of mountebanks. Mathematics contributed its share to magic in the form
of number mysticism, useful for prognostication.
Non-mystical aspects
of science were also increasingly popularised, and turned to useful ends.
Scholars were beginning to be proud to boast that they had mastered the secrets
of a craft, believing that knowledge would thereby be acquired such as was not
to be found in books. They repaid the debt by spreading knowledge of applied
science. As in the Middle Ages, all literate men now knew something of
astronomy, if only in its humbler aspects : the astronomy of time-keeping and
die calendar. In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries astronomers developed a
further interest in practical applications and began to make attempts,
ultimately successful, to introduce astronomical methods of navigation to
reluctant and conservative seamen. Mathematical practitioners, half applied
scientist, half instrument-maker, became common, and provided a new profession
for die scientist. New maps and new exploration made geography an ever more
popular subject. Map-makers flourished more on the proceeds of the beautiful
and colourful maps sold to the well-to-do dian on the profits from the
manufacture of seamen’s charts, but both were produced in quantity. Algorism,
reckoning with pen and paper and Arabic numerals (modem arithmetic), instead of
the older practice of using an abacus and Roman numerals, had been known to
scholars since the introduction (in the twelfth century) of the Hindu-Arabic
numerals ; but it was the sixteenth century which saw the production of a spate
of simple and practical books on elementary arithmetic. These, mainly in the
various vernaculars, were the contribution of mathematicians to merchants,
artisans and sailors.
Much of the
rediscovered Greek theoretical learning was also soon made available to the
non-leamed, as a process of translation from Latin to the vernacular succeeded
the first stage of translation from Greek to Latin, by which the learned had
been made free of the new literature by the more learned. Indeed, one aspect of
humanism was the popularisation of ancient learning. To be sure, the humanist
theory of education, designed to produce gentlemen, was an aristocratic ideal
(though in fact it aimed at creating gendemen, not merely at training gendemen
bom). But humanism battered its way into scholastic strongholds only by adroit
and clever propaganda which won sympathy from powerful forces outside the
learned world of the university. To secure support from public opinion
necessitated the creation of a limited but ever widening audience; and as this
audience increased, it began to demand the enjoyment of humanism without its
tediums. Hence the flood of translations, making sricnry (and literature)
available in a language the layman could read.
Soon, following the
example of his humanist predecessors, die scientist tried to make his learning
easily available to the ordinary man. To this end, the sixteenth-century
scientist burned with the (somewhat premature) desire to teach the ignorant
artisan how to improve his craft through better theory or more knowledge. For
this purpose an increasing number of simplified manuals were written, like
those of die English mathematician Robert Recorde : The Grounde of Arts (1542,
on arithmetic), The Pathway to Knowledge (1551, on geometry), and The Castle
of Knowledge (1556, on astronomy); in the process, vernacular prose was much
improved. Scientists were, in this period, very ready to learn from craftsmen;
having learned what the craftsman could teach diem, they naturally became
convinced that they had much to teach him in turn. They were constandy
disappointed to find this more difficult, when the craftsman failed to show
himself eager to be taught.
The heroic stage of
humanism belongs to the period before 1450 : it was in 1397 that the Greek
diplomat Manuel Chrysoloras (c. 1355-1415) began those lectures on Greek
language and literature which had seduced clever young Florentines from their
proper university studies and made them vehemently enthusiastic for Greek
letters. The early fifteenth century had seen an avid international search for
manuscripts of Greek and Latin authors previously forgotten, neglected or
unknown. Though the major interest of the humanists was naturally in the
literary classics, they took all ancient learning as their'province, and
scientific works were cherished equally with literary ones, always providing
that diey had not been studied in earlier centuries. In 1417 die Italian
humanist Poggio Bracciolini was as pleased with his discovery in a “distant
monastery” of a manuscript of Lucretius (Utde read in the Middle Ages, but to
become immensely popular in the Renaissance) as he was with the manuscripts of
Cicero that he found at the monastery of St. Gall. Guarino of Verona, hot in
pursuit of Latin literature, was happy in finding the medical work of Celsus
(in 1426) unknown for over 500 years. "When Jacopo Angelo returned from
Constantinople with manuscripts for baggage, only to be shipwrecked off Naples,
one of the treasures he managed to pull to shore was Ptolemy’s Geography,
mysteriously unknown to the Christian West that had revered Ptolemy’s work on
astronomy for three centimes; he had already translated it into Latin (1406)
so that it was ready for the public.
By the mid-fifteenth
century this great and exciting work of collection and discovery was, of
necessity, ended : the monasteries of Europe had been thoroughly pillaged, and
the fall of Constantinople to the Turks in 1453 meant, as the humanists
lamented, the end of the richest source of supply for Greek texts. One of the
strangely persistent myths of history is that the humanist study of Greek works
began with the arrival in Italy in 1453 of learned refugees from
Constantinople, who are supposed to have fled the city in all haste, laden with
rare manuscripts. Aside from the essential improbability of their doing any
such thing, and the well-established fact that the opening years of the
fifteenth century had seen intense activity in the collection of Greek
manuscripts in Constantinople, there is the testimony of the humanists
themselves that the fell of Constantinople represented a tragedy to them.
Characteristic is the cry of the humanist Cardinal Aeneas Sylvius Piccolomini
(later Pope Pius II), who wrote despairingly to Pope Nicholas in July, 1453, “
How many names of mighty men will perish! It is a second death to Homer and to
Plato. The fount of the Muses is dried up for evermore.”
Cut off from the
possibility of finding new manuscripts, humanists now turned from physical to
intellectual discovery, from finding manuscripts to editing and translating them
in ever more thorough, critical and scholarly a fashion, establishing the
canons of grammar and restoring corrupt and difficult manuscripts to what was
hopefully believed to be tie state in which the author had left diem. Here
again die humanists showed a surprising impartiality, to the advantage of
science. No one could be considered to have finished his apprenticeship to
humanism unless, as his masterpiece, he produced a creditable Latin translation
of a Greek original: the author chosen might be a medical or scientific one,
especially in the sixteenth century when the supply was running short. Thus
Giorgio Valla (d. 1499), a perfectly ordinary literary humanist, counted among
his treasures two of the three most important manuscripts of Archimedes ; he
also owned manuscripts of Apollonios and of Hero of Alexandria, and made
partial translations of these and other scientific texts which appeared in 1501
as part of his encyclopedic work, On Things to be Sought and Avoided (De
Expetendis et Fugiendis Rebus). Guarino, discoverer of Celsus, translated
Strabo’s Geography into Latin, along with purely literary texts. Linacre was
long better remembered for his share in introducing Greek studies into England
than for his encouragement of medical learning through new translations of
Galen and the foundation of the Royal College of Physicians (1518), but
contemporaries found this mixture of activities quite natural.
It is important to
realise that it was primarily the humanists who made the work of the “new” Greek
science available. Although much Greek science had been widely known in Latin
versions to the Middle Ages, this was chiefly either early science (fifth and
fourth century B.C.) or late (second century A.D.). The works of the best
period of Greek science, of tie Hellenistic scientists of c. 300-150 B.C., was
little known in the Middle Ages, partly because it was often highly
mathematical and always complex and difficult. The humanists’ role had
important consequences both for what was available and how it was studied.
Humanism, by nature, was intensely concerned with the establishment of the
exact words of the author, with the correction of scribal errors and the
restoration of doubtful passages. Consequently, humanists inevitably looked
with both scorn and distrust on translations of Greek works made in the
twelfth and thirteenth centuries indirectly through Arabic : these
translations, whose Latin words were often separated from the Greek by four or
more other languages, so tortuous had been the path of translation, were
necessarily far from exact and often included what, to fifteenth-century ears,
were horrible Arabicisms and neologisms, though the sense of the original was
doubtless more or less preserved. (The Roman medical writer Celsus was above all
at this time valued because he provided pure and proper Latin equivalents of
Greek anatomical terms to replace the Latin forms of Arabicised Greek terms.)
This preoccupation with exact rendering of an author’s words mattered far less
for scientific purposes, of course, than it did for literary ones, but no
distinction was made, which explains what now seems an excessive preoccupation
with “pure” texts.
The fifteenth- and
sixteenth-century scientist was in complete sympathy with these ideas, imbued
as he was with humanist ideals: hence his concern with “returning to” Galen or
Ptolemy (tout pur, purged from Islamic or mediaeval commentary) and hence the
time spent on the study of purely verbal aspects of ancient scientific texts.
No doubt much of this was time wasted ; on the other hand, it did force a
return to original sources which was beneficial: it was certainly more useful
to read Galen and Euclid direct than to read what a commentator thought an
Arabic paraphrase of Galen or Euclid meant. Many ambiguities were undoubtedly
cleared up. Above all, return to the original enforced a more serious
consideration of what Aristotle, Hippocrates, Galen and Ptolemy had actually
said, and this in turn involved recognition of the truth, error, fruitfulness
or uselessness of the contributions die great scientists of the past had made.
This constituted a first step towards scientific advance. Greek science had by
no means exhausted its inspiration in the fifteenth century ; it could still,
as it was to do for at least two centuries, suggest different topics of
exploration to each succeeding age and above all it provided authority for
departing from orthodox thought. Humanism did, therefore, have much to offer
science.
How is it that,
nevertheless, humanists like Erasmus often seem to have attacked science ? When
they did so, they were attacking die science of the universities, which they
regarded as part of the sterility of scholasticism. An age determined to be new
must of necessity repudiate the ideas of the immediate past; so the humanists
turned the much-praised “subtle doctor” of the late thirteenth century (Duns
Scotus) into the nursery dunce of the sixteenth. Modem historians, admiring the
ingenuity of fourteenth-century mathematics and physics, deplore this antipathy
and regard the humanist worship of antiquity as having been harmful to the
smooth advance of science. But however high the achievements of the
fourteenth-century philosophers in certain directions, some other ingredient
was needed to stimulate the development of modem science. Il faut reculer pour
mieux sauter is often true in intellectual matters: the mediaeval inspiration
was at a low ebb by the beginning of die fifteenth century, and die Greek
inspiration had, at the moment, more to offer. When the humanist attacked
mediaeval science, he was attacking an intellectual attitude that seemed to him
over-subtle, and sterile ; he was emphatically not attacking science as such.
He admired equally Aristotle the literary critic and Aristotle the biologist,
while attacking Aristode the cosmologer and semantic philosopher. He praised
both Plato the Socratic rejecter of the material world, and Plato the
cosmologer, who had insisted on the study of geometry as a preliminary to the
study of higher things. Indeed, Plato’s precepts were followed; for wherever
.humanist schools were set up, mathematics, pure and applied, was always
associated with die purely literary study of Latin and Greek. Infatuated as the
humanist was with all that had, in his eyes, constituted the glory of the Greek
past, he was eager to impart the image of that past as a whole, and to show
that the Greeks Had contributed to all areas of secular knowledge.* The
humanist emphasis on Greek learning may have cast mediaeval learning temporarily
into the shade, but it brought to light much that was fruitful and useful for a
contemporary scientist to know, and which he would otherwise not have
considered.
That science was not
solely a scholar’s concern, but was truly a part of the popular learning of the
age, even if not the main point of emphasis, appears from the list of books
printed before 1500, the incunabula which modem collectors have so lovingly col
lected and catalogued, and have made so expensive. The earliest surviving book
printed in Western Europe is dated 1447 ; by 1500 at least 30,000 individual
editions had been published in all the countries of "Western Europe (the
Iberian peninsula seeing the establishment of presses only at the very end of
the century). Of these tides the bulk was, naturally, religious, from the Bible
to theology; other books, equally reflecting the demand, followed, for no more
then than now did printers wish to publish what they thought the public would
not want to buy.
Yet perhaps ten per
cent of the incunabula deal with scientific subjects, not at all a bad
proportion: there is a mixture of popular science, scientific encyclopedias,
Greek and Latin classics, mediaeval and contemporary textbooks and elementary
treatises, especially on medicine, arithmetic and astronomy. There were, as
yet, relatively few Greek editions of scientists—reasonably enough since the
Latin translations were bound to be more popular—and few very difficult or
advanced works. Thus instead of Ptolemy’s Almagest entire (perhaps the most influential
treatise on astronomy ever written, but a work of interest only to competent
mathematical astronomers) one finds die up-to-date of that great work by
Regiomontanus. On the other hand, Ptolemy’s Geography was printed before 1500
(in Latin, in a number of editions), reflecting the wide contemporary interest
in cartography. There is nothing surprising in all this : specialist works, of
interest only to a limited scientific audience were not printed as books ; they
remained, for the time being, in manuscript, much as specialist work to-day
remains in learned journals ; then, as now, the wider demand was for
semi-popular expositions. That so many scientific works appeared early in the
sixteenth century shows how effective was the popularisation of learning and
science.
The printing-press
undoubtedly had a twofold influence on science : first, by making texts more
readily available, it “ sowed knowledge,” providing a wider audience than could
ever have been the case without printing, while serving as well to emphasise
the authority of the written word. Secondly, it peculiarly influenced the
development of the biological sciences, by making possible tie dissemination of
identical illustrations. Much fifteenth- and sixteenth-century work in
anatomy, zoology, botany and natural history depended for its effect primarily
on illustrations, which enormously aided identification (as well as standardisation
of technical terms); accurate illustrations could only be produced in quantity
through printing. (What happened when manuscript illustrations were copied by
scribes is obvious in the woeful degeneration that overtook the originally fine
illustrations to Dioscorides’ botanical work in the course of centuries : miniaturists
could draw flower illustrations accurately, but they had no notion of
scientific exactitude.) With the co-operation of contemporary artists, books
of astonishing beauty, as well as technical competence and importance, poured
from the presses, and again increased the popularity of science. The printing-press
also made easier the progress of science : it became increasingly normal to
publish one’s discoveries, thus assuring that new ideas were not lost, but were
available to provide a basis for the work of others.
Scientific advance
was not dependent on the printed word: indeed, many scientists, like Copernicus
(1473-1543), withheld their work from the press for many years, or like
Maurolyco (1494-1577) and Eustachius (1520-74) failed to publish important
works in their lifetimes ; but this attitude was increasingly rare. Publication
enormously facilitated dissemination, and it is generally true that scientific
work not printed had very little chance of influencing others—the work of
Leonardo da Vinci being the most notable case in point. In this, as in so much
else, the situation was only stabilised in the course of the sixteenth century,
but the late fifteenth century prepared the way.
Just as the invention
of the printing-press immensely furthered the spread of past knowledge, so too
it furthered an interest in the new knowledge which resulted from the great age
of exploration and discovery. The great discoveries were made with few new
techniques; but the result of the discoveries stimulated major advances in
mathematical geography and in astronomical methods of navigation, advances
disseminated by printed books. The early fifteenth-century seamen, venturing
blindly and hopefully into the Southern Atlantic, provoked learned men at home
into a fren2y of dismay over the inadequacy of their methods. This was
ultimately to the advantage of the seamen ; for it was nearly always landsmen,
not sailors, who introduced improvements, showing how to find one’s way in
unknown seas, and how accurately to portray the Earth’s surface on a flat map
or chart. The first was something new, totally unknown to antiquity ; the
second was a revival of knowledge lost in the centuries when Ptolemy’s
Geography was not known nor read.
Seamen’s methods and
landsmen’s knowledge joined hands only slowly, and, throughout the fifteenth
century, sea charts and land maps were constructed on entirely different
principles. At first the seaman was in the better position, for his charts were
more accurate by far than scholar’s maps. The humanist rediscovery of
Ptolemy’s Geography changed the picture by introducing a knowledge of
mathematical cartography which applied mathematicians were quick to adopt.
Meanwhile, the seaman continued to use portolan charts, developed after the
introduction of the compass in the late thirteenth century. The earliest such
charts are of the Mediterranean ; later, especially in the fifteenth century,
they were drawn for the Atlantic coast of Europe; finally, both shores of the
North Atlantic were mapped. The principle of the portolans was simple : as sea
charts, they gave careful outlines of the coast, with distances between
landmarks very precisely determined; land features were marked only if they
were of interest to the seaman, as ports or as navigational aids. All lettering
was on the landward side, leaving die sea area dear for the characteristic
feature of the portolan : the network of fine lines (rhumbs) radiating from a
series of compass roses, giving the points of the compass as they were
gradually being standardised. This permitted die sailor to work out his approximate
course from one place to another by tracing appropriate rhumbs (indicating
constant compass heading) from one compass rose to the next. Precise diough
these charts were in regard to distance and direction, they were not intended
to represent large areas of the Earth’s surface, and indeed were inadequate to
do so. They are die marine equivalent of the mediaeval road map, a kind of
schematic representation of a route or pilot-book.
The scholar had
always wanted something different, namely a pictorial representation of the
whole spherical surface of the Earth, or at least of its inhabited parts,
traditionally a hemisphere.
For many centuries he
had been content with a purely symbolic method of representation: he drew a
circle, and with two strokes like a T divided it into three separate areas of a
roughly triangular shape; these areas represented the three continents, Europe,
Asia and Africa, while the spaces between them and around the edge of the
circle represented the seas and the all- encirding ocean. In these so-called “
T.O.” maps the biggest area is assigned to Asia, and it is put at the top,
reflecting thereby the importance of the Holy Land. (Ancient maps had South at
the top ; the portolans initiated the modem Northern orientation.) Gradually
sections were taken out and expanded, and distances and directions began to
approximate to accuracy as geographical knowledge of the Earth’s surface
increased, but mathematical geography remained an unknown science until die
rediscovery of Ptolemy’s Geography, which summarised all Greek learning on the
subject to the second century a.d. It
was made available by the Latin translation of Jacopo Angelo, and after 1410
there are numerous manuscript copies ; with its first printing, in 1475, it
became even more popular, and there were seven editions in the fifteenth
century. So successful was the work, and so busy were the printers kept
supplying new editions, that there was no demand for new collections of maps;
new maps, and maps of new areas, were merely added on to Ptolemy.
Ptolemy’s Geography
had originally included maps; though the text survived the centuries intact,
die maps were lost, and there were none given in the first manuscript. One of
the first tasks facing geographers was to re-draw diem according to Ptolemy’s
careful directions. He had left tables of distance and was a sphere; what he
had to do was to convince people that the Earth’s circumference was as small as
he (wrongly) thought it to be, and that the land distance from Spain to the
Indies was proportionally as great as he (wrongly) supposed it to be. The
scholars were quite right; he could not have sailed from Spain to Japan.
direction of the
principal points of the inhabited world of Greco-Roman antiquity, and rules for
drawing maps; but the construction of such maps was not at first an easy task,
since it involved mathematical factors with which no fifteenth-century
mathematician was familiar. It is impossible to open up a hollow sphere and lay
it flat; equally it is impossible to wrap a flat sheet of paper around a sphere
and have it fit smoothly. Hence the spherical surface of the Earth cannot be
represented properly by direct transference to a continuous two-dimensional
surface: even a hemisphere cannot be accurately represented on a plane. It is
true that the makers of the portolans proceeded as if one could; but sea charts
usually involved only relatively small areas; when they did not, they contained
dangerous errors, as sixteenth-century writers on navigation endlessly pointed
out to recalcitrant seamen who would not believe that the plane chart which
they were accustomed to use was faulty. The map-maker must be resigned to error
; his worry is how to reduce that error to a minimum and to represent distance,
direction, size and shape as accurately as may be.
Until they read
Ptolemy, European map-makers had been unaware of the problem. Ptolemy had
discussed two methods of projection : the first, and that he mostly used,
involved imagining the spherical surface of die Earth to be the lower portion
of a cone, since cones can be represented as plane surfaces. This gave straight
lines for equator and meridians, and gave good results for regions not very far
from the equator, though increasing distortion in the northern regions of interest
to a fifteenth-century European.
* Astronomers were, of course, familiar
with the stereographic projection of the astrolabe; but aside from die fact
that it is not obvious that one can represent the Earth in the same way as the
heavens, the astrolabe gave position only; it was not an attempt to map the
relative direction and distance of the stars, and distortion was of no
importance. A map was supposed to be as exact a representation as possible, not
a conventional table from which positions of natural objects and cities could
be determined.
The second projection
(often called the Donis projection after the German Benedictine who drew maps
in this way to illustrate a fifteenth-century edition of the Geography) was a
modification of the first in which meridians and parallels were curved; the
geometry involved is more complex. Once the methods described by Ptolemy had
been mastered, cartographers were ready to invent new and better projections,
but this lay in the future, as did the re-estimation of a length of a
terrestrial degree at various latitudes.
Only one new method
of representation was utilised in the fifteenth century : the terrestrial
globe. Celestial globes, showing the constellations in fanciful detail and the
positions of the major stars, had been known for some time, but the first
surviving terrestrial globes appear only at the end of the century. These were
hand drawn; the most famous is one which Martin Behaim (1459-1507) made at the
request of the town fathers of Nuremberg. Behaim was a native of that city, so
famous for its astronomical instrument-makers; but he was interested in the
navigational aspects of astronomy, rather than in its astrological aspects and
therefore chose to spend most of his life in Portugal, returning only briefly to
Nuremberg, where he finished his globe in 1492. This showed the notable
Portuguese discoveries along the west coast of Africa, but not, of course, the
more recent discoveries of Vasco da Gama to the East nor those of Columbus to
the West. As long as globes had to be drawn by hand they were uncommon ; by the
turn of the century, however, methods of printing strips (gores) to be pasted
on the globe itself had been invented, though various problems remained to be
solved in accurate representation. To be useful in sailing, globes had to be
inconveniently large ; in spite of sixteenth-century attempts to persuade
sailors to use them, they tended to remain, as they have done ever since,
mainly decorative objects.
Preoccupied as they
were with the problems inherent in
SCIENCE AND
NAVIGATION
learning to make
accurate land maps, the cartographers of the fifteenth century had no time to
spare to inquire what use these could be to sailors; indeed, it was all they
could do to record die new discoveries the voyages of exploration were
producing. The
RIGHT ARM
LEFT ARM
PIG. I. THE SAILOR’S
GUIDE TO CELESTIAL DIRECTION
When the Guards
pointed to “ ten o'clock ” fifteenth-century sailors said they pointed to “ two
hours beneath the head ”, while “ five o’clock ” was “ one hour above the feet
”. Seventeenth-century sailors said “ northwest by north ” and “ south by east
”
. see footnote on
page 36
application of
scientific cartography to sea charts was to wait until well into the next
century. Astronomers and mathematicians had other possible ways of associating
themselves with the new discoveries, however, ways in which they could and did
help the explorers : namely, in developing new navigational methods. These were
sorely needed. They necessarily came from the scholar, who understood the
problem in theoretical terms, rather than from the practical navigator, highly
skilled in traditional methods but at a loss when these methods failed, as they
were bound to do as ships sailed out of the well-known waters of the
Mediterranean and northern Europe. No longer could the seaman rely on compass,
chart and table, as he had been accustomed to do in the Mediterranean, working
out his course by compass bearing and distance sailed : he had no chart, and
did not know the necessary compass bearings. Nor could he rely on lead, line
and rutter (as the English called the routier or pilot-book), like the sailors
of northern Europe, where the shallow seas over the continental shelf made
navigation by depth of water and the nature of the ocean bottom highly reliable
: he was sailing in deep waters, and he had no pilot-book. For Atlantic
sailing, he needed the methods of astronomical navigation ; and he only knew
the North Star and its associated constellation, the Little Bear, which he used
to tell the time of night by a complex method based on rote learning of the
positions of the Guards at various seasons.*
The impulse to use
astronomical knowledge to improve navigational methods came at first, like the
impulse to Atlantic exploration, from the Portuguese prince, Henry the
Navigator. He himself went on only one expedition, and that in his early youth
: across the straits of Gibraltar to assist in the capture of Ceuta in 1415.
But until his death in 1460 he was the chief European exponent of the value of
Atlantic exploration along the coast of Africa and of the value of astronomical
aids to such navigation. To this joint end he set up a veritable research
* The Guards of the Little Bear are those
two stars which are not on the line ending in Polaris; the sailor memorised
their relative positions at each hour, for each season of the year. The
primitive nature of his astronomical outlook is indicated by the fact that he
had to imagine a human figure whose head was North, whose feet were South and
whose arms pointed East and West; these four basic positions were further
subdivided, anatomically or by fractions, to give eight or sixteen positions.
(See figure 1.)
institute at Sagres,
on the south-west tip of Portugal; though this lapsed with his death, the
impetus to improve methods of navigation, like the impulse to explore,
continued strong. Portugal became so famous for its navigational interests that
in the late fifteenth century foreigners like Abraham Zacuto of Salamanca and
Martin Behaim of Nuremberg found Lisbon the most active and interesting centre
for practical astronomers.
To teach the sailor
how to navigate unknown oceans in the fifteenth century required two developments.
One was to devise simplified methods by which he might determine his position
on the globe; in practice this meant methods of determining latitude from the
altitude of the Sun or a star. The second was to devise instruments which would
work on the unstable deck of a small and lively ship, in the hands of an
untrained seaman. For an astronomer’s instruments were no more suited to life
at sea than were his observational methods to a sailor. The astronomer’s
favourite instrument was, as it had long been, the astrolabe, a complicated
device designed to supply astrologically useful information about the motion
and position of die Sun and stars; it was only incidentally provided with a
sighting device (die alidade) for measuring the angular distance between two
objects. A simplified form, the mariner’s astrolabe (essentially a heavy ring
carrying a scale, with die alidade as a movable pointer) was not developed
until the next century. The second most common device was the quadrant; this
also carried an immense amount of information, as well as two sighting holes
and a plumb-line ; but it had no moving parts (as did the astrolabe) and could
be simplified readily by replacing the astronomical tables engraved on the back
with navigational ones; in this form it was the instrument most used in the
fifteenth century. There was also the cross-staff, named by analogy with the
crossbow which it resembled, and the seaman could use it like a crossbow to
shoot a star; it was little else than a long narrow piece of wood or bone,
fitted with a short movable crosspiece ; to use it, one held the end of the
staff to the eye, and slid the crosspiece to and fro until its ends just
covered the two objects whose angular distance apart was sought. The staff
could be calibrated in various ways to give the information desired.
The latitude of a
point on the Earth’s surface can be determined by measuring the height of the
Sun above the horizon and adding (or subtracting) the angle of declination of
the Sun for that day. This method was not much used in the fifteenth century,
because it was easier to determine die altitude of the Pole Star and compare it
with the altitude at some known point; but in actual practice neither
astronomer nor seaman spoke in terms of latitude, still a concept known only to
the scientific cosmographer. Instead, the seaman was taught to take an altitude
by means of his quadrant, and to compare it with the altitude of his home port
by means of a simple rule (regiment was the more usual contemporary term)
devised by the astronomers. As a Portuguese explorer, sailing to Guinea in
1462, commented, “ I had a quadrant when I went to those parts, and I marked on
the table of the quadrant the altitude of the arctic pole.” 3
From such data as this, accumulated slowly through the century, astronomers
worked out tables of celestial altitudes, which became an essential part of the
rules for the use of seamen devised in the later fifteenth century. The seaman
was taught to observe the Pole Star and to correct his observation according to
the position of die Guards in the Litde Bear, the same Guards he already
watched to tell the time at night. In addition he was given rules to help him
to work out, from an altitude determination, how to sail by wind and compass in
various directions so as to arrive at the altitude of his destination, along
which he could then sail East or West until he arrived, no strange currents
interfering: “ running down the latitude ” it was called in the sixteenth
century. When manual* attempted to teach the seaman to find his latitude by
shooting die
Sun, it was a
laborious business, involving many tables and much calculation, as the manuals
which used Abraham Zacuto’s Almanack Perpetuum (written about 1473) amply
demonstrate.
The Portuguese were
in this period as far in advance in astronomical navigation as they were in
exploration, though in both cases the Spanish were about to rival them. Even
die Portuguese astronomers could not help the seaman much in determining
longitude; for the only method known involved comparison of the time at which
there occurred some celestial event—an eclipse or a planetary conjunction—and
the time at which it was predicted to take place at some known city in Europe.
This was so obviously an unsatisfactory method to rely on, depending as it did
on relatively rare events, difficult to observe and involving inherent errors
of timing and prediction, that it is hardly surprising that litde attempt was
made to determine longitude in this period except by dead reckoning and
guesswork. The seaman was quite content to use his new knowledge of winds,
currents, speeds and distances, unconsciously acquired skills which
distinguished navigators like Columbus who, in his later voyages, arrived at
his destinations with almost uncanny precision.
The fifteenth-century
astronomer had good reason to be proud of his achievement in solving
navigational problems: he had developed methods of using die stars unknown to
either antiquity or the Middle Ages, had translated them into simple terms
which seamen could use to good purpose, and had plenty of ideas on further new
methods. He had less reason to be happy about his ability to solve the problems
of astronomical theory which confronted him. Outwardly serene in possession of
a cosmological system which had endured for over thirteen centuries, he was
well aware that this system contained serious flaws which threatened its
existence. This was a cause of widespread scientific unease, one of the
recurring crises to which the theoretical superstructure of the sciences has
always been, and still is, periodically liable.
Traditional cosmology
involved a comfortable and tidy universe, supported by Aristotelian
philosophy, made scientifically effective by the mathematical synthesis of
Ptolemy, and Christianised by the scholars of the thirteenth century.
Imagination had contrived an orderly series of spheres, one within the other,
moving according to divine law, here and there adorned with shining heavenly
bodies. At the centre was the Earth, lowly in position and nature, yet
dignified as die centre of all and the abode of man; fixed immovably in its
place, it was subject to the influences of the ever-widening spheres which
surrounded it First in the terrestrial region, below the moon, came the spheres
of the four elements, earth, water, air and fire, die region of generation and
corruption and change. Then, in the celestial region, the eternal and
unchanging heavens, came the crystalline spheres of die Moon, Mercury, Venus,
the Sun, Mars, Jupiter, Saturn; hollow spheres nesting one within the other, so
that although their radii were large, the outer surface of one touched the
inner surface of the next bigger one. Beyond the planetary spheres lay the
sphere of the fixed stars; and beyond that again, the ninth sphere of the
Primum Mobile. The size of these spheres was presumed to be arranged in some
sort of harmonious proportion, and indeed it was commonly held that in turning,
these spheres produced a heavenly harmony, in which, perhaps, all the stars
joined:
Look how die floor of
heaven Is thick inlaid with patdnes of bright gold :
There’s not the
smallest orb which thou behold’st But in his motion like an angel sings,
Still quiring to die
young-ey’d cherubim/
So for, all was well,
and men were pleasantly aware of being at the centre of a neat cosmos, designed
and ordered for the
FIG. 2. THE MOTIONS
OF MARS ACCORDING TO PTOLEMY
1-7 are successive
positions of the centre of the epicycle (thin line) at intervals of one month
as it is borne round by the deferent (thick line); A-G, corresponding positions
of the planet on the epicycle as the epicycle rotates. The dotted line is the
apparent path of the planet
benefit of man. But
astronomically speaking, the universe was less tidy. The mathematical devices
of Greek astronomy were necessary to give an accurate representation of die
exact motions of die planets, and they were abstractions of a totally different
order from die solid realities of the crystalline spheres.* For thousands of
years astronomer and layman had agreed, however, that the evidence of the
senses was a reliable guide even to the heavens ; and die evidence of die
senses confirmed what mathematical and philosophical argument deduced, that
all heavenly motion was truly circular. One had but to watch the sun rise and
set, or the moon travel nighdy through the skies, to see that circular motion
was natural to the heavens. So die mathematicians’ epicycle and eccentric
circles (figure 2) had to be considered only mathematical fictions ; reality
knew only, as even Ptolemy had held in his less mathematical moments, the
solid, material crystalline spheres of Aristotelian cosmology. Fifteenth-
century astronomers concurred ; increasingly astronomers were to demand
reality, in the sense that they wanted astronomy to be a science of
representation rather than one of calculation, a science dealing with real
physical bodies rather than with mere mathematical magnitudes.
Even mathematically considered,
conventional astronomy was in an unsatisfactory condition. Nearly fifteen
hundred years of observation had revealed many discrepancies, real and
imaginary, between theory and observation. Some of these discrepancies (like
the imaginary trepidation “discovered” by Thabit ibn Qurra in the ninth
century, a “ shaking ” of the spheres) could be handled by adding on more
spheres, or more mathematical devices. But discrepancies between the predicted
location of planets and their observed positions were infinitely more
disturbing. For example, the calendar was in need of reform; this was a
religious problem in view of the dating of Easter, yet it could only be solved
with astronomical assistance; the Lateran Council of 1512 was forced to
postpone consideration of possible correction of the calendar “ for the sole
cause that the lengths of the years and months and the motions of the Sun and
Moon were not held to have been determined with sufficient exactness,” as
Copernicus reminded Pope Paul III.* Even more serious, the current tables of
planetary positions, drawn up at the command of Alphonso the Wise in Spain at
the end of the thirteenth century, were so grossly inaccurate as to
inconvenience astrologers. For these and other reasons, astronomers were uneasy
; it is almost fair to say that the Copemican revolution was predicted a
century before Copernicus published his great work. Even laymen knew that
astronomy needed reform: thus the humanist Pico della Mirandola (1463-94),
arguing against astrology on religious, philosophical and scientific grounds
(it denied the omnipotence of God, it denied man’s free will and it was
strikingly inaccurate) pointed out that the astronomical basis of astrology
would be shattered when astronomers altered their system, as he believed they
would.
Because they were
thoroughly imbued with the humanist point of view the astronomers of the
fifteenth century naturally turned to the ancients for a clue to the way out of
the astronomical labyrinth in which they found themselves, just as Copernicus
was to do in the next century. This was the more reasonable because one of
their main sources of disquiet was that astronomical representation no longer
conformed to criteria established by Plato and continued by a long line of
Greek astronomers. Plato, who had first suggested the search for a mathematical
device that would interpret the observed planetary motions in terms of precise
mathematical law, had also insisted that the law when found must express such
motions in terms of uniform circular motion about a unique centre. Overtly in
rebellion against the dead hand of the past in die person of Aristotle,
humanists everywhere turned to Platonist (and neo-Platonist) doctrines, and
stressed the importance of order, harmony and uniformity of circular motion
throughout the astronomical universe. No one could claim that Ptolemaic
astronomy was truly in conformity with this Platonist philosophy.
Eccentrics, as
originally devised to explain the varying brightness of the planets (rightly
interpreted as caused by varying distances from the Earth) began as circles not
quite centred on the Earth, about whose circumference the planet was assumed to
travel; in the fifteenth century eccentrics had become the inner or outer
surface of a crystalline sphere, whose shell was therefore of varying
thickness. (Since the heavenly spheres nested one inside another to prevent
empty space, the corresponding surface of the next sphere was also eccentric to
its centre.) The eccentric sphere was at die same time combined with what had
been for
FIG. 3. THE
MATHEMATICAL SYSTEM OF THE WORLD ACCORDING TO PEURBACH
M is the centre of
the world, A of the equant, c of the small circle, e of the eccentric which is movable and describes P, the
epicycle.
The two dotted
spheres, f,f, carry the apogee of
the equant; the two spheres s,s, carry the apogee of the eccentric. The
deferent is the white sphere lying between s and s; its eccentric circle is
ophr
Greek astronomy a
purely geometrical device, namely the epicycle and deferent, the epicycle a
small circle carrying the planet, itself travelling around the larger circle,
the deferent, so that the planet partook of die motion of both epicycle and
deferent. (The epicycle accounted for the “ retrograde ” motion of the planets,
when, as a result of the combined motions of Barth and planet about the Sun,
the planet appears to travel backward in a great loop.) The deferent could be
concentric or eccentric with respect to the Earth; its velocity might be
uniform with respect
NICHOLAS OF CUSA
to its centre, or
with respect to its equant. (The equant accounted for the fact that the
velocity of a planet is not, in fact, uniform, being more rapid when the planet
is near the Sun, as Kepler’s Second Law explained.) The equant preserved
uniformity of motion, but at the price of introducing a purely mathematical
point into a physical system. How epicycle, deferent and equant could be worked
into the system of planetary spheres is shown in figure 3, taken from
Peurbach’s New Theory of the Planets. The complex system of crystalline spheres
was far from the mathematical system that Plato had suggested; but it had die
advantage of providing a kind of physical reality, and it certainly explained
why the planets remained in their places in the sky, proceeding with a regular
motion through their appropriate revolutions. God had created the spheres at
the beginning of die world, and set diem moving in the way that they had continued
ever since.
Nevertheless, such
divergence from perfect circularity and uniformity bothered fifteenth-century
astronomers as acutely as did the divergence between theory and observation.
Drastic action was needed; yet few cared to go as far as Nicholas of Cusa
(1401-64) in rejecting conventional ideas altogether. Cusa was a prominent
ecclesiastic, eventually a cardinal in spite of a stormy career advocating
violent reform in all aspects of life and thought, from reform of church
government to reform of the calendar and reform of philosophy. His chief
philosophical work is On Learned Ignorance (1440) : learned ignorance is the
recognition of the inability of the human mind to conceive die absolute or the
infinite. Its astronomical significance lies in the fact that the human mind
is, stricdy speaking, incapable of framing an ordered cosmology. There is, for
Cusa, truly no simple harmony to be apprehended behind the apparent
irregularity of the skies; only a complexity whose order we cannot conceive.
The universe is without boundary or limit; not infinite, for then it would be
coexistent with God, but indeterminate, a partial
expression of God,
representing in multiplicity what God is in unity. Nothing is fixed, all is
relative ; the centre is everywhere and nowhere, for in an infinitely large
circle the circumference coincides with the tangent and in an infinitely small
circle, the circumference coincides with the diameter. All things are in
motion, even the centre of the universe, which is also the circumference since
it lies in God who is both at the centre and the circumference. Hence the
Earth, properly speaking, is not at the centre ; indeed, no heavenly body is
ever exactly at any fixed point for there are no constant spheres. Nor is there
constant uniform motion, though there is relative motion everywhere and always,
in the Earth as well as in the rest of the universe. Yet, at the same time, the
Earth can be considered more or less at the centre for purely astronomical
purposes; and in an astronomical note scribbled on the flyleaf of a book dated
1444, Cusa explained how the motion of the Earth makes no difference to the
total system. The motion of the Earth is a revolution about the poles of the
world, every 24 hours from East to West; meanwhile the sphere of the fixed
stars turns from East to West in twelve hours, so that exactly the same effect
is obtained as if the Earth stood still and the fixed stars rotated every 24
hours. Though Cusa worked out his system in some detail, he intended only to
show die philosophical necessity for breaking with the concept of an ordered
universe, a demonstration destined to appeal more to philosophers than to
astronomers.
To fifteenth-century
astronomers, the most obvious first step was to return to the fountainhead of
the current cosmological system, and see whether the difficulties of their
astronomy were not the result of the accumulation of errors over the centuries.
It was to them eminendy reasonable to suppose that Ptolemy must have been more
accurate and more correct than were Moslem and mediaeval astronomers; it was
quite likely that many errors had been caused by miscopying and mistranslation,
a natural belief in
an age when humanists had just discovered the joys of a critical scholarship
which could clear up ambiguities and clarify garbled texts. This was die view
of George Peurbach (1423-69), as much humanist as astronomer, who lectured
simultaneously at Vienna on astronomy and on Latin literature. Peurbach had
begun with a careful study of die Arabic commentaries on Ptolemy, extending
their work in spherical trigonometry. It was perhaps as the result of writing
a textbook, the New Theories of the Planets (Theoricae Novae Planetarum), that
he began to long for an accurate text of Ptolemy’s Almagest. His own book was
far superior as an introductory text to Sacrobosco’s thirteenth- century
treatise On the Sphere which was widely used in the universities; Sacrobosco
had described the framework of the heavens, but he had merely named the devices
of epicycle and eccentric and had not at all discussed their use or the motion
of the planets. Peurbach gave a careful detailed description of the
interlocking spheres of each planet, but he knew that the system was not as
good as he would like. He became obsessed with the belief that the only way to
improve astronomy was to study an accurate Greek text of the Almagest in place
of the Latin translation derived from the Arabic which was all he had to work
with. He had studied in Italy, and knew the wealth of manuscript material to be
found there; he made preparations for the journey, planning to take with him a
disciple, Johann Muller of Koenigs- berg, known after the fashion of die times
by a Latin form of his birthplace, Regiomontanus. Peurbach died before the
journey could be completed, but Regiomontanus took his place.
Regiomontanus
(1436-76) was, like his master, both humanist and astronomer, having already
lectured on Cicero ; when he arrived in Italy he copied the tragedies of Seneca
while learning Greek in order to translate die Almagest, and later, die Conic
Sections of Apollonios. He finally setded in Nuremberg and established a
printing-press ; one of the first books he published
was the astronomical
poem of Manilius (first century a.d.), in
the twentieth century die special interest of A. E. Housman. Regiomontanus had
ambitious plans for editions of most of the treatises of the great age of Greek
science, plans which he never executed, though the proposed trade list has
survived.6 He prepared an astrological almanac, the Ephemerides,
widely used at the end of the century. He continued the work of Peurbach in two
directions : first, in trigonometry, writing On Triangles (a systematic account
of principles) and secondly, in Ptolemaic astronomy, writing an Epitome of Ptolemy’s
Almagest, which is a summary of the mathematical as well as the descriptive
parts. Regiomontanus partially deserted secular pursuits to become archbishop
of Ratisbon, but it was his astronomical knowledge which caused his summons to
Rome in 1476 for consultation on the reform of the calendar, where he died.
Between them,
Peurbach and Regiomontanus had improved the teaching of elementary astronomy,
had advanced the study of spherical trigonometry, and had rendered the detailed
account of the Almagest more readily available to all who read Latin. The new
interest they stimulated continued: their textbooks were printed and reprinted
throughout the sixteenth century and served as models for other books. The
first printed edition of the Almagest (1515) was the mediaeval Latin version
which Peurbach and Regiomontanus had found so unsatisfactory; but a new Latin
version appeared in 1528, followed ten years later by the Greek text.
Ironically, astronomers now realised that the immediate goal of Peurbach and Regiomontanus
was futile ; no matter how purified and carefully edited, Ptolemy had nothing
for reformers. When sixteenth-century astronomers followed the inspiration of
Peurbach and looked to die ancients for aid, they sought it in the works of
Ptolemy's predecessors, retaining only the mathematical sophistication of
Ptolemaic astronomy. This was the method of Copernicus, so one can see that
Peur-
HUMANISM AND NOVELTY
bach’s design was not
altogether valueless. His greatest contribution was to raise the standard of
astronomical consciousness by rendering Ptolemaic astronomy more accessible. It
was necessary to ensure greater understanding of the existing system before
further advances could be made. Fifteenth-century astronomers to their credit
saw that astronomy would change, though they could not see in what direction.
Astronomy in the
fifteenth century professed seemingly contradictory origins, deriving equally
from humanist scholarship and practical demands. The same paradoxical blend was
to run through all Renaissance science. Striving to master Greek scientific
texts, while keenly aware of later technical progress, mathematicians,
botanists and physicians, like astronomers, strangely combined reverence for
the literal word of the remote past with a desire for novelty. Endeavouring to
see in nature what Greek writers had declared to be there, European scientists
slowly came to see what really was there.
CHAPTER II
THE
PLEASURE AND DELIGHT OF NATURE
The science of
biology is an invention of the nineteenth century. Earlier ages generally knew
only natural history—which satisfies mans inherent curiosity about the living
world around him— and medicine, which in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries
comprehended both the physical nature of man and the search for naturally
occurring remedies for man’s seemingly unavoidable ills. Natural history in the
fifteenth century still tended to cater for the same love of the marvellous
that infuses mediaeval bestiaries, following a tradition derived through
Christian moral tales from Pliny’s Natural History. A new current was now to
appear, fed on the one hand by a renewed interest in Aristotle’s biological
writings, and on the other by the new world of nature discovered in the
American continents. At the same time, natural history continued to act as a
subsidiary to medicine in die production of herbals, as die later Middle Ages
had christened the works of descriptions of herbs and other plants useful in
medicine; these derived in an unbroken tradition from the works on materia
medica written by Greek army doctors. The most famous Greek herbal, that of
Dioscorides (first century a.d.) was
copied and recopied incessandy until printed in 1478, still carrying the
illustrations which had been an integral part of the book since the time of
Dioscorides himself.
Much of the interest
in natural history was a popular one, reflected equally in the gardens and
menageries of the wealthy,
50
LOVE OF NATURE
and the
picture-books, often written in the vernacular, provided for the less
well-to-do. One of the most striking aspects of natural history in the
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, related to this popular interest, is the
appeal of nature to the artist, who increasingly turned to plants and animals
for models and studied them carefully in order to be able to paint them as
accurately and as sympathetically as possible. Besides this, humanism provided
a stimulus to the existing interest by furnishing new and better editions and translations
of the works of the ancients—Aristotle and Pliny on animals, Theophrastos and
Dioscorides on plants— and in each case the older and better work excited the
greater interest. Humanists also carefully cultivated delight in nature,
insisting that it should be understood and enjoyed for its own sake rather
than, as St. Augustine had desired, for its value in interpreting the Bible or
as an allegorical representation of the wonder of God and the truth of
religion. This love of nature is well exemplified by .the Swiss Conrad Gesner
(1516-65) writing in praise of mountains and mountain climbing ; and even
better by the German botanist Leonhard Fuchs (1501-66) who in the preface to
his History of Plants (De Historia Stirpium, 1542) wrote lyrically:
But there is no
reason why I should dilate at greater length upon the pleasantness and delight
of acquiring knowledge of plants, since there is no one who does not know that
there is nothing in this life pleasanter and more delightful than to wander
over woods, mountains, plains, garlanded and adorned with little flowers and
plants of various and elegant sorts, gazing intently upon them. But it
increases that pleasure and delight not a little, if there be added an acquaintance
with the virtues and powers of these same plants.*
The charm of nature,
the beauty of flowers and the collecting instinct all played their part,
together with die pleasures of recogr nition : for one of the tasks of the
natural historian was to identify
in nature the animals
and plants described by Aristotle or Theo- phrastos or Pliny or Dioscorides.
As so often happened,
the humanists produced a paradoxical situation: for their emphasis on the
ancients simultaneously advanced and retarded botanical and zoological
knowledge. This is most readily apparent in botany. On the one hand, various
works were shown by means of careful humanist scholarship to be falsely
attributed to Aristotle, and really undeserving of the respect in which they
were held, and the excellent Enquiry into Plants of Theophrastos (fourth
century B.C.), little noted in the Middle Ages, was substituted; it was
translated and printed in Latin (1483) and Greek (1497). On the other hand,
Dioscorides was also printed frequently in Latin, Italian, German, Spanish,
French and Greek. This was not in itself a retrograde step—though it emphasised
the medical aspect of botany to the detriment of broader interests—except that
these editions were naturally illustrated with the traditional drawings, now
direfully debased copies of successive copies of the delightful and accurate
originals. (The strength of the original drawings is indicated by the fact that
in a copy made in a.d. 512 the illustrations preserve a considerable degree of
freshness and verisimilitude.) Historians have often been puzzled to account
for the shocking difference between die crude and conventional woodcuts
illustrating fifteenth-century herbals, and the accuracy and artistic merit of
the work of painters and miniaturists of the same period. It is reasonable to
suppose that the fifteenth century saw no conflict: the woodcuts were copied
from the illustrations of the manuscript whose text was also faithfully copied;
the illustrations illustrated the text, not nature — a peculiar view, no doubt,
but there was as yet no really independent botanical (or zoological) study.
That was to be the
contribution of the sixteenth century, when herbalists stopped depending only
upon Dioscorides and Theophrastos, zoologists on Aristotle and Pliny; and
natural
historians began to
believe that they could work on their own (a situation to be repeated in the
study of human anatomy). First came uncritical acceptance of new or at least
unhackneyed texts; then critical appraisal; finally emancipation and
originality. For well-known texts the process was speeded up : thus Ermalao
Barbaro (i453~93)» a famous humanist who edited Dioscorides and
Pliny, claimed to have found no less than five thousand errors in the standard
Latin text, errors both of transcription and of fact, and he published his
findings in a book apdy entided Castigations of Pliny (1492-3)- Others
followed, and though Pliny found some defenders, he emerged with his reputation
for reliability much impaired. The same thing was in danger of happening to
Aristotle and even Theophrastos, until it was at last realised that the Greek
scientists described the Mediterranean flora and fauna which they saw around
them, and their descriptions consequendy could not be expected always to fit
the species of Northern Europe. This discovery relaxed the efforts of the
conservative to see with Aristode’s eyes, and avoided a great deal of wasted
effort; it also suggested that it might be profitable to study the variations
in flora and fauna in different parts of the globe.
One of the most
interesting aspects of Renaissance books on botany and zoology is die wealth of
pictures with which they are almost invariably filled, and which makes diem as
delightful to look at now as they were to their contemporaries. The fifteenth-
century natural historian had seen in picture-books a method of appealing to an
illiterate or barely literate audience ; the sixteenth century refined
techniques to produce handsome volumes accurately illustrated by admirable
artists. Botany, zoology, anatomy, engineering and invention all lent
themselves readily to this process. The illustrations delighted the eye and
supplemented the text; but in botany and anatomy they did more, for they could
convey what words, as yet insuffidendy subordinated to technical needs, could
not. There was as yet no technical language
accurate in meaning
and universally known, fit to explain in detail the necessary description of
form ; in feet, botany dispensed with pictures when, in the eighteenth century,
such a technical language was developed. In herbals especially it was true that
pictures were often the only possible means of identifying a plant loosely or
inaccurately described. Here a revolution took place as authors, in despair at
the inadequacies of purely verbal description, sought the aid of skilled
draughtsman and artists, trained to observe carefully and well.
How much credit
should be given in such cases to the writer of the text and how much to die
artist is difficult to determine ; for when a herbal is praised, it is more
often than not the illustrations that are really being judged. There is
remarkably litde evidence (as in the parallel case of anatomy) of how closely
artist and writer worked together: few were as meticulous as Fuchs who saw to
it that the men who drew the plants from nature, copied the drawings on to
woodblocks and cut the blocks were all given credit; he is unique in praising
them in his preface and including their portraits at die end of the book. Even
Fuchs does not indicate how fer, if at all, he directed the artist; nor did
his predecessor Brunfels (1488-1534), though his great work was called Living
Portraits of Plants (Herbarum Vivae Eicones, 1530), and the pictures by Hans
Weiditz are far superior to die text. In one respect the use of real artists
was a disadvantage, for though the artist always drew direcdy and observandy
from nature, he tended to draw exacdy what he saw, “ warts and all ” ; hence
Weiditz drew the specimen before him exact in every detail, broken leaves,
wilted flowers and the ravages of insects. It was only slowly, as botanists
learned die necessity of guidance, and chose-illustrators rather than
independent artists, that the drawings began to represent types, rather than
individuals. Such problems hardly arose in zoology, for drawings of common
animals had to have verisimilitude in their rough details at least, and no one
could tell whether
die portrayal of die exotic creatures said to exist in tropic and arctic
regions were accurate or not In any case, exact representation was less
important, and verbal description easier than for plants. Consequendy the
artistic calibre of most zoological illustration is low, and all through the
sixteenth century it is the text, not the pictures, that claims the reader’s
attention.
In botany, the
existence of the herbal amply demonstrated the domination of Dioscorides, which
only gradually relaxed as naturalists learned to add and substitute their own
observations. Soon after the first printed edition of Dioscorides (1483) there
appeared the first of a series of variations, themselves perhaps based upon a
fifth- or sixth-century version of Dioscorides. These works, in Latin and
various vernaculars, were called either Herbals or Gardens of Health (Ortas or
Hortus Sanitatis), and were immensely popular. This popularity derived mosdy
from their usefulness in gathering appropriate “ simples” for herbal remedies,
though presumably they were also used by collectors. Sixteenth- century herbals
all follow much the same pattern, and they were numerous in every country. Among
the more famous herbals were those of Fuchs, Valerius Cordus (1515-44) and
Camerarius (1534-98) in Germany, Plantin (15x4-88), Dodoens (1517-85), Clusius
(de l’Ecluse, 1526-1609) and Lobelius (de l’Obel, 1538— 1616) in the Low
Countries, Mattioli (1501-77) and Alpino (1553— 16x7) in Italy, the two Bauhins
(1541-1612 and 1560-1624) in Switzerland, Ruel (1474-1537) in France, Turner
(c. 1510-68) and Gerard (1545-1607) in England—the list indicates how numerous
and how persistent this type of presentation proved to be. The interest of the
herbalist was descriptive and utilitarian ; in fact die herbal is a handbook of
the botanic garden which was soon to be an indispensable adjunct to any good
medical school. Though there was much copying from one to another, each herbal
has some peculiar merit of its own ; each described some
new plants, and each
improved the descriptions of some well known plants. Notable among them is the
work of Fuchs, for his History of Plants (1542) showed an interest beyond the
purely medical, and he took pains to be as comprehensive as possible. Though
Fuchs listed his plants alphabetically (in part for ease of locating the
descriptions) he did try to name and compare each part of die plant as clearly
as he could, and to give some idea of such characteristics as the habit of
growth, the form of the root, the colour and shape of the flower, and the
habitat. But indeed the encyclopedic approach was the aim of almost all
herbalists, though not all succeeded as well as Fuchs.
Though the major
advances in botany are displayed in books, yet there were several new
developments which in the long run were to have perhaps a greater influence.
The first of these was the invention of the herbarium (or hortus siccus), a
collection of dried plants preserved by pressing the specimens between sheets
of paper. Dried flowers were known earlier (commonly for household use) but the
first recorded herbarium, of some three hundred specimens, was made by an
Italian botanist, Luca Ghini (d. 1556), professor at Bologna, a university long
famous for medical studies. His pupils followed his example, and the oldest
herbarium now in existence was made by one of them under his influence. By the
time of Ghini’s death, herbaria were well known in England and on the Continent.
Other developments derive from die influence on medicine of the immense
increase in botanical activity. Medical schools (beginning with Padua in 1533)
introduced chairs of botany, whose holders were expected to lecture on the
medicinal properties of plants; and soon after this, schools of medicine also
began to institute botanic gardens, to be looked after by the newly appointed
professor of botany. The Paduan garden was begun in 1542, and has continued in
flourishing existence ever since.
Perhaps because of
the greater knowledge of the animal world,
and the fact that
animals did not have the same usefulness as plants, there are relatively fewer
encyclopedic works comparable to the herbals and more works dealing with small
groups of animals, like fishes or birds. Zoology as a whole was far less
popular in the sixteenth and seventeenth century than botany, and only a few
men wrote surveys as extensive as those of the herbalists. The most complete
summary of the animal world was the History of Animals (1551-8) of Conrad
Gesner, a great encyclopedia intended to replace Aristotle’s work of the same
tide. Gesner was an almost universal scholar. Humanist, encyclopedist,
philologist, bibliographer, zoologist, botanist, alpinist, linguist, an M.D.,
it is no wonder that he was later called a “ monster of erudition.” His History
of Animals is comparable with Fuchs’ History of Plants, but even more
encyclopedic in character, for it was designed as a work of reference and
included descriptions drawn up by others, to whom Gesner, editor as well as
author, gave full credit. Gesner listed his animals alphabetically, though he
did use such divisions as birds, fishes, insects, and so on, the same divisions
used by Aristotle. Under each animal’s name is a wealth of diverse information
: names in all languages known to Gesner, habitat, description, physiology,
diseases, habits, utility, diet, curiosities, all with careful references to
authorities, ancient and modem. Gesner very sensibly drew heavily on the best
zoological descriptions he could find, and where these were lacking he
persuaded men like William Turner and Thomas Penny to write special accounts of
their own investigations for his use. The catholic nature of Gesner’s interests
led him into dealing with certain ambiguously genuine creatures. This is
especially true of marine animals, always a tricky subject, though Gesner
appreciated the essential difference between fish and river and sea animals.
Thus in volume iv (On the Nature of Fish and Marine Animals) there is a good
description of the sea-horse, with appropriate illustrations (the History of
Animals was copiously
furnished with
pictorial as well as verbal description). This is naturally followed by the
hippopotamus, after which come the sea-man and (from Rondelet’s Marine Fish of
1554) the bishop- fish, of which Gesner ambiguously comments “ I here show the
pictures of certain monsters : whether they truly exist or not, I neither
affirm nor deny ”.2 Yet he was inclined to doubt the freaks of
nature which some, he says, take for miracles ; and he dismisses Tritons and
Sirens as inventions of the ancients; while he includes them, one suspects it
is because they make such admirable pictures. Besides, an encyclopedist must
include all relevant information, whether he accepts it as true or not.
The same encyclopedic
tradition which stimulated Gesner to the production of his History of Animals
continued throughout the century. A famous example is the work of Ulysse
Aldrovandi (1522-1605), M.D., professor of pharmacology at Bologna, first
director of a museum of natural history, and later of the botanic garden which
was founded in 1567. He was an indefatigable worker ; he professed to have
investigated himself the subjects covered in what became fourteen published volumes.
Even his long life did not permit him to complete the work; only die volumes on
birds and insects were published in his lifetime; the remainder represents the
work of his pupils, based on the voluminous manuscript material he left on his
death. (There was such a mass that it has never all been edited.) This
posthumous publication makes Aldrovandi liable to a false comparison. For
though Aldrovandi’s classification is better than Gesner’s, and his books are
more handsomely printed, he was far less critical even than Gesner.
The most interesting
work in descriptive zoology in the sixteenth century is that of men who were
content to explore limited groups of animals ; this enabled them to make a more
thorough and original survey, and generally permitted the inclusion of
anatomical as well as external features of the creatures
described. This was
new in the sixteenth century. Fish and birds were the most popular subjects,
perhaps in part because Aristotle’s treatment of marine life had been so full
and (because he often dealt with species that do not exist outside the
Mediterranean) so baffling. But there was a popular side to the interest in
fish and birds as well, for the sportsman liked to know about his bag or catch.
Izaak Walton’s Compleat Angler (1653) is the ultimate successor of the more
learned sixteenth-century treatises of Guillaume Rondelet (1507-66) and Pierre
Belon (1517-64). Rondelet, like most naturalists of the time a physician, was
professor at Montpellier which at that time rivalled Paris as a centre for
medical studies. His great work, partly die result of travels in Italy, partly
of his desire to vindicate and re-confirm the descriptions of Aristode, is On
Marine Fish (De Piscibus Marinis, 1554), a work aided by copious and accurate
illustrations. Rondelet was able to detect certain peculiarities of marine life
described by Aristode, but regarded as improbable : for example, he illustrated
Aristode’s account of the placental dogfish by a picture delineating the young
just after birth. He also dissected the sea-urchin, and his illustration of
this is the first of a dissected invertebrate. (Indeed invertebrates had been
much neglected.) Though his standards were thus high, his credulity was strong,
and his book provided the picture of the bishop-fish used by Gesner.
His younger
contemporary Belon, also educated as a physician, managed to earn his living as
a naturalist by acquiring powerful patrons : first Cardinal Toumon, and later
the King of France. King Francis sent expeditions to the Near East, as well as
diplomatic missions j these were to bring back curiosities for his palaces,
animals for his menageries, books for his libraries, plants for his gardens,
and cartographic information for his merchant fleet. Belon accompanied one of
these expeditions and made a thorough survey of the coasts of the Levant. He
was an in-
fatigable note taker
and on his return had enough information fot L'Histoire Naturelle des lstranges
Poissons Marins (1551), La Nature et DiversitisdesPoissons (1555), L’Histoire
Naturelle des Oyseaux (1555), besides a monograph on conifers and an account of
his travels. (He might have written more had he not been murdered one night in
the Bois de Boulogne on his way back from Paris to the king’s palace, where he
was a pensioner.) Though Belon does not give any account of anatomical
dissections, he has excellent external descriptions, and he drew many of his
own illustrations, which are generally more accurate than those of Rondelet.
Like Rondelet, he confirmed many of Aristotle’s descriptions of the -
generation of marine animals, like the viviparous sharks, and was discerning
enough to realise that Aristotle was describing the marine population of the
Eastern Mediterranean (which Belon had now studied), and to notice how much
this differed from that of the coastal waters of Northern Europe. The work on
birds is notable for the portrayal of their skeletal structure and includes a
famous discussion of the homologies between the skeleton of a man and a bird.
Other specialised works
in the sixteenth century include the book on dogs by the English medical
humanist John Caius written for Gesner but first printed in London in 1570 ;
and the Theatre of Insects compiled (and largely illustrated) by Thomas Mouffet
from the work of Edward Wotton (1492-1555), die notebooks of the botanist
Thomas Penny (1530-88), the compilations of others and even his own
observations; after many vicissitudes, the book was finally published
(posthumously) in 1634, just before the introduction of die microscope was to
transform entomology. Far superior to any of these, which are entirely works of
natural history, is the monograph on the horse by Carlo Ruini, a senator of
Bologna. On the Anatomy and Diseases of the Horse (1598) is a beautifully
illustrated and strikingly accurate and comprehensive work, which entirely
avoids the
60
EMBRYOLOGY
usual
sixteenth-century practice of treating animal anatomy as a branch of human
anatomy. (In fact, though there are some overt comparisons in the anatomical
literature, very often die fact that animal and not human material had been
used in dissection was not even mentioned, for the differences were by no means
thoroughly appreciated.) Ruini’s work was not bettered for several generations;
it is one of the first examples of what could be done when animals were studied
for their own sake, not for the gratification of the love of die curious, or
for the sake of their possible utility.
One other branch of
zoology was embryology, fairly widely pursued in the sixteenth century, though
without significant advance. The difficulties in the way of achievement were in
fart great, though the embryologists of the period could not know that they
were foredoomed to stagnation. They were stimulated to explore embryology (as
the discussions of reproduction by Rondelet and Belon clearly demonstrate) by
the desire to emulate Aristode ; they very nearly succeeded in proving the
validity of the extreme humanist position, that modem man could not hope to do
more than know as much as the ancients had known. Lacking microscopes,
sixteenth-century scientists could see litde more than Aristode had seen. They
could, like him, merely open an egg day after day to observe the stages of
development as far as they are visible to the naked eye. A number of them—Al-
drovandi, his pupil Volcher Coiter (1543-76), and Fabricius of Aquapendente
(1537-1619)—did it with great zeal, taking special joy in noting errors
committed by Galen, though generally confirming the observations of Aristode.
The most thorough embryological treatise is On the Formation of the Egg and
Chick by Fabricius of Aquapendente (1612), a massive and profusely illustrated
volume, which is so Aristotelian that the account follows Aristode’s point by
point, elaborating, discussing and occasionally refuting. Fabricius treated the
egg—both hen’s egg
and insect
egg—exhaustively. He was particularly careful to explain each of Aristotle’s
four causes in great detail, paying special attention to the final cause, the
purpose for which each part of the egg exists. Perhaps the greatest
embryological contribution of Fabricius, as of his predecessors, was that the
knowledge left by Aristode was thoroughly canvassed, and all discrepancies,
together with a few errors, carefully noted. At least die way was clear for
further advance in the fascinating problem of die generation of animals, though
it was to be half a century before the use of the microscope made this advance
possible.
Zoology and botany
met on a descriptive level in the numerous accounts of the flora and fauna of
the Americas. Primarily travel books, these works nevertheless opened up a
veritable new world of plants and animals, providing much to stimulate
curiosity and adding a vast list of herbs to the standard pharmacopoeias. The
earliest examples in this genre were Spanish accounts of South America,
especially of Peru, often intended as propaganda pieces. They are therefore not
totally reliable, but they contain the first descriptions of such plants as
tobacco, maize, potatoes, pineapples and so on, soon to be essential to
European pharmacology, and later to die European diet. Thus there is die
History of the Indies by Oviedo y Valdes (1478-1557), prepared soon after his
return from forty-five years as an administrator; this is an observant though
credulous account of the new world of the Spanish colonies, describing the
rubber tree, the potato of Peru, and tobacco, already being imported into Spain
as a medicine. The first illustrated and reasonably detailed description of
tobacco is to be found in the work of Nicholas Monardes (1493-1588), first
published in 1569, but best known in its English translation of 1577 under the
delightful tide Joyfull Newes out of the Newefound World. This contains more
natural history than most accounts, and described many useful medicinal plants,
herbs and barks, as
well as exotic
animals like the armadillo. Monardes was a naturalist, rather than a traveller.
More complete than
either of these, though more purely descriptive than Monardes, is the
interesting and sympathetic account of Peru and Mexico by the Jesuit Jose
d’Acosta. His Natural and Moral History of the Indies (1590) deals, as the
title implies, with the country and its inhabitants; botanical, zoological and
human. Most of the exotic plants and animals of the region are described,
including, for example, the cochineal insects parasitic on the prickly pear,
which were later to provide red dye for European cloth. Acosta was also
interested in peculiarities of climate, noting that in the Western hemisphere
the Sun does not seem so hot on the equator as it does in Africa, and
commenting upon die reversal of seasons found below the equator. Even more of a
curious problem was the origin of the American Indians and indeed of the very
existence of die New World. Acosta faced the problem squarely : there is, he
says, no denying that the evidence of the senses flouts accepted authority; for
many of the Church fathers had undoubtedly denied the existence of the
Antipodes, and the Ancients (with the notable exception of Plato) were ignorant
of the existence of any continents other than Europe, Asia and Africa. One must
accept the fact of their fallibility. Even worse was the case of the
inhabitants of the New World, men and animals. To regard the Indians as pre-Adamite
was to flout the authority of die Bible, too much for Acosta to contemplate;
and besides, Noah’s Flood had undoubtedly covered the whole surface of the
Earth, and must have wiped out all living things in America as well as
elsewhere. Some had suggested that the Indians were the Ten Lost Tribes of
Israel; this Acosta denied on the basis of their cultural habits. For, he
noted, they did not know how to write, as the ancient Hebrews did; they did not
practise circumcision; and (for him the clinching argument) they had no great
love of silver. Surely,
he argued, even in
thousands of years they would not have lost such characteristic and ingrained
customs. So he concluded, sensibly enough, that the Indians had arrived from
Asia over a land link which must be north or south of the coastal regions so
far explored.
There is nothing for
North America so detailed or so lively as the books of the Spanish in this
period. There is, nevertheless, the account of Virginia written by the
mathematician Thomas Hariot for Walter Raleigh, published in 1588 as A Briefe
and True Report of the New Found Land of Virginia ; it includes something on
the fauna and flora, but it was very brief. One of the first members of the
Virginia colony was John White, whose water colours of the natives, the plants,
the fish, birds, insects and reptiles, were not only delightful, but accurate ;
engravings made from these drawings were used to illustrate the second edition
of Hariot’s book in 1590.
It should be obvious
that most botany and zoology was still purely descriptive in the sixteenth
century; which is not surprising when so much still remained to do in this
regard. It is true that some zoologists did good work in anatomy, though mainly
in order to illuminate human anatomy, just as animal physiology was entirely
subordinate to human physiology, which it was used to illuminate without any
appreciation of possible differences either way. In botany, even taxonomy was
not widely considered : most herbalists either listed plants alphabetically (in
Latin or a vernacular) or divided them into a few rough groups. This was
chiefly because the botanist’s concern was to identify plants, to enable others
to identify them as well, and to describe their uses. This strictly utilitarian
approach left little room for pure science. Few were aware of any alternative
approach; but that there was some appreciation of the need for pure science was
expressed by the Bohemian botanist Adam Zaluziansky, who in 1592 wrote
It is customary to
connect Medicine with Botany, yet scientific treatment demands that in every
art, theory must be disconnected and separated from practice, and the two must
be dealt with singly and individually in their proper order before they are
united. And for that reason, in order that Botany, which is (as it were) a
special branch of Natural Philosophy, may form a unit by itself before it can
be brought into connection with other sciences, it must be divided and unyoked
from Medicine.3 Zaluziansky tried to follow his own precepts : he
analysed plants into lower and higher forms (less and more ordered), and tried
to categorise the degree of order in terms of the degree of elaboration of the
leaf, but with only moderate success.
Others who felt that
botany needed to be more than a purely descriptive science were a curious group
of humanist reactionaries, more concerned to rescue botany from the
presentation of Dioscorides in order to restore it to a (presumed) Aristotelian
purity than they were to consider the problem de novo. The results were not without
merit, but rather too remote from conventional botany. Most striking of these
neo-Aristotelians was Andreas Cesalpino (1519-1603). Cesalpino received a
medical education at Pisa, and after taking his m.d.
in 1549 became professor of pharmacology there. His work is, however,
only incidentally medical. His two most important books, Sixteen Books on
Plants (1583) and Peripatetic Problems (Questiones Peripateticae Libri v, 1588)
both treat botany in as Aristotelian fashion as is possible. In the Peripatetic
Problems, Cesalpino developed a general theory of nature based upon an attempt
to reform all branches of science —not just biological science—by rejecting
later views in favour of Aristotelian doctrines: even Galen and Ptolemy were
unsatisfactory. Convinced that die Aristotelian doctrines of form and matter
could supply the all-embracing principle needed to organise nature* Cesalpino
applied these doctrines to biology, endeavouring
to establish even
more firmly than Aristotle had done the absolute continuity of the scale of
nature. Cesalpino’s argument was that as living matter (whether highly
organised or not) contains a single living principle, each living entity must
have a single, undivided living principle, located in some definite spot in the
organism. Higher animals clearly have their living principle in the heart;
which is their centre; for without the heart they die. Lower animals and
plants, which live when divided, must have a less centralised structure:
Cesalpino had already decided for somewhat different reasons that the centre of
a plant is the so-called collar of the root, the point at which stem and root
join; but this is die centre in actu only, that is, at any given moment, for in
potentia the centre is anywhere, since cuttings will take root to form a new
individual, whose centre of life will once again be where stem and root join.
Again, since there is only one living principle for animals and plants, all
living matter must be organised according to the same basic pattern, so that the
organs of plants must correspond to those of animals: on this basis, the root
corresponds to the digestive system, the pith to the intestines, stalk and stem
to the reproductive system, and fruit to the embryo. (In spite of this,
Cesalpino denied the sexuality of plants.) Each organ thus has its specific
function and use, on which account Cesalpino concluded that the leaves exist to
protect the fruit.
Though, obviously,
Cesalpino has much to say that is interesting, it is equally obvious that the
pattern of his thought is antiquated. Humanism not infrequently led to such
excesses as those of Cesalpino ; in his case, the attempt to rescue Aristotle
from the attacks of his detractors (growing increasingly vocal in the last
third of the sixteenth century, in Cesalpino’s old age) produced a work that
was bound to be of minor importance, because it had so litde to say that seemed
relevant to his contemporaries. Very probably they were right; Cesalpino seems
original after
four centuries, but
at the time he seemed reactionary and was obscure if not actually obscurantist.
It is difficult to see what use could have been made of his conclusions in
botanical study. He was original and foresighted in trying to evolve a common
pattern for botany and zoology, to create biology over two hundred years before
Treviranus and Lamarck invented the word ; but his comparisons are naive and
must at the time have seemed excessively vitalistic and teleological, in an age
that preferred its vitalism to be either more mystic or more muted. Botanists
were probably well advised to continue producing ever better herbals and to
begin the search for a successful method of classifying plants according to
structure. In neither attempt could such physiology as Cesalpino’s be of any
great assistance. Anatomy —animal and plant—was the first and most fundamental
requirement for the establishment of scientific zoology and botany; there die
seventeenth century was to benefit less from the natural historians than from
physicians studying human anatomy, and using animal anatomy for comparison and
assistance. More was learned about cold-blooded animals from Harvey’s study of
them in connection with the circulation of the blood (primarily a problem in
human physiology) than from a century’s inclusion of descriptions of serpents
in natural history books. Medicine did, in the end, repay animals for their
long scientific subservience to the needs of man.
CHAPTER III
First of all I wish
you to be convinced... that this man whose work I am now treating is in every
field of knowledge and in mastery of astronomy not inferior to Regiomontanus. I
rather compare him with Ptolemy, not because I consider Regiomontanus inferior
to Ptolemy, but because my teacher shares with Ptolemy the good fortune of
completing, with the aid of divine kindness, the reconstruction of astronomy
which he began, while Regiomontanus—alas, cruel fate— departed this life before
he had time to erect his columns.1
When Nicholas
Copernicus was bom in 1473, Ptolemy’s Almagest had not yet been printed. When
in 1496 Copernicus, his studies at the University of Cracow completed, set off
for further study in Italy, the Almagest could still only be read in manuscript
(most of the manuscripts were in Italy) and Regiomontanus’ Epitome of Ptolemaic
Astronomy was just being published. Copernicus was bom into a world in which
astronomers were groping for reform, and educated in a world in which only the
first step—mastery of Ptolemy—had been taken. By the time that Copernicus had
finished his preliminary training in astronomy, his teachers had begun to
recognise that, although an intensive study of the Almagest was a necessary
pre-requisite to further advance, to know only what Ptolemy knew could not
suffice to rejuvenate astronomy.
Nevertheless, the
humanist principle that all knowledge must
68
lie with the ancients
still appeared viable ; hence, when Ptolemy failed to give the required
assistance, it seemed reasonable that die next step should be the examination
of those notions of earlier Greek astronomy which the Ptolemaic system had in
its day rendered obsolete. Nothing in his background or education inclined
Copernicus towards drastically novel ideas. Everything combined to suggest that
the badly needed reform in astronomy could be achieved by adherence to humanist
principles. This was the legacy of Peurbach. It was fairly and clearly stated
by Copernicus in the dedicatory preface of his great work, On the Revolutions
of the Celestial Spheres (1543 ; generally known as De Revolutionibus); he said
I was led to think of a method of computing the motions of the spheres by
nothing but the knowledge that Mathematicians [i.e. astronomers] are
inconsistent in these investigations ... I pondered long upon this uncertainty
of the mathematical tradition in establishing die motions of the system of die
spheres... I therefore took pains to re-read die works of all the philosophers
on whom I could lay my hands to find out whether any of them had ever supposed
that the motions of the spheres were other than those demanded by the mathematical
schools.2
This is not a
revolutionary attitude ; indeed Copernicus never intended it to be. He was not
a pioneer, and attempted nothing that others had not tried before, for many
astronomers used ancient opinion to refute Ptolemy in the strange blend of
icono- clasm and respect for authority that so often characterised the
sixteenth century. Copernicus alone chose a system (the Pythagorean, he
understood it to be) which had profound revolutionary implications, though it
was not for another generation that these implications were to become apparent.
Never, perhaps, has such a conservative and quiet thinker had such an upsetting
effect upon men’s minds and souls; but seldom has such a conservative
thinker been, even
inadvertently, so bold in accepting the improbable.
Certainly there was
nothing in his education to prepare him for a revolutionary role in that
reformation of astronomy which, he learned, was needed. Son of a merchant of
Cracow, Copernicus was while a boy adopted by his maternal uncle, Lucas
Watzelrode, an ecclesiastic who later became a bishop. Naturally intended for
an ecclesiastical career, Copernicus began his preparation at the University
of Cracow. The professor of astronomy had published a commentary on Peurbach’s
New Theory of the Planets ; the astronomy lectures were presumably sufficiently
up to date to convey the problems confronting astronomers, though there can
have been nothing very unorthodox. (Then or later Copernicus acquired some
knowledge of the theories of Nicholas of Cusa, but he had no interest
whatsoever in the daring flights of intellectual fancy demanded by the doctrine
of learned ignorance.) After five yean, Copernicus went to Italy to continue
his studies at the University of Bologna : Greek, medicine, philosophy and
astronomy. He was already considered a trained astronomer: the professor of
astronomy at Bologna spoke of him as an assistant rather than as a pupil; and
in 1500 he went to Rome for an astronomical conference, probably to discuss the
reform of the calendar. He was recalled to Poland to be installed as canon of
the cathedral of Frauenburg, but was allowed to return to Italy to study canon
law and medicine at Padua, and to take his doctorate in law at Ferrara. This
accomplished, he returned to Poland, to act as his uncle’s secretary and
physician until 1512 when, at his uncle’s death, he settled in Frauenburg.
There he led an extremely busy life, as an active administrator, a practising
physician, and a writer on economics and astronomy.
The history of the
development of the Copemican system is obscure. Copernicus later said that,
outdoing even Pythagorean caution, he had kept his work in abeyance for over
thirty years ;
70
he presumably had
constructed at least the outlines some time before he wrote his first sketch,
the Cotnmentariolus (Little Commentary), in 1512. This brief synopsis
circulated among his friends and gradually acquired a wider audience ; it had
reached Rome by 1533 and was discussed enough there to cause ecclesiastical
pressure to be exerted on Copernicus to publish further. The Church, with an
eye on calendar reform, was eager at this period to encourage mathematical
astronomy. Yet probably nothing more would have happened, and Copernicus would
have died leaving a mass of unpublished papers, if a young professor from the
Protestant University of Wittenberg, Georg Joachim Rheticus (1514.-76), had not
determined to play much the same role for Copernicus that Hailey was later to
play for Newton. Rheticus had heard rumours of die new and exciting
astronomical theories, and in 1539 arrived on the doorstep of die Frauenburg
canonry, begging for astronomical enlightenment. Copernicus did not scruple to
let the young man, Protestant though he was, have full access to his
astronomical papers ; and barely two months later he permitted Rheticus to
prepare for publication a brief account of die system, the Narratio Pritna,
published in 1540.
This First Narration
(something of a misnomer, since the Cotnmentariolus was in existence) is very
brief, but it reached a wider audience than the Cotnmentariolus with two
editions in two years. Rheticus never named Copernicus, though he dated his
work from Frauenburg; he merely refers to “ my teacher.” No doubt Copernicus
had stipulated anonymity; very probably he wished to see what reception would
be accorded to the theory by a general audience before he acknowledged it.
Rheticus urged the publication of the years of work accumulated by Copernicus ;
he promised to see the book through the press, and perhaps pointed out to the
old man that the favourable reception accorded to the First Narration showed
that the time was now ripe for publication. Copernicus yielded; and though
Rheticus
defected, handing his
job over to a Lutheran pastor named Andreas Osiander, Copernicus let the
printers continue. The book appeared in 1543 under the tide De Revolutionibus
Orbium CoelestiumLibri Sex (Six Books on the Revolution of the Celestial Orbs),
with somewhat strange prefatory material. Copernicus dedicated the work,
naturally enough, to Pope Paul III, while Osiander, the Protestant, inserted an
unsigned and wholly unauthorised note to the reader of his own composition,
expressing his, not Copernicus’ views on the physical reality of the system.
The De Revolutionibus thus appeared in a curiously if anonymously Catholic-
Protestant guise.* Tradition has it that Copernicus saw his great work only on
his death-bed ; he was certainly ill in the months immediately preceding its
publication, and died soon afterwards.
Much controversy has
raged over the question of Copernicus’ avowed disinclination to publish in the
years between 1512 and 1539, though there has been curiously litde discussion
of his apparent readiness to yield to the request of Rheticus. Why the
hesitation, when he was prepared to give way in the end ? Was he afraid of
official censure ? Was he jealous of his superior knowledge ? Was he naturally
over-secretive ? Did he not truly believe in his system ? Did he want to keep
his discoveries to himself? Did he believe that learning was for initiates only
?
Careful reading of
the prefatory letter of dedication to Pope Paul III (hardly a sign in itself of
fear of official disapproval) suggests that the reasons were derived from what
he believed to be Pythagorean doctrine : that advanced scientific ideas should
be discussed only among scientists, because non-scientists, misunderstanding,
always travestied them. Copernicus was not dunking specifically of the popular
misapplication of scientific
* The dedication to the Pope most probably
explains why Copernicus did not mention the help given by Rheticus ; not
ingratitude, but policy, suggested the unwisdom of naming Protestants in 1543
in ecclesiastical circles. But the fact that Rheticus relinquished the
editorship suggests that his help was not so great as one would expect.
theory which is of
such common occurrence in modem science (though it was to happen with his
theory when used by Bruno to support a pantheistic doctrine) but of the incredulity
and scom with which, he believed, new ideas must always be treated. He knew his
theory was both novel and strange ; he feared lest it should be regarded as
absurd as well, and he himself, as he put it, “ hissed off the stage...
Reflecting thus, the thought of the scom I had to fear on account of the
novelty and incongruity of my theory, nearly induced me to abandon my
project.”*
Fear of ridicule is
not a very noble motive for withholding publication, perhaps, but it can be a
very real one : Galileo felt something of this half a century later, and there
seems no reason not to believe Copernicus when he plainly says it influenced
him strongly. One should reflect that then, as now, publication of a book meant
committing one’s ideas to the mercy of a wide general audience. Copernicus had
long before been willing to circulate his theory in manuscript (by means of the
Commentari- olus), a form equivalent to the modem method of reading a paper in
technical form to a learned society where it will be judged by specialists only
before venturing on formal publication. Actual publication of the De
Revolutiottibus exposed the Copemican system, as its author knew would happen,
to comment and criticism by all and sundry—humanists, scholastics, astrologers,
mathematicians, crackpots, ecclesiastics—for any educated man in the sixteenth
century when astronomy was the most widely studied of the natural sciences
fended himself competent to pass judgement on astronomical theories.
Remembering Luther’s scornful comment about the fool who sought to turn science
upside down, one can see that Copernicus had reason to fear ridicule. Attack by
a Protestant rebel could hardly have affected his position in the world, but he
obviously disliked personal ridicule of any kind; and as a public figure of
some note he was vulnerable to disdain from university professors and his
superiors
in the Church, quite
capable of judging astronomical theory. But, as he remarked disarmingly in his
dedication, the Pope, by his “ influence and judgement can readily hold the
slanderers from biting.” 4 All he wanted was a fair hearing ; though
he did not live to see it, his book was indeed well received in the Church and
used, as he had hoped, to further calendar reform. Ironically, little serious
attention was given at first to the heart of the book, the new theory.
Looking through the
De Revolutionibus one is immediately made aware of the fact that, true to his
training, Copernicus had studied the Almagest very carefully indeed. For the De
Revolutionibus is the Almagest, book by book and section by section, rewritten
to incorporate the new Copemican theory, but otherwise altered as little as
might be. Kepler was to remark later that Copernicus interpreted Ptolemy, not
nature, and there is some truth in the comment; to Copernicus the way to nature
lay in a re-interpretation of Ptolemaic astronomy, wrong in details, but right
in conception. And it was indeed essential, if one wished to replace Ptolemy,
to do everything he had done, only better. Copernicus did not wish to claim
novelty, which had no appeal to him; he claimed to be doing no more than revive
Pythagorean doctrines, especially those of Philolaus (fifth century B.C.), as
described by Plutarch.* But he was well aware of the fact that, before his own,
there was no system of astronomy comparable to
* It may seem odd that Copernicus did not
daim to be reviving the doctrines of Aristarchos of Samos (fl. c. 270), “ the
Copernicus of antiquity ” who gave the Earth both diurnal and annual motion.
But our only real knowledge of this theory is derived from a couple of
sentences in the Sand- Redtoner of Archimedes, combined with two brief
references in Plutarch. Copernicus had probably never seen the work of
Archimedes as it was first printed the year after his death. He originally
concluded the first book of De Revolutionibus with a brief recapitulation of
the difficulties of discussing complex scientific ideas for a general audience,
and then remarked that according to some authorities, Aristarchos held the
same opinion as Pythagoras. He later rejected these paragraphs.^
FRACASTORO AGAINST PTOLEMY
that of Ptolemy,
simply because none offered a computational scheme and method that could
replace that of Ptolemy. If one genuinely wanted to supersede Ptolemy (as
Copernicus did) one needed to offer more than a qualitative cosmology; one
must, in addition, present a thoroughly worked out mathematical system, capable
of giving results at least as good as those derived from the Ptolemaic system
when used for computing planetary tables. In this Copernicus was eminently
successful; his mathematical theory was even to be used for computation of
tables by astronomers who totally rejected his cosmological system.
The problem appears
in sharper focus if one examines the most ingenious and detailed of
and-Ptolemaic systems proposed before Copernicus. In 1538 there appeared
Homocentrics, dedicated, like De Revolutionibus, to Pope Paul 111. The author
was Girolamo Fracastoro, an Italian humanist, poet, physician and astronomer,
who had been professor of logic at Padua when Copernicus was a student, but who
spent most of his life as an author and physician. Fracastoro did not profess
to have originated the central idea of Homocentrics, which was to replace
Ptolemaic epicycles and eccentrics (see p. 434) with the concentric (or
homocentric) spheres originated by Plato’s pupil Eudoxos {fl. c. 370 B.C.) and
elaborated by Aristotle. Fracastoro did abolish epicycles and eccentrics but at
the price of a somewhat improbable system, certainly one even further removed
from physical verisimilitude than the Ptolemaic system it sought to replace.
Fracastoro assumed that every motion in space is resolvable into three
components at right angles to one another, so that the motions of the planets
could be represented by the motion of crystalline spheres with their axes at
right angles, three for each motion. He further assumed, quite gratuitously,
that while the outer spheres move the inner ones, die motion of the inner
spheres does not affect the outer ones; this permitted him to eliminate many of
Aristode’s spheres—those that served to counteract the
frictional motion
caused by two spheres rubbing against one another—but at the same time to allow
the diurnal rotation of the primum mobile to account for the rising and setting
of the planets as well as the fixed stars. In this way, he required seventy-
seven spheres in all! Fracastoro ingeniously eliminated the great disadvantage
of the Aristotelian system, which was that if the planets are located on the
equators of spheres concentric with the Earth there ought not to be any
variation in their brightness. He explained the observed variation by assuming
that the spheres (being material) were of variable transparency, because of
variable density. This system (with which others experimented as well) shows
how much Copernicus was following the fashion of the times in reviving ancient
systems to replace that of Ptolemy ; it also shows the immense superiority of
the conception of Copernicus. For, in spite of fairly detailed discussion,
Fracastoro did not offer a replacement to the computational methods of Ptolemy.
He knew and understood the Almagest, but he had neither the patience nor the
mathematical skill to write it anew; he was content to explain how one could
eliminate epicycles and eccentrics, without pausing to explore completely the
validity of his assumptions about the mathematical representation of motions by
means of spheres.
Copernicus, on the
other hand, wrote De Revolutionibus as a careful parallel to the Almagest, with
the mathematical and computational methods revised for a different concept of
planetary motions. Book i deals, as does Ptolemy’s Book I, with a general
discussion of the universe : the sphericity of the universe and of the Earth;
the circular nature of heavenly motion ; the size of the universe ; the order
of the planets; the question of the Earth’s motion; the basic theorems of
trigonometry, are all discussed in both works. But where Ptolemy argued for a
geocentric and geostatic universe, Copernicus argued that the Earth and all
the planets circled the Sun, carefully refuting Ptolemy’s
counter-arguments one
by one ; and he showed himself able to add to Ptolemy’s work in trigonometry.
Book II deals with spherical trigonometry, and the rising and setting of the
Sun and the planets (now ascribed to the Earth’s motion); Book hi contains the mathematical treatment
of the Earth’s motions, Book iv of the Moon’s motions, Book v of the motions of
the planets in longitude, and Book vi, the motions of the planets in latitude.
Or, as Copernicus explained it:
In the first book I
describe all the positions of the spheres together with such movements as I
ascribe to the Earth; so that this book contains, as it were, the general system
of the universe. Afterwards, in the remaining books, I relate the motions of
the other planets and all the spheres to the mobility of the Earth, so that we
may thus comprehend how far the motions and appearances of the remainder of the
planets and spheres may be preserved, if they are related to the motions of the
Earth.6
No one was going to
be able to brush aside the work of Copernicus because he only sketched a
system, as others (and he himself in die Commentariolus) had done before this
time. By his plan and development he insisted on being judged on the same basis
as Ptolemy ; there was nothing one could find treated in the Almagest that was
not also treated in De Revolutionibus. Copernicus certainly desired nothing
better than to be regarded as the Ptolemy of the sixteenth century ; he could
see no higher aim than to explain by his own system the appearances of the
heavens as known to Ptolemy. The Copemican would replace the Ptolemaic system,
he believed, because it was simpler, more harmonious, more ingenious and more
in keeping with the underlying philosophical basis, which demanded that the
motions of the heavenly bodies, being perfecdy circular, be represented by
mathematical curves that were as nearly perfect circles as might be. It was on
this that he wished to be judged.
At the heart of the
Copernican system lies the point which required the most carefully reasoned
argument: the attribution of motion to the Earth. It was this attribution that
caused Copernicus to fear that astronomers would laugh and refuse to take him
seriously. For to assume that the Earth moved, in the sixteenth century,
required such a straining of well-assured fact as to amount to an absurdity of
the degree that would be provoked by the contrary argument to-day. It is
difficult in the twentieth century to understand this ; we are convinced that
the Earth moves because we have been told so since babyhood, though relatively
few people can readily offer proof of this motion. In the sixteenth century
everyone knew, for similar reasons, that the Earth stood still; and no one
needed arguments to prove what the evidence of the senses confirmed. To be
sure, scientists and philosophers conventionally offered various kinds of
proof, logical and scientific, nearly all derived from Aristotle and Ptolemy.
Thus, for example, it was habitually pointed out that the Earth belonged at die
centre of the universe because, according to the tenets of Aristotelian
physics, that was the natural place for the heavy element earth of which it was
chiefly composed; that it was inherendy improbable that any such naturally
heavy and sluggish object should move ; that the natural motion of the
terrestrial elements was rectilinear, whereas the natural motion of die
celestial element was circular ; that if the Earth did rotate on its axis,
either the atmosphere, or else missiles and birds moving through it, would be
left behind, and a stone dropped from a tower would not hit the ground at die
foot of the tower.* These were points that it was essential to refute.
Copernicus did so,
firmly and ingeniously, using Aristotelian arguments wherever possible. Thus,
to the argument that the Earth should not be assumed to move, because to move
was contrary to its nature, Copernicus retorted that it was easier to
* This last was a new argument in the
sixteenth century.
imagine that the
relatively small Earth moved, than that the great heavens hurled themselves
around every twenty-four hours, a feat that must require truly enormous speed.
(To call the Earth small, even relatively, required a leaping imagination that
others could not encompass as readily as Copernicus did). Surely, so he argued,
it was easier to imagine that the apparent motion of the heavens was really the
result of the motion of the Earth, turning on its axis once every twenty-four
hours. As for Ptolemy’s fears that in that case the atmosphere would be left
behind, surely these were groundless: for the atmosphere was a part of the
whole terrestrial region, and as such would share, like things suspended in it,
the motion of its central body, the Earth. Copernicus could not deny that
circular motion was natural to the heavens, and rectilinear motion to the Earth
and its regions ; so he was forced to modify the rigid distinctions between
celestial and terrestrial physics which had for so long been essential tenets
of the Aristotelian cosmos. He had first to modify Aristotelian physics to
argue that rectilinear motion and circular motion might coexist in the same
body, so that the whole might rotate, while the parts moved in straight lines.
And he had secondly to argue that the spherical nature of the Earth fitted it
to move in circles as much as did the spherical shape of the heavenly bodies.
All unconsciously, by
denying one essential difference between the heavenly and terrestrial spheres,
Copernicus began that encroachment on cosmical dualism that was destined to end
fatally. Once astronomers began to consider heavens and Earth as one, there was
logically a need to treat their dynamical problems as one. Copernicus was the
first modem cosmologer to begin to break down the old-established barriers
between the Earth and the celestial regions ; one by one these barriers were
demolished until in the Newtonian universe modem physics allowed a return to
the unified and uniform cosmos of the original pre-Socratic conception. Not
that Copernicus argued
like this ; his
method was thoroughly Aristotelian in spirit if not in content. He insisted, “
We conceive immobility to be nobler and more divine than change and constancy.”
7 So, if the heavens were nobler, they should be at rest, while the
baser Earth moved. Since it was possible that the heavens were at rest and the
Earth in motion, it was, to Copernicus, also probable, reasonable and fitting
that this was in fact the case. And Copernicus felt that a probable argument
was all that could be expected of him.
The rearrangement of
the Ptolemaic system to form the Copemican required more than the assignation
of motion to the Earth. In the outline sketched in the Commentariolus,
Copernicus listed seven assumptions (his own word) required before serious
consideration of the system could begin.8 First, he had to assume
that there was no one centre of motion for all the heavenly bodies. For
although he was to postulate that the planets all revolved about the Sun, the
Moon still clearly revolved about the Earth. This dichotomy was, at the time,
considered a disadvantage, for one of the niceties of die Ptolemaic system was
that all the heavenly bodies revolved around die same point. Second, Copernicus
removed the Earth from the centre of the universe. He still necessarily
retained it, as lie said, as the centre of the lunar sphere ; for whatever one
might postulate, it was certainly a fact that heavy bodies were observed to
fall to the Earth, just as it was a fact that the Moon circled the Earth. Here
the Copemican system was again at a disadvantage, because physics and cosmology
no longer supported one another. According to Aristotelian physics, heavy
bodies fell to the Earth because it was the centre of the universe; when
Copernicus made this explanation impossible, he left gravity as a mysterious or
occult force, needing explanation in a way that it had not done before. He
could only postulate that gravity was common to all the planets, without
particularising further. The result was to raise a new and fertile problem to
be tackled by later cosmologists.
The third assumption
was that die centre of motion of the planetary system was in fact the Sun*
which was therefore the true centre of the universe, a conclusion which
Copernicus declared to be “ suggested by the systematic procession of events
and the harmony of the whole universe.” # This special position of the Sun
seemed to Copernicus to explain much that had hitherto been mysterious : for it
had always been a peculiarity that the Sun, a planet like Venus or Mars, but
not very near the Earth, should be so distinguished from the other planets. The
Sim alone shed light and warmth that fostered life itself; its importance was
obviously so much greater than the planet’s astrological influence that it had
always been given a special consideration. Now at last the unique properties of
the Sun were recognised as corresponding to a unique position ; as Copernicus
emphatically explained:
In the middle of all
sits the Sun enthroned. How could we place this luminary in any better position
in this most beautiful temple from which to illuminate the whole at once ? He
is righdy called the Lamp, the Mind, the Ruler of the Universe... So the Sun
sits as upon a royal throne ruling his children the planets which circle around
him.10 Besides, it explained why all planetary motion contained a
365- day period.
The fourth assumption
concerned the size of the universe ; it must, so Copernicus declared, be very
large, so large, in fact, that the distance from the Earth to the Sun must be
negligibly smaD* compared with the distance of the Sun from the sphere of fixed
stars. This was an extremely necessary postulate ; for it alone could account
for the fact that the motion of the Earth is not
* As it worked out, since the Earth’s
sphere is eccentric to the Sun, the real centre of motion was the centre of the
Earth’s orbit. It was nevertheless true that the planets “ went around ” the
Sun; and in the Ptolemaic system the same thing occurred with respect to the
Earth.
81
reflected in an
apparent motion of the fixed stars, as it would otherwise be. The fixed stars
in the Copemican system ought to exhibit the phenomenon of parallax ; that is,
any one star should appear to move slightly to and fro against its background
during the year as die Earth travels from one side of its annual path to the
other, just as the photographer’s view of a group drawn up before him varies as
he walks to and fro in front of it. But the fixed stars did not appear to
exhibit any parallax ; a fact which is hardly surprising since it continued to
evade telescopic detection until 1838-9. It was a weak point in the Copemican
system, since Copernicus could only insist that the parallax was there, but was
too small, owing to die immense distance of the stars from the Earth, to be
detectable.
The last three
assumptions were concerned with the motion of the Earth : Copernicus assmned
that the Earth’s diurnal rota? tion produced the apparent rising and setting of
the Sun, planets ana fixed stars, and tne Earth’s annual revolution about the
Sun produced die apparent annual motion of the Sun, Mid the apparent
retrogradations ot certain oftlieplanets. T^e resultant system is the familiar
picture of the Copemican universe : at the centre, die Sun; then the spheres of
Mercury, Venus, the Earth with its Moon, Mars, Jupiter and Saturn, with die
(now stationary) sphere of the fixed stars forming a boundary and limit to the
universe as a whole.
By these means and
with considerable felicity, Copernicus enhanced the order and harmony of the
planetary arrangement. The motions of the Earth, as Copernicus insisted,
explained much that had hitherto been a source of uneasiness and distress to
astronomers, because it seemed so untidy. The Earth’s diurnal motion
* To these two motions, Copernicus later
added a third (unnecessary) one, a motion of the poles to account for the
constancy of the angle of inclination of the Earth’s axis which, when the Earth
is carried around by a solid moving sphere, is in danger of a progressive tilt.
82
alone explained the
daily rising and setting of stars, planets and Sun, which did not now
themselves exhibit diurnal motion. Better still, the annual revolution of the
Earth around the Sun was not a mere replacement of the Sun’s yearly motion: it
served as well to effect a regularising of the motions of the planets.
FIG. 4. THE APPARENT MOTION OF JUPITER RELATED TO ITS
REAL MOTION
The size of the
orbits is not to scale
In the Copemican
system, die “ retrograde ” motions of die planets were shown to be merely
apparent motions ; the real motion of each planet was always in the same
direction about the Sun, though (because of the Earth’s motion) it did not seem
so. The Earth’s motion (which is our own) causes us to see the planet against
die background of fixed stars from different points of view as it (and we)
travel in orbits about the Sun, in the same direction, but at different speeds.
83
FIG. 5- A COMPARISON OF THE COPERNICAN AND PTOLEMAIC SYSTEMS
On the Copemican
system, c is the Sun, the centre of the system, b
is the Earth, and b an outer
planet. On the Ptolemaic system, c is the Earth, d the Sun and e the
centre of the planet’s epicycle, the planet itself being at p. The line from Earth to planet in the
second case will be parallel to the line from Earth to planet in the first
case, and the angle between this line and the Earth-Sun line will be the same
in each system. Consequently the apparent position of the planet is the same
Suppose we consider
the apparent path of an outer planet like Jupiter over the period of a year.
While the Earth is making one complete revolution about the Sun, Jupiter will
move only about 30° of its orbit (here both orbits are assumed circular), since
it takes nearly twelve years to circle the Sun. As shown in figure 4, the
result will be that while the Earth makes its circuit in the
twelve months, and
Jupiter in fact travels on its orbit from the points marked i to 12, the path
of Jupiter as seen from an apparently stationary Earth against the sphere of
fixed stars will be as indicated by the figures 1' to 12', where at the
beginning of the year the motion is backwards ; and if the apparent path of
Jupiter is observed throughout its complete orbital period, the result will be
a series of loops. The apparent path of Jupiter is thus the result of
neglecting to differentiate between relative and absolute motion ; in fact its
orbit is as smooth a curve as that of the Earth, and its motion always in the
same direction. To Copernicus this discovery represented a profoundly
satisfactory simplification, though it may be doubted whether to others it
necessarily did so. Certainly it curiously separated appearance and reality,
for all that Copernicus tried to argue calmly and persuasively that relative
motion was a simple affair :
It is but as the
saying of Aeneas in Virgil—“ We sail forth from the harbour, and lands and
cities retire.” As the ship floats along in the calm, all external things seem
to have the motion that is really that of the ship, while those within the ship
feel that they and all its contents are at rest.11 This was true
enough, and it was true that many of the motions in the two systems which
appeared to differ were in fact interchangeable, being identical though
assigned to different bodies.* But in that case, why change ? Who could be sure
that Copernicus really knew which was ship, and which shore ?
Copernicus was
certain that he did know, and equally certain that he had answered Ptolemy’s
arguments against the stability of the Earth as convincingly as anyone could
demand. It was certain that he had successfully turned Ptolemy inside out,
removing the Earth from the centre of the universe (though not so far as to be
uncomfortable ; for it was quite near the centre compared with its distance
from the fixed stars), and setting the
* The case of an outer planet (like
Jupiter) is shown in figure j.
Sun there instead;
making the fixed stars truly fixed, and die Sun at rest; using the motion of
the Earth to explain several motions at once. By these means, as Copernicus
argued, he had introduced a greater measure of simplicity, order, harmony and
uniformity, which corresponded, far better than the Ptolemaic system could do,
to Plato’s original conception of a universe mathematically expressible in
terms of circular motion. It is true that Copernicus still had to use
eccentrics and epicycles and deferents which were hardly simple, though their
use had long been interpreted as conforming to Plato’s requirement of a combination
of circular motions. But he had abolished the equant, which was a dubiously
satisfactory contrivance, and physically meaningless; and he had explained away
the awkward retrograde motions as mere appearances. There was a mathematical
ingenuity and elegance that must appeal to theoretical astronomers, Copernicus
was sure ; it was truly a Pythagorean system designed for the appraisal of
mathematicians. That it still used the familiar epicycles and eccentrics might
be an advantage to the sixteenth century; everyone knew how to manipulate
these, and would have found a universe totally denuded of them naked indeed.
Similarly, the fact that Copernicus retained the crystalline spheres not only
explained what kept the planets in their positions in the universe, and why
their motions were circular, but also preserved the familiar Aristotelian
concept of the universe as a nest of concentric spheres. The universe had grown
larger, but was still enclosed by the outer rim of the sphere of fixed stars,
now truly fixed and immovable. In addition, the mathematics of the Copemican
was a little easier to manage than the mathematics of the Ptolemaic system.
Were these advantages
enough ? Could one readily accept a system so reasonable, but so improvable ?
Was it, in feet, really so reasonable ? There were advantages in the Copemican
system admittedly, but were these advantages great enough to encourage
86
ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST
men to destroy the
work of centuries, and substitute Pythagoras and Copernicus for Aristotle and
Ptolemy ? Even the advantages of uniformity were not attained without
corresponding disadvantages. Though the motion of the Earth about the Sun
created certain simplicities, it failed to explain why, when the Moon revolved
about the Earth, it was not reasonable to suppose that the planets did also. It
was comforting, to be sure, to find that die Earth was not totally reduced to
the status of a planet, for the Earth was still unique in having the Moon as a
companion ; but this was not sufficient compensation for its degradation.
Even granted the
cogency of the arguments which Copernicus presented, there was no proof. It was
true that no one could think of an experiment to test the rotation of the Earth
on its axis; but everyone knew that the annual revolution should produce
stellar parallax, and equally that Copernicus did not claim that it did so, but
only said that the distance was too great for this phenomenon to be observed.
The argument from the well-known fact of the peculiarities of relative motion
was plausible, but hardly conclusive; however much it was true that the
passenger on the moving ship could imagine that he stood still while the land
moved, the passenger in fact recognised almost immediately that his senses were
playing tricks with him. There was absolutely no sign in everyday experience
that the inhabitants of the Earth needed to readjust their ideas; for
everything showed the Sun moving and die Earth standing still. If the Earth
were not at the centre of the universe, what about gravity ? For one need not
accept the argument of Copernicus. Worse than this : if the Earth were not at
the centre, what happened to the dignity of man ? Had not God created the
universe for man’s enjoyment, and put the Earth at the centre to prove it ?
Certainly the Earth was the only abode of man (one did not need to consider
the wild remarks of Epicurean atheists who thought otherwise) ; and this
proved that it was unique, and ought to occupy
a unique position.
Why did the motions of the planets influence the Earth and its inhabitants if
the planets in fact circled the Sun ? To us, knowing that Copernicus was right
makes the opposing arguments seem trivial. We falsify both the achievement of
Copernicus and the difficulties in his way if we do not realise that it was not
so simple ; he had reason to fear scom because his position seemed at the time so
untenable as to approach the ridiculous.
And yet, Copernicus
was only following humanist precepts : he was trying to replace Aristotelian
authority, which to the sixteenth century represented the outmoded intellectual
pattern of the Middle Ages, with a system equally derived from Greek authority,
which had the added advantage of being consonant with Platonic doctrines, so
much more highly esteemed now than those of Plato’s pupil Aristotle. And in
doing so Copernicus achieved a good and interesting hypothesis. But to carry
conviction an astronomical system required more than probable hypotheses,
which were readily available ; it needed to present a true physical picture of
the universe. Did Copernicus intend to supply this as well as a mathematically
useful hypothesis of planetary motions ? There is every reason to suppose that
he did. At the time his book appeared, this was by no means clear, for it was
prefaced by an Address to the Reader “ Concerning the Hypotheses of this Work ”
which tried to imply that astronomy was to be regarded as an intellectual
exercise, in which the astronomer, incapable of attaining physical truth, must
content himself with presenting any ingenious hypothesis which pleased him and
fitted the facts. Careful reading of the whole discussion readily suggests
(what was indeed the case) that the writer was not Copernicus. Later
sixteenth-century astronomers knew that it was Osiander.1* At first
no one paid great attention to this prefatory disclaimer, because no one cared
how deeply committed Copernicus was tc the truth of his system. It was later
Coper-
COPERNICAN COSMOLOGY
nicans like Kepler
who felt that it was imperative to establish that their master had meant what
he said to be taken as physical feet, not mathematical hypothesis. In this they
appear to have been correct. Certainly Copernicus thought that his assumptions
about the motions of the universe were valid, and that his hypotheses were
reasonable enough to be probably true. He did not expect observation to confirm
this, because his own experiences suggested that a high degree of accuracy
could not be expected. This was all the more reason for relying on mathematical
argument when attempting to create a new cosmos. In his own eyes, Copernicus
was not revolutionising astronomy ; he was using a different philosophical
basis, the Pythagorean, to arrive at a truer picture of the universe than that
which Ptolemy had; but his universe was recognisably akin to Ptolemy’s, and
none the less valid for that. The framework was the same, though the structure
differed. Copernicus had no wish to create a new heaven and a new Earth. For
him it was better to explain the nature of the old ones more exactly.
CHAPTER IV
As I happened from
time to time to meet anyone who held the Copemican opinion, I asked him whether
he had always believed in it. Among all the many whom I questioned, I found not
a single one who did not tell me that he had long been of the contrary opinion,
but had come over to this one, moved and persuaded by the force of its
arguments. Examining them one by one then, to see how well they had mastered
the arguments on the other side, I found them all to have these ready at hand,
so that I could not truly say that they had forsaken that position out of
ignorance or vanity or, so to speak, to show off their cleverness. On the other
hand, so far as I questioned the Peripatetics and the Ptolemaics (for out of
curiosity I asked many of them) how much they had studied Copernicus’ book, I
found very few who had so much as seen it, and none who I believed understood
it.1
It is peculiarly
difficult to judge fairly of the effect of a new scientific idea in the days
before book reviews and formal scientific meetings. One is entirely dependent
on an appraisal of comments, for and against: how does one balance, say, a lukewarm
estimate by a scientist against one ardent defence and one virulent attack,
both by non-scientists ? One can only try to weigh and interpret the evidence
imaginatively, remembering that to receive any mention at all, even an
unfavourable one, is in itself a sign of achievement.
In the case of
Copernicus there is the further complication
that his theory had
been, known in certain circles for many years before die publication of De
Revolutionibus in 1543 : through the Commentariolus, through rumour and through
the First Narration of Rheticus. He was held in high esteem in astronomical
circles during his lifetime; he was even spoken of as the potential saviour of
astronomy. (Ironically, few who looked forward so eagerly were receptive to the
new theory when at last it was made public.) Historians have sometimes tended
to treat with surprise and sorrow the fact that not all astronomers were
immediately converted, and to be shocked that some even wrote against the new
system. The wonder should rather be that so many took the pains to try to
assimilate a new and complex theory, whose proper appreciation required a high
degree of mathematical skill.
In fact, De
Revolutionibus was fairly widely read, enough, at least, to warrant a second
edition’s appearing in Basle in 1566, with the First Narration (now in its
third edition) as an appendix. Of course, many must have learned more from
Rheticus than from Copernicus, and presumably not all who talked so glibly about
what Copernicus had or had not done ever looked into his great work. Yet there
were many astronomers who were capable of utilising mathematical astronomy,
and, however slow the pace of new ideas in die sixteenth century, the Copemican
theory was used within half a dozen years of its publication. Popular discussions
soon followed: by the end of die century even literary writers like Montaigne
knew enough about the system to mention its implications. One might expect that
its spread would be quickest in Germany, the centre of the astronomical
instrument trade (and of astrology) and possessing new universities like
Wittenberg, where Rheticus had taught. But by some perversity of intellectual
development, countries like England and Spain, previously backward in cultural
and especially scientific advances, were quick to notice the new astronomical
ideas. Perhaps this was because they were not in firm possession of the old
ones.
Rather oddly, much of
the early praise for Copernicus is as an observational astronomer ; oddly,
because he made very few observations as far as is known, and professed a low
estimation of attainable observational accuracy. Even Tycho Brahe, the greatest
observational astronomer between Hipparchus and Herschel, treated the
observations of “ the incomparable Copernicus ” with respect, though he was
puzzled to find them so crude.* It is true, however, that this emphasis on the
observational aspects of the Copemican achievement was in part the result of
the first use made of the new system, in the computation of planetary tables.
Copernicus had given rough tables in De Revolutionibus; now Erasmus Reinhold
(1511-53), professor of astronomy at Wittenberg, drew up new, improved tables,
complete enough to take the place of the now hopelessly out-of-date Alphonsine
Tables. Reinhold called his tables “Prussian” in honour of his patron, the Duke
of Prussia ; they are usually known under the semi-Latin designation of the
Prutenic Tables (1551). Reinhold’s relationship to the Copemican theory is peculiar.
When he edited Peurbach’s New Theory of the Planets in 1542, he declared
(presumably on the basis of the First Narration) that Copernicus was to be the
restorer of astronomy and a new Ptolemy.3 When De Revolutionibus
appeared, he immediately saw that the Copemican system could form the basis for
calculating new tables. Yet he was never a Copemican ; for him it was enough
that Copernicus had imagined a convenient mathematical device which simplified
calculation.
The position of
Reinhold was that of many other computational astronomers. Reinhold’s Prutenic
Tables were widely used; indeed, they appropriately helped to fulfil the reform
of the calendar, as Copernicus had hoped a restored astronomy might do. They
were frequently revised for other countries, and often expanded. The first such
case was in 1556 when there appeared a work entitled Ephemeris for the Year
1557 according to the Principles
92
of
Copernicus and Reinhold for the Meridian of London ; its author, John Feild,
did not have anything to say about tie merits of the Copemican system (or,
apparently, of anything else, for he is otherwise unknown). The preface was by
the mathematician, astrologer, advocate of experimental science and
spiritualist, John Dee (1527-1608); he there explained that he had persuaded
his &iend to compile these tables because he thought that the work of
Copernicus, Reinhold and Rheticus had rendered the old tables obsolete ; but he
did not think that a preface was a suitable place in which to enter into a
critical discussion of the merits of the Copemican system. Nor did he ever
commit himself: very possibly he had no desire to accept the physical reality
of a computational and hypothetical system.
All astronomical
computers had to reckon with Copernicus after Reinhold’s work. So Pontus de
Tyard (though actually a Copemican) in his Ephemeris of the Eight Spheres
(1562) praised Copernicus as “ the restorer of astronomy ” purely because of
his contributions to astronomical calculation. All these tables were an
improvement on the older ones, and not only because they were up to date: how
superior may be judged by the experience of Tycho. Wanting to observe a
conjunction of Saturn and Jupiter, he found the prediction in the Alphonsine
Tables to err by a whole month, while the Prutenic Tables erred by a few days
only : too much, but still vastly better.*
Although there were a
good many references to the Coper- nican system by non-professionals throughout
the sixteenth century, there were few easy ways of getting a clear idea of its
contents. Except for the work of Rheticus, there were almost no elementary
presentations. Only one university curriculum even possibly included it: the
statutes of die University of Salamanca were revised in 1561, and stipulated
that mathematics (read in alternate years with astrology) was to consist of
Euclid, Ptolemy or Copernicus at the choice of die students.9 There
seems to be
no record of whether
they did decide on Copernicus during the sixty years before they could no
longer choose him. That the Copemican system was not otherwise taught in the
universities is by no means surprising ; astronomy was an elementary subject,
and the professors were expected to teach the basic elements as part of die
general education of an arts student. For the future physicians who needed a
competence in medical astrology a grounding in the Copemican system might well
have proved an embarrassment, since astrological tables and instructions were
Ptolemaic. So too were the everyday and literary references to astronomy.
Besides, even to-day one does not begin science instruction by discussing the
latest developments in nuclear physics ; nor were schoolboys fifty years ago
started on Einstein before they understood Newton.
This was the point
made by Robert Recorde in his Castle of Knowledge (1556) one of his series of
treatises in the vernacular on mathematics, pure and applied. Recorde had been
at both universities; having graduated in medicine at Cambridge, he taught
mathematics in London, a trade currently in much demand because of the lively
interest in navigation. In the Castle of Knowledge he developed a dialogue
between the Master and the Scholar which indicates not only the esteem in which
he held Copernicus, but also his judgement that it took an advanced astronomer
to weigh the arguments fairly and fully. The Master professes to believe that
he need not discuss whether the Earth moves or not, because its stability is “
so firmly fixed in most men’s heads, that they account it mere madness to bring
the question in doubt.” This naturally provokes die Scholar into an incautious
generalisation : “ Yet sometimes it chanceth, that the opinion most generally
received, is not most true,” which in turn permits the Master to retort And so
do some men judge of this matter, for not only Heraclides Ponticus, a great
Philosopher, and two great clerks
of Pythagoras school,
Philolaus and Ecphantus, were of a contrary opinion, but also Nicias
Syracusius, and Aristarchus Samius, seem with strong arguments to approve it:
but the reasons are too difficult for this first Introduction, & therefore
I will omit them till another time.... howbeit, Copernicus, a man of great
learning, of much experience, and of wonderful diligence in observation, hath
renewed the opinion of Aristarchus Samius, and affirmeth that the earth not
only moveth circularly about his own centre, but also may be, yea and is,
continually out of the precise centre of the world 38 hundred thousand miles :
but because the understanding of that controversy dependeth of profounder
knowledge than in this Introduction may be uttered conveniently, I will let it
pass till some other time.6 There is no doubt that Recorde believed
that the young scholar was in no position to judge from the evidence, and might
as easily turn against the new system as not; indeed, his Scholar thought it
all vain conceits, and the Master was forced to rebuke him, telling him that he
was far too young to have an opinion. This was fair enough ; but few ever did
have the knowledge to have an opinion.
Many besides Recorde
judged favourably of Copemicanism, but did not regard it as a suffidendy setded
part of accepted astronomy to indude in an elementary presentation. A typical
example is the case of Michael Maesdin (1550-1631), professor of astronomy at
Tubingen. A generation younger than Reinhold, he found it possible to accept
the Copemican system without at first trying to advocate it publidy. His
textbook Epitome of Astronomy (1588) very probably reflects his university
lectures, and is strictly Ptolemaic ; but later editions contain Copemican
appendices. The fact that Kepler (1571-1630) was his pupil, and treated Maesdin
as his master, shows that with advanced students he did discuss the new
doctrine; for Kepler was a Copemican
almost before he was
a competent astronomer, and later remembered defending Copemicanism publicly.
In 1596, Maestlin attended to the publication of Kepler’s first book and, of
his own accord, appended the First Narration of Rheticus, with a preface in
praise of Copernicus. Whatever his beliefs may have been before this time, he
was clearly a convert in the 1590’s ; and after the condemnation of the
Copemican system by the Catholic Church, Maestlin, a Protestant, proposed a new
edition of De Revolutionibus, though he got no farther than writing the
preface. Maesdin’s position is different from that of Christopher Roth- mann,
astronomer to the Landgrave of Hesse-Cassel, who carried on a long
correspondence with Tycho Brahe in which he ardendy defended Copernicus and
eamesdy refuted Tycho’s counterarguments, yet published nothing on the
subject. Although there may be many reasons for the silence which some astronomers
maintained, it was not usually want of conviction ; it was perhaps in many
cases merely that they saw no need to take a stand; so, long before the
condemnation of Galileo, there was no need to stand up and be counted. In any
event, one clearly cannot judge the influence of Copemicanism by the lack of
elementary treatments in textbooks; even Galileo chose to lecture publicly only
on Ptolemaic astronomy.
On the other hand,
public commitment to the Copemican theory had a great appeal for the radical
thinkers of the sixteenth century. Seeking escape from what they regarded as
the trammels of scholastic Aristotelianism, they turned eagerly to any dieory
supporting their desire for innovation. Many discussions of Copemicanism are
set within the framework of anti- Aristotelianism, and one sometimes gets the
impression that the defence of Copernicus is pardy a response to the intellectual
delights of novelty and perversity. If one wanted to attack Aristode in any
case, what better way than to upset the cosmological basis of his natural
philosophy ? This anti-Aristotelianism
A portolan of the North Atlantic coast. From Portolan Atlas (1572) by J.
Martinez. As the lettering shows, this was made to be folded, so that the map
of the British Isles must be read with South at the top. The compass roses and
compass lines are characteristic of all portolans
The Atlantic coast of the Iberian peninsula and the Straits of Gibraltar,
according to Ptolemy. From Cosmographia, printed at Ulm in 1486
The pea, from Fuch’s De Historia Stirpium (Basle, 1542). The vegetables
illustrated by Fuchs include the asparagus and several varieties of cabbaee.
The Portuguese
Man-of-War, from a watercolour by John White
Tycho Brahe and his
great mural quadrant. Tycho is taking observations, which an assistant writes
down. In the foreground and background, are scenes illustrating the normal work
of Uraniborg: Tycho's assistants are working with various instruments and operating
the printing press from which issued Astronomiae Instau- ratae Mechanica
(1598), the source of this illustration
Mathematical
instruments of the early 16th century (detail from Holbein’s Ambassadors). On
the table are a celestial globe, a shepherd's dial, a shadow scale, a
quadrant, a block dial and a torque- tum; below, a terrestrial globe, a rule, a
lute, dividers, music book and map cases
turn gfofoata fi
tJOtweroelciSat
An anatomy
demonstration as conceived in the fifteenth century, from Mondino’s Anathomia
(Venice, 1493). The professor comments on the text, while the demonstrator
displays the appropriate organs in the visceral cavity
Vesalius
demonstrating the muscles of the arm, from his De Humani Corporis Fabrica
(Basle, 1543)
One of the figures
showing the whole human skeleton from Vesalius’s De Humani Corporis Fabrica
An alchemical
laboratory, with seven furnaces. From Elias Ashmole’s
TheMrum
Chemicum Britannicum (1652), which reprints Norton's Ordinall of A Ichimy
A pump designed by
Jacques Besson, from his Theatres des Instrument (Lyon, 1579). The elaborate
machinery seems unnecessarily complicated for the simple domestic task shown,
and suggests the imaginative element in many Renaissance engineering books
A crane, from Ramelli’s Le Diverse et Artificiose Machine (Paris, 1588),
illustrating the Renaissance engineer’s love of complex gearing
and pulleys
The House of
Astronomy, from Kepler’s Rudolphine Tables (1627). Hipparchus holds his catalogue
of fixed stars, and Copernicus his De Revolutionibus (1543). Tycho points to a
diagram of his system of the world, while propped on the pillar is his
Astronomiae Jnstauratae Progymnasmata in which it was announced; Ptolemy is at
work on a mathematical problem with his Almagest beside him. On the pillars
hang an armillary sphere, a celestial globe, a rectangulum, two of Tycho’s
quadrants, an astrolabe and a lunar eclipse dial. On the base, Kepler is shown
seated somewhat gloomily at table; the centre panel contains a map of Tycho’s
island of Hveen; on the right is a printing shop. Above the structure are
figures symbolising the mathematical sciences, while over all an imperial eagle
(symbol of Tycho's and Kepler’s patron, Rudolph) scatters a meagre shower of
gold
Galileo, from a
portrait presented to the University of Oxford by his last pupil, Viviani
perhaps explains why
so many favourable references to Copernicus were made by men who were not
astronomers, or even scientists at all, as well as why it is often associated
with free thought or the wilder reaches of Lucretian Epicureanism. An
interesting and not very well known example of this occurred in the “ Academy ”
organised by and around various members of the French PUiade. There were
actually several academies, some informal, some formally associated with the
Court, which existed more or less continuously from before 1550 throughout the
century. (It is odd to think of Henri in in the dark days of the religious wars
listening to the poets of the Pliiade discuss the modes of Greek music.) These
groups, though organised by poets and originally literary in intent, expanded
from poetry to music, and thence, in the Pythagorean spirit, to mathematics and
natural philosophy. There were discussions of tie state of astronomy, and the
possible value of the new theories of Copernicus : their opponents cited these
discussions as evidence of the wild speculative freedom of thought in which the
PUiade indulged.
In 1557 there was
published a work with the title Dialogue of Guy de Brues, against the New
Academies; here de Brues, using as speakers actual members of the Pleiade,
attacked the novelty of their opinions, including those on science. According
to de Brues, Ronsard believed that astronomy must represent physical truth, and
hence he could not accept the mobility of the Earth, for which there was no
empirical evidence; whereas Baif regarded astronomy as merely a series of
hypotheses, and could therefore argue In Astronomy . . . there is no assurance
of principles.
. . . For example, as
to whether the Earth is immobile: for notwithstanding that Aristotle, Ptolemy
and several others have thought it to be so, Copernicus and his imitators *
* Evidently the reader of 1557 was supposed
to know that there were those who accepted Copemican doctrines.
have said that it
moves, because the heaven is infinite and therefore immobile: for (says he) if
the heaven is not infinite, and if there is nothing beyond the heaven, it would
follow that it is contained by nothing, which is impossible, since everything
which has being is in some place.
If, then, it is
infinite, it must be immobile, and the Earth mobile.?
One very interesting
aspect of this attack is the attribution to Copernicus of the belief (which in
fact he did not hold) that the universe is infinite ; clearly there was here a
confusion of radical ideas, for the Academicians were said to be Epicureans as
well as Copemicans, and it is easy for a non-scientist to confuse the Copemican
argument that the sphere of the fixed stars must be enormously large with the
Epicurean argument that the universe must be infinite.
Whether in fact
Ronsard and Balf argued about the merits of Copemicanism as well as about the
relative merits of Latin and vernacular poetry and of new and old poetic styles
is uncertain; but astronomical questions did interest other “ academicians.” In
the same year as the Dialogues of de Brues there was published The Universe
(VUnivers) of Pontus de Tyard (c. 1521-1605), a competent astronomer and a
churchman, destined to become Bishop of Chalons. The Universe consists of two
dialogues, the first of which deals with the state of philosophical opinion.
Here Tyard discusses the Copemican system in some detail: after explaining the
Greek sources of the theory, he gives a French translation of Copernicus’
description of the spheres, and uses Copernicus’ own arguments in favour of the
Earth’s mobility; in feet, the major arguments of the First Book of De revolu-
tionibus were treated. Nevertheless, in spite of his full exposition, Tyard
declined to commit himself; the most he would say was that this was an
interesting speculation, which was important mainly for astronomers. For, as he
said,
In truth his
demonstrations are ingenious, and his observations exact, and worthy of being
followed. Nevertheless, whether or not his disposition is true, the knowledge
of the being of the Earth, so far as we are able to know it, is not in any way
troubled thereby : and it does not prevent us from believing that it is a
heavy, cold and dry Element, the which from received, vulgar, and, as it were,
religious opinion we believe to be immobile.8 Though cautious, this
was a fair rendering of the position; Tyard was accustomed to free speculation,
but this did not mean that he wished to flout received religious opinion, nor
that he did not himself feel these opinions to have weight.
A physicist bent on
attacking Aristotle’s theory of motion could hardly fail to appreciate the
advantages inherent in pressing the attack on Aristotle’s cosmology as well.
This was the case with G. B. Benedetti (1530-90) whose Book of Diverse Speculations
on Mathematics and Physics was an anti-Aristotelian treatise. Benedetti was a
mathematical physicist, not an astronomer ; but he was warm in praise of “ the theory
of Aristarchus, explained in a divine manner by Copernicus, against which the
arguments of Aristotle are of no value,”9 mainly, one suspects,
because it was one more blow at Aristotle’s authority. In a similar vein,
Richard Bostocke, an obscure English writer, in The Difference betwene the
auncient Phisicke . . . and the latter Phisicke (1585) found it natural to
compare the physician Paracelsus and the astronomer Copernicus. Admittedly,
Paracelsus was not die first to proclaim his ideas; he was but the restorer of
ancient and true doctrines. As Bostocke put it, Paracelsus was no more the “
author and inventor ” of medical chemistry * then Nicholaus Copernicus, which
lived at die time of this Paracelsus, and restored to us die place of the stars
according to the truth, as experience and true observation doth teach, is
* Cf. below, p. ij<)£
to be called the
author and inventor of the motions of the stars, which long before were taught
by Ptolemeus Rules Astro- nomicall, and Tables for Motions and Places of the
stars.10 Whether Bostocke was a Copemican is not of much importance,
and he obviously had no exact notion of what it was Copernicus had done. But it
is significant that in England, as in Italy, if one wished to attack Aristotle
and defend scientific novelty in 1585, one appealed to Copernicus as an example
and as a weapon. By 1585 any scientific audience, mathematical, physical or
medical, could be expected to know something of the Copemican theory. And,
clearly, there was no bar to a free discussion of the theory if one felt
inclined.
Just as scientific
radicals hailed the Copemican theory as an important one because it displaced
Aristotelian authority, so, on the other hand, if one disliked scientific
novelty, one attacked the Copemican theory. In the sixteenth century, as in the
twentieth, non-scientists were apt to find scientific theories upsetting, and
scientists restless fellows always trying to disturb the established order of
things. The most violent attacks on Copernicus in tie sixteenth century come
from non-scientists, and they nearly always indicate that the basis of their
attack is the fear of novelty. Educated in one system, such critics hated the
idea of having to accept another or, even worse, having to balance the merits
of one system against another. This was especially true when the new system
involved a violation both of common sense, and of the apparent order and
harmony of the universe. For once astronomers came to accept the heliostatic
universe, the scientist had embarked upon that separation of the world of
science from the world of common sense experience which is the basis of so much
antagonism to science. There were now two worlds : die astronomer’s, in which
the moving Earth emulated the planets in circling the Sun ; and everyman’s,
patently geostatic and geocentric. The Copemican system was
bound to provoke
hostility from those uninterested in scientific analysis ; for it raised the
uncomfortable question of the reliability of familiar sense experience. It is
this which is reflected in the malaise expressed in popular criticism of
Copemicanism, especially among the poets, throughout the late sixteenth
century, a malaise which only vanished when, in the late seventeenth century,
science appeared to be restoring order and stability again.
By the last quarter
of the sixteenth century, the Copemican system, though it had gained few
adherents, was widely known ; after thirty yean of debate and discussion,
non-scientists were familiar with the fundamental problem. And they were coming
to resent the astronomers who seemed intent on disturbing their philosophical
peace, even as the physical peace of the heavens was being disturbed by strange
portents. Indeed, events in the heavens —a new star (nova) in Cassiopeia in
1572, and a long and apparently continuous series of comets between 1577 and
the early seventeenth century—-naturally called everyone’s attention to
astronomy, and to the heated discussions raging among astronomers who seemed
to be taking a perverse delight in defending absurdities. This point of view
was perfectly expressed by Guillaume du Bartas, whose influential work, The
Week, or Creation of the World (La Sepmaine, ou Creation du Monde, 1578), was
one of the most widely read of all didactic poems in the late sixteenth
century, and was partially translated into English many times. Although
familiar with ancient sources, and not above borrowing from Lucretius,
especially on literary points, du .Bartas was fiercely opposed to whatever
appeared to him to contradict his rather narrow view of orthodox cosmology:
even Aristotle was attacked for his views on the infinite duration of the
world. In his eyes, the age was wilfully determined to toy with novelties, and
scientists in particular would adopt even absurdities if they were but new.
After discussing God’s Creation
101
of the World, the
elements and the geography of the Earth, he came to describe the glorious
heavens, shining with lights, marred only by the peculiar views held by modem
scientists :
. . . some
brain-sicks live there now-a-days,
That lose themselves
still in contrary ways ;
Prepostrous wits that
cannot row at ease,
On the Smooth Channel
of our common Seas.
And such are those
(in my conceit at least)
Those Clerks that
think (think how absurd a jest)
That neither Heav’ns
nor Stars do turn at all,
Nor dance about this
great round Earthy Ball;
But th’Earth itself,
this Massy Globe of ours,
Turns round about
once every twice-twelve hours :
And we resemble
Land-bred Novices New brought aboard to venture on the Seas;
Who, at first
launching from the shore, suppose The ship stands still, and that the ground it
goes.
So, twinkling Tapers,
that Heav’n’s Arches fill,
Equally distant
should continue still.
So, never should an
arrow, shot upright,
In the same place
upon the shooter light;
But would do (rather)
as (at Sea) a stone Aboard a Ship upward uprightly thrown ;
Which not
within-board falls, but in the Flood A-stem the Ship, if so the Wind be good.
So should the Fowls
that take their nimble flight From Western Marches towards Morning’s light;
And Zephyrus, that in
the summer time Delights to visit Eurus in his clime ;
And bullets thundered
from the cannon’s throat (Whose roaring drowns die Heav’nly thunder’s note)
Should seem recoil: sithens the quick career,
That our round Earth
should daily gallop here,
Must needs exceed a
hundred fold (for swift)
Birds, Bullets, Winds
; their wings, their force, their drift.
Arm’d with these
Reasons, ’twere superfluous T’assail the Reasons of Copernicus ;
Who, to salve better
of the Stan th’appearance Unto the Earth a three-fold motion warrants:
Making the Sun the
Centre of this All,
Moon, Earth, and
Water, in one only Ball.
But sithence here,
nor time, nor place doth suit,
His Paradox at length
to prosecute ;
I will proceed,
grounding my next discourse On the Heav’ns motions, and their constant course.11
Du Bartas knew well
enough the simpler arguments against the Copemican system, and was certainly
not alone in regarding them as absolutely destructive of the foolish novelties
of die new astronomy. Nor was he alone in thinking that the best way to dispose
of this absurd scientific idea was by ridicule. A similar attack, in less
lively vein, is found in the Theatre of Universal Nature (1597) of Jean Bodin.
In this work the French political theorist and scourge of witches treated
encyclopedically the whole natural world. There he referred to Copernicus as
one who had “ renewed ” the opinions of “ Philolaus, Timaeus, Ecphantus,
Seleucus, Aristarchus of Samos, Archimedes and Eudoxus,” led thereto merely
because the human mind finds it so difficult to comprehend the incredible speed
of the heavenly spheres, and so arrogantly denies it. Bodin dearly knew less of
the Copemican system than did du Bartas ; writing nearly twenty yean later, it was
easier for him to speak from mere hearsay. He thought that Copernicus had
abolished epicycles, and did not know that Copernicus had used the argument
that rest is nobler than motion (so that the nobler heavens should rest, while
the baser Earth moves), for he recommends it as a good argument for Copemi-
cans to use! Bodin thought the whole theory absurd; and
103
anyway “ if the Earth
were to be moved, neither an arrow shot straight up, nor a stone dropped from
the top of a tower would fall perpendicularly, but either ahead or behind.”12
The attack is a poor
one ; but it illustrates both the discomfort raised in non-sdentific minds, and
the fact that at the end of the sixteenth century even an elementary discussion
of astronomy required a reference to Copemican ideas. Only a sceptic could
shrug off the whole problem of choice between Ptolemy and Copernicus, and
declare with Montaigne What shall we reape by it, but only that we need not
care, which of the two it be ? And who knoweth whether a hundred years hence a
third opinion will rise, which happily shall overthrow these two praecedent ?13
To most thoughtful men, it was little comfort to think that the unsettled state
of astronomy might continue unabated. Most preferred to look back to a time
(often before they were bom) when all had been certain, the Earth had stood
firm beneath men’s feet, and the heavens were truly as they appeared. The
position was immortalised by Donne; though his lines were written in 1611, when
the heavens had been further disturbed by the revelations of the telescope,
they are perfectly in keeping with the complaints of a preceding generation :
And New Philosophy
calls all in doubt,
The Element of fire
is quite put out;
The Sun is lost, and
tti Earth, and no man’s wit Can well direct him where to look for it.
And freely men
confess that this world’s spent,
When in the Planets,
and the Firmament They seek so many new; then see that this Is crumbled out
again to his Atomies.
’Tis all in pieces,
all coherence gone ;
All just supply, and
all Relation.1'*
If this was the way
in which die Copemican doctrine affected
104
poets, no wonder they
rejected it. Especially in an age when all was doubt, decay and dissension in
the religious and political spheres in any case. Why should they welcome chaos
among the stars as well ?
At the same time,
many natural philosophers, especially mathematicians, found the Copemican
system liberating to the spirit, and rather welcomed the freedom from the
bondage of a tiny world which it offered, than feared the loss of a cosy
certainty. Such bolder and more soaring spirits not only welcomed Copernicus ;
they tried to improve upon him. And as they did so, the Copemican theory was
stretched to breaking point. One of the first astronomers to enlarge the
Copemican universe was Thomas Digges (d. 1595), an Englishman bom about the
year in which De Revolutionibus was published. His father, Leonard Digges was,
though a gentleman, a practical surveyor and wrote much on applied mathematics,
including astrology ; having taken part in Wyatt’s Rebellion he had some
difficulty in printing his works and left many of them unpublished when he died
in 1558. He requested his friend, John Dee, to undertake the education of his
son, and the younger Digges, in a characteristically Renaissance phrase, called
Dee his second father in mathematics. Thomas Digges followed in the footsteps
of both his fathers, and was active in the ifiovement to teach practical
mathematics to the unlearned. He was also an observational astronomer of some
merit: along with other leading astronomers of the day (including Dee, but
Digges’s work was published earlier, and was better) he made a series of
observations on the strange new star (nova) which appeared in the familiar
constellation of Cassiopeia late in 157a. His observations were published the
next year with the punning tide Mathematical Wings or Scales {Aloe seu Scalae
Mathe- maticae, 1573); the “ scales ” were trigonometric theorems required for
the determination of stellar parallax, for Digges accepted die nova as a new
fixed star, and thought its appearance
gave an unparalleled
opportunity for testing the Copemican theory. (Digges mistakenly believed that
the decrease in magnitude of the star after its first sudden appearance would
be periodic, and hoped it might be parallactic in origin, the result of
apparent motion.)
Though he was unable
to use the star in this way, Digges had no doubt of the truth of the Copemican
system. So convinced was he, that he found it necessary to forsake filial
piety. In 1576, revising a twenty-year-old work of his father called A
Prognostication Everlasting (a perpetual almanac, especially concerned with
meteorological prediction) Digges could not bear to think that yet another work
based upon “ the doctrine of Ptolemy ” should be given the public, now that in
this our age one rare wit (seeing the continual errors that from time to time
more and more have been discovered, besides the infinite absurdities in their
Theorickes, which they have been forced to admit that would not confess any
mobility in the ball of the Earth) hath by long study, painful practice, and
rare invention delivered a new Theorick or model of the world.15
Since Copernicus had been led to his new model of the world by “ reason and
deep discourse of wit ” so it was fitting that “ such noble English minds (as
delight to reach above the baser sort of men) might not be altogether defrauded
of so noble a part of Philosophy.” He wanted as well to show that Copernicus
had intended not merely a mathematical hypothesis, but a true physical picture,
for Osiander’s Preface was being found out. So Digges appended to the
Prognostication Everlasting a short work with a long Elizabethan tide, A Perjit
Description of the Caelestiall Orbes according to the most auncient doctrine of
the Pythagoreans, lately revised by Copernicus and by Geometricall
Demonstrations Approved.
This “perfect”
description is mainly a translation of the
essential part of
Book I of De Revolutionibus (in fact what everyone has chosen to translate ever
since), but with a significant new concept of the translator’s added. For to
the Pythagorean doctrines expressed by Copernicus, Digges added a new dimension
to the celestial sphere. Because of the lack of stellar parallax, Copernicus
had postulated a very large celestial sphere, with huge stars. To Digges, this
was an indication of the wonder and majesty of God; but why should not God have
continued this sphere upwards until it met the firmament ? Physically, this
produced some interesting reflections. If, as Digges postulated, the sphere of
the fixed stars were “ garnished with lights innumerable and reaching up in
spherical Altitude without end,” then the stars must be at varying distances
from the Sun and the Earth. They were all necessarily very large, but very
probably their varying magnitude indicated merely differences in distance from
the Earth, not different intrinsic size. And there must be an infinite number
of stars, far more than we can see. For of which lights Celestial it is to be
thought that we only behold such as are in the inferior part of the same Orb
[the sphere of fixed stars], and as they are higher, so seem they of less and
lesser quantity, even till our sight being not able farther to reach or
conceive, the greatest part rest by reason of their wonderful distance
invisible unto us. And this may well be thought of us to be the glorious court
of the great God, whose unsearchable works invisible we may partly by these his
visible conjecture, to whose infinite power and majesty such an infinite place
surmounting all others both in quantity and quality only is convenient.
The universe of
Digges is no longer the closed world of Copernicus; the starry sphere is now
unbounded on its upper regions. But more than that; for with a mystical daring
characteristic of Dee’s teaching, Digges has carried the astronomical heavens
into contact with the theological Heavens. In breaking
the bounds of the
finite universe and wiping out the upper boundary of the celestial sphere,
Digges has conceived the abolition of die boundary between the starry heavens
and the firmament as well. If one could fly through the stars (which are only
like our Sun) he would arrive straight in Paradise. This is made even plainer
by the illustrative diagram which Digges included; it shows an “orb” of fixed
stars, but the stars are scattered outside the orb, right out to the edge of
the picture, in fact. Within die sphere Digges has written This orb of fixed
stars extendeth itself infinitely up in altitude spherically, and therefore
immoveable: the palace of felicity garnished with perpetual shining glorious
lights innumerable far excelling our sun both in quantity and quality ; the
very court of celestial angels devoid of grief and replenished with perfect
endless joy the habitacle for the elect.16
Mystical though this
may be, Digges was indubitably stretching the real physical world; the stars
have burst their bonds and are no longer hung on the vault of heaven, but are
scattered through immense space, and are themselves of an almost inconceivable
size.
This is the first in
a series of steps that fractured the tidy world of the ancients. At the time it
may not have seemed particularly novel; for many lumped all novelties under the
heading “ Epicurean,” and confused immensity with infinity; and Digges could
have been “reviving” the opinions of Demo- critos, Epicuros and Lucretius.
Certainly English readers now had the arguments of Copernicus readily available
in the vernacular, though one may wonder how many, consulting A Prognostication
Everlasting for a hint of next winter’s weather, paused to study the Copemican
appendix. Yet whether because of a confusion, or whether because of Digges, it
did become common in die later sixteenth century to assume that the Coper-
108
nican universe
demanded an indefinitely large, if not an infinite universe, and many believed
that infinity was demanded.
The next radical
revision of the Copemican universe was quite different in origin from that of
Digges. It was derived entirely from astronomical observation, not based upon
mystical speculation ; and it was die work of a non-Copemican. Though Tycho
Brahe never accepted the Copemican system, and though his own (Tychonic) system
was designed as a rival, yet a number of radical concepts developed by him were
generally adopted by Copernicans, and in the long run Tycho advanced the acceptance
of the Copemican universe far more than many convinced Copernicans.
Tycho Brahe
(1546-1601) began his interest in astronomy by observing the heavens, and it
was in observational astronomy that, ultimately, his greatest contributions
were to lie. It was a natural bent, for Tycho had no masters, and became an
astronomer against the wishes of his relatives. His father, according to
Tycho, did not even wish him to learn Latin (not a necessary accomplishment for
a Danish noble); but he was brought up by his uncle, who saw diat he had a
proper Latin education and sent him at the age of fifteen to the University of
Leipzig under the care of a tutor. Tycho seems not to have pursued the regular
University course, for he insisted in his autobiography (grandly entided On
that which We Have Hitherto Accomplished in Astronomy with God’s Help, and on
that which with His Gracious Aid has yet to be Completed in the Future11)
that he had taught himself astronomy and pursued it independendy and secredy.
His interest had begun with astrology and his first instruction came from
astrological ephemerides; this interest remained with him always, though it was
gradually overshadowed by a preoccupation with die observations themselves. His
first real observations were made in 1563, at the age of sixteen, with
improvised instruments; as he remembered bitterly
109
thirty-five years
later, his tutor refused him money to buy proper ones. These early observations
were on the conjunction of Saturn and Jupiter, and tht discrepancies between
his observations and the predictions in the Alphonsine and even the “ Copemican
” Tables, convinced him thus early that the chief requisite in astronomy was more,
and more accurate, observation. For this he needed and soon acquired, better,
professionally made instruments, as he went from Leipzig to the astronomical
centre of Augsburg. Here alchemy absorbed him as well as astrology— “
terrestrial astronomy ” he called it—and returning home, he very nearly became
totally absorbed in alchemical experiment. But the sudden appearance of the new
star in Cassiopeia in 157a determined his career once and for all. This new
phenomenon called forth all his resources as an observer, and the resultant
account (On the New Star, 1573) attracted the attention of the King of Denmark
who, anxious to keep such a promising scientist at home (national prestige
demanded intellectual as well as military success), gave Tycho the feudal
lordship of the island of Hveen. This magnificent generosity persuaded Tycho
not to emigrate to Basle, as he had planned; instead he spent twenty- one yean
on Hveen, which he made a centre for astronomical observation. Here he built
the fantastic castle of Uraniborg, with its observatories and laboratories;
here he constructed new instruments of enormous size (the only way to attain
accuracy before the invention of the telescope); and here he trained a whole
series of younger men, who came begging to work with the greatest observational
astronomer since Hipparchos.
Like Hipparchos,
Tycho felt that the appearance of a new star demanded the drawing up of a new
star catalogue, a project to which he devoted much energy in the next twenty
years. But he was also profoundly interested in the nova for its own sake. Here
was an amazing phenomenon : a new star in a well-known constellation, and when
it was first observed as bright as Jupiter.
no
Tycho, Digges,
Maestlin, Dee and many more studied it in wonder and perplexity. Tycho, Digges
and Maestlin (still an amateur astronomer) all tried to measure the parallax of
the new star ; not to test the Copemican theory, but because the new star was
at first thought to lie in the sublunar sphere. It must naturally be a meteorological
phenomenon, like rainbows, meteors and comets, for change belonged to the
terrestrial regions, and the perfect heavens of Aristotelian cosmology were
perfect because eternal and immutable. Anything that was located below the Moon
must reveal its relative nearness by its apparent shifts of position in
relation to the backdrop of the stars.
But the new star
obstinately refused to yield any parallax to the most careful and attentive
study. Tycho, Digges and Maestlin all concluded that it lay, consequently, in
the sphere of the fixed stars. Thereby all were committed to admitting that the
heavens did change, and were therefore not perfect. Not all astronomers could
face this ; indeed not all astronomers agreed with the observations. Some
insisted that the nova showed a parallax ; some, like Dee, ingeniously argued
that it was moving in a straight line away from the Earth, which accounted for
the fact that it grew progressively dimmer; others, including Digges, related
it to comets. Tycho was the boldest in accepting the inevitable conclusions,
perhaps because he was the most firmly convinced of the reliability of his
observations. He was at a loss to explain the new star’s variation in
brightness and colour (like all novae, it changed from white to reddish-yellow
to red); but he was absolutely convinced that it lay in “ the aetherial orbs.”
What its astrological meaning might be he discussed at great length, for so
rare an event naturally had a strange and wonderful significance. Its
astronomical significance was, however, equally great, and determined him to
settle quietly where he could “ lay the foundation of the revival of Astronomy
”18 by long and careful observation.
hi
At Uraniborg Tycho
observed, year after year, the location of the fixed stars, and the changing
positions of the planets, the Sun and the Moon, developing new and better
instruments and techniques until he had attained an accuracy far beyond that of
any previous astronomer. Tycho’s observations came to be pretty consistently
accurate to about four minutes of arc, the limit of naked eye accuracy.* Tycho
was well aware of the superiority of his methods, and kept himself to a high
standard. As he wrote after he had left Uraniborg, he judged his observations
as
not of equal accuracy
and importance. For those that I made in Leipzig in my youth and up to my 21st
year, I usually call childish and of doubtful value. Those that I took later
until my 28th year [i.e., until 1574] I call juvenile and fairly serviceable.
The third group, however, which I made at Uraniborg during approximately the
last 21 years with the greatest care and with very accurate instruments at a
more mature age, until I was dSity years of age, those I call the observations
of my manhood, completely valid and absolutely certain, and this is my opinion
of them.19 Ironically, however, these very accurate observations
served no purpose in Tycho’s own theoretical work. Though he declared that “ it
is particularly these later observations that I build upon when I strive by
energetic labours to lay die foundations of and develop a renewed Astronomy,”
his own use of them was negligible. He did indeed develop a new astronomy,
based upon observations, but it was all based upon observations of 1572 and
1577 5 later observations on comets merely confirmed what he already knew, and
his planetary tables were not needed in the only sketch he made of his system.
Yet die great mass of accumulated and accurate data was not wasted : for
Kepler was to use
* The naked eye cannot resolve points with
an angular separation of less than approximately two minutes of arc.
112
this data in the
laborious calculations on which he based an astronomical theory remote from
Tycho’s, though in many ways derived from it.
The observations on
the great comet of 1577 were the real basis for the development of the Tychonic
system; the only description of its details that he ever made is inserted into
an account of cometary orbits. As before, in 1572, Tycho observed the new
phenomenon with the utmost care. Once again he tried to measure its parallax,
only to find that it was too small to be consonant with a position in the
atmosphere. Comets must, like the new star, he in the aetherial regions, now
shown to be capable of yet another change. This was confirmed when other comets
appeared; as Tycho put it, “ all comets observed by me moved in the aetherial
regions of the world and never in the air below the moon, as Aristotle and his
followers tried without reason to make us believe for so many centunes”.20
The observations on comets were to provoke Tycho to even greater disturbances
of the Aristotelian heavens. If the geocentric universe were filled with
crystalline spheres, where were the comets to fit in? Especially since Tycho
believed that their centre of motion was the Sun. Their special connection with
the Sun had already been noted : for example the applied mathematician Peter
Apian * (1495-1552), observing a series of comets in the 1530’s, had been
struck with the fact that the tails point away from the Sun. Yet in die
Ptolemaic system the area above and below die Sun is completely filled by die
spheres of the planets, and even the introduction of a new sphere would not
help.
Tycho, noting that
however he arranged die spheres of the planets, the paths of the comets would
intersect them, decided
* His original name was Bienewitz; adoption
of the name Apian (bee) is ■> wrampU of the Renaissance tendency to use
Latin surnames. Apian
was primarily a
geographer j he showed no interest in astronomical theory, and in any case his
major work on cosmography was published in 1539.
113
that since comets
were indubitably located above the Moon, there could be no crystalline spheres
supporting and moving the planets. This revolutionary decision he made with
complete equanimity. As he wrote in 1588 in a great survey of his study of the
comet of 1577 (its tide, On the Most Recent Phenomena of the Aetherial World is
itself a challenge to orthodoxy and a manifesto of the new astronomy:
There are not really
any Orbs [spheres] in the Heaven . . . those which Authors have invented to
save the appearances exist only in imagination, in order that the motions of
the planets in their courses may be understood by the mind, and may be (after a
geometrical interpretation) resolved by arithmetic into numbers. Thus it seems
futile to undertake this labour of trying to discover a real orb, to which the
Comet may be attached, so that they would revolve together. Those modem
philosophers agree with the almost universal belief of antiquity who hold it as
certain and irrefutable that the heavens are divided into various orbs of hard
and impervious matter, to some of which stars are attached so that they
revolve with them. But even if there were no other evidence, the comets
themselves would most lucidly convince us that this opinion does not correspond
with the truth. For comets have already many times been discerned, as the
result of most certain observations and demonstrations, to complete their
course in the highest Aether, and they cannot by any means be proved to be
drawn around by any orb.*1 So blandly to deny the reality of the
crystalline spheres—to change the meaning of the word “ orb ” from “ sphere ”
to “ circular path” or “ orbit ”—was a most revolutionary measure, as revolutionary
in its own way as die displacement of the Earth from the centre of the
universe. Since the fourth century B.C., astronomers had unhesitatingly
accepted die reality of solid spheres, in which the planets were firmly
embedded. What else kept the planets
fixed in the heavens,
and how else could one give physical reality to a mathematical representation ?
With the abandonment of the crystalline spheres came the imperative need to
search for something else which kept the planets in their paths; but not,
apparently for Tycho, who never mentions the problem.
Now that the solid
spheres were gone, all that was necessary was to rearrange the Ptolemaic
spheres to make room for the comets to move around the Sun. As Tycho put it in
the omate style he affected,
Because the region of
the Celestial World is of so great and such incredible magnitude as aforesaid,
and since in what has gone before it was at least generally demonstrated that
this comet continued within the limits of the space of the Aether, it seems
that the complete explanation of the whole matter is not given unless we are
also informed within narrower limits in what part of the widest Aether, and
next to which orbs of the Planets [the comet] traces its path, and by what
course it accomplishes this.22 The Ptolemaic system as it stood was
impossible : cumbersome, loaded with equants and superfluous epicycles, and too
full to leave room for the comets. “ That newly introduced innovation of die
great Copernicus ” was elegandy and beautifully mathematical, but presented even
greater difficulties. For, as Tycho put it,
the body of the
Earth, large, sluggish and inapt for motion, is not to be disturbed by movement
(especially three movements), any more than the Aetherial Lights [stars] are
to be shifted, so that such ideas are opposed both to physical principles and
to the authority of Holy Writ which many times confirms the stability of the
Earth (as we shall discuss more fully elsewhere).
As other arguments
against the motion of the Earth (apart from its unfitness for motion and the
enormous space between the orb
of Saturn and the
fixed stars, evident from the absence of parallax) Tycho instances the great
size of the stars, necessitated by their apparent diameters * and their
presumed distance in the Coper- nican system ; and his belief that a stone
dropped from a tower would never hit the ground at the foot of the tower, if
the Earth were moving. Both these were convincing arguments, though both were
based on erroneous physics. But the erroneousness of such physics was first
clearly demonstrated only by Galileo.
Faced with these
problems, said Tycho,
I began to ponder
more deeply within myself, whether by any reasoning it was possible to discover
an Hypothesis, which in every respect would agree with both Mathematics and Physics,
and avoid theological censure, and at the same time wholly accord with the
celestial appearances. And at length almost against hope there occurred to me
that arrangement of the celestial revolutions by which their order becomes
most conveniently disposed, so that none of these incongruities can arise.
What Tycho wanted was
a system with die advantages of the Copemican and without the disadvantages of
a stationary Earth; and the elimination of Ptolemaic complications. Like
Copernicus, Tycho turned to the ancients for a suggestion; of a different
temper and generation from Copernicus, he never mentioned that his was
essentially the system of Heraclides of Pontus (fl. fourth century b.c.). This
system is really very simple. The Earth remains at rest, at the centre of the
universe, and every twenty- four hours there turns around it “ the most remote
Eighth sphere, containing within itself all others ” (the only solid sphere
which Tycho retained) to account for the daily rising and setting of the stars.
The Sun revolves annually about the Earth, while the
* Before the use of the telescope, it was
thought that stars must have discs like planets, and exaggerated ideas existed
about the size of their apparent diameters.
planets revolve about
the Sun, and can only be said to revolve about the Earth because they accompany
the Sun. As Tycho declared, “ I shall assert that the other circles guide the
five Planets about the Sun itself, as their Leader and King and that in their
courses they always observe him as their centre of revolution.” This system,
as Tycho pointed out with pride, explained as well as the Copemican theory why
Venus and Mercury were never far from the Sun; why the Planets appeared to show
retrograde motions; why they appeared to vary in brightness ; arid why the
motion of the Sun was always mixed with that of the planets. At the same time
it abolished any need for equants ; Tycho thought it could eliminate all, or
almost all, of the epicycles and reduce the number of eccentrics, but in feet
he never worked out the mathematical representation of the system.
One new complication
only was introduced, readily apparent from the diagram : the orbit of Mars
about the Sun is here seen to cross the Sun’s orbit about the Earth. If the
orbs are solid spheres, this is of course impossible. But Tycho had rejected
solid spheres; he knew that the machine of Heaven is not a hard and impervious
body frill of various real spheres, as up to now has been believed by most
people. It will be proved that it extends everywhere, most fluid and simple,
and nowhere presents obstacles as was formerly held, the circuits of the
Planets being wholly free and without the labour and whirling round of any real
spheres at all, being divinely governed under a given law.
The fact that there
were apparent intersections of the orbits (really the result of trying to
represent three dimensions in two) was irrelevant. In fact this new arrangement
had the advantage that it explained why Mars in opposition was at its
brightest; for it was then nearer to the Earth than to the Sun.
As all this was in
the nature of a digression in his book on
117
comets, Tycho did not
explore the workings of his “ machine of nature ” further, but went on to deal
with cometary motion. In the newly arranged universe, there was now room for a
comet to circle the Sun in the space between the orbits of Venus and Mars ; *
it could behave like “ an adventitious and extraordinary planet ” and display
a path not totally dissimilar to that of the planets. True, it moved at a
variable velocity, and its path was curious, but this was to be expected from
the nature of comets:
For it is probable
that Comets, just as they do not have bodies as perfect and perfectly made for
perpetual duration as do the other stars which are as old as the beginning of
the World, so also they do not observe so absolute and constant a course of
equality in their revolutions—it is as though they mimic to a certain extent
the uniform regularity of die Planets, but do not follow it altogether. This
will be clearly shown by Comets of subsequent years, which will no less
certainly be located in the Aetherial region of the world. Therefore either the
revolution of this our Comet about the Sun will not be at all points exquisitely
circular, but somewhat oblong, in the manner of the figure commonly called
ovoid ; or else it proceeds in a perfectly circular course, but with a motion
slower at the beginning, and then gradually augmented.
This is the first
serious suggestion that a heavenly body might- follow a path that was neither
circular, nor compounded of circles (though Tycho clearly did not think of
comets as having a closed path). It is significant that Kepler, when he began
to look for a non-circular path for Mars turned to the figure suggested by
Tycho for comets, though he introduced it into the Copemican, not the Tychonic
world.
* The path of the comet will clearly
intersect the paths of various planets, but this (as in the case of Mars) was
no longer a troublesome problem.
118
The advantages of the
Tychonic system were enormous, for it had very nearly all those of the
Copemican system (to which it is mathematically equivalent) without the
awkwardness of a moving Earth. It did in fact become a popular and fairly long-
lived rival to the Copemican system, and seventeenth-century astronomers who
were not Copemicans more often accepted the Tychonic than the Ptolemaic
universe (though some of them compromised and introduced a diurnal rotation of
the Earth).* If one accepted Tycho’s observational evidence for the nonexistence
of crystalline spheres, his system was highly acceptable. Many Copemicans
followed him in rejecting spheres, and thereby began a fundamental change in
the Copemican universe ; especially as such men usually eliminated the sphere
of the fixed stars as well, which was not needed if the stars were stationary.
Such a universe, a combination of the ideas of two totally different systems,
was destructive of Aristotelian cosmology in a way that might have alarmed
Copernicus. It is not surprising that after Tycho’s work it is often difficult
to tell whether a naan is a Copemican or not, and Copemicanism itself comes to
include many different concepts.
If one followed
Tycho, and dispensed with crystalline spheres, it did logically become necessary
to consider what kept the planets in their orbits. No really satisfactory
solution was to be found until much later; earlier attempts were crude, and
often dismayingly mystical. The best-known consideration was
* This modification was first published by
an obscure astronomer, Nicolas Reymers, in 1588 in Fundamentum Astronomicum.
Tycho then began a long and virulent public controversy with Reymers, in which
each accused the other of plagiarism. Tycho claimed to have invented his system
in 1583. and to have described it to Reymers when Reymers visited Uraniborg.
This Reymers stoutly denied. Reymers’ works are very rare, and there are few
contemporary references to him; whatever the merits of the case, it was
certainly from Tycho that contemporaries learned of the system.
undertaken by
Kepler,* who drew much inspiration from the English scientist, William Gilbert
(i540-1603). Like Digges—possibly influenced by the atmosphere created by
Dee—Gilbert combined rational science and mysticism in a peculiar blend, in
which neither interfered with the other. Gilbert was a physician, not an
astronomer, a university graduate who was highly regarded as a medical
practitioner; he also associated with London’s practical mathematicians,
especially with the navigational instrument makers. Outwardly, his great work
On the Magnet (De Magnete, 1600) was intended as an aid to navigation, an
impression strengthened by the feet that it carried a preface by Edward Wright
(1558-1615), the foremost English applied mathematician of the day. In feet,
about a third of the work is devoted to navigational problems ; this is the
least valuable part, for its premises proved erroneous, and its methods
impracticable. The earlier parts of the book remain the most valuable, because
they contain the bulk of the experimental work. The last part is different
again, for it is an astronomical section, devoted to offering evidence for the
diurnal rotation of the Earth.
Gilbert believed that
he had strong experimental evidence for the Earth’s diurnal rotation, and this
evidence was magnetic in character. He had already established that the Earth
was a great magnet; and he had found that a spherical loadstone would rotate
when its pole was displaced from the North, showing that a portion of the Earth
naturally displayed circular motion. Therefore, he argued, it is reasonable to
suppose that the whole Earth rotates as well. True, Aristotle had said that
only the heavens were animate (that is, self-moved), while the terrestrial
globe is inanimate and therefore stationary, but Aristotle was wrong. The Earth
no less than the planets is animate, because it possesses a magnetic virtue,
which is equivalent to a moving impulse. Having established that it is the
nature of the Earth to * See below, ch. x.
move, Gilbert argued
that it is impossible that the heavens should do so, for “who... has ever made
out that the stars which we call fixed are in one and the same sphere, or has
established by reasoning that there are any real and, as it were, adamantine
sphaeres ?” 23 This combination of Digges and Tycho made Gilbert
reject the idea of a Primum Mobile as well. This being so, it was more
reasonable to suppose that the Earth (which as a sphere has the same aptitude
for moving as the planets) rotates diumally, than that the heavens do so.
This fact established
to his own satisfaction, Gilbert did not go on to try to establish the annual
revolution of the Earth, which indeed he appeared to reject, remarking that “
it by no means follows that a double motion must be assigned to the Earth ”.24
He did, however, go beyond Tycho in considering the question of what kept the
planets in their orbits. In the posthumously published New Philosophy of our
Sublunary World (1651), he extended die magnetic force of the Earth as far as
the Moon, and argued that it was this magnetic force which kept the Moon
circling the Earth, and which, as well, accounted for the Moon’s influence upon
the tides.
Gilbert thus occupies
a peculiar place in astronomical thought: not an astronomer, he developed
several new astronomical ideas ; not a true Copemican, he was warm in praise of
what Copernicus had done. For Gilbert rated Copernicus as “ the Restorer of
Astronomy ” not only for his bold ideas, but for his mathematical penetration.*5
Yet the Platonic harmonies that appealed to Copernicus have no interest for
Gilbert; he is rather concerned with an animate mysticism which endows the
Earth with a living force, and accounts for physical rotation, and for eternal
perfection:
The human soul uses reason,
sees many tilings, inquires about many more; but even the best instructed
receives by his eternal senses (as through a lattice) light and die beginnings
121
of knowledge. Hence
come so many errors and follies, by which our judgments and the actions of our
lives are perverted ; so that few or none order their actions rightly and
justly. But the magnetick force of the earth and the formate life or living
form of the globes, without perception, without error, without injury from ills
and diseases, so present with us, has an implanted activity, vigorous through
the whole material mass, fixed, constant, directive, executive, governing,
consentient; by which the generation and death of all things are carried on
upon the surface. For, without that motion, by which the daily revolution is
performed, all earthly things around us would ever remain savage and neglected.26
This mystic strain
among English astronomers—astrological with Dee, theological with Digges,
magnetical with. Gilbert— perhaps explains in part why the mystic philosopher
Giordano Bruno found in London a stimulating atmosphere which encouraged him
to produce his most important philosophical work. There is no evidence that he
met any of the English scientists ; yet he may have heard of the Copemicanism
of Digges and Dee, which his own even more mystical Copemicanism resembles. It
was a long series of events which brought Bruno, bom about 1548 in Nola, near
Naples, to London for a few brief years in the 1580’s : early education at the
University of Naples ; entrance into a Dominican monastery; a stormy and
perverse eleven years as a monk who insisted on reading Erasmus ; finally
flight from the monastery and a restless wandering about European capitals. He
was always welcome wherever he went, for he had developed a system of
mnemonics, probably based on such mediaeval systems as die so-called “ art ” of
Raymond Lull, that was in much demand; * but his contentious and restless personality
was such that he always moved on in search of other and more congenial circles.
It was during his English visit that
* Memory, like knowledge, was held to be
power.
122
he first wrote on
cosmological problems. The basis of his belief was the Epicurean theory, which
he derived from Lucretius, of an infinite universe with a plurality of
(inhabited) worlds. Bruno’s was not merely an indefinitely large universe, like
that of Nicholas of Cusa (whose ideas did influence him) but a truly infinite
one ; indeed Bruno was probably the first philosopher who really comprehended the
possibilities inherent in the idea of infinity. With Lucretius, Bruno blended
the Platonic concept of the world-soul, and, from Nicholas of Cusa, a
pantheistic concept of the relation of God and the universe.
Among astronomers,
Bruno drew particularly on Copernicus and Tycho. The latter gave him arguments
for the idea that all heavenly bodies are in motion, in confirmation of the
doctrine of Nicholas of Cusa ; the former for an extension of the idea that
there is no centre of the universe. The fact that the Coper- nican universe was
very large helped him with physical arguments ; and the Copemican development
of the concept of a solar system seemed to confirm the Epicurean notion of a
plurality of worlds. (Bruno distinguished between “ world ” and “ universe ”;
the former means the solar system and the fixed stars, which is one system
among many like it; the universe is the totality of these worlds.) These worlds
were like our own, each with its Sun, planets, inhabited Earth, and so on ; our
own Earth could be anywhere in the universe, but certainly not at the centre.
This was not a scientific system ; as Bruno said in the dialogue On the
Infinite Universe and Worlds, “ No corporeal sense can perceive the infinite”.27
He had no interest in a scientific system ; he was a mystic prepared to push
mysticism to its utmost power. He had nothing but scorn for those who could not
accept his daring flights of intellectual fancy. For him, even more than for
Nicholas of Cusa, God was everywhere, the infinity of the universe blended with
the infinity of God, and there was one mystic whole. As he wrote defiantly, “It
is
123
Unity which doth
enchant me. By her power I am free though thrall, happy in sorrow, rich in
poverty, and quick even in death.” 28 In the mystic
contemplation of the One lay the true liberation of the mind and soul.
This has little
enough to do with astronomy. Yet the mystic vision of the potentialities of
infinity attracted such minds as Gilbert and Kepler. The use of natural science
in philosophy was familiar to all, for it was a large part of the force of
Aristotle’s philosophy that he covered all aspects, from natural philosophy to
metaphysics. No wonder that, faced with the manifest heterodoxy of Bruno’s
philosophy, there was a tendency to feel that the associated astronomy was
equally heterodox.
Until the end of the
sixteenth century, the Catholic Church had generally ignored the heretical
implications of Copemicanism, and been satisfied to treat it as a mere
mathematical hypothesis, useful for calculation, as in the case of the reform
of the calendar so successfully carried through in 1582. There was good
tradition for this: Oresme in the fourteenth century and Nicholas of Cusa in
the fifteenth had both discussed arguments in favour of a moving Earth, and
both had shown that the apparent contradictions of Scripture could be dealt
with harmlessly.* The fundamentalist position was not a Catholic one, and
there was good authority for treating Scripture allegorically: had not St. Augustine
declared that it was only when he learned that the Old Testament could be so
treated that he had been able to accept the tenets of Christianity ? In 1576 a
Spanish theologian Diego de Zuniga (Didacus 4 S tunica) had treated this
problem admirably : in a Commentary on Job (published in 1584) he used the text
“ who shaketh the earth out of her place, and the pillars thereof tremble,”
(Job, ix : 6) to show that though the immobility of the Earth was commonly
spoken of in Scripture, yet there was, as here,
* In fact, Oresme believed that the Earth
stood still, and therefore the relevant Scriptural passages were astronomically
valid.
124
also authority for
its mobility. And it was a well-established scholastic tradition that when
Scriptural passages appeared to contradict each other, reason might be applied
to the resolution. Hence, the author concluded that the Pythagorean doctrine
was not contrary to Scripture—a conclusion not specifically refuted by the
Church until 1616.
Various new factors
influenced the attitude of the Church after 1600, among which must be included
Bruno’s adoption of certain Copemican doctrines ; this certainly suggested,
what had not been apparent before, the philosophical dangers inherent in the
Pythagorean hypothesis. It was not for his espousal of Copemicanism that Bruno,
rashly returning to Italy in 1591, was imprisoned first by the Venetian and
then by die Roman Inquisition. There were plenty of charges against him : he
was an apostate monk; he had espoused atheistic Epicurean doctrines ; he
appeared to have taken an Arian stand on the nature of the Trinity ; he was a
magician of sorts. When pressed to recant he was obdurate, insisting that there
was nothing to recant, and trying instead to show his judges the beauties of
his mystic pantheism. The only strange element in the whole case was the
reluctance of the Inquisition to judge that he was “ an impenitent and
pertinacious heretic ”; it took eight years before he was finally condemned and
burned. In all the indictment there is no mention of Copemicanism, nor did it
occur to anyone that there should be. Once Bruno was dead, however, it was
difficult to forget that this astronomical hypothesis in particular could be
used for dangerous purposes if its physical truth were upheld. And astronomers
were soon to insist on its physical validity more strongly, and more publicly.
Protestants,
especially Lutherans, had been quicker to condemn Copemicanism; they did not
see it as an astronomical hypothesis, in spite of Osianders preface, but as a
system fatal to the truth of the Bible. This was not only because of their
insistence
on the literal truth
of Scripture, but, ironically, because they were well informed. Luther’s
disciple, Melanchthon, was connected with the University of Wittenberg, and
must have heard of the new theory from Rheticus, even before Rheticus went to
Frauenburg. At least Luther knew enough of the theory in 1539 to denounce it;
in one of his “ Table Talks ” he is said to have castigated
the new astronomer
who wants to prove that the Earth goes round, and not the heavens, the Sun and
the Moon ; just as if someone sitting in a moving waggon or ship were to
suppose that he was at rest, and that the Earth and the trees were moving past
him- But that is the way nowadays ; whoever wants to be clever must needs
produce something of his own, which is bound to be the best since he has
produced it! The fool will turn the whole science of astronomy upside down.
But, as Holy Writ declares, it was the Sun and not the Earth which Joshua
commanded to stand still.2*
Melanchthon, writing
after the publication ofDe Revolutionibus, in his own Elements of Physics
(1549), was more detailed in his rebuttal, but the essence of his argument was
the same. Only fools, seized with a love of novelty, try to insist that the
Earth moves ; “ it is a want of honesty and decency to assert such notions
publicly, and the example is pernicious. It is the part of a good mind to
accept the truth as revealed by God and to acquiesce in it.”30
Calvin never even mentioned Copernicus ; but his belief in the literal truth of
Scripture was no less absolute.31 With all this it is no wonder that
some, like Tycho, found the motion of die Earth too hostile to religious faith
for serious contemplation.
Yet though the gradual
recognition by the various Christian sects of the dangers inherent for dogma in
the new astronomy seemed to make inevitable a conflict between science and
religion, the issue was not often faced publicly. Many scientists accepted
the Copemican system
privately, and discussed it with friends, while avoiding public commitment.
Others salved their consciences by a partial acceptance. And many more boldly
asserted that the Churches were in error, and there was no need to insist that
Scripture and astronomy conflict. Paradoxically, the Protestant restriction
was strongest in the early years, when there was least evidence for the truth
of the Copemican system ; whereas the Catholic attack was fiercest when, for
the first time, it began to appear that there might be physical, as well as
mathematical and aesthetic grounds for adopting the heliostatic system.
"Whatever the
reservations of individual scientists, Copemicanism, modified during the
course of sixty years, was in far more flourishing state after 1600 than it was
in the i54o’s. This is the more strange, since throughout the later years of
the sixteenth century there had been no great new discoveries to render the
Copemican system one bit more probable than it had been in 1543. Indeed, its
later modifications had been of a nature to repel rather than attract rational
minds—the extension of the sphere of fixed stars towards infinity, the
abolition of crystalline spheres, the introduction of mysterious forces to
account for the motion of planets—all these tended to suggest that Copemicanism
belonged to the mystics. Tycho, the greatest practical astronomer of the age,
was an anti-Copemican: his work was of no immediate benefit to Copemicanism,
and the theoretical discoveries of Kepler were required to pull together all
the significant advances in astronomy of the sixteenth century into a form
which supported the Copemican system. But nevertheless there were more
Copernicans among serious astronomers than is usually indicated ; although the
later sixteenth century was not an age readily receptive of new ideas. And in
the sixty years since the publication of De Revolutionists, Copemicanism had
been so thoroughly debated and so widely discussed that even laymen knew the
arguments for and against it, and a casual reference was intelligible
to an ordinary
literate audience. These years of discussion rendered the system familiar, and
reduced its novelty ; this in turn helped to make it more acceptable when new
arguments in its favour were forthcoming. And they served as well to nullify
the force of anti-Copemican arguments, which were stultified by repetition. In
spite of the insistence by anti-Copemicans that nobody but a fool could fail to
perceive the incontrovertible force of their arguments, such fools continued to
become astronomers, and to win converts. The debate had been long and public
yet conducted with remarkable mildness in a violent age ; it was not to end
without passion and drama.
Anatomical study has
one application for the man of science who loves knowledge for its own sake,
another for him who values it only to demonstrate that Nature does nothing in
vain, a third for one who provides himself from anatomy with data for
investigating a function, physical or mental, and yet another for the
practitioner who has to remove splinters and missiles efficiently, to excise
parts properly, or to treat ulcers, fistulae and abscesses.1
In 1542 Andreas
Vesalius (1514-64) wrote with characteristic Renaissance smugness that “ those
who are now dedicated to the ancient study of medicine, almost restored to its
pristine splendour in many schools, are beginning to learn to their
satisfaction how little and how feebly men have laboured in the field of
Anatomy from the time of Galen to the present day.”2 It was his own
belief that his great treatise On the Fabric of the Human Body (1543) was the
first real step forward from Galen, no small boast in view of the high esteem
in which Vesalius, like his contemporaries, held the great Greek physician of
the second century a.d. Modem
criticism has tended to agree with Vesalius in thinking both that a revival of
anatomy was a necessary preliminary to the improvement of medicine, and that
the work of Vesalius himself is a landmark in that revival The hazards of a
date—1543—have brought together two diverse figures, Vesalius and Copernicus,
who shared a respect for the ancients and a
desire to raise modem
science at least to the level of ancient science.
Progress in anatomy
before the sixteenth century is as mysteriously slow as its development after
1500 is stardingly rapid. One cannot say that it was because anatomy was a
forbidden subject, for the old myth that human dissection was prohibited
throughout the Middle Ages has long since been dispelled. It is true that
Islamic writers laid little stress on anatomy, in spite of their knowledge of
the magnificent work of Galen in this field ; they emphasised rather the
identification of disease and the compounding of drugs, and this bent was
transmitted to Western Europe through the writings of Avicenna (979-1037). The
Moslem lack of interest in anatomy seems to have stemmed from religious
prohibition ; but there was no such prohibition by the Church in Christian
Europe.* Indeed, it appears that distaste for opening the human body after
death was a relatively late development (perhaps even appearing after the
revival of anatomy), for a fifteenth-century Florentine physician, Antonio
Benivieni, habitually performed post-mortem examinations and commented with
surprise when, after he had treated an obscure but interesting incurable
disease, the man’s “ relations refused through some superstition or other ” to
allow him to open the body and investigate the cause of death.3
Post-mortems were frequently performed in the fourteenth century, bodi
privately and publicly, and members of the university faculties were commonly
nllrd in as consultants in legal cases when it was desirable to asr^n-ain
* What the Church did forbid was the
boiling up of bodies to produce skeletons. The edict (1300) was the result of
what threatened to become an over-popular practice because of the desire of
rich Crusaders and pilgrim* to hare their bones laid to rest at home. The edict
was responsible for the many subterfuges such as robbing gallows and charnel
houses to which later anatomists resorted in order to acquire bones when bodies
were readily available for dissection.
if death were due to
natural or unnatural causes. (One wonders how they were able to decide.)
Nevertheless, anatomy
as such was little practised. One obvious reason was the lack of a guide.
Surprisingly, Galen’s anatomical treatises escaped the first great wave of
translation in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, when so much of his purely
medical work was translated. All that was available of his brilliant anatomical
investigations was a short treatise called De Juvamentis Membromm (On the
Function sof the Members), a truncated version of his physiological treatise On
the Use of the Parts, It was a highly abbreviated paraphrase of little more
than half of the original, dealing cursorily with the function of the limbs and
digestive organs, and retaining Arabic nomenclature. This could suggest a
reason for studying the body, and provide a list of the principal organs, but
it was of little help in directing men to a clear picture of the correct
approach to anatomy. There was thus little to stimulate investigation, and even
less to help if investigation was attempted. In fact, medical men at first
found they had quite enough to do in mastering the immense mass of material
presented to them in books. Besides, they not unnaturally tended to accept the
Moslem view, that medicine should deal with disease and its causes rather than
try to fathom the structure of man. Even the surgeon had little need to know
anything more than surface anatomy and the articulation of the limbs, the
latter useful in case of dislocations.
The first step
towards a rediscovery of human anatomy was a revival of interest: the first
indication that this had taken place is the appearance of an Anatomy by Mondino
de’ Luzzi, written in 1316. Mondino (c. 1275-1326), a professor at Bologna, was
perhaps influenced by the animal dissection undertaken at Salerno in the
previous century, perhaps by the growing demands of the surgeons, certainly by
his reading of Galen’s De Juvamentis mentioned in the proemium. Judging by the
use which Mondino
made of De
Juvamentis, it was only imperfectly Latinised, for Mondino’s terms are nearly
all Arabic in origin : he was, in fact, one of those Arabicised physicians whom
the poet Petrarch was to attack so vehemently in the next generation. Mondino’s
approach was simple: without preamble, he plunged into a brief and crude
description of the parts of the body, beginning with those of the abdominal
cavity and proceeding via the thorax to the head and extremities. This order
became traditional in anatomical study, partly from the example of Mondino,
partly from the need to examine first the parts most subject to decay.
Mondino’s intention does not seem to have been to write a detailed textbook,
but rather to provide a rough outline of procedure for dissectors; here there
are no precise directions to follow in dissecting, and no attempt at exact
nomenclature. Mondino has clearly dissected a body in the way he describes, but
he could not, even if he had wished to do so, delineate the position and nature
of every organ. Yet the work is thoroughly professional, and Mondino is not
wholly subservient to his authorities.
Because of its succinctness
and utility, Mondino’s Anatomy became the standard textbook of the medical
schools ; for about this time most universities incorporated into their
statutes the provision that all medical students should see one or even two
anatomies (always and naturally performed in the winter); and these same
statutes usually specify Mondino as a text. Indeed there was no other ; and
references to Galen are more usually to the supplementary text of De
Juvamentis. This remained true for another century, even though Niccolo da
Reggio in 1322, six years after Mondino had finished his Anatomy, completed a
translation of Galen’s On the Use of the Parts, a book which Mondino would
certainly have used had it been available to him. In feet, Galen was relatively
neglected, because Mondino had replaced him.
By 1400, anatomical
dissections were established as a regular part of the curriculum in most
medical schools,* and a standard procedure had been developed. The cadaver was
laid on a table, around which the students clustered closely ; the actual
dissection was performed by a demonstrator (often a surgeon) while the
professor on his high lecture platform read the prescribed text which was
Mondino or sometimes, later, Galen’s Use of the Parts. This is the famous scene
depicted in the frontispiece to a 1493 Italian edition of Mondino (and many
other woodcuts of the period) and doubtless represents official practice,
though there are other fifteenth-century depictions of anatomical scenes where
a less formally pedagogic dissection is in progress. Presumably students were
also able to attend post-mortem dissections when their own professors were
engaged for the purpose, and the records indicate that these were fairly
frequent. (One can perhaps account for the seemingly exaggerated claims of
later anatomists as to the number of bodies they dissected by assuming that
they lump true dissections and post-mortems together.) The printing- press
helped to establish Mondino’s as the official text; the first printed edition
appeared in 1476, after which there were at least eight more editions in the
fifteenth century, and over twenty in the sixteenth. At the same time,
commentaries on Mondino were naturally being produced by the professors who
lectured on anatomy, and it was in the form of commentaries on Mondino, rather
than on Galen, that new anatomical treatises were presented. Of these a typical
example is that of Alessandro Achillini (14631512), who was alternately a
professor of philosophy and of medicine: his Anatomical Annotations (published
posthumously in
* Some universities were slower: Tubingen
only introduced anatomical studies in 1485, and the statutes stipulated that
dissections were to be conducted every three or four yean! Even in 1538, when
the use of Mondino was forbidden, they were still infrequent. But the Tubingen
medical faculty achieved little fame—the better faculties were much more
insistent on dissections.
1520) reveal that his
lectures did not go much beyond Mondino. Yet he, like Mondino, clearly had
performed dissections, and tradition assigns to him a number of minor
anatomical discoveries. AchiUini’s work is mainly of interest in showing how
anatomical study and original anatomical investigation was slowly taking root
among professors of medicine.
In the early years of
the sixteenth century anatomy was undoubtedly regarded as far more important
than had been the case before, and anatomical studies were pursued with great
vigour, and in a new way. The chief stimulus in this direction came, rather
improbably, from humanism which, soon after denouncing the Arabic tradition
represented by Mondino, made available the superior Greek tradition of Galen.
Just as fifteenth-century astronomy rebelled against mediaeval texts and tried
to return to the pure fount of Greek tradition with an intensive study of the
works of Ptolemy, so in anatomy and medicine there was an attempt to restore
medicine by a reconsideration of the works of Galen. First, naturally, came new
editions of the texts known to the Middle Ages ; among the more famous new
translations are those by Thomas Linacre (?i4<5o-i524), humanist, physician
and founder of the College of Physicians, who concerned himself with medical
texts as well as with Galen’s great physiological treatise On the Natural Faculties
(1523). The most influential of Galen’s works in the early years of the
sixteenth century was On the Use of Parts, available by 1500 in a number of
versions direct from the Greek, which set the style for having a discussion of
the function of each organ in conjunction with anatomical dissection. It had a
further curious advantage in having been unknown to Mondino, which gave it
extra prestige in the anti-mediaeval and anti-Arabic climate of die period.
Every attempt was made to get these Galenic works into the hands of medical
students : thus in 1528 there was published in Paris a series of four handy
texts in pocket size, including On the Use of the Parts (in the fourteenth-
century translation
of Niccolo da Reggio), On the Motion of Muscles (newly translated) and
Linacre’s five-year-old version of the Natural Faculties. The rise in
importance of the medical school of the University of Paris dates from the
renewed interest in Galen indicated by these publications and by the activities
of the Paris faculty. It was Johannes Guinther of Andemach (1487-1574) (in
spite of his name, a professor at Paris) who first published a Latin
translation of a newly discovered and most important Galenic text, On
Anatomical Procedures (De Amtomicis Administrationibus, 1531). Guinther was a
medical humanist, rather than a practising anatomist, but his contributions to
the advance of anatomy are none the less great, and in spite of the later
criticism of his pupil Vesalius, Guinther did perform anatomical dissections,
as well as make translations. Vesalius as a student assisted Guinther in preparing
the professor’s own textbook, Anatomical Institutions according to the opinion
of Galen for Students of Medicine (1536).
The real worship of
Galen begins with the rediscovery of the Anatomical Procedures, and its
commentary by Guinther. (His Latin version of 1531 was followed in 1538 by a
Greek text, prepared for the press by a group of scholars which included the
botanist Fuchs. There were many editions of both the Latin and the Greek
versions through the course of the sixteenth century.) It was a Galenic
treatise wholly new to the Renaissance, whose superiority to Mondino, and even
to the commentators on Mondino, was conspicuous. Its immediate impact is
clearly indicated in die rearrangement of procedure that was now adopted.
Galen had begun, not with the viscera like Mondino, but with the skeleton, for,
as he insisted, “ as poles to tents and walls to houses, so are bones to living
creatures, for other features naturally take form from them and change with
them.”4 This was a much needed injunction, for the skeleton was
poorly known. Here too Galen indicated clearly the nature of his anatomical
material; lamenting the impossibility of studying human anatomy at Rome,
he explained why he
had chosen apes and other animals, while insisting that one should procure
human cadavers whenever possible. (Unfortunately, this warning was not always
heeded.) After the bones, Galen proceeded to the study of the muscles of the
arms, hands and legs, followed by the nerves, veins and arteries of the same
limbs ; then the muscles of the head. Only then did he proceed to the internal
organs of the body, which he classed by function—alimentary, respiratory
(including the heart) and the brain. This is a totally different method of
procedure from that of Mondino, both in the order in which the organs are
treated and the manner in which they are discussed ; the immediate influence
of die work is indicated by those treatises (including that of Vesalius) which
follow the Galenic procedure.
When one considers
both the novelty and the intrinsic value of die Galenic texts, it is not
surprising that sixteenth-century anatomists eagerly seized upon them, at the
same time denouncing the established tradition of the medical schools, and
those in particular who claimed that Mondino and his fifteenth- and sixteenth-century
commentators were preferable to Galen. Galen’s work was really so immeasurably
superior to what had been done in the intervening period that admiration and
adulation was inevitable and desirable. For until anatomists learned what Galen
had to teach there was little chance they would ever learn more about anatomy
than he had known. It is not surprising that adulation sometimes turned into
worship, and the conviction that Galen could do no wrong ; nor that the critics
who opposed Galen because they believed that mediaeval anatomists were better
became confused with those who, following Galen’s precepts, and exploring the
problems of human anatomy, found that Galen erred. So John Caius was content to
devote a major part of his life to die editing of Galen’s works, and regarded
dissent from Galen as an indication of academic flightiness and irresponsibility.
He found Galen a perfectly adequate guide when he
lectured on anatomy
to surgeons, and thought others should do so too.
The astonishing thing
is that contemporary with the rise of Galen worship there actually were
anatomists bent on following Galen’s example and admonitions, who did dissect
with a fresh eye (even though the other was usually fixed on the text of die
Anatomical Procedures). Galen certainly would have envied those, like Vesalius,
who had access to human cadavers, and would have had only scorn for the fact
that such men, with advantages he himself lacked, were often reluctant to
accept the evidence of their own eyes, and preferred to believe that Galen was
describing human anatomy when, as he himself had carefully pointed out, he knew
only animal anatomy. But what scientific apprentice has not, many times since
the sixteenth century, preferred to trust the authoritative text rather than
his own unskilled eyes ? It took time to create an independent school of
anatomy, even as it takes time to make an individual anatomist. And in spite of
the comparative abundance of human dissection material, it was not quite as
abundant as anatomists boastfully made out; much preliminary dissection was
performed on animals, and the lessons of this early training often persisted in
spite of later experience.
At about the same
time that humanism was influencing anatomy through the rediscovery of Galen,
artistic circles were influencing anatomy in quite a different way. Every
studio manifested an interest in surface and muscle anatomy as part of die
attempt at naturalistic portraiture. The greatest exemplar of this tradition is
Leonardo da Vinci (1452-1519), but he was merely the best of a large group
which includes Durer and Michelangelo, as well as many lesser artists, some of
whom turned their hands to anatomical illustration. Leonardo was introduced to
anatomy in the studio of Verrochio (1435-88) who insisted that his pupils learn
anatomy thoroughly : he taught them to observe surface
anatomy, and also had
them study flayed bodies, so that they could learn enough about the play of
muscles to represent them accurately in action. Artists of the late fifteenth
century commonly tried their hands at the dissection of human and animal
subjects in pursuit of artistic anatomy ; they could also attend anatomy
demonstrations, either the public dissections which took place every winter in
Italian universities, or the private lessons which were also widely available.
The earliest
anatomical drawings of Leonardo, made about 1497-9, show only slight knowledge
of dissection, though already profound understanding of surface anatomy. He
began about this time to plan a great book On the Human Figure, intended to
portray living, artistic anatomy rather than structural and physiological
anatomy. Soon after 1503, however, Leonardo’s approach began to change. First,
he had access to more dissecting material (though never, apparently, to as much
as he claimed). Then, perhaps about 1506, he read Galen’s On the Use of the
Parts, which stimulated him to further studies on bones and muscles, taught him
much about anatomical fact and procedure, and interested him in physiological
functioning. (He is often as scathing about the statements of Mondino as any
medical humanist.) It is to this period that his greatest work belongs, much
of it based upon the centenarian whose superficial anatomy he studied during
visits to the hospital, and whose body he later dissected and compared with
that of a seven-month foetus. Side by side with his studies on man were studies
on animals: partly because, with Galen, he assumed that animal and human
anatomy was basically identical, and partly from the demands of art. Leonardo
studied the anatomy of the horse for the great projected equestrian statue of
Ludovico Sforza, and he was as interested in the proportions of animals as in
those of human bodies.
Some of Leonardo’s
work is extraordinary : with the advantage of an eye trained to observation he
saw as clearly as any
138
professional
anatomist the correct relationships and forms of bones, muscles and organs, and
his mechanical ability suggested to him a number of ingenious techniques for
studying individual organs. Some of his work is poor : he either had not really
observed what he drew, or had observed it wrongly. But the whole—and the level
of his competence is generally high—is transformed and illuminated by the
drawings which fill every page of his notes, for Leonardo was a peerless
anatomical illustrator. He had, of course, the great advantage of being both
observer and draughtsman. There is almost no page of his manuscript notebooks
which is not a thing of beauty in its own right, and in all that he did,
Leonardo looked for the hidden beauty which he believed to lie behind all (or
almost all) the body’s frame and structure. Leonardo stands in a class by himself:
a great artist, he made of his anatomy a work of art.
Leonardo stands apart
for another reason: he worked in secret and published nothing. He was known to
be working on anatomy and a few artists saw some of his illustrations. In fact,
his influence may have been real on anatomical illustration, though his
influence on anatomy was nil. Anatomical illustration developed amazingly
during the first years of the sixteenth century, to such an extent, indeed,
that it is tempting to judge the worth of every work chiefly by its
illustrations. This would surely be wrong. Whether the illustrations have
independent artistic merit is really irrelevant to their purpose ; there was as
much luck as judgement involved in whether an anatomist could secure the
services of a good artist or not. Even the accuracy of die drawings may reflect
the artist rather than the anatomist, for, as in the case of herbals, it is not
at all clear how closely anatomists were able to work with their artists.
Anatomical illustration appears rather suddenly in the early sixteenth century,
for though the first books on anatomy are illustrated, there are no anatomical
drawings. Usually the illustrations are of dissection scenes or of
surgical operations,
though there were also the “ wound men ” indicating the probable location of
difficult sword cuts, and the crude figures indicating the astrological
significance of various regions of the body. The attractively illustrated
Anatomical Bundle (Fasdculo di Medicinae, 1493), which includes the text of
Mondino, has an interesting seated female figure with the body opened to show
the reproductive organs ; though the drawing is naturalistic the anatomy
emphatically is not.
The first anatomist
to take advantage of the possibilities of anatomical illustration was
Berengario da Carpi (c. 1460-c. 1530), who was associated with the University
of Bologna which had a good anatomical tradition. Berengario published a
commentary on Mondino in 1521, followed in 1522 by a short book with a long
title : A Short but very Clear and Fruitjul Introduction to the Anatomy of the
Human Body, Published by Request of his Students,5 and both books
were illustrated with true anatomical drawings. The second work contains a
number of plates designed to illustrate the muscles : the artist gives a
spirited view, rendering the scene arresting by drawing the body with normal
facial expression, the figure in each case cheerfully holding back flaps of
skin to display muscular structure. This method of demonstrating living anatomy
was further developed later to give complete “ muscle men ” and skeletons. The
figures in Berengario are all set in a bare landscape, which developed into the
almost blighted and ruined background of the figures in the illustrations to
the works of Vesalius, the climax of anatomical illustration in this genre.
Anatomical
illustration was undoubtedly valuable, especially in the absence of a competent
technical vocabulary. And it produced, some wonderful picture-books. But it
also had its disadvantages. Most noticeable is that it tended to draw
attention away from the text, which it did not necessarily represent
accurately. This was particularly undesirable in boob like
140
those of Vesalius
which are more than a mere outline of anatomy. In the sixteenth century, some
anatomists complained that illustrations even drew students away from
dissection ; having a picture, they felt less necessity to observe for
themselves. As Vesalius put it, “ I am convinced that it is very hard—nay,
futile and impossible—to obtain real anatomical or therapeutic knowledge from
mere figures or formulae, though no one will deny them to be capital aids to
memory.” 6
This difficulty still
exists, especially when appraising the work of sixteenth-century anatomists :
in looking at the pictures one is all too apt to forget the text, which is a
far better measure of scientific achievement. And the text by itself is always
interesting. Every anatomist of the period shares a certain common attitude.
Thus each declares that anatomy needs clarification, because the professors are
such blockheads ; and each claims to have learned this need through his own
dissection of innumerable cadavers. Equally, each betrays the fact that his
anatomical investigations were in reality based on relatively few cadavers,
supplemented by autopsies on the one hand, and numerous animal dissections on
die other. This last fact explains many anomalies. It has always been a puzzle
to understand why sixteenth-century anatomists “ saw ” in the human body what
Galen described for animals, and it has been assumed that they were wilfully
blind or stupid. Aside from die fact that it is often quite easy to “ see” what
a textbook or manual says should be seen, very often sixteenth-century
anatomists used the same animal material as Galen, partly because it was
readily available, partly because it did more closely resemble what Galen
described. Hence the “five-lobed” liver, found in dogs and apes but not in man,
yet commonly shown in anatomical illustrations including the early drawings of
Vesalius. Hence, too, die insistence that the rete mirabile was present in man,
though it was known to be
141
difficult to detect
in a body long dead.* Hence, too, the universal habit of representing the right
kidney as higher than the left, though in man it is lower : clearly the ideas
of most anatomists (even of Leonardo and Vesalius) were so firmly fixed by
early dissection of animals that they never rearranged their vision when they
dissected man, an indication of how difficult it may be even for practised eyes
to see aright.f
Beginning about 1520
there was a great rush of anatomical works, one after the other, of various
degrees of originality. All are, naturally, more or less influenced by Galen,
either physiologically or anatomically. Each of these books has its own merits
and its own discoveries; all together represent the “new anatomy.” It is
difficult to distinguish them chronologically for books were often years in
preparation ; one of the distinctions of Vesalius was the way in which he rushed
into print. Among the earliest of the new kind of anatomical treatise are those
of Berengario da Carpi: the Commentary on Mondino, and the Brief Introduction.
As befitted a commentator, Berengario organised his work on lines laid down by
his authority, but his was immeasurably superior to Mondino’s. He explained his
position in the dedication:
There are many books
which discuss anatomy, but they are not well arranged for the reader’s comfort.
The authors seem to have borrowed fables from other volumes instead
* The rete mirabile is a network of vessels
at the base of the brain, found in cattle but not in man. The difficulties
connected with it are indicated by the comment of Niccolo Massa (c. 1489-1569)
in his Introduction to Anatomy (1536): “ some dare to say that this rete is a
figment of Galen . . . but I myself have often seen the rete, and have
demonstrated it to the bystanders so that no one could possibly deny it, though
sometimes I have found it very small.” 1 Vesalius used to keep the head of an
ox or lamb handy when dissecting a human head, in order to demonstrate the
rete plainly.
f Galen says, “ Hie
right kidney lies higher in all animals,” 8 but says nothing about
man. The rest of the paragraph makes it plain that he is referring to apes and
cattle.
of writing genuine
anatomy. For this reason there are few or none at all who now understand the
purpose of this necessary and important art.9 And he proved his own
understanding by demonstrating his own achievements in actual dissection. He
studied “ the reader’s comfort ” too; for, in contrast to Mondino, Berengario
was clear, direct, careful to explain both the names and positions of organs, indicating
how they were to be handled for the most effective dissection, what precautions
were necessary. Reading his account, anyone would feel almost capable of
picking up a /4i<«yfing knife and going to work. Berengario was not startlingly
original, but he did observe with a fair degree of accuracy. He was amusingly
contemptuous of the “ common opinion ” that the rete mirahile is found in man,
for “ I have never seen this net, and I believe that nature does not accomplish
by many means that which she can accomplish by few means ”:10 since
it is not necessary, there is no need to imagine it. There are many other
onatrtmtral works in this period which have merit: the Introduction to Anatomy
of Niccolo Massa (1536); On the Dissection of the Parts of the Human Body, by
the French printer Charles Estienne (published in 1545, though begun about 1530
; Estienne (15041564) ingeniously provided illustrations by taking figures
from contemporary artists and having anatomical details inserted); the Anatomy
of Mondino by Johannes Dryander (1541) > cach introduced some new names and
new facts worthy of note. But none is significantly superior to any other.
It is the
distinction of Vesalius to have produced a work far superior to all others,
anatomically, pictorially and physiologically, so far superior as almost to
eclipse the work of his contemporaries. Vesalius had certain advantages,
especially that of having been educated into the new anatomy. Bom in 1514, he first at Louvain, where he learned Latin and
Greek,
absorbed the humanist
love of languages, and found pleasure in
dissecting animals.
In 1533 he went to Paris for formal medical training ; though he stayed only
three yean, and though he was later to characterise his teachers as ignorant of
practical anatomy, in fact the years at Paris formed his anatomical outlook.
Here, under Guinther of Andemach, he was introduced to Galen’s Anatomical
Procedures ; he assisted Guinther in the preparation of his Anatomical
Institutes ; and he was profoundly inflnqiced by the tremendous interest in
Galen displayed by the mescal faculty and the printers of Paris. The scorn that
he later heaped on his teachers is at least partly a measure of how mnrh they
taught him: for they and Galen combined to teach him to approach anatomy, not
as a textbook subject, but as a subject for research. The value of seeing for
oneself, the intimate connection between anatomy and physiology—these were
Galenic precepts, and Vesalius followed the path his education fitted Him to
follow, though he left his teachers far behind.
Vesalius left Paris
for Louvain in 1536 when war forced the closing of the medical school; for a
year he lectured and demonstrated with iclat, published his thesis, and then
departed for Italy. Here, at Padua, he secured his m.d. and immediately, in
spite of his youth, appointment as Lecturer in Surgery. He lectured on anatomy
and as a result of his first experiences published the six sheets known as the
Tabulae sex in 153 8. These are large, perhaps so that they could be pinned on
a wall, and combine illustration and text on each sheet. Characteristically,
the first sheet carries a dedication which explains that it was at the demand
of the students and other professors that Vesalius produced this work. The
first three sheets (with drawings by Vesalius himself) represent the liver and
associated blood vessels, together with the male and female reproductive
organs, the venous system and the arterial system; the drawings are adequate
but contain traditional errors with respect to the shape of the liver and
uterus, and the relative positions of right and left kidney.
The last three
sheets, drawn by Jan Stephen van Calcar (a pupil of Titian) represent the three
aspects of the skeleton, in living posture, with a text naming the bones. These
sheets seem to have started a fashion, and after their appearance many
anatomical sheets were produced for student use.
For the next few
years Vesalius lectured and dissected furiously, until he felt satisfied that
he had solved the major problems in anatomy and was competent to present the
results of his work to the public. He presented his achievements not in one
book, but in two, both published in 1543 : On the Fabric of the Human Body (De
Humani Corporis Fabrica) and a brief handbook, about the size of Berengario’s,
the Epitome. This is a fantastic achievement in the time available, the more
so as Vesalius was in this period concerned with editing Guinther’s Anatomical
Institutes and contributing to the 1541 Latin edition of Galen (the Giunta edition).
In 1543 Vesalius left Padua for Basle, to see his books through the press; when
copies were available, he took diem to the Emperor’s court in Germany, hoping
to secure a court position. He was successful; after his appointment as
Imperial Physician to Charles V, Vesalius had little time for dissection, and
his anatomical activity nearly ceased, though the second edition of the Fabrica
in 1555 includes a fair amount of revised material. This second edition
immediately preceded his appointment as physician to Philip II of Spain, just
as the first had preceded his appointment as physician to Charles V. He
appears to have been less successful in Spain than he was in Germany and the
Low Countries, and about 1562 he gave up his post; his activities are then
obscure, but he died on a pilgrimage in 1564, intending to return to teaching
at Padua.
What makes the
Fabrica superior to all other anatomical books of the period (apart from its
dramatic and artistic illustrations) *
* These were attributed to Jan Stephen van
Calcar (1499-;:. 1550) by the sixteenth-century art historian, Vasari. Modem
students have doubted this,
is its plan and its
scope. As the title indicates, it is more than an account of structural anatomy
; its size shows at once that it is no mere handbook. The influence of Galen
was still strong on Vesalius : the content of the sections follows the plan of
Galen, not of Mondino ; and Vesalius included in the last book many of the
vivisection experiments described earlier by Galen on the effect of cutting and
tying various nerves. The first book treats the skeleton; the second, myology,
carefully showing all the muscles and their relations; the third and fourth
books the venous, arterial and nervous systems; the fifth and sixth the organs
of the abdominal and thoracic cavities and the brain.
Vesalius was in part
writing an anti-Galenic polemic; at least he was ever eager to attack ihe
Galenists, even his own masters. He enjoyed disagreeing with Galen, as when he
argued that the vena cava has its origin in the heart, not the liver, an
argument he pursued in some detail. But in feet he could not have written his
great work without Galen ; there is a real sense in which Vesalius began with
Galen rather than the human body, in the same way in which Copernicus began
with Ptolemy rather than with die physical world. Neither Copernicus nor
Vesalius was any the less original for that. Vesalius kept one eye on Galen,
but the other was quick to look for possible discovery : for no anatomist of
the sixteenth century felt that he had really established himself as an
independent worker unless he found something that had escaped Galen, which he
was the first to dis-
because the figures
are as superior to those in the Tabulae Sex as the text of the Fabrica is to
that of the earlier work—though it is possible that the artist had learned as
rapidly as the author. In place of Jan Stephen van Calcar, the only candidate
is an unknown, also a member of Titian’s studio. It seems difficult to believe
that so spirited a draughtsman as the artist who drew the pictures for the
Fabrica should be otherwise unknown; though it is odd that Vesalius, who had
given Jan Stephen credit for his work in the Tabulae Sex, did not mention the
name of the artist of the Fabrica.
cover. Vesalius is no
exception. Nor was lie an exception in persisting in error in spite of many
dissections “ with his own hand.” (His insistence that the right kidney is
higher than the left is a case in point.) Vesalius was exceptional in the
amount of new material that he saw, and in his detailed and lively comments. It
is almost a pity that the illustrations are so fine, for they are not as
accurate as the text. Occasionally the figures include both animal and human
anatomy telescoped together, not, generally, through confusion, but because
Vesalius was, in the text, discussing comparative anatomy, and permitted the
artist to make a combined figure, either for simplicity or to save his time.
Perhaps the most
striking aspect of Vesalius’ work is the pains he took to deal with the
relation between individual organs and the body as a whole. What starts as a
complete skeleton ends as a few bones; what starts as a flayed (but active)
human figure displaying its surface muscles is dissected layer by layer until
only a few individual muscles are left; the bodily cavity is considered as a
whole before its individual parts are discussed. This is different from the
standard method of procedure as much as the aim of the book is different: for
Vesalius was not writing an elementary text and handbook, but a great monograph
designed as a replacement for Galen.
Not unnaturally,
Vesalius was as much concerned with the use of the parts of the body as with
their structure, with physiology as well as anatomy; indeed he made, like
Galen, little distinction between the two. Structure is, where possible,
related to function ; thus Vesalius considers very carefully the difference in
fibre structure between veins and muscles as these are related to their action
and purpose. The main function of the veins is to serve the body in conveying
nourishment, so their structure is adapted for this purpose :
Nature gave straight
fibres to the vein ; by means of these it draws blood into its cavity. Then
since it has to propel
the blood into the
next part of the vein, as though through a water-course, she gave it transverse
fibres. Lest the whole blood should be taken at once into the next part of the
vein from the first without any pause, and be propelled, she also wrapped the
body of the vein with oblique fibres.*11 For, “ The Creator of all
things instituted the veins for the prime reason that they may carry the blood
to the individual parts of the body, and be just like canals or channels, from
which all parts suck their food.”12
Following normal
Galenic physiology (all he knew) Vesalius assumed that the veins take their
origin from the liver (a belief presumably engendered by the striking size of
the vena cava) and that their function is to carry the nutritive blood to
various parts of the body, while at the same time removing waste products.
Similarly, the arteries are presumed to distribute the vital spirit to all
parts of the body. Very noticeable is the strongly mechanical concept of bodily
function : for attraction and repulsion represent inhalation and expulsion,
and the whole venous system is compared to a water supply, an analogy that was
to serve Harvey in good stead seventy-five years later. The insistence upon
the importance of fibre structure (especially detailed in the discussion of the
lungs, in Book vi) was to be maintained continuously after Vesalius, and became
emphatically mechanistic in eighteenth-century physiology.
Nutrition Vesalius
discussed at great length in connection with the anatomy of the abdominal
cavity. He had nothing very original to say, but he expressed clearly the
common conclusions of sixteenth-century anatomists and of Galen :
Thus food and drink
are taken from the mouth through the stomach into the belly, as into a certain
common workshop or storehouse, that squeezes everything enclosed within it,
* According to Vesalius, straight fibres
are responsible for attraction, oblique fibres for retention, and transverse
fibres for expulsion.
148
mixes it and concocts
it, and protrudes what is concocted into the intestine. Thence, the branches of
the vena porta suck away what is best of that concocted juice, and most suitable
for making blood, together with the moister remnant of this concoction,
carrying it to the hollow of the liver. . . . However, the liver, after admitting
the thick juice and fluid, adds an embellishment to it necessary for the
production of perfect blood. It expels a double waste, that is, the yellow
bile, the lighter and more tenuous waste, then the atrabilious or muddy juice,
thick and earthy. . . . But the blood is led through the vena cava propagated
in a very numerous series of branches to the parts of the body : and what in it
is similar and appropriate to the individual parts they attract to themselves,
assimilate, and place in position. What is superfluous and what waste arises in
this concoction they exclude from themselves through their own ducts.13
To Vesalius, as to
Galen, the arterial system was both less important and less interesting than
the venous system. The venous system derived its importance both from its
responsibility for nutrition, and from the necessity of knowing the exact
position of each vein for successful phlebotomy. Besides, the structure of the
arterial system was less controversial than that of the venous system, though there
were plenty of questions to ask about the structure of the heart, from which
the arterial system arose:
The dissension among
medical men and philosophers concerning the great artery is much less than
that about the origins of the veins and nerves. For Hippocrates, Plato,
Aristotle and Galen lay down that the heart is the fount and origin of the
arteries, as is reasonable ... But if philosophers and leading physicians have
decided that the heart is the fount of the arteries, nevertheless they do
differ not a little about the sinus of the heart from which the great artery
springs,
149
since some contend
that it arises from the middle sinus of the heart, others from the left one.
But as this controversy turns rather upon the ventricles and sinuses of the heart,
than upon the origin of the artery, and since there are only two ventricles in
the heart, we shall confirm the origin of the great artery in the grander left
sinus of the heart.*4
A more difficult
problem was the question of the nature of the septum, the thick wall dividing
the right side of die heart from the left. The surface of the septum is covered
with litde pits which Galen, not unreasonably, concluded to be very small
pores; he therefore assumed that they existed to allow a small amount of blood
to percolate from the right side of the heart to the left. The importance of
this became greater in the sixteenth century as the interest in detailed
physiology increased. Vesalius was predisposed to accept the idea that these
pits went through the septum, though after careful examination he could not
detect any passage. He could only conclude that there was no certainty in this
matter:
Conspicuous as these
pits are, none (as far as can be detected by the senses) permeate from the
right ventricle into the left through the septum between the ventricles; nor
did any passages, even the most obscure, appear to my eyes, by which the septum
would be made pervious, although these are described by the professors of
dissection because they have a most strong persuasion that the blood is carried
from the right ventricle to the left. Whence also it is (as I shall advise more
plainly elsewhere) I am not a litde doubtful of the heart’s action in this
respect.15
Inevitably, having
considered the structure of the heart, Vesalius next considered “ the function
and use of the heart and of its parts so far described and the reason for their
structure.”16 This seems natural, but there was a problem troubling
Vesalius : if one considers the natural faculties of the heart and lungs one
must become involved
in the theological question of the nature of the soul. But, properly speaking,
Vesalius argued, this is medical as well as theological, and is, therefore, a
fit topic for a work on anatomy:
Furthermore, lest I
should here meet with any charge of heresy, I shall straightway abstain from
this discussion about the species of the soul, and of their seats. For today,
and particularly among our countrymen (Italians) you may find many judges of
our most true religion, who if they hear anyone murmur something about the
opinions on the soul of Plato, or of Aristotle and his interpreters, or of
Galen (perhaps because we are dealing with the dissection of the body, and
ought to examine things of this kind at the beginning) they straight away
imagine he’s wandering from the faith, and having I don’t know what doubts
about the immortality of the soul. Not bothering about that, doctors must (if
they don’t wish to approach the art rashly, nor to prescribe and apply remedies
for ailing members improperly) consider those faculties that govern us, how
many kinds of them there are, and what is the character by which each is known,
and in what member of the animal the individual ones are constituted, and what
medication they receive. And especially, besides all this, (if our minds can
attain it) what is the substance and essence of the soul.17 Having
thus proclaimed his right to discuss such sensitive questions, Vesalius
proceeded to a detailed discussion of the functions of the heart and certain associated
functions of the liver and brain. He concluded that:
Just as the substance
of the heart is endowed with the force of the vital soul, and the unique flesh
of the liver with the faculty of the natural soul, in order that the liver may
make the thicker blood and natural spirit and the heart may make the blood
which rushes through die body with the vital spirit,
and thus these organs
may bring materials to all parts of the body through channels reserved for
them, so ... die brain ... prepares the animal spirit.18 This is
perhaps a rather lamely orthodox result of his bold proclamation of the rights
of free medical inquiry, for it was a conclusion to which Galenists could
readily subscribe, but at least Vesalius had the advantage of proclaiming his
independence, however litde use he made of it.
The work of Vesalius
is so imposing—partly because it so often transcends anatomy—that the work of
his contemporaries appears somewhat tame by comparison. But he was a member of
a fertile and original generation, and when he left Padua the university found
no difficulty in finding worthy successors, for there were many Italian
anatomists, each of whom made his own contributions. One of the most
interesting is Eustachio (1520-74), a practising physician in Rome who, alone
among the great anatomists, was not associated with a university. His work was
often more accurate than that of Vesalius, but he published litde. In 1563 he
produced a small book (Opuscula Anatomica) in which he compared organs in man
and in animals, pointing out that Vesalius and many others had discussed animal
kidneys, not human kidneys, and noting the difference between, for example, the
venous system in the arm of a man, an ape and a dog ; he also published on the
anatomy of the ear. He planned a detailed and comprehensive survey, but only
the plates (published in the eighteenth century) now survive. Among the
professors of anatomy at Padua was Fallopius (1523-62); his Anatomical
Observations are especially good on the female reproductive system, whose
organs he described in detail. Other Paduan anatomists, like Realdus Columbus *
(d. 1559) and Fabricius of Aquapendente were concerned with the physiological
anatomy of the venous system. Anatomy and physiology were slowly
* C£ ch. ix, below.
152
separating and
becoming specialised, though, each remained a necessary adjunct to the other.
There was, in the
sixteenth century, a divergent, though less fruitful, physiological tradition,
best represented by the French physician Jean Femel (d. 1557). His Natural
Parts of Medicine (1542) was modelled on Galen’s On the Use of the Parts, just
as the Fabrica of Vesalius was modelled on Galen’s Anatomical Procedures. But
Femel was far less original, and he underestimated the importance of anatomy.
Though he devoted the first section of his book to an adequate anatomical
discussion, he apparently felt that physicians were paying too much attention
to anatomy, and too little to medical practice. As a contemporary reported:
Often too I have heard him declare the absurdity of going on toiling, even into
old age, in turning over books of anatomy and reading the properties of
simples, without ever looking at a sick man or actually seeing the things which
the ancients have described in the sick. He argued that it is better, after
perusing once and then once again, some skilled and well-written but brief
compendium of anatomy, and going through it attentively, to pass straight to
the things themselves as they can be seen and observed in number of sick
persons, and not lose time, and the years life has to offer, in reconciling a
multitude of authors whose statements disagree. Today, he said, books on
anatomy are almost more numerous than are the sick, and there are more writers
of herbals than there are herbs to describe.19 This slightly muddled
plea for empiricism and attention to the needs of the sick by no means deterred
Femel from pursuing a thoroughly unoriginal concept of the workings of the
human body. Though he did emphasise the importance of distinguishing between
the functioning of the body in health and the body in disease, he was unable to
do more than to present a “ modem ” version of Galen. In this capacity his book
was to prove
acceptable to the fiercely Galenic medical faculty of the University of
Paris.
It was physicians who began the new study of anatomy in the sixteenth
century, but it was far more useful to the surgeons. Though the surgeon was
both less highly educated and lower on the social scale than the physician, the
latter did try to keep the surgeon informed of the latest anatomical advances,
in spite of the disputes that continually sprang up between the two kinds of
practitioners. This was especially true in England, where surgeons achieved an
assured position in the mid-sixteenth century. There the old battle between
barbers and surgeons had ended in 1540 with the creation of a united company,
entitled to supervise surgical practice. This they did by keeping a check on
the candidates for apprenticeship (who were expected to have attended a grammar
school long enough to acquire a little Latin), and setting examinations. They
further provided for the education of present and prospective surgeons by
establishing a Readership in Anatomy, for which they secured the right to the
bodies of four criminals yearly. These readers were able men, who
conscientiously fulfilled the duties of their office. The first, Thomas Vicary
(d. 1561), published a respectable treatise on anatomy; the second, John Caius,
established the tradition of appointing university graduates. The English
surgeons of the later sixteenth century therefore had advantages of
opportunity, education and respectability, in strong contrast to the position
in France. There the surgeons proper formed the College of Saint-Cosmas, but
their more active and numerous inferiors, the barber-surgeons, were
unorganised, and their training varied with the master under whom each served
an apprenticeship. English and French surgeons shared the advantages of
hospital appointments, where they usually really began to learn their trade,
for among the poor there was much opportunity for
observation and practice. From there, most surgeons went on to serve in
war, and the battlefield proved an even better school than the hospital for
training distinguished men.
Properly, there was a clear division between medicine and surgery, though
the two professions inevitably overlapped. Surgeons were supposed to deal with
external medicine, physicians with internal; surgeons dealt with wounds,
fractures, and childbirth, cut for the stone, performed amputations and (at
the physician’s orders) let blood.* The surgeons were supposed to appeal to the
physicians when medicines were required, but they often prescribed drugs on
their own account, arguing that the fever deriving from wounds lay within the
province of the surgeon, or that the surgeon was entitled to administer the
purges which were a necessary preliminary to operations. There was, in the
sixteenth century, one disease which was nearly always left to the surgeons,
partly because they had first treated it, pardy because its outward
manifestations were lesions of die skin, which the surgeon was clearly entided
to treat. This was “ the new sickness of the armed forces,” the “ French
disease,” lues venerea, syphilis, f Whether brought from the New World or not
(and the sixteenth century nearly always thought that it had been) this
undeniably became epidemic in the armies at the siege of Naples in 14.95, and
spread from thence all over Europe with frightening rapidity. Every surgeon who
wrote at all wrote on the new disease and its cure, as surely as he also wrote
on the treatment of gunshot wounds. Remedies varied: mercury (already widely
used for skin diseases, and a great expeller of
* In France, the surgeon proper applied bandages
and external remedies; he did not perform operations nor let blood. The
barber-surgeon, who did all fhw, gradually replaced the more restricted
surgeon, and all the notable French surgeons of the period were
barber-surgeons.
f This last nam<»
was given die disease by Fracastoro in an allegorical poem (1530) which both
accounts for its origin in mythological terms, and gives an accurate clinical
picture of it.
peccant humours through salivation) and guaiacum, a wood from South
America, were certainly the favourites. Controversies on which was the better
raged furiously and mingled with the later controversy over chemical versus
herbal remedies in medicine.
One of the earliest writers on the surgical problems of the army was
Giovanni da Vigo (1460-1525), an Italian who became surgeon to Pope Julius II.
Vigo has a poor reputation because in his work On the Art of Surgery (1514) he
advocated the cauterisation of gunshot wounds, which he believed must be
poisoned by the lead of the bullets. (Perhaps he was influenced by the high
incidence of tetanus.) He also wrote on the ligaturing of arteries under
certain conditions (a technique forgotten since antiquity); on new surgical
instruments; and on syphilis, for which he advocated the ingestion of mercurial
drugs. His book with its brief anatomical introduction was rapidly translated
into all the major vernaculars, and was highly influential. Indeed, the chief
claim to feme of Ambroise Par£ (1510-90) is his denunciation of Vigo’s practice
of cautery, which he replaced with mild dressings. Pare, after an
apprenticeship as a barber-surgeon, and a couple of years’ service as
house-surgeon at the H6tel-Dieu in Paris, went on the campaign of 1536 as
private surgeon to the general in command of infantry. Here he began to acquire
experience and to devise new methods of treatment; after a number of campaigns
(and passing the barber-surgeons’ examinations in 1541) he became surgeon to a
succession of French kings. Par6 wrote voluminously on gunshot wounds,
dislocations, amputations (where he extended the use of the ligature),
obstetrics (he devised new procedures and instruments), and bums; he discussed
specific case histories, and took good care to proclaim the manifest
superiority of his methods over those of his contemporaries and opponents. Very
similar was the slightly later career of the English surgeon William Clowes
(1544-1604) whose surgical
casebook (A Proved Practice, 1587, revised and enlarged as A Profitable
and Necessary Book of Observations, 1596) is a delightful account of the
difficulties and achievements of a successful surgeon, for Clowes wrote with
zest and skill, and he had a wide practice.
Surgical casebooks make depressing enough reading, for wounds were slow
to heal and excessively painful; but at least the surgeon was, usually, dealing
with an ailment which he was competent to cure. The practice of the
contemporary physician was dismal in the extreme : he could, sometimes,
diagnose the disease, but there was little or nothing he could do to alleviate
or cure it, and most of his methods of treatment seemed rather to aggravate
than mitigate discomfort. Yet every physician boasted spectacular cures, and
certainly physicians kept their patients’ confidence. Purges, bloodletting and
a variety of complex and nauseous drugs were the inevitable prescription,
whether the nature of the disease was known or not. Almost the only positive
treatment (from a modem point of view) was the isolation of the contagiously
sick, the quarantine developed in the later Middle Ages and applied to leprosy
and plague.
One of the few treatises of this period dealing with a purely medical (as
distinct from physiological, anatomical, surgical or pharmaceutical) problem is
the work of the humanist physician and astronomer Fracastoro, Contagion,
Contagious Diseases and their Treatment (1546). Fracastoro was familiar with
numerous contagious diseases, old and new, from consumption to typhus ; he
tried to classify them by degree and method of contagion. There are, it seems,
three fundamentally different types of contagion. The first infects by direct
contact only. The second does the same, but in addition leaves fomes, and this
contagion may spread by means of that fomes, for instance scabies, phthisis,
bald spots, elephantiasis and the like, (by
fomes I
mean clothes, wooden objects, and things of that sort, which though not
themselves corrupted can, nevertheless, preserve the original germs of the
contagion and infect by means of these). Thirdly, there is a kind of contagion
which not only is transmitted by direct contact or by fomes as an intermediary,
but also infects at a distance ; for example, pestilent fevers, phthisis,
certain kinds of ophthalmia, exanthemata of the kind called variolae [typhus],
and the like. These different contagions seem to obey a certain law ; for those
which carry contagion to a distant object infect both by direct contact and by
fomes; those that are contagious by means offomes are equally so by direct
contact; not all of them are contagious at a distance, but all are contagious
by direct contact.20 Fracastoro believed in “ seeds of contagion,” imperceptible particles
somehow mechanically transmitted from the sick to the healthy. This essentially
atomic theory of disease seemed to conform to experience when carefully
examined; but it was not really useful, and Fracastoro’s investigation is an
example of pure medical research similar to the case histories of Hippocrates.
However meticulous his examination of the problem and however dear his vision,
he could not apply his theory in any constructive way except to confirm the
advantages of isolation. Perhaps this is why, though he was a physician, he
fled from Verona during the plague of 1510 to live in the safety of his country
estate. Knowledge can make cowards.
Another development in the recognition and classification of disease was
consideration of occupational and regional diseases. Paracelsus (c. 1493-1541)
wrote a book on miners’ diseases 533-4) in which he commented on
mercurial and arsenical poisoning, though he somewhat diminished the value of
his observations by regarding all diseases assodated with metals as “mercurial”
in origin. Some years later Agricola (1490-1555),
physician in a mining town, included in his great work on metals (De Re
Metallica, 1556) a short section on the diseases peculiar to miners. Similarly,
travellers were peculiarly subject to certain diseases like scurvy, and had as
well the risk of meeting entirely new diseases, especially in the tropics. In
1598 there appeared a work on tropical medicine entitled The Cures of the
Diseased In Remote Regions: Preventing Mortalitie, incident in Forraine
Attempts, of the English Nation (by George Wateson); Hakluyt thought it ought
to be included in his Voyages, but he was dissuaded by William Gilbert to whom
he submitted it for approval: Gilbert denounced the views of Wateson, and
promised instead to provide Hakluyt with a better and more complete work on
tropical and arctic medicine. He failed to do so ; and this is the only glimpse
we have of Gilbert’s medical interests.
Although from the modem point of view there was little the
sixteenth-century physician could do to alleviate suffering and cure disease,
he naturally was unaware of this feet and had frill faith in his chosen
remedies. Most of these were traditional, many even Greek in origin, but there
were new and exciting developments in drugs in the late fifteenth and early
sixteenth centuries. These resulted from the markedly increased use of chemical
remedies in spite of the criticisms of herbalists who adhered to tradition.
Controversy about the advantages of chemical drugs usually centred around the
name of Paracelsus, but the use of non-herbal remedies antedates that strange
mystic figure, whose ideas are so much more magical than medical; chemical
drugs had always been used to a certain extent, especially externally.
Chaucer’s physician knew that “ gold in physick is a cordial ” ; and his “
cordial waters,” improved by the addition of flecks of gold, are still in
existence, though rather as an afier- dinner liqueur than as a specific against
the plague.
Cordials or strong waters—distilled liquors—were introduced into Europe
in the course of the fourteenth century, originally as
medicines. The German physician (Michael Puff von Schrick) who is the
author of the first printed book on distillation (1478) wrote hopefully, “
Anyone who drinks half a spoonful of brandy every morning will never be ill,”
and assured his readers that brandy would revive even the dying.21
Cordials were widely used in time of epidemics. They were distilled from a
variety of substances, ranging from wine and fermented grains to fruits and
herbs, and a cult of “elixirs” and “essences” developed in the fifteenth
century. This is. well displayed in the books of the fifteenth-century surgeon
Hieronymus Brunschwygk (c. 14501512), The Small Book of Distillation (Liber de
Arte Distillandi de Simplicibus, 1500) and The Big Book of Distillation (Liber
de Arte Distillandi de Compositis, 1512) being among the first of a long series
of distillation books.* Brunschwygk describes how to achieve the “essence” of a
substance by macerating it with water or spirit of wine (alcohol) and then
distilling ; and also how to construct a still. As his books were soon
translated into various vernaculars, the art of treating herbal remedies
chemically rapidly spread throughout Europe ; it was already partially
established by 1500, at least in Strasbourg, for Brunschwygk described the
practice of the surgeons and physicians he knew.
Although the official pharmacopoeia issued at Augsburg in 1564 lists
chemical remedies only for external use, in fact many substances totally
unrelated to herbs were prescribed at this time. As early as 1514 Giovanni da
Vigo had advocated giving mercury internally in the treatment of syphilis, not
merely externally as a salve, claiming infallible success. There was good
reason not to follow Vigo’s practice : mercury vapour was, of course, known to
be poisonous, and there was a possibility that liquid mercury was too. In fact
it is not, but taken internally in any considerable
* An interesting example is a work by
Gesner, published pseudonymously in Latin in 1552, and in English in several
different translations and under various titles, including the picturesque one
of The Newe Jewell of Health (1576).
160
amount it produces uncomfortable symptoms, including excessive
salivation. And doses were massive; it was said that some surgeons prescribed
so much mercury that their patients’ bones were found to be filled with mercury
instead of marrow! It was also expensive. No wonder that many physicians and
their patients preferred to trust guaiacum, the Holy Wood of the New World,
arguing that the remedy for a disease of die New World must be found there.
There were many attested cures; as guaiacum is totally without medical value
these cures were either imaginary, or else the initial diagnosis of syphilis
was wrong; but there were many failures as well. It was fear of the misuse of
mercury that caused the Augsburg Senate to warn apothecaries in 1582 not to
prepare “ substances which are known to be detrimental or poisonous, such as .
. . Turpethum minerale and other purging mercurials.” 22
Paracelsus leapt gleefully into the mercury-guaiacum debate on the side
of mercury, partly because it was the side of novelty against tradition, partly
because he believed in a homoeopathic principle that like must combat like, and
violent illnesses demanded violent treatments. He enthusiastically adopted also
the use of antimony, a newer and even more violent drug than mercury. Antimony
is an emetic; various antimonial compounds were used (though tartar emetic is
a slightly later preparation), but the simplest and most common method was to
fill a cup made of antimony with wine, allow it to stand overnight, and flrinV
the contents on rising. (No more eloquent testimony to the power of the drug is
needed.) Along with pure antimony * and mercury went their compounds, usually
prepared by the action of mineral adds (newly discovered in the fifteenth
century); these rejoiced in such names as Mercurius vitae (an antimonial preparation
which in feet contains no mercury), balm and regulus
* Antimony in this period always meant the
sulphide ore; the metal was called regulus of antimony.
of antimony, and spirit of quicksilver. Mineral acids, especially oil of
vitriol (sulphuric acid), were also enthusiastically adopted in medical use by
Paracelsus ; since his patients appear to have survived, perhaps he prescribed
these in the form of metallic salts. The most famous of Paracelsan remedies was
his Laudanum, praised by himself and his followers as an almost miraculously
curative substance ; this, rather oddly, was a mild herbal mixture, similar to
drugs known to Galen, and containing no opium ; it was later Paracelsans who
prepared their laudanum from opium.
Perhaps the violent nature of the new chemical remedies appealed to an
age in which new and extremely violent epidemic diseases—syphilis,
typhus—appeared to match the violence of war and religious controversy. Perhaps
their novelty had an attraction for an age prepared for newness; perhaps it was
merely desperation in the face of recurring disease. Certainly their use spread
rapidly, only partly under the aegis of the mystic medical theory of
Paracelsus. In spite of all official restrictions chemical remedies were
increasingly in demand by both patients and physicians. The so-called
iatrochemists (medical chemists) and chemical physicians were usually regarded
as followers of Paracelsus, though most of them were lukewarm partisans, accepting
the idea of chemical medicine but rejecting the extremes of medical mysticism
demanded by Paracelsus. One of the most fervent Paracelsans was Joseph Du
Chesne, generally known as Quercetanus; writing a defence of his own doctrines
in 1575 he said cautiously:
As touching Paracelsus I have not taken upon mee the defence of his
divinitie, neither did I ever thinke to agree with him in all points, as though
I were sworn to his doctrine : but ... I dare be bold to say and defend, that
he teacheth many things, almost divinely, in Phisicke, which the thankful
posteritie can never commend and praise sufficientlie.23 What
Quercetanus most commended in Paracelsus was his use
of metals and salts as drugs; this he made plain in his polemic On the
Truth of the Hermetic Medicine against Hippocrates and the Ancients (1603), a
panegyric on chemical remedies ; the English translator thoughtfully added
recipes for the use of converts. Another Paracelsan, Oswald Croll (1580-1609),
professor of medicine at the University of Marburg, in his Royal Chemistry
(Basilica Chymica, 1608) devoted bis energies to propaganda for the chemical
approach to medicine, declaring “ Without this chemical philosophy, all Physick
is but lifeless.” 24 His work achieved extensive popularity,
especially after it began to appear with practical advice on the use of
chemical drugs, added by another Marburg physician, Johann Hartman.
One of the oddest works on this subject was The Triumphal Chariot of
Antimony of Basil Valentine, supposedly a fifteenth- century Benedictine monk,
most probably in fact the German “ editor,” Johann Tholde ; this was published
in German in 1604 and subsequently in Latin, French and English. Like its
title, the book is presented in a misleadingly antiquated and alchemical style
; in fact it is a thorough investigation of the chemical and medical properties
of antimony, and an ardent defence of its use in medicine. The author gives
recipes for the preparation and administration of a wide variety of antimonial
drugs; he admits that chemical medicines are nearly all deadly poisons, but he
argues that chemists prepare them so that their poisonous nature is removed,
and that, besides, their derivation from poisons permits them to act as
antidotes to all poisonous ills, by their very nature.* The Triumphal Chariot
of Antimony had a profound influence on the acceptance of antimonial compounds
in medicine, and on the chemical study of metals.
* This continued to be a fruitful defence
in the seventeenth century, About 1650 the young Robert Boyle wrote “ An Essay
of Turning Poison; into Medicines,’* instancing this phenomenon as an example
of the infinfa goodness and diversity of the ways of God.
163
At the end of the century, as at the beginning, there was a new medicine
and an old; the new medicine was not now distinguished by its appreciation of
anatomy, but of chemistry. The old-fashioned physician defended “ Galenicals ”
(herbal preparations) ; the new physician championed “ Spagyric” (chemical)
drugs, and took a generally anti-Galenist position. Some moderates tried to
combine the two points of view; the German Daniel Sennert (1572-1637) tried to
show that every conceivable scientific position was reconcilable in medicine,
as the title of his most famous book—On the Agreement and Disagreement of the
Chemists with Aristotle and Galen (De Chymicorum cum Aristotelicis et Galenicis
Consensu ac Dissensu, 1619)—indicates. But the controversy continued to rage,
and conservative forces only slowly gave ground. The French king might issue
edicts against antimony, but its use was so extensive in Paris in the early
seventeenth century that the edict was soon rescinded. The English College of
Physicians was among the more conservative bodies in this respect, and as late
as 1665 a group of London physicians set up a “ Society of Chymical Physicians
” in opposition to the official body, contending that only violent chemical
medicine was adequate to deal with the Great Plague ; the fact that no
distinguished names appear in the new society indicates that it was perhaps as
much recognition of the mischief played by violent remedies as old-fashioned
adherence to tradition that produced reluctance to pin all dependence to
chemical drugs.
Chemical medicine had a doubtful influence on medicine : it had a wholly
benevolent effect upon the practice of chemistry. As the demand for the new
drugs grew, there was a corresponding demand for recipes. Apothecaries needed
instruction, and a new kind of chemist appeared to satisfy this demand. The
chemical teacher was also the first writer of chemical textbooks. One of the
earliest to establish a course of lectures for apothecaries was
164
the Frenchman Jean Beguin (c. 1550-1620), who in 1610 published a book
entitled Chemistry for Beginners (Tyrocinimi Chymicum) for the use of his
pupils ; though Beguin wrote in Latin, the work was soon available in
vernacular versions, and continued popular for nearly the whole of the century.
Begum’s aim was to teach “ the Art of dissolving natural mixed Bodies, and of
coagulating the same when dissolved, and of reducing them into salubrious,
safe, and grateful Medicaments ” ;25 to this end he wrote a work of
instruction, simple, precise and detailed. There was no room for alchemical
secretiveness in the works of the new chemical teachers. The new pharmacy soon
received official sanction ; in France, a royal decree ordered the establishment
of a chemical chair at the Jardin du Roi, the official botanic gardens, in
1626, and a number of useful textbooks appeared as a result. Chemistry was
already a university subject in some German medical faculties; it soon became a
commonplace adjunct. Whatever reservations conservative physicians might have,
chemical medicine was accepted and chemical drugs were indispensable. This was
a revolution in medical practice ; but it was a rational one, rather than the
mystic revolution proclaimed by Paracelsus. Iatrochemistry triumphed, but
Paracelsan chemico-medicine was even less acceptable than it had ever been.
Medical chemistry joined metallurgy and pyrotechnics as a practical craft.
RAVISHED BY MAGIC
The sciences themselves which have had better intelligence and
confederacy with the imagination of man than with his reason, are three in
number : Astrology, Natural Magic and Alchemy ; of which sciences nevertheless
die ends or pretences are noble.1
To the layman, the scientist has always seemed something of a magician,
seeing further into the mysteries of nature than other men, and by means to be
understood only by initiates. The line separating Copernicus or Vesalius,
ordering the stars and planets in their courses and penetrating to the
innermost secrets of construction of the human body, from Faust, selling bis
soul to the devil for the knowledge that is power, was narrow indeed to the
popular mind of the sixteenth century. Physician, alchemist, professor all then
wore the same long robe, which might mark either the scholar or the magician.
And when so much of what was new in science was concerned with the very frontiers
of knowledge, and dealt with almost unimaginable problems of the organisation,
complexity and harmony of Nature, scientists themselves were puzzled to know
certainly where natural philosophy stopped and mystic science began. When
problems failed to yield to traditional methods they were tempted to cry with
Faust,
Philosophy is odious and obscure;
Both Law and Physick are for petty wits;
Divinity is basest of the three,
Unpleasant, harsh, contemptible and vile :
’Tis magic, magic that hath ravished me.2
The difficulty was not that there was no difference between natural
philosophy and mystic science ; but rather that men saw that each rational
science had its magical, occult or supernatural counterpart. Applied astronomy
might be either navigation or astrology ; applied chemistry either metallurgy
or the search for the philosophers’ stone. Yet at the same time even the most
ardent practitioners of the mystic branches knew that their form of science was
not as intellectually or morally reputable as the more normal forms.
Astrologers were better paid than instrument makers, but even non-scientists
in the sixteenth century knew in their hearts that astrologers, like magicians,
gazed on things forbidden, though they also knew that not many of them were
really in league with die devil.
This aspect of the mystic sciences even lent them a certain glamour,
because forbidden learning was almost certain to be more exciting and more
important than mere licit knowledge. Certainly astrology flourished
outrageously in the sixteenth century, along with alchemy, natural magic (the
occult form of the not yet invented experimental physics), even spiritualism.
As later in the nineteenth century, the natural philosopher was attracted to
this last, the most occult of all the magical arts; yet John Dee, hiring a
medium to gaze at a crystal ball, became thereby no less an enlightened applied
mathematician than Sir Oliver Lodge, three centuries later, nullified his
contributions to physics by his addiction to stances and table rappings of a
not very different sort. In each case it was only essential for the scientist
to be aware of the difference between his two fields of interest; for in each
case he accepted mysticism as the road only to that knowledge inaccessible by
ordinary scientific means of investigation. The area to which magic could be
and was
applied in the sixteenth century was still very great; it is fascinating
to observe the way in which, out of the muddled mysticism of sixteenth-century
thought and practice, the scientifically valid problems were gradually sifted
out to leave only the dry chaff of superstition.
The attack on astrology by fifteenth-century humanists like Pico della
Mirandola had appealed particularly to literary men, already developing that
cool and rational scepticism so characteristic of Montaigne ; it had far less
influence on astronomers. Yet though there was no agonising re-appraisal in the
early sixteenth century, astrology was already noticeably on the defensive, and
was to remain so throughout the century. Society, while it continued to pay the
astrologer better than the astronomer, increasingly expressed its disapproval
of the “mathematician” who dabbled in the occult wisdom of the stars. And
“judicial astrology ” (the casting of personal horoscopes, as distinct from
general prognostication) was legally forbidden, though commonly practised. It
was a most tempting pursuit, especially in its medical aspects, for what
physician and what patient would not want to try all means to determine an
accurate prognosis ?
Indeed, many were introduced to astrology by medicine. Jean Femel,
educated as a physician, neglected to practise his profession for some years
because he found astrology so much more interesting ; as his sixteenth-century
biographer explained, contemplation of the stars and heavenly bodies excites
such wonder and charm in the human mind that, once fascinated by it, we are
caught in the toils of an enduring and delighted slavery, which holds us in
bondage and serfdom.*
Femel spent his own and his wife’s fortune on the construction of
“mathematical” (i.e. astrological) instruments, and only desisted under the
stem admonitions of his father-in-law and the necessity of earning a living.
This was about 1537, when the Paris medical faculty was enforcing the edict
against die practice
168
of astrology quite strictly. Indeed, only a year later the Parlement of
Paris, at the request of the faculty, publicly condemned Michael Servetus
(1509-53), then a pupil of Guinther von Andemach, later more famous as a
radical theologian, for giving public lectures on judicial astrology ; legal
proceedings being slow, he managed to forestall more severe punishment by
hastily publishing A Discourse in Favour of Astrology, a denunciation of Pico
and others and a defence of astrology on the grounds that it had been accepted
by both Plato and Galen. The Italian physician and mathematician Cardan
(1501-76) was, about the same time, an ardent practitioner of astrology, who
cast horoscopes of himself, his patients, and even, it was said, of Jesus
Christ; his patients might approve, but his colleagues regarded this as so
highly dubious a practice as almost to amount to malpractice.
Professional astronomers tended to take astrology for granted; there is
no doubt that most of them agreed with die common people that it was a
legitimate application of astronomical knowledge, as well as a useful way of
gaining a livelihood. They tended to avoid judicial astrology in the ordinary
way, preferring general prediction and calculation, though they all upon
occasion cast horoscopes for men of importance whose personal fortunes might
affect die well-being of nations. So Regiomontanus produced his Ephemerides,
the astrological almanacs which allowed others to calculate horoscopes and to
be aware of such significant events as eclipses and planetary conjunctions; a
common form of publication in the sixteenth century. There were general, nontechnical
works, like the Prognostication Everlasting, of the English practical
mathematician Leonard Digges, from which a literate man could derive useful
predictions. Every eclipse and every comet produced its spate of ephemeral
literature, asserting that these heavenly events foretold famine, war and
pestilence for mankind; this omnipresent trio never failed to oblige. (The
astronomer Kepler, in his first formal attempt at astrology, predicted
famine, a peasant uprising and war with the Turks for the year 1595, three
events which duly occurred.) Even Galileo cast horoscopes for his patron, the
Grand Duke of Tuscany, coolly rational as he might he on other occasions.
The greatest observational astronomer of the sixteenth century, Tycho
Brahe, had begun his astronomical career from astrological interest, and he
never lost either his preoccupation with astrology or his conviction that it
was true applied astronomy. The nova of 1572 provided him with a splendid
opportunity for prediction, of which he took full advantage whenever he wrote
about its scientific significance. As, so he thought, this was only the second
time in the history of the world that a nova had appeared, he was not hampered
by precedent, and was able to offer, for once, a cheerful prognostication. The
nova, he concluded after some years’ consideration, predicted a New Age—because
it followed the conjunction of Saturn and Jupiter by nine years and was
reinforced five years later by a comet—and foretold the future for the whole
world—because it lay in the eighth sphere. The New Age would be one of peace
and plenty ; it would begin in Russia in 1632, sixty years after the nova’s
appearance, and thence would spread all over the world. An enterprising London
printer published an English version in 1632 (entitled Learned Tico Brahe His
Astronomicall Coniectur of the New and Much Admired * Which Appeared in the
Year 1572) quite undeterred by the feet that Tycho’s original astronomical
prediction was patently inexact. But as Tycho had said, “ These Prognostic
matters are grounded only upon conjectural probabilitie,” * for the matter was
difficult; or, as he was to write later, “ it will hardly be possible to find
in this field a perfectly accurate theory that can come up to mathematical and
astronomical truth.” * Yet it was always worth trying, for “ we ought not to
imagine that God and Nature doth vainly mock us, with such new formed bodies,
170
which do presage nothing to the world.” 6 Indeed, after his
study of planetary orbits, he took Astrology up again from time to time, and...
arrived at the conclusion that this science, although it is considered idle and
meaningless not only by laymen but also by most scholars, among whom are even
several astronomers, is really more reliable than one would think; and this is
true not only with regard to meteorological influences and predictions of the
weather, but also concerning the predictions by nativities, provided that the
times are determined correctly, and that the courses of the stars and their
entrances into definite sections of the sky are utilized in accordance with the
actual sky, and that their directions of motion and revolutions are correctly
worked out.
But, though he was sure his astrological method was correct, he would not
make it public. “ For it is not given to everybody to know how to use it on his
own, without superstition or excessive confidence, which it is not wise to show
towards created things.” 7
This tendency to keep esoteric knowledge secret, because only the
initiated can be trusted with it, is the chief reason why the magical sciences
are so obscure ; their practitioners wrote long, passionate apologies and
defences, but seldom revealed their methods. Astrology was, for a mystical
science, singularly open in its methods; alchemy by contrast was the most
secretive. Tycho, who practised alchemy along with astrology, defended himself
again on the grounds that not everyone was to be trusted with such powerful
knowledge. As he explained:
I also made with much care alchemical investigations or chemical
experiments... the substances treated are somewhat analogous to the celestial
bodies anddieir influences, for which reason I usually call this science
terrestrial Astronomy. I have
been occupied by this subject as much as by celestial studies from my
twenty-third year, trying to gain knowledge... and up to now I have with much
labour and at great expense made a great many discoveries with regard to metals
and minerals as well as precious stones and plants and similar substances.
I shall be willing to discuss these questions frankly with princes and
noblemen and other distinguished and learned people, who are interested in the
subject and know something about it, and I shall occasionally give them
information, so long as I feel sure of their good intentions and their secrecy.
For it serves no useful purpose, and is unreasonable, to make such 1-Kings
generally known, since although many people pretend to understand them, it is
not given to everybody to treat these mysteries properly according to the
demands of nature and in an honest and beneficial way.8 Most
alchemists shared Tycho’s arrogant certainty that only the alchemist could
judge whom to initiate into the " subtle science of holy alchemy,” and
that only initiates could be trusted. Certainly they were successful in keeping
their meaning secret, and few who are not alchemists can pretend to understand
what they wrote on the subject.
By the fifteenth century alchemy, a relative late-comer to Europe, was
firmly established, and laymen had learned that most alchemists were cheats.
Yet there is no doubt that many alchemists shared Tycho’s conviction that the
toilsome life of the alchemical laboratory could lead to something higher than
the making of gold. An instructive example is the English Ordinall of Alchimy
(1477) of Thomas Norton of Bristol, a longish work in rather doggerel verses of
great if naive charm. Norton' had the highest aims, and his alchemy is
thoroughly Christianised: only die upright and pure can succeed in the work and
only a devout apprentice can hope to learn it from his equally devout master.
Masterfully marvellous and Archemastry Is the tincture of holy Alchemy A
wonderful Science, secret Philosophy,
A singular grace and gift of th’almighty :
Which never was found by labour of Man,
But it by Teaching or Revelation began.
It was never for Money sold nor bought,
By any Man which for it hath sought:
But given to an able Man by grace.’
Norton described his own apprenticeship, and catalogued some of the
technical processes, like the degrees of fire and the hierarchy of colour ;
though he professed to be writing clearly and simply so that all could
understand, and though his mysticism was comparatively simple, one cannot
learn much about alchemical processes from him- Most alchemical treatises are
similar : fairly clear on processes like calcination, distillation,
sublimation, digestion, rather vague on recipes, shot through with an ancient
and complex symbolism that readily lent itself to illustration in printed
books, but did not so readily lend itself to comprehension.
By 1500 alchemy was becoming even more mystic in the face of competition
from the technical chemical processes which provided so many instructive and
detailed books ifl. the sixteenth century, delightfully illustrated and written
in dear, simple, layman’s language. These covered a multitude of subjects and
varied from Brunschwygk’s books on distillation (1500 and 1512) ; and die litde
German Bergbiichlein and Probierbiichlein, Agricola’s great Latin treatise De
Re Metallica {1556), all on mining and assaying; Biringucdo’s Italian treatise
on metals and minerals (Pirotechnia, 154°)» Neri’s Art of Glass (1612). All
were more informative and instructive than any alchemical work, and made the
alchemist seem by comparison excessively secretive, obscure and occult. These
authors despised alchemy ; Bitingucdo remarked scornfully:
The more I look into this art of theirs, so highly praised and so greatly
desired by men, the more it seems a vain wish and fanciful dream that it is
impossible to realize unless someone should find some angelic spirit as patron
or should operate through its own divinity. Granted the obscurity of its
beginnings and the infinite processes and concordances that it needs in order
to reach its destined maturity, I do not understand how anyone can reasonably
believe that such artists can ever do what they say and promise.10
Biringuccio distinguished two kinds of alchemy. One “ takes its enlightenment
from the words of wise philosophers . . . This they call the just, holy and
good way, and they say that in this they are but imitators and assistants to
Nature.” This is at once the better branch, and the more fascinating; “ it is
indeed so ingenious a thing and one so delightful to students of natural things
that they cannot forego the expenditure of all possible time, labour, or
expense,” because it continually produces something new, especially such
useful results as medicines, colours for painting, and perfumes. Even though
somewhat uncertain and suspect, this was a science to be tolerated. But there
was another form of alchemy, a “ sister or illegitimate daughter ” to enlightened
alchemy which was so evil that “ usually only criminals or practisers of fraud
exercise it. It is an art founded only on appearance and show ... it has the
power of deceiving the judgement as well as the eye ... it contains only vice,
fraud, loss, fear and shameful infamy.”11 This corrupting form was
tie tricky and cheating alchemy the rational man laughed at, and it was
practised by the alchemist of derisory literature from Chaucer’s Canon's
Yeomans Tale of the late fourteenth century to Ben Jonson’s Alchemist of die
early seventeenth. Few ever believed tie claims of the alchemist to have made
real gold, though tie alchemist maintained his claims undeterred.
The late sixteenth century saw a number of notorious claims to transmutation;
in a sense these men truly succeeded in making gold, for they all acquired vast
sums from credulous patrons, at least for a while. (Whether they believed in
their own claims it is often difficult to tell.) Edward Kelly, whom Jonson mentions
by name, was apparently as much of a fraud in alchemy as he was in the
crystal-gazing which led John Dee to follow him half over Europe ; Kelly’s
imposture proved too obvious even for the credulous Emperor Rudolf, and Kelly
ended his life trying to escape from the prisons of Prague. A more ambiguous
figure is the Scotsman Alexander Seton (d. 1604), known as the Cosmopolite, who
was reported to have performed prodigies of transmutation on his way through
Holland in 1602. After wandering through Germany, always receptive to mystic
science and where he had great success, transmuting even iron by means of a
mysterious red (or perhaps yellow) powder, he finally arrived at the court of
the Elector of Saxony, where his success was also remarkable. Too remarkable,
because the Elector decided he needed to know what the powder was ; when Seton
refused to divulge his secret, he was tortured and imprisoned, and only rescued
by a sympathetic and clever fellow practitioner, Michael Sendivogius. Seton
died soon after his rescue, bequeathing his remaining supply of powder to
Sendivogius, but not the secret of its composition. Both Seton and Sendivogius
were convinced of the realities of transmutation; yet at the same time, and
while writing with an excessive amount of symbolism, they did have some idea of
chemical theory. Indeed Seton was one of the first to discuss the theory that
there are nitre or nitrous particles in the air which play an essential role in
combustion. The ideas of Seton and Sendivogius (it is impossible to separate
them) were set out at large in a very popular work, New Light on Chemistry
(Nomm Lumen Chymicum, 1604), which purported to be by Sendivogius, but is
probably really by Seton. The
book is a fair enough example of the new theoretical alchemy that
developed in the early seventeenth century ; it has far more chemical content
than the older works, but was still deliberately obscure and semi-mystic.
The most famous—and most baffling—figure of sixteenth- century alchemy,
as well as the best known, is Paracelsus (14931541). Paracelsus had a great
fascination for his contemporaries, and has often charmed those who have made
his acquaintance since : there are many who, painstakingly searching through
his enormous collection of writings, claim to have found much of philosophical
and scientific import; he has been called the first systematiser in chemistry,
a great naturalist and a great mystic philosopher.* Others have been violently
repelled, and found his writings obscure, unduly superstitious, and
scientifically worthless. Everything about him is so complex and difficult that
almost any interpretation is justified. Even his name is surrounded with
obscurity. By the end of his life he was known as Philippus Aureolus
Theophrastus Bombastus von Hohenheim Paracelsus, though at the beginning
Bombast von Hohenheim only appears. His parentage was dubious ; his father,
William von Hohenheim, was apparently an illegitimate son of the German noble
whose name he bore, and his mother was (probably) of peasant origin. Though he
grew up in a small Swiss mining village, and nearly always wrote in the local
dialect, with many Latin words mingled where required, he seems to have been
well educated in the traditional subjects, though whether he ever formally
studied medicine is uncertain. His whole life is obscurely full of wandering ;
whenever he settled down his violent actions and prejudices soon aroused
equally violent opposition—as when he burned the books of Galen and Avicenna in
a students’ bonfire at Basle on St. John’s Eve, 1527—and
* Most translations of bis works have been
made by those holding this view; this has tended to make them clearer than
Paracelsus left them.
he was forced to move on. Like the philosopher Giordano Bruno, he was
equally adept at attracting disciples and repelling colleagues.
Paracelsus wrote enormously, and not always consistently, on all sorts of
subjects; for he shared to the full the Renaissance passion for novelty and
universality. He combined iconoclasm with appeal to ‘ experience/ primarily mystic
experience. He attacked reason because it was opposed to magic, and magic was
to him the best key to experience :
Magic has power to experience and fathom things which are inaccessible to
human reason. For magic is a great secret wisdom, just as reason is a great
public folly. Therefore it would be desirable and good for doctors of theology
to know something about it, and to understand what it actually is, and cease
unjustly and unfoundedly to call it witchcraft.12
His attitude to alchemy is complex : he certainly believed that the
alchemist should be more concerned with the preparation of drugs than with
transmutation—partly because he was aware of the alchemist’s dubious
reputation—but at the same time he insisted that alchemy could best be described
as “ an adequate explanation of the properties of all the four elements—that is
to say of the whole cosmos—and an introduction into die art of their
transformation.”13
Both alchemy and medicine were, he thought, controlled by an archeus and
a vulcanus and both were associated with the arcana. Vulcanus and archeus
together effect all chemical and medical operations; they work together, but
separately, and the archeus is an inner vulcanus. Thus in the Labyrinth of
Errant Physicians he wrote:
This is the way that nature proceeds with us in God’s creatures, and as
follows from what I have said before, nothing is frilly made, that is, nothing
is made in the form
of ultimate matter. Instead all tilings are made as prime matter and
subsequently the vulcanus goes over it and makes it into ultimate matter
through the art of alchemy. The archeus, the inner vulcanus, proceeds in the
same way, for he knows how to circulate and prepare according to the pieces and
the distribution, as the art itself [alchemy] does with sublimation,
distillation, reverberation, etc. For all these arts are in men just as they
are in the outer alchemy, which is the figure of them. Thus the vulcanus and
the archeus separate each other. That is alchemy, which brings to its end that
which has not come to its end, which extracts lead from its ore and works it up
to lead, that is the task of alchemy. Thus there are alchemists of the metals,
and likewise alchemists who treat minerals, who make antimony from antimony,
sulphur from sulphur, vitriol from vitriol, and salt into salt. Learn thus to
recognize what alchemy is, that it alone is that which prepares the impure
through fire and makes it pure.14 This might conceivably mean that
Paracelsus thought of alchemy as practical metallurgy, but it is more likely,
in view of his other writings, that he never clearly understood the nature of
technical processes; he certainly did not understand what happens when a metal
was chemically extracted from its ore.
His most important purely chemical work is the Archidoxis written about
1525 and published posthumously in 1569); even here the microcosm, man, was
always discussed in connection with the mysteries of the macrocosm. Paracelsus
was much influenced by the work on distillation of the late fifteenth century,
combining its technique with the alchemical theory of elements. The result was
conviction that to attain the quintessence one must separate the elements by
fire, “ for all things must go through fire in order to attain to a new birth,
in which they are useful to man.”1S Confusingly, Paracelsus spoke
both of the
Aristotelian elements—earth, air, fire and water—and the three chemical
principles—salt (solidity), sulphur (inflammability, malleability, yellowness)
and mercury (fluidity, density and metallic nature). Metals he took to have a
special importance, an importance enhanced by the ease with which, so he said,
the elements could be separated from them. The processes he described, some
comprehensible and some not, are usually those of metallurgical preparation and
alchemical endeavour to make the perfect metal, combined in a peculiarly
obscure fashion and designed for obscure ends. Paracelsus seems to have been
genuinely, if not necessarily intimately, familiar with the processes he
described, but not in the least original in devising new ones; there is not one
single chemical discovery ascribable to him.
His real achievement was to excite disciples to turn to a modification
of traditional alchemy, replacing mediaeval symbolism with Renaissance symbolism,
and traditional alchemical interest in metals with a new medical interest.
Paracelsan alchemists laid stress on alchemy as the key to medicine, either
through the preparation of drugs or the chemical interpretation of physiology
(die chemistry of the archeus being already vitalistic, this was the easier to
do). There was still a great interest in metallic reactions and processes in an
attempt to separate out the elements : this involved die conversion of metals
(and metallic minerals like antimony, always in the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries the sulphide ore, not the metal) from their natural forms by calcination
and the action of fire into “ passive ” forms in which they might more easily
be acted upon by the archeus.
This kind of alchemy was more talked about than practised by Paracelsus
himself; die real Paracelsans in this case are his later followers. One of the
most interesting and influential works of this sort is the Triumphal Chariot of
Antimony of “ Basil Valentine ”; this is often obscurely worded and its aim is
certainly difficult to
understand, but it contains a wealth of information about antimony and
its compounds, and many new processes. Though it displays much alchemical
symbolism of a fairly obvious sort, there is none of the rhodomontade mysticism
of Paracelsus, and much of the book is recognisably about chemistry. Even the
consideration of elements reads more clearly than Paracelsus could have phrased
it:
Mercury is both inwardly and outwardly pure fire ; therefore no fire can
destroy it, no fire can change its essence. It flees from the fire, and
resolves itself spiritually into an incombustible oil; but when it is once
fixed no cunning of man can volatilize it again.16 The generation of
metals is here considered a natural process: The first principle is a mere
vapour extracted from the elementary earth through the heavenly planets, and,
as it were, divided by the sidereal distillation of the Macrocosmus. This
sidereal infusion, descending from on high into those things which are below,
with the aero-sulphureous property, so acts and works as to engraft on them in
a spiritual and invisible manner a certain strength and virtue.
Thisvapourafterwards resolves itself in the earth into a kind of water, and out
of this mineral water all metals are generated and perfected.17
In spite of its cosmic beginning, this is essentially closer in spirit to
the theories of those who wrote about mining and smelting metals than to those
who wrote about transmuting them. Most of the Triumphal Chariot of Antimony is
devoted to describing the preparation of innumerable antimony compounds—glass,
liver, regulus, flowers, arcanum, mercury, and best of all, the star— each
readily identifiable. Rather disappointingly, the arcanum turns out to be
merely sal ammoniac (ammonium chloride) distilled with spirit of vitriol
(sulphuric add) and spirit of wine (alcohol), the original antimony having been
thrown away in the first “ operation”; the final result was (probably) ether.
(This
is the first record of its preparation.) The “ star ” of antimony was
made by smelting the regulus of antimony (the metal) and allowing it to cool
slowly, especially in the presence of iron, to form a characteristic
crystalline structure; this was a phenomenon which, it was felt, must indicate
that the alchemist was well set on the road to discovery, and many methods of
preparing it were discussed all through the seventeenth century. As the author
of the Triumphal Chariot expressed it, “ Antimony is a mineral made of a
terrestrial vapour changed into water, which sidereal change is the true Star
of Antimony.”14 No doubt he knew. All such operations upon metals as
here described involved prodigious quantities of strong mineral adds, and for
the first time these became essential reagents in chemical practice.
The introduction of alchemy into medicine was not so strange as it might
appear, for medicine also was, in some aspects, an occult sdence. Certainly
astrological prediction played an important role in prognosis; just as true
magic played a role in therapeutics. Femel, in his physiological treatise On
the Hidden Causes of Things, found it well to explain that No magic can create
the real thing as it is; it can only produce a semblance or ghost of a thing,
which deceives the mind as does a conjurer’s trick. Hence magic does not cure;
it is never sure or safe ; it is always capridous and perilous.
I have seen a jaundice of the whole body removed in a single night by a
scrap of writing on a paper hung round the neck. But the malady soon returns,
and may be worse than before. The cure is plainly fictitious and merely
makeshift.1®
In spite of his (moderate) scepticism of the methods of his fellow
practitioners, it never occurred to Femel that many of the ingredients of the
drugs he prescribed—powdered skull or filings of loadstone—were equally
magical, as were many of the more
181
noxious drugs. Paracelsus was not being any more mystic than his
contemporaries when he explained that the emerald is a green transparent stone.
It does good to the eyes and memory. It defends chastity ; and if this be
violated by him who carries it, the stone itself does not remain perfect.20
Most sixteenth-century physicians would have agreed. But Paracelsus’
acceptance of the doctrine of signatures—the theory that each and every natural
object has stamped upon it some sign of its utility to the relief of man’s
ills—was far more wholehearted tbftTi was the case with most physicians, and
more literally insisted upon. Thus he wrote:
Behold the Satyrion root, is it not formed like the male privy parts ?
Accordingly magic discovered it and revealed that it can restore a man’s
virility and passion. And then we have the thistle: do not its leaves prick
like needles ? Thanks to this sign, the art of magic discovered that there is
no better herb against internal pricking. The Siegwurz root is wrapped in an
envelope like armour, and this is a magic sign showing that like armour it
gives protection against weapons. And the Syderica bears the image and form of
a snake on each of its leaves, and thus, according to magic, it gives
protection against any kind of poisoning.21 Paracelsus was stating
explicitly the theory behind the practice ; such herbs continued to be used
well into the seventeenth century (and beyond in popular medicine) though fewer
knew the magical reason for their efficacy as time went on.
Thomas Norton, explaining that the word “ alchemy ” derives from a, King
Alchimus, a noble “ clerk ” who laboured long to find the “ work,” added that
King Hermes also he did the same Being a Clerk of Excellent fame ;
In his Quadripartite made of Astrology,
Of Physic [medicine] and of this Art of Alchemy,
And also of Magic natural
As of four sciences in nature passing all.2*
Of all the mystical and occult sciences, natural magic was, ultimately,
the most fruitful. Superficially, natural magic was to natural philosophy what
astrology was to astronomy, but in fact it dealt with problems with which
natural philosophy had failed to cope. It was, besides, a far more truly
empirical art than astrology or even alchemy. When sixteenth-century writers on
die occult tried to defend magic as the key to nature—as they did by deriving
the word “ mage ” from Persian, in which it was supposed to mean “ a wise man,
or a Philosopher, so that Magic contained both Natural Magic and the
Mathematicks ” 23—it was natural magic which supported their
contention. The German writer Agrippa von Nettesheim (c. 1486-c. 1534), author
of The Vanity of Arts and Sciences (1530) as well as numerous books on the occult,
took Natural Magick ... to be nothing else, but the chief power of all the
natural sciences ; which therefore they call die top and perfection of Natural
Philosophy, and which is indeed the active part of the same, which by the
assistance of natural forces and faculties, through their mutual and opportune
application, performs those things that are above Humane Reason.24
Natural magic, as Agrippa here implied, was die study of the occult and
mysterious forces of nature by natural means rather than by supernatural ones ;
it thus differed from pure magic both in its means and in its ends, which were
benign rather than demonic. As the Italian G. B. della Porta (d. 1615) wrote in
1589:
There are two sorts of Magic: the one is infamous, and unhappy, because
it hath to do with foul spirits, and consists
of Enchantments and wicked Curiosity ; and this is called
Sorcery The other Magic is
natural; which all excellent
wise men do admit and embrace, and worship with great applause; neither
is there any more highly esteemed, or better thought of, by men of learning.25
The forces which natural magic undertook to investigate were sympathies and
antipathies, signatures, magnetic attractions, the virtues of stones and herbs,
mechanical arts, optical illusion—all strange by-lanes of nature over which the
natural magician alone had control. Hence his contemporary English name of
Arche- master. The scope of his domain was ably outlined by the mafhrtnaririan
John Dee who in his preface to the first English translation of Euclid (1570)
wrote not only on the dignity and importance of mathematics, pure and applied,
but on the study of nature in all its aspects. He was particularly eloquent
about the potentialities of Archemastry :
This Art, teacheth to bring to actual experience sensible, all worthy
conclusions by all the Arts Mathematical proposed, and by true Natural
Philosophy concluded : and both addeth to them a farther scope, in the terms of
the same Arts, and also by his proper Method, and in peculiar terms, proceedeth
with help of the foresaid Arts, to the performance of complete Experiences,
which of no particular Art, are able (formally) to be challenged.. .. Science I
may call it, rather, than an Art: for the excellency and Mastership it hath,
over so many, and so mighty Arts and Sciences. And because it proceedeth by
Experiences, and searcheth forth the causes of Conclusions, by Experiences :
and also putteth the Conclusions themselves, in Experience, it is named of some
Scientia Experimentalist Dee thought that archemastry exceeded observational
sciences like astronomy and optics in the attention it gave to “ doctrine
Experimental!.” One must, of course, be wary of the word “experience” in the
sixteenth century: to Paracelsus and other
mystics it meant all too often occult experience, just as seeing with
one’s own eyes meant denying orthodox doctrine. But Dee, though a mystic
himself on other occasions, here truly meant genuine observation of nature; for
Dee, as for others, natural magic was near to becoming experimental science. On
occasion indeed, sixteenth-century natural magic was indisringnkViaVilp from
true experimental science in its investigation of the effects of mysterious
forces by means of observation and experiment. Natural magic and experimental
science finally parted company when the latter was allied to that particular
form of natural philosophy known as the mechanical which endeavoured to
understand both the effects of such mysterious forces, and fVir cause, in truly
rational terms. So, for example, when magnetism could be successfully explained
by a consideration of the orientation of the particles of die loadstone, or
the rainbow by a consideration of reflection and refraction of light, natural
magic lost its importance and became not archemastry, but conjuring. But this
was not finally to happen until the middle of the seventeenth century.
The best natural magic, by understanding nature, sought to master and
control it; it thus shared the power ascribed later by Francis Bacon
(1561-1626) * to experimental science. Bacon indeed was well aware of the close
relationship between the two, though he saw that natural magic had a side
characterised by charlatanry, which was not the case with experimental science.
Bacon accurately described natural magic as The science which applies the
knowledge of hidden forms to the production of wonderful operations; and by
uniting (as they say) actives with passives, displays the wonderful works of
nature.27 This was its worthy side; there was also that “ popular
and degenerate ” side which
* See below, ch. viil 185
flutters about so many boob, embracing certain credulous and
superstitious traditions and observations concerning sympathies and
antipathies, and hidden and specific properties, with experiments for the most
part frivolous, and wonderful rather for the skill with which the theory is
concealed and masked than for the thing itself.
The two aspects of natural magic, serious and popular, experimental and
mystic, noted by Bacon in the 1620 s are characteristic of the subject
throughout the sixteenth century. Most works on natural magic were written with
an eye to laymen, who even then enjoyed reading about and perhaps performing
simple and ingenious experiments. A good example is On Subtlety (1551 in Latin,
and then translated into French) by the Italian physician and mathematician
Cardan. Cardan combined mathematics, mysticism and medicine in a successful
amalgamation, rfrnngh even he could not always quite keep his various
jnt-pr^fc separate. The subjects of On Subtlety are those things which are
perceived by the senses, but which the intellect comprehends with difficulty
if at all: the realm of natural magic, in feet. When Cardan discussed such things
as the nature of the four elements, his real interest was in mechanical
contrivances. He described a gimbal-mounting for keeping a chair stable on the
deck of a ship at sea (the so-called Cardan’s suspension), fireworks
(introduced in a consideration of fire), pumps (introduced in a consideration
of water), meteorology (the phenomena associated with air), geology (the
phenomena associated with the element earth), optics, the burning glass, gems
and their influence and activities (including the electrical action of rubbed
amber), the virtues of plants, the generation of animals, the character and
temperament of man, the phenomena associated with the senses of hearing and
smell, the nature of the intellect and die soul of man, arts and crafts,
marvels, and demons. The result is an experimentally oriented version of a
mediaeval Summa, with
the emphasis on the forces of sympathy and antipathy, rather than on the
more orthodox explanations of scholastic natural philosophy.
In vitalising such forces as sympathy and antipathy lay the key to
natural magic, for the natural magician regarded them as the dominant forces of
nature. Cardan was by no means the first to treat them in detail; die physician
Fracastoro had written a book on the subject in 1546. Here he discussed such
diverse questions as why the magnet turns to the north, how the remora or
sucking fish stops a ship (he believed that the fish lived near magnetic
mountains, which were responsible for the effect) and how the seeds of
contagion of a disease happened to affect one person and not another.
Fracastoro’s work is more theoretical and less experimental than later works on
natural magic, but he shared with their authors a preoccupation with such
mystic forces as were involved in the attraction of iron to the loadstone or of
chaff to rubbed amber.
The famous treatise on Natural Magic of della Porta (published in 1558,
revised and enlarged in 1589 ; both editions were often reprinted) was frankly
a work of popularisation even though written in Latin. Porta made a parade of
learning, but his interest was really that of the party conjurer who deceives
the eye by the quickness of his hand or mind before demonstrating how die thing
was done. In effect, Porta treats the same subjects as Cardan, but without the
interest in natural philosophy which made Cardan discuss the phenomena
associated with each element in turn; Porta was more interested in tricks, such
as how to make near things seem far, how to make a plain woman appear beautiful
(or, cruelly, to detect the methods she has used to try to appear beautifid).
Biology for Porta was the production of strange new plants and animals;
metallurgy the study of apparent changes in metals; the chapter on gems deals
with counterfeiting. There is, on the one hand, a miscellany of
information about practical affairs—housekeeping, cooking, medicine,
distillation, Hunting and fishing—on the other hand there are chapters on
magnetism, optics, hydraulics, statics which are superior to those of Cardan.
Underlying the whole is the belief that by observing the sympathies and
antipathies associated with natural objects, one can arrive at an understanding
of their essential nature and a control of their virtues, since it is by means
of the hidden virtues (or forces) of things that apparent wonders are
performed.
Porta wished to explain how apparent wonders actually came about, just as
he was genuinely interested in trying and testing the marvels he wrote of;
indeed, he had some real comprehension of the role of experiment in investigation.
His chapter on the loadstone is much concerned with such trivia as how to move
figures of men and animals placed on a table without touching them, effected by
making them of iron, and moving a loadstone held under the table. Yet at the
same time he concerned himself with more important and complex properties of
the loadstone which he tried, often ingeniously, to test experimentally. And
he showed a most healthy scepticism about some of the more surprising powers
attributed to the loadstone. Whereas Agricola solemnly repeated the story that
one could destroy the virtue of a magnetic compass by rubbing it with garlic,
or even by breathing on it after eating garlic, Porta reported that
It is a common Opinion amongst Sea-men, That Onyons and Garlick are at
odds with the Loadstone : and Steersmen, and such as tend the Mariners Card
are forbid to eat Onyons or Garlick, lest they make the Index of the Poles
drunk. But when I tried all these thing*, I found them to be false: for not
onely breathing and belching upon the Loadstone after eating of Garlick, did
not stop its vertues : but when it was all anoynted over with the juice of
Garlick,
188
it did perform its office as well as if it had never been touched with
it.*8 .
Nor did Porta concern himself with the ever-popular notions of magnetic
mountains or die magnetic island described so vividly by Olaus Magnus in his
History of the Northern Nations (Historia de Gentibus Septentrionalibus, 1555),
a great compendium of wonders (which even described the sticks of wood on which
one could slide over the surface of snow).
Porta’s optical marvels are more often than not perfectly respectable
experiments presented in a context of wonder such as the use of a lens as a
burning glass, the use of magnifying lenses, the building of a camera obscura.
His pneumatical experiments are also perfectly sound examples of simple
engineering, mainly derived from Hero of Alexandria’s Pneumatics, a work of the
first century a.d. dealing with the
physical nature of air, and the ways in which its elastic powers could be used
to work mechanical contrivances. The late fifteenth century gave it considerable
attention, and it received a Latin translation at the hands of die
mathematician Commandino (1509-75) in 1575. It was subsequently translated into
Italian by several authors. Cardan had known something of Hero ; Porta had
access to the Latin version. Later the book became the model for a host of
others dealing with mechanical toys and wonders,* like Jean Leurechon’s
Ricriations Mathimatiques (1624) and Gaspar Ens* Mathematical Thaumaturge
(1628), whidi are natural magic without any serious element of mystic belief.
Its influence is also reflected in serious sixteenth-century engineering works,
like those of Jacques Besson, and—at the other extreme—in the work of avowed
mystics like Robert Fludd. Here humanism and natural
* Hero’s book was one of those which
Regiomontanus intended to print; it is perhaps significant that Regiomontanus
was supposed to have built many mechanical animals, including a fly and an
eagle, both of which were reputed to fly as if living.
magic combined ; all discussions of air, atmosphere, the vacuum, and of
contrivances worked by air and water pressure, derive equally from Hero and
from the basic content of natural magic.
Clearer proofs, in the discovery of secrets, and in the investigations
of the hidden causes of things, being afforded by trustworthy experiments and
by demonstrated arguments, than by the probable guesses and opinions of the
ordinary professors of philosophy : so, therefore, that the noble substance of
that great magnet, our common mother (the earth), hitherto quite unknown, and
the conspicuous and exalted powers of this our globe, may be the better
understood, we have proposed to begin with the common magnetick, stony, and
iron material, and with magnetical bodies, and with the nearer parts of the
earth which we can reach with our hands and perceive with our senses; then to
proceed with demonstrable magnetick experiments ; and so penetrate, for the
first time, into the innermost parts of the earth.2*
So William Gilbert (1540-1603) addressed “The Candid Reader, studious of
the Magnetick Philosophy ” whom he hoped to attract to his great work On the
Magnet, Magnetick Bodies also, and on the great magnet the Earth ; a new
Physiology, demonstrated by many arguments and experiments (De Magnete, 1600).
This, the first full-length treatise on the magnet, is often taken to be the
first great work in modem experimental science, and its claim is supported by
more than the title. But it is also, and more certainly, the last important
work in natural magic, for Gilbert’s work is closer to Dee’s archemastry than
any other sixteenth- century attempt to study the hidden forces of nature.
Gilbert showed how successful the experimental investigation of such forces
could be; but he was not outside the tradition. Most of
the “ magnetical ” writers whose ideas Gilbert quoted (not always, though
usually, in derision) are those who had regarded magnetism as occult; indeed,
Gilbert’s first chapter is almost a bibliography of works on natural magic.
Gilbert’s method was not very different from that of Porta ; many of his
experiments were very like those of earlier writers; and he was still, as
befitted a physician, equally interested in the medicinal properties of the
loadstone. He was more ingenious, more thorough, more curious, and possessed of
a better power of evaluating experimental results. Hence, though his aim was
that of previous writers, his conclusions are more striking and more important.
Gilbert was interested in more sweeping problems than the mere behaviour
of objects under the force of attraction, though he investigated such behaviour
most thoroughly. This is amply illustrated by his first great conclusion : that
die Earth itself is a magnet. As a consequence, loadstones must be nothing but
iron ore magnetised by lying in the correct orientation to the magnetic poles
of the Earth; and when smiths produced magnetism in the bars of iron they
hammered, this was because the iron lay in a North-South line, and like natural
iron ore, was affected by the magnetic poles of the Earth. The compass needle
must point to the North because it was attracted by die terrestrial pole (not
the celestial, as earlier writers had thought). From this it followed, Gilbert
believed, that the variation of the compass needle from true North was caused “
by die inequality of the projecting parts of the Earth,”30 which is
an engagingly rationalistic explanation.
When he came to examine the phenomenon of attraction, Gilbert for the
first time clearly distinguished between magnetism —the attraction of die
loadstone for iron—and electricity *—the
* Though Gilbert did not use the word
electricity, he did coin the term electrics for those bodies which acquire the
power of attracting light objects when subjected to friction.
attraction after rubbing of hard translucent objects like amber, jet,
some gems, glass, resin, sulphur for any small, light bodies. Gilbert designed
the first electroscope (versorium, he called it), a lightly poised metal
needle, to assist his careful examination of electrics and his attempt to find
out what changes in their physical state, such as those caused by heating and
chilling, would do to their powers of attraction. Even in his brief
investigation of electricity, Gilbert proceeded with a thoroughness of experimental
detail which is utterly captivating. And in those sections which treat of the
magnetic nature of the Earth, the nature of the loadstone, the methods by which
its attractive force can be strengthened, and the investigation of its
directive force, Gilbert provides a wonderful array of interesting and
ingenious experiment mostly original, as he grandiosely indicated by the guidebook
device of small and large stars in the margin. Many of these experiments
involved the use of his favourite “ terrella ” or spherical loadstone, which he
truly imagined to be, in its behaviour, the Earth in miniature.
Gilbert also, like his contemporaries, attempted to find out how to use
the properties of terrestrial magnetism to aid navigation. Variation from true
North had been known for a couple of centuries, and Columbus had been
fascinated by the discovery that it changed from East in the Mediterranean, to
zero off the Azores, to West as he proceeded westward across the Atlantic. By
1599 there had been a long period of collection of data, which many hoped could
be used for longitude determination if the data were plotted on a global grid.
This method was advocated by the Dutch engineer and mathematician Simon Stevin
(15481620) in his aptly entitled Havenfinding Art, Or the Way to Find Any
Haven Or Place Appointed at Sea (published in Dutch and English in 1599)*
Gilbert was doubtful: he thought variation was affected by many forces and
changed from place
192
to place in too complicated a fashion to make it accessible in
navigation.
Gilbert preferred to think that position could be determined from the
recently discovered dip (inclination). Dip had first been described by a contemporary
of Gilbert, Robert Norman, a London instrument-maker. He was accustomed to magn
his needles after they were mounted, and found difficulties with long needles,
which dipped so violently towards the compass card that their ends touched
before the needle was stable. Faced with this problem, Norman studied the
matter seriously, devised a declinometer to measure the amount of dip, and
published his ideas in a little book quaintly entitled The Newe Attractive
(1581). Gilbert extended Norman’s work with the help of the terrella, and
discussed die possibility of devising a very elaborate grid, together with a
special quadrant, whereby measurement of dip could be used to establish
latitude at sea. The advantage of Gilbert’s method of latitude determination
was that it could be used in cloudy weather, so, though difficult, it had
merit. It is the first contribution to the art of navigation by experimental
science, as distinct from mathematical science, and Gilbert had some reason to
be proud of his suggestion ; as he boasted,
We may see how far from unproductive magnetick philosophy is, how
agreeable, how helpful, how divine! Sailors when tossed about on the waves with
continuous cloudy weather, and unable by means of the celestial luminaries to
learn anything about the place or region in which they are, with a very slight
effort and with a small instrument are comforted, and learn the latitude of the
place.31 He never knew that dip, like variation, changes with time
as well as place, and that neilher latitude nor longitude can be determined
magnetically.
In spite of occasional encomiums on die “ magnetick philosophy,” and
digressions on the feeble reasoning powers of his
predecessors, Gilbert maintained a steady experimental outlook through
nearly three-quarters of his book. He had steadfastly interested himself in
experiments to illustrate the magnetic abilities of the loadstone, and had
given little attention to discussing the possible cause of magnetism. There is
but one brief chapter on the causes of magnetic and electric attraction, where
Gilbert derived electricity from matter and magnetism from form ; though this
is conceived in terms of Aristotelian philosophy, experiment finds its place
even here, and the occult is firmly rejected. Gilbert was certain that the
magnetic power of the Earth is a natural force and “ is neither derived nor
produced from the whole heaven by sympathy or influence or more occult
qualities, nor from any particular star.” 32 Yet Gilbert was, after
all, a natural magician, not a natural philosopher, and speculation about
forces would creep in. So, at the end of his careful discussion of dip and
navigation, there is suddenly a chapter entitled “ Magnetick force is animate,
or imitates life; and in many things surpasses human life, while this is bound
up in the organick body,” a title suitable to Cardan. Gilbert was partly trying
to ascribe an anima—a moving soul—to the Earth, instead of merely to the
celestial sphere, to support his belief that the Earth moves. But there is more
than that, and Gilbert demonstrated a profound belief in a totally animate
universe. Aristotle, he insisted, erred in denying a moving soul to the Earth;
he did not indeed properly appreciate what Gilbert knew, that “die whole
universe is animated, and that all the globes, all the stars, and also the
noble Earth have been governed since the beginning by their own appointed souls
and have the motives of selfconservation.” 33
This is not very like a purely experimental investigator, nor was his anti-Aristotelian
mysticism wholly a defence of the possibility that the Earth moved. Gilbert
genuinely believed that magnetism, however subject to control by the natural
magician
who thoroughly understood the ways in which it manifested itself, was
truly an occult force. When, as in the New Philosophy of the Sublunary World
(written soon after De Magnete, but published posthumously in 1651), Gilbert
concerned himself with the heavens, the Earth and the Moon, it was this
slightly magical strain of anti-Aristotdianism which predominated, to make a
work so non-experimental that it seems to differ more in tone from De Magnete
than is, in feet, the case. It is here, as Francis Bacon was to complain later,
that Gilbert “ made a philosophy out of the loadstone,” attempting to explain
gravity by the magnetic attraction exerted by the Earth on all bodies, perhaps
even on the Moon. Here, too, Gilbert discussed a host of questions lying on the
borderline between scholastic philosophy and natural magic : the possibility of
an interplanetary vacuum, the composition of the heavenly bodies, the actions
of the tides (related to magnetism again), and various “ meteorological ”
(atmospheric) phenomena, like winds, the formation of rainbows, and fountains.
It is actually a continuation of the last ten chapters of De Magnete ; and just
as Gilbert regarded his conclusions about the Earth’s magnetic and animate
nature as directly derived from his earlier experiments on magnetic bodies, so,
one must presume, he thought the later work also derived from magnetic experiments.
Once again Gilbert appears to be more nearly a natural magician than a
seventeenth-century experimental sdentist. His failure to treat more adequately
of theoretical subjects reveals more clearly than anything else the gap that
separated natural magic from the new experimental learning to be developed in
the seventeenth century. Even Gilbert’s experimental genius was cramped by his
attempts to restrain it within the bounds of a method which, however much it
endeavoured rationally to understand the way in which the forces of nature
worked, and to control them, yet assumed these forces to be impervious to
rational comprehension, because it knew them to be occult and essentially
unknowable. Magic was a delight to the inquiring mind; but even when white and
natural, it led men all too often astray. No wonder that there was to come a
period of revolt and rejection of the occult, a revolt so violent that it led
to a veritable excess of rationalism.
Perspective, Astronomy, Musike, Cosmographie, Astrologie, Statike,
Anthropographie, Trochilike, Helioscopie, Pneu- matithmie, Menadrie,
Hypogeodie, Hydragogie, Horometrie, Zographie, Architecture, Navigation,
Thaumaturgike and Archemastrie.1
When Henry Billingsley, university graduate and successful London
merchant, published die first English edition of Euclid in 1570, he invited
John Dee, England’s leading mathematician, to write a preface dealing with the
virtues and advantages of mathematical learning. He and Dee hoped to “ stir
the imagination mathematical: and to inform the practiser mechanical ” how
necessary the study of mathematics was for all manner of useful arts, as well
as for die study of nature. It was not just that mathematics was used in those
applied sciences which, in exuberant Greek derivatives, Dee listed with
Renaissance gusto; for madie- matics, in the eyes of its fifteenth- and
sixteenth-century practitioners, was not merely an abstract art for the
specialist. To diem, as to the Greeks, the term meant all the sciences of magnitude
and number, and their practical applications.
Though geometry was the branch of mathematics which had been most
esteemed by the Greeks, they had not neglected other branches. The Pythagoreans
had judged mathematics to consist of four divisions: geometry, arithmetic
(number theory), astronomy and music; for they regarded astronomy as being
applied geometry, and music as applied arithmetic. This
classification had persisted, to reappear in the quadrivium of the
mediaeval university. Plato, influenced by the Pythagoreans, had emphasised the
role of mathematics in science as well as in philosophy. Pure mathematics, in
Platonic doctrine, because it dealt with the world of perfect, unchanging,
abstract ideas, was the best possible training for the philosopher who wished
to study the nature of ideas, forms and essences. Mathematics reflected the
unchanging reality behind the flux and uncertainty of the world of the senses;
hence for the Platonist to study nature was to search for the mathematical laws
which govern the world. Though Aristode had protested that magnitude and body
were different things, and natural philosophy and mathematics could not be the
same, the Platonic tradition continued to appeal to many minds. The fifteenth
century’s intensification of interest in Platonic and neo-Platonic doctrine
helped to encourage the view that mathematics was not only the key to science,
but included within its competence the greater part of what the seventeenth
century was to call natural philosophy. One has only to recall that Copernicus
wrote for mathematicians, and might well have called his book “ Mathematical
Principles of Celestial Revolution ” to realise how the anti-Aristotelian tendency
of the age was apt to express itself by die attempt to treat mathematically
what Aristode had treated qualitatively.
The Platonic tradition was of enormous consequence for Renaissance
mathematics. Most obviously, it encouraged the study of pure mathematics and
the search for previously neglected Greek mathematical texts. It stimulated the
founding of chairs of mathematics in the new humanist schools, like the College
Royale in France, though these were intended as linguistic centres. It helped
the revival of professorships of mathematics in the established universities,
though it did not raise the professors’ salaries. It suggested that mathematics
was better training for the mind than dialectic. It offered a number of useful
varieties of
mathematics, suitable for non-academic education : fortification for the
gentleman-soldier, surveying for the landed proprietor, practical astronomy and
some knowledge of the use of maps for all. On a less rational plane, Platonism
and neo-Platonism encouraged so much number mysticism and astrology that to the
layman “ mathematicus ” and “ astrologer ” were identical. (Indeed, they were
when the mathematician was a Cardan or Dee, though the latter protested that he
only dealt with “ marvellous Acts and Feats, Naturally, Mathematically and
Mechanically wrought,” and it was unfair to call him a conjurer for that.) Many
a young man must, like Femel, have progressed from elementary geometry and the
doctrine of the sphere to the delights of astrological prediction ; no wonder
that careful fathers like Vicenzo Galilei warned their sons of the dangers of a
subject at once dubious in reputation and poor in remuneration.
The popularisation of science and the new awareness of the needs of the
technical man affected mathematics strongly. In the mediaeval university, all
students attended lectures on Euclid ; now they expected the professor of
mathematics to cover a wider range by dealing with practical mathematics :
everything from the doctrine of the sphere to the use of mathematics in war,
navigation or engineering. Mathematicians were eager to exploit the host of
newly discovered ways in which they could aid the unlearned, from teaching the
merchant how to reckon his profits to showing the instrument-maker how to draw
the scales on the brass plates of his wares. So great was the demand that there
sprang up a new profession of semi-learned mathematical practitioners, men
skilled in the practical aspects of mathematics, who knew how to apply geometry
and trigonometry to the problems of scientific measuring devices. Many of these
gave mathematical lectures in die vernacular, a practice especially common in
London in the second half of the sixteenth century, and wrote books of
elementary instruction in plain, simple and easy language.
199
A fair example is A Booke Named Tectonicon by Leonard. Digges, published
in 1556 and often reprinted. Digges said he had planned a “ volume, containing
the flowers of the Sciences Mathematicall, largely applied to our outward
practise, profitably pleasant to all manner men in this Realme ” ; while
waiting to complete it he produced this smaller work, whose subtitle declares
it to be a book
briefly shewing the exact measuring, and speedie reckoning all manner of
Land, Squares, Timber, Stone, Steeples, Fillers, Globes, &c. Further declaring
the perfect making and large use of the Carpenters Ruler, containing a Quadrant
Geometricall. Comprehending also the rare use of the Square. And in the end a
little Treatise adjoyning, opening the composition and appliancy of an
Instrument called the Profitable Stafle. With other things pleasant and
necessary, most conducible for surveyers, Land-meaters, Joyners, Carpenters
and Masons.
Truly an indispensable mathematical handbook, suitable for learned and
unlearned alike.
An earlier attempt to apply mathematics for the use of the craftsman was
exemplified in the Course in the Art of Measurement with Compass and Ruler
(1525) by die artist Albrecht Dvirer (14711528). This is an example of Dee’s “
Zographie,” the application of mathematics to art. Painters had not long since
solved the problems of perspective and methods of creating the illusion of
three dimensions on a two-dimensional canvas; the results were exhibited in
Jean Pelerin’s On Artificial Perspective (1505) embodying the developments of
over half a century. But this was empirical knowledge; more sophisticated now,
more learned in academic subjects, many painters wanted to know the mathematics
and theory of the art of “ false perspective.” Not that mathematics could teach
than how to paint, but that many were filled with curiosity to know why the
tricks of the trade worked.
200
Hence Leonardo’s studies on the mathematics of proportion, or the
elaborate vernacular treatises of Diirer, which made Latin and Italian
knowledge available to Germans; for, he thought, “ geometry is the right
foundation of all painting ” *—and of all arts as well as the building
crafts—and should be available to all.
Not all applied mathematics was dedicated to elucidating the practices of
the craftsman; an immense amount of interest centred on the mathematical
background of the theoretical sciences. The work of fifteenth-century
astronomers had amply demonstrated the need for detailed mathematical analysis
of astronomical problems. That was for the specialist; on a more elementary
level there was the geometry of the sphere, which helped to make elementary
astronomy also mathematical. Some tutors began with the ancients ; Linacre used
his own translation of Proclus (1499) to introduce the English royal children
to the beginnings of astronomy ; others preferred to write new treatises on the
sphere, treatises which stressed the terrestrial rather than the celestial
spheres, and became geographical rather than astronomical. Cosmography became
a common subject; treatises ranged from the learned and thoroughly mathematical
works of such men as Peter Apian, professor of mathematics at Ingolstadt, or
Oronce Fin£ (1494-1555), professor of mathematics at the College Royale, to
intentionally popular works like that of Sebastian Munster (1489-1552), who had
been educated in mathematics at Heidelberg before he turned to lecturing on
Hebrew at Basle. They all helped spread an understanding of the importance of
mathematics in geographical exposition.
Navigational problems such as fifteenth-century astronomers had tried to
solve were still in the domain of the applied mathematician. More erudite now,
as well as better aware of the needs of the seaman, die professors of
mathematics were as eager as their predecessors to devise new methods to aid
sailors ; and even more ingenious. Boldly they tackled the problem of
longitude, untouched in the fifteenth century. Peter Apian and Oronce
Fine suggested that longitude might be determined by the “ method of lunar
distances,” which involved the measurement of the angular distance of the Moon
from certain stars; this involved further study of lunar motions and accurate
tables, but it was more promising than the timing of lunar eclipses, not
frequent enough to be useful. Gemma Frisius (1508-55), Apian’s pupil and a
professor of mathematics at Louvain, suggested the use of clocks for longitude
determination ; this was a fantastically optimistic proposal in view of the
current inaccuracy of timepieces. Jacques Besson, professor of mathematics at
Orleans, invented a universal instrument for navigation, timekeeping and
astronomy, which he described in Le Cosmolabe ou Instrument Universel concemant
toutes Observations qui se peuvent faire Par les Sciences Mathematiques, Tant
au Ciel, en la Terre, comme en la Mer (1567) and thoughtfully included a fine
picture of an observer sitting in an improbably large chair, mounted on gimbals
to minimise disturbances from the ship’s roll and pitch; he did not say how the
sailors would find room on deck for their work.
These methods, though possible for shore-based mathematicians, were too
complex and uncertain for use at sea. No wonder that practical men, like Robert
Norman and Simon Stevin, thought the mathematical professor an uncertain guide
even though their own methods were not necessarily better. Those who had been
at sea were extremely critical; Robert Hues (1553-1632), Oxford graduate and
professional mathematician, had some right to speak from experience after
accompanying Thomas Cavendish on his circumnavigation of the world (1586-8);
he was full of scorn for mathematicians who thought to calculate longitude from
lunar motion : this is an uncertaine and ticklish way, and subject to many
difficulties. Others have gone other ways to worke; as, namely, by observing
the space of the Aequinoctial hours
202
betwixt the Meridians of two places, which they conceive may be taken by
the help of sundials, or clocks, or hour glasses, either with water or sand or
the like. But these conceits long since devised, having been more strictly and
accurately examined, have been disallowed and rejected by all learned men (at
least those of riper judgements) as being altogether unable to perform that
which is required of them.3
But Hues had little to offer instead beyond cartographic assistance ;
and the practical man, joining forces with the natural magician, was as
fallible as the mathematician ; for the compass needle proved to change its
variation and declination with time, and to be no help in the problem.
In spite of ingenious suggestions, better tables and improved instruments
(like the backstaff* described by John Davis in Seamens Secrets, 1594) sailors
at the end of die sixteenth century, as at die beginning, preferred to depend
primarily on dead- reckoning, with astronomical assistance where this proved
readily practicable. Even here the mathematician had good advice to offer, not
all of which was accepted. The learned man knew that a great-drcle route was
the shortest distance between two points; but the sailor preferred the method
of parallel tailing or “ running down the latitude,” whereby the ship made its
way to the required latitude as directly as wind and current permitted, and
then sailed East or West until land was sighted. This kind of navigation was
facilitated by the invention of the “ log ” for measuring the ship’s speed,
from which its day’s run could be calculated. An English invention, it was long
an English monopoly, though it was described at length by William Bourne in die
popular A Regiment for the Sea (1573)- Formerly die sailor
* This was a quadrant, modified so that the
navigator turned his back to the Sun, whose altitude he measured by observing
the shadow cast by a movable vane.
had estimated his ship’s speed by throwing overboard a chip of wood and
watching it travel past the length of the ship while he paced die deck to
determine the time it took to do so. Now the sailor heaved astern a log of wood
fastened to a line knotted at equal, fixed intervals, and counted the number of
knots that ran out during a length of time measured by a sand glass. (Hence the
practice of giving a ship’s speed in knots, since the distance between each
knot was designed to measure a speed of one nautical mile per hour.) For
accuracy, tie knots needed to be properly spaced and the sand glass accurately
calibrated, two measurements hardly ever systematically undertaken. But when
the length of a degree of terrestrial arc (which determined the nautical mile)
was far from settled, sailors were justified in refusing to worry as long as
they erred on the safe side. As they said, it was better to be a day’s sail
behind their calculated position than even a cannon shot ahead of it.
Here the mathematician was ready with advice, and sometimes achievement.
Edward Wright, the Cambridge-trained mathematician who had learned about
practical navigation on an expedition to the Azores in 1589, was the first to
note the desirability of measuring the Earth’s surface to determine the length
of a terrestrial degree with some accuracy, and made an astronomically based
improvement. The first actual F.nglisb measurement was that by Richard Norwood
(1590-1675), seaman, mathematical teacher and surveyor: he paced out tie
distance between London and York when lie had occasion to go from one city to
the other, and published the result in The Seaman’s Practice (1637). Great
improvements in tables, methods of calculation and instrumental aids appeared
in the early seventeenth century, notably the use of Gunter’s sector (first
described in 1607), a calculating instrument which greatly reduced the amount
of tedious computation required in dead- reckoning.
Whether by dead-reckoning or astronomical methods (increasingly
sophisticated now, as more and more mathematicians compiled tables, developed
simplified methods and published books) all navigation involved the use of maps
and charts. By the beginning of the sixteenth century nearly all land maps were
based on some form of projection, but the “ plane chart ” * still held
supremacy at sea. In the plane chart distances between meridians were the same
at all latitudes, whether near the equator or the poles, and large errors were
thereby introduced at high latitudes. The Portuguese mathematician Pedro Nunez
(15021578), a successor to Zacuto in his interest in applying mathematics to
the improvement of navigational methods and techniques, tried to analyse the
problem mathematically in his Tracts (1537); his analysis became better known
when a Latin version appeared in 1566 under the title On the Art of Sailing.
Nunez discovered that on a sphere a rhumb line or loxodrome (a line of constant
compass heading) is not a straight line, as it is on a plane, but a spiral
terminating at the pole. He also noted that since the meridians on a globe
converge, a true sea chart should not have its meridians everywhere equally
spaced. Nunez designed a quadrant which would enable one to find the number of
leagues in a degree along each parallel, but he was unable to solve the much
more important mathematical problem of finding a projection which would give
the required convergence and make rhumbs straight lines.
Many references to the problem are to be found in subsequent books on
mathematical navigation; the next real step towards its solution was made by
Gerard Mercator (1512-94). Mercator studied mathematics under Gemma Frisius and
lectured at Louvain until his Protestant faith made it necessary for him to
leave the Low Countries for Germany. There he became a
* So called because it treated the
(spherical) Earth as if it could be mapped on a flat plane.
mathematical instrument-maker and a globe and map designer and publisher.
His globes reflect both his mathematical ingenuity and his knowledge of the
work of Nunez, whose loxo- dromic spiral he engraved on some of them. He also
worked out the proper relation between the length and width of the gores which
made up the map on the globe (printed paper slips pasted on the globular core)
: he divided his map into twelve gores, cutting off each twenty degrees from
the pole, and providing two extra circular gores for the poles, a procedure
which ensured a higher degree of accuracy than previous methods. His world map
of 1569, not a true sea chart though ostensibly “ for the use of mariners,”
further utilised the notions of Nunez: here Mercator spaced out the meridians
towards the poles, apparently by guess-work, though he may have used trigonometric
methods. He never explained how he derived his figures; others, though they
might admire, could not duplicate his work, and Mercator never made another
such map.
The next map-maker to publish a map on “ Mercator’s ” projection was the
Dutchman, Jodocus Hondius (1563-1611), who nude use of die work of the English
mathematicians whom he had met while a refugee in London between 1584 and 1595.
The English mathematicians proved better at solving the problem than Mercator.
The inspirer of their work was John Dee, who had travelled to the Low Countries
in 1547, “ to speak and confir with some learned men, and chiefly
Mathematicians,” * among them Gemma Frisius and Mercator. (Dee brought back
some of Mercator’s globes, which he gave to his College.) A year later Dee was
back on die Continent, first, briefly, as a student at Louvain, then as a
teacher of mathematics at Paris ; here he met Fin£, Femel and others, acquired
a reputation as an ingenious mathematician, and established correspondence with
a number of continental workers, including Nunez. Dee was thus in dose touch
with the work being done in navigation and carto-
206
graphy. Two of his colleagues, Thomas Hariot (1560-1621) and. Edward
Wright, claimed success in the matter of a loxodromic chart. Hariot discussed
the matter briefly in the fifth part of Hues’ Treatise on the Globes (1594),
but he gave no precise data or method. The first real discussion was in Edward
Wright’s Certaine Errors in Navigation, Arising either of the ordinarie
erroneous making of the Sea Chart, Contpasse, Crosse staff, and Tables of
declination of the Sunne, and fixed Starres detected and corrected (1599). Wright
had been in no hurry to publish; perhaps he agreed with Dee, that mathematical
knowledge was sufficiently esoteric to warrant secrecy, though he did not share
Dee’s addiction to the magical sciences. Wright’s work circulated for some time
in manuscript before it was published; he claimed at last to make it public
only to forestall a pirated edition under another’s name. Indeed, as he knew,
Hondius had already made use of his work, and without acknowledgement, though
he had shown his tables to Hondius only under the promise of secrecy.* If his
work were to become common property, it might as well be accurately done, and
he might as well claim the credit.
Wright’s intention was to analyse all the errors commonly associated with
the usual methods of dead-reckoning : in particular he treated the errors
inherent in die use of the plane chart, showing their geometrical and physical
sources and the ways of avoiding them. Wright supplied tables of rhumbs, showed
how to use these tables and the new charts based upon them ; how to find the
distance from one place to another on the new charts, given latitude and
longitude, and how best to plot a course. In fact everything die practical man
needed to know, and with
* When accused, Hondius admitted his fault,
but tried to explain that he had failed to acknowledge his debt to Wright in
print—as he claimed to have done verbally—only because the Latin translation
was too poor to publish under Wright’s name! The true reason was more probably
what he wrote to Wright’s friend Henry Briggs, professor of geometry at Gresham
College : “ the profit thereof moved me.” s
the tediums of calculation and computation removed as far as possible. No
wonder that Hondius—not a mathematician, and not even a skilled
cartographer—had been able to draw a map on the new projection.
Wright’s description of the geometrical problem involved in this new
projection illustrates the clarity of his thought and his style: he wrote,
Suppose a spherical superficies with meridians, parallels and the whole
hydrographical description drawn thereupon to be inscribed into a concave
cylinder, their axes agreeing in one.
Let this spherical superficies swell like a bladder (whilst it is in
blowing) equally always in every part thereof (that is as much in longitude as
in latitude) till it apply, and join itself (round about and all along also
towards either pole) unto the concave superficies of the cylinder : each
parallel upon this spherical superficies increasing successively from the
equinoctial towards either pole, until it come to be of equal diameter with the
cylinder, and consequently the meridians still widening themselves, till they
come to be so far distant every where each from the other as they are at the
equinoctial. Thus it may most easily be understood, how a spherical superficies
may (by extension) be made a cylindrical, and consequently a plain
parallelogram superficies.6
It was, of course, not enough to see that the problem could be simplified
if a cylinder (which can be unrolled to form a flat surface) were used instead
of a sphere, though this was more than either Nunez or Mercator had seen. It
was necessary to work out tables to permit the construction of maps upon this
projection. Wright did both; and after the publication of his work any
map-maker could draw a map on the now familiar Mercator projection, so
particularly suited to the sea chart, since
208
now a rhumb line is a straight line, and a constant compass course can be
laid out with a ruler. That a great circle route is not so simple was still,
obviously, of no concern to seamen not interested in finding the shortest
distance between two points, since wind and current would never permit them to
sail it even if it had been easily plotted.
The new projection did not become instantly popular, though it was fairly
common within a generation. If it did not make its way more rapidly, this was
partly because maps were so popular that any botch could be sure of a good
sale, and many map publishers blindly pirated their predecessors. Most maps
were not for seamen at all, but for gentlemen—“ to beautifie their Halls,
Parlers, Chambers, Gaieties, Studies, or Libraries with,” as Dee observed 7—for
diplomats, for travellers and for scholars. Sailors, English and Dutch
especially, pinned their faith to the “ Waggoner,” the useful Mariners Mirror
compiled by Lucas Janszoon Waghenaer (published in Dutch in 1583, and subsequently
in many editions in many vernaculars). This was a handy and simple manual of
elementary navigational methods, complete with tables, astronomical rules and
old-fashioned charts of European waters. The printers who published and
republished it saw no need to improve on it, even when better charts and
navigational rules were available and it became more and more out of date.
It was perhaps to remedy this situation that the States General of the
Netherlands in 1605 commissioned Willem Blaeu (15711638) to write a new
seaman’s guide. Blaeu belonged to the scientific school of cartographers : he
was no mere publisher of maps, but a competent and highly trained mathematical
instru- ment-maker who had spent two years under the supervision of Tycho Brahe
at Uraniborg, studying astronomy, geography and the construction of precision
instruments. The result of his work, published as The Light of Navigation in
1612, was a much improved
209
manual, complete with new and corrected astronomical and nautical tables
and a new set of sea charts, all drawn on Mercator’s projection. It was the
first of many works which embodied the advances of the later sixteenth century,
and in which English marVipmacidans now repaid the debts contracted earlier to
Portuguese and Dutch applied mathematics. The log, the backstaff and Wright’s
elucidation of Mercator’s projection all came into use throughout European
practice in the first half of the seventeenth century.
The instrument-maker was not the only craftsman who needed guidance from
the mathematician : the engineer found mathematics equally essential. Civil as
well as military engineering was a thriving profession throughout Europe in
the sixteenth century, especially in Italy, but north of the Alps as well.
There was a general interest in machinery, as the many beautiful picture- books
of the period testify. There was Jacques Besson’s Theatre des Instrumens
Mathematiques & Mechaniques (1579) ; Ramelli’s Le Diverse et Artijiciose
Machine (1588, published bilingually in French and Italian); Faust Veranzio’s
Machinae Novae (c. 1595); Zonca’s Novo Theatro di Machini et Edificii (1607);
Branca’s Le Machine (1629); and many more, all describing power machines,
pumps, mills, cranes, bridges, fountains, war machines, pneumatic and
hydraulic devices.
There was some humanist influence, derived from Greek and Roman works,
but mostly the interest and the novelty came from the flourishing practical
technology of the age, such as that illustrated in Biringuccio’s Pirotechnia or
Agricola’s De Re Metallica. The “ practical men ” who built these machines were
by no means always ignorant of mathematics, and there were a host of mathematically
trained inventors equipped to design ladies for cutting cylinders and cones and
similar refinements. Ramelli (1531-90) was eager to insist on the advantages of
mathe-
210
matical knowledge: his book carries a preface
entitled De I'excellence des mathematiques, ov il est demontre combiett elles
sont necessaires pour acquerir tous les arts liheraux. Besson described himself as “ docte Mathematicien ”, and characterised
mechanics and engineering as the true goals of mathematics: “ the contemplation
of the proportions of numbers, points, and measures of artificial things is
useless unless related to action, so that it follows that mechanics is the
fruit of geometry, and consequently its goal.” 8 This, of course,
was the ideal; but certainly the sixteenth century thought that the building of
machines was a mathematical art.
The science behind this art was mechanics, or mathematical physics : the
study on the one hand of the laws of simple and complex machines, and on the
other hand of the behaviour of bodies on which these machines were based, that
is to say, of statics and dynamics. The fifteenth century had been little
interested in such problems. The sixteenth century enjoyed the advantage of a
twofold stimulus : tie printing of mediaeval works on physics, and the
collection and editing of the works of Archimedes. The treatises of Archimedes
had been well known to fourteenth-century scholars; but the mediaeval approach
to statics derived less from the method of Archimedes than from that of the
pseudo-Aristotelian Mechanical Problems. This, the earliest theoretical
discussion of the theory of simple machines, embodied a dynamical approach,
treating all cases of rest as similar to the equilibrium of a balance.*
Archimedes, on the contrary, dealt with rest only, and treated statics as a
branch of mathematics, concerning himself with the precise handling of
magnitudes. His works were too complex to attract publishers
* The author of the Mechanical Problems,
who followed the Aristotelian tradition quite closely, reduced all simple
machines to the lever, which he related in turn to the circle through the
balance and wheel He gave the first statement of the law of the lever in
qualitative terms, and was critical of Aristotelian dynamics.
in the fifteenth century; the first fairly complete Latin text (excerpts
were printed earlier) was the version drawn from various sources and
edited—badly, his enemies said—by Niccolo Tartaglia (1500-57), for publication
in 1543. A more accurate translation, with a Greek text (though oddly, not the
one from which the translation had been made), was published a year later *
The combination of the ready availability of Archimedes with the
publication of mediaeval texts started two different sorts of investigation.
The interesting comments on statics by Leonardo da Vinci, early in the century,
derive exclusively from the mediaeval tradition. In contrast, Simon Stevin at
the end of the century was motivated solely by Archimedean considerations, and
a rigid insistence on a statical approach both to equilibrium problems and to
fluid mechanics. Reflecting on the old problem of how it is that objects at the
bottom of a lake or the sea are not crushed by the weight of the water above
them, Stevin arrived at an enunciation of the hydrostatical paradox that the
pressure of a fluid upon a solid body immersed in it is proportional to the
height of the column of fluid immediately above it, and not to the total volume
of fluid in which it is immersed. His logical, quasi-mathematical approach was similar
to that later employed by Pascal.
Stevin himself was most proud of his elucidation of the equilibrium
conditions of bodies on an inclined plane, which he illustrated on the title
page of The Elements of the Art of Weighing (published in Dutch in 1586) * with
a motto intended to show that he had taken the wonder out of an apparent marvel
(see figure 6). He imagined a triangular surface abc, with base ac parallel to
the horizon, and side ab twice side bc ; over this he imagined hung an endless
chain on which fourteen spheres had
* The translation, was that made by
Regiomontanus, a correction of an early fifteenth-century version. The complete
mathematical text had to wait for translation (by Federigo Commanding) until
1558.
fig. 6. stbvin’s demonstration of equilibrium on an
INCLINED PLANE
been fastened at equal intervals, all the spheres being of the same size
and weight. Unless there is to be a perpetual motion of the chain about the
triangle, which Stevin regarded as absurd and impossible, it must rest in
equilibrium with two spheres on bc and
four on ab : because otherwise
there will be a perpetual motion of the chain about the triangle. Since the
chain is in equilibrium, the lower portion may be removed without disturbing
the equilibrium of die rest. Hence the length of die inclined planes will be
direcdy proportional to the “ apparent weight ”—the component along the
direction of the plane—supported along the plane, which is equivalent to
saying that on inclined planes of equal height a given force will sustain a
weight proportional to the length of the plane. Note that Stevin here used a “
triangle ” (though he sometimes preferred to call it a
213
prism); and indeed he defined the Elements of the Art of Weighing as
concerned with “ gravity, dissociated in thought from physical matter,” 10
which he, like his age, considered the mathematical way of treating the
subject. In fact he regarded weight as similar to number and magnitude, and
hence to be discussed in a manner similar to that used for number (arithmetic)
or magnitude (geometry). Yet at the same time he saw no absurdity in arguing in
this mathematical context against perpetual motion as a physical impossibility.
In his methods and outlook Stevin was an Archimedean, though less strictly so
than, for example, Com- mandino’s pupil Guidobaldo del Monte (1545-1607) whose
Mechanics (1577) contains a very rigorous development of statical principles.
Stevin’s discussion of the equilibrium conditions on an inclined plane
was ingenious and original, but it was by no means the only possible approach
to the problem. Another approach had been considered by Jordanus Nemorarius in
the thirteenth century, one based in turn on that in the Mechanical Problems,
and this tradition flourished at the same time as the Archimedean. Indeed, the
two could be combined, as they were by Galileo (1564-1642) * in the treatise On
Mechanics which he wrote about 1600 for his private pupils in Padua. It is an
elementary analysis of the five simple machines (inclined plane, lever,
windlass, pulley and screw) with a brief discussion of the elements common to
all of them. Although Galileo thought little of his contributions, and did not
regard them as sufficiently original to merit inclusion in the Discorsi of
1638, modem writers have noted in fact, he was the first to see that simple
machines could not create work, but merely transformed its method of
application. Galileo always equated input and output of a machine, Hthrr in
terms of power and distance or of force and speed. His analysis
* His early work on physics is
described below, pp. 221 f.; his life and astronomical work are described in
ch. xi.
was at the same time suggestive of further problems to be investigated
mathematically, and clearly related to the actual physical world. His approach
is revealed by his conclusion to the discussion of the steelyard and lever :
And to sum up, the advantage acquired from the length of the lever is
nothing but the ability to move all at once that heavy body which could be
moved only in pieces by the same force, during the same time, and with an equal
motion, without the benefit of the lever.11 As the Mechanics was
widely read in Italy (although until 1649 only in manuscript versions) and in
France (in a translation by Mersenne published in 1634), it had a wide
influence.
The Aristotelian elements detectable in On Mechanics by no means indicate
that Galileo was, at this period, in any sense an Aristotelian, however thoroughly
he may have been grounded in the Peripatetic doctrine during his student days.
He was already both an anti-Aristotelian and a devout disciple of “ the
superhuman Archimedes, whose name I never mention without a filling of awe.” 12
Indeed he had already, in a treatise On Motion (De Motu, c. 1590), used
Archimedean physics as a weapon against Aristotelian dynamical principles; in
this approach he was influenced by the work of Niccolo Tartaglia and G. B.
Benedetti. Many mathematical writers—Leonardo da Vinci in his manuscripts,
Tartaglia, Benedetti, Galileo’s Pisan teacher Bonamico—had already tried to
mathematise the impetus theory of dynamics. This theory, thoroughly explored in
late mediaeval physics, experienced a new lease of life in the sixteenth century
when the experience of gunners and the growing anti-Peripatetic spirit of the
age combined to show the glaring errors inherent in Aristotle’s discussions of
motion. The sixteenth-century attempts to malcp impetus dynamics rigorously
mathematical were doomed to failure, as Galileo was to realise after the
completion of De Motu, for impetus was a qualitative, not a quantitative force.
But the
215
very impossibility of the attempt made Galileo realise the necessity for
a new dynamics which should somehow satisfy both the Archimedean demand for an
expression appropriate to abstract magnitudes moving through geometrical space
(an approach adopted by Benedetti and further pursued by the young Galileo) and
the exigencies of real bodies rolling down physical inclined planes.
No one in the sixteenth century could write about the physics or
mathematics of moving bodies without reflecting the ideas of Aristotle.
Aristotle had related all motion to the medium in which a body moved, and also
to its position in the universe ; anyone who wrote against Aristotle—like
Benedetti in his Book of Divers Speculations on Mathematics and Physics—had
always to remember that Aristotle had satisfactorily explained how and why
bodies fell and projectiles move, and his theory had to offer explanations of
the same kind. “ Natural ” motion, including the motion of falling bodies, had
for Aristotle required no cause other than previous displacement; for natural
motion was the result of a body’s intrinsic tendency to seek its natural place
in the universe. A “ heavy ” body was one which tended to fell “ down ”
(towards the centre); a light body one which tended to rise “ up ” ; both down
and up being determined absolutely with respect to the centre of the universe.
Absolutely heavy bodies and absolutely light bodies had only one tendency;
relatively light and heavy bodies were those which could either rise up or fall
down, depending on where they found themselves. The body displaced “knows” that
it is so, and hence “knows” its goal, so it moves fester (accelerates) as it
approaches its destination.
One other factor is involved in natural motion : the medium. Recognising
that the denser the medium through which a body moves, the slower the motion,
Aristotle argued that the speed is inversely proportional to the density of the
medium. Hence in a
216
vacuum, where no medium exists, the speed of a falling body would be
infinite. This was to Aristotle a manifest absurdity, and a solid argument
against the possibility of the existence of a vacuum. Again, the heavier the
body, the greater the ability to overcome the resistance of the medium, so the
swifter the fall; hence, the speed of a falling body is also directly
proportional to the weight of the body. Projectile motion did, in Aristotle’s
view, require a force, not only to initiate it, but to ensure its continuance,
because it was forced, not natural, motion. For Aristotle (as for Descartes
later) all such motion had to proceed by impact, and he imagined that again the
medium played the essential role, maintaining the push initially imparted by
hand or sling. But the push of the medium gradually grew less and less with
time, until it was finally worn out; at this point gravity, previously
inoperative, took over, and the body dropped under natural motion. Since forced
motion and natural motion did not mix, all projectiles were regarded as having
straight-line trajectories, not curved ones.
Now these theories, though they appeared to offer answers to all possible
questions concerning bodies in motion, were not wholly satisfactory, and a
certain amount of criticism began very early, especially in regard to the
question of whether, in feet, bodies fell at speeds exactly proportional to
their weights. Alternative answers were slow to develop, and it was only at
the end of the classical period, among sixth-century commentators on Aristotle,
that the impetus theory was first adumbrated. This theory preserved the
outlines of Aristotelian thought, the doctrine of natural places and the
incompatibility of mixed motion, while at the same time its proponents rejected
Aristode’s view that a body continues to move after an initial application of
force because the air pushes it along. This they did on two grounds : first,
because air (as Aristode himself had said) naturally resists motion ; and
second, because the motion of heavy bodies lasts
longer than that of light bodies, although air moves light objects more
easily rhan heavy ones. These logical arguments they supported by examples
drawn from experience, familiar facts to be continually repeated for centuries.
In place of Aristotle’s theory, they supposed that the moving force gave to the
body moved an impetus (also known as an “ impressed force ” or “ moving virtue
”). Just as heat was the name given to the quality possessed by a body which is
hot, so impetus was the name given to the quality possessed by an object that
moves ; and just as the heat gradually wears off after the fire is removed, so
impetus must do when the moving force is removed.
The impetus theory reached its height of sophistication in the fourteenth
century, in the hands of English mathematicians at Merton College, Oxford, and
others at the University of Paris. They used it to explain how a falling body
increases its speed (because at every instant the tendency to fall is added to
the existing impetus to move) and thereby dispensed with the notion that speed
increases as the goal is approached. They even used impetus to account for the
unchanging and eternal revolution of the celestial spheres. More important,
they recognised that speed itself (and not merely impetus) could be treated as
a quality of the moving body. They had devoted great ingenuity to the
development of both geometric and arithmetic expressions for the variation of qualities
in general, working on the assumption that the “intension” of any quality (like
heat, or whiteness) could be denoted numerically. Thus, they argued, a body of
heat 8 would be hotter than one of heat 4 ; and a speed 8 would be faster than
speed 4. (Of course, these numbers are purely arbitrary, and had no physical
meaning.) One of the important questions treated was the comparison of a
quality that varied (say from 9 to 1) with a quality that remained constant, a
process known as the calculus of qualities. The most fertile such calculus of
qualities was that developed for the discussion of the "latitude”
218
or variation of forms and qualities by Nicole Oresmc, the great
mathematical philosopher of the fourteenth-century University of Paris.
Essentially it was a method of plotting the “intension” of a quality
geometrically against something else—its “extension ”—which was constant (a
period of time, for example). If the variation were linear, Oresme called it “
uniform ” ; if
FIG. 7. THE LATITUDE OF FORMS: GEOMETRICAL ANALYSIS
non-linear, “ diffonn.” He therefore represented uniform variation by a
sloping straight line, difiorm variation by a curve. Thus in figure 7, the
intensity of any uniformly varying quality is represented by the length of the
vertical line mn, increasing
uniformly as N moves from A to B. As Oresme expressed it: The quantity of any
linear quality at all is to be imagined by a surface whose longitude or base is
a line protracted in some way in the subject . . . [i.e. the extension] and
whose latitude or altitude is designated by a line erected
219
perpendicularly upon the protracted base line [i.e. the intension].13
In the figure, therefore, the quantity of the uniformly varying quality
MN is the area of the triangle abc ;
and this is, obviously, equal to the area of the rectangle abed, when E is the mid-point of EC.
Hence, Oresme concluded, the quantity of a uniformly varying quality is the
same as that of a constant quality equal to the mean value of the uniformly
varying quality.
When this analysis was applied to moving bodies, it was necessary to
treat speed as a uniformly varying quality, as Oresme and others were prepared
to do. From the discussion above, it follows that the “ quantity ” of a speed
uniformly varying from v to V is the same as that of a constant speed which we
may
express by the notation v + (Tte
special aPPkca-
tion to speed is usually known as the Merton Rule, after the Oxford
College where it was derived by an arithmetical calculus, which gave die same
results as Oresme’s general geometrical analysis.) The only problem is the
meaning of “ quantity ” in this case: for Oresme it meant, as his geometry
suggested, distance.
There were many other problems involved, however ; and these were not to
be cleared up until Galileo took them in hand. Though the Merton Rule provided
a way of treating accelerated mnfinn, it was not applied to falling bodies
before the sixteenth century, because no one was bold enough to assume that
such bodies are uniformly accelerated. And the mathematicians who discussed the
intension and remission of such qualities as speed did not relate this direcdy
to impetus, which remained a useful explanation of why bodies moved, without
being necessarily involved in the purely mathematical discussion of how mathematical
magnitudes moved.
Impetus theory in the sixteenth century was a muddled
subject, for it had had no consistent development. It was used to attack
Aristotelian theory quite as much as to endeavour to understand the actual
problems of moving bodies; and the tacit belief that impetus theory could be
treated in Archimedean fashion (which it could not) inevitably introduced
confusion. Besides, each mathematician was interested in some special aspect of
the problem, and few considered kinematics as a whole. Thus Tartaglia
interested himself in the motion of bodies almost entirely from the point of
view of ballistics, and his task was not made easier by his attempt to reconcile
Aristotelian physics with the observations of gunners. (In spite of what might
seem obvious, this was not in fact a case of reconciling traditional and
out-of-date theory with the discoveries of clear-sighted empirics. Gunners made
as many mistakes as Aristotle : they knew for a fact that a cannon ball
increased its speed after leaving the gun for some little time, so that muzzle
velocity was not maximum velocity.) Tartaglia regarded the imposition of
impetus as responsible for forced motion, but for long he believed with
Aristotle that natural and forced motion could not mix. Hence the trajectory of
a projectile must consist of two straight lines ; later, perhaps in the face of
observation, he decided that gravity must act continuously, always drawing the
projectile a little away from a straight path into a slighdy curved one ; or,
as he put it, “ there is always some part of gravity drawing the shot out of
its line of motion.” 1 * He hesitated whether to describe the
acceleration of a felling body in terms of its distance from its starting
point or its approach to its terminal point, but he could not make up his mind.
It was Benedetti, even more anti-Aristotelian than Tartaglia, who first
liberated himself from the concept of a “ goal ” and began to consider only the
past history of the falling body, without trying to anticipate its fiiture, in
attempting to establish the speed of the body at any given point.
Galileo’s work On Motion (De Motu) belongs in the general
221
tradition of Tartaglia and Benedetti. Though it is far superior to their
work, it shows that even so penetrating a mind as Galileo’s could not render
the problem of falling bodies and projectiles clear and simple as long as it
was considered within the framework of impetus physics. Galileo tried to write
an elementary but exhaustive account. So his first chapteu are concerned with
the nature of heavy and light; here he broke with Aristotle by denying the
existence of light bodies. Lightness, he said, is relative ; apparently light
bodies move upwards because heavy ones fall down below them, but in reality all
bodies are more or less heavy. This notion he seems to have derived from a
consideration of floating bodies ; and indeed much of this part of Galileo’s
mechanics is derived from Archimedes’ hydrostatics. He is as much concerned
with the rise of light bodies in water as with the fell of heavy ones in air,
and so he regards the resistance of die medium (whether air or water) as a kind
of buoyancy which supports less dense bodies more effectively than it does more
dense ones. His theory can, in fact, be reduced to the view that bodies fell at
speeds proportional to their densities (not their weights, as Aristode had
supposed) less the density of the medium. Or, as he said, speed will be “
measured by the difference between the weight of a volume of the medium equal
to the volume of the body, and the weight of the body itself.” ** Hence in air,
for example, objects made of the same material, having the same density, would
all fell at the same speed, irrespective of their weights. If one has two
objects of the same weight, however, the denser would fell the fester.* If the
density, or buoyancy, of the medium were to be progressively decreased, then
the objects
* As this treatise was written
while Galileo was at Pisa, it would have been this theory which was to be
tested by the Leaning Tower of Pisa experiment—if indeed it took place.
Others, like Stevin, had described dropping balls of different weights and the
same material, which duly hit the ground together.16 It proved
Aristotle wrong, without establishing an alternative theory.
would both fall progressively faster until in the limit (i.e. a vacuum)
their speeds would be proportional to their densities. (Galileo says to their
weights, meaning their relative weights.) Thus motion in the vacuum is
possible, Aristotle notwithstanding, even though objects of different materials
still fall at different speeds in it.
Using weight as the determining factor, Galileo derived some rather
peculiar notions about acceleration in free fall. According to his reasoning, a
falling body has first to overcome the force which placed it in position, so
its initial motion is accelerated motion. Once its characteristic speed of fall
is attained, there is no further acceleration; indeed, there can be none
because, so Galileo argued, a constant force must produce a constant speed.
Since heavy bodies have a greater force to overcome, they attain their
characteristic speed more slowly than light ones. By this reasoning, Galileo
was able to deny Aristotle’s contention that unopposed natural motion would be
infinitely swift, as in a vacuum, and opened the way for later consideration of
the speed of bodies falling with no resisting medium. At the same time, Galileo
was forced to conclude that true inertia is impossible, although he had some
inkling of its practical existence. From a consideration of inclined planes
(from which he later drew the conclusion that there was inertial motion) he
here remarked that if one takes the case of a perfectly smooth body and a
frictionless surface, one can conclude that “ any body on a plane parallel to
the horizon will be moved by the very smallest forces, indeed, by a force less
than any given force.”17 This is, obviously, very close to the
concept of inertia, still denying true inertial motion. Benedetti, indeed, had
seemed to state the case for inertial motion more clearly—but only for abstract
bodies moving through geometrical space.
How Galileo progressed from this world of involved Archi-
medean-Aristotelian-impetus physics to a totally new dynamics
223
is by no means dear. He wrote relatively little on mechanics between De
Motu and the Dialogue on the Two Chief Systems of the World (1632) which
embodies many of his conclusions on the subject.* He was mainly concerned, at
least after 1604, with astronomy and polemic. But there are a few glimpses of
his laborious progress from one system to another. The most famous is contained
in a letter to Paolo Sarpi, and is dated 16 October 1604.18 He wrote
:
Reflecting on the problems of motion for which, in order to demonstrate
the accidents which I have observed, I needed an absolutely certain principle
which I could take as an axiom,
I arrived at a proposition which seemed reasonably natural and
self-evident: which being supposed, I demonstrate everything else, namely that
the spaces passed over in natural motion are as the squares of the time and
that consequently, the spaces passed over in equal times are as the series of
odd numbers. And the principle is this : That the speed of a body falling in
natural motion is proportional to its distance from its point of origin.
Now this is most curious ; for what Galileo has proved is the familiar
law of free fall, namely s=i/zat2; but the self-evident natural axiom by which he claims to have derived
this conclusion, that the instantaneous velocity is proportional to the
distance traversed, is quite wrong. That speed was related to distance
traversed (rather than to elapsed time) was an eminently natural assumption;
speed had been regarded as proportional to distance by, for example, Leonardo
and Benedetti, and was still to be so regarded by Descartes, who never was able
to correct this erroneous view. It was the almost inevitable result of trying
to deal mathematically with falling bodies ; for as long as mathematics was
primarily geometry, space rather than time is the most
* For a discussion of his
later work in dynamics, see Galileo to Newton (yoL m in this
series).
obvious dimension to consider. Only much later did Galileo come to see
that, although a constant cause must produce a constant effect, this constant
effect may be a rate of change, not a fixed value; that is, it may be uniform
acceleration rather than constant speed. From this, ultimately, derives the law
of inertia. But in a very real sense a more intense degree of mathematisation
was required before the mathematical point of view could show itself really
consonant with the empirical test which Galileo perhaps tried at this time, the
rolling of balls down an inclined plane in the manner so graphically described
in the Discourses on Two New Sciences of 1638. Yet his conclusions of 1604
amply justified his faith in the mathematical approach, even though it was to
be some years before his mathematical reasoning could be perfected. Galileo’s
early work shows both the strengths and the weaknesses of sixteenth-century
applied mathematics in the world of physical bodies.
The mathematics used by the applied mathematician was not of a notably
high order; indeed, initially he used little which had not been available to
earlier centuries. The simplified computation possible with Hindu-Arabic
numerals had been known to the learned since 1200, as had algebraic methods of
solving simple equations, while the geometry used in surveying, navigation,
perspective and mechanics went little beyond Euclid. The trigonometrical
requirements of navigation and astronomy were mathematically complex, so that
trigonometry mad esignificant advances in the hands of astronomers and (later)
pure mathematicians, as did advanced computational methods. Most of the men
who wrote on pure mathematics in this period wrote on applied mathematics as
well, so that theory and practice went more serenely hand in hand than is
usually the case. By the early seventeenth century pure mathematics had reached
a stage of complexity far exceeding its state of a century earlier; for the
stimulus to this advance one can look both to the practical demands and
the influence of humanism. For the later sixteenth century was powerfully
influenced by mathematicians of the age after Euclid; and it must be remembered
that before 1550 even Archimedes had been better known for his mechanical than
for his mathematical work. Later Greek mathematicians had been almost unknown
until Regiomontanus and other mathematical humanists rescued their work from
near oblivion and called attention to its importance.
It was not, in fact, until the second half of the sixteenth century that
advanced mathematics received much attention from translators. One of the most
important contributors to this work was Federigo Commandino (1509-75),
mathematician to the Duke of Urbino, whose humanist court rejected astrology,
leaving Commandino free to devote himself to a study of Greek mathematics. He
was an indefatigable and able translator, with complete command of both Greek
and mathematics. He was responsible for the first reasonably complete text of
the mathematical work of Archimedes (a text which made available the Sand-Reckoner,
in which the heliocentric system of Aristarchus is described) ; and he himself
did sound work on the centres of gravity of solids, using Archimedean methods.
He also made a translation of the Conics of Apollonios (1566), a text superior
to those of Regiomontanus and of J. B. Memus (published 1537); yet it was only
in the last quarter of the century that mathematicians began to study conic
sections seriously. Commandino also translated the valuable Mathematical
Collections of Pappus, and a number of other treatises on pure and applied
mathematics. The algebra of Diophantos had been known only to mathematicians
like John Dee who could read Greek; it appeared in Latin in 1575, and
subsequently suggested a host of new problems to the already flourishing algebraists.
Geometry was undoubtedly at once the most useful and the
most advanced branch of mathematics ; perhaps for that reason it received
relatively less attention than other branches. Necessarily, much time and
effort was expended in assimilating the work of the ancients, who had gone so
far, and only advanced mathematicians could hope to succeed in developing novel
forms. There was much Archimedean geometrical analysis of solid and plane
surfaces, work that was only to show its worth in the next century. Francesco
Maurolyco (1494-1575), considered one of the best of the sixteenth-century
geometers, and an important writer on geometrical optics, wrote on conic
sections, treating them, as Apollonios had not, as actual plane sections of the
cone. There was a continued interest in the regular Platonic solids and, for
the first time, an interest in skewed solids, first pictured by Luca Pacioli
(d. c. 1510) in his Divine Proportion (1509), and often discussed thereafter.
Kepler, the astronomer, published Wine-Vat Stereometry in 1615 ; in the course
of trying to ascertain the proper method of judging the cubic contents of a
wine cask he treated the determination of areas and volumes by means of
infinitesimals, rather than by the more normal method of exhaustion, and
discussed a wide variety of solids produced by the rotation of a conic section
about any straight line lying in its plane, this investigation produced
ninety-two differently shaped solids. Kepler, like Maurolyco, contributed to
the development of mathematical optics, and more influentially. Indeed, the
most important geometrical works in the later sixteenth century were concerned
with the application of geometry to optics, astronomy and mechanics.
The most widely pursued form of mathematics in the fifteenth and
sixteenth centuries was what we should now regard as the most elementary: die
art of reckoning with Hindu-Arabic numerals, and the solution of numerical
problems which tacitly required quadratic and cubic equations for their
presentation. These two types of mathematics were usually subsumed under
227
the general term Arithmetic, which by this time had lost its original
Greek meaning of number-theory and had begun to replace the mediaeval term
algorism. (Algorism—reckoning with Arabic numerals—is a corruption of the name
of the ninth- century Islamic mathematician al-Kwarizmi; the word algebra is a
corruption of the title of the treatise in which he described the art of
solving problems arithmetically rather than geometrically.)
The use of Arabic numerals had been known to specialists for centuries;
al-Kwarizmi’s treatise on the subject was one of the first Arabic texts
translated in the twelfth century, and the thirteenth-century treatise of
Leonard of Pisa (misleadingly called the Book of the Abacus : in feet it made
the abacus unnecessary) was a clear, concise and useful summary of the
principal methods required. But the Arabic numerals were slow to replace the
use of the abacus. This was not really so peculiar as it seems ; even the
sixteenth century found the rules of simple arithmetic very difficult to
comprehend, and long division was truly long in the time required to accomplish
it. At the same time, quick and easy methods for the simpler operations of
arithmetic were much in demand, especially in the merchant cities of Italy and
Germany, and the later fifteenth century saw the appearance of numerous
vernacular treatises designed to satisfy the demand. These surveyed the field
from numeration to double-entry bookkeeping ; from simple addition to the
solution of complex problems involving quadratic equations; and from
multiplication to the extraction of roots. Indeed the most complete and
detailed fifteenth-century treatise, die Summa of Luca Pacioli (written in 1487
and published in 1494), includes arithmetic, algebra and (relatively briefly)
practical geometry, making a manual of useftd mathematics.
In both arithmetical and algebraic operations, some form of abbreviation
was desirable, and indeed to print without contractions was an unheard of idea
to fifteenth-century type-setters, still
228
influenced by manuscript style. The earliest arithmetical signs were
short forms of plus and minus, mere contractions; our modem forms for these two
operations first appear as a commercial symbol to indicate overweight and
underweight bales or boxes of merchandise. Most sixteenth-century algebraic
symbolism was also abbreviative rather than symbolic of operation. This is
confirmed by the use of the term “cossist” for a writer on algebra ; it derives
from the Italian use of the word cosa (thing, equivalent to Latin res) to
designate the unknown quantity in a problem. Separate terms were used for
powers to avoid writing the whole series of words; it was only slowly that the
advantages of a symbolism which clearly displayed the relationships between
powers was recognised. (Even at the end of the seventeenth century,
mathematicians wrote a1 and aa indifferently.) Because we are familiar with a system of arithmetical
and algebraic symbolism which has been standard for over two centuries, it is
tempting to assume that each symbol has inherent merit, and hence to hail the
early adoption of any one of these symbols as a great achievement.
Sixteenth-century developments show the fallacy in this reasoning ; most modem
symbols owe their survival more to luck than merit, and many equally useful and
valid symbols appeared only to be lost, as mathematicians slowly worked from
abbreviated (often called syncopated) algebra to true symbolic algebra.*
Each writer developed his own symbolism, and drew exclusively on those
predecessors who wrote in his own vernacular —for algebra and arithmetic were
popular arts—so that national schools of algebraic notation tended to emerge.
It is equally true that there is almost no sixteenth-century writer in the
field
* The modem symbol for square
root is no more—and no less—indicative of the operation to be performed than
the earlier Rx (radix, root) generally written in the abbreviated form used in
medical prescriptions; this earlier form could equally carry small numbers to
indicate higher roots, like the fourth or sixth.
who did not invent at least one symbol still in use : thus Robert
Recorde, a teacher, not an original mathematician, was the first to use the
modem sign for equality, though it had been used earlier as a non-mathematical
commercial symbol; in the Whetstone of Wit (1557) he explained that, in his
view “ nothing could be more equal ” than two parallel equal lines. Nothing
illustrates better die complexities of evaluating contributions to symbolism
than the work of Simon Stevin on decimal fractions. His little work on the
subject, originally published in Dutch in 1585 as De Thiende, then in French as
La Disme (The Tithe), was influential in popularising the use of decimal
fractions to simplify arithmetical computations; but his notation was clumsy
and was soon superseded. The first suggestion that there might be general rules
established for algebraic notation came from Francois Viete (Vieta, 1540-1603);
he advocated the use of vowels for unknown quantities and consonants for known
or constant quantities. This principle was finally accepted (in a different
form) when Descartes adopted the use of the letters at the end of the alphabet
(especially x) for unknowns, and the initial letters of the alphabet for
constants, a rule rapidly assimilated into seventeenth-century practice.
Of more importance in the long run than the development of the cossic art
of symbolism was the discovery of general methods of handling algebraic powers
and complex equations. The Greeks had solved quadratic equations geometrically;
die Islamic mathematicians followed suit, and achieved the solution of certain
forms of cubic equations. But many of these latter were incapable of solution
by the mathematical methods of the sixteenth century; indeed, few quadratics
could be solved by algebraic as distinct from geometrical methods. Thus Pacioli
could give simple general rules for such equations as x2+x=a ; but
for more complex equations he had to provide a cumbersome geometrical solution.
The aim was to find simple methods,
such, as anyone could learn to apply, but these simple methods were not
readily found out. Few would now regard the following as a problem of higher
mathematics : “ Find me a number which, multiplied by its root plus three, will
make twenty-one ? ” (That is, find xz when x3 + 3*2 = 2i.) Even if we cannot remember how to solve it,
we know that the method is readily available. Yet Cardan, who prided himself on
his algebraic skill, could not solve it when, among others of the same type, it
was put by him to Tartaglia in 1539.19 Indeed Tartaglia suspected as
much, and suspected, too, that Cardan was trying to make him divulge his newly
achieved power to solve most ordinary cubic equations.
Tartaglia’s reputation as a professional teacher of mathematics (he
lectured at Verona and Venice) as well as his livelihood depended on his being
able to demonstrate his ability in a public challenge such as was common in the
sixteenth century (and indeed continued common for another century and a half).
It was almost necessary for such a man to keep a few techniques secret, so as
to win renown and impress his colleagues. Tartaglia had been often challenged
in the years before 1539 ; in each case, suspecting that cubic equations would
be involved, he had worked out rules for solving one or more types; and in each
case he successfully responded to the challenge of solving such problems as “
Find me four quantities in combined proportion, of which the second shall be
two ; and the first and fourth added shall make ten,” while at the same time
baffling his competitors with his own problems. No wonder that he wrote on
applied mathematics only, preferring to reap more honour and glory before
telling the rest of the mathematical world how to solve such problems. The only
wonder, in fact, is that, approached by Cardan in 1539 with problems that had
formed part of a contest between Tartaglia and another mathematician two years
before, Tartaglia should have yielded to importunity and given Cardan
the answer which Cardan was incapable of working out for himself. To be
sure, he made Cardan promise not to reveal the secret, a promise Cardan
cheerfully broke when he published his algebraic treatise Ars Magna (The Great
Art) six years later. Though Cardan gave full credit to Tartaglia, the latter
was bitterly and publicly annoyed, and revenged himself by publishing the
whole story in vivid detail. He had reason to feel bitter, and Cardan has
emerged unfairly well in the eyes of historians of mathematics. To be sure,
having been given the method of solution, Cardan showed ability in analysing
the various kinds of cubic equations and in recognising negative roots for the
first time as valid, but he did not originate the methods he describes.
Algebra continued to make progress in the later sixteenth century, if
less boisterously, especially in the work of Vi£te and of Thomas Hariot
(1560-1621). Both worked on cubic equations, devising new methods for their
solution as well as for the solution of equations of higher degree.* Another
considerable step forward was Vi&te’s ordering of equations, that is,
devising methods of reducing complex equations to their most workable form.
Vi£te also spent much time on areas contained under complex curves, which he
expressed by means of infinite series. Once again, national difference
developed: Vi&te’s work influenced primarily the French mathematicians,
while the English mathematicians, especially John Wallis, preferred to draw
their ideas and methods from Hariot’s The Art of Analytic Practice (Ars
Analyticae Praxis, 1631).
Arithmetic was useful in the affairs of the counting-home and market
place; algebra provided the solution to ingenious and interesting problems that
might conceivably relate to com
* They reduced cubic equations
to the form y6 + y* = a, which can
be handled like a quadratic equation; higher equations they handled by methods
of approximation.
mercial enterprise; but neither had much direct relevance for science at
this stage. Arithmetic, of course, was used in astronomical calculation, but
it was a cumbersome help at best. Astronomical calculation for long remained a
drudgery which few can have undertaken cheerfully. Fortunately for astronomy
there have always been scientists who enjoyed the sheer mechanics of wrestling
with long and complex sums, a notable example in this period being Kepler. Even
fairly simple astronomical calculations involved another branch of
mathematics, of interest only to astronomers, the ancient art of trigonometry.
This developed among Greek astronomers—notably Hipparchos and Ptolemy—out of
the need to measure linear as well as angular velocity. Greek trigonometry was
originally concerned with determining the length of an arc by measuring the length
of the chord of the circle concerned. Thus, in figure 8, if a body moves from A
to B along the arc of the circle, the distance traversed can be determined
either by measuring the angle aob, and
knowing die length of the radius ao ;
or from the length of the radius and that of the chord ab. The tables of chords drawn up by Ptolemy gave their
lengths as parts of the diameter of the circle, and the related length of the
arc corresponding to die chord. Various Hindu and Arabic developments led to
the innovation of dividing the triangle in half, to give a right-angled
triangle in which the important relationship was that of half the angle at the
centre of die circle (the angle at o in the figure) with die radius. This is
the familiar modem trigonometric sine,* though it only appears in its modem
form of a decimal fraction in the eighteenth century. Tangents developed out of
shadow measurements for time-reckoning. The fifteenth century saw the complete
substitution of the right-angled triangle for the triangle inscribed in a
circle ; this in turn suggested the introduction, of
* The word itself is a Latin mistranslation
of the Arabic transliteration of the Hindu word for the half-chord.
FIG. 8. THE GEOMETRICAL ORIGIN OF TRIGONOMETRIC SINES
the cosine (complement of the sine) as a useful trigonometric function.
The secant and co-secant were also introduced in the fifteenth century, these
as a by-product of navigational tables; like cosine and tangent they received
their modem names in the course of the sixteenth century. Spherical
trigonometry, which treated of triangles formed by the intersection of circles
on a sphere, was widely used in astronomical calculation. Hence the “doctrine
of the sphere,” which began as the simplest branch of mathematical astronomy
involving merely the naming and locating of the great circles of the universe,
could also be a complex branch of mathematics.
Progress in trigonometry proceeded in orderly fashion, for the most part
in conjunction with mathematical astronomy. Peurbach and Regiomontanus,
studying Ptolemaic astronomy, studied trigonometry as well, and as companions
to their astro-
234
nomical treatises produced trigonometrical treatises. Peurbach was
content with a new table of sines ; Regiomontanus produced On Triangles (1464,
published in 1533), a complete survey of plane and spherical trigonometry.
Copernicus annexed new trigonometric tables to the first book of De
Revolutionibus, in exact imitation of Ptolemy, and his tables were, in turn,
improved by Rheticus. In the later sixteenth century it was realised that
trigonometric knowledge could be presented to non-mathematicians, and the more
advanced and up-to-date sailing manuals taught the seaman how to use simple
trigonometry. William Borough (1537-1598), an expert seaman who had learned the
usefulness of mathematical knowledge by practice, exhorted the readers of his
Discourse on the Variation of the Cumpas (1581) to compare his discussion with
that of Regiomontanus, evidently his accepted authority. He was rather scornful
of the table of sines prepared by Rheticus, which he thought inferior to those
of Reinhold. He hoped to be able to publish even better ones “ for the
commoditie of all such as shall have occasion to use the same for Navigation
and Cosmographie.” *°
The most important new development for both trigonometry and astronomical
computation was the invention of logarithms by John Napier (1550-1614). In the
sixteenth century sines were still expressed as lengths and, in order to avoid
the fractions which made calculation so tedious, the radius of the circle in
which the sine was inscribed was taken as a very large value ; this permitted
the sine to be computed in units. Though this gave sufficient accuracy and
avoided the use of fractions, it still made operations involving the
multiplication and division of sines formidably complex and long-winded.
Napier, searching for a means of devising tables which would permit rapid determination
of the products of any two sines, began with a complex analysis of the
relations between arithmetical and geometrical progressions of large numbers.
He gradually found that the
labour involved was so enormous that some other means must be invented ;
analysing his results he discovered that he could achieve his desired end by
the use of ratios, which he called logarithms. After twenty years of work he
published in 1614 A Description of the Marvellous Rule of Logarithms: here he
gave tables of the logarithms of sines and tangents, and explained how one
could multiply sines by adding their logarithms and divide sines by subtracting
their logarithms.*21 Napier’s Latin version was translated by Edward
Wright into English and published in 1616, to be followed three years later by
Napier’s description of the methods whereby he had calculated his tables.
Meanwhile Henry Briggs (1561-1630), professor of geometry at Gresham College,
had visited Napier and suggested the use of a decimal base together with the
calculation of logarithms for ordinary numbers as well as trigonometric ones.
Napier had previously intended to calculate tables to the base 10, and he
gladly relegated the task to Briggs. In 1617 appeared the first of a series of
tables prepared by Briggs, covering the first thousand numbers; later tables
were more extensive and included logarithms of trigonometric functions. In the
form used by Briggs logarithms were seen to be immensely helpful, and they were
soon widely used in long calculations. More tables followed, including a series
by the Dutch printer Adam Vlacq in 1628, to fill up the gaps left by Briggs.
Logarithms were at once a triumph of pure mathematics and a gift to the
practical mathematician, and both could appreciate them. What they could do was
neatly summed up by the anonymous versifier who wrote in the preface to
Wright’s translation of Napier’s Description that,
* Since a logarithm of a
number to a given base is the power to which the base must be raised to give
the number (so that the logarithm of 8 to the base 2 is 3, since 23 — 8)
logarithms obey the laws of exponents, whereby
a“xa*=,i»+j>. 1
Their use is great in all true Measuring Of Lands, Plots, Buildings &
Fortification So in Astronomie and Dialling Geographie and Navigation.
In these and like, young students soon may gain The skilful, too, may
save cost, time and pain.22
THE ORGANISATION AND
REORGANISATION OF SCIENCE
There was but one course left, therefore—to try the whole thing anew upon
a better plan, and to commence a total reconstruction of sciences, arts, and
all human knowledge raised upon the proper foundations.1
Sixteenth-century scientists were filled with the twin spirits of novelty
and rebellion. Consciously turning away from established views, eagerly making
discoveries and discussing new ideas, they came to feel more and more surely
that totally new methods were required for the effective investigation of
nature. The midsixteenth century was too fully occupied—either in defending
the thesis that all Aristotelian science was wrong (like the logician Petrus
Ramus at Paris) or in developing new hypotheses in particular sciences—to
consider the general problem of scientific method. But by the end of the century
scientists had begun that intensive investigation of a possible reorganisation
which was to lead to the production of full-fledged philosophies of science
like those of Bacon and Descartes.
Organisation was of two possible varieties: organisation of method, and
organisation of men; and both were to be intensively discussed in this period.
For both what was known and the numbers of those who knew it were increasing
far too rapidly for the old ways to continue unchanged. In the fifteenth and
early sixteenth centuries the scientists, like the humanists, could
238
count themselves a small band of scholarly colleagues, and contact could
be maintained by correspondence. Analogously, the content of science was still
simple and restricted enough to make a conventional university education,
supplemented by thorough independent reading of the classical authorities,
adequate to equip a man to consider himself a serious scientist. The
achievements of the mid-sixteenth century changed all that. Scientists began to
demand, publicly and frequently, that there be far more teaching of science,
and on two levels: on a high mathematical plane for the would-be scientists,
and on a broad vernacular basis for the general public, now that science had
shown that it could be useful. Scientists also began to wish for more
opportunity for personal contact, now that every country could boast a
significant number of trained scientists, not all of whom could expect to spend
time in one of the major university centres of Europe. At first this discontent
expressed itself in mere discussion ; by the end of the sixteenth century the
first steps had been taken which were to yield the concrete results
characteristic of the mid-seventeenth century.
The science of the early modem period begins in die university ; but,
however much it remained true that most scientists were university-trained, and
that many scientists found positions as university teachers, the science of the
later sixteenth century was not indigenous to the university. In this respect
the early modem period differs markedly from the Middle Ages when almost all
scientific discussion took place within the walls of the university, and within
the framework of the standard university curriculum. That by and large this was
no longer true in the sixteenth century is only pardy the result of university
conservatism which saw no need to adapt its curriculum to the ferment of new
ideas. It was equally the result of the changing nature and content of science
itself. The universities, providing general education in the liberal arts for
all, had always grounded their
students in general elementary science only ; even the medica school gave
theoretical rather than practical instruction, an< generally of a fairly
elementary nature. The complex anti' Aristotelian ideas on dynamics of the
fourteenth century, the nev astronomical speculations of the fifteenth century,
or the nev medical theories of the early sixteenth century could be presentee
to general students after their initial introduction to natural sdena because
all the newer ideas were closely rdated in form anc content to the
Aristotelianism from which they were derived ir revolt.
The new sdence of the later sixteenth century, though it wai equally
anti-Aristotelian in intent, derived from other source than “ the Master of
Those That Know,” and a knowledge ol Aristotelian sdence did not necessarily
make the new speculation: intelligible. Even mathematics was more dosely
related to Archimedes than to Euclid, and only Euclidean geometry was taught
in the university. Similarly, the texts of Sacrobosco or ever Peurbach were not
suffident preparation for the astronomy oi Tycho ; nor did knowledge of Mondino
necessarily prepare one to tackle Vesalius. This situation grew more acute
when, aftei the turn of the century, exdtingly new developments were introduced
by such men as Kepler, Harvey and Galileo, development! so radical that they
bore little or no immediate resemblance tc traditional natural philosophy.
Until the new learning of the sdentific revolution could produce its own
textbooks in the elements of mathematics and natural philosophy, the ararfcrmV
education of any man, even the would-be scientist, was bound tc be nearly
devoid of useful sdentific content. The most that university-trained men of the
late sixteenth and early seventeend centuries would admit as a (doubtful)
benefit was an intense disgust for the Aristotelianism of traditional learning,
generated by years of training in scholastic thought and method. The knowledge
so acquired might prove useful in polemic, but hardl)
240
in any other way. It also left them with a working vocabulary poorly
suited to new ideas, though having the advantage of universal intelligibility
to all university graduates. All this being the case, it is no wonder that the
best teachers preferred giving private lectures to holding university posts, or
that one and all, whenever they thought or wrote on the problem of how best to
advance scientific learning, always did so in terms of institutions quite unrelated
to universities.
Scientific education proper in the sixteenth century took various forms,
but the chief derived from the practice of the fifteenth-century humanist whose
“family” included young scholars, half apprentices and as such members of his
household, and half pupils. So John Dee at Mortlake taught others besides
Thomas Digges, and directed and influenced their later work by the
quasi-parental relationship established. The most striking example, on such a
large scale that it seems almost an establishment apart, was the constitution
of the household at Tycho Brahe’s Uraniborg : surrounded in any case by the
host of servants essential to feudal housekeeping, and needing numerous
subordinates to assist him in his multifarious scientific activities, it was
easy to include a few more young men in the life of the island. There was
plenty to do : astronomical instruments to be set up and calibrated ;
astronomical observations to be made; alchemical experiments to be tried; a
printing-press to be supervised. Many aspirants to either astronomy or the
scientific instrument trade did come to spend a few months or years—not only
from Denmark, but from many foreign countries—at the only scientific centre of
its kind. When Tycho finally left Uraniborg, many of his disciples went with
him, so that he was never without scientific assistants in training.
A quite different form of scientific group—though still with an
educational purpose—was that held together by a wealthy and noble patron, who
hoped to learn from the scientists whom
he wholly or partially supported. A famous example in Englai is the group
gathered around Sir Walter Raleigh, usually ident fied with Shakespeare’s
School of Night (mysteriously mentione in Love’s Labours Lost). Most of these
men were poets and pla; wrights; but one was the mathematician Thomas Hariot wl
taught Raleigh and the occult-loving Earls of Northumberlar and Derby a good
deal of astronomy and mathematics, and thei were one or two minor
mathematicians in the group. The known subjects of discussion were
philosophical, and their reput; tion a dark one, for they were said to dabble
in both magic an atheism. In fact, except that they did interest themselves i
chemistry—Raleigh had a famous secret cordial that he w; allowed to try on the
dying Prince Henry—their interests wei probably fairly rational.
There were many other such groups, little known unless the happened to
include some notable scientific figure. In effect tl Accademia dei Lincei, to
which Galileo was so proud to belon; was much the same sort of group : in
origin and activity it w: far closer to such gatherings than to the later
scientific societie The Accademia dei Lincei began in 1603 when Duke Federig
Cesi (1585-1630) began studying natural history at his home i Rome with three
minor scientists; the best known is Francesc Stelluti (1577-1653) who is
associated with the publication of th first microscopical figures, a couple of
plates of bees printed b the Academy in 1625, and later reissued in 1630. Like
Raleigh group, Cesi and his friends were suspected of occult studies (die were
reputed to communicate in cipher) and they seem to hav discontinued their
meetings until 1610. They were then moi formally organised with a membership of
thirty-two whic included both Galileo and della Porta. The newly invente-
optical instrument of Galileo was a source of great comment an interest, and it
was at a meeting of die Academy that the nam telescope was first applied to it.
Many of these men were no
242
resident in Rome, and their plans for a studious, quasi-monastic (but
anti-clerical) communal life were soon abandoned. Perhaps they took warning
from the evil reputation that they acquired, which must have seemed
strengthened by the enrolment of della Porta within their ranks; he had long
since attempted to organise an Academy of the Secrets of Nature which, not
surprisingly if its members pursued his favourite studies, soon foundered on
the rock of suspected witchcraft. Nevertheless, the Lynxes continued to exist,
to meet occasionally, and even to publish books— including some controversial
writings of Galileo—until Cesi’s death in 1630 ; and Galileo always proudly
indicated his membership on the title-page of all his works.
The true form of academy, organised by its members and run entirely by
them, did appear in the sixteenth century, but few were scientific. The
humanists still led in scholarly organisation and most of these first societies
were literary, like the Accademia ddla Crusca, formed to adjudicate upon the
purity of the Italian language. A few had somewhat tenuous connections with
science, like the academy (or rather series of academies) formed by the
Pl&ade after 1550. Although nominally under the patronage of King Henri
111, its cessation with his death was the result of the increased political
chaos in France, rather than an indication of his influence. The academicians
were primarily interested in literature and the arts, but there was a good deal
of scientific interest expressed by its changing membership, and its especial
emphasis on music gave room for mathematics and physical acoustics.
In the generation after 1589 there were many demands in France for a
revived royal sponsorship of an academy devoted like the old ones to learning
and the arts. Some of the interest in both the aesthetic and scientific aspects
of music characteristic of the older group is apparent in the work of Marin
Mersenne (1588-1648), whose Harmonie UniverselU (1627) is very like what
the Pleiade sought to develop. Mersenne came to Paris in 1619, and
deplored the lack of any sort of formal organisation to which men of learning
might resort; he wistfully remarked that there seemed in 1623 no chance for
forming such centres as the earlier academies, though he hoped that some day
something better might be organised. Meanwhile, he did his best to supply a
substitute, partly by inviting men interested in science to visit him at his
monastic cell, partly by becoming what the seventeenth century called an
intelligencer, a man who made it his business to know and correspond with the
leading scientists of the day, to whom he dispensed news in return for more
news.
There were other cases of individual patronage by a scientist or
semi-scientist: one of Mersenne’s correspondents was Peiresc (1580-1637), a
wealthy amateur in the south of France. Peiresc was a friend of della Porta and
a member of the Lincei; consequently he was an early telescopic astronomer,
and others besides himself made use of his instruments. A curious case is that
of John Dee : at his house at Mortlake he had assembled an enormous library and
many scientific instruments, which were used by others besides himself. He
hoped that the Queen (who often stopped at Mortlake to inquire the latest news
from the stars) would grant him a comfortable living somewhere in the country
where he could organise a scientific centre, to be shared by his friends. But
nothing came of this except a long and informative appeal by Dee to the Queen.
In spite of abortive attempts at formal scientific organisation, it remained
true that the best places to gather news and exchange ideas were the cities in
which scientists, drawn by the prospect of employment, were most thickly
gathered. These were not university towns, in general. Nuremberg, centre of the
astrological, instrument-making and printing trades was more of a genuine
scientific centre than any of the university cities. Other cities attracted
scientists because they possessed mathematical
244
lectureships, often designed for the benefit of the practical man. There
was much interest in mathematical lectures in Paris, as Dee reported from his
own experience, in spite of the existence of the university. He was invited to
lecture there by “ some English gentlemen ” and his lectures on Euclid, so he
remembered later, drew so many auditors “ that the mathe- maticall schooles
could not hold them; for many were faine, without the schooles at the windowes,
to be auditors and spectators, as they best could helpe themselves thereto.” 2
The King offered him a good stipend if he would stay and become a regular
lecturer in mathematics. This in spite of the fact that there was a
mathematical professorship, whose incumbent at this period was Oronce Fine,
associated with the humanist College Royale, founded by Francis I; though the
college was intended as a centre for study of Greek, Latin and Hebrew, it soon
acquired professorships of both mathematics and medicine, and the lectures were
given twice, once in Latin and once in French. But there was apparently still
an unsatisfied demand.
In London there were no university or public lectureships, but private
mathematical lectures abounded, similar to those given by Robert Recorde
earlier in the century. The first public scientific lectures were those on
anatomy given by the Reader appointed by the united Company of Barbers and
Surgeons; after 1583 there were also the Lumleian lectures in surgery read at
the Royal College of Physicians. Various schemes for the establishment of
professorships and academies by the Crown were proposed, and came to nothing.
The first successfid lectureship in the mathematical sciences was established
by a public-minded group of London citizens in 1588 : the lectures were to be
for the instruction of the captains of the trained bands, though they were open
to the public. The first and only incumbent, Thomas Hood, faithfully lectured
for four or five years, and translated and wrote several works in elementary mathematics as well, but when the emergency
eased, the interest appeared to slacken.
Perhaps this was because an endowment for a much more munificent scheme
had already been announced, and was soon to take effect. In 1575 Sir Thomas
Gresham had drawn up a will in which he bequeathed much of his property
(chiefly the Royal Exchange and a great house in Bishopsgate Street) jointly to
the City of London and Company of Mercers ; after his death and that of his
wife, die heirs were to support seven professors—of Rhetoric, Divinity, Music,
Physic, Geometry, Astronomy and Law—who were to live and lecture in his house.f
The lectures began in 1598 in what was soon to be known as Gresham College ;
the geometrical and astronomical professors were especially notable. The first
professor of geometry was Henry Briggs, not yet associated with Napier; a
Cambridge graduate, he held the chair until 1619 when, on the establishment of
the Savilian chairs of astronomy and geometry at Oxford, he became professor of
geometry—a progression to be followed by other Gresham professors, including
Wren. The first Gresham professor of astronomy was an undistinguished Oxford
graduate warm**! Edward Brerewood; he was succeeded in 1619 by Edmund Gunter
(1581-1626), already known for work in navigation and practical mathematics.
Gunter’s successor (in 1626) was Henry Gellibrand (1597-1636), who continued
Gunter’s interest in navigation, though in a different way: Gellibrand was
responsible for the discovery of the change of magnetic variation from true
North with time, a discovery which he made through experiments conducted over a
period of years in the garden of the
Keeper of Stores at the Navy Yard at Deptford. Gresham College was particularly
important in supplying a meeting place for scientists. Many scientists and
physicians with varied interests met in Gresham’s great house before and after
lectures on astronomy, mathematics and medicine, long before a group of young
scientists who were later to form the nucleus of the Royal Society adopted the
practice. Gresham College was in some senses the university of the new
learning.
Part of the scientists’ eager desire to increase the possibilities for
acquiring a scientific education, as well as their enthusiasm for friendly
meetings for the exchange of ideas, derived directly from a new self
confidence, a belief that theirs was truly the way to an understanding of
nature. Not many as yet took them at face value ; one of the few men who did
so, and who tried to preach their ideas more widely, was Francis Bacon, not a
scientist, not even a recognised patron of science, who yet became die most vocal
prophet of science possible. Bacon shared to the full the self confidence of
the scientist; in his early youth (he was bom in 1561) he once wrote to his
uncle, Lord Burghley, that he had taken all learning to be his province. His
first taste of formal education did not assist him ; he spent a short time at
Cambridge University from which he derived no other benefit than the conviction
that scholastic modes of thought were utterly sterile and useless. Like Petrus
Ramus (1515-42) in France, he was inclined to think that if only one altered
the method of reasoning by introducing a new logic all would be welL His later
training, legal and courdy, tended to confirm this view; yet gradually he
extended his knowledge by reading and meditation, until he came to the
conclusion that only science could provide the key to the truth, and only
empiricism could provide the key to science. He had a Faustian belief that
knowledge was power, but his exact legal mind prevented him from equating
knowledge with magic ; the closest he came to magic was to adopt die work of the natural magician which he soon transmuted
into genuine experimental science. He was fired with the conviction that he had
found the best, shortest and safest road to scientific certainty ; and he
passionately longed to persuade the world of the value of his knowledge, and
the error of earlier methods.
Bacon’s aim—to reform all knowledge and create a “new learning ” in place
of the old—was one which he shared with Galileo (his contemporary) and
Descartes (a generation younger, 1596-1650); and like them, he believed that in
the reform of scientific method lay the possibility of improving all learning.
Unlike Galileo, he was no professional or even serious original scientist;
indeed his knowledge of contemporary science was curiously uneven, and his
ideas of scientific experiment were naive and over-simple. Unlike Descartes, he
was no mathematician or profound abstract philosopher, nor was he a gentleman
of leisure. He was a man of law by training and profession, a busy public
figure, always seeking place and advancement until he achieved his goal as Lord
Chancellor. Only his final disgrace and enforced retirement gave him time and
leisure to complete (nearly) the series of works he had planned. The last five
years of his life were filled with writing and experiment. It was love of
experiment which occasioned his death in 1626 : he stopped one snowy day near
Highgate to buy a hen from a housewife, which he had killed and then stuffed
with snow, the object being to test the action of cold on the preservation of
food; inadvertently, he tested the action of cold on the human body, and died
of pneumonia. The experiment is curiously characteristic : a good idea in
advance of its time, investigated spontaneously, unsystematically,
inconclusively, but ardently.
Bacon’s first attempt at describing his ideas about the deficiencies of
current science, and the need for a new approach, was addressed to James I, and
published in 1605 under the title The Two Books of Francis Bacon, of the
Proficiende and Advancement of Learning,
Divine and Human. After a preliminary bid for royal patronage, Bacon turned to
the subject of his real interest, the appraisal of current knowledge in all
fields, and the proposing of steps to be taken to improve it. Eager to
criticise the schoolmen, Bacon was yet anxious to avoid any tendency towards
anti-intellectualism, and was therefore careful to balance praise and blame,
praise for learning rightly pursued, blame for the methods of the contemporary
world. It was easy to show the benefits of learning: rightly pursued, it
improves the mind, strengthens the character, ennobles the citizen and the
state, and is a source of power, delight and utility to man. Learning as
practised may appear none of these things, but that is because it is subject to
abuse, pedantry, excessive reliance on authority, ignorance, the self-esteem of
its proponents, the pitfalls of the human mind, mysticism and limitation of
range. The pitfalls of the human mind, which Bacon was later to dramatise as
Idols, particularly interested him, for they were the result of inherent human
tendencies—like love of system building, the influence of custom, and the snare
of words improperly used—against which the only weapons were recognition and
vigilance.
The worst of all defects was that men generally have sought knowledge for
the wrong reasons:
Men have entered into a desire of learning and knowledge, sometimes upon
a natural curiosity and inquisitive appetite; sometimes to entertain their
minds with variety and delight; sometimes for ornament and reputation ; and
sometimes to enable them to victory of wit and contradiction ; and most times
for lucre and profession ; and seldom sincerely to give a true account of their
gift of reason, to the benefit and use of men.3
The “ benefit and use of men ” meant to Bacon many things : power,
because it was synonymous with understanding ; truth ; control of nature; and
the “ relief of man’s estate,” the application
of science to the useful arts that could improve the material well-being
of mankind. Because this was a novel idea, it has perhaps been too much
stressed as Bacon’s chief aim in the advancement of science, which it
emphatically was not. No one ever inveighed more firmly than Bacon against the
evils of purely “ lucriferous ” (money-grubbing) knowledge ; what he sought was
“ludferous” (enlightening) knowledge. But he did believe that knowledge gave
the power to improve the lot of mankind, and to increase the sum total of human
happiness : in many ways, Bacon was the real progenitor of the eighteenth-
century enlightenment. His greatest criticism was that men had sought laming
for private and trivial reasons ; he was too impressed with die potentialities
of true knowledge not to feel that its study should be undertaken only in a
serious—even a solemn—spirit.
Of all the varieties of human knowledge, science had advanced the least,
because it lacked any coherent method of procedure. It did not even, like the
mechanic arts, build on past experience ; one age, Bacon complained, did not
learn from another ; Aristotle was as good a scientist—perhaps a better
one—than any cinr^ and in die early seventeenth century one knew for certain
litde more than Aristode had known. Or, as he put it,
The sciences stand where they did and remain almost in the same
condition, receiving no noticeable increase, but on the contrary, thriving most
under their first founder, and then declining. Whereas in the mechanical arts,
which are founded on nature and the light of experience, we see the contrary
happen, for these (as long as they are popular) are continually thriving and
growing, as having in them a breath of life ; at first rude, then convenient,
afterwards adorned, and at all times advancing.4 So the sciences
should copy the mechanical arts in two respects : they should be “ founded on
nature ” and diey should learn to be
cumulative. The greatest need was for the organisation of scientific
method. Until the structure of scientific inquiry was understood, how could men
know how rightly to proceed ? And it was precisely for want of co-ordination of
the various lines of scientific inquiry that the sciences had hitherto
languished so miserably ; or, as Bacon admonished,
Let no man look for much progress in the sciences—especially in the
practical part of them—unless natural philosophy be carried on and applied to
particular sciences, and particular sciences be carried back again to natural
philosophy.5
To Bacon it seemed natural—since he was imbued with the notions and methods
of the law*—that the first step was to classify the major divisions of
learning, including natural philosophy, in order to see what needed to be
done. He divided learning into three main headings : History, Poesy, and Philosophy,
each of which required the exclusive use of one of the three Faculties of
Memory, Imagination, and Reason. Imagination was all too much stimulated in
Bacon’s view—it must have been hard to be bom without appreciation of poetry in
the Elizabethan world—and hence had no role in the advancement of learning,
however much it might delight and amuse. History and philosophy had been
cultivated, but not properly, and not enough; and besides, natural history and
natural philosophy must be separated from the other aspects of these two heads.
This was easy to do with natural history, which had little tendency to become
entangled with civil or ecclesiastical history, but natural philosophy
presented a more difficult problem. Natural philosophy must be separated on the
one hand from divine theology—for though the study of nature might lead to an
enhanced view of the wonder and majesty of God, faith and natural philosophy
had no connection and must be kept firmly
* Harvey was later to say,
cogently enough, that Bacon wrote philosophy like a Lord Chancellor.
separate—and on the other hand from metaphysics, which concerned itself
exclusively with final causes, those “ barren virgins ” who had no place in
natural philosophy. Analysing and cataloguing further, Bacon divided natural
philosophy into “ the Inquisition of Causes, and the Production of Effects ;
Speculative, and Operative ; Natural Science, and Natural Prudence,” 6
each of which he was quite ready to subdivide further.
In spite of his legal mind, Bacon did not classify as a means of
description, but as a means of demonstrating that “ knowledges are as pyramids,
whereof history is the basis : so of Natural Philosophy the basis is Natural
History ; the stage next the basis is Physic; the stage next the vertical point
is Metaphysic,” 7 Physic being the inquiry into material and
efficient causes, Metaphysic the inquiry into formal causes. It was this
belief in the pyramidal structure of learning that led Bacon to lay such great
stress on natural history—the collection of facts about nature in course,...
nature erring or varying, and... nature altered or wrought; that is, history of
creatures, history of marvels, history of arts.8 By “ nature in
course ” Bacon meant nature as she appears to the observant eye and mind; “
nature erring or varying ” was aberrant, marvellous nature, the study of
wonders and monsters, a subject which the Royal Society was to find almost as
interesting as Bacon did. By “ nature altered or wrought ” he meant on the one
hand the curious discoveries of the trades and mechanic arts, and on the other
hand what could be created in the form of an experiment by the curious
investigator.
That the arts and crafts had much to teach the scholar was fairly widely
recognised in the later sixteenth century, though no one had previously made it
a principle ; that men should deliberately experiment—as distinct from merely
observing nature— had seldom been advocated, certainly not with the systematic
thoroughness which Bacon proposed. To Bacon, experiment
252
was the one truly necessary ingredient of scientific endeavour : without
it, he thought, natural philosophy was no better than metaphysical speculation,
and the scientist no better than the metaphysician who spun webs of a priori
hypotheses out of his own inside. With experiment, the scientist possessed the
key he needed to unlock the secrets of nature; the use of experiment
is of all others the most radical and fundamental towards natural
philosophy; such natural philosophy as shall not vanish in the fume of subtle,
sublime or delectable speculation, but such as shall be operative to the
endowment and benefit of man’s life ; for ... it will give a more true and real
illumination concerning causes and axioms than is hitherto attained. For like
as a man’s disposition is never well known till he be crossed, nor Proteus ever
changed shapes till he was straitened and held fast; so the passages and
variation of nature cannot appear so fully in the liberty of nature, as in the
trials and vexations of art.9 In spite of the baroque style, Bacon’s
meaning is clear; he was firmly convinced that the experimental method,
properly developed, was the only true way.
There was another advantage to the experimental method, of peculiar
importance for the organisation of die scientist as distinct from the
organisation of science : it permitted co-operative endeavour, and it permitted
various kinds of minds to contribute equally to the progress of science. Facts,
whether derived from observations or experiments, were useful to the scientist
who was investigating nature ; and it did not take the same kind of mind to
collect facts as it did to make use of them. The encyclopedia was a preliminary
to the scientific theory, and the man who collected its facts could feel that
he had made a genuine contribution to the advancement of knowledge. It was a
kind of demo- cratisation of knowledge, because it lessened the need for high
intellectual powers such as were required in reasoning ; as Bacon once
put it,
the course I propose for the discovery of sciences is such as leaves but
little to the acuteness and strength of wits, but places all wits and
understandings nearly on a level.10 That dm was exaggeration he
knew; and when he wrote the fragmentary account of a scientific Utopia in The
New Atlantis, his Salomons House—the island’s scientific research centre—
contained men who merely thought, devising experiments, analysing results, and
drawing conclusions, as well as men who merely observed facts and performed
experiments at the direction of others. Though he was unduly optimistic about
the possibilities of co-operative science, Bacon ingeniously saw some of the
possibilities for utilising lesser minds to help in the task of understanding
nature which were, in fact, to emerge as modem science progressed.
Bacon by no means understood his experimental way to be pure empiricism.
He had no use for random experimentation, undertaken without aim or guiding
principle, however much he might at various times fell into the error of
collecting diverse experiments, such as those posthumously published in his
Sylva Sylvarum. Nor did he think well of investigating some one aspect of
nature by performing all possible experiments relating to it, “ as Gilbert with
the magnet, and die chemist with gold ” ; this he thought “blind and stupid.
For no one successfully investigates the nature of a thing in the thing itself;
the enquiry must be enlarged, so as to become more general.”11
Experimenters should begin by trying to devise “ experiments of light ” from
which general axioms or principles could be drawn by die method of induction,
and this meant that the experiments must be planned beforehand.
The method of induction was Bacon’s bid for a new logic to replace
Aristode’s, and for that reason he called the work in which
he discussed this logical method Novum Organum (1620). This book is
Bacon’s boldest claim foe serious consideration as a philosopher; the fact that
generations of philosophers have criticised it as naive, inconsistent and a
failure shows that he did at least succeed enough to be taken seriously. Novum
Organum was intended to be a book of restricted scope, for it was written as
the second part of his “ Great Instauration,” the plan for the restoration of
the sciences to their proper dignity and usefulness. The first part was a
revised and extended Latin version of the Advancement of Learning, which
explained the need for the new sciences; Novum Organum explained the method;
and there were to be other works on natural history and natural philosophy
illustrating the possibilities of the plan, by demonstrating how to proceed
from fact to theory. The method was simple ; induction is that method of
reasoning which “ derives axioms from the senses and particulars, rising by a
gradual and unbroken ascent, so that it arrives at the most general axioms last
of all. This is the true way but as yet untried.”1 * The method of
induction is based upon the method of experiment, and is a method whereby
reason and sense experience can learn to support one another.
The weakness of Bacon’s proposals is that, however admirable in
themselves, they do not carry conviction, and this chiefly because one cannot
read long without realising that Bacon could not judge the worth of any
individual experiment or experimental discovery, even while proclaiming the
value of experiment. Partly this was because he expected too much ; convinced
of the value of the experimental way, he could not believe that it had been
rightly applied if it failed to give immediately satisfying answers. So (in
1620, when nothing had as yet been published on the subject) he doubted whether
the microscope would prove a permanently useful scientific instrument, because
it had been used only on trivial subjects ; yet, he added, “ great advantages
might doubtless be derived from the discovery ” if only “ it could be
extended to larger bodies, or to the minutiae of larger bodies, so that the
texture of a linen cloth could be seen like network, and thus the latent
minutiae and inequalities of gems, liquors, urine, blood, wounds &c. could
be distinguished,”13 a very reasonable expectation. He was not even
certain of the permanent value of the telescope; Galileo’s discoveries were
admirable, but the telescope had made no more discoveries; and he could not
help regarding even the first ones “ with suspicion chiefly because the
experiment stops with these few discoveries, and many other things equally
worthy of investigation are not discovered by the same means.”14
Bacon clearly had no feeling for patience in scientific inquiry, and no notion
of how long any actual “ discovery of nature ” might be expected to take.
In a different way, he deprecated the work of Gilbert because, after a
wealth of experiment, “ he made a philosophy out of the loadstone ” and
indulged in extravagant speculations ; if he could speculate so wildly, how
could one be quite sure that his experiments were truly performed and reported
? (Had Bacon lived to read Galileo’s most important works, he would have
deplored Galileo’s addiction to mental in place of physical experiment.)
Though he drew information from Gilbert, he could not help regarding him as a
perpetual awful warning. Because he so feared abstract reasoning not based upon
experience, Bacon was particularly mistrustful of such purely theoretical
science as Copemican astronomy. From his reading (which probably included some
of Tycho Brahe’s works) Bacon had learned that Copernicus had wrongly
attributed an extra and unnecessary motion to the Earth, and he had also
learned that astronomers Tia^ begun to believe that it might be possible to
construct a system of the world devoid of mathematical epicycles, strictly
physical in construction.
But the strongest argument against Copernicus was that he had no
observational evidence for his system :
It is easy to see, that both they who think the Earth revolves, and they
who hold theprimum mobile [to do so]... are about equally and indifferently
supported by the phenomena.1*
In fact, he preferred Tycho’s system, very probably because of Tycho’s
greater insistence upon astronomical observation than upon astronomical
calculation. He joined Tycho and other radical contemporary astronomers in
denying the special character of the heavens, and he went beyond most in
asserting that the physics of the celestial and the terrestrial spheres is
identical. Or as he said picturesquely:
For those supposed divorces between ethereal and sublunary things seem to
me but figments, superstitions mixed with rashness ; seeing it is most certain
that very many effects, as of expansion, contraction, impression, cession,
collection into masses, attraction, repulsion, assimilation, union and the
like, have place not only here with us, but also in the heights of the heaven
and the depths of the earth.16 It was observation alone that would
demonstrate this, as it could settle other questions : whether the stars are
scattered at different distances throughout space; whether (as Gilbert thought)
the stars revolve; whether there is a true system of the world, or whether
there are only stars and planets moving and existing independently in space.
The astronomers might protest that Bacon ignored what they had done, and asked
them to settle points on which they had no evidence; but Bacon’s notion of
astronomical problems is both varied and complex, and a useful antidote to the
new self confidence of the astronomers.
Bacon’s estimation of the problems that the scientists should immediately
try to solve was often wrong, and he was unduly optimistic in thinking that it
was only misunderstanding of scientific method which obstructed an immediate
answer. But
he was by no means always wrong about what were the most interesting
problems, nor what the most correct approach to their solution might be. Of all
parts of natural philosophy the most important—and the least studied up to his
day—was, Bacon held, “ the discovery of forms ” ; and yet it was “ of all other
parts of knowledge the worthiest to be sought.”17 Here, as
elsewhere, Bacon adopted the terminology of the familiar Aristotelian theory
of causation—it was the only one available to him—but he modified it as he used
it. Since all bodies are composed of both form and matter, there must be both
formal and material causes of all things. Bacon believed that science should
concern itself most with cause and effect; but the formal cause, though it was
not sufficient in itself, needed elucidation. Aristotle had defined the formal
cause as what makes a body’s essential nature, the sum of the attributes which
make an object belong to a particular category or class, so that perceiving it
we instantly give it a name. Originally Aristotle had in mind such things as
the attributes of a piece of furniture, which make it recognisable as a chair,
or of a piece of bronze which we recognise as a statue. In natural philosophy “
form ” came to have a more extended meaning : the formal cause for the kettle’s
growing warm on the fire was the heat which the fire contained, and similarly
gold was characterised by such forms as density, malleability, resistance to
corrosion, yellowness and the like.
The sixteenth century had introduced a vast new number of forms to
account for chemical changes, and the new physics was to introduce even more.
Bacon took a different view of what a form might be. As he explained:
For though in nature nothing really exists besides individual bodies,
performing pure individual acts according to a fixed law, yet in philosophy
this very law, and the investigation, discovery, and explanation of it, is the
foundation as well of
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knowledge as of operation. And it is this law, with its clauses, that I
mean when I speak of Forms.18 Lacking
an understanding of mathematical law, Bacon was forced to introduce the
somewhat cumbersome device of the law of forms. Yet what he meant is clear
enough, and refutes the notion that he did not seek general principles of
nature. Indeed, Bacon laid almost too much stress on the importance of
discovering the natural laws of forms : from that alone, he thought “ results
truth in speculation and freedom in operation.”19
The discovery of forms meant, generally, the study of the physical
properties of matter. Such things as heat, colour, whiteness and blackness,
rarity and density, attraction and repulsion, must be not just accidental
attributes of matter, but the result of the obedience of matter to certain
laws. Much of Book n of Novum Organum is devoted, in almost painful detail, to
Bacon’s views as to how one investigates and discovers these laws by induction.
First comes the elaborate compilation and classification of the natural
history of the particular form in question, die collection of a body of fact;
next comes the even more elaborate comparison, check and elimination which
should, almost mechanically, leave one with the correct answer. He showed in
detail how this should be done by performing it for the form of heat, giving
four separate tables of “ instances ” of the production of heat all laboriously
compared and cross-indexed. It is difficult to believe that anyone could
imagine that this was the proper way to proceed in scientific inquiry ; yet
Bacon’s results were exactly those of the best seventeenth-century scientists,
who derived their conclusion in quite a different way, namely that, “ Heat is a
motion, expansive, restrained, and acting in its strife upon the smaller
particles of bodies.” 20 And he ventured to predict that a number of
other properties—colour, whiteness, chemical action —would similarly be found
to result from the motion of the small parts of bodies. Obscure, almost mystic,
as his language might
be, Bacon was clearly formulating the premisses of what later came to be
an almost universally accepted principle of science under the general name of
the mechanical philosophy.
The nature of Bacon’s achievement in this regard is more than a little
obscured by the tediousness of his presentation. He discussed the investigation
of forms at length only in a work primarily intended to explain the workings of
the inductive method, and the sections on forms were introduced primarily as
examples of that method. As he warned the reader, “ It must be remembered
however that in this Organum of mine I am handling logic, not philosophy.” 21
Endeavouring to keep to the point, he resisted the temptation to desert
induction for forms, and never explicitly discussed his tacit belief that the
general method of explanation of forms lay in the study of matter and
motion—though this was a view which later scientists like Robert Boyle derived
from him.
Though philosophers—and his nineteenth-century editors— have often
regarded Bacon’s doctrine of forms as extraneous to his philosophy, this is
because what they call philosophy he called logic. In his view, a rational
experimental investigation of the properties of bodies was essential to the
development of the new natural philosophy. In this he was prescient: for the
mechanical philosophy, the derivation of physical properties from the mere
structure and motion of matter—from die shape and motion of the invisible
particles which must compose visible bodies—was to become one of die great
organizing principles of seventeenth-century science. Bacon was one of the
first to adopt and proclaim the view that one of the fundamental problems of
natural philosophy was to find a method of explaining “ occult properties ” in
rational terms.
The same point was made, more expliddy though in less detail, by Bacon’s
almost exact contemporary Galileo. In his famous polemical work The Assayer (II
Saggiatore, 1623) Galileo
260
simultaneously developed an erroneous theory of the nature of comets and
a brilliant analysis of his own, most fruitful, scientific method. As a
consequence of the necessity to attack his opponent’s views on the nature of
heat, he had occasion to distinguish between the objective and the subjective
attributes of physical bodies. He wrote :
But first I must consider what it is that we call heat, as I suspect that
people in general have a concept of this which is very remote from the truth.
For they believe that heat is a real phenomenon, or property, or quality, which
actually resides in the material by which we feel ourselves warmed. Now I say
that whenever I conceive any material or corporeal substance, I immediately
feel the need to think of it as bounded, and as having this or that shape; as
being large or small in relation to other things, and in some specific place at
any given time ; as being in motion or at rest; as touching or not touching
some other body ; and as being one in number, or few, or many. From these
conditions I cannot separate such a substance by any stretch of my imagination.
But that it must be white or red, bitter or sweet, noisy or silent, and of
sweet or foul odour, my mind does not feel compelled to bring in as necessary
accompaniments. Without the senses as our guides, reason or imagination unaided
would probably never arrive at qualities like these. Hence I think that tastes,
odours, colours, and so on are no more than mere names so far as the object in
which we place them is concerned, and that they reside only in the
consciousness. Hence if the living creature were removed, all these qualities
would be wiped away and annihilated.22 This is a remarkably dear
statement of what Locke was later to make famous as the distinction between
primary and secondary qualities, primary qualities being those attributes of
bodies which produce in us the sensations which we commonly ascribe to the
bodies. Everyone has, usually as a child, encountered the old logical
problem of whether when a tree falls in the centre of an uninhabited forest its
fall produces a noise, when no one is there to hear; Galileo offered the first
explicitly satisfactory answer. Having raised the question, he concluded :
To excite in us tastes, odours, and sounds, I believe that nothing is
required in external bodies except shapes, numbers, and slow or rapid
movements. I think that if ears, tongues and noses were removed, shapes and
numbers and motions would remain, but not odours nor tastes nor sounds. The
latter, I believe, are nothing more than names when separated from living
beings.23
Having established the general principle, Galileo, like Bacon, turned to
heat as a specific example. His choice was dictated by the considerations of
polemic : he wished to demonstrate that his opponent was quite wrong to believe
that heat could be generated by friction alone, and consequently to show that
comets could not shine merely because they passed very rapidly through the
atmosphere. He did not mean to argue that friction did not make a body hot, but
merely to demonstrate that friction alone was not enough. In particular,
Galileo wished to stress that something moving rapidly through the air did not
necessarily grow hot, the old stories that the Babylonians cooked their eggs
by whirling them in slings notwithstanding. At least, one could not achieve
that result nowadays; and consequently it must have been done by some other
method than merely whirling them about. As Galileo argued:
To discover the true cause I reason as follows: “ If we do not achieve an
effect which others formerly achieved, then it must be that in our operations
we lack something that produced their success. And if there is just one single
thing we lack, then that alone can be the true cause. Now we do not lack eggs,
nor slings, nor sturdy fellows to whirl them ;
262
yet our eggs do not cook, but merely cool down faster if they happen to
be hot. And since nothing is lacking to us except being Babylonians, then being
Babylonians is the cause of the hardening of eggs, and not friction of the
air.” 24 The purposes of polemic aside, Galileo had concluded that
heat was the result of the impinging of the moving particles of fire, contained
in matter, upon our organs of sense; or as he described it:
Those materials which produce heat in us and make us feel warmth, which
are known by the general name of “ fire,” would then be a multitude of minute
particles having certain shapes and moving with certain velocities. Meeting
with our bodies, they penetrate by means of their extreme subtlety, and their
touch as felt by us when they pass through our substance is the sensation we
call “ heat.” 25 And he added, “ Since the presence of
fire-corpuscles alone does not suffice to excite heat, but their motion is
needed also, it seems to me that one may very reasonably say that motion is the
cause of heat.”
Only one other thinker in this period dealt with the explanation of the
properties of bodies in terms of the structure and motion of their ultimate
particles : the obscure Dutch schoolmaster Isaac Beeckman (1588-1637).* He was
not interested in publication, being satisfied to discuss his scientific
speculations with friends, but he kept an elaborately detailed diary in which
he noted a multitude of scientific observations, experiments and conjectures.
He had developed a complex theory of matter before 1618, partly derived from
atomic theories of Greek
* There were, of course,
attempts to revive the atomic theories of the Greeks in this period; examples
are Nicholas Hill’s Epicurean Philosophy (1601) or Sebastian Basso’s
Anti-Aristotelian Natural Philosophy (1621, based on Plato and Democritus) or
Daniel Sennert’s Democritean attempts to reconcile atomism and Aristotle
(1619); but they were neither original, successful, nor, ultimately,
influential.
antiquity, but directed to the same purpose as Bacons discovery of forms
and Galileo’s speculations on the causes of sensations. Like Galileo, Beeckman
believed that heat was caused by the motion of fire particles in a body; and
like Bacon and Galileo both, lie believed that particles in motion were
responsible for the physical properties of bodies. Or as he said, “ all
properties arise from motion, shape and size of the atoms, so that each of three
tilings must be considered.” 26 Although he never worked out these
speculations in detail, he did now and again revert to them, and he continually
tried to explain seemingly mysterious natural events in terms of matter and
motion. (So he attributed the action of suction pumps to the pressure of the
incumbent atmosphere.) Beeckman’s statements would be of little more than
antiquarian interest were it not for the fact that he was a friend and
associate of Descartes, whose views on science he greatly influenced ; though
in this case Descartes, accepting the general principle, that die properties of
bodies lie in the structure and motion of small particles, rejected the
particular conclusion that matter was composed of atoms and vacuum.
By 1630, two generations of effort had hardly seemed to be rewarded, and
science appeared as much unorganised as ever. Yet this was a false appearance,
and the next generation was to demonstrate the feet. For the attempts at
organisation of science, by the formation of societies, by the development of
workable forms of scientific method, by the acceptance of the mechanical
philosophy all reached fixation in the next thirty years.
The animal’s heart is the basis of its life, its chief member, the sun of
its microcosm; on the heart all its activity depends, from the heart all its
liveliness and strength arise.1
The anatomical work of the first three-quarters of the sixteenth century
satisfactorily established the gross structure of the heart, as it did the
structure of most of the organs; it could not so satisfactorily establish its
function. Physiology, as the attempts of Femel showed, could not advance much
beyond Galen without further anatomical study; but equally, as the elaborate
attempts of Vesalius showed, it was not easy on the basis of exact anatomy
alone to advance much beyond Galen. On the Use of the Parts remained the great
standard work of reference and instruction, though now brought up to date and
corrected in many special treatises: there is something curiously old-fashioned
about the continual references to Galen as authority from men whose anatomical
knowledge, as they were boastfully aware, now far exceeded Galen’s. But until
they could develop a new approach to physiological problems, Galen’s system was
not obsolete.
Temporarily, the anatomist was fairly well satisfied with his
understanding of the structure and function of the venous and digestive
systems; Vesalius, finding Galen full of errors, was quite certain that he had
been able to eradicate them. Vesalius had been content to leave Galen’s picture
of the structure of
heart, arteries and lungs virtually unchanged; perhaps partly for this
reason his contemporaries turned their attention particularly to the
physiology of the heart and lungs, the physiology of respiration. They could
not know that this was to remain an obscure problem until the pneumatic
investigations of the midseventeenth century offered a new method of inquiry,
and a supply of new facts. Even without new facts, sixteenth-century anatomists
found Galen’s account of the way by which the vital spirits got from the air to
the lungs to the arteries to the tissues neither clear nor convincing. And what
made Vesalius belligerently reluctant to enter too far into a subject rendered
delicate by its theological implications—for “spirit” and “soul” were closely
associated, since breath, vital to life, was the vehicle by which the soul left
the body at death—made others, less place- seeking and less philosophically
orthodox, peculiarly attracted to the problem.
It is more than probable that only theological interest ever led Michael
Servetus (c. 1511-53) to wander into the complexities of the anatomy and
physiology of the arterial system ; for until he had occasion to discuss the
mechanism whereby the vital spirit got to the heart, he had shown little
interest in this branch of medicine. It is true that he had studied anatomy
with Vesalius’ teacher, Guinther of Andemach, and had even, like Vesalius
earlier, served as his assistant; but what Servetus learned from his teacher
was a profound interest in the philological aspects of medical humanism and a
pronounced Galenism, rather than any bent for anatomical or physiological
research. Indeed, Servetus appears to have turned to medicine as a profession
only when literary and philological scholarship proved insufficiently
rewarding.
The details of Servetus’ life are as intricate as his theology; but the
main outlines indicate a passionate addiction to radical unitarianism, coupled
with a humanist devotion to the works
266
of the ancients of a rather arid and rigid sort. He was bom in Navarre
and brought up in Catalonia ; sent by his father to study law at the University
of Toulouse, he acquired a profound distaste for Catholic doctrine, a,
passionate anti-clericalism only nourished by a journey to Rome, a preference
for France as a country of domicile, and no obvious taste for the law. His
violent unitarianism soon found expression in two books on the errors of the
Trinity, published before he was twenty-one, books so radical that they gave
him a dangerously heretical reputation even in Protestant centres like
Strasbourg and Basle. With a discretion he never showed again, Servetus changed
his name to Villanovus (after the town in which his childhood had been passed),
went to Lyons and there worked in the publishing trade for some years,
interrupted by intermittent periods of study in Paris. He seems to have begun
with some interest in applied mathematics if his first published work, a new
edition of Ptolemy’s Geography (1535) is any due ; he also achieved a
competence in, and profound acceptance of, judidal astrology. He indulged his
addiction to controversy by writing a violent pamphlet attacking the botanist
Fuchs, who was himself engaged in an equally violent controversy with a
physidan of Lyons named Champier. What the grounds of the dispute were is by no
means clear, for both men were Galenists, and both opposed the Arabists ; but
it provided much material for the printers.
Perhaps it was this which drew Servetus’ attention to medicine; at any
rate, in 1536 he was attending Guinther’s lectures at Paris, and the next year
wrote A Complete Account of Syrups carefully Refined According to the Judgement
of Galen, a prolonged discussion of the role of “ syrups ” (“ sweet, prepared
potions ”) as aids to digestion. It was after this that he matriculated
formally as a medical student, only to be in danger of censure for his renewed
practise of judicial astrology. Although his defence was fairly successful, he
nevertheless—for the second
time in his life—gave up the unequal battle and retired into obscurity as
a practising physician in a small town at some distance from Lyons. After a few
years he moved to Vienne, resumed his connection with the Lyons publishers, and
continued medical practice. His editorial work involved assistance on a new
edition of the Bible, which perhaps revived his interest in theological
controversy. At any rate, by 1546 he had written On the Restitution of Christianity
whose publication, under the name Servetus in 1553, led to an immediate uproar
in both Catholic and Protestant circles. Forced to flee from Catholic France,
he travelled by way of Geneva where he was recognised as the Servetus who had
attacked Calvin twenty years before in his first theological treatises ; he was
promptly arrested, tried and executed as a heretic.
The seven books of the Restitution of Christianity were indubitably
radically Unitarian and wildly heretical. It is difficult to see how a
physiological discussion belongs in these impassioned pages. But there is a
connection: Book v deals with the Trinity, and here, discussing the nature of
the Holy Spirit and the way in which God imparts the divine spirit to man,
Servetus suddenly turned to physiology. The connection is primarily a
philological one: because the Hebrew word for “ breath ” is the same as that
for “ spirit,” Servetus argued that the two were one. For this reason, he says,
So that you, reader, may have the whole doctrine of the divine spirit and
the spirit, I shall add here the divine philosophy which you will easily
understand if you have been trained in anatomy.2 The “spirit” as
distinct from the “divine spirit” is a combination of the three Galenical
spirits, which Servetus regarded as originally one. Vital spirit, he thought,
when “ communicated through anastomoses from the arteries to the veins ” became
natural spirit, and then belonged in the liver and veins, differing from vital
or
268
animal spirits only in location. This amalgamation of the spirits enabled
Servetus to reconcile the primacy of the heart, the necessity of air for life,
and the Biblical identification of blood with life, with orthodox medical
physiology.
Before he could proceed further, Servetus felt it essential to explain
how and where the vital spirit “ which is composed of a very subtle blood
nourished by the inspired air ” ram* into existence. It was usually considered
that the vital spirit was produced in the left ventricle of the heart; Servetus
at first accepted this view, only to contradict himself later. He defined the
vital spirit as “ a rarefied spirit, elaborated by the force of heat,
reddish-yellow and of fiery potency ” ; and declared that the “ reddish-yellow
colour is given to the spirituous blood by the lungs; it is not from the heart
” because the heart is not endowed with organs suitable for mixing air with
blood to create this reddish-yellow fiery spirit * This fiery spirit must, he
thought, be
generated in the lungs from a mixture of inspired air with elaborated,
subtle blood which the right ventricle of the heart communicates to the left.
However, this communication is not made through the middle wall of the heart,
as is commonly believed, but by a very ingenious arrangement the subtle blood
is urged forward by a long course through the lungs; it is elaborated by the
lungs, becomes reddish- yellow and is poured from the pulmonary artery into the
pulmonary vein.f Then in the pulmonary vein it is mixed with inspired air and
through expiration it is cleansed of its sooty vapours. Then finally the whole
mixture, suitably prepared for the production of the vital spirit,
* Servetus, with a large
vocabulary of Latin adjectives to choose from, selected Jlavus to describe the
colour of arterial blood, perhaps to emphasisfc its similarity to fire and
flame.
f Servetus, like all anatomists of the period, writes “ artery-like vein
” (vena arteriosa) and “ vein-like artery ” (arteria venosa).
is drawn onward from the left ventricle of the heart by diastole.
This is as clear a statement as one could expect of the pulmonary or
lesser circulation—the route by which, in fact, the blood goes from the right
side of the heart to the left—and the first to be published in modem times.*
How Servetus arrived at his correct conclusion it is impossible to conjecture.
It is true that many anatomists besides Vesalius had doubted that blood
traverses the septum or middle wall of the heart through visible pits; but they
were not prepared to offer an alternative path. (Ironically Servetus, like
other proponents of the pulmonary circulation, was inclined to think that “
something may possibly sweat through.”) Servetus was thoroughly alive to the
novelty of his conclusion; anyone who carefully compared his statements with those
of Galen in On the Use of the Parts would, he boasted, “ thoroughly understand
a truth which was unknown to Galen.”
It is most probable that Servetus arrived at his conclusion by pure
ratiocination. He was, after all, primarily concerned with where and how air
(containing the all-important spirit) became mixed with arterial blood; it was
not unnatural to suppose that the lungs, the organ with which we breathe,
should play an important role. And as Servetus shrewdly noted, there was no
reason to assume that the left ventricle of the heart, which resembles the
right ventricle in appearance, had a more complex function than the right
ventricle. It was easier and simpler (as well as more consonant with his
theology) for Servetus to assume a pulmonary route. All the vessels under
consideration were perfectly well known, even to a man who had more Galenical
than empirical anatomical knowledge; no other knowledge was
* It has recently been found
that a thirteenth-century Persian commentator on Avicenna, Ibn al-Nafis, had
suggested this route for the blood ; but his commentary was unknown in Europe
until the twentieth century.
270
required for the formulation of the pulmonary circulation. And having
made his point, Servetus continued with the physiology of the soul.
The circumstances surrounding Servetus’ enunciation of the theory of
pulmonary respiration, and his subsequent martyrdom, have won him a highly
sympathetic response from historians of science ever since 1694, when William
Wotton stated in Reflections on Ancient and Modem Learning that he had been
told by a friend, who had a transcript of the relevant passage made by someone
else, that the first discussion of the lesser circulation occurred in On the
Restitution of Christianity. Certainly Servetus was the first to write of it;
whether later anatomists who also did so should rightly be accused of
plagiarism and lack of originality is questionable. How any anatomist could
have known of what Servetus wrote is not clear; for it is doubtful if many of
them were sufficiently interested in theological controversy to risk reading a
wildly heretical, Unitarian book by an unknown author (for it was Villanovus
who was the medical man and scientific author, not Servetus, who only wrote on
theology). Since many copies were destroyed unbound, and more burned with the
author (so that a mere handful are known to have survived), it is doubtful
whether any anatomist could have read the book had he wished to do so.
It is probable, therefore, that one ought not to count Servetus as the
propagator of the doctrine of the pulmonary circulation, though he may have
been its progenitor. It is most likely that acceptance of Vesalius’
conclusion—that there was no passage for blood through the septum of the
heart—naturally suggested the need to find an alternative passage. Once an
anatomist tried to postulate such an alternative route, he would naturally
consider that through the lungs, since part of the blood had always been
supposed to follow this route. This was particularly likely to be the case as
anatomists turned more and more to the problem of
respiration. There is
even the faint possibility that each anatomist who said—as they constantly
did—“ nobody has ever observed this before me ” meant to speak truthfully, even
though standards of truth were low when claims for scientific discovery were
made.
The most important
sixteenth-century statement of the pulmonary route of the blood from the right
to the left ventricle of the heart—because it was the most widely read—is in
Fifteen Books on Anatomical Matters (De Re Anatomica Libri xv, 1559) by Realdus
Columbus (1516-59).3 Published posthumously, it is apparently the
text of the anatomy lectures he gave for many years, first at Padua (he was the
alternate for the post in Surgery in 1541; lectured when Vesalius, the
incumbent, was absent; and when Vesalius finally gave up the job in 1544, held
it for a year), then at Pisa (1545-8) and finally at Rome (1548-59) where his
audience was composed of eminent laymen as well as medical students. Columbus,
as a competitor for the position which Vesalius won and then soon abandoned,
was not above pointing out with great enjoyment that his successful rival had
committed many errors, including some associated with the function of
respiration. Like Vesalius, Columbus modelled his book on Galen’s Anatomical
Procedures, while at the same time fulminating against Galenists more devout
than bimwlf As he put it:
To think that some
folk in our time swear to the dogmas of Galen about anatomy so that they dare
to assert that Galen ought to be taken as gospel, and that there is nothing in
his writings which is not true! It is wonderful how men are carried away by
this doctrine ; and the princes of anatomy offer it to the rabble.*
It was in considering
the structure of the heart that Columbus differed most easily and convincingly
from the beliefs of the “ Galenists.” After describing the anatomy of the right
and left ventricles he continued:
Between these
ventricles there is placed the septum through which almost all authors think
there is a way open from the right to the left ventricle ; and according to
them the blood is in transit rendered thin by the generation of the vital
spirits in order that the passage may take place more easily. But these make a
great mistake ; for the blood is carried by the artery-like vein to the lungs
and being there made thin is brought back thence together with air by the
vein-like artery to the left ventricle of the heart. This fact no one has
hitherto observed or recorded in writing ; yet it may be most readily observed
by anyone.
That his statement is
similar to that of Servetus need occasion no surprise ; it is difficult to see
how else it could be put, since both are describing a flow of blood from right
ventricle to lungs to left ventricle, and its assimilation of air in the lungs.
Columbus was not interested in the theological aspects ; for him, the soul was
quite distinct from the air, and he was only concerned with the physiological
role of the vein-like artery (pulmonary vein), because, he thought, its
function had been misunderstood by Galen, and by those who followed Galen too
closely. As he put it, in the customary polemical tone of the day,
Anatomists, not very
wise, begging their pardon,.. . think that the use of this [the vein-like
artery] is to carry the changed air to the lungs which, like a fan, ventilate
the heart, cooling this organ—and not, as Aristotle thought, the brain. The
same writers think that the lungs receive I know not what smoky fumes...
discharged from the left ventricle. About this, all one can say is that it
pleases them, for they certainly seem to think that the same state of things
exists in the heart as in a chimney, as if there were green logs in the heart
which give out smoke when burnt.... I for my part hold quite a different view,
namely that this vein-like artery was made to carry blood mixed with air from
the lungs to the left
ventricle of the
heart. And this is not only most probable, but is actually the case.
The function of the
lungs was not merely to supply air for temperature regulation, but to elaborate
and retain the vital spirits drawn from the air,s the left ventricle
of the heart then being merely a receptacle, not a chamber for converting air
into vital spirits.
Columbus might have
modified his poor opinion of other anatomists had he known that they would read
his book in considerable numbers, and soon generally adopt the mechanism of
the pulmonary circulation. It had the further advantage, as the devout
Aristotelian botanist Cesalpino (1519-1603) recognised, of suiting Aristotle’s
theory of the primacy of the heart better than the traditional view, and of
offering an anti-Galenist argument which, to a real Peripatetic, meant another
blow for Aristotle. Cesalpino was still a student at Pisa when Columbus began
lecturing there (the precocity of Columbus was notable, in an age which still
expected doctors to be greybeards), and no doubt heard of the pulmonary
circulation from him. Italian nationalism has decreed that Cesalpino had a clear
notion of the systemic circulation a generation before Harvey ; but Cesalpino’s
statements are far from clear, and are often contradictory. Certainly he
developed arguments which might have led hirn to postulate the “ motion of the
blood in a circle ” : he noted correctly that when a vein is ligatured, it
swells on what he called “ the far side,” from which he argued that the
movement of the blood is not all outwards from the viscera to the various
organs. Confusingly, he concluded from this only that it explained Aristotle’s
view of sleep. As Cesalpino commented,
Here is the solution
of the doubt arising from what Aristotle writes concerning sleep when he says :
“ It is necessary that what is evaporated should be driven to some place and
then turned back and changed like Euripus. For the heat of every
274
living thing ascends
by nature to a higher place, but when it has reached the higher place, it in
many cases turns back again and is carried downwards.” This is what Aristotle
says.
Cesalpino’s explanation
of this rather confused doctrine is as follows:
Now when we are awake
the movement of the native heat takes place in a direction outwards, namely, to
the sensory regions of the brain. When we are asleep, however, it takes place
in the contrary direction towards the heart. We must therefore conclude that
when we are awake a large supply of blood and of spirits is conveyed to the
arteries and thence to the nerves. When we are asleep however the same heat is
carried back to the heart not only by the arteries but by the veins. For the
natural entrance into the heart is furnished by the vena cava, not by the
arteries. A proof of this may be seen in the pulses, which when we are wide
awake are full, vehement, quick, with a certain rapidly repeated vibration, but
when we are asleep are small, languid, slow and infrequent. For in sleep the
supply of native heat to the arteries is diminished, but it bursts into them
with vehemence when we wake. The veins however behave in an opposite manner;
for when we are asleep they are more swollen, when we are awake they are
shrunken, as anyone may see who watches the veins in the hands.6 It
seems hard to conclude from this that Cesalpino clearly understood anything
about the physiology of the venous and arterial system. Setting aside the
question whether “ native heat ” flow is necessarily the same as flow of blood,
it appears that he thought the blood and heat behaved quite differently in
sleep and in waking. Nor did he repudiate the importance of die venous system
to digestion, remarking firmly in his last book, published posthumously in
1606, that the vena cava was as important in its physiological role as the
aorta.7 Cesalpino’s discussion should really be
read as one of a
number of discussions (by Ruini, among others) on how the blood might get from
the right side of the heart to the left if the anatomists were correct in
thinking that none got through the septum, rather than a firm statement of how
it did so. Neither the suggested solution of Cesalpino, nor that of any other
sixteenth-century anatomist, aroused the least interest among contemporaries.
These explanations cannot have seemed especially cogent, and certainly they all
lacked the relentless pressure of argument that was to drive Harvey’s
conclusion home.
When William Harvey
(1578-1657) was a very old man, the then very young scientist Robert Boyle
consulted him professionally. The consultation did not produce any useful
medical results, but both men enjoyed the scientific contact. Among other
topics, they talked of the circulation of the blood, and Harvey was asked how
he had come to think of such a thing : he replied that it was from a
consideration of the action of the valves in the veins in sending all the
venous blood to the heart. In his published work, Harvey ascribed the first “
depiction ” of the valves to either Fabricius of Padua, or Sylvius (1478-1553)
of Paris. In fact, the venous valves were discovered by a number of
sixteenth-century anatomists; * that is to say, they described little membranes
found in a number of veins, although they did not speculate successfully on
their function.
The most complete
account of their structure and possible function is that contained in a little
pamphlet of twenty-four pages On the Valves in the Veins (De Venarum Ostiolis)
published in 1603 by Fabricius of Aquapendente (c. 1533-1619). Fabricius, who
had taken his m.d. from Padua in
1559, remained in and
* Notably by Giambattista Canano
(1515-1579), who mentioned them in lectures given in the i54o’s and told Vesalius
of Ids discovery; by Charles Esdenne, who mentioned them in his anatomical
treatise of 1545 ; by Amatus Lusitanus (1511-1568), who described Canano’s work
in 1551; and probably by others. Sylvius described some valves in his Isagoge
of 1555.
276
about the University,
giving private lessons in anatomy for many years. In 1565 he became professor
of surgery, a post which he held until 1613. When Harvey first attended his
lectures in 1600, Fabritius (according to his own later account) had been
describing the valves for sixteen years, and there is independent evidence that
he had mentioned them in the anatomy lectures for the year 1578-9' Unlike his
predecessors, he did more than merely describe their existence ; he
investigated all the veins, to find out which possessed these membranes; he
provided anatomical illustration of their structure and action ; and he
attempted to explain their function. This he described as follows :
The mechanism which
Nature has here devised is strangely like that which artificial means have
produced in the machinery of mills. Here millwrights put certain hindrances in
the waters way so that a large quantity of it may be kept back and accumulated
for the use of the milling machinery. These hindrances are called... sluices
and dams.... Behind them collects in a suitable hollow a large head of water
and finally all that is required. So nature works in just the same way in the
veins (which are just like the channels of rivers) by means of floodgates,
either singly or in pairs.8 Perhaps the most important aspect of
Fabricius’ description was his conception of tie venous and arterial systems in
hydraulic terms, so that he was able to perceive that these membranes must act
to control the blood supply, which was analogous to a water supply. (This
analogy was to be happily applied again by Harvey.) But though it is quite
clear that Fabricius was trying to deal with the problem of the blood as a
problem of simple hydraulics, it is equally clear that he did not really
understand that the blood supply required valves to regulate the direction of
flow. He did not think of valves at all; the word he used (ostiola) obviously,
from his analogy, meant to him “floodgate” rather than “valve,” and he thought
these served to regulate the blood supply in
277
volume rather than
direction. Indeed, he was quite explicit about this, stating that,
Nature has formed
them to delay the blood to some extent, and to prevent the whole mass of it
flooding into the feet, or hands and fingers, and collecting there.*
Which is to say that
the membranes were placed in the veins to ensure a fair and even distribution
of blood for the nutrition of the various parts of the body. Fabricius did not
see that he should have chosen a pump, rather than a mill, as his model. He was
not really much closer than his predecessors to a true view of the function of
these membranes, though he did see that they played a mechanical role, and were
connected with the problem of the motion of the blood. Still less did he detect
any connection between die existence of the valves and the action of the heart.
This was pardy (as Harvey was to note later) because Fabricius approached die
relation of the heart and lungs purely from the point of view of respiration
(on which he published a book in 1615); and because he never dealt with the
mechanism of the heart itself.10 It was also because these membranes
were found in the veins ; had they existed in the arteries Fabricius might have
seen a connection with the heart, but the venous system was centred on the
liver, until the work of Harvey centred it at last on the heart.
There was nothing in
Harvey’s training to make him approach the problem differently : thoroughly
indoctrinated with Galenic medicine at Caius College, he studied under
Fabricius at Padua for two years before taking his m.d. and becoming a successful London physician. From
Fabricius Harvey certainly learned something of the advantages of a mechanical
approach to physiology, and something as well of the currendy fashionable tendency
towards replacing Galen’s primacy of the liver by Aristode’s primacy of the
heart. Quite original was Harvey’s profound interest in the structure of the
heart and in such problems as that
278
of the different
functions of the two structurally identical ventricles (one of which controlled
the flow of spirits, the other the flow of blood). He wondered why the
artery-like vein served to nourish only the lungs, while the similar vein-like
artery nourished the whole body; why (as Columbus had asked) the lungs should
need so much more nourishment than other organs ; why, since the lungs moved,
the right ventricle also moved ; and why the right ventricle should exist
exclusively for the use of the lungs.11 This was hardly what later
scientists were to call the mechanical approach, and it plunged deep into the
search for final causes; yet here, in spite of Bacon, final causes proved
fruitful of experimental results.
When, in 1616, Harvey
began his lectures as Lumleian professor to the Royal College of Physicians,
he had thought long and carefully about die structure and function of the heart
and lungs. (He had already also formulated for himself a new and surprising
code of behaviour ; for in his lecture notes he carefully reminded himself to
avoid contentiousness and the common practice of attacking all other
anatomists, “ for all did well, and there was some excuse even for those who
are in error.”I2) Here in 1618 Harvey first set out his new theory
of die motion of the blood in compact and certain terms :
It is plain from the
structure of die heart that the blood is passed continuously through the lungs
to the aorta as by the two clacks of a water bellows to raise water. It is
shown by the application of a ligature that the passage of the blood is from
die arteries into the veins. Whence it follows that the movement of the blood
is constandy in a circle, and is brought about by the beat of the heart.13
Here Harvey obviously had a firm grasp of the actual motion of the blood, and
that with a clarity of thought which makes the speculations of his predecessors
seem murky indeed. In the first place, he understood that the membranes of the
veins and heart
acted like
clack-valves, which opened to allow the blood to go from the lungs to the left
side of the heart, but which would not open in a reverse direction. In the
second place, he understood that this occurred throughout the body, so that the
blood always travelled from the arteries to the veins “ in a circle ” and back
to the heart and lungs. There is a real sense in which Harvey, rather than any
earlier anatomist, is the true “discoverer” of the valves in the veins, since
he was the first who truly understood that they were valves.
For the next ten
years Harvey continued to pursue his study of the motions of the heart and
blood in animals ; the results were published in 1628 in De Motu Cordis
(Anatomical Exercises on the Motion of the Heart and Blood in Animals). As its
title implies, Harvey here treated the matter primarily from the anatomical
point of view; like any sixteenth-century anatomist he insisted that “ I
profess to learn and teach anatomy not from books but from dissections, not
from the tenets of philosophers but from the fabric of nature.”14
Like any sixteenth-century anatomist too he began with what Galen had taught,
and managed to interpret Galen’s words to win support for his own new doctrine.
He wrote,
The proof which Galen
adduces for the passage of blood from die vena cava through the right ventricle
and into the lungs can more rightly be used, if only the names are changed [!],
for the passage of blood from the veins through the heart into the arteries,
and I should like to use it in that way.15
Like many truly
original thinkers, Harvey had no desire to be outrageously revolutionary ; he
was fully aware of his originality, but did not wish to alienate his
adversaries more than need be. Secure in his knowledge that he really had done
and seen what no one had done or seen before, he was willing to present his new
discoveries in conventional language.
Yet the whole of De
Motu Cordis is a singularly tough and tight piece of scientific reasoning,
firmly based upon experimental evidence. Harvey was not content to state the
fact of the circulation of the blood, even with the support of plausible
arguments; he was determined to demonstrate it convincingly and unarguably,
which to him meant the total explanation of the function of the heart, its
purpose, and the means by which it achieved its purpose. The result is a short
but remarkably trenchant book, in which the reader is bludgeoned with
illustrative and demonstrative argument until he can hardly help agreeing with
Harvey’s concluding claim :
All these phenomena
to be seen during dissection, and very many others, appear if rightly assessed
to elucidate well and to confirm fully the truth which I stated earlier in this
book, and at the same time to oppose the commonly accepted views. For it is
very difficult for any one to explain in any other way than I have done the
reason why all these things have been arranged and carried into effect in the
manner that I have described.16
Because Harvey was
interested in the function of die heart, rather than in that of the lungs, he
was able to make use of coldblooded animals which were well suited to
vivisection experiments ; consequently he was able to study the action of the
heart in a way that had not been attempted before. As he commented,
Since it is probable
that the connection of the heart with the lungs in man provided, as I have
said, the opportunity for going astray, those persons do wrong who while
wishing, as all anatomists commonly do, to describe, demonstrate and study the
parts of animals, content themselves with looking inside one animal only,
namely man—and that one dead.17 Cold-blooded animals provided ideal
subjects, and the conclusions drawn from them about die action of the heart in
animals
could be confirmed on
warm-blooded animals whose heart action slowed down with approaching death.
Harvey began his investigations by analysing the motions and characteristics of
the heart. He established that the heart was a muscle (a much debated point
previously); and that it was active in systole— when it contracted, the moment
when the blood was expelled— rather than, as had been held up to then, in
diastole. That is to say, the action of the heart consisted in the expulsion of
blood, rather than in the sucking up of blood. Harvey further found that he
could correlate the dilation of the arteries, the systole of the heart and the
beat of the pulse. He did not compare the heart to a pump, as he might have
done, but to a machine : the function of the heart was “ the transmission of
the blood and its propulsion, by means of the arteries, to the extremities
everywhere.” 18
Having established
the mechanics of the heart action, Harvey was next able to consider the
question of the pulmonary circulation, “ the ways by which blood is carried
from the vena cava into the arteries, or from the right ventricle of the heart
into the left one,” »* still by means of anatomical experiment. He demonstrated
the case by dissection of a living fish, a toad, frog, snake, lizard and a
mammalian foetus before considering the more complex case of mammals. The only
problem he found difficult of resolution was the means whereby the blood was
transferred through the tissues of the lungs, and here he was forced to argue
merely by analogy from other secretions. Now he was ready to prove the
existence of the systemic circulation, the true circular motion of the blood
from the left side of the heart, through the arteries, into the veins, to the
right side of the heart, through the lungs back to the left side of the heart
again. This he did once more by a wealth of anatomical evidence, supported by
teleo- logical arguments of the fitness of various structures to the functions
he ascribed to them.
But Harvey also
introduced more novel kinds of reasoning. The most interesting is his use of a
quantitative argument, based on the analogy between blood supply and water
supply: he considered the size of the ventricle, the amount of its contents
that it ejects with each contraction, and the rate of its beat. From this he
concluded that, inevitably, the amount of blood sent by the heart into the
arteries in half an hour is greater than the amount of blood in the whole body;
and that in a day the heart would eject a greater weight of blood than the
weight of the whole body. This being impossible, it must be that the same blood
is continually passing through the heart; that is, there is a circulation.
Quantitative arguments are rare in the seventeenth century, even in physical
science; it is even rarer to find them used in so appropriate a connection.
The fact of
circulation at last made plain the purpose of the valves in the veins : “ they
completely prevent any backflow from the root of the veins into the branches,
or from the larger into the smaller vessels ” ;20 they serve to
ensure that all the blood flows towards the heart, from the small veins to the
larger ones. Indeed, the valves were, Harvey found, so strong that he could not
pass a probe through them in the wrong direction. Only one problem remained
unsolved: the means by which die blood passed from the very small arteries to
die very small veins. Here, and here alone, Harvey was reduced to pure
speculation : he was forced to conclude that there must, as in die lungs, be an
area of spongy tissue between the arteries and veins through which the blood
seeped until it found the entrance to a vein—a poor mechanism, on die whole,
since it did not explain the continued and necessary unidirectional flow.
Nevertheless, Harvey
had every reason to feel satisfied that “ calculations and visual
demonstrations [had] confirmed all [his] suppositions ” and that one could not
by any means fail to conclude that in animals the blood is driven round a
circuit
with an unceasing,
circular sort of movement, that this is an activity or function of the heart
which it carries out by virtue of its pulsation, and that in sum it constitutes
the sole reason for the heart’s pulsatile movement.*1 But in fact he
could never be quite satisfied, nor cease from searching for more arguments to
support his view. Having reviewed all other kinds of arguments, those drawn
from anatomy, from experience in phlebotomy, from reason, he fell back on the
purpose of the circulation, and the relation between structure and function of
the various organs. It appeared obvious, he said, that “ It will not... be
irrelevant to add that, according to certain common reasonings, it should both
fittingly and necessarily be thus.” 22 And so he shows that he can
provide arguments on this level too.
Most of his arguments
were drawn from Aristotle; it is curious that as anatomists learned more, and
rejected Galen, they turned to Aristotle for philosophical support of their
new-found knowledge. Aristotle seemed particularly helpful to Harvey, because
of his doctrine of the supremacy of the heart. This was a view which Harvey
accepted wholeheartedly : the heart, he thought, “ deserves to be styled the
starting point of life, the sun of our microcosm, just as much as the sun
deserves to be styled the heart of the world.” Indeed, Aristotle’s scientific
discussions in other areas offered support for circular motion everywhere :
We have as much right
to call this movement of the blood circular as Aristotle had to say that the
air and rain emulate the circular movement of the heavenly bodies. The moist
earth, he wrote, is warmed by the sun and gives off vapours which condense as
they are carried up aloft and in «Vir condensed form fell again as rain and
remoisten the earth, so producing successions of fresh life from it. In similar
fashion the circular movement of the sun, that is to say, its approach and
recession, give rise to storms and atmospheric phenomena.
284
It may very well
happen thus in the body with the movement
of the blood.23
De Motu
Cordis is, in fact, filled with as many dithyrambs in praise of the heart and
the circular motion connected with it as an astronomical treatise by a
Copemican might be filled with praise of the Sun. The heart, like the Sun,
provides living creatures with warmth, essential to life and digestion, it is
the king and ruler of the microcosm. It is all very mystic ; but the mysticism
is an enthusiasm which led Harvey to investigate the function of the heart in
an eminently non-mystic fashion. Harvey must have had some sympathy with the
work of Gilbert, and even of Kepler ; for he was of their philosophical
persuasion.
One aspect of
Harvey’s work remains a puzzle : the small effect his discovery had on medical
practice. No one—not even Harvey—suggested that the discovery of circulation
revealed a fallacy in the age-old practice of phlebotomy. Though Harvey had
noted the fact that an animal could bleed to death through a cut artery as
evidence in favour of the existence of the circulation, he emphatically never
took the next step of recognising that excessive bleeding might be positively
harmful. He did, nevertheless, discuss how the existence of the circulation
could be used to explain certain peculiar medical facts: why a poisoned or
infected organ can cause illness to the whole system ; why some fevers,
attacking the heart, affect respiration; why medicines applied externally can
have an influence upon die internal organs —as for example, when “ garlic bound
to the soles of the feet helps expectoration.” 24 All these were
attempts to rationalise “ facts ” previously believed to require a mystic or
occult explanation.
Opposition to
Harvey’s views was often violent and partisan, but it was by no means
universal. Even in France, where the conservative medical faculty totally
rejected the new doctrine as late as 1650, there were still many who accepted
it, and wrote in
its favour. In fact,
it became one of the basic tenets of the “ new science,” and was accepted as
such by figures so diverse as Descartes and the clever young physicians who,
about 1645, began those meetings at Gresham College which were the seed from
which the Royal Society was to grow. The circulation of the blood ranked as an
important example of the new experimental natural philosophy. Bacon did not live
to read of it, but later scientists, who could give no higher praise, thought
that Harvey admirably exemplified what they took to be the Baconian method.
Tycho did what
Hipparchus did: it serves as the foundations of the building. Tycho endured
the greatest labour. We cannot all do everything. A Hipparchus needs a Ptolemy
who builds up the theory of the other five planets. While Tycho was alive I
achieved this : I built up a theory of Mars, so subtle that the calculations completely
accord with the observations.1
Of all the
astronomers of the post-Copemican period, the most difficult to appraise and
appreciate is Johannes Kepler. Not a great observational astronomer—poor
eyesight would have hindered him had he tried to be one—he yet insisted upon
closer agreement between theory and observation than any astronomer before his
time. A passionately devoted madie- matical computer, and an extreme
neo-Platonist mathematical mystic, he cared only for those mathematical
representations of the heavens which offered the possibility of interpretation
in physical terms. Mystic and rational, mathematical and quasi- empirical, he
constantly transformed apparently metaphysical nonsense into astronomical
relationships of the utmost importance and originality. Immensely arrogant in
his conviction that he held a sure key to the mysteries of the universe, and
even to the structure planned by God at the Creation, he always acknowledged
his debt to his predecessors. He took his achievements with the utmost
seriousness, and left an elaborate trail of the
287
procedure whereby he
arrived at the eponymous laws of planetary behaviour by which he is remembered
; yet he never called them laws, nor did he distinguish them from others, to
him equally precious, most of which are now rightly forgotten. Totally
dependent for his best work on the observations of Tycho Brahe, he was a firm
and unwavering Copemican. He was a prodigious worker, author of a couple of
dozen books on astronomy, optics, mafVi^matirs and religion, and at the same
time conducted a voluminous correspondence. Yet his theories had little
influence on his contemporaries, for the works in which they were embedded
were in a style alien to the ablest astronomers of his day, men too clear-headed
and too scornful of occult and mystic notions to trouble to analyse them
properly ; and the generation of mystic Copemicans like Digges and Gilbert was
nearly all dead by 1600—before, that is to say, Kepler had made any real
contributions to theoretical astronomy. Paradoxically, Kepler’s ideas were
first really appreciated by the intensely rational generation of scientists
working after 1660, who saw that they could be applied to the mechanical
systems of the universe and removed from the mystical context in which Kepler
had set them.
Kepler belonged to
die first truly Copemican generation, for he learned the elements of
Copemicanism as a student under Maesdin. Though Maesdin had for long lectured
only on the Ptolemaic system, his lectures at Tubingen in Kepler’s day included
a thorough presentation of the new as well as the old astronomy. And this in
the introductory course of lectures ; for Kepler was not at first especially
drawn to astronomy. Bom in 1571 in a small town in Wiirttemberg, of a respectable
but decaying family, Kepler benefited from the Lutheran belief in the value of
education. The family was devout if not hard-working, and though not very
admirable parents, his mother and father saw the advantages of training their
eldest son for the ministry.
This led to education
at a seminary in preparation for entry into the Protestant University of
Tubingen. Kepler seems to have begun as a diligent and orthodox student, but
apparently could not maintain the required rigidity of Lutheran doctrine ; indeed
his religious views were never subsequendy wholly acceptable to the Lutheran
congregations of the various towns in which he lived. Nor was his temperament
such as to suggest the successful pastor. At the same time, it was noticeable
that he had a marked bent for mathematics. Wisely, the faculty at Tubingen
urged him to accept the offer of a post as district mathematician and teacher
of mathematics at the Protestant seminary in the Austrian city of Graz ; in
default of any clerical post, Kepler reluctandy accepted the position in 1594.
However he may have
felt at the time, Kepler was eminendy well prepared for his new job. Maestlin
was one of the most esteemed astronomical teachers in Germany, and one of the
few who publicly taught both the Ptolemaic and Copemican astronomy. Maestlin
obviously encouraged his pupils to weigh the pros and cons of the two systems
seriously; as Kepler wrote in the preface to his first book—ever anxious to
expose the history of his ideas, a practice he continued throughout his life—
Ever since the time
at Tubingen, six years ago, when I enjoyed association with the most celebrated
roaster, Michael Maestlin, I felt how litde satisfactory was the usual concept
of the many motions of die world. At the same time I conceived such an
enthusiasm for Copernicus, whom my master often mentioned in his lectures, that
not only did I frequendy defend his views in the disputations on physics with
other students, but even composed an entire disputation in defense of the
thesis that the “ first movement ” came from the rotation of the Earth.*
It is clear that
Kepler had received a far better and more
up-to-date training
in theoretical astronomy than any astronomer of his age.
The professional
duties at Graz were not onerous. Kepler was expected to prepare yearly
calendars, containing full astronomical information liberally spiced with
astrological prediction (to which he was not at all averse), and to teach such
students as presented themselves. These were not many ; astronomy was not a
required subject, as it would have been at a university, and Kepler was not a
good enough lecturer to arouse any interest in his subject. No one minded
whether Kepler had students or not; it was enough that his services were
available if required, and that he provide the yearly calendar. Hence he was
free to devote himself to his own interests ; to his private life (he indulged
in a long and slightly farcical courtship which culminated in his marriage to a
young widow a few months after the publication of his first book in 1596) and
to research in theoretical astronomy. All during 1595 Kepler was busy
elaborating a new theory of the mathematical relationships involved in the
sizes of the planetary orbits ; the results were proudly sent to Maestlin, who
saw The Cosmographical Mystery (Mysterium Cosmographicum) through die press
late in 1596.
Kepler was naturally
immensely proud of his work, and took care to send copies to princes—who might
offer him a better and more secure job—and to distinguished scientists, among them
Tycho Brahe. At least one copy reached Italy, where it was seen by Galileo,
still professor of mathematics at Padua and not yet known as an astronomer; the
professor wrote kindly to the younger man, explaining that the promptitude of
his writing prevented him from having read the work properly (there is no
evidence that he ever did so), but praising Kepler for his faith in die
Copemican theory, to which he admitted himself to be an adherent. (It was on
the strength of this letter that Kepler later attempted to establish a regular
correspondence between himself
and Galileo.) Tycho
also was encouraging ; the mysticism of the book could not repel anyone as
committed to the belief that both alchemy and astrology were sound roads to
truth as Tycho was, and he saw that Kepler was already an exceptionally able
and industrious astronomical computer. He would make an ideal assistant at
Uraniborg ; Tycho therefore urged Kepler to join him, promising him access to
his vast collection of observations. But Kepler refused, then as later
reluctant to leave Germanspeaking lands, and seeing no reason why the Graz
post should not continue.
But the situation in
Austria, and even in South Germany, was to grow rapidly uncomfortable as the
forces of the Catholic Counter-Reformation slowly pushed back the Protestant
frontiers. In the autumn of 1597, all Protestant clergy and teachers were
ordered to leave Graz. An exception was specifically made for Kepler, as it was
to be on subsequent similar occasions ; he was known to be regarded as unsound
among orthodox Lutherans, who thought him too liberal (and too inclined to
Calvinist doctrine, but perhaps the Catholic authorities did not know that). He
was also on good terms with many Catholics, including a number of Jesuits, the
vanguard of the Catholic force. Kepler was always ready for religious
discussion ; true, he always in the end firmly rejected Jesuit pressure for
conversion, blandly claiming to be already a Catholic since he was a Christian,
but he was obviously by no means so intransigently anti-Catholic as most of his
co-religionists. No doubt also the civil authorities felt that it was more
important to have a district mathematician who was an able astronomer and
caster of horoscopes than one who was better at attending mass than waiting on
the stars. So Kepler stayed on in Graz for another three years, speculating on
the mysteries of the solar system.
But by 1600 the
demands for religious uniformity were greater. Besides, Tycho had now left
Denmark to settle in
291
Bohemia as Imperial
Mathematician, a post which would enable him to employ assistants. Kepler
decided to see if Tycho’s original offer still stood, and whether things could
be arranged on a basis satisfactory both to his pride and his pocket; he went
to Prague, and after much negotiation the situation was resolved in a manner
acceptable to both astronomers. Kepler was soon settled, and busily
investigating the orbit of Mars on the basis of data collected over many years,
an investigation destined to lead him to such remarkable discoveries that he
was quite justified in considering that he had created a new astronomy.
Tycho’s death in 1601
produced little disturbance, except for time lost in negotiation with the
Emperor and with Tycho’s heirs. In the end, Kepler retained access to Tycho’s
papers, and continued his work, at the same time succeeding to Tycho’s post as
Imperial Mathematician. This was not an onerous position except for the amount
of energy required to secure any substantial part of the promised salary ;
Kepler cast a few horoscopes for the Emperor, but he was chiefly intended to
complete the planetary tables based on Tycho’s work which had been promised
long before Tycho’s death. Kepler worked on these fitfully through the years,
never wholly neglecting them, but always turning aside to pursue other
interests ; they were finally completed in 1623, only to be delayed for five
more years as a result of the chaos of war. When they appeared in 1627, the
Rudolphine Tables were a fitting monument to Tycho from his worthiest disciple.
Meanwhile, without
totally neglecting his official work, Kepler busied himself with a multitude of
problems : with work on the orbit of Mars, with the optics of refraction, with
the new star (nova) of 1604, with mathematics, with consideration of Galileo’s
new astronomical observations, with scientific correspondence. But Kepler was
not entirely happy at Prague; the Emperor was growing old (he died in 1612),
and the political
292
disturbances which
preceded the outbreak of the Thirty Years* War indicated that Prague was no
longer a suitable environment for scholarly pursuits. Alarmed, he sought a more
secure post, which he found as district mathematician in the Austrian city of
Linz, a better paid job than his earlier position at Graz, and near South
Germany, to which he always hoped—in vain—to be able to return. Kepler remained
at Linz for fourteen years, until the actual presence of war drove him to
search for a suitable place of publication for the Rudolphine Tables, now
complete, and of residence for himself and his family. The Rudolphine Tables
were published at Ulm in 1627, after which Kepler was free to search for new
patrons—Wallenstein was briefly one of them—for the restoration of property and
his long-overdue salary from various sources ; still searching, he died at
Regensburg in 1630.
When he died, Kepler
was widely known as a scientific heir to Tycho Brahe—as much on the strength of
his writing on the nova of 1604 as on account of his profound calculations
based on Tycho’s observations. Indeed, in 1610 the poet John Donne could write
in the satirical Ignatius his Conclave of “ Keppler, who (as himselfe testifies
of himselfe) ever since Tycho Brahe’s death hath received it into his care,
that no new thing should be done in heaven without his knowledge.” This was the
view of the non-scientist; astronomers knew that Kepler had written four works
on theoretical astronomy—the Cosmographical Mystery (1596), the New Astronomy
(1609, Astronomia nova or commentaries on the motion of Mars), the Epitome of
Copemican Astronomy (1617-21), and the Harmony of the World (1619 Har- monices
Mundi)—all intensely Copemican, and all concerned with a new, daring and
decidedly obscure form of mathematically based astronomical theory. It was on
these that Kepler’s reputation was ultimately to rest; but they were probably
the least appreciated of his works when he died.
What fascinated
Kepler about the Copemican system was the superior order and harmony which it
appeared to him to display. From his earliest years as an astronomical
speculator, Kepler had been convinced that there was more order and harmony in
the universe than customary astronomical methods could display. By order and
harmony Kepler meant two slightly different aspects of the cosmos: one, a
reflection of the properties of the divine creator, the other, a set of
mathematico-physical relationships : a mystic harmony and a mathematical one.
It was this concept and vision that led Kepler to pursue the attributes of God
through the observations of Tycho Brahe, never relinquishing either the mystic
vision or the observational fact, but labouring unceasingly until the two were
one. As he informed the reader of the Cosmographical Mystery, there were three
things of which I pertinaciously inquired the causes of their being as they
are, and not otherwise : the Number, Size, and Motions of the Orbs. This I
ventured to do because of the wonderful correspondence of things at rest—the
Sun, the fixed stars, and the intermediate space— with God the Father and the
Son and the Holy Ghost: an analogy which I shall pursue further in my
Cosmography.3
This was a favourite
analogy, which to Kepler provided at once a reason for research and a true
mystic vision ; over twenty years later in the Epitome of the Copemican
Astronomy he again compared the centre of the world to the Father, the sphere
of the fixed stars to the Son and the planetary system to the Holy Ghost. This
was not a pantheistic mysticism alone, as for Giordano Bruno ; it was at once religious
comfort and a powerful stimulus to investigation—physical investigation; for
the harmonies of the world were meaningless to Kepler unless they conformed to
accurate observation. Even in his first attempt, before he had worked with
Tycho, Kepler repeated his computations over and over, all during a whole
summer, until at last he found a mathe
matical
representation sufficiently close to the best data he could obtain. It was
because he hoped that even more accurate data would permit him to discover even
more wonderful relationships that he wanted to work with Tycho ; as he was to
remark some years later, “ since, with divine goodness, God has granted a
supremely careful observer like Tycho Brahe... it is only proper for us
gratefully to recognise and benefit from this gift of God.” 4 Kepler
recognised that it was Tycho’s observations which made the errors of earlier
theories perceptible. And whether it helped or hindered him, Kepler loyally
accepted Tycho’s work as the exact basis on which he must build, cheerfully
throwing away the labour of months if the calculations showed that his theory
was not as exact as the observations required. Never before had an astronomer
taken such a rigid view of the concord necessary between observation and theory
; equally, never before had any calculator had such accurate and consistendy
reliable observations from which to work. It was Kepler’s good fortune to have
access to such an extensive body of observations ; it was a part of his genius
that he took advantage of their precision. No one but Kepler could have drawn
the full advantage from Tycho’s work, as he gratefully acknowledged; but not
even loyalty could persuade him to accept the Tychonic system rather than the
Copemican.-
Devout Copemican that
he was, Kepler obeyed Tycho’s injunctions and justified his use of Tycho’s work
by increasing his computational labours: in the New Astronomy (his first
publication using Tycho’s data) he calculated all the elements of the orbit of
Mars for three systems, the Ptolemaic, the Tychonic and the Copemican. As late
as 1619 he noted that he derived his study of “ the most perfect harmony of the
celestial motions and their origin from the same cause of the Eccentricities,
Semidiameters and periodic times ” according to both the Tychonic and the
Copemican systems. (By the time he came to draw up
the title page for
the fifth book of the Harmony of the World he no longer felt it worth while to
bother with the Ptolemaic system.) He thus salved his conscience while
remaining a Coper- nican; but in other ways he was more nearly a follower of
Tycho fhan of Copernicus. Like Tycho, he rejected the notion of crystalline
spheres (though, again like Tycho, he retained the enclosing sphere beyond the
fixed stars, which gave the world boundary and limit) ; this permitted him to
accept Tycho’s theory of comets as being bodies situated in the heavens,
travelling in a possibly closed orbit between the orbits of Venus and Mars.
Like Tycho, he transformed the planetary orbs from spheres into orbits ; but,
unlike Tycho, he saw that this led to the necessity of finding a physical cause
for their persisting in these orbits. For it was not enough to find that the
planets did revolve in fixed and continuous orbits, of constant size and
determinate shape, located in space at fixed distances from the centre of the
universe : Kepler thought it essential to search for the reason why they did
this, and he was prepared to search until he found the reason out.
Indeed Kepler, like a
small boy, was obsessed with the possibilities inherent in the word why. Why
was half the universe (the centre and circumference) at rest and the other half
in motion? Why did the outer planets move more slowly than the inner ones ? Why
did the planets have orbits of certain sizes and not others ? Why were there
just six planets, no more and no less ? To all these questions there must be an
answer ; and for Kepler this answer must be expressed in physical as well as in
mathematical terms. To say that six is a “ perfect ” number (as the Greeks had
called numbers which were the sum of their factors) was not enough; once again,
Kepler asked why ? What was the physical significance of this mathematical fact
? It was this obsessive curiosity which was the basis of his first book, the
Cosmographical Mystery. Could geometrical figures be employed to give con-
296
crete reality to a
numerical relationship ? About the apexes of the triangles designating various
positions of the conjunctions * of Jupiter and Saturn one could construct a
circle; but unfortunately its dimensions did not appear to accord with the
true size of the planetary orbits. Hence, although the geometrical “ harmony ”
was attractive, Kepler reluctantly abandoned this calculation. In any case, it
ought to be possible to find a geometrical relationship involving all the
planets ; or, as Kepler put it,
For if (I thought)
for the size and proportion of the six celestial bodies which Copernicus
established, there could be found five figures among the infinite number of
others which would have just these particular properties, this would give what
I wished. And so I pressed on. What had plane figures to do with solid orbs ?
They rather resemble solid bodies. Behold, Reader, the discovery and material
of all this little work.5
Rather naively,
perhaps, Kepler regarded solid bodies as being more physical, less purely
geometrical, than plane figures, and hence as having greater significance. He
was so delighted with his final discovery, to which he was led by consideration
of the regular Platonic solids, that he could not forbear to present it to the
reader in the preface, although it was to be discussed in immense detail in the
body of the book. This was his discovery :
The sphere of the
Earth is the measure of all. Circumscribe about it a Dodecahedron : its
circumscribed sphere will be [that of] Mars. Circumscribe a Tetrahedron about
[the sphere of] Mars: its circumscribed sphere will be [that of] Jupiter.
Circumscribe a Cube about [the sphere of] Jupiter :
* A planet was “ in conjunction ” when a
line drawn from the Earth to the Sun could be extended to include the planet;
that is, when Earth, Sun and planet all lay on the same straight line, in that
order.
its circumscribed
sphere will be [that of] Saturn. Now inscribe an Icosahedron within [the sphere
of] Earth: its inscribed sphere will be [that of] Venus. Inscribe an Octahedron
in [the sphere of] Venus : its inscribed sphere will be [that of] Mercury. Here
you have the reason of the numbers of the planets.
And here, to prove
it, was an enormous double folio illustration of the pleasing harmony ; a
figure often reproduced, but seldom on a scale large enough to do it justice,
for Kepler insisted on representing the orbits to scale.
To the modem reader,
this may seem so much nonsense ; it is difficult to see that this relationship
meant any more in physical terms than did the relationships that Kepler had
already rejected. But Kepler was entirely delighted, and wished for nothing
more, except possibly more accurate calculations on the sizes of the orbits
which would, he was sure, make the relationship even more exact. This to him
was a truly physical relationship, and one moreover that came closer to
relating every planet to the system of the world as a whole than anyone had
done previously. To improve matters, Kepler even put the Sun in the centre of
his universe (in place of making the centre of the Earth’s orbit the centre of
the universe, as Copernicus had done), even though this meant the
reintroduction of the equant, the mathematical device which Copernicus had so
hated. Even there, Kepler was to be justified; for he was thereby led to novel
speculations about the speed of planetary motions at various points in their
orbits, which in turn were to permit him to abandon the equant once and for
all.
The agreement between
Kepler’s solution of the cosmo- graphical mystery and Copernicus’ determination
of the sizes of the planetary orbits was not quite as close as Kepler would
have liked, in view of the manifest truth of each; to acquire more accurate
data he was willing to work with Tycho Brahe,
even though it meant
subordinating his own Copemicanism temporarily to the wishes of his master.
Kepler hoped that Tycho would have available the information he required; he
was somewhat cast down at first to find that only the raw figures were
available, and nearly all the computations were still to do, so that he could
not immediately pursue his own interests. Not that he minded computing the
elements of the orbit of Mars, for he had no dislike of calculation, and Mars
proved rapidly to offer all sorts of interesting results. His first discovery
was that the centre of the Sun and the whole of the circular orbit of Mars lay
in the same plane (a point in favour of the Copemican system), even though the
plane of the orbit was inclined to the ecliptic.* But more was to follow ; the
longer he studied Mars, the more there seemed to be to discover.
Kepler soon became
particularly disturbed by the erratic way in which the planet moved through its
orbit, for its velocity varied according to no obvious law. It was certainly
not uniform with respect to the Sun; nor with respect to the centre of its
orbit (a circle eccentric to the Sun) ; nor with respect to any fixed point
within the orbit. True, the error involved in assuming such uniform motion was
only eight minutes of arc (an error that would not have troubled Copernicus),
but Kepler knew that Tycho’s observations were correct to less than that, and
he remained uncomfortable. As a check, he tried computing the velocity of the
Earth, only to find that the Earth behaved in the same tiresome fashion. In
both cases the planets moved fester when approaching the Sun, and slower when
receding from it, .but in neither case was there any uniformity in this change
of motion. Two problems presented themselves: how to find a mathematical
expression for this variation, and how to explain its existence. The solution
to the first problem involved complex
* Later lie determined that the planes of
all planetary orbits pass through the Sun’s centre.
FIG. 9. KEPLER’S LAW
OF AREAS
The area of triangle
spxp2 is equal to the area of triangle sp3p4,
where s is the Sun, and px, p2, p3, p4
represent positions of the planet.
The dotted curve is
that of a circle eccentric to s, with its centre at c {the centre of the
elliptical orbit); this is obviously a close approximation to the true
elliptical orbit, whose eccentricity is here slightly exaggerated even for Mars
mathematics, making
use of Archimedean integration by summation of small lines and areas; Kepler
proved quite equal to its solution. The result (though its author never stated
it in quite this form) was the now-familiar “ second law ” of Kepler : that the
radius vector drawn from the Sun to the planet sweeps out equal areas in equal
times (cf. figure 9).* The mathematical
* Kepler expressed it both more precisely
and more tentatively: he drew his line from “ the point with respect to which
the eccentric is computed” or “ that point, which is taken to be the centre of
the world.” 6 At this time Kepler was dealing with mathematical
considerations only, and of course regarded the orbit as an eccentric circle.
300
derivation, together
with several detailed proofs, occupies most of Part HI of the New Astronomy.
Here was a wonderful new mathematical discovery about the planets; and best of
all, it was susceptible of physical meaning. For the cause of this variation
must lie either in the inherent properties of the planet or those of the centre
of the world, and in either case Kepler thought he could find it out.
He had, already,
speculated vaguely on the possible cause of the variation in planetary
velocity, and wondered whether there might not be some kind of moving spirit or
soul (anima) in the Sun, related in some way to light. But since his first
speculations he had become acquainted with the concept of magnetic force,
through reading Gilbert. Years later, in the Fourth Book of the Epitome of
Copemican Astronomy (published in 1620) he was for once to defend his claim to
originality by proclaiming his dependence upon others; he wrote :
My doctrines—most of
which I have taken from others— say whether love of truth or glory is mine :
for I have built all Astronomy on the Copemican Hypothesis of the World ; the
Observations of Tycho Brahe ; and the Magnetic Philosophy of the Englishman
William Gilbert.7
Gilbert’s magnetic
philosophy now offered Kepler exactly what he required in order to explain the
calculated variations in planetary velocities. Kepler developed the idea of a
force (or rather “ virtue ”) similar to magnetism, and possessed of a power of
attraction. Magnetic attraction was manifest from terrestrial experiments, and
known to be capable of extending over large distances ; it could be invoked to
explain why the motion of a planet being attracted to the Sun was greatest when
the planet approached the Sun, least when the two bodies were farthest apart.
The attraction set up by this virtue was not just a force, but a genuine ‘
pulling towards ’—a motion, in fact. Not that this motion was exercised without
restraint, for all bodies must
have a resistance to
motion, or it would not be necessary to explain why they move; and all the
planets, as well as the Earth, also possessed, in Kepler’s view a
quasi-magnetical moving virtue. The motive virtue of the Sun combined with the
moving virtue of the planets to produce the peculiar variation in velocity characteristic
of orbital motion. The existence of magnetic forces within each planet, varying
with the size of the planet, explained the mysterious property of gravity :
heavy bodies seek the Earth not through desire to achieve their natural place,
but as a result of magnetic attraction.
This theory was to be
elaborated over the years; but as early as 1609 Kepler stated in the New
Astronomy that the Sun, turning on its axis, emitted its magnetic virtue in
much the same way as it emitted light, and in turning produced a kind of
vortex. Later, in the Epitome of Copemican Astronomy, Kepler became more
precise : he provided a diagram showing how the orientation of the magnetic
poles of a planet revolving about the Sun (whose own poles were the surface and
centre) necessarily explained both the orbital path and orbital velocity (see
figure 10). Kepler was now secure in a physical explanation of his mathematical
laws; at the same time, his magnetic virtue was an occult force ; and the
planets which were loadstones were nevertheless, as they were for Gilbert,
animate bodies.
Even after finding
the mathematical law of planetary motion, and a physical explanation for its
existence, much remained to be done on the shape of the planetary orbit. The
more he investigated, the more certain Kepler became that the planets could
not be travelling in perfect circles eccentric to the Sun. Such courses might
be metaphysically sound, but they were not consistent with physical fact. In
the New Astronomy Kepler (having, as always, given the reader a summary of his
views in the preface) laboriously devoted die whole of Part IV to a detailed
account of the reasons which had led him to this conclusion, the mathematical
302
fig.
io.
kepler’s explanation of the elliptical
ORBIT IN TERMS OF
MAGNETIC FORCES
As the planet
revolves anti-clockwise about the Sun its two magnetic poles retain the same
orientation with respect to the orbit. At a
and d they are equidistant
from the Sun, and the planet has no tendency to approach or recede from it. As
the planet goes from A to D (as at B and c) the attractive pole is nearer the
Sun and the planet therefore tends to draw closer; as it goes from d to a
(as at £ and f) the
repelling pole is nearer the Sun and hence the planet tends to recede. The
result is the ellipse
computations which
had confirmed it, and the methods which he had employed to devise a substitute
hypothesis and to prove that. At one stage (Kepler never spared the reader any
step of his own painful progress) he even thought of abandoning the law of
areas, but further tedious computation showed both that it really did hold, and
that it was inconsistent with the assumption
of a perfectly
circular orbit. This inconsistency was particularly (and fortunately)
noticeable in the case of Mars, which at best required an orbit of far greater
eccentricity than was the case with tie Earth.* By means of the law of areas,
and with great labour, Kepler was able to compute the distance of Mars from the
Sun at different points in its orbit. From this incontrovertible evidence, in
the face of the ancient prejudice in favour of circular motion that neither
Tycho nor Galileo ever questioned, Kepler was driven to conclude:
This is dear: die
Orbit of the planet is not a cirde, but passes gradually inside at the sides,
and again increases to the amplitude of a cirde at perigee. The shape of this
kind of path is called an oval.8 Was Kepler perhaps influenced,
consciously or unconsciously, by Tycho’s suggestion that comets might follow
oval paths ? Or, like Tycho, was he merely led to the condusion by similar
evidence ?
As usual, Kepler
could not be content with his theoretical speculations unless they had a
possible physical significance ; in this case, he thought, the deviation from
circularity could be explained as the result of the influence of the magnetic
force of the Sun; this varied with distance, being greatest at perigee (when
the planet was closest to the Sun), and was further combined with the tendency
of die planet to rotate in a cirde under the influence of its own proper motive
virtue to produce an ovoid (egg-shaped) figure. The ovoid proved a most
intractable curve; after a number of attempts Kepler sighed, “ if only our
figure was a perfect ellipse, it could be described by the method of Archimedes.”9
But it seemed not to be anything so simple, and he struggled on, trying to
calculate his ovoid by treating
* The eccentricity (the “ flattening ” of
the ellipse) of the Earth’s orbit is indeed quite small; that of Mars is about
five times as large, and the discrepancy in Kepler’s calculations varied
approximately with the square of the eccentricity.
304
each end as a portion
of a perfect ellipse, only to find that the motions he calculated for Mars on
this assumption always failed to agree with the observations. No matter what
combination of ellipses he used to represent an approximation of his ovoid
(which no geometry could touch), he could not handle the problem. At last,
after years of effort, Kepler decided that it was the particular ovoid which he
had guessed for the orbit which was at fault, and he thought it worth while to
try another, though this meant a totally new set of approximations. The first
ellipse he tried showed a happy numerical congruity that seemed to justify his
use of the ellipse ; but he was once more defeated, this time by an
arithmetical error. Once more he was in despair ; once more persistence brought
relief.
So far, Kepler had
treated his ellipses as mere devices of approximation : suddenly it struck him
that if (as it should in accord with his “ magnetic ” theory) Mars librated on
the diameter of an epicycle circling around the Sun (a perfectly “ classical ”
concept) the resultant curve would be ... an ellipse. Surprised at his own
foolishness—the foolishness which prevented his seeing that his physical ideas
and the geometry he had been using all led to the same inescapable
conclusion—he retnmed to his calculations and found the slip in his arithmetic
which had previously prevented his success. As a further reward he found that,
indeed, there could be no curve except the perfect ellipse (with the Sun at one
focus) which would fit the data, and at the same time would agree with the law
of areas.10
Kepler’s surprise,
and his previous neglect of the ellipse as a possible orbit, rather than a mere
calculating device, are not so unlikely as they might appear : conic sections
were little studied in the sixteenth century, and as Kepler himself complained,
“ How many mathematicians are there who would put up with the labour of reading
through the Conics of Apollonios of Perga ? ”11 It was a measure of
the importance of Kepler’s discovery that
some eighty years
later Newton was to advise a would-be reader of his Principia that Apollonios
was fundamental to the comprehension of astronomical theory. Even Kepler,
pleased as he was with his solution, was not quite sure that he understood the
physical mining of the ellipse as confidently as he did that of the eccentric
circle, because too many of its elements were merely geometrical. True, the Sun
was at one focus; but the other focus was empty ; and so was the centre. But
observation and computation could not lie; and Kepler consoled himself by
boasting that
with extremely
laborious demonstrations and by the handling of exceedingly many observations,
I have discovered that the path of a Planet in the Heavens is not a circle, but
an Oval route, perfectly Elliptical.,a And Kepler had calculated the
new orbits of all the planets, including the Earth, and found them all
elliptical, though mostly with far less eccentricity than was the case with
Mars.
One problem still
remained : what was the cause of the relative sizes of the planetary orbits ?
This had been the subject of the Cosmographical Mystery. A quarter of a century
later Kepler was to return to the study of the relationships of the velocities
of the planets at various points in their orbits, the length of time it took
each planet to traverse its orbit, and the average distances of the planets
from the Sun. Surely there should be some interesting and relevant mathematical
relationship between velocities and distances, a relationship which must, of
course, be capable of physical interpretation? And surely this relationship,
when found, would once more confirm and elucidate the divine harmony and proportion
of the universe.
All Kepler’s later
investigations on this subject are contained in The Five Books of the Harmony
of the World, where, according to his habit, he painfully recapitulated his
progress to a few certain
principles, and
reminded his readers of what he had previously discovered. The first book is
almost entirely geometrical, being concerned with the harmonic proportions of
plane figures, without any relation to astronomy. The second book (which
Kepler called Architectural) deals with solid figures, and is again mainly
geometrical. The third book is a Pythagorean disquisition on Harmony,
explaining the mathematical proportions responsible for musical harmony. With
the fourth, the physical world appears ; this is “ Metaphysical, Psychological
and Astrological,” dealing with the souls and bodies of celestial and
terrestrial bodies.
Only the fifth book,
“Astronomical and Metaphysical,” contains the subjects that had concerned
Kepler for so long : the harmonies of celestial motions, based upon the
mathematics and metaphysics of the preceding books. Here is a recapitulation of
the central doctrine of the Cosmographical Mystery, in relation to the
Copemican and Tychonic systems. But there is new doctrine as well; in chapter
III Kepler presented “ a summary of the astronomical doctrines necessary for
the contemplation of the harmonies of the heavens,” which is really a summary
of the newest of his discoveries. He described the weeks of labour spent on
examining the relations between planetary motions and the size of their orbits;
he had been slow to see the truth, but at last it came and he could insist,
But it is an
absolutely certain and exact fact, that the proportion between the periodic
times of any two Planets, is precisely as the three-halves power of that of
their mean distances, that is, of the orbits themselves,13 Or, as in
the modem expression, the squares of the periodic times of the planets are in
the same ratio as the cubes of their respective mean distances from the Sun.
Here, as Kepler fully realised, was a wonderful revelation; but not even he
could realise its full significance. He naturally saw its metaphysical
significance
far more plainly than
its physical, and it immediately inspired him to further flights of
computation. Elaborately he compared the proportions between the various
elements of the planetary orbits, building up tables of harmonies which he then
compared with the numerical proportions of various notes on the musical scale
or with the geometrical proportions of the lengths of strings emitting various
notes. By comparing thus astronomical, numerical and geometrical ratios he
produced what he saw as a true “ music of the spheres,” displayed at loving
length in both mathematical and musical notation. Thus triumphantly Kepler
solved the ancient Pythagorean problem, and made manifest the harmony of the
world.
Did Kepler really
expect astronomers to discover what was to become his third law in the great
morass of Pythagorean calculation ? Very probably not; in the Proemium to Book
v he admitted that he might have to wait a hundred years for a sympathetic
reader. But he comforted himself with the thought that this was little, when
God had waited six thousand years for someone to contemplate His wonders with
an appreciative mind and eye. More practically, he took steps to see that his
ideas had readers, even though his works were too difficult for a general
audience. In the later parts of the Epitome of Copemican Astronomy, that
peculiar mixture of elementary question and answer with advanced Keplerian
astronomy, the third law was plainly stated and fully discussed, without any
complications of celestial harmony since it was for an elementary audience. Not
because Kepler thought the discussion of harmony in any way “ non-sdentific ”
as a modem critic might do, but because he thought it involved complex
mathematics, such as the reader of the Epitome would not normally have ; as he
had said ruefully at the beginning of the New Astronomy, there were few in his
day who could comprehend advanced mathematical development. To its author,
even the dithyramb to the Sun which
308
concluded the Harmony
of the World was an expression oi the mathematico-physical laws of the
universe, and as suet intelligible only to those capable of following him on
the complex mathematical road whereby he had arrived at the truth.
Kepler remains
inescapably foreign to the modem world, one of the most difficult of scientists
to portray accurately or to appreciate as he really was. It is not that he
mixed daring new ideas with vestiges of the past; no scientist has ever failed
to do that and in many ways Galileo, his elder by only seven years, retained
much more of the past than Kepler, and is nevertheless more easily
comprehensible. Kepler was certainly a true Renaissance scientist, invoking
the extreme past to advance the present, adopting the cosmological approach of
the early Greek philosophers, and cherishing the feet that Ptolemy had written
about celestial harmonies. Yet the stranger aspects of his thought were not
drawn from the past, nor were they wholly of the present. There is, to be sure,
something of the natural magician in Kepler ; but he is closer to the natural
magic of Gilbert than to that of Porta, a strange mixture of number mysticism
and passion for empirical fact. Not even Gilbert was so insistent as Kepler
that mystic theory was only worth considering when it was based upon
irrefutable observation and conformable with physical interpretation. There is
little in Kepler of the neo-Platonic number nonsense of the late fifteenth
century—entirely self- sufficient—or of the religio-philosophic pantheism of
Giordano Bruno. To Kepler his newly discovered mathematical harmonies were so
many laws which revealed the wonder and order of the world of God; this was a
world ruled by mathematical law, which in turn was discoverable by astronomical
observation.
In many respects,
indeed, Kepler was less ready to accept mathematical metaphysics than most of
his contemporaries ; for
his notions of
harmony bore little resemblance to those of most Copemicans, like Digges and
Dee. Under the influence of Tycho Brahe, Kepler totally rejected the existence
of solid spheres, except for that which enclosed and held together the
universe, and made it one. Under the influence of Tycho’s data, Kepler had shed
the time-honoured concept of the necessity for perfectly circular motion, a
concept which had provided the metaphysic for the physical calculation of
planetary orbits since Plato’s day. Kepler’s universe was thus a strange one,
far more divorced from traditional astronomy than that of Copernicus. At its
centre was the Sun, fixed in its place, but rotating on its axis, emitting
light and magnetic virtue ; at its outer periphery the region of the fixed
stars, truly at rest, bounded by an enclosing sphere. In between were scattered
the planets, held in their places not by material orbs, but by the balance of
motive virtues and magnetic attractions; ceaselessly revolving about the Sun in
ellipses (strange shapes!) at velocities described by the mathematical
relationships of the law of areas and the law of harmonies, while the sizes of
the ellipses were predetermined functions of the periodic times, and of the
essential and harmonious proportions between all parts of the universe. And the
clue to understanding these novelties had been the data of Tycho Brahe,
interpreted by Kepler’s intense and passionate conviction that harmonies
governed the world, and that it was worth immmtf labours of calculation to find
the mystic, but physical, expressions which accurately revealed what these
harmonies might be. For they were as much a reflection of the work of God as
the threefold division of the universe was of the three persons of the
Trinity. Not the least of the wonders of Kepler’s work is that with these
preconceptions his discoveries were to prove exactly what was required by later
natural philosophers to convert his mystic harmonies into coldly rational
“mechanical” physical reasoning.
It was, however, some
time before this was realised ; for in his mysticism and his daring Kepler
stood equally outside the main stream of scientific development, already
insisting on rationalism as its guiding principle. His scientific
contemporaries read him little. He was valued by kings, princes and state
officials for his skill in astrological prediction ; hence his numerous posts
as mathematician to courts and senates, and the numerous offers from foreign
princes, like that with which Sir Henry Wot ton tried to attract him to
England. Astronomers praised him, as both Maestlin and Galileo did, but none
appears to have taken his ideas seriously. The first real discussion of
Kepler’s Laws waited until 1645, when the French astronomer Ismael Bouillaud
(1605-94) in his Astronomia Philolaica dealt with the first two, of which he
accepted only the first. The famous encyclopedic astronomy of G. B. Riccioli
(1598-1671), Alma- gestum Novum (1651), mentioned the first law, only to reject
it as insufficiently proved.
England had done a
little better : Hariot had encouraged his pupils to read the New Astronomy, and
to reflect upon the possibility of the truth of elliptical orbits; but few of
his pupils were real astronomers and when he died in 1621 there was no one to
follow his interest. Yet nearly twenty years later Jeremiah Horrox (1619-41)
wrote a thorough and informed defence of the first two laws; this again had
little immediate influence, since it was not published until some thirty years
later. Seth Ward (1617-89), Savilian Professor of Astronomy at Oxford from
1649, wrote against Bouillaud in 1653, criticising his geometry; like his
adversary, he accepted only the first law. The third law was even less well
known ; G. A. Borelli (16081679), trying to establish a system of the world
based upon gravity (Theoricae Mediceorum Planetarum, 1666) did not accept what
would have been so helpful. Fortunately not everyone ignored Kepler’s best
work, and some hints reached the young
Newton before the end
of 1665, in time to assist him in his first formulation of the Newtonian
system. After 1665 Kepler’s Laws were well known and generally accepted by the
best mathematical astronomers, though it was the success of Newton in using
them that at last gave Kepler’s discoveries the status of scientific laws.
Galileo . . ., who of
late hath summoned the other worlds, the stars to come neerer to him, &
give him an account of themselves.1
For half a century
and more after the publication of De Revolu- tionibus the case for Copemicanism
had been based on arguments concerning harmony and probability in nature,
rather than on evidence. The followers of Copernicus were not effective
observational astronomers ; no one but Tycho had amassed any fresh body of data
that might help to settle the question of the motion of the Earth one way or
the other. Tycho’s most interesting observations—on the new star of 1572, and
on comets —had yielded arguments that were strongly anti-Aristotelian, but not
especially favourable to Copemicanism. Tycho’s destruction of the crystalline
spheres could be applied to the heliocentric system, but did nothing to render
it more plausible ; on the other hand Tycho’s own system of the celestial
motions did require that the spheres be abolished. By 1610 the Tychonic system
was a powerfixl rival of the Copemican, at least among those trained in science
(though Galileo was to choose to ignore it) ; its innovations, relating rather
to the Aristotelian, physical picture of the universe than to the vexed
question of the Earth’s motion, did not so much prepare the way (as yet) for
the still greater innovations of Copernicus as offer instead a fresh, modem
alternative to the heliocentric doctrine. Even Kepler, in 1609, still
recognised that the two new laws of planetary motion he
had extracted from
Tycho’s observations could be as well applied to Tycho’s system as to the
Copemican, though he believed the Copemican to be the true one. In any case his
discoveries, the more suspicious because they were purely mathematical, were
ignored by the partisans on either side with equal impartiality. If Kepler did
not fulfil Tycho’s requirement that his years of calculation be devoted to
proving the truth of Tycho’s system, nevertheless his writings had little
effect on the opposite side.
By 1610 the old
arguments were growing stale. Even the literary man knew them by heart, and the
great debate was declining in vigour through lack of fuel. Only fresh evidence
could revive it, only some gifted writer who revelled in polemic could bring up
new issues for discussion. Galileo furnished both. New evidence came from his
astronomical use of the telescope ; new arguments from his drawing the
controversy out of the realm of mathematics into that of physics. In so doing
he raised a great new issue of principle, the right of the scientific
astronomer to speculate and to communicate his speculations with freedom. If,
ultimately, he lost this right for himself by the hardihood of his
championship, he won it for his successors.
In 1609, at the age
of forty-five, Galileo was a moderately successful teacher of mathematics at
Padua of seventeen years’ standing, who had published nothing but a little
pamphlet describing his improvement of a mathematical instrument. A year later,
after the appearance of the Sidereal Messenger, lie was world-famous and in a
position to arrange his return to his native Tuscany on most honourable terms.
Seldom has fame come so suddenly—or so late—in the life of a great scientist.
His origins were not very different from those of Kepler. His father was a
member of a decayed patrician family of Florence, a not very successful cloth
merchant living in Pisa in 1564 when his eldest son was bom. Though unskilful
at making money Vicenzo Galilei was a cultured and accomplished musician, from
whom his son evidently
inherited mathematical ability. Like Kepler, Galileo was sent to a university,
but it was to study medicine, not theology nor mathematics. (Tradition has it
that his father forbade Galileo the art of mathematics, lest he become too
entranced and drawn away from the lucrative practice of medicine.) Galileo was
an even more recalcitrant pupil than Kepler, and again like Kepler he left the
University of Pisa without taking a degree, having already distinguished
himself in both pure and applied mathematics, to which he now applied himself
energetically. Mathematical ability never made Galileo rich, but it led him to
the first of a series of inventions, a new hydrostatical balance ; it brought
him private pupils in Florence and Siena; and, through his work on finding the
centres of gravity of bodies, it won him the influential patronage of Guido-
baldo del Monte, an authority on mechanics.
Galileo’s first post,
as professor of mathematics at Pisa in 1589, was neither remunerative nor
agreeable, for he wrangled with the rest of the Faculty; he was delighted to
attain, with Guidobaldo’s support, a similar chair at Padua, where the pay was
higher, the duties lighter and the private pupils more intelligent. There he
remained eighteen years, respected but inglorious, begetting illegitimate
children, lamenting constantly the slenderness of his salary, the necessity
for taking pupils in his house, and his exile from the Florence to which he
returned each summer vacation. His interest in physics (or as he said, “philosophy”)
and applied mathematics resulted in no other publication than the Geometrical
and Military Compass pamphlet of 1606, which brought him a little fame. Yet
Galileo’s first letter to Kepler, in 1597, shows that he had thought deeply
enough on astronomy —a normal part of his mathematical teaching—to become, in
private, a Copemican. Fear of ridicule (so he said) held Him from avowing his
conviction. Like every other professor of mathematics Galileo lectured to
appreciative audiences on the
famous new star (nova)
of 1604; he used the occasion for a brilliantly anti-Aristotelian exegesis,
which delighted his friends ; but he bad no novel astronomical arguments to
offer as yet. Characteristically it was a problem in physics that drew him five
years later into the field in which he was to win fame among contemporaries.
The change in the
course of Galileo’s private work was brought about by reports of the recent
invention, in Holland, of a new optical device that made distant objects appear
close. Less than a year afterwards Galileo wrote :
About ten months ago
[May 1609] a report reached my ears that a certain Fleming had constructed a
spyglass by means of which visible objects, though very distant from the eye of
the observer, were distinctly seen as if nearby. Of this truly remarkable
effect several stories were related, which some believed and others denied. A
few days later the report was confirmed to me in a letter . . . which caused me
to apply myself wholeheartedly to inquire into the means by which I might
arrive at the invention of a similar instrument. This I did shortly afterwards,
my basis being the theory of refraction. First I prepared a tube of lead, at
the ends of which I fitted two glass lenses, both plane on one side while on
the other side one was spherically convex and the other concave. Then placing
my eye near the concave lens I perceived objects satisfactorily large and near,
for they appeared three tiWs closer and nine times larger [in area] than when
seen with the naked eye alone. Next I constructed another one, more accurate,
which represented objects as enlarged more than sixty times [in area]. Finally,
sparing neither labour nor expense, I succeeded in constructing for myself so
ftvrallwnt an instrument that objects seen by means of it appeared nearly one
thousand times larger and over thirty closer than when regarded with our
natural vision.*
His first conclusion
was that the spyglass (occhiale ; the word telescope was invented among the
Lyncean Academicians in 1611) should be applied to military and naval purposes;
no very original idea, as the Dutch had already so used it. But soon Galileo
turned his occhiale, much more powerful than any yet made in Holland, to the
night sky ; a simple act, but one that was to revolutionise astronomy. For, and
increasingly as Galileo improved upon his first attempts, it both revealed new
facts and rendered all naked-eye observation obsolete.
The first object
observed by Galileo, naturally enough, was the Moon. He was the first to see
more than the shadows that fancy had embellished. He recognised mountains, and
a little later found out how to estimate their heights from the lengths of
their shadows ; he saw the vast plains which he took to be seas (they are still
so called). As he put it: if anyone wished to revive the old Pythagorean
opinion that the Moon is like another Earth, its brighter part might very fitly
represent the surface of the land and its darker region that of the water. I
have never doubted that if our globe were seen from afar when flooded with
sunlight, the land regions would appear brighter and the watery regions darker.3
With typical acuity
he went on to explain carefully this paradoxical opinion that irregular
surfaces reflect more light than smooth surfaces do, and why the edge of the
Moon always looks smooth to the naked eye. At the same time he discussed
earthshine (the “ old Moon in the new Moons arms ”) and presented good reasons
for the view (already held by some astronomers) that it was caused by sunlight
reflected from the Earth to the Moon and back. All this implied that the Moon,
whose celestial status no one had ever doubted, was suspiciously like the Earth
itself; a telling blow at the Aristotelian twofold division of the universe
into terrestrial (or sublunar) and celestial
regions, and
consequently an indirect argument in favour of Copernicus. If its hitherto
unperceived terrestrial nature had never inhibited the revolution of the Moon,
why should it be impossible for the Earth to revolve ?
Next, Galileo turned
to the stars. Two facts struck him : first, that the telescope did not make the
fixed stars appear larger, but only brighter ; and secondly, that he could now
for the first time see so many more stars. When he turned to the planets, they
revealed themselves as “ globes perfectly round and definitely bounded, looking
like little moons flooded all over with light,” but the stars did not appear as
physical bodies, even when much magnified. The telescope stripped the stars of
their “ sparkling rays ” without enlarging them as much as other objects, or
disclosing their physical nature. Thus the telescope emphasised the difference
between the planets and the fixed stars. Moreover, the multitude of stars
invisible to the naked eye that were seen through it showed how much of the
universe had hitherto escaped observation. The mystery of the Milky Way—was it
a nebulous river of light, or an aggregation of stars ?—was now solved ; it was
certainly composed of a vast number of stars closely crowded together. And
Galileo concluded that all the objects called “ nebulae ” (clouds) were
similarly formed of masses of small stars.
What pleased and
astonished him most, however, was the discovery of four new planets (as he
called them), four satellites or moons of the planet Jupiter which he named, in
honour of the ruling house of Tuscany, the Medicean stars. Their discovery was
a combination of luck and persistence in observation. On 7th January 1610
Galileo, observing Jupiter with his best telescope, noticed three small stars
in a line with the planet (two to the east and one to the west) that he had not
seen before. He naturally took them to be fixed stars. But the next night, “
happening ” as he said to look at Jupiter again, he found the three stars,
still in
a line, now all to
the west of the planet. His first assumption was that Jupiter had moved ; but
the motion of Jupiter at this time was retrograde, and so the three stars, if
they were fixed, should have been to the east. Further observation, continued
nightly throughout the winter, convinced Galileo that the revolutions of four
stars round Jupiter caused the changes he saw. This was the best evidence on
behalf of the Copemican system yet discovered, or rather, it was the best
evidence against the anti-Copemicans. As Galileo said:
Here we have a fine
and elegant argument for quietening the doubts of those who, while accepting
with easy minds the revolutions of the planets about the Sun in the Copemican
system, are mightily disturbed to have the Moon alone revolve about the Earth
and accompany it in an annual revolution about the Sun. Some have believed that
this structure of the universe should be rejected as impossible. But now we
have not just one planet revolving about another while both run through a great
orbit round the Sun; our own eyes show us four stars which wander round Jupiter
as does the Moon about the Earth, while all together trace out a grand
revolution about the Sun in the space of twelve years.4
The Sidereal
Messenger,* published in Latin in the spring of 1610, was a work of enormous
significance. It described an optical instrument hitherto almost unknown, and
never before used in astronomy ; it showed how this instrument revolutionised
that science; it made Galileo the most famous and popular astronomer in Italy;
and it spread the fame of Italian science
* The Latin title, Siderius Nuncius, is
ambiguous. When, later, Galileo was accused of arrogance for proclaiming
himself a messenger from the stars, he pointed out that nuncius means message
as well as messenger. Therefore the title might be translated as Message from
the Stars, but Sidereal Messenger, sanctified by long usage, embodies the most
usual meaning of nuncius, and Galileo may have been trying to correct his
critics’ Latin and slip out of a tight spot at the same time.
abroad with
incredible rapidity. Sir Henry Wotton, then English ambassador to Venice,
bought a copy on the day of publication, read it with delight, and posted it
off to England to entertain the King, promising to obtain a telescope as well.
His excitement was not merely aroused by new wonders—though there was that
too—but by what he regarded as the revolutionary implications of the little
book. He wrote :
So as upon the whole
subject he [Galileo] hath first overthrown all former astronomy—for we must
have a new sphere to save the appearances—and next all astrology. For die
virtue of these new planets,must needs vary the judicial part, and why may
there not yet be more ? . . . the author runneth a fortune to be either
exceedingly famous or exceedingly ridiculous.s Wotton was prescient,
for Galileo was considered famous or ridiculous depending on the astronomical
doctrine favoured by his appraiser.
Materially, the
Sidereal Messenger was an immediate success. Everyone who read it longed to
look through the marvellous spyglass, except a few timorous diehards who were
convinced in advance that the wonders it disclosed were in the lenses, not the
heavens (optics had so long been employed to cause scientific illusions). No
optician could grind lenses as good as those of Galileo, and his were in great
demand ; he could have made a small fortune had he chosen to organise a
workshop to make them (as he had for his mathematical compass). He did oversee
the manufacture of a good many instruments, which he delivered to those princes
and great men who might advance his career. Scientists, he thought, should make
their own, as Kepler soon did; Galileo combined exasperation and scorn for
astronomers who could not find the means to see what he had seen. (We should be
inclined to forgive them, as anyone who has looked at the heavens with
low-power opera-glasses, similar in optics and
magnification to the
first telescope, will agree.) But the men who tried without success to discern
the new wonders in the heavens were not content to doubt—they scoffed; and
indeed, their picture of a middle-aged professor confusing the man in the moon
with mountains and seas was a fit subject for ridicule.
Princes and great men
saw it otherwise. The Venetian Senate promptly offered Galileo a greatly
increased salary and a life-appointment, which he accepted, though he still
hoped for a court position in Florence. He had been mathematical tutor to the
present Grand Duke five years before ; had dedicated his book to the prince;
and had named Jupiter’s satellites in his honour. Like many middle-aged
professors he was tired of the routine of lectures and private teaching,
endless time-wasting on dull pupils and jealous colleagues. He wanted free
time, time to perfect his ideas and write his books, and, as he once
disarmingly remarked to a friend, “ It is impossible to obtain wages from a
republic, however splendid and generous it may be, without having duties
attached.” 6 Besides, like many scientists since, Galileo found the
prospect of communicating his discoveries to laymen most enticing. Like
Leonardo long before he offered to the Duke’s Secretary of State “ great and
remarkable things,” but of more real concern to him was his personal programme
of work to be done :
Two books on the system
and constitution of the universe— an immense conception full of philosophy,
astronomy, and geometry. Three books on local motion—an entirely new science in
which no one else, ancient or modem, has dis-
Three books on
mechanics . . . though other men have written on this subject, what has been
done is not one- quarter of what I write, either in quantity or otherwise. I
have also lesser works on physical topics, such as treatises
321
on sound and the
voice, on vision and colours, on the ocean tides, on tie nature of continuous
quantities, and on the motions of animals, and yet other works.7
Probably nothing in this huge list was more than sketched at this Hme. Only a
part of it was ever completed, and then not according to the original design.
Galileo’s was to be a life not of calm contemplation, but of bitter
controversy.
For the moment all
was fair. Galileo secured his appointment at Florence on the terms he sought
(he was to be “ Philosopher” as well as “Mathematician” to the Duke, the
latter alone savouring too strongly of astrology and other uncertain things);
he left Padua in the summer of 1610. In Venice the Senate was furious that
Galileo had broken his contract at Padua, while his friends were hardly less
dismayed: reluctant to lose him, knowing that he had made enemies and
foreseeing that he would make more, they judged that he was unwise to leave the
security of a proud republic for the chances of an uncertain court. As Sagredo,
the Venetian merchant whom Galileo was affectionately to commemorate as a most
intelligent scientific virtuoso, wrote:
Where will you find
freedom and self-determination as you did in Venice? ... At present you serve
your natural prince, a great man, virtuous, young, and of singular promise; but
here you had command over those who govern and command others; you had to serve
no one but yourself; you were as monarch of the universe.8 And he
added ominously : “ I am much disturbed by your being in a place where the
authority of the friends of the Jesuits counts heavily.” Galileo was too
content to heed such warnings, especially now that he had convinced the
philosophers at Pisa, for they had been converted, steadily if slowly, and many
of the recalcitrant must by now (as Galileo sardonically remarked) have seen at
first hand on their way to heaven the Moon, the Milky
Way and the Medicean
stars that they had refused to glimpse through the telescope.
At Florence Galileo
began his work auspiciously, with further discoveries in the skies. He had,
naturally, looked to discover if all the planets had moons like the Earth and
Jupiter ; only Saturn seemed promising, but his appearances were tantalisingly
uncertain. For having as he thought observed two satellites, Galileo soon
found that they changed their shape, while clinging closely to the planet;
cautiously—and perhaps to tease Kepler to whom he sent it—Galileo announced his
discovery in a jumbled anagram, which he then publicly clarified a few months
later, when he was certain. (He never knew that Saturn had in fact not “
attendants,” but rings.) The discovery seemed proof that not only Jupiter, but
other planets had “ moons.” His next discovery was more important, in every
respect; again he could hardly believe his eyes, and again he announced his
discovery first in an anagram, delaying its clarification until he was certain
of what precisely he had seen : it was, that Venus showed phases like the Moon.
It had always been an argument against the Copemican system that Venus did not
vary in brightness ; now Galileo was able to show (though only his best
telescope was able to demonstrate the phenomenon) that the cycle of phases
occurred in such a way that Venus was “ full ” (and therefore brightest and
biggest) only when most remote from the Earth.® There seemed no end to what the
telescope could show.
Galileo was winning
converts everywhere, even in Rome. Because of what came later, it is difficult
to remember that Galileo’s relations with the Church were, at first, peculiarly
cordial. The Jesuit mathematicians at their College in Rome were among the most
competent in Italy ; one of them, Clavius (1537-1612) (he had long ago been
responsible for the final computations of the Gregorian calendar), soon
accepted Galileo’s telescopic discoveries, and others followed suit. Indeed,
they
welcomed all
additions to astronomical knowledge, though they were committed to the
geostatic system. Galileo wished to reestablish relationships with Clavius,
whom he had known long before ; and he had hopes of influencing the highest
ecclesiastical officials, since the Church had always been interested in astronomy.
Possibly Galileo was even toying with the idea of trying to convince the Pope
that the Church should accept the Copemican system, on which it had, after all,
never officially pronounced. His visit to Rome in the spring of 1611 was a
triumphant success. The Jesuits were cordial; the head of their College,
Cardinal Bellarmine (1542-1621), after his mathematicians had assured him that
there was no doubt of the truth of Galileo’s observations, was friendly. At
the same time the anti-clerical Lyncean Academy admitted him as a member, and
christened his spyglass “ telescope ”; Galileo was immensely proud of his new
status, and called himself “ Lyncean Academician ” ever afterwards.
After all these
triumphs Galileo returned to Florence to find himself embroiled in controversy,
a controversy which threatened to become endless. He enjoyed polemic, he did
not suffer fools gladly, and as a professional scientist he needed to defend
his scientific reputation: but above all, this was a cosmological controversy.
Even before he had publicly taken up the cudgels for Copernicus he had begun
the necessarily concomitant attack on Aristotle; and now the two aspects of the
debate drew closer together. First came an anti-Aristotelian debate over
floating bodies, which began at the Grand Duke’s dinner table with a discussion
of why ice floats in a cooling drink ; after the publication of Galileo's
Discourse on Floating Bodies (1612) it continued with renewed acerbity because
of Galileo’s insistence on writing in Italian, so that he could appeal to the
educated rlassre over the heads of the traditional men of learning.
Next came (in 1613)
Galileo’s History and Demonstration Con-
cerning
Sunspots and their Phenomena, a tract in the form of letters provoked by a book
in which a German Jesuit, Christopher Scheiner (1573-1650), claimed to be the
discoverer of these phenomena. Galileo claimed priority, because he had
observed them three weeks before Scheiner (in fact large sunspots had been
observed for centuries with the naked eye, and a German astronomer, Johannes
Fabricius, was the first to publish an account of telescopic observations of
sunspots in 1611) ; but the question of priority soon gave way to the more
interesting one of interpretation. Scheiner found the best (and least
disturbing) conclusion to be that these were small bodies moving about the Sun,
which then might be said to have satellites like other planets. Galileo denied
this conclusion, with its anti-Copemican implications, and insisted
(correctly) that the spots were on the Sun, substantiating his claim by
computations based upon the laws of mathematical optics. He never guessed their
exact nature, but believed that they were indeed “ spots ” or imperfections,
whose existence falsified Aristotle’s theory of celestial perfection. He also
used the apparent motion of the spots as an argument in favour of the Sun’s
rotation upon its axis. Once again he possessed arguments which could be used
with effect against Aristotle —or rather against his followers; for he remarked
(as he was often to do later) that Aristode himself was too intelligent to have
been capable of accepting the ideas put forward in his name! Elated by the
cogency of his own arguments, Galileo chose this as the place in which to
announce his discoveries about Venus and Saturn, with die conclusion :
And perhaps this
planet also, no less than homed Venus, harmonizes to perfection with the great
Copemican system, to the universal revelation of which doctrine propitious
breezes are now seen to be directed towards us, leaving litde fear of clouds or
crosswinds.10 For Galileo was determined to continue discussing die
Copemican
system, and in his
own special way : arguing from observation, and appealing to the intelligence
and common sense of the educated Italian public. If, as well, he could
discredit all anti- Copemicans by ridicule and logical reasoning, that made his
task so much the easier.
For the moment this
seemed a perfectly safe course. The Jesuits at Rome continued to accept his new
discoveries, while rejecting his interpretation of them, even though his old
friend Clavius was now dead. There were certainly attacks, clerical and
academic, upon Galileo and his dangerous doctrines, but they did no more than
arouse interest. As the lay public became better informed, inevitably the
question of the relation of Copemicanism and the Bible, of science and
revelation, began to be debated. After one of his pupils had been involved in a
debate on the matter at Court, Galileo supplied a long and thorough analysis of
the problem, and a cogent defence of the independence of scientific
investigation, together with arguments on the compatibility of Copemicanism
and Scripture; after expansion and re-writing, it became the Letter to the
Grand Duchess Christina. Galileo wrote with conviction, though one of his chief
arguments was based upon the somewhat flippant epigram of Cardinal Baronius, “
the intention of the Holy Ghost is to teach us how to go to heaven, not how
heaven goes.”11 He argued that the Bible was not a scientific text,
so we need not take its casual remarks as scientific statements. Further, he remarked,
sensibly enough, that if a scientific theory is false, it may be refuted by
demonstration ; and if it can be refuted by demonstration, it cannot be
dangerous. (But Galileo failed to see that the inability of the scientist to
imagine a contrary hypothesis need not argue the truth of his initial
explanation.) Finally, Galileo used the old and perfectly orthodox argument,
that since nature and Scripture are two divine texts, they must give the
intelligent reader the same conclusions ; but where his opponents
relied in every case
upon the evidence of Scripture, Galileo preferred that of the senses.
Galileo’s friends and the Tuscan court were pleased with the essay. But it was
not a wise one to have written, even for private circulation; for here Galileo
was on theological ground, and his scientific reputation did not give him the
right to compete with established clerical authority.
Indeed, partly as a
result of the Letter (which circulated in manuscript), the attacks on Galileo
were growing sharper. A Dominican preacher, who had been expounding the book of
Joshua (with its anti-Copemican text), delivered an impassioned sermon in which
he attacked Galileo, Copernicus and all mathematicians as inimical to the
Christian faith, and subversive to the State. Very shortly after, a copy of
Galileo’s letter on science and religion was sent to the Holy Office. Galileo
countered by improving on his original version; seemingly he was unperturbed by
the fact that to anti-Copemicans he had become the leading Copemican spokesman,
and the most dangerous. Galileo’s Roman friends tried to urge him to a less
open belligerence; Prince Cesi, patron of the Lyncean Academy, wrote :
Those enemies of
knowledge who take it upon themselves to disturb you in your heroic and most
useful inventions and writings, are such perfidious and rabid beings as can
never rest, and the best way to demolish them altogether is to pay no heed to
them and to attend to your health, so that you may complete all your books and
give them to the world in spite of their efforts.12 Which was a
tactful way of reminding Galileo that he had not done much about that great
series of treatises which he had promised to give to the world. And, as Cesi
reminded him, Cardinal Bellarmine, receptive to new ideas though he was, had
always maintained that Copemicanism was contrary to Scripture, though an
interesting mathematical hypothesis. Too much boldness might make Bellarmine
and others think that tie open
discussion which the
Church had so far permitted might present a threat to the faith. Indeed,
Cardinal Barberini had told a friend of Galileo that it was as well not to try
to improve upon Copernicus : it was better to treat astronomy mathematically
than to try to convert theologians. And all the more so since what began as
sound scientific arguments often became distorted in the process of
popularisation. This was the first hint that Galileo was regarded as a
particular menace because he wrote in Italian, for the non-leamed, who did not
always know how far it was safe to carry scientific conclusions.
As if to confirm the
fact that Galileo’s work provided the best arguments on the Copemican side, a
fact that automatically made Galileo the most dangerous Copemican from a
clerical point of view, there was published in Naples an essay by a Carmelite
friar, Father Foscarini, in which the author used Galileo’s observations as
proof of the truth of the Copemican doctrine ; at the same time Foscarini
argued that Copemicanism was not contrary to Scripture. Foscarini asked
Bellarmine for his opinion; the Cardinal quickly replied that any discussion of
these matters was acceptable provided that the discussion was couched in
hypothetical or purely mathematical terms.* As Bellarmine put it: to say that
assuming the Earth moves and the Sun stands still saves all the appearances
better than epicycles and eccentrics is to speak well; this has no danger in
it, and suffices for mathematicians. But to seek to affirm that the Sun is
really fixed in the centre of the heavens and merely turns upon itself without
travelling from east to west, and that the Earth is situated in the third
sphere and revolves very swiftly around the Sun, is a very dangerous thing, not
only because
* As he, and everyone but such ardent
Copemicans as Galileo and Kepler who had detected that Osiander was the real
author of the Preface to De Revolutionibus, thought Copernicus himself had
done.
328
it irritates all the
theologians and scholastic philosophers, but because it injures our holy faith
and makes sacred Scripture false.
Admittedly, if the
Copemican hypothesis could be proved, then Scripture could and must be
re-interpreted. “ But,” he declared firmly,
I do not think there
is any such demonstration, since none has been shown to me. To demonstrate that
the appearances are saved by assuming the Sun at the centre and the Earth in
the heavens is not the same thing as demonstrating that in truth the Sun is in
the centre and the Earth is in the heavens.
I believe that the
first demonstration may exist, but I have very grave doubts about the second ;
and in case of doubt one may not abandon the Holy Scriptures as expounded by
the holy Fathers.13
It seemed to Galileo
that there was nothing new in this, and
he need fear nothing
; he was even mildly indignant that anyone
should think that he
had been meddling with theology. After
all, he had but
followed doctrines set forth in a book accepted by
the Church ; was it
fair that, doing so, he should ^e accused by
“ ignorant
philosophers ” and preachers of saying things contrary
to the faith ? All he
wished was to convince everyone that these
things were not
contrary to faith. Determined on this path,
which he could not
see to be a dangerous one, he went to Rome,
where he had a
pleasant few months debating and discussing with
gusto and success,
enjoying the way all contrary arguments
collapsed before the
cogency of his controversial skill.*
But in fact this was
not the way to please the authorities.
Pope Paul was no
friend to scientists or literary men, disliked
* At the same time, he wrote an essay on
his theory of the tides, arguing that they were caused not by the attraction of
the Moon, but by the double motion of the Earth; this he thought an irrefutable
confirmation of the Copemican system. It was read by only a few, until it
appeared in 1632 as part of the Dialogue.
ingenious subtleties,
and was inclined to think that Galileo’s opinions must be pernicious and
heretical, since they were scientific, literary and ingenious. Cardinals Bellarmine
and Barberini could not approve of the way in which Galileo had ignored their
friendly cautions. The more Galileo’s cleverness won him friends, the more it
also won him enemies. And many ecclesiastics were seriously concerned, as
Bellarmine had been for some time, over the consequences of what Galileo wrote,
since those who read him carried his arguments to extremes. The Holy Office
considered Foscarini’s book, and necessarily Galileo’s work as well. The
Congregation of the Index completed its deliberations in March, 1616 : the
opinion that the Sun is the centre of the world, and immovable, they declared “
foolish and absurd, philosophically false and formally heretical ” ; the
opinion that the Earth is not the centre, but moves, both by rotation and revolution,
they declared equally false in philosophy, and “ at least erroneous in faith”
Foscarini’s book was prohibited ; those of Copernicus and Didacus i Stunica
were placed on the Index until corrected (very minor corrections sufficed). As
for Galileo, Bellarmine was instructed to admonish him not to hold or defend
these (Copemican) opinions, which was duly done.1*
Though his enemies
claimed Galileo had been forced to recant, he felt he had not done badly. For
security, he asked Cardinal Bellarmine for a certificate that he was cleared,
and had suffered nothing ; and he wrote home :
As may be seen from
the very nature of the business, I am not in the least concerned, nor would I
have been involved had it not been for my enemies, as I have said before. What
I have done may always be seen from my writings (which I keep so that I may
always silence the malevolent), and I can show that my activity in this matter
has been such that not even a saint could have dealt more reverently or more
zeal-
ously with the holy Church than I. This is perhaps not equally true of my
enemies, who have not scrupled to scheme, slander, and make diabolical
suggestions.15 Bold words ; it was true that many within the Church
regretted the whole affair, but nevertheless it was serious. Galileo still felt
rebellious; his mood must have been similar to that which made him, many years
later, write in the margin of the Dialogue : In the matter of introducing
novelties. And who can doubt that it will lead to the worst disorders when minds
created free by God are compelled to submit slavishly to an outside will? When
we are told to deny our senses and subject them to the whim of others ? When
people devoid of any competence whatsoever are made judges over experts and are
granted authority to treat them as they please ? Those are the novelties which
are apt to bring about the ruin of commonwealths and the subversion of the
state.16 But for the moment—and the more so as his health was
persistently bad—there was nothing to do but wait.
Though he could not appear publicly as a Copemican, there was nothing to
prevent his appearing openly as an anti- Aristotelian, and controversy soon
flared up again with the appearance of a series of comets in 1618. Ironically,
for once Galileo did not have observation on his side (for he was ill in bed)
and, perhaps as a consequence, his views were scientifically unsound. The
affair was complex; early in 1619 there appeared an anonymous pamphlet, soon
known to be written by a Jesuit, Father Grassi (1583-1654), adopting Tycho’s
view that comets were heavenly bodies located beyond the Moon. Grassi supported
this concept with arguments about parallax and telescopic appearance. Galileo
had never been sympathetic to Tycho’s ideas, partly because they offered a
sound alternative to the Copemican doctrine, and he treated Grassi’s account as
if it were a direct attack on the Copemican system. Not that he
could say so openly; but he could discredit Grassi’s scientific argument
by an ingenious counter-theory of his own. This he did in a work ostensibly
written by one of his pupils, Mario Guiducci (1585-1646), but actually mainly
written by himself: a Discourse on Comets, read by Guiducci before the
Florentine Academy, and then published. Rather unfairly, the Discourse began by
attacking the Aristotelian theory of comets (unfairly, since Grassi had said
nothing of the nature of comets, and because, as Galileo well knew, he would be
obliged as a Jesuit to defend Aristotle even though he disagreed with some
Aristotelian views). Aristotle had held that comets shine because of friction
set up as they move through the air,* and an attack on this view could only
have been intended to provoke Grassi to a reply. Galileo’s own notions about
comets—that they were the result of an earthly exhalation rising towards the
Sun, shining by refracted light, illusions like haloes—permitted him to
discount Grassi’s optical and parallactic arguments, since these would not hold
if the comets were not solid bodies.
If Galileo had wished to provoke Grassi, he succeeded; the result was a
violent attack on Galileo, and a fervid defence of Aristotle, under the title
The Astronomical and Philosophical Balance, On which the Opinions of Galileo
Galilei Regarding Comets are Weighed, as Well as Those Presented in the
Florentine Academy by Mario Guiducci and Recently Published. Here Grassi tried
to show that comets were real and solid bodies, having a circular path about
the Sun (a theory more nearly correct than Galileo’s) ; he also tried to defend
the Aristotelian theory of heat in all its ramifications, some of them absurd.
Hence the detailed analysis of the nature of heat that characterised the best
part of The Assayer (II Saggiatore, 1623), and the merciless drubbing Galileo
* Carried away by the heat of
controversy, Galileo adopted an equally untenable view: that substances grow
hot with friction only when they are soft enough so that some material can be
rubbed off and “ consumed.”
332
gave his hapless adversary, in the course of which the weak side of his own
argument was obscured.* Indeed, Grassi’s rejoinder, A Reckoning of Weights for
the Balance was too dull and heavyhanded to count for much.
Besides the joy of battle, Galileo had other reasons for feeling that he
had won an important advance in the campaign for the right to discuss
scientific theories freely. Though it was published under the sponsorship of
the Lyncean Academy, Galileo was able to dedicate the Assayer to the new Pope,
Urban vm, that Cardinal Barberini who had always befriended him and who now
expressed himself as delighted at the wit with which Galileo overcame his
Jesuit opponent. The situation seemed promising to Galileo ; now that an
intellectual was Pope, one moreover who was a personal friend and no great
protector of narrow-minded orthodoxy, he thought the moment right to try the
effect of personal diplomacy. In the spring of 1624 Galileo went to Rome to try
to secure more freedom for discussion of the Copemican system. As he had done
thirteen years before, he carried a new scientific instrument—a compound
microscope —which he used to reveal new wonders in the living world, as the
telescope had revealed new wonders in the celestial world, j* This attracted
interest and proved him still to be a creative scientist, all to the good when
scientific prestige was needed to back up his arguments.
His optimism was, it seemed, fully justified. He saw the Pope
* Cf. ch. vii, pp. 2(51-3 above. Kepler,
sympathetic to Galileo’s position, was yet too loyal to Tycho not to defend his
master against Galileo’s attacks. This he did in an appendix to a defence of
Tycho he was then publishing, Tychonis Brahei Dani Hyperaspites (The
Shieldbearer of Tycho).
f Microscopes had been known for some time, though not, apparently, in
Rome, but their zoological use was new. Galileo gave an instrument to Cesi*; in
1625 the Lynceans christened it with its modem name, and one of them, Francesco
Stelluti, produced an account of the anatomy of the bee as revealed by the
microscope. (Cf. p. 242 above.)
several times, was received cordially, given a number of Agnus Dei
medals, and much good advice. Best of all, there was opportunity for long
discussions about the problem of the Coper- nican system. Galileo inquired
about the effect of further physical arguments in favour of the Copemican
system ; suppose, for example, he could show that if the Earth were assumed to
move, this would explain the tides without recourse to “ occult ” attractions
between the Moon and the sea. Would this be admitted as a strong, even
conclusive, proof of the Copemican system ? Presumably it was at this time that
the Pope pointed out to Galileo that he should never, especially in questions
bordering on theology, forget that the weak and fallible intellect of man could
not always understand the ways in which God chose to work. Even if to human
reason it seemed that there was only one way of constructing the universe,
nevertheless it did not follow that God had constructed the universe in this
fashion. God could not be constrained by the limits of human reason; because a
man thought he had irrefutable proof of the Earth’s motion, it did not follow
that God had chosen to make the Earth move. However well inclined the Pope
might be towards free scientific discussion, as Supreme Pontiff he was
responsible for the safety of men’s souls, and he judged that open support of
the Copemican system was dangerous because it might cast doubt upon the
infallibility of Holy Scripture. Especially was this true of discussions in
Italian which treated the matter in a popular and easy vein, for this was
readily open to misconstruction. It was all too easy to think that Galileo
said the Bible spoke untruth, when all he said was that it needed
re-interpretation; the ordinary lay reader, unfamiliar with theology or
mathftm^rirs, was apt to assume that if the astronomers differed from the
Bible, and claimed to be right, the Bible was no longer to be trusted. The
Copemican system was a useful mathematical device; it was best to leave it
there, and never to discuss it except as a scientific hypothesis. To Galileo, this was permission enough, and he returned
to Florence determined to take up the dHrncf of the Copemican system once more.
As long ago as 1610, Galileo had promised the world a great cosmological
treatise which he temporarily called The System of the World. His theory of the
tides was intended as the clinching argument in favour of the Earth’s motion,
which was to be supported by his own telescopic observations, and his own discoveries
about motion. Now he began to write seriously ; in Italian, of course, and in
dialogue form. In Galileo’s youth literary men had enjoyed writing literary and
philosophic dialogues in the manner of Plato ; and the dialogue form gave him
greater freedom to express what he believed to be true without announcing it as
his own conviction. For this could be no gay and slashing attack on the
anti-Copemicans ; he must prove the truth of the Copemican system beyond doubt,
for, as he had written long before,
The most expeditious and safe way for me to prove that the Copemican
position is not contrary to Scripture will be to demonstrate by a thousand
truths that it is true, and that the contrary cannot be sustained in any way.
Whence, sinn» two truths cannot be in contradiction, it necessarily follows
that this and Scripture are perfectly in accord.17 Although Galileo
could contemplate the possibility that science might compel theologians to
admit that the Bible was not literally true, at the same time he had to
remember the Pope’s argument, that no scientific proof had sufficient force to
permit men to say that God must have done things in this way and no other. No
easy task ; and after a year Galileo stopped writing, and turned instead to
magnetic experiments ; he had presumably arrived at the point where he wished
to make use of Gilbert’s discovery of the magnetic nature of the Earth, and
wanted to confirm Gilbert’s experiments. But once laid aside he did not
As usual, Galileo hoped to have his work published in Rome with the
assistance of the Lyncean Academy, and Cesi agreed to see it through the press.
But it needed a licence, of course, and permission from the Pope was a
desirable precaution. Once again, Galileo went to Rome, and had audience with
the Pope ; as before, the Pope was friendly, and assured him he was free to
discuss the Copemican system provided he avoided theological controversy, and
provided he did not claim to have proved the truth of what was only an
hypothesis. So the title must be one which gave a sure indication of the
contents; Dialogue on the Two Chief Systems of the World (Dialogo sopra i due
Massimi Sistemi del Mondo, Tolemaico e Copemicano) was chosen. And there must
be a preface in which the hypothetical character of the pro-Copemican arguments
must be clearly stated. On the strength of this, Galileo submitted the book to
the censors ; they were worried, but when the Pope had given permission, what
could they do ? Only ask for minor adjustments to preface and conclusion, which
they did; indeed the preface was only released after the rest of the book was
completed. All should have been plain sailing, but there were vexatious delays
: Cesi died; there was plague; it was difficult to oversee the work from afar
; when it was decided to print in Florence there were new censors to be
satisfied. At last the book appeared early in 1632.
The Dialogue was an important and sensational work. It was nearly ten
years since Galileo had published anything, and there had been a dearth of
Italian books on astronomy. Here was a lively discussion of the Copemican
system, convincingly pro- Copemican yet couched in such terms that one could read
it with a clear conscience. It was, as Galileo explained in the
To the talent for polemic which Galileo had displayed so many times he
here gave full play, softened only by the fiction that this was a polite
conversation between three gentlemen. Nevertheless, Galileo employed every
device he knew to the confusion of poor Simplicio who, like a disciple of
Socrates, is continually and ruthlessly led to expose his ignorance and lack of
comprehension of the Aristotelian tenets he thinks he knows so well. Logic,
telescopic discovery, the new Galilean dynamics, the theory of the tides, and
all contemporary anti-Aristotelian physics were pressed into service to support
the Copemican side. The
I know that if asked whether God in His infinite power and wisdom could
have conferred upon the watery element its observed reciprocating motion using
some other means than moving its containing vessels, both of you would reply
that He could have, and that He would have known how to do this in many ways
that are unthinkable to our minds. From this I forthwith conclude that, this
being so, it would be excessive boldness for anyone to limit and restrict the
Divine power and wisdom to some particular fancy of his own, was met by
Salviati’s polite but hardly fervent rejoinder,
An admirable and angelic doctrine, and well in accord with another one,
also Divine, which, while it grants to us the right to argue about the
constitution of the universe (perhaps in order that the working of the human
mind shall not be curtailed or made lazy) adds that we cannot discover the work
of His hands.
Particularly when Sagredo’s only comment was to say how much he looked
forward to Salviati’s promised exposition of “ our Academician’s [Galileo’s]
new science of natural and constrained local motions.” It is dutiful; it is
correct; it is what the Pope had told Galileo to say ; but it lacks conviction.
Warmth and zeal were expended on the Copemican side of the argument; obedience
alone marked the conclusion.
No wonder that the Pope was hurt and dismayed : he had allowed, even encouraged Galileo to write, under certain conditions ; and his benevolence had been abused. The Preface was dubiously sincere; the conclusion, the Pope’s own ingenious argument about the omnipotence of God, was put into the mouth of Simplicio, the simpleton, who throughout the rest of the book continually got the worst of the argument. The Pope could not but agree with those who suggested that Galileo was laughing at both argument and Pontiff. The whole book was a mistake, and should not have been licensed ; as no one wished to blame the censors, it must be that Galileo had somehow misled them. Had he perhaps altered the text? The preface, last of the book to be printed, was in a different type face from the rest; perhaps it had been added after the censors had seen the rest. The Jesuits were now thoroughly anti-Galilean, and the Pope in no mood to defend his former favourite. Sale of the Dialogue was suspended, and Galileo’s friends became seriously alarmed. The Florentine Ambassador obtained an interview with the Pope and reported to the alarmed Grand Duke that His Holiness broke out in great anger, and on the spur of the moment said to me that all the same Galileo had dared to enter where he ought not, and into the most grave and dangerous matters that could be raised at this time.The Pope was both angry and alarmed lest, in deserting mathematics for Scriptural and religious controversy, Galileo had strayed from the Faith. He asked the Holy Office to consider the affair, and summoned Galileo peremptorily to Rome. Galileo was shocked ; he was used to better treatment, and he thought he had the Pope’s support. Besides he was ill. Yet he could still hope that it would be possible “to justify myself fully and make plain my innocence and holy zeal towards the Church.”
For once, Galileo did not want to go to Rome and conduct the affair in
person ; no one wished to deal more closely than he need with the Inquisition,
and he was genuinely ill. The Pope thought he was unduly arrogant, hardly
credited his pleas of ill health, reasonable as they were in a man of nearly
seventy, and at last threatened that if Galileo did not come immediately, he
would be brought as a prisoner. Yet when he did arrive in Rome, it was two
months before he was finally examined by the Inquisitors. To his surprise, he
found that the chief offence attributed to Him was that he had disobeyed the
injunction of 1616 ; the Inquisitors seemed to claim that he had been told that
he must not defend, hold, teach or discuss the Copemican system, when his
recollection was that he had merely been told not to hold or defend it, which
would leave him free to discuss it, as in the Dialogue. How could he prove his recollection except by his sworn word and by
inference from the certificate that Bellannine had given him? For Bellarmine
was now dead. To make things worse his judges appeared to have evidence to the
contrary. Galileo never, of course, saw the evidence; it was in fact an
unsigned, unofficial minute found in the files for 1616. It purported to record
as happening what would have taken place had Galileo not immediately agreed to
accept Bellarmine’s warning. With this document in existence, however,
it was impossible not to feel that Galileo should never have written the
Dialogue, nor tried to get it published. Yet there may have been some doubt
about the document, which should have been in a more official form; certainly
Galileo came off well in his interrogations, and was kindly treated, though the
strain of imprisonment by the Holy Office while the interrogations were
conducted was great, despite the attention paid to his personal comfort.
Indeed, after two examinations, Galileo was released to the custody of the
Florentine Ambassador, and deliberations continued. There were a certain number
of private
interviews ; Galilpo must be made to realise that, in the eyes of the
Church, he had been guilty of contumacy, and could not expect leniency unless
he would submit to the will of the Church without further constraint, and show
his appreciation of the gentleness with which he had been treated.
Finally, four months after his arrival in Rome, the decision was reached:
late in June 1633, Galileo was once more summoned to the Holy Office to
receive the decree of the Inquisitors. He was censured for disobedience; the
Dialogue was prohibited ; he was to abjure his errors and confess his disobedience,
after which he was to be detained in the prisons of the Holy Office during the
Pope’s pleasure. (In fact, the sentence of imprisonment was immediately
commuted to house arrest in one of the Roman residences of the Medici.) But on
two points Galileo won : he begged that he should not be required to say that
he was not a good Catholic, nor that he had ever knowingly deceived anyone in
publishing his book. What, in fact, he abjured was having appeared
to bold opinions which the Church regarded as heretical; and what he promised
was never to hold them again in such a fashion that he could be again suspected
of possible heresy. There was nothing to which he could not swear with a clear
conscience, as a loyal Catholic ; but he felt the social disgrace of the
sentence and subsequent imprisonment keenly, perhaps more keenly than the
prohibition of the Dialogue, which he had expected.
Many legends have arisen about Galileo’s trial and sentence. In the
nineteenth century, when freedom of thought seemed secure and rationalism
triumphant, the whole affair seemed incomprehensible : either Galileo must
have been broken by torture, or else he must have recanted with tongue in
cheek. But Galileo was an Italian of 1633, not a nineteenth-century North
European Protestant. He thought the Holy Office, even the Pope, misguided, as
individuals; but as representatives of the
Ironically, the decree of the Church and the trial and conviction of
Galileo did more to promote Copemicanism than to discourage it. A Latin edition
of the Dialogue appeared in Strasbourg in 1635, together with Latin and Italian
editions of The Letter to the Grand Duchess. Italians might be forced to
silence, or to apply their Copemican theories only to Jupiter and its
satellites, but Catholic scientists in France and elsewhere cheerfully ignored
the decree. Descartes was unique among French scientists in never openly
supporting Copemicanism when he believed it to be the true system of the world.
Father Mersenne, a devout Churchman, translated much of Galileo’s work on
mechanics into French, and became a convert to Copemicanism. Gassendi
(1592-1655), also a cleric, not only continued to correspond with Galileo after
1633, but continued to defend die Copemican system. Indeed, there were many more
serious scientists who supported the Copemican position after 163 3 than before
1610. Galileo had provided telescopic information that showed how litde the
ancients had known about the universe and that fitted far better with the
Copemican than with the Ptolemaic system. And his trial and condemnation had
made the choice between the Copemican and Ptolemaic systems a matter of
conscience ; no one could be content to wait and see. For this was one of the
most serious scientific issues of the day ; and those who chose not to be
Copemicans had at least to be
Tychonians if they wished to be serious scientists. Galileo had won,
while seeming to lose ; for he had convinced men that the debate was not about
theology, but about the heavens. Acceptance or rejection of Copemicanism was
no longer a matter related to religious belief; it rested upon the evidence of
the stars, such as Galileo had provided.
EPILOGUE
Galileo’s trial marks the climax of the great debate on cosmology, and
the end of the long search for a new astronomy begun by Peurbach. Galileo
demonstrated the road which astronomy was now to follow, for it was only
through Galilean dynamics that the Newtonian synthesis came into being. The
dynamics Galileo had used as an incidental argument in the Dialogue was to be
elucidated at length in the Discourses on Two New Sciences which he indomitably
completed, in spite of confinement and blindness. That book was smuggled out of
Italy and printed in Holland in 1638, as if to show that nothing could stop the
new bent which Galileo had given to natural philosophy. Kepler, dying in 1630,
never saw the Dialogue, never knew of Galileo’s new dynamics, nor that Galileo
had ignored all his own elaborate calculations. Yet it was a combination of
Galilean dynamics with Keplerian mathematical astronomy that made possible the
ultimate triumph of the new astronomy.
Astronomy matured earlier than the natural sciences. Yet in a sense
Harvey’s work also marks a point of triumph, and of completion. The
fifteenth-century attempts to capture human anatomy and physiology through the
eyes of Galen had led first to independent study, then to new concepts and new
knowledge. Finally, these in turn had led to the overthrow of the central
pillar of Galenic physiology by means of the doctrine of the circulation of the
blood. Though this discovery was still rejected by many in 1630, few could
doubt that modem physicians knew more than the ancients, nor that experimental
methods were as
One of the most noticeable changes in the period between 1450 and 1630 is
the change in attitude towards die ancients. In 1450 men attempted no more than
comprehension of what the ancients had discovered, certain that this was the
most that could be known ; by 1630 things had so changed that the works of the
ancients were available in various vernacular translations, and even the barely
literate who read these versions were aware that the authority of the Greek and
Roman past was under attack. Ancient learning was increasingly old-fashioned;
what had been new in 1500 was outmoded by 1600, so relatively rapidly had ideas
changed. In 1536 Petrus Ramus as a wildly daring young man could, perhaps
prematurely, publicly defend the thesis that everything Aristotle had taught
was false ; forty years later Aristotle’s philosophy was still a university
subject, but bright undergraduates like Francis Bacon were already saying that
the study of Aristode was a great waste of time. By 1630 it was obvious that
the way was clear for a new physics, as it was for a new cosmology; only
Aristode’s zoological work still, precariously, survived.
In 1450 the scientist was either a classical scholar or dangerously close
to a magician. By 1630 he was either a new kind of learned man or a technical
craftsman. As ancient authority declined and self confidence in the ability of
the modems grew, the necessity for a classical education grew less, though
every scientist wassstill expected to read and write Latin competendy. The
sheer success of science and the steady advance of rationalism generally meant
the end of the magical tradition. Mathematician no longer meant astrologer; the
word chemistry replaced alchemy as a new science was bom ; the number mysticism
Kepler loved gave
Of very practical significance to the individual scientist was the
changed position of science in the learned world. Peurbach and Regiomontanus
had lectured on literature, not mathematics nor astronomy ; Vesalius was
appointed lecturer in surgery, not anatomy; in 1500 there were few university
posts in science, and no scientist could expect respect from the learned world unless
he were also a humanist. By 1600 things were very different. There were chairs
of mathematics at all major universities, and many minor ones (like Graz);
these supported cosmographers, astronomers and applied mathematicians in
considerable numbers. Their pay and prestige was at first lower than those of
the corresponding chairs in the older faculty of medicine, but even this began
to change after 1600, as the experience of Galileo was to show. Harvey found
the Lumleian chair profitable in terms of pay and opportunity for research, and
chairs of anatomy, botany and even chemistry became indispensable to good
medical faculties. New scientific chairs were founded: the Savilian chairs at
Oxford, die Lucasian chair at Cambridge were well-paid, well-regarded posts
which could draw men away from Gresham College in London. They were founded
often by wealthy amateurs, receptive to the progress of science, and aware of
its potentialities. As the content of science became more technical, there was
a greater demand for textbooks and manuals, first in Latin, later in the
vernaculars. In 1550 those who knew no Latin were expected to be interested in
litde beyond elementary mathematics, pure and applied. In the early years of
the seventeenth century Galileo showed that the most novel and complex ideas
could be presented in common language. Galileo’s example was followed more and more, except for very
technical works, though of course all important books in English, French or
Italian were regularly translated into Latin for the benefit of the learned
everywhere. The sheer volume of scientific books published reflects the growth
of science itself, and the growth in the size of the audience capable of
appreciating them. Increase in numbers of the men engaged in scientific work
was not yet great enough to warrant widespread formation of scientific
societies, but only a generation separates the Lyncean Academy from the formal
societies of enduring importance, the Royal Society in England and the Academie
des Sciences in France.
Science became more self-assured pardy as it became more useful, though
its utility was limited as yet, and its practical potentialities could not be
predicted with assurance. Anatomy helped the surgeon, though only up to a
point; he was incompetent to deal with internal disorders. Better
understanding of plant structure did nothing to advance medicine; new plants
from strange lands provided the physician with more drugs, but they were not
necessarily better for being exotic. The discovery of the circulation of the
blood paradoxically led to more bloodletting, not less. Chemistry added new
drugs to the pharmacopoeia ; whether this was pernicious or beneficial is as
debatable now as it was then. Purges and emetics were now both cheaper and more
violent than they had been a century earlier; die death rate remained
unvaryingly high, though wound-surgery was perhaps marginally more effective.
The chemist learned more from the craftsman as yet than he could hope to teach
in return. In contrast, astronomy and applied mathematics were immediately and
genuinely useful. Astronomy satisfied many needs : through astrology it offered
man certainty for the future, reassuring if not quietening his mind; through
calendrical computation it gave a more certain date for Easter, quietening
man’s soul; through navigation it protected men’s bodies on perilous
Interest in the useful application of science meant interest in tvyhniral
problems and encouragement of craftsman and engineer. The fifteenth century saw
the military engineer of the Middle Ages concern himself with a host of
civilian problems. This, together with the increase in demand for astronomical
and surveying instruments, encouraged the development of a new profession,
that of instrument-maker and mathematical practitioner. Quadrant, cross-staff,
back-staff, sector, logarithmic and navigational scales, magnetic compass,
theodolite, declinometer—a host of new instruments appeared, demanding some
mathematical knowledge and much mechanical skill for their construction.
Science enormously increased the stock-in-trade of the mathematical
practitioner. First came the navigational instruments and charts; then
astronomical instruments, such as those Tycho invented and taught others to
construct and use ; finally, in the early seventeenth century, various optical
devices. Galileo turned the spectacle maker into a telescope maker. As the
seventeenth century wore on, it was to become common for scientific inventions
to provide new wares for the craftsman as well as new tools of scientific
investigation for the scientist himself.
Though the sixteenth century saw increased interest in science, and its
spread among the relatively unlearned, it paradoxically did not see a parallel
influence on the learned world. Once science had been a part of every man’s learned education, as it was to be
again; science had formed a part of the university curriculum in the Middle
Ages, when every clerk had read Aristotle On the Heavens. Turning away from the
scholasticism of the universities with which Aristotelian science was indissolubly
associated, the new humanism preferred literature and philology to natural
philosophy. Mathematics fared best, regarded as the training for the mind
advocated by Plato, whose doctrines provided a convenient alternative to those
of Aristotle. But the very success of the new science left the non-scientific
philosopher far behind ; how could he accept a repudiation of ancient learning
coupled with a tendency, however faint as yet, to believe that modem man might
know more than the ancients knew, when he was still evaluating the various
doctrines of the ancients ? Particularly was this true as the astronomical
revolution gathered strength and upset the fundamental human belief in an
earth-centred cosmos made for man. Astronomy, once the most commonly understood
science, had burst all bounds to become both highly mathematical and highly
abstract; and as the astronomer’s universe became vast in extent and strange in
appearance the non-scientific intellectual often took refuge not in rebellion
(as the poets did) but in indifference. The philosopher did not feel the need
to apprehend the prodigious changes in the universe brought about by science;
like Montaigne he was content to assume that it was all a play with hypotheses,
which could matter little. Only a few saw it, as yet, otherwise ; both Bruno
and Bacon showed, in very different ways, what use philosophy could make of
speculations about the physical universe. Soon, no philosopher could afford to
ignore the new cosmos invented by scientists and strangely made real by their,
fascinatingly novel methods.