HISTORY of THE
FRENCH REVOLUTION.
1789—1795.
Vol. III.
HEINRICH VON SYBEL,
translated from the third edition
of the original german work,
WALTER 0. PERRY,
BOOK VII.
INTERRUPTION OF THE COALITION AVAR.
CHAPTER
I. the
first committee of public safety.
CHAPTER
II. war and diplomacy in april and may.
CHAPTER
III. fall
of the gIronde.
CHAPTER
IV. shelving of danton.
CHAPTER
V. polish troubles.
CHAPTER
VI. catastrophe of the coalition.
BOOK VIII.
REIGN OF TERROR IN PRANCE.
CHAPTER I. provisional
government.
CHAPTER
II. end of the campaign of 1793.
CHAPTER
III. oppression of the country.
CHAPTER
IV. party feuds among the jacobins.
resolves to annihilate both parties.—Fall of the Hebertists.—Dissolution
of the revolutionary army.— Fall of the Dantonists.—Position of affairs ............259
BOOK IX.
VICTORIES
OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC.
CHAPTER
I. french preparations for war.
CHAPTER
II. russian plans against turkey.
CHAPTER
III. revolt
of poland.
CHAPTER
IV. struggle for belgium.
CHAPTER
V. evacuation of belgium.
BOOK VII.
INTERRUPTION
OF THE COALITION WAR.
CHAPTER I.
THE FIRST COMMITTEE OF PUBLIC
SAFETY.
It is
very remarkable how exactly the two mighty forces which fill
so prominent
a place at the end of the 18th century —Russian imperialism and Freeh
democracy—ran parallel with one another. The death of the Emperor Leopold in
March 1792, was to both the signal for action. During the
summer, the one succeeded in conquering Poland, and the other in overthrowing
the throne of the Bourbons. The fruits which the autumn yielded were, for Paris
the repulse of the Prussian invasion, for St. Petersburg the first breach
between the German Powers, and the final resolution of
Prussia to join in the partition of Poland. The beginning of the year 1793, again, produced for Catharine the advantageous
treaty of St. Petersburg, and for the Jacobins the triumph over all
their domestic enemies, in the trial of Louis XVI. And lastly, while, in April, the Polish provinces were
occupied without resistance by their oppressors, the Parisian
party, though beaten in the field, forged
a weapon or future victories in the Committee of Public Safety. We pee how these two mighty streams, simultaneously swelling, beat against the
dams of Central Europe; and we soon convince
ourselves that this coincidence is not the work of chance. While in other countries, personal liberty manifested in
freedom of thought and security of property is the prevailing cry of the age, we have before us two Powers which unite all
the resources of their subjects—their thoughts and wishes—their intellect and
property—under an iron despotism, and lead them forth for the
subjugation of the world. Europe would, indeed, have had
strength enough to resist them both at once, if its leaders had appreciated the
danger, and been united among themselves. But as the very contrary of this was
the case it was natural that every mistake should redound to the equal advantage of both these formidable
adversaries. The realm of modern freedom lost ground every month; until at last
the billows of war, raised on the one side by Russian despotism, and on the
other by French democracy, beat wildly over the whole
of our quarter of the globe.
We have seen what prevented the Parisian Democrats from seizing the
reins of government in France immediately after the execution of the king. But
as they were in the possession of the actual power, as the majority in the Convention wavered between the two parties,
as the ministry was an impotent phantom without unity or fixed principle of
action—there existed nothing worthy of the name of government,
and France, benumbed by the indolence of the great mass of the people, was fated to become the victim of the first audacious ravisher. The
Gironde imagined that after the removal of Louis the time was come for the real
work of the Convention—the drawing up of a new constitution— from the
fulfilment of which they expected the restoration of their own power. As
they had a majority in the committee appointed for this very purpose,
Condorcet was able to bring forward a scheme as early as the 15th of February.
The propositions contained in it were conceived
entirely in the spirit of 1791, and were carried out to
their remotest logical consequences—freedom for every
State—freedom for every individual—freedom for every kind of
labour and property.
In accordance with these principles he proposed the nomination of all officials and representatives by universal
suffrage, in the smallest possible electoral districts—election of the cabinet
council by the whole nation—and a guarantee of all the original and fundamental
rights of man—in short, an ideal of a free constitution for ideal men. What it lacked was, a government strong enough to administer the
laws, to protect the fundamental rights, and to punish evil-doers. The mistake
of 1791 was repeated on a larger scale; and its repetition, at such a moment,
is fatal to the reputation ,of the Gironde for political
sagacity. The scheme met with the worst possible reception from public opinion.
The Bourgeoisie, who now looked on all politics
with disgust and horror, took scarcely any notice of it; while the Jacobins,
who thoroughly understood the real nature of democracy,
were furious at the treacherous scheme which hallowed the selfishness of the
owners of property, and proclaimed equality of rights for all men,
and consequently for aristocrats, capitalists, and all other enemies of
freedom. "This system of election," said Thuriot, "favours the
rich." "The constitution," cried Hassenfratz,
"ought to contain regulations by which the people may rid itself of
unfaithful representatives." "According to this plan" said
Couthon, "the position of the ministers would be so strong,
that the patriots would have a difficulty in ejecting them." They were
angry, therefore, that Condoreet did not subject the
richer classes, the ministers, and the representatives of the people, to the patriots—i. e. to the populace of the capital and
their leaders. We see from this that the Jacobins did not understand the word
democracy in its modern sense of equal rights for all men, but literally, as
the sole and absolute rule of the demos,— of the poor over the rich. The Convention did not venture to
come to an immediate decision, and its deliberations on the project dragged on
so heavily, that three months were spent over the preamble—the "Rights of
Man." The feebleness of the Gironde was displayed in
the most glaring light.
Very different was the activity and success of their opponents, the Democrats. The plan of subjecting all the property and civilisation of France to their will, which they had first
promulgated after the 10th of August, and again during the month of December, was now to be brought into full operation by the new
ascendancy which this party had acquired through the trial and execution of the
king. As the middle class in Paris kept entirely aloof from politics, the
sectional assemblies were only attended by a handful of
proletaries, who commenced their sittings late in the evening after work hours,
and faithfully represented that sovereignty of the people, whose
dicta—according to the doctrine of the Jacobins— were to be a binding law on
the Convention. Care was taken that there should
never be any want of orators or exciting themes of declamation: discussions
were carried on till late in the night, on the worthlessuess of the ministry
and the Gironde—on the intrigues of the Emigres,
and the traitors at home—and above all, on the
starvation of the poor, the hard-heartedness of the rich, and the means of
exterminating usurers and monopolists. As many
articles were made dear by the stagnation of trade and the mass of assignats,
there was reason enough for complaint; and the
exasperation was increased by the thought that goods existed in plenty, and
that they only had a higher price put on them by the merchants, or were
altogether withdrawn from the market, in consequence of the uncertain value of
the paper money. And thus a fresh outcry was raised against their grinding
selfishness and it was again demanded that the State should decree low and
fixed prices, and punish those who refused to sell their goods. The word was
passed from section to section; wherever any opposition showed itself
it was immediately suppressed by a number of resolute Federes;
and on the 12th of February the first of those storm-petitions—which
were so terribly to characterize the year 1793—was presented to the Convention.
Commissioners of the sections and the Federes,
warmly supported by Marat, demanded,
in the first place, a fixed price for corn; 1 but
they met with so unfavourable a reception from the majority, that the magnates
of the Mountain thought good to disown them, and pretended
to scent disguised aristocrats among them. The consequence was that for the
present the chiefs kept themselves cautiously in the background, but that the
movement assumed a form all the more unruly in the lower grades of the
faction. As in October 1789, the women once more took the
lead. While the washerwomen, infuriated by the dearness of soap, demanded the
punishment of death for all accapareurs
and accumulators of wares, the sister Jacobin
Club of the dames des Holies and huckstresses, called for the equalization of the value of
paper money and silver coin. To remove all doubt of the political connection of
these demonstrations, 28 sections came to a resolution, on the same day, to
demand from the Convention a vote of approval in favour of the September murderers. If patriotic murder was once formally legalised,
the sovereign people would certainly possess the simplest means of making the
property of the rich available for the public good.
The Municipality which formed, as in September, the centre of all these machinations, took care to procure, in addition to the
agitation of the masses, more solid and trustworthy weapons. Their armed
force—the old troops of the 10th of August and the 2d of September—the utape-durs"
"strike-hards," as the people of
theHalles called these allied banditti— was now completely organized. Their
commander at this time was the clerk Maillard, dispenser of the popular justice
in September, and formerly leader of the women in the march
of October the 6th 1789. Through him the Commune sent their
daily orders to the companies distributed through the metropolitan seetions; at
the head of whieh were their most trustworthy partisans, chiefly composed of
needy adventurers of all nations, equally
serviceable as sectional orators or
street assassins. By the side of this revolutionary army, the Hotel de Ville
possessed an equally revolutionary police in the sectional committees which had
been formed during the trial of the king. These consisted of about a dozen men
in each section, humble artisans of fiery patriotism, but without a particle of education or property, who in virtue of
their innate sovereignty, issued summonses, distraints,
and orders of arrest, at the beck of the Commune, and under the powerful
protection of Maillard. The Municipality had by these means established its authority in Paris on a firm
foundation, and its connection with the clubs enabled it to extend its
influence to the Departments also. Jacobin clubs existed .in almost all the
towns, and as in these too, as well as in Paris, the
Bourgeoisie had given way before thein in the sections, the Jacobins had the
complete control over the election of town-councillors. They were, moreover,
always ready to follow the instructions received from the capital, to collet money and armed men, and get up violent petitions. And since they
sent reports to Paris of their own local-troubles, and especially of the
resistance they experienced from the departmental authorities, which were under
the influence of the higher classes, we can
easily understand how the Parisian Democrats naturally conceived the idea of a
polity, in which France should be ruled by a number of despotic communal
councils, under the direction of the Municipality of Paris, for the advantage
of the proletaries. To abolish the departmental
councils, and to invest the communes with, all the
powers of government, were the first steps in this direction.
For the present, however, these armaments and recruiting cost very
considerable sums, which the Municipality, until, they had attained their
grand objects, could only procure
from the Convention. At. the beginning of February, therefore, they begged permission to raise 4,000,000 francs, by a
progressive tax upon the rich, for the purpose, as they alleged, of buying corn; and the restless proletaries were not a little pleased by
the prospect of both a progressive scale of taxation,
and a public distribution of bread. The Convention did not dare to refuse, and
not only decreed the tax, but themselves advanced one million of it on the spot. But
this was by no means sufficient. When the Convention, on the 24th, received the
demands of the women, and in consequence of their unruly conduct made the
Municipality answerable for the public peace, the latter asserted the absolute necessity of larger advances to be spent
in alms and the purchase of bread. The Convention referred the matter to a committee, and showed little inclination to. bestow new marks of favour of
that kind. Whereupon Marat had bills printed during the
night and distributed in .the early morning of the 25th, which pointed out to
the people that by plundering a few magazines, 'and hanging a few usurers, they
might easily minister to their own necessities. In conformity with this
summons, a thorough and complete clearance of shops of
every kind was begun about 8 o'clock by a mob of women and disguised men, who
began, indeed, by demanding low prices, but soon proceeded to plunder without
any payment at all. At first the cry was raised for the necessaries of life, —for coffee, rice, and sugar; but in a short time the crowd
seized on everything within their reach—wearing materials, grocery, valuables
and dainties. The rioters poured through the streets without resistance,
shouting and yelling, and hour after hour passed by, before the
authorities gave any sign even of their existence. Garat, the minister of the
interior, was the first to point out to the Convention the real object of the
movement, by saying that the great question of the necessaries of life had again to be considered; that the Commune
could easily restore order, but that for this purpose it
needed further advances. It was then about 2 o'clock, and it
was not until this time—six hours after the commencement of the pillage—that
the Municipality met, and for decency's sake issued an
order to the National Guard to interfere. Even then they sent, in the first
place, to the more democratic sections, where the call to
arms by roll of drum produced no effect at all.1
When, soon afterwards, several of the plundered citizens made their
complaint to the Hotel de Ville, a priest named Roux declared, amid the
applause of the galleries, that "the shopkeepers were only giving back to
the people what they had hitherto robbed them of; upon which the Municipality proceeded with the "order of the clay," and the
plundering bands with their work of rapine. At last, at 5 o'clock, the
Convention reluctantly came to the conclusion that there was no other means of
staying the tumult than yielding to the demands of the
Municipality, and buying off the maltreated citizens by an instalment of money
from the treasury. They therefore made a further advance
of 3,000,000, and subsequently 4,000,000 for the succeeding months. On receipt of this 'weighty intelligence, the scene in the Municipality was changed; orders were sent into all the
sections to sound the alarm, and in most of the streets the plundering ceased.
But the rioters were even now pursued with so little vigour, that
they were able to commit fresh acts of violence
during the whole of the night. In the morning it appeared that 1200 shops and
magazines had been gutted, belonging almost exclusively to constitutional members of the National Guard; while the property of the Jacobin tradesmen had been spared.2 The
Municipality had attained their object
without trouble and without danger; the impotence of all other authorities had
been more palpably displayed than ever, and after this complete victory, the Commune no longer scrupled to come forward
openly with its communistic programme. In the first place,
their procureur, Chaumette, appeared before the bar of the Convention, on the
3rd of March, to demand a prohibition of all money-dealing, and the adoption of
measures against corn usurers. Then the Federes,
on the 4th, worked in the same direction by a
demonstration in the form of a fulminating address, in which they demanded
before all things the heads of the Girondists, and moveover declared open war
against the possessors of property. "The moneyed aristocracy," they said, "are striving to raise themselves on the ruins of the
noblesse; almost all the richer merchants and capitalists are usurers; let us
do away with the constitution which is calculated to
favour the rich and to injure the people; we can then march against the crowned tyrants of Europe with overwhelming force.
It is evident that if, in accordance with these demands, the buyers up
of goods (accapareurs) were suppressed— i. e. the immediate sale of wares rendered compulsory;
and further, if, as the women proposed, the price of all
articles, and, as the Commune demanded, the value of paper money, were once for
all fixed by law—the Government would be enabled by an unlimited issue of assignats
to take possession of all the property in France, and bestow it at their pleasure upon their faithful
proletaries. It was the most comprehensive attack on the rights of
property, as far as our historical knowledge reaches, which was ever made in Western
Europe; an attack made in the heart of a great and civilized nation, and one which was not confined
to the brains of a few idle dreamers, but practically carried out in all its
terrible consequences. It was made with fiery fanaticism and unbridled passion,
and yet with systematic calculation. Its originators—victorious at home and abroad—were perfectly free in their deliberations,
and did not adopt their measures under the pressure of necessity or despair,
but from deliberate choice. For, at the end of February, when they proclaimed
this unexampled
tyranny to their fellow citizens,
Dumouriez had possession of the old imperial city, Aix-la-Chapelle, and
was destroying one Dutch fortress after another; the most brilliant prospects
of victory and booty were opened out in every direction, and nowhere was there
any danger whieh eould give rise to angry
excitement. On the contrary, the war had hitherto essentially improved the
material condition of the proletariate, and thereby removed
all possible excuse for such a system of robbery.1 These
are facts of universal significance, on which we ought to fix
our attention all the more earnestly, because they have been disregarded,
although they are fraught with the most important consequences.
Before the beginning of the war, indeed, the working classes had
suffered much more fro in the financial consequences of the Revolution than the possessors of property. The price of
all the necessaries of life had been enhanced by the assignats
and the stagnation of business; and in consequence
of the small demand for labour, wages, if not lower, remained nearly the same
as before. This was the case in the summer of 1792. But when the war assumed
larger and larger dimensions—when thousands upon thousands hastened to join the
army—when, in February 1793, orders were given to raise 300,000 men,—a sudden change took place. Labourers of every kind became scarce,
and the rate of wages necessarily rose to an unexampled height. The effect of
the war was further increased by the growing anarehy whieh opened to the idle
rabble the prospect of revolutionary booty, and spared them the
necessity of seeking work. Thus the
wages of unskilled workmen rose from 15 or 18 to 40 sous; and those of an
artisan from 26 or 30 to 70 or 80 sous, i. e. to double, or even triple, the
former rate. As to the cost of living, it is true that meat, fuel,
and candles were also dearer. Beef, for example, formerly 8, was now 20 sous,
and tallow, formerly 12, was now 30 sous a pound; but bread, the chief food of
French workmen, thanks to the colossal contributions of the treasury, was as usual 3 sous in Paris, and on an average 6 sous in the
Departments. Every where wages had risen in price much more than the necessaries of life, and consequently the condition of the French workman
was better than it had ever been.
The position of the capitalists, on the other hand,
had deteriorated exactly in the same proportion. The war with Germany in 1792, as has been observed, destroyed the prosperity of French
manufactures; and now the English war entirely ruined the trade with foreign countries. The evil was the more sensibly felt when the Democrats, on
the 1st of March, made use of their influence in the Convention to pass a
decree, which threatened all goods fabricated in an enemy's country—no matter
to whom they had subsequently belonged, —with confiscation. This
measure was a heavier blow to neutral trade than any previous legislative act,
and was the commencement of that long
series of prohibitions and reprisals, which culminated in the Continental system and the annihilation of
all neutrality, Jn the reign of Napoleon I. Other consequences of the war
pressed with equal weight on agriculture. While the roads were allowed to fall
into decay, from the absence of all regular administration, the army withdrew
an ever-increasing number of horses and oxen from the farms. The
rise in the rate of wages kept pace' with the increasing dearness of
agricultural implements; and in short, the cost of
production was enhanced in every respect, at the very same time that the
Parisian Democrats were clamouring more and more loudly for a
compulsory lowering of the price of corn.
This state of affairs teaches us several important lessons. It proves
that the offensive measures taken at this period by the French Democrats
against their fellow-citizens and the Powers of Europe, were adopted
from deliberate choice. Their enmity against property did not spring from unavoidable necessity, but partly from idleness and love of pleasure,
partly from the blind self-conceit of popular sovereignty,
which made its possessors think themselves too good to
earn their bread in the sweat of their brows. The scheme for the subjugation of
the possessors of property, which was completed during the victorious progress
of the French in Holland, was not adopted as a means of saving the country from foreign enemies. On the contrary, it was in the
interest of the Democrats to perpetuate the foreign war, which gave a larger
military force to the government, higher wages to the workmen, and afforded to
both the prospect of booty of incalculable value. No one dreamt
of the possible overthrow of the French armies on the frontiers, and when,
nevertheless, they were defeated, the same scenes were enacted as in September;
men thought far less of defending themselves from dangers
which they hardly recognized as serious, than of
turning the disasters to account as means of exciting the masses, and
annihilating the moderate party.
On the 5th of March the first intelligence of the Toss of
Aix-la-Chapelle reached Paris. Robespierre forthwith demanded in the Convention, that all the aristocratic officers should be
put to death, and in the Jacobin club, that all the venomous journalists should
be branded; and Desfieux added a motion for a new revolutionary tribunal to
exterminate all traitors. The Hotel de Ville eagerly adopted
all these propositions, and a tumultuous cry was raised in the sections against
the conspirators, reactionists and rich egoists. Marat meanwhile wrote about
the palpable treachery of the generals, whom, he said, Beurnonville foolishly and disgracefully
took under his protection. "No indeed," cried the
section du Louvre, "the Ministers are not to be trusted." "The poor
soldiers," said the section de VOratoire, "who are led out by their officers to be butchered!"
"The people," said Robespierre to the section Bonne
Nouvelle, "must arm themselves for the war, while we are crushing intrigues
at home." The waves of popular commotion again ran high, as they had done
after the 10th of August. All the factious of the democratic party were set in motion, and without any definite plan of operations
rushed forward in wild confusion, seeking to outstrip each
other in the headlong race; Robespierre aiming above all things at the legal
annihilation of his opponents, and the Municipality at
communistic booty for themselves and their mob. Maillard and his followers—
among whom Fournier, the leader of the last butchery at Versailles, and a
stately dissipated Pole, Lazowski, distinguished themselves—were active in
every quarter, and exhorted the
people not to hesitate or make many words, but to take the matter into their
own hands as on the 10th of August, and destroy the traitors in
flagrante delicto. Just at this moment Danton arrived from Belgium, and threw a new
proposition, fraught with vast results, into the boiling
caldron of popular passions. He was bound by all his reminiscences,
tastes and connections, to the popular factions, by whose deeds of violence he had risen
to power. But his short term of office had sufficed to awaken in him the statesman's sense of order and conservatism, and at the same
time to change his former opinion of his old friends of the Hotel de Ville into
one of unmixed and lasting contempt. He plainly saw that what France wanted,
both in her domestic and foreign
affairs, was a dictatorship. It seemed to him childish, in the face of
countless dangers, to be still talking of liberty instead of military rule; and
he thought nothing of any moment but the warding off of foreign invasion. He had never possessed either political or moral principles,
and in the present dead-lock of domestic affairs, especially, all systems
seemed to him equally good or equally bad,
and he was ready to join any party which could bring intellect, zeal, and
energy, to the all important task of the moment—the deliverance of
the country from its foreign enemies. On the very first day after his arrival,
therefore, he rushed to the rostra to advocate the necessity of a strong
national government, which should unite all the revolutionary parties, all the resources of the land, and all the powers of the state:—in
short the direct rule of the Legislative Assembly
itself, in the persons of the leaders of the Convention.
These words contain the fatal catastrophe of all the previous revolutionary efforts. The unbridled freedom of 1789 had brought itself and the
country to the edge of the precipice; to preserve her existence, France now
threw herself into the arms of unlimited despotism!
At the first moment Danton's proposition excited an almost speechless astonishment. The constitutional division of authority was still deeply rooted in the minds of many; and both the
Girondists, and the partisans of the Hotel de Ville, were particularly
unwilling to invest the Convention with absolute power—the former because they wished to reconstruct it by means of the primary
electors, and the latter because they intended to control it by the help of
their proletaries. But the force of circumstances
irresistibly urged them on. In the first place, Danton and Robespierre came to an understanding with one another. Even the latter was
disgusted with the greedy, disorderly, and utterly unmanageable proceedings of the Hotel de Ville; and he thought that if he could
but crush the Girondists, he could found his own supremacy
by the help of the Convention, better than by that of the Hotel de Ville. He
therefore demanded above all things a criminal tribunal, in order to secure for
every emergency a weapon against the Gironde. As soon, therefore, as he had received ready assurances of support from Danton,
he immediately came forward as his ally to advocate
the establishment of a Conventional Government. The Mountain and a large
section of
the Centre followed the two allied chiefs; the" impetuous fury of the Parisian populace carried others with it, and on the 9th of March they succeeded in laying the foundation of their grand scheme. The Convention
decreed that 82 deputies should be sent into the Departments for the avowed
purpose of accelerating the recruitment of troops in
every possible way; but in reality to stifle all opposition on the part of the
provinces to the new democratic dictatorship. This intention was shown from the
very first in the selection of commissioners. "No appellants must
be chosen," cried Collot d'Herbois; and so thoroughly was the Convention intimidated, that they
caused the president to proclaim en
bloc, without any opposition, the list drawn up by the Mountain, consisting
exclusively of the names of the most thorough-paced and unscrupulous patriots. The Commune, at the same time, came in for its share of good
things; the Convention laying down the principle
that a fresh war tax ought to be laid upon the rich for the promotion of
patriotic armaments.
On the following day—the 10th—according to Robespierre's
wish, the motion for a new revolutionary tribunal was brought forward. It had
been drawn up by Robert Lindet, a friend of. Robespierre, in the simplest form,
. and was to the effect that nine men should be appointed, and empowered,
without any assistance from a jury, or any fixed forms
of procedure, to condemn all seducers of the people to death. Such a tribunal
would hold the life, not only of every private person, but of every member of
the Convention, in its hands; and this was the main object which Robespierre had in view. So atrocious a measure, however, in
spite of all the threats of the Mountain, and the officious zeal of the Centre,
could not but call forth a storm of indignation; a furious debate was carried
on for hours, and an open breach in the Convention seemed
unavoidable. The subordinate agents of the Mountain deemed
that the time for the employment of brute violence was now come. On the evening before,
Fournier and Lazowski had proposed to the Jacobin and Cordeliers' clubs
respectively, and these, again, during the night,
to some of the sections, the immediate murder of the Girondists and the
ministers. Without any direct instructions from their chiefs, they
now united their bands at a patriotic carousal, and proceeded as soon as it grew dark with a noisy crowd to the Jacobin Club to induce them to
join en masse in the deed of violence. It is said, with great probability, though
absolute proofs are wanting, that the friends of Philip of Orleans were at work
on this occasion, in the hope of placing him at the head of
the Republic in the midst of the general confusion. It is certain that opposition to the bloody scheme was raised in the Jacobin Club, that a
long and furious tumult took place, and that at last Danton's friend, Dubois-Crance, induced the Club to refuse its participation. The bands then
withdrew, and were soon afterwards dispersed by a torrent of rain, still more
effectually than by a battalion of Brest Federes
which was railed out against them. When order had been gradually restored in the streets, the debate in the Convention was at last
brought to a conclusion. The erection of the tribunal was indeed decreed, but
the nature of the offences which were to be brought before it was more
accurately defined, and it was determined that juries should be appointed
to decide upon the facts of every case. What was still more important for the moment, the Convention reserved to itself the right of
impeachment in each particular case. Thus, while the sword was sharpened for
the neck of the refractory in the provinces,
Robespierre's immediate object—the establishment
of an independent power for the overthrow of the Gironde—was frustrated. As the
latter, therefore, still retained their former position and
influence in the Convention, Robespierre looked coldly on the
plan of a conventional government.
The result was that Danton strove all the more
zealously to form connections with the other parties—with the Hotel tie Ville, the Centre, and
the Right, in turn. It would answer no purpose to
enter into the particulars of these secret and hasty conferences; the important
point—the general relation of the parties and their chiefs—is sufficiently
known from other sources. All parties agreed that it was before all things
necessary, in the present critical state of affairs, to
appease the hot-headed rabble of the capital. In the absence
of ready money, bills were given them on the future; on the 18th, the
Convention, on the motion of Barere, laid down the principle of the proletary's
right to work—progressive
taxation on the rich—and the division of the communal
lands among the poor of Paris. No opposition was made, although the State, by
the first of these propositions, guaranteed the earnings of all labourers; by
the second, laid claim to all private property beyond a certain
sum; and by the third, arbitrarily disposed of many millions' worth of other
people's land. With the same facility the Convention passed another law of no
less importance, on the 21st; by which committees of twelve citizens were ordered to be elected by universal suffrage in every town or
city district, for the purpose of exercising a surveillance over strangers. At
present this was nothing more than the legal recognition of the hole-and-corner
clubs which existed in the sections of Paris, and which
henceforward, under the lofty title of revolutionary committees, subjected both
natives and foreigners, with the same shameless tyranny, to the control of
their police.
Meanwhile Danton's efforts had succeeded so far, that a personal conference of party chiefs was held about the middle of the month, at which he recommended a general reconciliation, and mutual forgiving and forgetting. But at the very
commencement of the meeting, the long-cherished hatred between the Gironde and Robespierre broke out with such violence, that the latter left the
room with contemptuous hauteur. Guadet more especially—who knew how to humble
and embitter, but not to subdue or gain over an opponent—treated Danton also
with pitiless severity, so that this first conference broke up
without any immediate result. The negotiation, however, was not entirely given
up. It appears that, besides these men of the rostra, Danton wished to gain
over Dumouriez, as a military support in case of need. At any rate this was the very time in which he once more hurried to Belgium, in order
to prevent an open breach between that general and the
Convention. Immediately after his return, he came to a preliminary
understanding with the Gironde, which immediately led, on the 25th of March, to the first decree of the Convention respecting, the
future form of the Government.
The majority still hesitated to .take direct possession of the reins of
government; and they contented themselves with decreeing the election of a
committee from the Convention itself, to keep
watch over ministers. This committee was to consist of 25 members, was itself
to transact no business, and all its meetings were to be open to the other
deputies. These provisions all tend to show the almost invincible distrust of the different parties towards one another, and were of a
nature to render all speedy, energetic, and orderly administration simply impossible. Still a shape had been found for the future
government, and the first step towards its realisation
taken. The election of the Twenty-five took place on the following day,
and indicated in the clearest manner the grouping of the different parties.
While Robespierre could hardly reckon with certainty on a single supporter, the
Gironde had nine adherents, and Danton could boast of four
avowed followers of his own, and nine almost equally trustworthy members of the Centre. In this position of affairs everything
depended on the question, whether the new alliance between Danton and the
Gironde had any vitality in it, and strength enough to
meet and subdue its foes. It was quickly put to the test!
The success of the Girondists was a signal to the more zealous
Jacobins, to Robespierre and the Parisian Democrats, for
an open declaration of war against the new committee.
All the fair promises of the 18th—the revolutionary committees,
and the revolutionary tribunal—appeared to them illusory, worthless, and even
dangerous, if their deadly enemies held possession of the
highest position in the government. They meditated an immediate resort to violence, before the new committee was
firmly fixed in office, and before the popular excitement had subsided. As
early as the evening of the 25th an orator in the Jacobin club proposed to disarm the Girondists and other opponents,
"with a reservation," he said, "of all further measures."
The Club eagerly signified their assent, and on the 26th one of the Parisian
sections demanded of the Convention, that the revolutionary committees should
be empowered to disarm all nobles, priests, and suspected persons. The
first intelligence of Dumouriez's threatened defection
arriving just at this crisis tended to inflame men's minds, and aided the
Mountain in carrying the decree. Thereupon Paris resounded with police alarms.
One section drove out all the quondam nobles from
their district on the 28th; on the following morning the gates were closed, the
houses searched,
and a number of persons arrested. At the same time a cry
was raised in the sections for the formation of a people's army, by which was meant the payment of Maillard's troops from the treasury,
and the arming, on an increased scale, of trustworthy
Sansculottes for the service of the Revolution at home. The agitation and
terror of the citizens was boundless, for it
was just in this way that the September massacres had been preluded. In the same way as on that occasion, the sections presented a petition to the Convention on the
28th, calling upon them to summon the people to the rescue of their country; in
the same way as in September, a so-called "central
committee of the public weal" assembled to discuss the particulars of the
plan for the intended outrage. This body consisted chiefly of the subordinate
tools of the democratic party—the leaders of the
"tape-durs," and other congenial murderers, most of them
in the pay of the Commune, and all devoted admirers of Marat and Robespierre.
There were also among them some Cordeliers of Danton's retinue, who still saw
in him the hero of the 2nd of September, who would not even hear of any dictator but him, and immediately got into a violent and
jealous dispute with their colleagues on this very point.
Up to this time Danton had secured his position on all sides. While he
secretly made the fairest promises to the Gironde, he charmed the galleries by thundering declamations in favour of liberty, and
extravagant, high-sounding proposals—e. g. to present every
Frenchman with a pike, and to
declare every reactionist an outlaw—proposals which from their very monstrosity could have no practical application. His position, however, became
every day more critical and disagreeable; he already saw himself suspected by
the armed mob whose idol he had been, whilst the last weapon—the Belgian
army—which he might have used against them, had been wrested
from him by the defection of Dumouriez. His convictions continued to be on the
side of the Gironde, but the real power was evidently in the hands of the
Parisian party. He remained, therefore, in a state of uncertainty and
irresolution, incapable of coming to any definite decision.
Meanwhile the fatal blow was dealt by the Girondists themselves.
We have seen with what hesitation and reserve the latter had made up
their minds to an alliance with their despised and dreaded opponent. No sooner
had the compact between them been made, than the
storm which raged every day more and more threateningly in the streets of Paris
broke out. Intelligence arrived respecting Dumouriez
which awakened afresh the reminiscences of Danton's doings in Belgium; and the
fatal idea entered the minds of the Girondists that Danton had meditated
treachery from the very first, and that he would use the new powers of the
Committee of Public Safety, in alliance with Dumouriez, to attack the
Convention itself. The impossibility of his entertaining such an intention
would have become apparent on the slightest consideration; but, irritated and
harassed as they were, they did not deliberate at all, but only rejoiced in
finding in Dumouriez's treachery a po- , pular weapon against the leader of the September massacre. On the same day on which the committee
of insurrection assembled in the episcopal palace, Lasource
stood up in the Convention to charge Danton, in a cutting and violent speech,
of complicity with Dumouriez's treasonable intrigues
against his country. As matters stood, this was a deadly attack, proceeding
from the very midst of the newly-formed alliance; and considering his former
relations with Dumouriez, and the hostility of the
Jacobins, Danton was in no small danger. Yet he
restrained his feelings for a considerable time, exhorted his
assailants to peace, and reminded them of their late reconciliation. But his
enemies, forgetting that Danton could still reckon on the Mountain as long as
he did not himself disown it, were not to be diverted from their
purpose, and only redoubled their attack. Then, at last, he returned to his
former courses, and in a long and passionate declamation threw down the
gauntlet, and challenged his enemies to the contest of life and death. The Left shouted in triumph as they listened to the thunders of their old
chief, and saw the Danton of September once more at their head. And when at the
conclusion of his speech, he cried out that he would take his stand in the
citadel of reason, and crush his enemies to powder with the
artillery of truth, the charges against him fell to the ground amidst thunders
of enthusiastic applause.
It was now all over with the Committee of twenty-five —with the hope of
raising the Gironde to power by the aid ' of Danton. The
Democrats, once more united, and therefore secure of the Convention,
immediately adjourned the armed revolt, and disowned the conspirators of the
episcopal palace. All the more comprehensive were
their measures in the Convention itself.
In the first place several decrees were passed
in accordance with Robespierre's views. The Revolutionary
tribunal was empowered to proceed against the representatives" of the
people, ministers, and generals, in virtue of an impeachment by the Convention;
but against all other persons at its own discretion.
The commissioners in the Departments received full powers to deprive every
reactionist of his office, and to incarcerate him without further examination.
Marat and Danton then agreed mutually to minister to each other's desires. The former proposed, according to Danton's wish, the
establishment of an absolute government; and the latter agreed to support the
communistic plans of the Hotel de Ville. The Girondists," with impotent
rage, saw themselves overwhelmed by the flood, and the Centre
couvpletely subjugated by the Mountain. On the representation of Marat, that it was absurd to talk of freedom and and
constitution, when the question was one of contest and power, the Committee of
twenty-five received orders, on the 3rd of April, to report on the
means of {establishing a more efficient government. On the following day the Girondist Isnard had to bring up the report in the name of the committee.
Buzot violently opposed it, but Barere, Thuriot, and Marat united in repelling his attack. On the 5th, therefore,
it was resolved to institute a Committee of vPublic
Safety, consisting of nine members, for one month, which should debate with
closed doors, stimulate and watch the ministers, and, when necessary, suspend
their orders. It was likewise empowered to make resolutions of immediate
efficacy. The nine members were chosen at once; they were Danton and his
intimate friends Lacroix and Guyton-Morveau, and six compliant members of
the-Centre; Barere, Cambon, Delmas, Breard, Treilhard and Debry. When the
latter declined to serve, his place was supplied
by a still stauncher partisan—Robert Lindet.
Here, we see, the Parisian party gave Danton free scope; its own
attention was directed to other quarters, and Danton, on the evening of the same day
(the 5th), gave them a solid guarantee of his intention to support them. The Convention, on his
motion, passed three decrees; 1st, that a people's guard, or, as Lacroix more
precisely expressed it, an army of Sansculottes, should be formed. 2ndly, that the priee of bread should be regulated by the rate
of wages; and 3dly, that the requisite expenses should be borne by the rich. It
is true that these decrees had no immediate practical effect;—for the guard
must first be formed, the proper price of bread ascertained, and
the rate of taxation on the wealthy determined:—but the deep significance of
the recognition of such principles as these
must have been clear to everyone. It was an additional satisfaction to Robespierre that a resolution was passed, on the 6th, for the apprehension of all Bourbons still
living in France, and especially of Philip Egalite, who since the 10th of March had
been an object of great suspicion. Marat, who was even now loth to part with
his old friend and benefactor, was richly compensated by the
appointment of Colonel Bouchotte to the ministry at war, who immediately renewed all the abuses of
Pache's ministry—the friendship with the Hotel de" Ville, the
persecution of the officers, and the incitement of the soldiers to mutiny. On the 8th it was decreed, with the same ends in view,
that in the military department only assignats
should be used, in order to spare the treasury the expense of the
premium on silver, which had amounted during the last quarter to not less than 61 million franes.1 But
that the soldiers might not starve, a prohibition of all trading in money was
added on the 11th: henceforward no one might
ask more assignats for his silver money than the nominal worth of each, on pain of six.
years' imprisonment in irons. This was the first
application of the system of forced currency to private traffic; it was quite
certain that what was acknowledged to be legal in respect to silver, would soon
become equally so in the case of corn, and finally of all property whatsoever.
CHAPTER II.
WAR AND DIPLOMACY IN APRIL AND MAY.
Austria's
position in respect to the affairs of Poland,—Russia
and prussia control the elections to the polish diet.—austrian note against
prussia—breach between the two powers.—pause in warlike
operations—danton's diplomacy.—negotiations with Sweden.—Treaty.—Custine's plan of leading the moselle army to belgium.-desportes
entrusted with a prusso-bavarian negotiation. — Scheme
for secularising the spiritual electorates.— Temporary truce at mayence.
The new French government was more especially intent on remodelling its
relations with foreign countries. The government itself was in fact the
offspring of this tendency, and felt its deep importance at every step it took.
With a thorough indifference, therefore, to home politics,
it applied itself with eager zeal to the questions of its foreign policy. No
doubt, had it been left to its own resources,— to its own wisdom and its own
passions—it would have perished before it had had time to
develop even the first part of its system. But it so happened, that at the
very time when the French were suffering the greatest disasters— at the time of
Custine's flight and Dumouriez's desertion —victorious Europe paused in its
career. The grand alliance was on the point of dissolution; it
allowed its enemies to escape from beneath the sword, and the parties who
formed it were animated by scarcely any other feeling than suppressed, arid therefore doubly bitter, hatred towards one another.
It was still the Polish question which prevented the
breach between the German powers from being healed. The occupation of Poland by Russian and Prussian troops had taken
place in defiance of the representations of Austria: all that remained
to do was to wrest from the remnant of the Polish state the. formal
recognition of the fait accompli] and it was at this point that the two partitioning Powers on the one
side, eagerly pushing on towards full fruition, and Austria, on the other,
restraining and delaying them, came into direct and violent collision. As
early as the 9th of April—two days after the publication of the Russian
manifesto—Sievers and Buchholtz handed in the declarations of their respective
courts to the assembled Confederation in Grodno. The servile members, who formed a decided majority of the Confederation, were prepared, and the
streets were occupied by patrols of Cossacks to prevent the assembly from
separating without having come to a formal resolution. After the retirement of
the ambassadors a very violent debate
arose. One member after another declared that he would never sanction the
dismemberment of his country, and never vote for the convocation of a diet
whose office was to be the cession of provinces. With loud cries they reminded
the Confederation of the oath which it had taken at its
establishment under Russian protection, to preserve the inviolability of the Polish territories; and after the first excitement had
subsided, it was resolved to send a message to Sievers, as protector of the
Confederation, begging him to wait for the arrival
of the king, and meanwhile to allow them to send a petition to St. Petersburg.
The brief answer was returned, that such steps would be unavailing, because the
understanding between the three courts was beyond all doubt; and that they must inevitably proceed to-issue writs for the
assembling of the diet.
Among these mere clients and hirelings of Catharine there had never, of
course, been any serious thought of resistance to her commands. They were,
indeed, surprised that Russia, which only a year before had
made the most brilliant promises to the Confederation, should
now, without any cause of dissatisfaction with the Poles, proceed to the
partition of
Cii.
II.]
POSITION
OP KING STANISLAUS.
29
their country. Felix PotoCki, especially, who had hoped by
the aid of Russia to make himself king of Poland, was thoroughly crushed and
desperate. The majority of his colleagues, however, thronged as usual round the
Russian ambassador with petitions for pensions, maintenance money, and appointments; and their only object in protracting the
proceedings, 'both now and afterwards, was to indulge their very genuine hatred
against Prussia, and to save their dignity, in some degree, in the eyes of
Europe. For this reason they kept recurring to their oaths, which
rendered it impossible to them to convoke a diet. Sievers, who heartily
despised them all, and would have preferred to dissolve the Confederation without further ceremony, at length adopted the expedient of
restoring in the first place the so-called
"Standing council"—which, as a portion of the former-constitution, had been abolished ii| 1790—and leaving all further
proceedings to this body, which had the legal right of summoning the diet. A meeting of this assembly was indispensably necessary, even independently of the partition, since now that
the constitution of May 1791 was abolished, some steps must necessarily be
taken with respect to the future form of government.
Meanwhile King Stanislaus, who, according to Sievers' orders, had started from Warsaw-for Grodno, was lying ill, as was
alleged, in the middle of his journey, at Bialystock. He was in the most
miserable position—without money, friends, or influence—suspected as an
opponent by all parties, and subjected by the Russian
ambassador to the most harassing surveillance. With bitter tears he several
times supplicated Sievers for permission to lay down his crown; but the latter,
always polite and friendly, gave a decided refusal, because be needed a royal
signature for the treaty of cession. Yet even this
feeble king still possessed weapons by which he could cause delay and vexation
to the conquerors at every step. He saw how grievously his oppressors were
alarmed by the increasing opposition of Austria, how greatly the in
30
WAR
AND DIPLOMACY IN APRIL AND MAY. [Book
VII.
fluence of the Emperor in Europe had been increased by his Belgian
victories; he saw the state of irritation into which the ambassadors had
fallen, and that Buchholtz, especially, seemed to have no
other thought than how he might bring the matter to some conclusion or other,
without much caring what. The king, therefore, took the
greatest delight in bringing everything to a standstill by his own inaction. He
secretly entered into correspondence with the refugees of 1791 (who had
found a hospitable reception in Vienna and Dresden), although they entertained
no other feeling towards him than utter contempt, and regarded the
Targow-icians with deadly hatred. He likewise came to an understanding with some of the latter, especially with
Vice-Marshal Walewski, and the Second-General
Rzewuski, who warmed up afresh the opposition to Sievers' late demands. While
they daily threw new, obstacles in the way of the appointment of the Standing
council, the Confederation, at their instigation,
resolved on sending a polite answer to Sievers, apparently complying with his
wishes. With regard to Prussia, however, they at first returned no answer at
all, and at last only sent an energetic protest to Sievers against the Prussian claims.
There was one consideration in the mind of Catharine, with which these
proceedings of the Poles completely harmonised. It was only with
reluctance that she had admitted the Prussians to a corner of the Polish soil;
and having done so she was all the more firmly determined
to allow Prussia no share in the government of Poland, but from her lofty and
dominant position to regulate the affairs of the Prussian conquest, as well as
that of Russia. The Polish proposition favourably coincided with these sentiments; but, as the Confederation might easily have
seen, the time was not come for Russia to throw off the mask. As long as
Sievers had not succeeded in bringing his own affairs to a complete settlement,
he advocated the cause of Prussia as his own. In his affable way, indeed, he allowed the
Poles to
■
Cn. II.] SIEVERS COERCES THE POLISH
NOBLES. 31
indulge their oratory for weeks, but he then brought them back to their
due submissiveness by a few brief commands which admitted of no resistance.
When, after his first directions, they still adhered to their protest, he ordered Walewski, Rzewuski, and their
adherents, to leave the Generality, and threatened, in case of their refusal,
to send them to Siberia for having insulted his august mistress. Being in doubt
as to how far he was in earnest, they still hesitated with their
recantation; whereupon Sievers wrote to the king, on the 14th of April, that no
one desired the welfare of Poland more than himself, but that a few insolent
and crazy men were crossing all his efforts; that, the day before, he had wished to free Grodno from the heavy expense of having soldiers
quartered upon it, but that in consequence of the protest he was not able to
carry out his purpose; that, the day before, he had given orders to General
Igel-strom to pay the provinces the cost of maintaining the Russian troops, but that he must revoke those orders until writs had been
issued for a diet; that, in case of continued obstinacy,
he should be compelled to stop the navigation on the rivers, to break up all
the Polish' regiments, and to postpone the settlement of
the king's debts. When even these threats were of no avail, Sievers subjected
the estates of Rzewuski and Walewski, on the one hand, and the possessions of the refugees, on the other, to military occupation; and
thus the originators and the destroyers of the
constitution of 1791 saw themselves persecuted with equal severity; and after
this blow they all yielded with officious celerity. A note to Prussia was
agreed upon, identical with the one addressed to Russia; the Standing council was formed of persons named by Sievers; 1 and
the writs for the elections to the Diet drawn up at once. With regard to the writs
1 In regard to these persons Igel-
kind of wood, but a Zaluski (Sievers
strom
wrote to Sievers on the 30th had nominated him on Igelstrom's
of
April: "I can understand that you recommendation) cannot pull together
are
obliged to cut arrows from every with a Wikoffski, a Walicki, a Rad
32
WAR
AND DIPLOMACY IN APRIL AND MAY'. [Book
VII.
the chancellor and Sievers agreed that the Standing
council might, for decency's sake, send them into the severed provinces also, but that the postmasters on the borders should destroy
them, and no further mention be made of them. Immediately afterwards Rzewuski
and Walewski came to the all-powerful ambassador to
assure him of their good intentions, and received back their
sequestrated estates. The elections began in all the palatinates without any
opposition, under the superintendence of the Russian garrisons, the officers of which only admitted electors and candidates after receiving
distinct promises from them; and in many cases they named the deputies without
further ceremony. General Igelstrom, who managed this affair, displayed, as
Buchholiz reported, a rare experience and an incredible activity; and
Sievers was able to announce to his sovereign that not a single voice would be
heard in the Diet adverse to the interests of Russia. They did not
disdain, by the way, to put whatever Polish troops or recruits they could lay hold of into Russian regiments; and the number of those who were thus
incorporated had risen at the end of April to 14,500.1 Matters
in Poland, therefore, stood as favourably for Russia as possible. But her
position was very greatly strengthened about the
same time by the development of Austria's policy. It soon appeared that the
attitude assumed by Catharine towards Austria in the second partition had been
based on* a sound calculation. The new minister, Thugut, was of opinion that
the aggrandisement of Prussia would be the greatest
misfortune to Austria, and that Leopold's most serious mistake had been the
neglect of the Russian alliance. He therefore instructed his ambassador in St.
Petersburg to declare that the Emperor earnestly desired to renew the former intimate
zinski,
and two others of still lower sters and General Mollendorf, as
origin,
gamesters, pettifoggers and well as from Sievers' correspondence
highwaymen."
in the "Denkwurdigkeiten
von Sievers",
1 All this is taken from Buehholtz's
by Blum, despatches to the king, the mini-
Cii. II.] AUSTRIAN NOTE AGAINST
PRUSSIA.
33
understanding of 1781 with Catharine; he adhered to his refusal to join
the Petersburg treaty of January 23d, but did not make any objection to the
acquisitions of Russia; contenting himself with earnestly
entreating Catharine to prevent, or at least to defer, the final settlement of
Prussia's claims.
At the same time he called on Russia to declare what compensation she intended to procure for Austria; pointing ont that obstacles had arisen to the Belgian-Bavarian Exchange, and hinting that
Austria might be compelled to claim a portion of Poland for herself.1 Meanwhile Thugut sent a note to
1 Berlin, refusing, in the most positive terms, to acknowledge the
treaty of St. Petersburg, protesting against the immoderate extent of the Prussian acquisition, and expressing the
greatest astonishment that Prussia should speak of an assent given by the
Emperor in December. He said that all that had taken place at that time was of
an entirely indefinite nature, and had led him to
expect further negotiations, indeed, but by no means an
immediate occupation. It immediately became apparent that an adherence to these
views must lead to an open breach between the German powers, which would give to the French Republic in the west, and the Russian Autocracy in
the east, an absolutely dominant position. Catharine saw the incalculable
advantages of such a state of affairs. To stand as umpire between Prussia and
Poland was as nothing when compared to this; for now an intestine feud
was driving the great Powers of Germany" into dependence upon her. She well knew how to
I take the appropriate steps on both sides.
For the present it was natural, under the circumstances, that she
should lean to the side of Prussia, as long as her own
relations with Poland were unsettled. But it was necessary at the same time,
with a view to the future, to keep up a certain • connexion with Austria, and
not absolutely to cut
1 Vkl. Correspondence between Thugut and
Cobenzl, Arub. in St.
Petersburg. (Archives of Vienna.)
III.
C
34
AVAR
AND DIPLOMACY IN APRIL AND MAY. [Book VII.
off all her hopes. She therefore told the imperial ambassador that the
matter was settled, and could no longer be altered without great mischief, although she allowed that Prussia had been
immoderately aggrandized. The Emperor Francis hereupon
wrote a letter to Catharine with his own hand, in a very elevated 1
strain, appealing to her generous heart, and drew from her a reply, which, though rather cool, was not altogether discouraging. She begged
him, in consideration of the dangers which threatened Europe, to postpone his
Polish claims at any rate till the restoration of peace, but, at the same time,
expressed the greatest inclination to second his efforts to gain
compensation in any other quarter. The ambassador Rasu-mowski pointed
particularly to Bavaria, against the immediate occupation of which," he
said, the empress had no objection to make. 2 This
hint, as we may easily imagine, was not lost upon Thugut, and
it thoroughly answered the purpose of Catharine, to make Prussia, and not
herself, appear to be the stumbling block in Austria's path.
As regards Prussia herself, the new complication of affairs had
completely bound her to Russia. Her new Polish acquisition, threatened alike by Poland and Austria, was absolutely dependent on the good will of Catharine. For the present
Buchholtz placed the greatest confidence in her intentions,
as Sivers continued to be all frankness and amiability, and discussed the most ticklish point, the claims of Austria,
in the most unreserved manner. "If I were not afraid," said he one
day to Buchholtz, "of being laughed at by Mollendorf as a non-military
man, I should almost advise him to be on his guard under present
circumstances, and to fortify Czenstochau, and gradually to make an arsenal of
it against the Cracow border." An hour after this conversation Buchholtz
received intelligence from Berlin that these precautionary
measures had just been ordered, and he reported
"Romantic"
says Buchholtz. 2 Sir Morton Eden to Lord Grenville,
June
19th.
Cii.
II] THUGUT'S EXCESSIVE CLEVERNESS.
35
to the general, with the liveliest satisfaction, this happy-coincidence
of views. Prussia, in short, with implicit trust in Catharine, apprehended
the most hostile measures from Austria, and prepared to oppose them by force of
arms.
Matters stood thus in May 1793 between the two mighty allies of the
revolutionary war. Prussia thought it necessary
to protect her new province against Austria by trenches
and redoubts; she certainly regarded every increase of power on the part of her
new opponent as a serious danger to herself, and, no doubt, thanked heaven that
the armies of i France would occupy her greedy neighbour for a long time to come. To fill up the measure of her anxiety and
anger^ Thugut, in addition to his Polish protests and claims, still adhered, to
his project against Alsace, and his plan of exchanging
Belgium for Bavaria.1 It
seemed as if Austria laid claim to Strasburg and Munich, Lublin
and Cracow, at the same time, and insisted, moreover, oh a diminution of the
Prussian provinces in Poland—a proceeding which would overthrow to the very
foundation all existing treaties, and presented Austria in the light of the nearest and most urgent, if not the most dangerous,
enemy of Prussia.
This posture of affairs was all the more melancholy, because Thugut had shown himself in these dangerous colours wantonly and
unnecessarily, from an excess of diplomatic cleverness.
In reality, he would have been contented with any one of these
acquisitions—either Bavaria or South Poland, —and he several times signified to
the English ambassador his readiness to give up the Bavarian exchange. But he
expressly demanded of the cabinet of St. James, that no
Prussian statesman should be informed of this renunciation; and Count Mercy, as
we know, had received express instructions to say that the emperor
would perhaps keep his intended conquests in Belgium in his own hands, or that
possibly he only desired to improve the object of exchange
Correspondence
of Lord Auckland III. 55.
C2
3G
WAR
AND DIPLOMACY IN APRIL AND MAY. [Book
VII.
for the advantage of the House of Wittelsbach. It is difficult to understand the purpose of this duplicity.
Thugut probably saw how embarassing Austria's
resistance in the matter of Poland, and her success in the Bavarian affair,
would be for Prussia; and intended, therefore, to harass the latter from these
two quarters, until the king, in order to secure
repose ou the one side, should give way to the emperor on the other. Of the
expediency of this plan there is not much to be said; it is, in fact, condemned
by the consideration that Thugut had, at this period, simply no means of
occupying Bavaria without Prussia's assistance, and
therefore, that after his rejection of the treaty of St. Petersburg, the
reference to Bavaria might indeed irritate and embitter, but could serve no
practical purpose whatever. And though he was thus forced to rest his hopes entirely on the friendship of England, yet he could not bring
himself to give up Bavaria according to England's wish; nay, he made
an energetic protest when, about this time, England brought forward a claim to
Dunkirk for herself, and to some districts in the
province of Liege for Holland. The wisdom of this policy, therefore, is not
more commendable than its morality; between the fires of the French Revolution
and the stream of Russian conquest, the leading statesman of the German Empire
had nothing to interpose but futile and spiteful
demonstrations of the pettiest kind.
These dissensions had a most fatal effect on the conduct of the war
with France. After Custine's retreat, -Mayence had been blockaded by the army
of the Duke of Brunswick —22,000 French had been compelled to retire into the
town —the remnant of the French Rhine army, scarcely 20,000 men, in a state of
utter demoralization, had been driven beyond the Lauter—and the army of the
Moselle, which was but little stronger, beyond the Saare. Brunswick was superior to them in every respect, whether
we look to the numbers or quality of the opposing armies,
or to the strength and security of their positions. If he left about 30,000 men
Cii. ir.]
PAUSE
IN WARLIKE OPERATIONS.
37
before Mayence, lie might advance with an overwhelming
force to the crest of the hills, separate the two hostile bodies, roll them up
and disperse them one afteranother; after which the East of France, as far as
the eye could reach, would have lain defenceless before him. 1 But under any circumstances a mode of warfare which, in the consciousness
of strength, seeks out danger at its source, was little in accordance with the
cautious and calculating disposition of the duke, and it was rendered
impossible by the political turn in affairs which we have described
above. Nothing was more certain than , that if the French armies had been
annihilated, General Wurmser would have been received with enthusiasm in Alsace as a liberator; and the province taken possession of for
Austria.without further difficulty; but then the
conquest of Bavaria would have approached its realization, and no one could
estimate the reaction upon Poland. It was not safe, therefore, to be completely
victorious, and the only task of the Prussians was to hold the balance between a hostile ally and a well-disposed enemy. The king,
whose devoted and shortsighted nature was in general ill adapted for such complicated relations, satisfied his own mind in this case by saying, that
he certainly did not wish to further the ends of Austria, but that as a
German prince he would protect the Empire. Instead, therefore, of the
annihilation of the French army, the recovery of Mayence was made the main
object of the campaign; just as had been agreed upon at Frankfort, in February, before the miserable defeats of Custine. Accordingly full half the army,—more than 40,000 men—were employed in the. blockade of the town, and the remainder were distributed
in a broad girdle from Kreuznach to Germersheim, for purposes of observation and protection.
The evil consequences of this course were imediately
1 In this conviction Valentini
on agreed. Marshal Soult entertained the German, and
Gouvion St. Cyr the same opinion. ' on
the French side, are entirely
38 •
WAR AND DIPLOMACY IN APRIL AND MAY. [Book VII.
However skilfully Brunswick might distribute his outposts on the rocky
heights of the Rheingrafenstein, in the defiles of Kaiserslautern, and the
fruitful valleys of the Palatinate, his line of defence was everywhere too weak to resist a serious attack. The distances between the
posts were measured with the most scrupulous accuracy,
so as to allow of mutual help; but unfortunately Wurmser, who with 15,000 men
formed the extreme wing on the Rhine and the Lauter, was
always moving away with a view to an adventurous attack on Alsace, so that it
was found necessary to appeal to the Prince of Coburg to call him to order. It
became known that the French were making use of the unexpected cessation of
arms to strengthen themselves.from the garrisons in
their rear, and the grand levies of March; so that by the end of April Custine
had once more 36,000, and the army of the Moselle 27,000 men. The Prussians,
therefore, made the most urgent appeals to Austria and the Empire for corresponding reinforcements; >but we
already know how little was to be expected from them, and how every thing
conspired to stifle the remaining sentiments of national feeling in the heart
of the kin£.
The prevalence of such feelings necessarily produced lassitude and- indifference in the whole
conduct of the war. Against Mayence the besiegers could for the present proceed only by way of blockade, because they were entirely destitute of
siege artillery. The singular spectacle was presented
at this time of an Austrian park of artillery
passing Mayence on its way to the Netherlands, while a Dutch battery was being laboriously dragged up the Rhine from Holland for the siege of Mayence. The duty of the troops meanwhile was extremely severe, as the numerous
garrisons continually assumed the offensive, attempted
many dangerous sallies, and disputed the villages in the immediate neighbourhood of the town with the greatest obstinacy. At the headquarters of the king in Guntersblum, on the other hand, there was little to be seen of war, in consequence of the
Ch.
II.] THE KING AMUSES HIMSELF AT
FRANKFORT. 39
cessation of all great operations. Now and then the different posts
were inspected, military conferences held, and a barren correspondence carried
on with Wurmser. Then again excursions were made to the
neighbouring court at Deux-Ponts, —where the elector palatine entertained his
august protector, with splendid festivities—or across the Rhine to Darmstadt,
where just at that time the betrothal of the Prussian
Crown-Prince and Prince Louis (of Prussia) with the amiable Princesses of Mecklenburg-Strelitz took place. In spite of all his
diplomatic annoyances, the love of pleasure was once more kindled in the sated
heart of the King by the vernal breezes, the blooming landscape of the
lovely Palatinate, and the daily excitement of the petty war. Again and again
did he repair with a small retinue to Frankfort, to which he was drawn by the
attractions of a fair enslaver, and where his passion was continually inflamed by stubborn obstacles. But political intrigue intruded even
upon these enjoyments, and spread its threads and snares in the quiet
rendezvous of Frankfort, as well as in the scenes of the masked balls at
Darmstadt, which so greatly occupied the public
attention. Since the appointment of Thugut, Manstein had met with a powerful
rival in Lucchesini, who, as we have seen, had maintained from the very first,
in opposition to Haugwitz, that the Vienna arrangement was futile and
pernicious. His prophecies were now confirmed; the king was
seized with an angry shudder wherever the Bavarian Belgian exchange was
mentioned, and Lucchesini's influence was raised by the remembrance of his
correct judgment. In addition to this advantage, he was, in general cultivation, tact in business, and savoir
vivre, as far superior to the sour-tempered and narrow-minded Manstein, as to
the wearisome and peddling formality of the Duke of Brunswick. On all occasions
decided even to dogmatism, he spared the king the hated necessity of reflection and resolve; and he practised, with all the delight of
a virtuoso, the base but influential art of spying out and profiting by the
weaknesses and secret
40
WAR
AND DIPLOMACY IN APRIL AND MAY. [Book
VII.
wishes of his master. Thus he had lent a helping hand both in
Darmstadt and Frankfort, and thereby put the cornerstone
to his influence with the king. Viewed from without, this personah predilection
of the king appeared a matter of hardly any importance, but it was really
destined to produce
a very considerable effect on the history of the world. At the moment which
decided the future of Germany, the ablest of all the opponents of Austria took
the lead in Prussia; while Thugut, the bitterest enemy of Prussia, bore the
sway in Austria. Both countries were ruled by men who
followed no other star than selfish advantage and temporary convenience, and had not the slightest idea of the national interests of the German empire.
To complete the picture of the Coalition war at this period, we need only add, that in the
Netherlands the Prince of Coburg—immediately after the fall of Dumouriez—invested the first of the French border fortresses, the inconsiderable Conde, employed part of his forces to cover himself against the neighbouring towns of Lille and Lequesnoi, and
with a feeble remnant of 11 batallions watched the wrecks of the French army.
Here, too, the war promised to become in the first place a struggle for the
fortresses; but the force of circumstances might on this occasion, also, as after the capture of Aix-la-Chapelle, have led to more extended operations, had not the weakness of the German forces rendered
such an extension simply impossible. Without reckoning the divisions which were
indispensable to the protection of Treves, Luxemburg and Namur, Coburg stood with his 45,000 men before Conde,
and Knobeldorf with 8000 Prussians not far from him in Tournay. The rest of the
forces—Dutch and English, Hanoverians and Hessians,— were not expected before
the end of April, or even the middle of May; and previous to
their arrival it would have been madness to advance, notwithstanding the
weakness of the enemy. The Committee of Public Safety, therefore, had in this
quarter, as well as on the Rhine, plenty of time
Cn.
II.]
ACTION
BEFORE CONDE.
41
to eolleet and strengthen their forces. It so happened that the
Committee had drawn together 21 batallions from different
departments for the war against La Vendee; and these were-now sent by foreed
marches against the northern frontier, whieh was ehiefly threatened. Whereupon
Carnot, at that time conventional commissioner at Lille, was able to report to
Paris,- by the middle of April, that there was no longer any question of
danger. In the begining of May General Dampierre-even proceeded to assume]the offensive, and on the 1st and 8th endeavoured to break the
blockade of Conde by impetuous charges on the covering eorps. But some
batallions of Austrian grenadiers under General Wenk-heim repulsed the fiery
assault of the enemy—in spite of their superior numbers—with iron
resolution; and Dampierre himself was mortally wounded in a last desperate
eharge. Yet the Austrians were not in a condition to follow up their vietory.
We' shall hereafter see what ehanees a vigorous leader with a powerful army would have had at this moment; but Coburg had to rest well satisfied
with merely maintaining the position which he had taken
up, on the edge of the great ring of fortresses. The Commjttee of Public Safety
had many a quiet week before them for diplomacy and warlike preparations.
Let us see how they employed them. Danton, immediately on his entrance
into the Committee, had assumed the management of foreign affairs, and was
supported by his friend Herault-Seehelles, and the ever-servieeable and willing
Barere. He found this department, like all the other branches of the public
service, in a state of utter disorder. ' After the trial of the king, Lebrun
had become as powerless as the rest of his colleagues. Having risen to power
with Dumouriez, he was deeply affected by his decline and fall;
continually exposed to the attaeks of the Jaeobins, he lost his strength and
eourage, neglected the business of his office, or earried it on without system;
and he who, three months before, wished to turn the world upside down, now longed for peace at any
42
WAR
AND DIPLOMACY IN APRIL AND MAY. [Book
VII.
price. In the Convention itself the Girondists, the originators of the
war, entirely shared the opinion of the minister, after they had learned that
in foreign as well as home affairs, their former
policy hacLonly furthered the cause of the Jacobins.
The latter thought that there was nothing higher or better than the decree of
the 15th of December; and Robespierre, who turned this feeling of
his party, like every other, to his own advantage,
coloured his sketch of the rights of man with some lrigh-sounding propositions,
in which he declared that it was the duty of all
peoples to make war upon all kings, as oppressors of humanity and rebels
against nature. Between
these differing views Danton took up as decided a position as on the occasion
of the appointment of the Committee itself. He would not hear of a humiliating
peace, such as the Girondists advocated; he knew full well that it would ruin
them all, and bring them to the gallows; and as he was well
informed of the unsoundness of the Coalition, he saw in the actual posture of
affairs far greater incentives to a bold advance than a timid retreat. At the
fire-breathing impetuosity of the Jacobins he shrugged his shoulders, and considered it ridiculous to reject a useful alliance
with a State, merely because the ruler of it wore a crown. There was at first,
indeed, much murmuring on the Mountain when, on the 14th of April, he laughed
at the idea of a universal war with all kings, and put the
question, who would be willing to waste the blood of Frenchmen to overthrow the
Emperor of China! But he succeeded at last, and obtained from the Convention a
distinct declaration, that as France would allow of no foreign interference in her .domestic politics, so she, on her part,
renounced all right to meddle with the constitutions of other countries. The
object of this open renunciation of the revolutionary policy was declared by
Barere on the 16th. "By this decree," he said,
"you have laid the foundation of peace:" and that the majority were
satisfied with this declaration was immediately proved by their granting a
secret fund of six millions for the nego-
Cii.
II.]
DANTON'S
FOREIGN POLICY.
43
tiations which had been commenced by the Committee of Public
Safety.
It is true that Danton had not destined this money to the immediate
promotion of peace, but at any rate to the formation
of alliances of a very anti-jacobinical character. Thoroughly
sick of domestic broils, he transferred the residue of his restless
energy to the field of European politics. In this sphere he intended to show,
before his end, what a man of his calibre could do. He would teach the Jacobins
that more was to be done for the Revolution by firmness and prudence than by frantic violence; and show the Gironde that peace was
only to be obtained by the energetic conduct of the war to a successful end.
Nevertheless he was much more moderate in his claims than Lebrun had been, in
the time of his arrogance; the state of affairs, too, was much more
favourable to Danton than it had been to Lebrun in November; and therefore the steps he took were highly fertile of
consequences, if not for the moment, at any rate in the future.
His measures received their first direction
from the great event which absorbed the whole attention of the east of
Europe—the colossal development of Russian power. Dumouriez
and Lebrun had, as we have seen, also turned their attention in this direction;
and the latter had on this account thought
of Sweden, Poland and Turkey, as useful allies against Russia. All his plans,
however, had ended in smoke, because just at that time Austria and Prussia were
united, and immediately afterwards the breach between England and France took place. In consequence of this unfavourable juncture, Lebrun was so much disheartened that he dropped
the embassy at Constantinople, did nothing at all for Poland, and . obstinately
turned his back on an opportunity for action which was
actually forced on him by the Swedes themselves. For, singularly
enough, it was from Stockholm, whence Gustavus III. had intended to start on
his crusade against the Revolution, that exactly one • year afterwards the
first offer of alliance was sent to the Republic.
U WAR AND DIPLOMACY IN APRIL AND MAY. [Book VII.
Duke Charles, the guardian of the young King Gustavus Adolphus, had at
first, in spite of Catharine's angry protests, retired into a strict neutrality
in the general war. Although this position might have suited his weak and vacillating disposition for a long time, various
circumstances combined to make him entirely change his system. For the last
hundred years it had been an article of faith with the rulers of Sweden that their State could not exist without foreign subsidies. Catharine had furnished these for several years, but had withdrawn
them upon the Swedish declaration of neutrality, and thereby placed the
minister Reuterholm—who cared for nothing bnt money and power—under the
necessity of procuring money, no matter from what quarter. A brief state of indecision as to the choice of sides
.was put an end to by the Baron von Stael, who pointed out to the 'duke the
utter annihilation with which Sweden was threatened by the power of Russia. In
January 1793 he succeeded in procuring a
commission to repair once more to Paris, and to offer the Republic, on
consideration of a large subsidy, the alliance of Sweden, under the pretext of-
the neutral trade being threatened by England. 1 As
long as he had to deal with Lebrun, who would listen to no extension of
the already vast theatre of war, he could effect but little: but on the
appointwent of the Committee of Public Safety the negotiation was taken up with
so much zeal, that on the 23d of May a treaty was signed, in which Sweden engaged to furnish 10 ships of the line and 8,000 men against all
enemies of France. Almost at the same time a manifesto appeared at Stockholm,
which once more laid down the principles of 1780 2
hostile to English commerce, and thereby removed all
doubt in Paris as
1 This negotiation was mentioned for
the first time, but in a very incomplete manner, in Barere's Me-moires. I have made use of a very detailed
account, which Stael gave of it to the later Committee of Pub-lie Safety, 15.
Germ. III. 2 Mo-niteur,
2nd June.
Cii. II.] ALLIANCE BETWEEN FRANCE AND SWEDEN. 45
to the ratification of the treaty by the king. The Committee gave their
assent to it on the 17th of May.
The advantage thus gained seemed by no means inconsiderable. It was of no little importance to revolutionary France
to have made her first treaty with one of the old States of Europe; and however
small the forces of Sweden were, they would have served as an. efficient basis
for an active interference in the affairs of Poland. And lastly, what a favourable turn might be thereby given to the almost forgotten mission to Constantinople! The Committee set to work with zeal.
Semonville was once more sought out, and money collected for his equipment; a
peaceable and almost humble step taken by Lebrun towards peace with
England was unreservedly confirmed, because it seemed to fit in with the
eastern plan. Immediately after the loss of Belgium, which country had been the
sole cause of the English war, the French minister had secretly asked in London, on what conditions England would make peace. 1
Danton's practical good sense outweighed all sentiments of military honour; for
peace with England was an indispensable pre-requisite for an oriental war. What
prospects would be opened if they succeeded in
appeasing England! if the torch of war blazed up in the rear of • the Coalition
on the Danube, the Vistula, the Duna and the Neva, at the same moment!
This was the first path which was opened to the policy of France by the
faults of the Coalition; but it was not the only one. An
altogether different scheme, in which not the banks of the Vistula, but of the
Rhine, played the principal part, was rendered feasible to the Committee by the
breach between Austria and Prussia; which, with all its details, was known to the French government from sources whith wich we shall
presently become acquainted. In this case, too, as in that of Sweden, the
Committee had not the merit of invention, but they, seized the
opportunity which was offered them
1 All this is taken from the protocols of the ministerial bouncil.
46
WAR
AND DIPLOMACY IN APRIL AND MAY. [Book VII.
by others, with energy and skill. The first iclea was given them by
Custine, who, like Dumouriez, in the midst of his military operations was never able to keep his thoughts from the charms of politics, and
alternately overwhelmed his government with constitutional, warlike, and
diplomatic schemes. His earlier hopes of crushing the German empire at the
first onset had, indeed, vanished away, and given
place to an infinite amouut of caution in all his military operations. With
violent expressions of anger he threw all the blame of his disasters on his
government, complaining that Pache had left him, as well as the Belgian army,
without reinforcements, and that Beurnonville had crossed
his plans out of personal hatred; in short he was filled to overflowing with
patriotic wrath against the disorders of Paris. In this mood he heard of the
appointment of the Committee of Public Safety, and the election of his intimate friend Guyton-Morveau as one of its members; and he
immediately conceived the idea of getting the reins of
government into his own hands through their means, and saving France both at
home and abroad. On the 9th of April he sent a memorial to the Convention, in which he characterised that assembly as an arena of
party feuds, howling fury, and utter selfishness
; advocated the appointment of some man of great mind and virtuous soul as
dictator; announced a grand plan of deliverance for the country, and demanded either full powers for its execution or his own
dismissal from office. No one in the Convention took any notice of his
bombastic letter,but the Democrats in the War ministry
observed that it was exactly in the style of Lafayette and Dumouriez, and secretly resolved on the speedy overthrow of the new
dictator. Meanwhile Guyton-Morveau received the promised plan of war, and
thought it sufficiently important to be immediately
laid before the council of ministers and the Committee of Public Safety, for their serious consideration. It is indeed remarkable
enough in itself, from the breadth of its views; but more especially because a
year later it was taken up again by Carnot, and then became
Cii. II.]
CUSTINE'S
COMPREHENSIVE PLANS.
47
the bridge to all the triumphs of the
Republic. Custine proposed to treat the whole region from Strasburg to Dunkirk as one vast theatre of war, and to bring all its operations into
close connection with one another. After taking into consideration the impending advance of the Austrians on the Scheldt, and the sluggish movements
of the Prussians on the Rhine, he proposed to break up the Army of the Rhine,
to employ 19,000 of its soldiers in occupying the passes of the Vosges
Mountains, to unite the rest with the army of the Moselle, to lead the
united forces—which would then amount to G0,000 or 70,000 men —in quick marches
to the Ardennes, throw them upon Na-mur, aud thereby place the Allies between
two armies superior .to their own, and uproot for ever
the Austrian rule from the soil of Belgium.
It is easy to see that such a movement would have completely decided the fate of Belgium. It is also clear that Custine
reckoned on Prussian inactivity on the Rhine, since, without this, the conquest
of Belgium would have been more than outweighed by the
exposure of the eastern frontier of France. Meanwhile the ministerial council
took Custine's projects into consideration, aud Lebrun commissioned "the
general in the first place to sound Prussia, to see whether the king, in return for the surrender of Mayenee, would agree to allow the
garrison to retire, and to conclude a formal armistice. Having once entered
upon this course they soon proceeded to more comprehensive plans. Desportes,
the French charge
d'affaires in Stuttgart, had been obliged, in consequence
of the declaration of war by the Empire— which had at last been issued—to leave
that court, where the state of feeling was very hostile to Austria, and where
he had the' best opportunity of studying the affairs of Germany. This man was now selected by the
Committee to try his hand in the first place upon Bavaria, and through her upon
Prussia. When Custine still held possession of Deux-Ponts in February, the
duke's minister, Baron von
48
WAR
AND DIPLOMACY IN APRIL AND MAY. [Book VII.
Esebeck, had been arrested by the general's orders on the charge of
intriguing against France. Desportes was directed to go in the first, place to
him, and he found the poor baron, who had been greatly terrified by his
imprisonment, ready to perform any good service
for his liberator, They quickly agreed, first of all to obtain the cooperation
of the Prince of Bretzenheim, the eldest of Charles Theodore's natural sons, in
rousing the Duke out of his usual apathy, and thus to induce the court of Munich to take decided steps in favour of France. If
this plan succeeded and bore its natural fruits, Prussia would at any rate make
no very great resistance. The great point was to turn the prevailing displeasure against Austria to the be§t possible account, and instead of
high-flying revolutionary ideas, by which Lebrun had scared away the king in
November, to offer him intelligible, practical, advantages, in
accordance with current Prussian views. The necessary materials lay ready enough at hand,, and the rulers at Paris determined to make use of them.
In the beginning of May a detailed and well-considered plan was brought
forward for approval in Paris through Desportes. Desportes proposed, in the
first place, nothing, less than the secularization of the three
ecclesiastical States of Mayence, Treves and Cologne; an idea which had
occurred at an earlier period to Lebrun and the Girondists, but which had
fallen to the ground from its connection with their universal propaganda.
Desportes now substituted for their vague scheme a
plan based on the policy of self-interest. While he stipulated for the
republican independence of the town of Mayence, in accordance with the promise
of France, he proposed to give the other electorates to the most powerful of the German states, and in return to gain their alliance for
the Convention. The electorate of Mayence, and a portion of the territory of
Treves, were to fall to Bavaria, which woidd in this way round off its possessions in the Rhenish Palatinate in the most desirable way,
Cii. IT.] SECULARISATION OF ECCLESIASTICAL STATES. 49
and in return would gladly place the remote districts of Jiilich and
Berg at the disposal of the French. The French government was then to offer
these two duchies, with the rest of Treves and the whole of
Electoral Cologne, to the crown of Prussia, which had long desired to / gain
possession of them. Desportes had no doubt that the neutrality of Prussia, at
the very least, might be. thus secured; and it then seemed certain that France, might, without any danger, unite all her forces to
overpower the Austrians in Belgium.
The characteristic feature of this scheme, we may observe, is not the
old enmity of the Revolution to the ecclesiastical States, but the proposal to
secularize them in the interest of Germany herself. It was the first
appearance of those plans which ten years afterwards gave the German Empire
nearly its present constitution. 1 But
there was this infinitely important difference, in favour of Germany, in the plan of 1793, that the vast territories of the left bank of the Rhine
were not to be given to foreigners', but to German princes. In this respect it
resembled the project of Charles VII., •who, fifty years earlier, had proposed
the secularization, in the first place like Desportes, for the
advantage of Prussia and Bavaria, without distinction of religion — the former
country being protestant and the latter catholic. In this connection we clearly see that the proposition had, in the fullest sense
of the word, an historical foundation in Germany;
and in fact in the empire itself—if we except the interested parties, and the
Austrian politicians—the conviction had long existed, that the union of the
princely and episcopal offices, was an evil both to Church and State. In the 18th century men did not much concern themselves
whether the ecclesiastical princes were good bishops or
not, but they saw only too clearly, that the bishops were with few exceptions
the most wretched administrators of a State. Almost all
their territories were burdened with debt, and their towns im-
Ii r.
1 This was written before 1866.
d
50 WAR AND DIPLOMACY IN APRIL AND MAY. [Book VII.
poverished; in agriculture and trade, in civilization and education, they were far behind their secular neighbours. And
in how glaring and sad a manner had the military impotence of these little
potentates and the consequent weakness of the western frontiers of the empire,
which were entirely occupied by them, been displayed since the beginning of the war! While Mayence and Treves alike set the example of
imbecility and cowardice at the first appearance of Custine,
the neighbouring states of the Upper Rhine and Fran-conia hastened to declare
to the empire that they would have nothing to do
with a war of the empire, and that with respect to the countries already
attacked they should follow the principle that self-preservation is the highest
duty. In like manner the Bishop of Paderborn declared that he did not indeed
intend to furnish troops, or any considerable subsidies,
but that in case of extreme need he would manifest
his patriotic feelings by a small contribution of money. Similar cases occurred
in the cities of the empire and among the smaller dynasts; and their conduct
was an evidence- of that universal rottenness of the
feudal system, which, since the reconstitution of the greater territories, had
had its most characteristic representatives in the cities, and in the knights
and prelates, of the empire. But, without question, the most peculiar growth of the soil of feudalism, and the most glaring
contrasts to the secular States, were to be found in the ecclesiastical
dominions. Every man among the people knew that these two elements of the
empire were entirely incompatible in their nature—that
the one belonged to the past, and the other to the future of Germany; that the
one formed the weak places, and the other the powerful organs of the nation.
Under such circumstances it might be regarded as a most unexampled piece
of good fortune that the old foe of the empire, which had
always cherished all its weaknesses, should now give the first impulse to improvement. We need only call to mind the innumerable wounds which
France was able for centuries to inflict on
Ch. II.] THE COMMITTEE FAVOUR
DESPORTES' SYSTEM. 51
the crumbling defences of Germany, and then consider a proposition of
the French government to give Prussia her present Rhine province, and thereby
make the west of Germany invulnerable to France
herself. Let us reflect, likewise, that this idea arose at the very
same time that Prussia saw in the German Empire nothing but weakness and
aversion to the war; detected in Russia the first traces of double-dealing; and
thought herself obliged to fortify her own possessions
against the aroused hatred of Austria. It will then
become clear to us, that the whole character of the war must necessarily
undergo the most complete change, as soon as the Committee of Public Safety
openly adopted the system of Desportes.
These points, as we may easily imagine, were regarded in
Paris from very various points of view. Herault de Sechelles received repeated
representations from Desportes, in which he described Bavaria (in highly
exaggerated colours, as we shall afterwards see), as entirely trustworthy, and prophesied the certain overthrow of the Prussian throne
consequent on its very friendship with the French Republic; so that peace would
bring about the real commencement of the Revolutionary
propaganda. But other persons in the immediate vicinity
of Danton held very different language. Thomas Payne, for example, who
had formerly come over from America to revolutionize Europe, wrote to Danton on
the 3d of May, that all hope of the world's freedom had been destroyed for ever
by the disorders of the French democrats; that France must
seek peace to save herself from the greatest hprrors. In Danton's mood at that
time both these views had points of attraction for him. At all events he
inclined more and more decidedly to Custine's opinions, with which the proposed peace with Prussia was intimately connected; and on the 12th
of May the first step in this direction was taken, when Custine, in consequence
of a most emphatic pecommendation of the Committee, received the command of
D 2
52
WAR AND DIPLOMACY IN APRIL AND MAY.
[Book VII.
the army of the North, after the ministerial council had definitively
accepted his great plan for the conduct of the war.
The hostile armies before Mayence stood at that time in a very peculiar
position to one another. The Prussian headquarters had received preliminary intelligence of the wishes of the
French rulers through an agent of Custine named Corbeau, who since October had
been accredited to the Bavarian authorities in Mannheim. The
general himself had commenced a correspondence with Brunswick in
the beginning of May, in which he professed
himself an avowed enemy of the Jacobins, and called on the Duke to become peacemaker to an exhausted world. The military operations became doubly sluggish under these circumstances.
Before the fortress the Prussians contented themselves with forming: batteries,
and engaging in petty skirmishes in the neighbouring
villages. Custine, on his side, did not attempt anything against the blockading
army until the 17th of May, when he made a feeble attack, to which he
was driven almost by force by the deputies of the Convention, three radical
Ma-ratists; and even then, after a little firing, he retreated with 25,000 men
before three battalions of Austrians. During: this cannonade on the Queich, Prince Louis Ferdinand entertained the Mayence generals at a
military breakfast between the hostile lines, at which he held a long political
conversation with the deputy Merlin de Thionville, an intimate friend of
Danton, about the evacuation of the town. Officers and soldiers
drank together in the most cordial manner, and a feeling prevailed that their
present enmity was on the point of being extinguished. 1
The sentiments of King Frederick Willam II., indeed, had not yet
reached this point. He hated the Jacobins as cor-
1 The letters of Desportes
and Paris; the correspondence of Custine,
Payne
here mentioned are among partly in the Depot de la guerre,
the
papers of the Committee of Public arme'e
du lihin 1793,
partly among
Safety
in the imperial archives at the documents of
Custine's trial.
Cu.
II.] SENTIMENTS OF FREDERICK
WILLIAM IV.
53
dially as in the former year; and we have seen with how little
reluctance he had promised to continue the war until the Revolution should be
put down. Nevertheless, as a matter of fact, his
own policy in respect to German affairs was directed to the very same object as
that of Danton and Desportes. As early as December, when perplexed by the
difficulties of the Bavarian-Belgian exchange, he had put the question at St. Petersburg, whether Austria, in case she could not
find any other compensation, might not undertake
a grand secularization' in Germany. This proposal was sent on in the course of
the negotiations to Vienna, where, however, it certainly raised this consideration before all others, whether such a step on the
part of Austria might not prove a dangerous example to the avarice of Prussia. 1 It is
clear enough, what weight an open and official proposal
of peace from the French government, in accordance with the views of
Desportes, might have had, under the circumstances we have just described.
But this prospect was quickly closed. The Parisian Revolution at this moment roused itself for a last and most tremendous
effort, by which the freedom of France and the peace of Europe
were removed, for a whole generation, to an unattainable distance.
1 Ssolowjoff, "Z)er Fall Polens," 310, 313, from the documents in the
Russian
archives.
54 [Book VII.
CHAPTER III. FALL OF THE GIRONDE.
The
frencii democrats hostile to peace.—Raising of 300,000
recruits. Revolt
of la vendee—the conventional commissioners in the departments.—Fresh demands of money BY the parisian municipality. —The
departmental council demands fixed prices.—Forced loan and recruitment in paris.—conseqcent emeute of citizens
in the sections.—tlie democrats determine to overthrow the gironde. —Danton's
proposals rejected by the gironde.—Danton Robespierre and pache at charenton.—
commission of twelve appointed against
these intrigues.—arrest of HeBERT.—attitude cf the
committee
of public safety.-tlie revolt of may 31st
fails.—
Revolt
of june 2nd.—Arrest of the Girondists.
The Committee of Public Safety was, as we have seen, the offspring of an
alliance between Danton, Robespierre and-Marat—i. e. a union of all the
democratic factions. The Jacobins expected that its establishment would ensure
the absolute dominion of their principles over the whole of France, and it was
only after giving his associates the necessary guarantees on this point, that Danton received from them the sole possession of the
newly-created powers. In domestic affairs he was obliged to look to them for
support against royalists and catholics, against Bourgeoisie and Gironde. Against all these enemies, who pursued him
with the same deadly hatred, and who formed, perhaps, four-fifths of the French
people, he had no other means of defence than the armed bands of the Hotel de
Ville, the Jacobin clubs, the democratic communes and the "conventional
commissioners in the provinces. If the Committee of
Public Safety did not choose to rely on these resources, it had no support at
all in the country; and for the sake of its own mere
Cn.
III.] ANOMALOUS POSITION OF FRENCH
GOVERNMENT. 55
existence it was compelled to procure for
these organs the despotic rule over the enslaved nation.
We may notice in this place an irreconcileable contradiction which attached itself to this new government from the very
first moment of its existence. Nothing is more certain than that Danton himself, and still more decidedly his colleagues of the centre, desired
to check the progress of communistic .mob-rule, to form a rational government,
and for this purpose to bring back the foreign policy of the country to a
moderate and orderly system. Under the influence'of
these views they had made advances to the Girondists,
and had by no means changed them because the latter rejected their overtures.
Whilst their wishes were in all respects opposed to the programme of the
Jacobins, they were compelled by a regard for their own
existence to place themselves at the head of this very party and to promote its
interests. Under their auspices the Jacobins subjected one portion of the
country after another to their rule, and they were obliged to look on, to assist and applaud, with the full assurance in their hearts that the
triumph of Jacobinical communism would lead to the
overthrow of all their own cherished plans. This was more particularly the case
in respect to their foreign policy and the conduct of the
war. Marat was already denouncing their greatest general as a traitor, and no
one could speak in the circles of the Hotel de Ville of an alliance with a
crowned head without risking his life. It was only the fact that the Gironde
still formed a counterpoise' in the Convention to the
absolute rule of the Mountain, which enabled the Committee to continue its negotiations. It stood therefore, exactly as the former ministers had done, between the parties, depending for its
existence on the continuance of party strife, and compelled to conceal its own game, and alternately to use one faction
against another. If one of these were to obtain a decided victory, the position
of the Committee would become untenable and its downfall certain.
56 FALL OF
THE GIRONDE. [Book VII.
All the more impetuously on this account did the democratic party strive to make use of the favourable moment to secure the
advantages they had already won, and to remove the last obstacles to their
progress. Having conquered Paris in January, the time was come for
them to subjugate the provinces also. It is evident that the
conventional commissioners could come forward with far
greater authority than the envoys of the Hotel de Ville in September; and they
therefore hastened, with eager zeal, to fulfil the
expectations of their party. Their immediate pretext was, as we know, the levy
of 300,000 men which had been decreed in March. The recruiting had, indeed, at
present been followed by no very brilliant results, 1 as
will always be the" case when conscription is for the first time substituted for the system of
volunteering. Here and there the peasants resisted with arms in their hands,
but it was only in one quarter—the departments of La Vendee and
Deux-Sevres—that a lasting and dangerous revolt arose. We have
already remarked upon the peculiar position of the peasantry of these
districts—the isolated situation of the woods and marshes which cover the whole
of Lower Poitou—the good understanding in which the nobles and peasants carried on the rearing of cattle together—the warm and steady attachment
with which these simple people clung to the church of their fathers. When the
Revolution drove the nobles into exile, the farmers grumbled; when it laid violent hands upon the church, it seemed to them the offspring of Satan. But still these simple people
kept quite aloof from politics, and the country remained quiet in spite of the
overthrow of the throne and the murder of the king; until at last the
conscription reached their
1 Cambon says in
his report to stated in the Convention, on the 10th
the
Committee of Public Safety on of April, that the population of many
the
12th of July; "without the inter- villages had fled into the neighbour-
ference
of the conventional commis- ing towns to escape the conscription
sioners
not 20,000 men would have more easily, been raised." It had been before
Cii. iii.]
REVOLT
OF LA VENDEE.
57
cottages. Then, indeed, ,the word was passed from village to village,
that if the musket must be shouldered, they would
rather shed the last drop of their blood in fighting against the
heaven-detested Revolution, than in serving its evil ends; and within a few
weeks many thousand men had taken arms, and all the districts from the Loire to
Rochelle had renounced their obedience to the Convention. They
were but irregular bands, badly armed, with little order, and in loose
connection with one another. It was fortunate for them that the government was
obliged by the defection of Dumouriez to send off the regiments, which were already marching against them, to the northern frontier, so that they
had leisure for arming and fortifying the country.
Elsewhere the population responded to the warlike summons, in some
places with patriotic enthusiasm, in others with ill-concealed reluctance: at any rate they obeyed. Vast numbers of men were collected,
frequently more than the decree required; in some departments the number is
calculated at 20,000, and even 30,000 men. The Committee of Public Safety did
their best to transform these swarms of recruits into serviceable
soldiers. The manufacture of arms was carried on with restless haste, all
the'horses de luxe seized, and uniforms and shoes bought up, to the utter exhaustion of
the treasury. Depots were established at suitable places in the interior to receive the conscripts, and to give them their first
training, and then to send them off hi never-ending droves to the different
armies. We may here anticipate the result. It was the division in the Coalition
on the one hand and the wonderful activity of the Committee on the
other, which enabled the Republic to resist all Europe. Within two months the
French armies attained the numerical amount which it maintained, without
change, until the end of the year; and as their numbers were not further increased until the administration of Carnot in 1794, the
so often repeated assertion that the fall of the
Gironde, and the absolute rule .
58
FALL
OF THE GIRONDE.
[Book VII.
of the Mountain, stamped the renowned 14 armies out of the ground, is nothing more than one of those rhetorical phrases of which the
history of-this period is full. On the contrary, we shall soon see that the
peculiar measures of the Mountain party did not promote but impeded the armaments; we ought to say that France conquered
not by means, but in spite, of the Jacobins.
This was shown in the most glaring manner in the conduct of the conventional commissioners during the first levy. Who could
blame them for carrying out the conscription with the utmost severity, and without the slightest regard to the circumstances of individuals? — for
rather taking too much for the supply of the armies than too little? But, in
fact, the levying and equipment of the troops was with them only a pretext for
subjecting the country to their own partisans — to the clubs and
the rabble; and a single glance at their other proceedings will at once open
before us the abyss, towards the edge of which they were driving France. Their
first step was to depose all the authorities displeasing to them, to appoint central committees, with almost unlimited power, as ruling
bodies in the departments, and to institute absolute revolutionary committees
as police courts in each of the communes. And thus a new and despotic official
hierarchy took the place of the authorities which had been
chosen by the people in 1791. The clubs, which furnished the members of the
governing bodies exclusively from the artisans and day-labourers, became a
portion of the official government; and the needy classes were solemnly declared by the commissioners to be the only hope of
the country — the only privileged persons in the Revolution. The brutality with
which this doctrine was carried out, in opposition to the mass of the nation,
and in contempt of the rights of private individuals,
can only be expressed in the commissioners' own words. In Versailles Chales
told the Sansculottes that they had only to put their hands into the pockets of
the
Cii. III.] OUTRAGEOUS UTTERANCES OF COMMISSIONERS. 59
rich; and Guffroi explained to a popular meeting at Chartres, that
they were in the midst of a revolution, which meant, that the purse of the rich
was now open to the poor.1 "It is time," cried Simon in the club of Annecy, "that
the war of the poor against the rich, the usurers, and the egoists, should commence; that the people may proceed with all
resources to the Revolution."2
"The aristocrats," wrote Gonene from Tarn and Aveyron, "are
tamed, and the Sansculottes ready for insurrection."3 This
was the watchword in every quarter, and the mob was every where summoned to an attack on all existing
institutions. Chabot, in the market-place of Toulouse, preached to the people:
"ye women, increase and multiply; for which purpose ye want neither
priests nor parsons, the citizen Christ was himself
the first Sansculotte."4 The
commissioner at Sedan declared that there were no citizens but the
Sansculottes, since the rich had always been enemies of the people; that
moreover the former were no longer bound by any laws, since the Constitution
had perished with the monarchy.5 If we
consider that there existed in every place a hungry and fanatical
proletariate—that the order to revolt was now given in the name of the highest
and absolute authority in the State — that every check or barrier of police or law was now removed in the name of the law itself — we shall be able to
estimate the despair which now brooded far and wide over the land; for, from
the very first, the agitators did not content themselves with words. Whereas
formerly those were arrested who excited men to robbery, now he
who resisted violence was deprived of his freedom. In Sedan the commissioners
had 55 men incarcerated in one day — in Nancy 1046 in
three weeks — in Arras more than a
1 Buchez, 25, 156. Gorsas, Courier, Great applause from the Mountain
May
15. — 2 Gorsas, May 5th. — and the galleries! — 5 Gorsas,
3 Debates of
the Jacobin Club, May 30th. — 6 Report of the Com-
April21th.—
i Conv. Nat. July 12th. missoners C.
N., May 3th,
60
FALL
OF THE GIRONDE.
[Book VII.
thousand1 in
two months — in Jura above 4000 in the same time2 —
and every where without any charge or examination — as suspects,
egoists, or enemies of freedom. In Lons-le-Saulnier, all persons of
noble birth, with their servants,3 and in Aix, all the inhabitants of a certain quarter4 without
distinction, were arrested and imprisoned. These are single examples taken at
random from an endless list of similar acts of horrible tyranny, which were
committed throughout nearly the whole of France. Bourgeois and peasants were benumbed with terror; the
millions of isolated men ventured on no resistance against this alliance of the
government and the clubs. In Toulon the inhabitants had compelled their
Jacobins in October to send back to prison the galley-slaves whom they had liberated in the name of freedom. But since January not a
hand had been raised against the club, when it made weekly raids against the
neighbouring villages, and levied black mail upon the inhabitants.5 It
was only in some of the larger cities, such as Bordeaux and Rouen, that
the Bourgeois, led by a like-minded municipality , defended themselves from
these outrages. In Marseilles and Lyons, too, they opposed an obstinate
resistance to the demagogues in the sectional assemblies, and thereby excited them to frantic hatred. In Lyons Challier openly endeavoured,
during the whole winter, to bring about a renewal of the September massacres,
mustered his pikemen in the open market-place, and made them take an oath to
exterminate all aristocrats, moderates, monopolists, and egoists.6 In
March all the prisons of Lyons were already filled, but the massacre was
postponed because
1 Gorsas, May 27. — 2 Sommier April 3th. — 8 Lauvergne, Histoire
(a zealous Montagnard) Histoire
du du Departement du Vur. — 6 Guillon
Jura. — 3 Another commissioner de Monleon, Lyon, I, 158. Conf.
makes
the same boast in the Jacobin Revol.
de Paris, XV, 234,
402, 433.
club,
May 10th. — 4 Reports of the Extracts from the
Lyons journal in
sections
of Marseilles C. N. May 25th. Gorsas, Feb. 27th. Robespierre in
the Jacobin Club,
C*.
III.] INCREASING POWER OF THE JACOBINS. 61
the staunch Jacobin Challier was at variance with the conventional commissioners Legendre and Bazine, zealous adherents of Danton; and the intended establishment
of a revolutionary tribunal was thereby prevented.1
Greater harmony reigned in Marseilles, where the commissioners ordered a
general disarming of the insubordinate Bourgeois, and with the muskets thus
obtained began to equip a patriotic army.of 6000
men, who were to march to Paris and do their best to prepare a 10th of August
for the Gironde.2
Towards the end of April all the departments, except La Vendee, and
perhaps Rouen and Bordeaux, were by these means completely subjected to the
rule of the Jacobin rabble. Such a fact necessarily
reacted in the strongest manner on the metropolis of the empire and the
Convention. The mere moral influence was a powerful one, and the victors no
longer made any secret of their wish3 to
draw material resources from the conquered provinces for the
conquest of Paris. The Girondists, who knew that they were more particularly
threatened, considered their position, and determined
to anticipate the attack. In the Convention the moment was favourable to them,
on account of the absence of the commissioners, which
deprived the Mountain of nearly a hundred of its most resolute partisans; and
in the country they might reckon on the desperate exasperation of the middle
classes, the consequence of the unbounded tyranny of the democrats. Hitherto the bourgeoisie had hated the Gironde, as the
originators of the war and the destroyers
1 This is proved by the documents produced by Guillon; only imaginary, on the other hand, is their
connection with Bourbon (Funke 1793) or Orleanist intrigues,
which Guillon — incorrectly amplifying the incorrect
statement of Senart—assumes.
— 2 Police reports of the 26th April
(in the Imperial archives). Des-fieux in the Jacobin club, April 17th. C. N.
12th and 25th of May. — 3 Reports from Bordeaux C. N. April 18. — from Nismes C. N. May 7.
62
FALL
OF THE GIRONDE.
[Book VII.
of the Constituting on, as much as the other Jacobins; but now that it
was no longer a question of form of government and political interests, but
of the person and life, the rights and property, of every
individual, the Gironde could reckon on general support, if they now came
forward in defence of these precious personal possessions. It was high time for
action, for the Parisian party in the capital itself — in the same way as their agents had already done in the provinces — began to carry
into practice the principles which had been santioned by the Convention, viz.
the right to lucrative employment, cheap goods, and an increasing rate of
taxation on the rich. The leaders of all these movements were still the Municipality, which Pache presided over with
cautious zeal and subtle pliancy. The starting-point of all their proceedings
was the poverty of the Commune, which claimed a yearly increasing grant from
the State treasury, and came into immediate conflict on
this point with every succeeding government. In the Committee of Public Safety
the finances were entrusted to Cambon, who was a revolutionist from the bottom
of his heart; but even he was frightened and angry when be discovered that the State had at that time already advanced 110
million livres to the Commune, and was expected to go on making further loans
for indefinite periods. He declared that he would not only not pay any more,
but would force the repayment of the sums already lent. At this
announcement Pache remained calm and submissive as usual, and left it to his
friends to depict the wrath which such a resolution would excite amongst the
people; and Danton gradually persuaded his hotheaded colleague of the impossibility of repayment.1 But
in regard to future advances the Committee remained immoveable, .and the
Municipality, fully determined not to give up the blessings they had hitherto
enjoyed, gave their
1 Debates of the Jacobin club francais, N. 247, in Buchey, 28, Aug. 26th., from the Republicain 485.
Ch. III.]
THE
GIRONDE ATTACKS MARAT.
63
party the signal to help themselves. Consequently, on the 12th of
April, the very day after the decree which gave forced currency to the assignats,
a Section appeared at the bar of the Convention to
demand a lower fixed tariff for flour and bread, wood and candles, meat and
wine, sugar and coffee. Meantime, for the purpose of intimidating the
Convention and exciting the mob, the cry was raised that a famine was impending; the baker's shops were plundered, and the people called on by the
street orators to rise in rebellion. The Gironde, who, curiously enough,
considered Marat as the most dangerous of their enemies, replied to this
petition by impeaching his inflammatory articles in the journals;1
whereupon the Municipality accepted the challenge and sent a large deputation,
with great solemnity and form, to accuse 22 Girondists of high treason. These
blows pretty nearly neutralised each other, as the Convention, on the 20th, rejected the charges of the Hotel de Ville as an unfounded calumny; and the revolutionary tribunal, on the 24th, after an
almost comical trial, acquitted the friend of the people, Marat, with fervent
veneration.
Of still greater importance than these demonstrations
was the ultimatum respecting the price of corn which the Parisian party brought
forward on the 18th. This time it was the departmental Council which declared
to the Convention that the fruits of the ground, like the light of heaven, were
the common property of all men; and that public opinion was decided, in
accordance with these principles, on the following points: — That the price of
corn should be fixed at 25—30 francs: that a register of all stocks should be
drawn up: that the trade in corn should be annihilated, and no one
allowed to act as agent between the producer and consumer. Vergniaud and Buzot
energetically opposed the proclamation of this system with warnings and
reproaches, whereupon
1 Valaze explains the motives April
14. (Papers of the Committee for this
step to his
constituents, of Public Safety.)
64
FALL
OF THE GIRONDE.
[Book VIL
the orators of the Departments threatened them with a revolt of a
million starving men. In the evening Chaumette administered an oath to his applauding followers to continue in a state of revolution until the
people had cheap provisions, and to consider themselves attacked as a body on
the first prosecution of a patriotic citizen. - The. excitement of this scene
spread through all the Sections, and more especially among the
Jacobins. Robespierre brought forward — at first in the Jacobin club, and then
in the Convention — that draft of the "Rights of Man" in which he
produced the before-mentioned programme for a general war, endeavoured to express the communistic wishes which it contained in the least offensive
manner, and to refer them to settled principles. While he allowed property to
exist in name,- he declared that the employment of it was subject to the power
of the State, aud that all property was unlawful and immoral
which injured the possessions or the freedom of another. Although all the
claims of the proletaries may be deduced from these propositions, the Jacobins
were by no means satisfied with a theory which did not allow every individual to put his hand into his neighbours' purse, but only gave to
the State the disposal of private property'; and Boyssel excited immense
enthusiasm when—immediately after Robespierre's "Rights of Man" — he
proclaimed the right of the Sansculottes to the
use and enjoyment of all the fruits of the earth — the right to clothe and feed
themselves, and to propagate the race of Sansculottes. Supported by these
sentiments, the Mountain, on the 18th, began the final discussion on the
propositions of the Department. It soon became evident, on
this occasion, as during the king's trial, that the contest would not be
carried on by arguments but by external force. Addresses poured in from all
sides, mobs of threatening and wretched appearance were conducted into the hall, and the replies of the Girondists were drowned in the roar of
the galleries. Fresh leaven of excitement was thrown into the Convention from
the prq^-
Ch. III.]
"PATRIOTISM" AT MONTPELLIER.
65
vinces, 'when the patriots of Montpellier reported that,, in consequence- of the violation of the frontier by a small Spanish
corps, they had taken upon themselves to make an additional levy of 5,000 men,
and for this purpose had raised a forced loan of five millions from their
wealthy fellow-citizens. The Convention ordered that this report
should be sent to the other departments as a manifestation of patriotic
sentiments; whereupon Danton, who was at that time on rather bad terms with the
Jacobins on account of his foreign policy, took the opportunity of winning back their favour in another field, by declaring that the
resolution of the Convention was a formal recognition of the proceedings in Montpellier, and a summons to imitate them. The
municipality did not need"" to have these directions repeated. They resolved without delay to raise 12,000 men, a la
Montpellier, for the war against La Vendee, and to defray the expenses by a forced
loan of twelve millions from the wealthy inhabitants of the capital.' The men
were to he selected by the revolutionary committees,
which gave the Hotel de Ville a guarantee that none but opponents of their
policy, and, moreover, opponents capable of bearing arms, would be chosen, by
which means the last strength of the moderate party would be removed from the
capital, never to return.
The object now was to impose at once a fixed price of corn on the rural
districts, a compulsory loan on the towns, and military exile on all the
parties hostile to the Jacobins. Tq prevent all attemps at resistance on the
part of the Convention, the old furnace of revolution, the
Faubourg St. Antoine, was once more heated red-hot. More than 8,000 petitioners
from this quarter appeared at the bar of the Convention, on the 1st of May.
"Make sacrifices,", cried their spokesman, "as* the people has
done. Let the majority forget that they belong to the class of proprietors.
Decree a fixed price of corn, and then tear up all unfair leases. Let every one
who possesses more than 2,000 livres a year
in. e
66
FALL
OF THE GIRONDE.
[Book VII.
contribute the half of the surplus to the
expenses of the war and the relief of the poor. If you reject these wholesome and necessary measures, know that the people is in a state of
insurrection." These last words raised a storm of indignation in the
Right, and a tumult within and without the hall; and at
last their meaning was in some degree palliated and explained away.
Nevertheless the demonstration had its effect, and, on
the 2nd, the Convention decreed a maximum price of corn; first, the average
price since January, and then a gradual fall till
September; and, lastly, several restrictions were laid on the trade in corn.
The decisive step was taken towards the omnipotence of the State over property
and trade.
These enactments concerned the agriculturists; on the following day the turn of the Parisian Bourgeois came, when the
municipality published its resolutions concerning the forced loan. All incomes
above 1,500 livres were to contribute in increasing rates, so that
1,000 livres would pay 30 livres, and 3,000 livres,
100 livres; but as for incomes above 30,000 livres, all the surplus was to fall
to the commune — one third within forty-eight hours, another after fourteen
days, and the remaining third at the end of the month. All this was to be done
by order of the revolutionary committee and on pain of
confiscation of property. Hereupon messages and instructions
poured in from the Hotel de Ville to the Sections, the revolutionary committees
met, and began to enrol one of their neighbours as a recruit, to demand of another a few hundred, and of a third a few thousand, livres, as a
contribution. Their delight at the golden harvest after so easy a victory was
boundless.
But they had to learn that the real contest was still to be fought. As
early as the 1st of May, a few young men, waiters, clerks and
shopmen, who were taken as recruits, had attempted violent
resistance; and when preparations were made to carry out the
forced loan, the turn, upon which the Gironde had founded all their hopes, took
place.
Ch. III.]
RESISTANCE OP THE BOURGEOIS.
67
The mass of the Bourgeois, who for the last two years had kept aloof
from politics, in order to look after their own individual safety, suddenly
became aware to what this caution had brought them. They saw that from out of
the party feuds to which they .were utterly indifferent, had proceeded a
ruinous onslaught upon the life and property of every individual; they
perceived the danger, heard the tumult in the Sections, and came forth one
after the other to defend their property and lives. All at once the aspect
of the sectional assemblies was changed, so that the Jacobins hardly knew
themselves there. The Bourgeois asked by what authority the committees took
away money from their neighbours, who Had just as many rights as themselves? by what kind of standard they selected the recruits? why quiet
men of business were to be sent into the field, while 3,000 troops of the line,
and the Federes, were idly and mutinously lounging about the Parisian pave? A
hundred voices soon gave the answer; they were to be sent away
for this very reason, that the robbers and beggars might have a clear course;
every where it was roundly declared, that according to such rules as these, not
a man would pay, not a man would march.1
The Democrats were beside themselves with surprise and
fury, and sought in every possible way to regain a majority in the Sections.
Municipality and Jacobins, the Sister club and the Cordeliers, were in constant
deliberation. Chau-mette threatened blood and destruction, the police dispersed the meetings just as they were about to draw up petitions
to the Convention, and within forty-eight hours more than 2,000 men were put
into confinement. Exactly in the tone of the Hotel de Ville, Robespierre cried
out to the Jacobins: "The great conspiracy has broken out;
whoever wears gold braid on his trowsers is the natural enemy of the Sansculottes; we must form an army of these last in Paris to
1
Adolf Schmidt, Tableaux
I, 166.
E2
68
FALL
OF THE GIRONDE.
uBook VII.
combat the aristocrats, and maintain all the poor
of the Republic from the treasury, at the cost of the rich."
In fact the democratic party encountered during this week the greatest
and most sensible danger which could possibly befall
it — the rising, not merely of the few political party men, but of the
heavy mass of the quiet population. If this state of things continued, the
Jacobins would see their best weapons, the Sections, pass into the hands of
their opponents; their armed bands were already afraid to show themselves before the excited and zealous national guard,
and an overwhelming force, ready for immediate action, voluntarily presented
itself to the hands of the Gironde.1
Disquieting intelligence also was received from the provinces, where the same
indignation was gradually goading the Bourgeois to
action. The Sections in Marseilles had just assumed the management of affairs
again, sent the commissioners out of the city, and disarmed the Federes, whom
the commissioners had summoned to their aid. Bordeaux, at the exhortation of the Gironde, prepared to send a body of men to Paris
to protect the Convention. In Lyons the opposing parties threatened every
moment to come into collision; several departments of Normandy sent violent
manifestoes to the Convention against the agitators. The fate of the
Jacobins depended on their anticipating the union and consolidation of all
these hostile elements, calming the momentary excitement in
Paris, and then with all possible speed dealing the death-blow to the Gironde,
which now formed the centre of the moderate
party. The Jacobin chiefs with great dexterity chose out the elements suited to
their purpose from the existing crisis, in order to attain their end by
suddenly doubling, under pretence of yielding.
The object of the new plan was to continue the recruit-
1 Attempts have since been made the
Department, and the Convention,
to
detract from the importance of prove beyond a doubt how much
»his
movement in the Sections; but was at stake, the transactions of the Commune,
Ch. in.] THE
JACOBINS DISSEMBLE. 69
ing, indeed, but no longer to employ it as a means of exiling hostile
citizens, but of arming democratic battalions. Their destination was still to
be La Vendee, but the Jacobins intended to employ their arms, before they marched out, in a coup d'etat against the Gironde. The levying of the
forced loan was therefore postponed — no one was compelled to enter the
battalions, but, on the contrary, only volunteers were received.1 At
the same time the municipality, on the 13th, decreed
the raising of an army of Sansculottes in addition
to the forces destined for La Vendee, and, on the 17th, arbitrarily appointed a
fanatical Jacobin named Boulanger commander of the national guard in the room
of Santerre, who was to lead the Parisian contingent against La Vendee.
Several thousand proletaries were quickly armed, of a character exactly suited
to the wishes of the municipality — needy men, who, on account of the cost of
their equipment alone, would be unable to leave Paris for some weeks, and who were ready in the interval for any undertaking against
aristocrats, Girondists and capitalists. Their leaders hastened to cut out
their work for them. A certain Henriot, a servant
up to 1789, then a custom-house officer, and lastly a police spy, who had been dismissed from all these places for theft, had risen into
notice since September as a patriotic executioner, and become
commander of the national guard in the Section of the Sansculottes. This man
held forth to the volunteers, day after day, that
they must not leave Paris until they had overthrown the Gironde and tamed the
aristocrats. Varlet enlarged on the same subject in the Section of the corn
market; other crowds collected round Maillard, under the name of
"Defenders of the invincible Republic;" and the Sister club
resolved, "as the time of fine speeches was over," to form a
battalion of Amazons. Meanwhile the municipality assembled deputies from all
the Sections at the Hotel de Ville, who were to prepare
Report
of the department to the Convention, May 8th.
70
FALL
OF THE GIRONDE.
[Book VII.
beforehand a list of the arrests which would be necessary in Paris.
They also established a revolutionary committee in the episcopal palace, to
form the visible rallying-point of the revolt on the
decisive day.1 All this was done with noisy publicity, as if it were a harmless or
justifiable measure; and all Paris knew that in a few
days the Democrats would rise, slay all unpopular persons, after the manner of
September, and thus once more "save their country"!
This was the position of affairs in the first half of May, when Payne
was writing about the destructive consequences of democratic disorders, when
Danton was deeply engaged in his negotiations with Sweden and Russia, and the
Committee of Public Safety was coming to terms with
Stael, drawing up Semonville's instructions, and sending Custine to Belgium. If
the municipality prevailed, it was all over with these plans, partly from the
principles of the Parisian party, who refused to treat with any king, or to leave any neighbouring country undisturbed; and partly
on account of the persons who were engaged in the above-mentioned affairs, who,
for various reasons, were in the highest degree odious to the Jacobins.
Custine's intercession would have been sufficient of itself to
decide them in favour of an open breach. Danton recognised the difficulties of
the moment, and was ready to begin the contest with them. Undismayed by his former failures, he made one more attempt at a
reconciliation with the Girondists, and succeeded in bringing about a great meeting with them in the pleasure gardens of Sceaux.2 The
conference began with a luxurious banquet under the stately trees of the park.
Politics were not brought forward at first, but instead of them the champagne flowed in streams: the ladies present were not of the
number of the 2>rudish beauties of Paris, and for the moment all dif-
1 Unpublished report of the
mayor "Vergniaud," p. 65
(German trans-to the Committe of Public Safety, lation). June 1st. — 2 Touchard-Lafosse,
Ch. III.]
THE
BANQUET AT SCEAUX.
71
ferences were forgotten in the intoxication of pleasure. But no sooner
had the men proceeded after dinner to serious conversation, than old and
incurable wounds opened afresh. As in the previous
March, it was Guadet who replied to Danton's first proposal — amnesty for the
past — by a decided and unconditional refusal. Vergniaud thought this neither
humane nor wise, but was too indolent to bring over his hotheaded colleague to
his own opinion; and thus, after a brief and hopeless
discussion, they separated without having come to any agreement. Danton was
deeply moved. Several times did he secretly send proposals to his opponents, and on the 10th May he even publicly voted with them in the
Convention, on one of the most important points
in the new Constitution — whether the government should be named by the people,
or by the legislative body — but it was all in vain. "Twenty times,"
said Danton, in a despairing tone to a friend a few months later, "twenty times did I offer peace, but they rejected me, that they might
destroy me; they alone have brought this mob-rule upon us, which has consumed
them and will consume us all."1
It is true that the mob-rule which sent them to the scaffold might
perhaps have been averted by an alliance. And yet
Danton did them injustice when he imputed their refusal solely to personal
hatred; their position at that time had more to do with it than their mere
feelings. For after they had placed themselves at the head of the Bourgeois, had inscribed the words "security and property"
on their banner, and sought new strength in the attachment of the middle
classes, all cooperation with Danton, the leader of the September assassins, the originator of the last outrages in Paris, was utterly impossible. And thus it was their fate, by their very
struggle for law and order, to cut away the last rope that coidd have saved them,
and to make the fullest
1 Garat, in Buchez, 18, 451,
72
FALL
OF THE GIRONDE.
[Book VII.
atonement for their own evil deeds, in sealing
their own destruction by their very conversion to the cause of right. They had
at least one consolation — they could fall with a purified conscience, after a
vigorous struggle. But what shall we say of Danton's position? He had once more to learn that for him there was no forgiving or
forgetting. Though he despised his associates, and destroyed his former work,- he
was bound to them with iron fetters. He had but one choice, either to mount the
scaffold, after the triumph of the good cause, or to
proceed in his old courses in the full consciousness of his own turpitude. He
had not yet strength to die; he resolved to hold fast to life and crime.
In the little town of Charenton, about a mile from Paris, he held a
nocturnal conference with Pache, Robespierre,
Henriot and other associates of the city party.1 The
democratic camp in Paris was in a state of the greatest excitement; murderous plans of every kind were discussed among the
Cordeliers, in the episcopal palace, and the Hotel de Ville; and at
Charenton, too, a blow a la September
against several hundred deputies was repeatedly proposed..2 Danton at any rate opposed these extreme measures with all his might,3 and
finally earned his more moderate proposals. It was still
desirable, even for the Democrats, to avoid doing open violence to the
Convention, as such, and in its stead to extort4 a
decree against the Gironde from the representatives of the nation by threats
aud intimidation, as formerly against
1 Garat, in his Memoirs, tries to Garat says, on another occasion (p. throw doubt on
these deliberations, 450); Danton
a e'te Fauteur de ses but
they are proved not only by a journe'es,
plusieurs les voulaient, seul deposition
made to the Commission il a
pu les /aire. — 2 Barere in the of twelve, but also
by Cambon, Ba- Convention 4. Germ. III. — 3 Leclerc rere, Guyton and Delmas,
all of in the club of Cordeliers, June 27,1793 them members of the Committee of
(Buchez 28, 520). Legendre in the Public Safety. Conv. Nat. 12, Vend. Convention 7. Germ. HI. — 4 LaI.,
Brum. 4 et 7, Germ. III. Moreover maignant C, N. 7. Germ. III.
Ch. III.] STRUGGLE BETWEEN GIRONDE AND JACOBINS. 73
King Louis. At this moment, it is true, the tools which they had
hitherto used,' viz. the Sections, were not at their disposal; and
as long as the citizen, whether deliberating or armed, had the upper hand, the
success of a massacre on r, large scale must always appear doubtful. The
suppression of the Sections, therefore, was proposed as the first task, and immediately commenced with the greatest vigour. The patriots
bestirred themselves in all quarters of the city, but in the present violent,
excitement among the Bourgeois, they made but little progress. The municipality
were all the more active in preparing for the worst; they
fabricated daggers aud pikes where muskets were wanting, and detained the
battalions which were marching out against La Vendee at Courbevoie, a short
distance from Paris. But the decisive moment was brought on sooner than they expected, by their opponents.
From the hurry and bustle with which these preparations were carried on
it was impossible that they should long remain concealed from the Gironde. By
the 12th of May, Mazuyer had sent an exact account of what was going on to the Committee of Public Safety,1
whose members, between their fear of Danton on the one side and the majority of
the Convention on the other, could come to no resolution. On the 18th Guadet
openly brought the subject of the conspiracy before the Convention, and moved the suppression of the rebellious authorities of the city.
Barere endeavoured to parry this sharp blow by proposing that the Convention
should appoint a Commission of twelve members to investigate all the decrees
which had lately been issued by the Commune.
Nothing, of course, would have been found in the minutes concerning the
murderous plots, and Danton especially would have got off scot
free. But the Gironde, followed up their advantage, and added a clause to
Barere's motion, that the investigations of the Twelve should be
Papers
of the Committee of Public Safety.
74
FALL
OF THE GIRONDE.
[Book VII.
extended to all machinations against public order.1 In
the selection of the commission they carried their most zealous members, who
set to work at once, and, as was to be expected,
plenty of material poured in upon them from every side. As early as the 24th
they forbade the nocturnal assemblies of the Sections on the
authority of the Convention, and deprived Boulanger of the command of the national guard. On the following night the darling of the street
democracy, Hebert, and immediately afterwards Varlet, with three associates
worthy of him, were arrested.
And thus the destruction of one of the two parties was rendered
unavoidable; Hebert was privy to all the plots, the three
others were the chief agents for their execution, and the Jacobins were lost if
they did not get the start of their opponents. They no longer hesitated in the
Sections; every thing depended on their carrying the adoption of an imperious petition in favour of
Hebert within twenty-four hours; and where arguments had no effect, they made
no scruple of resorting to force. In those Sections in which the patriots had
not a majority, they attacked the unprepared Bourgeois with fists and sticks, chased them in wild confusion out of the assembly,
and then voted their sovereign petition under the protection of the city
police.2 In
spite of this, however, the mayor was only able to demand the liberation of
Hebert, and the dissolution of the commission, in the name
of twenty-eight Sections. The rest had again to be done by tumult. A swarm of
Federes, Amazons, and tape-durs suddenly broke into the hall, and noisily mingled with the deputies of
the Mountain; and in the midst of the turmoil Danton's friend Herault, as
president, declared that the Convention had granted the demands of the
Sections. But the exidtation caused by this success was of no long duration,
since on
1 "Vos amendements
liberticides" Saladin,
Buchez 28, 37. — 2 Pro-cried
Bazire to the Gironde on May tocol of the commune, May 26. Jaco-31th. — Conf.
the expressions of bin club eodem.
Ch. in.]
DEFEAT
OF CHALBOS IN LA VENDEE.
75
their very next sitting, the Convention, though they passed over the
liberation of Hebert, declared the resolutions of the
preceding day null and void, restored thereby the Commission
of twelve, and renewed the threats of legal steps against the Jacobins. The
latter were determined to proceed to every extremity. Hebert, in
his exasperation, incited the Cordeliers, in the midst of
the Convention, to the immediate massacre of the Girondists.
Danton's friends with some difficulty prevented this, but the Central committee
of insurrection in the episcopal palace resolved, on the strength of their previous success in the Sections, to proceed to the execution of the
plot of Charenton.
The Committee of Public Safety, as well as the ministers, were fully
aware of these proceedings. Both bodies, however, were divided and without
leaders, most of their members uncertain as to their own
wishes, full of apprehensions of the Hotel de Ville, but, at the same time, of
anger and suspicion against the Gironde. To increase the general embarrassment
and terror the most alarming tidings arrived from the theatre of war. The peasants of La Vendee, who had been masters of that province
since the beginning of the month, had gained a complete victory over General
Chalbos at Fontenay, on the 25th, and threatened to pass the Loire at several
points. In Belgium, again, Coburg had at last received his
reinforcements, had driven the French Army of the north from its camp at Famars
on the 23st, and had ever since that day blockaded the' important city of Valenciennes on every side. In the Convention the government spoke of these disasters with contemptuous pride, but in their secret hearts they
were so terrified, that Lebrun entrusted proposals of peace for the Austrian
government to a Saxon diplomatist'— who was just then starting for Paris1 — on
1 Haeften to the States General, at the Court of Louis XVI.,
who had June 3th. It was the secretary
of been''left behind. Count Salmour,
Saxon ambassador
76
FALL
OF THE GIRONDE.
[Book VII.
the basis of restoring all conquests, and compensating the German
princes; nay, the Committee of Public Safety meditated offering to the emperor the liberation of the unhappy Marie
Antoinette, if he would withdraw his heavy hand from the Republic. With such
sentiments, the commonest consistency would have forced upon these rulers a
decided co-operation with the Gironde, if Barere and his associates had ever
regarded principle or the public good, or indeed anything
but their own selfish interests. But though they were in no little fear of the
Austrians, there was a nearer danger arising from
the hatred of the Gironde, and a still nearer in the daggers of the tape-durs.
And thus the Committee had continually wavered during the last few
weeks. As late as the 18th Barere had hinted clearly enough' that the disposal of the armed force must be taken out of the hands of the
municipality; and yet, on the 20th, Camthon, in entire conformity with the views of the Hotel de Ville, had procured a decree for
levying a compulsory loan on all the wealthy inhabitants of France. Their
course, however, was at last decided by their jealousy
of the new Committee of twelve, in which they apprehended a rising Girondist
government, and on the 20th they formally broke with the Gironde, and
astonished the Convention by proposing that the latter should allow them (the Committee of Public Safety) to add five members to their number,
who should be commissioned to lay the foundation of the future Constitution.
That there might be no doubt of the meaning of this proposition, they
designated for this function, on the 30th, the Dantonist Herault,
Robespierre's most intimate friends St. Just and Couthon, and, in addition to
these, two zealous Jacobins, Ramel and Mathieu. It was now certain that the
Gironde would meet with as little aid from the Committee as from the Hotel de Ville.
And now the struggle was at hand. The plan was to proceed in the same
way as on the 10th of August, and. in the first place to form a provisional
government at the
Ch. III.]
REVOLT
OF MAY 31st FAILS.
77
Hotel de Ville by commissioners of the Sections,
who should act on behalf of the sovereign people with unlimited powers. On the
night of the 30th of May the nomination of these commissioners
took place in twenty-nine Sections;1 at 3
o'clock the tocsin began to sound, and three hours afterwards the commissioners took possession of the Hotel de Ville. Henriot was named
commander of the national guard; the call to arms was sounded in every quarter;
the mails were stopped, the letters seized, a day's wages of 40 sous offered to
every proletary; and, lastly, an act of impeachment against
thirty-four Girondists — which was the main business of the day — was drawn up.
The conspirators hoped by endless patrols throughout the great city, to keep
the citizens — who hastened to their rendezvous for the
most part in utter ignorance of the occasion of the tumult — far away from
the Convention, and then, by means of the
furious raging of the well-filled galleries, to carry the motion for the arrest
of the proscribed victims. At first every thing proceeded according to their wishes. The Left first rose in the Convention to denounce
the Committee of twelve, who for three hours strove in vain to get a hearing in
their own defence, and at last declared themselves ready to transfer all their
powers to the Committee of Public Safety. But in the afternoon the position of affairs underwent a very serious change. With all
his arts of agitation Henriot could not at last prevent the question as to the
cause of the revolt from being raised among continually increasing masses of the citizens. One Section after another came to an understanding on the subject; some of them sent commissioners to the Hotel de
Ville to watch the proceedings there, and others even to demand an account of
them. In the Section Con-trat-Social the national
guard threatened to fire on the
1 This was the number of
Sections protocol of the Commune
exagger-by whom the deputation
to the ates the number to thirty-three. Convention
was empowered. The
78
FALL
OF THE GIRONDE.
[Book VII.
patriots;1 and
at last the Sections 1792, Butte-des-monlins, Mail, and Gardes Francaises,
resolved without further circumlocution2 to
occupy the Palais Royal with their battalion and guns, and to take up a decided
position there for the purpose of protecting the
Convention, and overawing the Hotel de Ville. The effect soon showed itself in
the Tnileries. Vergniaud declared that the Parisian section had deserved well
of the country; Camboulas carried a motion for a criminal
charge against Henriot, and the Committee of Public Safety returned to its attitude of mediator by demanding, through Barere,
that "the Twelve" should be suppressed, and at the same time that the
armed force should be placed under the exclusive control of the Convention.3 The
Hotel de Ville, however, was not to be intimidated so
easily. While their great deputation, accompanied by a raging and threat-ing
mob, were entering the Convention to bring forward their accusation against the
Twelve, the ministers Roland, Cla-viere and Lebrun, and twenty-two Girondist deputies—Henriot was bringing up 10,000 men with a
powerful artillery from' the Faubourg St. Antoine against the Palais Royal,4
under the false pretence that the Butte des-Moulins had mounted the white
cockade. The preponderance was thus restored to the Left in the
Convention itself; Robespierre got the motion rescinded which deprived the
Hotel de Ville of the disposal of the armed force, and of Barere's demands only
the one for the dissolution of the Committee of twelve was acceded to. The Mountain regarded the day as won, and were on the point of at last
opening the discussion on the main question — the proscription of the
Girondists. Bnt suddenly a fresh crowd — and this time a peaceable and
rejoicing one — appeared at the bar of the Assembly,
with
1 Protocol of the Commune, June 4 About 5 o'clock in the evening.
Vid.
1st.
— 2
Conv. Nat. May 31st. Gorsas; and
the anonymuos writer
Buchez 27, 352. —
3 Conf. his in the supplement to
Meillau's Me-
statement
on the 4. Germ. III. — moires.
Cii III.]
APPARENT
RECONCILIATION.
79
the intelligence that the men of St. Antoine had convinced themselves
in the Palais Royal of the sound republicanism of their opponents; embraces and
fraternization had taken the place of blood-shedding, and the Bourgeois were now accompanying their comrades back to their Faubourg with
music and floating banners. Under these circumstances it was impossible for the
Convention to occupy itself with prosecution and impeachment, and the sitting
broke up to all appearance amidst general harmony and
reconciliation.
The rage of the municipal assembly at this turn of affairs was
unspeakable. The very first proceeding of the four Sections had aroused a
strong feeling of anger among the Jacobins at the mismanagement of the committee which had hitherto conducted their affairs; they immediately
dissolved it, and supplied its place by 25 other members.1 In
the evening Hebert represented that the impatience of previous schemers had
imperilled everything; that the causes of failure ought
to be explained to the people, who should be made to understand that what was
not completed to-day might be done to-morrow.2 This
was fully resolved upon; they must, it was said, after having gone so far,
force their way through all difficulties, or perish
in the attempt. They entertained nothing but the bitterest anger against
time-servers of Danton's stamp, who had excluded armed
force from their programme; and the new committee set
to work to carry out their objects, regardless of all considerations. In that very same night they procured a decree from the municipality
for the arrest of all the citizens who had taken part in the reactionary
movement.3 This
order was forthwith carried out in all the Sections in the early morning of the
10th of June, and continued during the whole of the
day. They had
1 Report of the mayor to the clamation made at the Hotel de Ville
Committee
of Public Safety, June 1st. at 6. o'clock a. m. Protocol of the
— 2
Protocol of the Commune, Commune, June 1th. May 31st. — 3 Mentioned in a pro
80
FALL
OF THE GIRONDE.
[Book VII.
marked the orators and ringleaders in the battalions, and could feel
sure that during their incarceration no fresh rising of the masses would take
place. In the next place messengers were despatched in all secrecy to Courbevoie, to recall the battalion which
had been raised for the war against La Vendee (about 12,000 men) to Paris. With
their aid, they thought, if it came to the worst, all opposition might be
drowned in the blood of their opponents, whatever Danton might say
to the contrary, To please him, indeed, the Hotel de Ville made one more
attempt in the evening to obtain from the Convention the immediate impeachment
of the Gironde. But when, in spite of the absence of nearly the whole Right, the Centre and the Dantonists rejected the proposition as
premature, the signal was given by the Committee of twenty-five, immediately
after midnight, for the last decisive blow.
On the 2nd of June, in the early dawn, ,the clanging of the alarm bells once more commenced, while the columns -from Courbevoie, provided
with a powerful artillery entered the city, and at first took up their position
on the northern Boulevard. The Sections were not yet quite put down; the
assembly of the Section Fraternite was dispersed in the middle of
the night; Marseilles and Theatre Francais were overpowered in the course of
the forenoon. 1 The arrests were continued in all quarters; 2 the
most important printing-offices occupied, 3 the messageries
and barrieres closed,' and the issue of passports
prohibited. When this had been done, a deputation from the Hotel de Ville
repaired to the Convention for the purpose of
enforcing the will of the people by a final unalterable command. Their demands
were, indeed, somewhat mitigated; they no longer asked for
an
1 Protocol of the Commune, June June
2nd (Buchez, 27, 411.) 3 Gor-2nd. Debates of
the-Convention, 21. sas' house not till after midday, Bu-Ventose III. 2 Chronique
de Paris, chez,
28, 19.
Cii.
III.]
REVOLT OF JUNE 2ND.
81
act of impeachment, but only for the provisional arrest, of
twenty-seven Girondists as suspicious persons; but this was to be carried into
effect without delay, without curtailment, and by every available means.
Meanwhile the ministers in one part of
the Tiiileries, and the Committee of Public Safety in another, were
deliberating on the great question of the clay. 1 Of
the former, Claviere, who had been arrested during the night, was missing; of
the latter, Danton, whose intentions had been outstripped
by events.2 After long deliberation, the remaining members came to a resolution to
make one motion in the Convention for the voluntary retirement of the Gironde,
and another for hiring 6000 proletaries as a Parisian army of the Revolution, with the view of curbing the impetuosity of
the Parisian party. But the latter had already made further progress. When the
deputation of the Hotel de Ville appeared with their command for the
proscription of the Gironde, Billaud-Varennes demanded
that it should be referred to the committee for
immediate report; but the Convention decreed its reference to the committee without the
additional clause, upon which the Commune at once broke off all negotiations which could lead to peace. On a signal of Henriot the battalions of Courbevoie occupied the
external approaches of the Tuileries, and the men
who had hitherto filled the gallery hastened, with the cry of "aiuv
armes!" to block up the doors of the hall. They had all received instructions
not to allow either minister or deputy to withdraw until
further orders: the Convention were not to be allowed to
1 Alarat, Dufourny and Lhuillier
This disposes of Garat's report (Bu-
had
informed the Committee of the chez 18, 408).
Danton's offer to
views
of the Hotel de Ville. Lindet give himself up to the
Gironde as
in the
Con v. Nat. 1. Brum. III. a
hostage, which has been repeated
2 According to the minutes of the a
hundred times on Garat's authority,
sitting. Guyton and Delmar were cannot at any rate,
have been made
also absent; Treilhard was
there, here.
III.
F
82
FALL OF
THE GIRONDE.
[Book VII.
leave the place until they had delivered up the proscribed members to the Commune. In order to preclude any deliberation in the
Sections, the battalions of the national guard were posted in military
order far away on the quays of the Seine, for the alleged purpose of protecting
the Convention.
In the hall the debate turned exclusively on the one absorbing subject. The din of the rabble and the rattle of arms was heard from the lobbies; and some of the deputies, thrust back from the
doors, interrupted the proceedings with useless complaints. At last Barere
brought up the report of the committee. While this was being commented upon
with disfavour by both sides, Lacroix rushed into the hall with torn
garments, beside himself with rage; he, too, the confidant
of Danton, who till the preceding day had been a leader of the movement, had
been maltreated and driven back into the hall. All his friends, the members of
the Committee, the Centre and the Right rose up
together, and Barere demanded the execution of the
commander of the national guard, who had dared to violate the majesty of the
Convention. On the motion of Lacroix the Conventiou ordered the troops to
retire; on that of Danton, they decreed an investigation by the Committee of Public Safety. But the Parisian party
treated these commands as idle words, and all the approaches remained closed.
Barere then made a last attempt, and suddenly proposed that the Convention should break up in a body with the president at their head in order to
test their freedom. An unanimous shout of assent
was raised at the proposal, and the deputies began to move, with the exception
of about a hundred Montaguards,
who remained in their seats with irresolute curiosity. The
others got as far as the main entrance of the palace, where Henriot, slightly
intoxicated, was stationed in front of a battery of democratic gunners. He
answered the address of the president with brutal ribaldry, and after the exchange of a few words drove the crowd of men, who called themselves the representatives of France, back into the palace,
Cii.
III.]
ARREST
OF THE GIRONDISTS.
83
by the word of command "aux canons1. Wherever the Convention tried their fortune in the garden, they fared no better; and they soon allowed
themselves to be led back into the hall by Marat, who, surrounded by a troop of
gamins, marched triumphantly along.
All resistance was was thus broken down. On the motion of Couthon, the
list of victims was read out—while'Marat now struck
out a name here, and added another there—and the immediate arrest of the
proscribed was ordered. When the-latter, one after the other, came down to the
bar, and delivered themselves up to the gensd'armes, the 'Convention in humble silence submitted to the
commands of the victors, unanimously decreed the formation of the revolutionary army of Paris, and empowered the committee to draw up a
laudatory account of the great day. The Gironde was defeated; their political career for ever ended; this day decided their fate as completely as
the - 10th of August that of the monarchy. Hurled from the very height of
political power by a bold stroke of their opponents, they went like Louis XVI,
first into mild and decent confinement, to experience within a few
months brutal imprisonment and death upon the block. But the victors, who had
scarcely held together during the tumult of the contest, separated in enmity as
on the 10th of August, in the very moment of victory. The immediate result to France of the 2nd of June was a new struggle between the
democratic factions for the spoils of the vanquished—a feud which filled up a
whole year, and was not ended until all the leaders of that day's outrage had
mounted the scaffold.
F2
84
[Book VII.
CHAPTER IV.
SHELVING OF DANTON.
Significance
of june 2nd.—Revolt of Marseilles, lyons, bordeaux and
bretagne
against the jacobins.-ferment among the bourgeois of
paris.—The jacobins temporise.—Constitution of 1793.—The
committee of public safety tries negotiation with the
departments.
—It
adheres to a policy of peace with foreign countries.—Protects ccstine and biron against the democrats.—melancholy condition of the army of the north.-danton wishes to save the
queen.—Fall of the committee of public safety.—War against Marseilles and
lyons.-persecution of the
girondists custine and
biron.—Fall of mayence and Valenciennes.—The queen before the revolutionary tribunal.—warlike spirit of the new
committee of public safety.
The first step of the victorious Commune, as soon as
the result obtained in the Convention on the evening of the 2nd of June had
been announced, and the triumphant enthusiasm somewhat cooled down, was a
decree to the following purport: that the revolutionary army should be organised that very week—the maximum
carried into effect—and the levying of the forced loan commenced. On
the following day the Commune appointed a committee to promote cheapness of
provisions, and to draw up lists of the stocks in the hands of the Parisian bakers. The debates in the Jacobin club were
equally explicit. On the 3d the Capuchin Chabot declared amid general applause,
that the time was come for setting a fixed price on bread throughout the whole
kingdom, and immediately proclaiming a new constitution,
with the right to maintenance as basis, and the certainty for all men of
procuring food, as principal object. The younger Robespierre called for the
suppression of the
Ch. IV.] ANTIJACOBIN REVOLTS IN PROVINCES.
85
bad journals, since, he said, the freedom of the press
must not be allowed to injure the liberty of the people. Billaud-Varennes laid
open the whole programme of the club a few days later; punishment of the guilty
generals—dismissal of the aristocratic officers—expulsion of strangers—disarming of lukewarm, and incarceration of suspected,
citizens—progressive taxation and compulsory loans for
the maintenance of the poor—formation of a revolutionary army for the annihilation of all internal enemies. The French nation, therefore, was not left long in doubt as to the
significance of the recent coup
d'etat; the men of September once more raised their blood-drenched banner over
the trembling land.
Yet the more sagacious among them felt that though they had indeed
stormed the citadel of the State by a sudden attack, there
were still many difficulties to be overcome, before
the conquest of France could be regarded as accomplished.
Resistance of every kind was rife in the provinces, in the metropolitan
Sections, and even in the government itself; so that the Commune,
Robespierre, and Danton, with equal zeal, exhorted their followers to caution
and patience, in order not to conjure up all dangers at once against the chiefs
of the party.
Even before the 31st of May, a lively opposition
had arisen in some Departments against the tyranny of the Democrats. Marseilles, as we have seen, had several weeks before closed its Jacobin club, brought, its leaders before a special
tribunal as robbers and murderers, and expelled the Commissioners of the Convention from the city. The storm broke out in Lyons on the
14th of May, when the commissioners, the municipality, and
the Jacobins, had joined in decreeing a forced loan of six million livres, a
levy of troops destined for La Vendee, and the arming of
4,000 proletaries as an abiding garrison for the city.
In the levying of the compulsory loan all the richer inhabitants were shamelessly plundered; the obnoxious or influential citizens were enrolled in the corps which was
8G
SHELVING
OF DANTON.
[Book VII.
destined to march away, and the September bands and Challier's dreaded
myrmidons in that which was to remain in the city.
Challier himself had promised the club, on the 27th, that after two
days the rich egoists, the presidents and secretaries of
the Sections, should all be beheaded; and as the municipality
surrounded the Hotel de Ville with artillery on the 28th, no one any longer
doubted that this threat was uttered in sood earnest. 1 The
citizens therefore came to the resolution rather to fall in open combat, than allow themselves
to be butchered unresistingly.
The Sections declared themselves en
■permanence; the contest began on the 29th, and after raging through the streets for
several hours, amidst the heavy fire of artillery, was decided in favour of the
Bourgeois, after about 200 patriots had fallen. The victors occupied the Hotel
de Ville, dispersed the municipality,
and arrested Challier and his most important friends; and the Conventional
commissioners, being divided amongst themselves, did not dare to oppose the
popular will. This movement had just as little political signification as that in Marseilles; there was still no idea of hostility to the Republic or the Convention, but only of personal defence against general
plunder and a renewal of the September massacres.
At the same time the departments of Bretagne, at the opposite side of France, and with essentially different views, declared themselves
against the Jacobins. A civil war between the town and country populations had
raged throughout that province during the months of March and April. The
peasants, influenced by the same feelings as the men of La Vendee,
resisted the great conscription, declaring that they would defend house and
land against all enemies, but would not leave their homes; they did not conceal
their attachment to royalty, and demanded that the
1 Cadillot to Robespierre, in Buchez, 30, 422,
Cii.
IV.] BRETAGNE RISES AGAINST JACOBINS.
87
deposed clergy, who were reverenced both by young and old, should be
restored to them, When the national guards of the towns were summoned to
enforce the law, a struggle arose, which, though of short duration,
was carried on in every corner of the land; the rude brutality of the peasants
excited a lively indignation amongst the townspeople, and in the beginning of
May the revolt was quickly suppressed in every 1
direction.
The result in the towns was, that the party
feuds which prevailed in every other part of France were entirely suppressed; nothing was heard of Jacobin machinations against the
Bourgeois, and the middle classes .were rendered in the highest degree
enthusiastic for the Convention by the contest which they had undertaken in its favour. No sooner, therefore, did
they hear of the revolt of the Parisian authorities
against the national representatives, than the cry, first raised in Finisterre,
spread rapidly through all the districts of the
province, that all rebels against the nation, Jacobins as well as royalists,
must be made to feel the weight of the Breton arm, and several battalions of
volunteer national guards assembled to inarch to Paris for the protection of the Convention.
Under these circumstances the events of the 2nd of June naturally
produced a very powerful effect. It widened the breach between the hostile
parties, and greatly increased the number of the opponents of the Jacobins.
Foremost of these was the rich and influential city of
Bordeaux, which had always regarded its eloquent deputies with pride, and now,
loudly declaring- that it would liberate them from their illegal imprisonment,
decreed the equipment of a force sufficient for that purpose. Meanwhile some of the deputies had escaped from their confinement,
which was at that time by no means strict, and hurried away, some to Lyons and
others to Bretagne and Normandy, in order to extend the movement
1
Conf.1 Duchatellier, Histoire
de la revolution de Bretagne, Vol.
2. 1
88
SHELVING
OF DANTON.
[Book VII.
and give it the necessary unity. They were everywhere received with
open arms. The class of proprietors in Normandy had always been moderate in
their views, and being royalists at the bottom of their hearts, were little
inclined to put up with the despotism of extreme democracy. The citizens of the
Jura, the Aisne, and the upper Loire, gathered round Lyons; Montpellier,
Toulouse, Nismes, and the greater part of Provence, united themselves with Marseilles; and Bordeaux headed the towns of Guienne, Qnercy and
Peri-gord. The Jacobin clubs were everywhere closed, and their leaders
subjected to judicial examination; the lists of their members were destroyed,
the committees and authorities appointed
by the March commissioners abolished, the public monies seized and placed under
the management of the great land-owners, who were also entrusted with the
command of the military force which was in course of formation. It is true,
indeed, that the military portion of the enterprise,
although the only vital one, made but slow progress. The whole movement was in
fact purely civil, and the most zealous leaders, therefore, were not likely
from their age, their wealth, and the nature of their occupation, to be of a particularly warlike character. The most vigorous part of
their national guard was fully employed in controlling
the proletaries, who had also been roused to fanaticism
in the revolted districts in favour of the Jacobins; consequently only a small number of men could be spared for the expedition against Paris.
Still less confidence could be placed in the peasants, who, in Bretagne, had
just suffered such bloody defeats from the towns, and who, in the South, were
either enthusiastic catholics, like the Vendeans, or had been made
zealous communists, like the Parisians, by misery and hunger. Nothing remained
to the towns therefore but to raise mercenary battalions, for which officers
must first be procured, and new resources, connexions and organizations created; and lastly there was an entire want of unity and supreme
control over all the provinces, as well as of a po-i
Ch. IV.] FERMENT AMONG BOURGEOIS OF PARIS.
89
litical bond to keep together the different parties, who, for the
present, only agreed in their abhorrence of the
Jacobins. In short, the success of the moderate party in an armed collision was
from the very beginning by no means certain. As, however, the government also
was, for the moment, entirely unprepared, the general movement of the country placed the Jacobins in the greatest danger.
Meanwhile the Sections of the capital were no less active than the
Departments. In spite of the violence done to the Convention, in spite of all
the arrests—the number of which amounted to more than
1,300—there was a never-ending ferment among the citizens. The
Commune had daily to contend against their 1
opposition. More than one Section dissolved its revolutionary committee, others
refused to allow the Jacobins to speak in the assembly, and a particularly serious agitation arose against the equipment of the 6,000
Sansculottes. It was of no avail that the Municipality sent commissioners with
unlimited powers, that an arbitrary police employed every means in their power,
that the patriots of the democratic sections inarched through
all the others in turn, in order to overwhelm their opponents in each by the
weight of numbers. In tweuty-seven—i. e. in the
majority of the sections —a strong resolution was passed against the new
revolutionary army, as a source of military tyranny, so
that the municipality found itself obliged for the
present actually to postpone its formation. This was doubly
disagreeable to them, because many of their most active and useful partisans
had marched to La Vendee with the battalions of the last levy,
immediately after the 2nd of June, by which the ranks of the tape-durs
had been greatly thinned; and the municipality
felt more deeply than ever the necessity of a new recruitment. Under these circumstances the Bourgeois raised
Protocol
of the commune, 2. 4. 8. 10. 12th of June.
00
SHELVING
OF DANTON.
[Book VII.
their voices more and more loudly, and when the news arrived from
Bretagne, several of the Sections no longer attempted to conceal their sympathy
and joy. "Everywhere," cried Hebert, "the
public feeling is bad; everywhere we have to crush the germs of reaction."
The position of affairs seemed so critical, that Robespierre was against
sending any more troops to La Vendee, in order not to risk the possession of the capital; and both Danton and Hebert
agreed with him not to say a single word for the present on the tenderest point
of the whole question—that of property. The compulsory loans, the fixed
tariffs, the laws against usury, as well as the creation of a revolutionary army, were postponed to a more favourable moment. If they had
come forward with these measures now, they would have had to fear a revolt of the Sections, and then a combined movement of Paris and the
united provinces, by which they would all have been
hopelessly overwhelmed. They resolved, therefore, to play a cautious game, and
to save their hatred and their wrath, their avarice and their violence, for a
more favourable moment.
Their chief concern was to gain over the mass of the undecided' and timid by a grand liberal programme,
and thoroughly to clear themselves, during the
crisis, from the reproach of ambition and love of
plunder. They used as a means to this end the original task of the
Convention—the preparation of the new constitution. As long as the Gironde remained influential, the
Jacobins had violently opposed every step in this direction; it now lay in
their own interest rapidly to push forward the work and to throw back the
reproach of delay in the teeth of the conquered party. Danton's friend, Herault-Sechelles, was commissioned to draw up a new scheme,
which he laid before the Assembly on the 10th- of June; and on the 24th the
discussion concerning it, which was carried on with restless haste, was brought
to a close. As the object was not to produce a law which could
really be carried out, but only one which should gain
Cu.
IV.] THE JACOBINS CONCEAL THEIR
INTENTIONS. 91
over popular opinion, its contents were as practically 1 immature, and at the same time as little Jacobin as possible; a caricature, in fact, of the principles of 1789, which left all
important functions to the decision of every individual Frenchman, and consequently appeared to discard every appearance of arbitrary
rule. In the declaration of the rights of man, they
wisely left Condorcet's clause respecting property almost unaltered, and merely
added the proposition, that society was bound to support the poor either by
work or alms. In regard to foreign policy they added, with equal conciseness, to Danton's dictum—that France adhered to the system of non-intervention — the declaration of Marat, that all free
peoples are friends and allies.
Before this manifesto, however, could produce the expected effect on
the French people, its authors had to pass through an unforeseen and dangerous interlude in Paris. In drawing up this document
they had the liberal feeling of the mass of the population so exclusively
before their eyes, that they had entirely lost sight for the moment of the
aspirations of their faithful proletaries, and they were now affected in
the most painful manner by the surprise of the latter—who were »t first
confounded, aud then filled with wrath, by the apparent
treachery of their leaders. The poor creatures had so often received assurances
of cheap goods and guaranteed wages—they were so sure
of the victory of their cause after the triumph of the 2nd of June—that they
were utterly unable to explain such a complete
disappointment. Some of the inferior agents of the Hotel de Ville—a certain
Leclerc from Lyons, the priest Roux, and the street
orator Varlet—
1
Heranlt wrote to his friend De-saulnays: Charge
avec quatre de mes collegues de preparer pour Lundi un plan de Constitution, je
votes prie de nous procurer sur-le-champ les lois de Minos, qui doivent se trouver dans un recueil de lois Grecques: nous en avons un besoin
urgent. According
to the facsimile in the "Tsographie
des hommes ce'lebres" printed
in the Quarterly Review, 93. 3JQ.
92
SHELVING
OF DANTON.
[Book VII.
who considered themselves as insufficiently rewarded for their
past exertions, and thought themselves at least as good as Hebert or
Robespierre, added fuel to the flames, gained over the club of Cordeliers and
some of the Sections, and appeared before the Convention on the 25th, to reproach the Mountain with their breach of promise, and to demand the
insertion of a law of usury, or of compulsory sale, in the new Constitution. 1 When
the Mountain—who had no intention of allowing themselves to
be outdone in the eyes of the proletaries, or of throwing off the mask
before the time —drove them away with ridicule and abuse; when the municipality, on the 26th, in like manner passed over their dangerous
petition, on the motion of Hebert, to the "order of the day," the mob
called to mind the 25th of February, and the principles
propounded by Hebert at that time, and for the space of two days plundered the
ships in the quays, and the shops in the neighbouring streets. Embarrassing as
these proceedings were to the rulers, they did not venture to call out the national guard against their old associates; but they
contented themselves with gaining over the club of Cordeliers to their more
cautious views, through the influence of the Jacobins, and thereby depriving
the new demagogues of their most important organ. A sum of money from
the civil treasury allayed the disturbance of the proletaries for the moment,
and the proclamation of the new fundamental law was made in Paris without
further difficulty.
This result was generally agreeable to the Committee
of Public Safety. The majority of that body were rejoiced at the defeat of the
communistic agitation, and had yet taken
1 The debates of the Convention,
rioters as a new fraction
of the
the
municipality and the Cordeliers, enrages,
than that modern enquirers
leave
no doubt of the character of should have seriously sought for the
this
movement. It is easier to under- particular principles and programme
stand
that Robespierre and Hebert of this party, found it convenient to brand the
Ch. IV.] ATTEMPT TO RECONCILE THE PROVINCES.
93
so much part in the 31st of May that they sympathised in the wish of
the Jacobins to rally the whole of France round the banner of the new
Constitution, round the Convention and the Committee, in opposition to the
Girondists. As early as the 25th they despatched couriers in all directions,
to lay the law before the assembled people in the Departments, for their vote and approval; and they had soon the satisfaction
of receiving a favourable answer from a number of different
places. It was not possible, of course, to get in this way at the towns and
provinces which were already in a state of revolt; and concerning the treatment
of these the views of the Parisian rulers differed very widely.
The majority of the Committee were decidedly in favour of adopting
mild measures. They were so for every conceivable reason—personal
conviction, abhorrence of civil war, jealousy against the Commune, and regard
for the opinion of foreign countries. It was only too evident that in three-fourths of France neither the clubs nor the authorities possessed
sufficient power to put down the revolt of the Bourgeoisie. If the government,
therefore, resorted to force, it had no other weapon than the armies, for
which, indeed, the Bourgeois would certainly be no match. But it was not
in itself a thing to be calmly contemplated by the men of the Revolution,—to
call out the military power against the people, for the first time since 1789;
and in addition to this there was the danger of foreign invasion, to which the employment of troops at home would
necessarily open the way. The Committee therefore determined to negotiate, and,
if possible, to reconcile; and in'order to gain over the middle classes, they
brought forward a motion in the Convention, on the
7th of June, to appoint a new commander of the Parisian
national guard in the place of Henriot, and to dissolve the detested
revolutionary committees throughout the whole of France. But the democratic
party justly regarded this proposition as an open declaration
of war; Robespierre declared that the adoption of this
motion would once more
94
SHELVING
OF I)ANTON.
[Book VII.
rouse the Sections so lately quieted: and the Convention had been so
intimidated by the blow received on the 2nd, that Barere
himself withdrew his inotiou, and Robespierre carried a solemn declaration on
the 13th, that the Commune and the people of Paris had deserved well of their
country on the 2nd of June. Meanwhile the Committee liad sent off three of its
members, Robert Liudet to Lyons, Matthieu and Treilhard to
Bordeaux, and some secret agents to Normandy, to enter into uegociations
with the revolted cities, and, if possible, to prevent the outbreak of open
war. Lindet, who found an avowed Girondist and republican at the head of the police committee in Lyons, was the first to return, and
briefly reported, that as long as the movement retained its present character,
freedom had much cause for watchfulness but none for fear. This
expression referred to the fact, that the government of Lyons, though
constantly avowing republican opinions, gathered round
it for the moment all who sympathised with their immediate object—the destruction of the Jacobins; and that, consequently, a number of
monarchical elemeuts were to be fonnd in the Lyonese authorities and
national guards. The consequence was that though in the future this city might
become the centre of a powerful opposition, yet for the moment the Girondists
possessed but little influence. Lyons, in fact, manifested not the slightest interest in the party questions of the Convention, and put no
other device upon their banners than safety and and property.1 As
long, therefore, as the government separated itself in some degree from
the Jacobins, there remained a small possibility of reconciliation; the city avoided all direct manifestations of
hostility; allowed e. g. transports of horses and arms to pass
without hindrance to the army of the Alps, and gave the Conventional
commissioners a safe and honourable reception. The Committee
would have been heartily glad, on its part, to come to terms, and to
From
the official documents in Guillon de Montleon, Chap. VTI.
Cu.
VI.] AGITATION IN BORDEAUX AND
LYONS.
95
grant the Lyonese an amnesty for their revolt, and liberty to manage their internal affairs, in return for an acknowledgment of the Convention as the legitimate government of the land.
But in the face of the more zealous members of its party, the Committee did not
dare to take any open step in this direction; they were
incessantly and vehemently urged by Dubois-Crance and others to interfere by
force of arms, and it was with difficulty that they deferred the discussion on this point from day to day. 1
The popular feeling in Bordeaux was more ardent and passionate than in Lyons, because the former entered with greater zeal into the contest
in behalf of the Girondists, and was determined not to acknowledge the
authority of the Convention until it had recalled the imprisoned deputies to
their seats. The envoys of the Committee, therefore, were surrounded
with guards, and after some feeble attempts at negotiation banished from the
city. Yet this ardour was not backed by such lasting endurance as in Lyons. The
sons of the rich citizens paraded in splendid uniforms as a mounted national guard, but there was nowhere any trace of an inclination to
enter upon the serious duties of war. The same may be said, with still greater
truth, of Bretagne and Normandy; the movement produced a great number of
speeches and pamphlets, some money, but hardly any troops. The
middle class in Normandy held constitutional opinions, but the fugitive
Girondists were loud in their expressions of republican zeal, and thought to
brand the Jacobins most deeply by calling them concealed royalists. Under these circumstances the Bourgeois saw little reason to risk their lives in
supporting the democrat Buzot against the democrat Robespierre, and the call to
arms had so little effect, that the heads of the Department were obliged to
hire the so-called Carabots—a plundering and cowardly crew, which had been originally organised and
armed by the Jacobins—for
1 Report of Merlin voii
Thionville. Conv. nat. Oct. 23nd 1793.
96
SHELVING
OF DANTON.
[Book VII.
their war against the Convention. 1 The
shortsighted zeal of the Gii'ondists had an equally
bad effect on the conduct of their armed force. General Wimpfeu held the
military command of the province at that time; in 1792 he-had defended Thionville against the Germans, and for some months past had
commanded the so-called "army of the coasts
of Cherbourg," which for the present consisted of himself and his two
adjutants. He was a strong minded and moderate man, a liberal royalist in
his political opinions, full of disgust at the disturbances of the Parisian mob, and consequently very willing to place
himself at the head of the Breton forces. But he very soon convinced himself of
the practical incapacity of his new associates, and at last plainly told the
Girondists, that if they did .not wish to perish immediately, they must invoke the aid of England. They loudly inveighed
against this proposition, rejected his proposal with patriotic indignation, and
from that time kept a watchful and suspicious eye upon the general. He returned
their distrust with interest, and in order not to lose sight of
them, remained behind at Caen when the column of Carabots began their march
towards Paris and advanced as far as Vernon on the Seine; where they were soon
afterwards dispersed by a handful of Parisian
gensd'armes, almost without firing a shot. In such a state
of weakness and disunion, the agents of the Committee of Public Safety, who
operated by means of speeches and pamphlets, promises and threats, and, above
all, great masses of assignats,
had an easy task.2 At the beginning of July, the Committee was already
assured of the submission of these provinces.
In spite of the 2nd of June the Committee of Public Safety endeavoured
to maintain a similar position in war and
1
Couf. Vanltier et Mancel, Pin-surreetion normande, Caen 1858. 2 The papers of the Committee of
Public
Safety
furnish us with a great number of proofs of this.
Cir.
TV.]
FOREIGN
POLICY.
97
diplomacy to that which they had already taken up at home. They adhered
to the wish to carry on the war according to a reasonable
plan and with definite views, although the difficulty of such a course was
greatly enhanced by the coup (VetM of the Commune. Which of the European courts would like to treat with
Marat and Henriot? And what French minister, without risking his life, could have pro-r posed to the Commune an alliance with a king?
Lebrun himself, on account, as was alleged, of his above-mentioned inclination
to peace, had been arrested on the 2nd, and the Swedish Ambassador had left
Paris for Switzerland in despair.
Nevertheless the Committee sought at any rate to keep the clue in their hands,
and made use of the first few weeks, (during which Lebrun, in spite of his
imprisonment, conducted the business until the appointment of his successor),
to send off several diplomatic agents who were initiated
into their views, and more especially to accredit Desportes at the court of
Stuttgart. When the answer to Lebrnn's question of the 6th of April arrived
from London, to 'the effect, that no French envoy could be received in England, and that all overtures should be addressed to the head -
quarters of the Dnke of York, the Committee ordered the minister to draw up the
necessary instructions for such a negotiation— whether it were for a separate
treaty with England, or for a congress of all the belligerent
powers. The Committee would have joyfully concluded a peace upon any tolerable
conditions; always provided that the Parisian democrats did not send them to
the scaffold for their pains.
When, under the influence of these sentiments,
the Committee had entrusted the command of their
most important army to General Custine, they soon afterwards appointed a friend
of his, General Beauharnais, chief of £he army of the Rhine; and that pattern
of a liberal nobleman,'General Biron, commander on the third most
important theatre of war—La Vendee. Not one of these officers was a
considerable general, and they had all a strong vein of hazardous ad-* HI. G
98
SHELVING
OF DANTON.
[Book VII.
venture in their characters, but they were on
that very account all the more suitable tools of the utterly foolhardy
diplomacy of their chiefs in the Committee. Custine was as innocent of
political convictions as Biron or Beauharnais, but with all their republican
love of freedom, they were still cavaliers and soldiers to the
back-bone, and zealously cultivated discipline, honour, and military pride,
among their troops. This was sufficient to bring them into irreconcileable feud
with the democrats of the capital; Robespierre in the Jacobin club, and Hebert in his journal, were inexhaustible in their charges against
the aristocratic generals; and the expulsion of all quondam noblemen from the
armies soon became the loudest cry of the Parisian
party. Bouchotte, minister at war, obedient to every
beck of the Hotel dev
Ville, and entirely guided by bis chief secretary Vincent, a bosom friend of
Hebert, caused the lampoons of Hebert to be circulated
by millions in all the camps, by means of his own commissioners. 1 He
also protected every soldier in his mutinous conduct towards an
officer, without considering the fatal consequences of such a vile proceeding
in the face of an advancing enemy. The generals, irritated to the utmost, overwhelmed the Committee of Public Safety with their complaints,
and the latter—who, though they no longer ventured to carry out Custine's
first plan of sending the army of the Moselle to Flanders, considered the
general necessary to them both for war and negotiation—did not hesitate a
moment to proceed against Bouchotte. They announced
to the Convention, on the 13th of June, that Bouchotte
had sent in his resignation, and proposed Geueral Beauharnais as his
successor. The Convention sanctioned
1 Bouchotte himself states, that rest to seven other journalists, and
from
April 1793, 1,200,000 livres that 1,118,800 copies were circulated
were
spent for this object in rather of the Pere Duchesne alone. Buchez,
less
than a year; that 1,118,800 of 31, 236. this sura were paid to Hebert, and the
Ch. IV.]
THE
CHIEFS OF LA VENDEE.
99
the proposal, but the patriots immediately raised such a violent storm,
that Beauharnais did not dare to accept the nomination, and Bouchotte remained
as firmly fixed in his post as ever. The decided predominance of the Parisian
party was proved about the same time by the filling up of
the vacancies left by the ministers who were arrested on the 2nd of June:
Lebrun was succeeded by Desforgues, lately a subordinate
of Bouchotte, and consequently a democrat of the first water; and
Destournelles, one of the most zealous members of the revolutionary municipality, succeeded Claviere as minister
of finance. The anarchical intrigues of the democrats
were carried on in the military department with ever-increasing zeal.
The consequences manifested themselves in a
terrible manner in all the theatres of war. The
revolt of La Vendee, especially, carried on with unbounded enthusiasm and opposed with infinite confusion, daily increased in extent and strength.
Charette, formerly a naval lieutenant, ruled over the marsh land of the coast from Nantes to Sables d'Olonne. In the interior
the waggoner Catelineau—the Saint of Anjou, as the peasants were accustomed to
call him on account of his ardent enthusiasm—had nearly 40,000 men under arms,
with which force he' drove the republicans out of the country South
of the Loire, and threatened the nearest districts of Anjou and Maine
at several points. Opposed to him stood General Boulard on the coast, with
12,000 men, near Sables d'Olonne, and General Canclaux, with an equal force, at Nantes; both these divisions consisted of good troops, but were
hardly strong enough to cut off the enemy from the sea, where perhaps they
might enter into communication with England. On the land side, Biron had to
stand the brunt of the enemy's attack with an army which contained
at most about 18,000 serviceable soldiers. The remainder consisted of hastily
raised national guards from the neighbouring districts, young and
wretchedly armed recruits, and, lastly, the Parisian volunteers under Santerre—men who filled
G2 •
100
SHELVING
OF DANTON.
[Book VII.
the country with their excesses, and the camp with their lawlessness; who in every battle ran away at the first shot, and often
carried the other divisions with them.1
Biron vainly endeavoured to control them or to send them
away, since Bouchotte's commissioner, Ronsin, constantly protected and
encouraged them in the name of the minister; and when Biron had procured an
order from one of the numerous Conventional commissioners, Ronsin
easily got a counter-order from another. It was fortunate for the Convention
that the peasants, with all their heroic devotion, were just as little capable
of steady perseverance and regularity as their enemies; the character of this
partial war was made up on both sides of daring surprises,
furious onslaughts, local defeats, and unexpected reappearances, without
either party being able to gain any decisive advantage. When at last, at the
end of the month, the Vendeans collected their whole force for an attack upon Nantes, Canclaux repulsed their tumultuary bands at the weakly
barricaded entrances of the town by a steadily conducted fire from the houses
and hedges. They were, however, so far from being destroyed by this disaster,
that General Westermann, who had just dispersed an army of peasants
by a bold irruption into the interior, was immediately
afterwards furiously attacked, and driven back with great bloodshed. This last
blow brought the confusion at head-quarters to a
crisis. Immediately after the battle Westermann learned that a favourite
of Ronsin, named Rossignol, a dissolute goldsmith of Paris, who, as a September assassin, had gained a claim to the rank of lieutenant-colonel, was
rousing an assembly of soldiers in a public-house to robbery and insubordination. Biron, encouraged by a letter from the Committee of Public
Safety, which had
1 Conf. Barere's report July 26th a cinq cents livres (the levy of the
according
to the orders of Committee middle of May), la honte de farmee;
of Public Safety: c'es/ le
royalisme Us sunt laches, fuyavds, indisciplines
qui, dans Paris, a fait lever ces
he'ros et pillards.
Ch. IV.]
DESTITUTION
OF FRENCH
ARMY.
101
arrived shortly before, and which praised him and exhorted him to
perseverance, caused the mutineer to be arrested in the very act and handed
over to a court-martial. Ronsin hastened to Paris to save his friend, and there
was greater quiet in the camp; but Vincent and Hebert, the Jacobins and the
Commune, united in a furious cry for the annihilation
of the shameless and liberticidal generals.
The condition of affairs in the Army of the north, in Flanders, was.
exactly similar. On his arrival Custine found the main body, after the loss of
Famars, in the so-called Caesar's camp, near Bouchain on the Scheldt, in number about 39,000—of whom 10,000 had no muskets, 6,000 more no
bayonets,—5,000 cavalry and, in all, 147 artillerymen. 1
Moreover the officers were without authority, and the men without discipline,
and both without courage or self-reliance; and they continually
received denunciations from Paris, which taught them to
look at the treachery of the generals as the sole source
of every disaster. A second corps of 36,000 men, which was stationed at Lille,
under General Omoran, was in no better case; while the
Ardennes army (from Maubeuge to Longwy), after sending off large contingents to
La Vendee, counted at most 10,000 men, chiefly newly-arrived national guards.
In order to raise the forces to these numbers, so many men had been drawn from
the garrisons of the fortresses, that, e. g. Lequesnoi
retained only 1,600 men, Landrecies 1,100 men within its walls; a weakness of
force all the more dangerous, because the majority of the , fortresses were
just as little in a state of defence as in the previous September. In the above-mentioned places fortifications were
raised in the sight of the enemy; the works of Bouchain and Rocroy were in a
state of utter ruin, and Cambrai and Lille were only provisioned for a few
weeks. The administration of Pache and Bouchotte,
This and the following state-
ments are derived from the correspondence
of the war ministry. •
102
SHELVING
OF DANTON.
[Book VII.
or, in other words, the capture of the war ministry by the Mountain,
had brought this most important frontier to a
state of utter defencelessness. In the face of these facts, what becomes of the
boasted glory of the Mountain, that it tyrannised over France, indeed, but at
any rate saved her from foreign enemies?
But we may go further than this. Thanks to the measures of the Jacobins, the public feeling of
these border lands,—which even in March had been thoroughly patriotic,— had by
this time undergone a radical change. This new evil was owing to the conduct of
the conventional commissioners during the great conscription, and also to the law of the maximum. The commissioners in these
districts, like their brethren in Paris and Lyons, had, with brutal partiality,
and under the influence of the clubs, kej3t back
the radical proletaries in the cities, in order to
control the latter, and sent off the respectable bourgeois from their business
.to the battalions. As to the maximum law, the
peasants declared they would rather eat their oats themselves than let them go
at such a price; and Lille, on this account, could not be supplied with provisions until July, when Carnot. on his own responsibility, suspended the operation of this jjernicious enactment. In all quarters the inhabitants had learned to look at the
occupation of their country by the Austrians, not as a national misfortune, but as a deliverance from famine and destruction. It is
due to Custine and the Committee to say that they did their utmost to rescue
the army from this horrible state. Custine began, on the
5th of June, by issuing a general order, in which he
threatened deserters, mutineers, and ringleaders, with immediate death. 1 A few examples
1 Bouchotte blames this order on On
his own part. Custine wrote se-
tlie
1st of July as utterly inconsistent veral times, that he should always
with
the spirit of republican armies; admonish an ignorant
Minister; that
"A
free man," he said "must carry out he was republican enough not to
take
his
commands among his brethren a dunce for a god, even though he
not
by inspiring terror but confidence.'' were (a Minister, &c.
Ch. IV.] PERSECUTION OF GENERAL CUSTINE.
103
showed that he was in earnest; he was, moreover, equally strict with
the officers, indefatigable in providing for and training his forces; and the
soldiers, though they grumbled at first, soon saw that he
was in the right, and began themselves to seize, and deliver up the
Parisian envoys. At the same time the Committee exerted itself to reinforce the
army. The levy of March began to bear its fruits; by the end of June, the camp
of Caesar counted 55,000 men, the Ardennes army 29,000,
and a new levy of 30,000 cavalry was actively going on. It is true that when
the patriots of the capital talked of relieving Valenciennes, aud demanded
Custine's head for his dilatoriness in carrying out their wishes, the general could only shrug his shoulders with angry pity. He was quite
contented to accustom his troops to warlike confidence by petty engagements
between the outposts, and thanked Heaven that his powerful opponents allowed
him leisure for this slow training of his men. And thus the troops of
the line, at least, gradually regained some degree of steadiness; among the
volunteers, however, Hebert's journals and Bouchotte's intrigues kept
up the anarchical spirit, until Custine, at last, like Westermann, made short work of them, and caused the commissioners of the minister to be
arrested and confined. 1 As a
matter of course the Jacobins were from this moment perfectly convinced of his
infamous treachery.
The Committee of Public Safety, whose position was painfully embarrassed by such a breach between
the minister and the general, could not avoid seeing the danger which must
arise, if, in the midst of this quarrel, Valenciennes should
1 A certain Cellier made himself
plaint against Custine is that this
particularly conspicuous; some of the 11 General-moustache" was in the habit
battalions
protected him, and after of abusing Robespierre, &c: there
his
arrest he wrote to Billaud-Varen- is no talk of his holding communi-
nes
and Hebert, by whose influence cations with the Austrians. he was
liberated.. The constant com"
104
SHELVING
OF DANTON.
[Book VII.
fall and the Austrians attack the army. Custine had declared in the
most decided manner, that the place could not yet be relieved: the war seemed
almost hopeless, and peace further removed than ever.
The answer to the note which had been sent to Austria at the end of May had
arrived: it was to the effect that it was impossible to negotiate with a
country of which no one knew the actual government. 1 In
this position the Committee resolved to make a
last attempt. The ambassadors Semonville and
Maret were just starting for Constantinople and Naples: they were both directed—as the sea was blockaded by the allied fleets—to pass through
Switzerland and North Italy, and they now received secret
despatches' to Florence, Naples and Venice, in which an offer was made to
'these States of the life of the imprisoned cpieen, if they would for the
future keep the peace with France. - Danton was no stranger to this stepj 3 but neither he nor his colleagues were in a position to guarantee the
safety of the caieen. At any rate they might hope that the above-mentioned
courts would not come to a decision without consulting the emperor of Germany,
and that then the hostilities on the part of the Austrians would be
somewhat relaxed.
But at the time when the Committee adopted these extra-ordinary measures, the hours of its rule were numbered. It was no
especial disaster, no individual hatred, no personal dislike, which brought
about its fall; it was the general position of affairs which rendered
its continuance impossible-It had staked its existence on mediation and
compromise, but the time of half measures was irrevocably passed. The
1 Haeften to the States General aanu, page 67. That Maret, in 1797,
of
Holland, June 8th. 2 Durozoir in . at Lille, did not
mention the circum-
the Biographie unicertselle, 73,
104, stance to Malmcsbury
(diary III,
according
to a note of Maret, the -iS'6.)
is no proof to the contrary,
existence of which is also confirmed 3 Mallet du Pan, Me'moires II. 63. by Ch. de Sor, in Le Due de Bus-
Cii. IV.] FALL OF THE COM. OF PUBLIC SAFETY.
105
Jacobins had laden themselves with such a mass of crime, that they
could not spare the lives of any of their opponents without the most
deadly apprehensions for their own. This dreadful consequence of sin was
displayed in the most glaring colours both in the affair of the generals and of
the revolted cities. If they did not succeed in sending Custine and Biron to the scaffold, a criminal charge of mutiny, robbery and every kind
of maladministration, would continually hang over the heads of Bouchotte's
agents, the darlings of the Parisian democracy. If the cities were not reduced
to unconditional submission, the heads of the patriots of Lyons,
Marseilles and Bordeaux must inevitably fall; for they were all standing before
irritated judges on a charge of public butchery, murderous plots, and illegal
exactions. This antagonism allowed of no solution or reconciliation. The Convention, at the imperious demand of the Commune and the
Jacobin club, had given orders for the liberation of all oppressed
"patriots," with the threat of severe punishment in case of
non-compliance. But to the desperate and revengeful population of Lyons, this appeared like a
sentence of death against themselves—like the setting, free of uutameable
beasts of prey. Challier's trial, therefore, was zealously carried on in spite
of all the decrees of the Convention; the arming of the people was accelerated, and an avowed royalist, Perrin de Precy, was placed at
the head of the army of Bourgeois. The reaction upon Paris was not long in
shewing itself. The Jacobins were furious against the
Committee, which had allowed things to come to such a pass
by its criminal mildness; and the latter did not cling very tenaciously to
power, the mainr tenance of which, in the road on which they had entered, was
no longer possible. In this state of affairs the final decision, as far as we can see, was brought about
by the long-expected and much discussed report of the Committee respecting the delinquencies and fate of the Girondists. The report
itself had been drawn up by St. Just, who, however,
106
SHELVING
OF DANTON.
[Book VII.
was forced by the majority of the Committee 1 to
make several alterations; it was proposed that only the fugitive deputies, nine
in number, who had openly taken part in the rebellion, should be proscribed;
five others impeached, and the rest recalled to the Convention. Such was the proposition made to the Convention by St.
Just, on the 8th of July, in the name of the Committee; it appeared to the
genuine Jacobins both a bitter mockery and a mortal danger to their party, and
the decree was postponed at their instigation. They would
have nothing more to do with a Committee which recalled half their enemies from
the steps of the scaffold to their arm chairs in the
Convention.
As the powers of the Committee expired on the 10th of July, no noisy
attack was needed for its removal: the Convention
had only to decree a new election instead of prolonging
its authority. The members themselves were partly inclined to favour the
change, either from fear of greater persecution, or from the wish not to cut
themselves off from public employment for the future. Danton's most
intimate friend, Camille Desmoulins, himself brought forward the motion:
Barere, who always liked to take the stronger side, openly joined Robespierre
on this occasion, and thereby secured his own re-election. Couthon, St. Just, and Robert Lindet, also retained their places; Danton himself,
whose conduct became continually more obnoxious to the Jacobins, did not gain a
single vote, and found himself represented only by his friends
Herault-Sechelles and Thuriot. The three last,
Jean-Bon St. Andre, Prieur and Gasparin, were Jacobins of the first water, so
that the Committee,— which had hitherto represented the centre of the
Convention, under the leadership of Danton,—had now become the organ of
Robespierre with a slight dash of Dantonism, It is not quite clear
why Robespierre himself did not enter the new Com^
'
Protocol of the Cornrnittee of Public Safety, June 24tb, July 2nd.
Cii. IV.] THE NEW COMMITTEE OF PUBLIC SAFETY. 107
niittee; at any rate he was present at its sittings,
and when Gasparin sent in his resignation, Robespierre caused himself to be
formally elected.
The 10th of July is the second act of the coup
d'etat, which Robespierre and Pache, the Jacobins and the Commune, commenced on the 31st of May. On the 2nd of
June they expelled the last, and sometimes effectual, opposition to themselves
from the Convention, by the overthrow of the Gironde; on the 10th of July,
Robespierre himself took possession of the helm of the State.
The tyranny of democratic revolution was now for the first time
unreservedly displayed in all its horrors. All that had hitherto kept the
Committee of Public Safety in the paths of moderation and mediation
■—aversion to bloodshed and civil war, regard for the material welfare of
the people, for justice or morality, considerations
of the danger of foreign invasions—all immediately vanished into air. Perish
what might, the new Committee had no other watchword than the unconditional
subjection of the country, the utter annihilation of all opponents, and reckless war against Europe. It was not the boldness of a
moral resolve which drove them into this dreadful path, it was the timid
anxiety of the criminal, who hopes to find a momentary escape from punishment
and retribution in the completion of his crime. "Whoever wishes to
bear the name of Jacobin,'' it was said on one occcasion during the debates of
the club, "must be able to answer the question: What
hast thou done to be hanged, in case of a counter-revolutionV The men of the 2nd of June, of the 21st of January, of the 2nd of
September, had given a triple answer to this question; whoever else
besides themselves and their bandits might rise to power— whether Girondists or
Constitutionalists, Bourgeois or emigres,
Vendeans or foreigners—they could look for nothing but a shameful
end. For them there was no safety but in unlimited
power; no security for their rule but to reduce the land all around them to a
desert. They were rendered foolhardy and
bloodthirsty by the fear of deatht
108
SHELVING OF DANTON.
[Book VII.
In the first place the new Committee did not hesitate for a moment what
attitude to assume towards the revolted cities. Normandy and Bretagne, indeed,
submitted without further trouble, in consequence of the measures of the late Committee and the flight of the Carabots; but means were immediately employed to reduce the southern provinces by force of arms.
Likeminded conventional commissioners, regardless
of exposing the French frontier on the side of Piedmont, had already summoned 4,000 men of the army of the Alps to operate against Provence under
Carteaux, before whom the national guard of Marseilles withdrew behind their
walls almost without a blow. Kellermann himself, commander of the army of the
Alps, was ordered to Lyons with 6,000 men,1 so
that 20,000, at most, were left on the frontier to oppose nearly double that
number. As, however, this corps was evidently insufficient for the subjugation
of the populous and excited city, and as the
Lyonese, meanwhile, had openly declared against the coup
d'etat of the 2nd of June, the Committee, on the very first day of its
existence, had recourse to a measure which it is difficult to characterise. On
the motion of Couthon, the Convention issued a decree, on the 12th of July,
which proscribed the leaders of the Lyonese
revolt, confiscated to the State the property of all' those who partook in it,
and decreed the distribution of the booty amongst the patriots of the city and
the neighbourhood. The object of this decree is clear from the circumstance, that' the conventional commissioners in those provinces
raised the peasants against Lyons; Javoques collected 12,000 men in Vivarais;
Reverchon 13,000 men in the Upper Saone, Cote d'Or, and the Saone et Loire;
and, lastly, Couthon himself, by a written summons, 25,000 men in
his native place, Puy-de-D6me. It was necessary to apply a powerful excitement
to bring these bodies of men to actual combat; and there could be no stronger
motive than the prospect of
1 July 14th. Report of Merlin, Oct. 23d 1794.
Ch. IV.]
OPERATIONS
AGAINST LYONS.
109
plundering this wealthy manufacturing city. And thus the new government
began their office by hounding on the rude masses to the pillage of citizens
who had only taken up arms to protect their lives and persons from a handful of lawless murderers. The city once more offered
submission, if the Convention would recall their decrees; but as the tribunal
at Lyons had sentenced Challier to death, and actually executed him, there was no chance of a favourable hearing. Dubois-Crance, the conventional commissioner of the army of the
Alps, demanded unconditional surrender; and when this was refused by the
Lyonese he immediately commenced hostilities. He made, however, but very little
progress before the arrival of the above-mentioned hordes of peasants. Kellermann, meanwhile, had added
8,000 national guards to his battalions; but with these forces he was not even
able to form the blockade of the beleaguered town. He himself occupied the road
to Geneva, on the" right bank of the Rhone, with one column;
General Rivas was posted with a second on the left bank of the Saone, on the
north of the city; a third, under 'General Vaubois, stood on .the left bank of
the Rhone, and immediately began to bombard the quarter which lay nearest to them. But Precy commanded a national guard of 40,000 men
and had an arsenal of 300 guus within the city; the roads towards the
south-west leading to Forez and Clermont were open for traffic, and the
besiegers had to content themselves for the present
with maintaining their own position against the constant sallies of the
Lyonese. The offensive operations of the republicans came to a complete standstill when general Kellermann was recalled to Savoy by an
attack of the Piedmontese; and although he energetically repulsed the
foreign enemy, Robespierre declared, in the Jacobin club, that all the fault of
the success of the Lyonese rebels lay with Kellermann; whereupon the minister
at war immediately decreed the dismissal of the general.'
At the same time the signal for bloodshed was given
in Paris also in every quarter. On the
13th of July, a young
110
SHELVING
OF DANTON.
[Book VII.
girl from Caen, named Charlotte Corday, full of enthusiasm for an ideal
republic, and filled with indignation against the Parisian demagogues
by the fate of the Gironde, presented herself at the house of Marat, "the
friend of the people," the darling of the Parisian mob. She gained access
to Marat under the pretext of reporting the progress of events in Bre-tagne, and then stabbed him by a well-aimed blow with a knife. We have
already observed that Marat had never exercised a decisive influence on the
course of the Revolution. He had risen with the power of the mob, because, in
his infinite self-complacency, he possessed the faculty of demanding in all honesty and sincerity, as the undoubted right of the people,
all that was usually regarded as insane or criminal— e. g. murder of political
opponents, robbery of other people's property, and mutiny of the soldiers against their officers. With no less sincere conviction he then
declared himself the only man fitted'to be dictator in France, received money
from Philip of Orleans—for what ought not to be allowed to the virtuous friend
of the people?—furnished his always dirty and disorderly rooms with
costly satin furniture, engaged in one vile love affair after
another, and incessantly demanded, in ever-increasing numbers, the heads of all
corrupters of the people. Such <■ man could only be a tool in the
hands of cooler and wi r leaders.
At this period, in July, he was confined by a disgusting malady, laboured under
the suspicions of the Jacobins on account of his longing for the dictatorship,
and had become a source of annoyance even to his colleagues in the Convention. His death, therefore, could have no real influence on the subsequent
course of the Revolution, except by giving the Parisian
democrats the opportunity of decking their own lust of
murder with the title of just revenge. On the day after his death Billaud-Va-rennes brought forward a motion to commence criminal proceedings against thirty-two Girondists; two deputies were arrested as
alleged accomplices of Charlotte Corday, on the person of one of whom a Written
protest was found against
Ch. IV.]
ARREST
OF BIRON AND CUSTINE.
Ill
the 2nd of June, signed by seventy-three deputies, which from that time
forward remained as a standing title of impeachment againt the lives of the
subscribers. The time had now arrived to come to a conclusion respecting St.
Just's report of the 8th, in accordance with the wishes of the new rulers;
on the 28th, therefore, the Convention decreed the proscription of twenty
Girondist deputies, and the arraignment of nine others before the revolutionary
tribunal.
The generals, as well as the Girondists, were made to
feel the effects of the change of government. No sooner had the new Committee
seized the reins of power than it pronounced the deposition of General Biron on
the 11th of July, and summoned him to Paris to answer for his conduct. He was succeeded by the miserable Rossignol, who, however, had
the good word of Robespierre, and was commissioned by the Committee — in the
first protocol signed by Robespierre — to burn all the houses, hedges and
woods, in La Vendee, to cut down the corn, to drive away the cattle,
and transport the old men, women, and children into other Departments. The
execution of the men was a matter of course: "In two months," said
Barere, "La Vendee will cease to exist." Four-and-twenty hours after
Biron's dismissal, Custine's turn arrived. The
committee, which did not venture to proceed openly against him, on account of
the attachment of his troops, sent him orders on the 12th to come to Paris, to
take part in an important consultation. On his arrival the news of the fall of Conde had been just received; he was, nevertheless,
greeted in the streets by the acclamations of the people; but this was only an
additional reason in the eyes of the Committee to hasten his end. On the
22nd the Convention ordered his arrest, "in the interest,"
they said, "of the public security." Whereupon
Ronsin wrote to Vincent: "I congratulate you on the fall of Custine; 1
contributed somewhat to the overthrow of Biron, and I hope that you will
proceed in the same way against Beauharnais and his associates."
Bouchotte and
112
SHELVING
OF DANTON.
[Book VII.
the Commune saw the generals at their feet; the principle of free
soldiership with military licence had completely gained the day.
On the same . day on which Custine was conducted
to prison, Mayence opened its gates to the Prussians. Although the former Committee of Public Safety had by great exertions
strengthened the armies of the Moselle and Rhine by nearly 20,000 men, yet the
French could not hinder General Kalkreuth from beginning
the general assault on the 18th of June, and then continuing the attack by toilsome operations against the outworks. Four weeks later, however, he was
still half a league from the principal fortifications,
and Beauharnais, who, however slowly and irregularly,
was always making some progress, was just on the point of forcing the positions
of Brunswick which covered the besiegers, and bringing
certain relief to the town. But the relaxation of discipline and the absence of
the feeling of honour, bore the same fruits as in every
other part of the French army. The troops, who had. suffered from want of meat
and vegetables, became refractory, although they had still abundance of
bread and wine; and the conventional Commissioners were apprehensive for their own personal safety in case of imprisonment.1 In
short, on the 22nd, the capitulation w~.-j signed
on condition of a safe retreat for the garrison, which was bound not to serve
against the allies for the space of a year. The soldiers shouted with joy at the news, and drank bumpers with the Prussians and Hessians, who
inarched into the town,2 without any feeling of shame at having surrendered, while all the
1 The above-cited Brunswick correspondence speaks of the bribing of the 'French leaders, but the groundlessness of this suspicion is proved both by the official
documeuts of the Prussian ministry and
the statements and letters in Reynaud's life of Merlin, of Thionville.
2 This is taken from the journals of
the men given by Ditfnrtli die
Hessen in der
Champayne u. s. w.
Cu.
IV.]
FALL
OF VALENCIENNES.
113
fortifications remained untouched, and the relieving troops were close
at hand. Beauharnais stopped as soon as he received the crushing intelligence,
and, well assured of his own condemnation, soon
afterwards sent in his resignation, by which however he did not eseape the
hands of Bouehotte's associates.1
The same eauses which were in operation here, also led, a few days
later, to the fall of Valeneiennes. The citizens of this place had for some time longed for the entranee of the imperial troops, and the garrison
resisted any eon-tinuanee of their sufferings, although here, as in Mayenee,
the main works of the fortress were uninjured, and contained supplies of
provisions for a full year. There was, indeed, no hope of relief, for in
the camp of Caasar the report of Custine's arrest had nearly eaused a mutiny of
the soldiers, and the newly restored bands of order and confidence had been
again torn asunder. Consequently, when, on the 25th, the Austrians had sueeeeded in foreing several of the outworks of Valeneiennes, a
riot broke out in the place among the soldiers and citizens. The conventional
commissioners, who were present, were repeatedly threatened by the raging
populaee; an agent of the ministers was with difficulty reseued
from their hands; and the brave septuagenarian eommandant, General Ferrand,
being without hope of aid from any quarter, was foreed to eapitulate. On the
first of August, therefore, the Allies oeeupied the eity amid the shouts of the population, winch was immediately made to swear fealty, not
to Louis XVII., but to the Emperor Francis.
The Emigres in Brussels • raised indignant protests
1 The conventional commissioners
attaehed to the Moselle army immediately sent in indignant reports; St. Cyr was also of opinion that the resistance might
have been prolonged. But it was in the interest of the
III.
rulers
to praise the brave garrison of Mayence, and we therefore read their praises in
every quarter. But eompare their conduct, e. g., with Wurmser's long and
steady defenee of Mantua in 1797.
H
114
SHELVING
OF DANTON.
[Book VII.
against this proceeding, but the retreating garrison was so thoroughly
demoralised, that, on their march into the interior,
they raised thundering vivats
to the Prince of Coburg and the house of Austria, in-the public
market-place at Soissons.1
When this disaster became known in Paris, and it was clear to everybody
that Coburg might disperse the shattered army of Caesar's camp with his
superior force, and then march towards Paris without
resistance, the Committee had no other thought than how to make the best use of
these dangers to excite the passions of their political adherents, and to crush
their domestic enemies. On the arrival of the news from
Mayence, Custine was brought before the revolutionary
tribunal; three more Girondists were impeached; and the number of judges in the
criminal tribunal was doubled, with a view to more comprehensive operations.
After the fall of Valenciennes the Convention gave orders for the
confiscation of all estates in La Vendee belonging to the rebels, the
destruction of the church of St. Denis, the arrest of all foreigners living in
France, especially the English, whose government, it was alleged, was carrying
on the war with fire and murder, and was therefore accursed in the eyes of
all the nations of Europe. None of these things, as we need scarcely remark,
had any connexion with the loss of the fortresses, or the reinforcement of the
armies; if they had any bearing upon the war at all, it was
this, that they irrevocably destroyed the last hopes of peace.
Nothing more had been heard for a long time of the negotiation with
Prussia. The faction now in power had, as early as June, sent out assassins
against the King and the Duke of York; but their murderous
plans had been discovered from letters intercepted before Mayence,
1 According to the unanimous
commissioners and generals, statements of all the reports of ihe
Cii. IV.]
THE
QUEEN SEPARATED FROM HER SON.
115
and happily frustrated.1
Against England the Committee indulged in a stream of all the abusive words
contained in the French language, because a national convention of British
democrats had been fixed for September in Edinburgh,
and it was wished to give them courage to commence a revolt, by an irreparable breach with the English government.
As regards Austria, lastly, those above-mentioned
secret instructions to Maret. and Semonville decided, just at this moment, the
unhappy fate of the imprisoned queen. The fallen Committee of Public Safety,
on the very last day of its existence, had the cowardly meanness to inform the Convention of the plot for her liberation—which it had, not
indeed initiated, but at any rate favoured— cunningly charged an innocent
officer, General Dillon, with the crime, and decreed the separation of the
dangerous princess from her son. The Municipality carried out this resolution
with triumphant ferocity. Its officers appeared in the middle of the night to
announce the order to the unhappy
mother, just startled from sleep. A dreadful scene ensued. For more than an
hour she offered a desperate resistance to the myrmidons, threw herself upon
the boy's bed, and thus protected him with her own person against the
assailants. No persuasions, no threats, were of any avail, she
would not yield or move; until suddenly one of the men seized her daughter,
declaring that he would cut down the girl, if she did not deliver up the son.
Then indeed her arms fell powerless, and she
allowed one child to be torn from her in order to save
the other.2
1 This correspondence is in the
English state paper office; its authenticity is proved by some details
concerning Dumouriez, .which at that time could be known to only a very
few persons. — 2 The commissioners of the commune reported on their part: La separation s'est faite avec
toute la sensibilite qii'on devait at-tendre dans cette circonstance, oh les
magistrats du peuple ont eu tous les e'gards compatibles avec la se've'rite de
leurs fonctions. Louis
Blanc, IX. 379,
considers the separation as justi-
H2
SHELVING
OP DANTON.
[Book VII.
After this horrible night she could look for nothing worse; in all her
further sufferings she had no support but quiet resignation and the certain
hope of death. Her persecutors did not allow her to wait long
for it. At the end of July the Committee received the intelligence that
Semonville and Maret — from whose mission the Powers apprehended revolutionary intrigues in Italy and serious consequences in Constantinople — had been seized on their passage through
the Grisons by an Austrian officier, and taken as prisoners to Milan. After
their instructions had thus fallen into the hands of Austria, the Committee had
to apprehend their untimely publication, and thereupon resolved by an extreme measure to clear themselves of all suspicion of a love of
peace and humanity. On the 1st of August they caused the Convention to decree
the removal of the queen to the Conciergeric,
and her trial before the revolutionary tribunal. By thus treating the daughter of Maria Theresa as a
common criminal, they cut off for a long period all possibility of negotiation
between Austria and the Republic.
War then — incessant, irreconcilable war in every quarter — was the
banner which Robespierre waved over France and Europe. And this was
done at a moment when the systematic demoralization of the French
army had rendered all resistance to a serious attack impossible. The greatly
weakened army of the Alps could not have prevented the Austro-Sards, who were nearly twice as numerous, from liberating Lyons. The Republic had no
means of securing the coasts of La Vendee from a landing of English troops. For
a long time no general at all was to be found for the scattered army of the
Rhine, and at last, Carlin, a captain of dragoons, was made
commander, and he amused himself with posting his regiments along the frontier
in the order of their numbers!
lied
by the circumstance that the and had, e. g., given the child of Queen, ever
since the of death Louis eight years old a higher chair than XVI.,
had treated her son as king, she used herself.
Ch. IV.]
WARLIKE
SPIRIT OF NEW COMMITTEE.
117
And lastly, on the Flemish border, nothing was needed but a resolute
attack of the victorious Austrians to defeat the demoralised troops of Cajsar's camp, to open the shortest road to Paris, and to
get a start of several weeks of any reinforcement which could be raised from
any quarter whatever.1 To persevere in such a condition of affairs, to collect every means of
resistance, and to choose destruction in preference to
submission, appears extremely heroic; but in addition to this, to irritate
opponents by a useless crime and vulgar abuse, seems nothing less than
insanity. But, in fact, it was not a question of madness or of courage; a portion of the Parisian" democrats had no idea at all of the
ruined state of their affairs; they only saw their nearest party opponents in
the capital, and did not spend a single thought on the far distant forces of
the Powers. The government, on the other hand — though they might not
know all the particulars of the diplomatic relations between the Powers — were
perfectly well informed on the general state of things, and the plans and weak
points of the Coalition; so that they had not for a moment any feeling
1
Poisson (an old patriotic officer) II. 2-12: says " La
lenteur des operations des Allies, la lenteur avec laquelle Us s'avancuient, el
leur manque d'union constiteurent la veritable defense du pays qu'ils voulaient
envahir." He
likewise cites the speech of Marshal Bugeaud in the sitting
of the chamber of deputies Jan. 6. 1834, in which that celebrated general
enlarges on the insignificance of the services and the want of discipline of
the Volon-taires
nationaux, and
comes to the conclusion: ce
iCest qu'a Fleurus qu'ils ont commence a rendre des services: a Jemmappes
et a Valmy, les principales forces etaient composees de la vieille armee de
ligne ... (Test
le systeme de guerre que suivaient les etrangers qui a sauve la France. We shall presently see that it was owing still more to the discord, than to the military system, of the allies; at all events it was not owing to the terrorising policy of the Jacobins. Even
Louis Blauc, IX. 134 (Paris Edition), remarks: En de
telles extremites la France e'tait perdue, si les gouverne-ments
qui Vattaquaient eussent eu la centieme partie du genie et de la va-leur que
de'ploya le Comite de salut public.
118
SHELVING
OF DANTON.
[Book VII.
of being in serious danger. All that was said of a contrary kind from the rostra, to stir up the mob against the traitors, was coolly-
calculated bluster. In secret Desforgues continually
received reports from his Belgian agents, to the effect that Coburg had given
up all idea of marching to Paris; that at head-quarters the
Allies had unanimously -agreed to confine themselves to the capture of .border
fortresses; that the Coalition was undermined in every part, and was on the
brink of utter dissolution.1 It
was in accordance with these presumptions, that Bouchotte, with the greatest calmness of mind, adopted his measures against the
generals, and imperilled the existence of the armies in order to ruin some
obnoxious officers. It was with a full sense of security,
that the Committee issued its bombastic warlike manifestoes — well aware that it coidd not carry out its long-prepared schemes of
plunder at home, without the pretext of military preparations, nor keep up the
necessary agitation among its adherents, without the inflammatory excitement of
a state of war.
How correctly the condition of the Powers had been
described to the Committee — and how the former gave up their contest with the
Revolution at the very moment when the party victory of the Jacobins had, at
the same time, destroyed the prospects of peace, and the military strength of France, we have now to relate in detail.
1 In addition to the Belgian agents
were added the fruits of bribery,
some
of the Charges
d'affaires in There were at that time highly
placed
South
Germany, and the far-seeing ambassadors of great
Powers, who
Barthelemy
in Switzerland, gave plen- drew fixed pensions from France,
tiful
diplomatic information. To these and sent regular reports to Paris.
Ch. V.]
119
CHAPTER V. POLISH TROUBLES.
Lithuania
and codrland pray to be received under Russian suzerainty. —Parties
in the polish diet.—Catharine defers the Prussian
negotiation.-piusso-polish
*treaty of june 22nd.—impatience
of
prussian
government.—polish diet refuses to ratify prussian treaty.-the russian
ambassador expresses his concurrence with
the
diet.
While in Western Europe, democracy —:
undeterred by the hostility of Germany, England, Spain and Italy — was founding
its fearful despotism over France, the Empress Catharine in the East, — to all
appearance resting calmly upon her own strength, but
in secret incessantly advancing — was moving step by step towards her grand
object, of subjecting not only the severed provinces, but the whole Polish
kingdom. Care was taken that Prussia should gain by the partition neither
influence in Poland, nor security in her own share of the
booty. And in fact, the wrath of the Poles against Prussia only aided Catharine
in involving the rest of the Republic more and more irretrievably in her toils.
We have already observed how the elections to the Polish diet were carried on with the cry of obtaining protection against Prussia
from the favour of Catharine. When this object had been gained without much
difficulty, through the deep demoralisation of the Polish nobles, the Russian
agents immediately proceeded to more comprehensive
measures. The idea began to gain ground in Lithuania,
among a faction of the nobility, of separating this province entirely from the
sinking fortunes of Poland; and as early as May envoys from Wilna and other
towns,
120
POLISH
TROUBLES.
[Book VII.
under the conduct of Kamenski, the palatine of Minsk, came to St.
Petersburg to propose the erection of Lithuania into a separate vassal state
under the protection of Russia.
A portion of the nobility of Courland went still further. This little territory, the crown of which was nominally held as a fief of
Poland, but virtually for the last half century as a fief of Russia, had been
disturbed in all its internal arrangements by the movements in Poland
since 1791. The duke had heartily joined in the efforts of the Polish
constitutional party, had granted new privileges to the corporations of towns,
had conceded the right of possessing fiefs to the burghers, and thereby drawn
upon himself the bitter hatred of the nobility. Complaints had been sent from both parties to Warsaw, and after a long investigation, an
entire reconstruction of the polity of Courland in
the direction of liberal monarchy, had been decreed in the beginning of the
year 1792. As long as the Polish constitution was maintained, the nobility were obliged to conceal their vexation in submissive silence: but no sooner had the Russian arms gained the mastery
in Poland, and the" laws of 1791 been trodden in the dust, than they
hastened to invoke the august protection of the Russian empress for their own time-honoured privileges and chartered
monopolies. The immediate consequence of this step was a short
note, by which the secretary of the Russian ambassador at Mittau communicated
the orders of Catharine to the representative of the
Polish crown of that place, to quit the country within twenty-four hours. It is
true that the duke hereupon hastened to send off a submissive embassy to the
empress, and to remove all pretext for further violence by
restoring the most important privileges of the nobles; but he did not
thereby prevent the latter from sending off an agent on their own part to St.
Petersburg, who was instructed to counteract the influence
of the ducal commissioners. This agent was a Herr von Howe, once a favourite of
the duke, but who subsequently underwent a change in his
views and feelings. This
en.
V.] RUSSIAN INTRIGUES IN COURLAND.
121
man incessantly stole into all the antechambers of St. Petersburg , . and though personally despised by the Russian ministers, was petted by them as a useful tool. In fact he extorted from the unhappy
duke a sum of 110,000 ducats, whieh he shared with'Suboff and Markoff.
Nevertheless, going a step farther than the above-mentioned Lithuanians, he
unreservedly declared that there was no salvation for Courland but .a
formal incorporation with the Russian empire. Catharine, who, out of respect to
the European powers, was not inclined openly to go so far, sent him a reproof
through Suboff for his thoughtless zeal; yet the vice-chancellor, Ostermann, did not scruple to confess to the Dutch ambassador, that the
remaining portion of Poland was "stretching out its neck" to receive
the yoke of Catharine, and had already sent in
representations to this effect.1 So
far had the cabinet of St. Petersburg got beyond the treaty of
partition, five months after the 23rd of January — .so clearly did the
extension of the Russian frontiers to the Wartha and the Niemen lie before the
eyes of the Empress Catharine.
Meanwhile the diet, which was to sanction the
cession of territory to the two Powers, commenced its sittings on the 17th of
June at Grodno. At the suggestion of Sievers, Count Bilinski was appointed
marshal of the assembly; and it was a melancholy sign for the public spirit of
its members, that in spite of the shameful task which
lay before the diet, there were no less than six competitors for this post of
honour. .The form of oath by which Bilinski had to bind himself to the
fulfilment of his duties, immediately raised a violent contest, which occupied the whole of the first sitting. For whereas, formerly, every
Confederation in Poland legally expired with the opening of the diet, the
marshal was now .called upon to take $n oath
of fidelity
Hogguer
to the States General of Holland, June 14*
122
POLISH
TROUBLES.
[Book VII.
to the league of Targowice, because there was a considerable number of new men among the deputies from whom the old
Targowicians apprehended an infringement on their influence, or even
prosecution on account of their previous doings. Three days passed in
tumultuous discussions before this question was carried in favour of the
Targowicians, and it was not until the 20th that the notes handed in by Sievers
and Buchholz could be brought before the diet. These two identical documents demanded the nomination of a .Committee,
which should be empowered to conclude a definitive treaty with the two Powers.
Buchholz sent word on this occasion to General Mollendorf that the matter could
hardly pass off without disturbance, and that he must
therefore hold the army in readiness; but he added, that though the Poles were
divided among themselves by jealous feuds, they were already familiar with the
idea of partition, and resolved on bringing the matter to a conclusion, that
the country might not be altogether ruined by the
Russians.
Of this judgment thus much was correct, that the members of the diet
were agreed in sacrificing their country, and in every other respect opposed to
one another in endless strife. While the Targowicians and the new members regarded one another with deep distrust, there was among
both, a strong Russian, and a weak Prussian, party. King Stanislaus and his
confidants, on the other hand, still wished at any rate to impede and annoy the
partitioning Powers, and therefore sought to draw Austria into the
discussion. One portion of the Russian party, with Marshal Bilinsky at its
head, looked only to the will of Catharine, and always obeyed the beck of the
Russian ambassador. The most influential leader of the Targowicians, on the contrary, Kossakowski, himself a Russian general, entertained a
lively jealousy of Sievers, in whose place he wished to rule- the-country
himself under Catharine's protection; he therefore sought to frustrate all his
steps in deta.il,
that he might afterwards represent him to the empress as an incapable and
unsuc-
Ch. V.]
THE
TARGOWICIANS.
123
cessful diplomatist. In this endeavour he was powerfidly supported in
St. Petersburg itself by Suboff, who was angry with Sievers for having reported to the empress the extortions of her favourite
in Courland. From that time forward Sievers met with perpetual difficulties,
more especially when, in addition to the treaty of partition, he aimed at
introducing greater order into the Polish government, made proposals
for a new constitution, and endeavoured to limit the thievish selfishness of
the Kossakowskis and their adherents. Catharine forbade him to
undertake any reforms before the conclusion of the treaty
of partition, and-Suboff protected all the embezzlements
and extortions of the Targowicians. "Why do you
wish," wrote General Igelstrom to the ambassador, "to hinder the good
Kossakowski from enriching himself at the cost of the Polish state ? All former
riders have done so, and all future ones will do so
again." And thus Sievers was all-powerful for the-
oppression of Poland, but utterly unable to remove an aristocratic cut-purse.
Kossakowski was able to carry on his operations more fearlessly and openly
every day. As, moreover, the inferior deputies wished to
extort as high a price as possible for their votes, and the more
distinguished determined, for honour's sake, not to sign the partition without
the appearance of compulsion, it was certain that an abundance of noise and confusion would yet fill the hall of the diet; but it was also certain
that under the form of an historic tragedy, nothing more than a great
intriguing comedy would b'e brought upon the stage.
Immediately after the reading of the two notes all these different views were noisily proclaimed. The king advised that the sympathy
of the European powers should be invoked for Poland's misfortunes; the
Kossakowski party hoped to avert the partition by appealing to the magnanimity
of Russia; and all resolved, for the present, to give a rfegative
answer to the ambassadors. When the latter, hereupon, replied with imperious
brevity, that they would not
allow
124
POLISH
TROUBLES.
[Book VII.
of any evasions, and insisted upon the immediate nomination of the committee, the kino- succeeded in the first instance in again accrediting General
"Woyna, an honourable man of decidedly patriotic opinions, at the court of
the emperor, and appealing to Austria — as having guaranteed the territory of the Republic after the first Partition in 1775 — for
assistance. But the majority was not to be induced to adhere consistently to the course hereby pointed out; and after Marshal
Bilinski had brought back the discussion to the main question — the formation
of the committee — they a*t last came to a resolution (by
107 votes to 42), which partook of all the various colours of
all the different political parties. The committee was to be appointed; but, in
the first place, it was not to treat with Prussia, but only with Russia; secondly, it was to discuss, not the cession of land, but a close alliance
with Catharine; and thirdly, the negotiation was to be carried on with
the constant co-operation of the Austrian charge
d'affaires, Du Cache, as representative of a guaranteeing Power. The last clause proceeded from the royal party; the second contained
the favourite idea of Kossakowski — to prevent the partition, by bringing the whole country under the suzerainty of Russia; the first clause
expressed the feelings of nearly the whole diet, but originated from a higher
source — viz. the Cabinet of St. Petersburg itself.
Catharine, as wc know, had submitted to purchase from reluctant Europe
the conquest of Poland at the price of a small sacrifice in favour of Prussia.
Nor was she able even now to diverge altogether from this
course: the treaty of St. Petersburg was already concluded and partially
carried out, and Prussia most anxiously avoided giving the empress any pretext
for a change of policy. Another consideration was the restless and vacillating conduct of the Austrian minister, who was equally ready
to acquire a Polish province for himself, or, if unable to
do this, to throw obstacles in the way of Russo-Prussian partition. On the 16th of June
Cii. V.]
RUSSIAN
JEALOUSY OF.PRUSSIA.
125
he sent a despatch to St. Petersburgh, in whieh he brought forward the
claim of the Emperor to Craeow, Czenstoehau and its neighbourhood, in plain
terms, and even proposed, in case of need, a complete partition of Poland. When
Catharine did not accede to these proposals, he wrote an
urgent exhortation to the Russian government, on the 12th of July, "to
postpone the partition of Poland — in consideration of the untrustworthiness
of Prussia — until the end of the French war. The first effeet of these notes was, of eourse, to strengthen Catharine's resolution to bring her
own affairs in Poland to a settlement as quickly as possible.
In the next place they revealed to the empress afresh, the whole depth of the
gulf by which the two German powers were separated ; all danger of a change in affairs which eould induce the
eourts of Vienna and Berlin to take joint steps against Russia was removed to
an infinite distance. Under these circumstances Catharine was still resigned to
giving up the Polish province to Prussia; but she was all the
more resolute in her determination to preserve and manifest her dominant
control in every other respeet. Poland, therefore,
was not to treat with Prussia and Russia on the same footing, at the same time,
or in the same document. On the eontrary, the eession to
Russia was above all things to be made without delay; and then the bargain
between the two petty states — i. e. between Poland and Prussia — was to be
quickly concluded, or further postponed, according
to circumstances. The full powers, consequently, by
which Sievers was accredited to the Republic, were drawn up in sueh a manner
that he might earry on the negotiation by himself alone, or in community with
the Prussian minister. He had already laid these
credentials before the Polish government without the
knowledge of Buchholz; and we may imagine with what zeal the former seized upon
the possibility of a separate negotiation, which was equally in aeeordanee with
the interests of the eountry and its own hatred towards Prussia. Fully assured,
therefore, of Russia's
12G
POLISH
TROUBLES.
[Book VII.
connivance, the diet was unanimous and energetic in its opposition to
all the demands of Prussia.1
Under these circumstances very little effect was produced by a note of
the 29th, in which the two ambassadors protested
against any separation of the Russian and Prussian interests, and repeatedly
demanded the appointment of a joint committee. The Poles well knew that
Sievers, for the present at least, was not serious in this demand, and many voices were raised in favour of waiting to see the effect
of the embassy to Vienna, and the proposal for an alliance with Russia, and of
deferring, for the present, any resolution for the prolongation of the
diet. As an extraordinary diet, like
the present, could'only sit, according to the Polish law, for fourteen days,
the passing of this motion would have led to the dissolution of the assembly on
the 2nd of July. But this was a little too much for Sievers; he threw himself
into a violent passion, arrested seven deputies of the
royal and Kossikowskian parties on the 1st of July, sent off a military
execution against the estates of Count Tys-kiewicz, the king's nephew, and
sequestrated all the revenues of the king, for the alleged purpose of satisfying his numerous creditors. He was resolved,
he said, to use fire and sword unless Stanislaus yielded, and threatened forced
contributions and military violence of every kind in Masovia and Cracow;
so that the goodnatured Buchholz, to prevent further
mischief, invited the primate of Gnesen to come to Grodno and represent to his
brother, the king, the dangers of his position.
It soon appeared, however, that no dangerous flash would follow this
thundering bluster. The two chancellors of the diet held a
meeting with the ambassadors, and on the 2nd the subsequent proceedings were
harmoniously arranged. In
1 We have here another proof how
lition. The article "Allemagne" in well-informed the Parisian rulers
the Moniteur of July 30th gives an al-were of the
internal state of the Coa- most
exhaustive view of Polish affairs.
Cir.
V.] RUSSIA TREATS WITH POLAND
SEPARATELY. 127
the first place they agreed upon an answer of the diet to the note of
the 29th, to the effect that it had never been contemplated to exclude Prussia from the negotiation altogether.
On the other hand it remained fixed that the committee
was, for the moment, only empowered to conclude the treaty with Russia. Sievers
conceded this point to the Poles immediately; and when Buchholz vehemently protested, he no longer hesitated to avow that this was the
express will of the empress, and had always been the command of the Russian
government. At the same time he solemnly promised, that immediately after the
conclusion of his own treaty he would extort full powers for the
settlement of an agreement with Prussia; that he would not allow any other
subject to be brought before the diet; and would promote the final arrangement
of the affair by every means in his power. Buchholz, although very disagreeably surprised, had no means of resistance, and endeavoured to
console himself with the idea that the delay might at least have this advantage, that the Poles would meanwhile cool down, and the affair be all
the more rapidly concluded. King Frederick William thought it very
vexatious, but said that they must have patience with a woman's vanity; the
ministers in Berlin had nothing better to propose, but they conceived a decided
distrust in the friendship of Russia, and began to prophecy mischief of every kind.
Sievers now withdrew his severe measures against the Poles, liberated
the imprisoned deputies, and allowed them I to occupy some sittings of the diet
with complaints of his I violent interference.
Poninski, the nephew of the marshal, brought forward
a protest against the arrest of his colleagues; the diet supported him, but the
marshal refused to register the motion.
Even the appointment of the committee was protracted for several days,
partly because many of the I deputies
wished to suffer apparent compulsion, and partly because
Kossakowski 'was endeavouring to prevent the Russian ambassador from
carrying his point too easily. On
128
POLISH
TROUBLES.
[Book VII.
the 12th, however, Sievers proceeded to bring the matter to a
termination. He threatened, in the first place, to
expel all rebels and firebrands from the assembly, secondly, on the 16th,
to occupy the estates of all adversaries by Russian troops; and lastly, to
sequestrate all the revenues of the State, and to keep back the pay of the Polish troops. This last point would have been sufficient to
characterise the whole proceeding, since the Polish treasury had been empty for
several months, and no pay had been given to the soldiers since September,1 so
that Sievers1 threat was entirely nugatory. The diet,
however, considered it sufficient, and after a stormy scene —
during which several deputies declared that they would rather go to Siberia —
granted the committee the desired powers on the 17th. Sievers was extremely
indifferent to the fact that a protest against his
violence was added to the resolution, and he laid his treaty before the
committee for a sham discussion and unaltered acceptance. By this act
Poland ceded the provinces occupied by Russia; in return for which(the
latter promised her guarantee to the future Polish constitution, full
religious freedom for her new subjects, and every possible encouragement to Polish commerce. King Stanislaus and Kossakowski now both
united in recommending despatch; and both for the same
reason, because they thought that by speedy acceptance
they might possibly obtain the protection of Catharine against Prussia. The
treaty was therefore signed on the 22nd of July; the conquest of Russia had
received the solemn sanction of the diet.
Buchholz now hoped that his turn was come at
last, and lost no time in demanding that a -committee should be empowered to
treat with him also. In the diet, however, there was but one voice that every
means must be used to resist his claim.
The same deputies who a few days before
1 Buchholz, July 2nd. Report of 26th
(extracts from which are given the Crown General Ozazowski, July in Polish Journal, 1793, page 813).
Ch. V.]
OPPOSITION TO CLAIMS OF PRUSSIA.
129
had pretended to prefer Siberian exile to the Russian
treaty — e. g. Kimbar the member for Upita — loudly declared that Catharine, in
her clemency, would not deliver them over to the Germans, after they had placed
the fate of their country in her hands.
Only a few voices were raised in opposition; others
again brought forward the appeal to
Austria, and it was actually resolved to send off prayers for help
simultaneously to Vienna [and St. Petersburg. At Buchholz's
instigation, Sievers assembled the'
party chiefs to various deliberations, at which the
latter demanded a favourable treaty of commerce, as the first condition of a
political agreement. Sievers then
declared to them that Catharine positively insisted on the cession of the land
demanded by Prussia; but he told his colleague in private, that he considered the Polish conditions not unreasonable, and pointed
out to him that on the arrest of any of the deputies
the whole diet would probably disperse. It certainly occurred to Buchholz that
during the Russian negotiation no mention had been made of this danger,1 nor
of any further conditions; and with
respect to the desired treaty of commerce, he was entirely without any special
views or instructions. Just at this
time, however, the news of the capture of Mayence arrived, which produced a visible impression on all sides; and as Sievers, on the 29th, I sent off a peremptory note to the diet, which was followed I by the transmission of full powers on the 31st, Buchholz was once more
elated by the joyful prospect of completely I attaining
his object in three weeks. A particular
occurrence 1 contributed to confirm his confidence.
Immediately after the I 23d of July, General Kossakowski
started for his estates, I as he alleged, but in reality for St. Petersburg, in
order to use his personal influence with Catharine against
Prussia.
1 The town of Grodno was at a pass from the Russian Comman-
that
time so well guarded that no dant. Ferrand, III 302. one could enter the
promenade without
III.
I
130
POLISH
TROUBLES.
[Book VII.
But he had hardly proceeded half-way on his
journey, when he received an imperial order not to enter the capital before the
signing of the Prussian treaty. In short, Buchholz
felt so certain of the hearty support of Catharine, that he thought himself
bound expressly to warn his government against all
suggestions at all unfavourable to Russia: — "for," he added to
Mollendorf, "every thing is possible among us, even distrust of
Russia"!
In fact, both in Berlin and at head-quarters, the Prussian authorities
were becoming somewhat impatient; and in the
beginning of August, Buchholz received orders to threaten a hostile advance on
the part of General Mollendorf, if the matter was not concluded by the 20th.
The ambassador soon had an opportunity of making use of these instructions. For in the discussion it appeared that the committee had not
been empowered, on the 31st of July, to make a cession of territory, but only
to conclude a commercial treaty. Day after day was passed in tedious
formalities; so that Buchholz, about the
15th, called upon Sievers to communicate the above-mentioned threat. But,
contrary to his expectation, Sievers, under various pretences, declined to do
so, and Buchholz observed a rapid diminution in the zeal of the ambassador. He
did not know at first to what cause he should ascribe
this indifference — whether to advanced age, or want of firmness against the
Poles, or the petty desire of not allowing the Prussian treaty to be concluded
more quickly than the previous Russian one. By degrees, however, he plainly observed a certain coolness towards Prussia, of which the
Poles immediately made use to manifest their own hatred without reserve; and,
on the 19th, they even threatened every deputy who should propose the cession
with the penalty of high treason. At the same time they sent off to
St. Petersburg a formal proposal for a strict alliance, which would of course
secure the complete subjection of Poland to Russia. Whereupon Buchholz himself
begged General Mollendorf not to pass the cordon, since, he said, the people
Ch. V.]
DOUBLE
DEALING OF RUSSIA.
131
in Lithuania would not care the least about the fate of Great Poland or
Cracow, but act exclusively according to the directions of Russia;
"instead therefore," he added, "of employing
military force, I must see what I can do with Sievers by
incessant importunity." But the latter was, at this time, holding
deliberations with his sovereign of a very different kind. Thugut had once more
thrown out a hint to Rasumowski concerning the partition of all Poland; and Sievers was of opinion that in the face of such a tendency Russia
ought not to divide the country at all, but to promote
the complete restoration and union of Poland — of course under Russian
suzerainty. The question arose, consequently, whether he ought not, under plausible pretexts, to defer the signing of the
Prussian treaty. He begged -the empress to inform him whether she entertained
more extended views in regard to Poland, such as he thought that in the
interests of Russia she ought to hold. He repeated
this request on the 19th, with the remark, that the acceleration or protraction
of the Prussian treaty would depend entirely on Catharine's
commands. At last, on the 25th of August, he proceeded a step further, by
laying the draft of a treaty before the Prussian ambassador,
declaring that he could force the diet to accept this, but nothing more. In
this document the cession was on the whole maintained; but in the much
discussed question of the border line, the claim of Prussia was
only half satisfied — viz. in the district of
Czenstochau, but not further to the north in regard to Zakroczyns. Buchholz was
hereby placed in a position at variance with his last instructions; but in his
helpless condition, he signed the draft, and urgently recommended his court to accept it, in order to
emerge at last from these endless complications. Hereupon, Sievers* appeared for a time to return to his old courses. With the same severity
as he had made use of, four weeks before, in pis own negotiation, he ordered the diet to come to an immediate settlement; and when, on the 29th, a
violent
12
132
POLISH
TROUBLES.
[Book VII.
storm arose in the assembly, when an assenting deputy had been seized
as a traitor, and others of the Prussian party threatened with the sword in the hall itself—he gave notice that he would occupy the
palace with two battalions of grenadiers, and allow no one to leave
the hall until the treaty was signed. Nevertheless the fears of Buchholz were
by no means dispelled. He was grieved on the one hand to observe that Sievers continued to advocate the commercial treaty, and
encouraged the Poles to remain firm on this point; on the other hand, he
suddenly found the influence of Austria rife among the deputies, which had
remained entirely in the baek-ground during the Russian
negociation. It was not, therefore, without anxious suspense that he looked
forward to the decisive day, the 2nd of September.
He, soon found that he had not been deceived by his forebodings.
Sievers had left no doubt that the diet voted under the
pressure of Russia. Grenadiers were posted at all the doors of the hall; their
commander, General Rauten-feld, sat among the deputies near the throne of the
king; whoever wished to leave the hall was thrust back with the butt-end of the musket. For several hours the tumult was dreadful. On the
motion of the king and Bishop Kossakowski, the discussion on the draft
was begun; and finally a proposition of General Miaeynski was carried by
sixty-one against twenty-five votes — a proposition
which no one knew and no one had read, and whieh Miaeynski only recommended by saying that it was the draft proposed by Sievers. But the
matter was by no means at an end. The diet added a protest, expressed in the
most violent terms, against the pressure which had been exercised
upon them. Buchholz would probably have paid as little regard to this as
Sievers had done; but what was of more importance, the diet added four
additional articles, according to which, Prussia was to deliver up the image of the Virgin at Czen-stoehau to the Poles; was not to compel the primate
of Gnesen to reside on Prussian territory; was to give up all
Cii. V.] DIFFICULTIES IN THE WAY OF PRUSSIA.
133
hereditary claims to the Radziwill estates; and lastly, the ratification of the whole treaty was not to be made until the treaty of
commerce demanded by Poland had been concluded. ,
The first three points were by no means agreeable to Prussia, but she
might have taken them into the bargain, when acquiring a large and well-situated province. But the fourth deferred the settlement of
the" whole matter to an indefinite future, and one which eould be all the
less certainly reckoned upon, because the diet
claimed the special guarantee of Russia for both the treaty of commerce and the treaty of cession. By these clauses, therefore, the termination of the affair was rendered doubtful, and the whole
paraphernalia of Russian violence and Polish indignation, during the sitting,
was shewn to be a mere farce. Buchholz hastened in sorrow and anger to Sievers to make emphatic
complaints: but the latter coolly replied, that he was quite certain that the
Poles would not withdraw the four additional clauses without new measures of
compulsion, but that he could not employ any further violence
on the part of Russia. Thereupon Buchholz asked him at any rate to give his
assent to the entrance of the Prussian troops; but Sievers declared that it was
very unfair to make war upon men who were willing to subscribe; he could not
take it ill of them, he added, that they had made some
conditions, especially in respect to trade, since they, too, wished to live. In
conclusion he put an end to all further discussion by these decisive words:
"I have received fresh orders to bring the treaty of cession with Prussia to an end; but at the same time to procure for the Poles
free-trade and other alleviations, because, without these, they would become
too dependent upon Prussia.1'
This declaration put an end to all uncertainty. Before Sievers had sent his
troops against the diet, before the latter had made its protests and additional clauses, the article respecting the treaty of commerce—exactly in the same way as the separation of the
134
POLISH
TROUBLES.
[Book VII.
two treaties—had been sent from Petersburg. The whole proceedings in
the diet, therefore, if not actually directed by Russia, had at any rate
secured her approval; and the Prussian treaty was deferred indefinitely, by the
command of Catharine, "that the Poles might not become too dependent upon Prussia." On the J3rd and
18th of September the empress repeatedly expressed to her ambassador her entire
approbation of all the steps which he had taken against Prussia in favour of
Poland. Buchholz, who had no other means of reducing the diet to submission than the aid of Russia, could not any longer struggle against
Russia herself; he was obliged to wait and see how his government would meet
the unexpected danger. Sievers and the diet appeared to have no doubt of the
submission of Prussia, and regarded the treaty with the
additional clauses as already concluded. They proceeded to other business,
discussed Polish finances and military affairs, dissolved the Targowician
confederation in order to place the king, as usual, at the head of the administration, and began to deliberate on a new
constitution. In all these matters Sievers displayed industry, penetration,
preeminent knowledge, and lofty sentiments, and conducted himself in all
respects as the virtual regent of the land. King Stanislaus renewed his proposal to Catharine to appoint the Grand-duke Constantine as
his successor; in which, however, no further mention was made of any eventual interests of the German powers.
The report of this turn of affairs, — in itself sufficiently exciting
and perilous — reached the Prussian head-quarters at a moment when the Polish
question had given rise to deep anxiety and vexation from another quarter; and
led immediately to the downfall of the. great European coalition, to the real
decision of the revolutionary war, and to a crisis of vast
importance to the history of the world. It will be necessary to realise to
ourselves the general character of Prussian policy since the capture of
Mayence.
Cu.
VI.] 135
CHAPTER VI. CATASTROPHE OP THE COALITION.
Coburg's
arguments against a march upon paris.—Agreement
between him and prussia respecting the plan of the campaign.— conflicting views in london and vienna,—mission of count lehkbach to the
prussian
head-quarters. — He
demands a polish province for austria.
—Arrival of intelligence from grodno.—Prussia retires from the coalition.—discontent of holland and sardinia.
— conclusion of the prussian treaty in grodno. poland becomes a russian province by the alliance of thr 16tii
of october.
The fall
of Mayence and Valenciennes afforded the allies the
opportunity of commencing a decisive attack on the French armies and Paris
under the most favourable circumstances. The king of Prussia, who had just
formally concluded a treaty with England against the Revolution, on the 18th of July, wished for nothing better: he desired to put an end to the
fatal war by rapid blows, and to display the sharpness of the Prussian sword to
the enemy and the world, after the disasters of the previous autumn. In his
impatience he often gave great trouble to his political advisers,
who exhorted him to pause and delay on account of Thugut's
un-trustworthiness; or pointed out to him the impossibility of defraying the
cost of a third campaign in the present state of the Prussian 1
finances. But other views prevailed at the head - quarters
of the Duke of Coburg, where no voice was raised in favour of an invasion of
France, or a march upon Paris. The ground of this disinclination has not always
been rightly stated. A great deal has
been
1 The ministers expressed this opi- treaty, against the conclusion of which nion in
the negotiation of the English they
urgently protested.
136
CATASTROPHE
OF THE COALITION. [Book VII.
said of the old methodical tactics, which forbade a further advance until all the border fortresses had been captured. It has even been hinted
that Austria retarded the decision, to promote eternal anarchy in France,
instead of the restoration of the Bourbons. There is
thus much truth in both these views —that Coburg did not
easily resolve on bold or fool-hardy steps, and that Thugut had not the
slightest liking for the French Emigres.
But the Austrian government would have been equally glad with the
Prussian to see the end of this expensive war; and it was well known to the older tacticians that border fortresses may, under certain circumstances, be just as well reduced by defeating the hostile army and
capturing the capital; as, vice
versa, the subjection of an enemy's country may be prepared by the conquest of
its fortresses. The prince of Coburg was only partly
decided by military considerations; in the main he was guided by his political
views of the internal condition of France. In the preceding September, the Duke
of Brunswick had about the same number of troops as the allied
army in Flanders at the time of which we speak; yet his invasion had only led
to a union of the contending parties against the attack of foreign enemies—a
union for which the German armies remained a match only for a few weeks. Coburg
did not wish to repeat this error. He hoped that the
revolutionary ferment—if the war could but be kept from immediately affecting
the great mass of the people in the interior of the country—would find a vent
in the formation of new parties, in wilder and wilder struggles of faction; that the lacerated land
would thus be shortly reduced to complete helplessness; and that the moment for
a perfectly safe invasion might arrive, perhaps in the spring of 1794. 1 With
this view he had already sanctioned a plan of Colonel Mack in April, according to which he was to undertake nothing further
during this summer—even after
1 Memoir of Mallet du Pan, for Lord
Elgin and Count Mercy, Mem. 1,408.
Cii. VI.]
COBURG'S
PLAN OF OPERATIONS.
137
the fall of Valenciennes—than the storming of
other frontier fortresses. 1
That this course was strictly in accordance with some of the phases of
the general condition of affairs—that it was fully justified, up to August
1793, by the disorders of the Jacobins, the demoralization of the armies, the
growing discontent of the border provinces—is not to
be denied. But we must immediately add, that even this plan was not fully
carried out; that much was neglected that might have been done; and that a most
essential point was entirely overlooked. Even with a
view to a war of fortresses alone, it was important
, nay essential, not to allow the French armies to be restored, and not to open
a single breach until the neighbouring camps of the enemy had been
broken up. And, above all, it was absolutely indispensable—if
they looked for aid from the internal disturbances of France - to support the
opponents of the Convention, and not to allow Lyons and La Vendee to bleed to
death unaided. Otherwise, it was evident to all men of enlarged views that
anarchy would not be infinitely prolonged, but would
produce a rigid despotism; all the more cpiickly, the
more violently it broke out. We have seen in Dumouriez' catastrophe that Coburg
was aware of this truth; and Prussia, for a time, likewise advocated a landing in La Vendee. But the courts of Vienna
and London, unwilling to connect themselves with any French party, rejected
every idea of this kind with perfect indifference;
nor did they understand that in this ease nothing but an immediate advance upon
Paris and the Convention could save them. And thus
they gave the enemy time and opportunity to develope an
overpowering force in the midst of the most fearful dangers.
Meanwhile, about the middle of July, the prince of Coburg laid a general plan of the war before the
king of Prussia; by which he hoped, after taking the
two border fortresses,
1
Oestr. milit. Zeitschrift, 1813,
Band I.
138
CATASTROPHE OF THE COALITION. [Book VII.
to bring the campaign of the present year to as prosperous a result as
possible. His opinion was, that the king should turn from Mayence towards
the west, capture Saar-Louis, and endeavour to occupy Lorraine from that side;
that meanwhile he himself should operate from Valenciennes towards the south-east, and take Maubeuge, Givet and
Philippe-ville, by assault. By these means he considered that the two armies
would be brought nearer to one another, and strengthened
by the now separated corps of communication in Na-mur, Luxemburg and Treves;
that Flanders would be easily covered in the extreme west; and Alsace and
the French army of the Rhine threatened in the rear from the side of Lorraine
in the extreme east; and that thus an excellent base would be secured at the
conclusion of the campaign for energetic attacks on the interior of France in the following year.
This plan—if once the idea of a rapid advance upon Paris was given
up—was obviously well adapted to the purpose in view; the forces of the allies
would thus be drawn nearer to one another, would be themselves more protected, and be made more dangerous to the enemy on every theatre of war. The
plan, moreover, suited the king of Prussia for political reasons, because it
made the attack upon Alsace, contemplated by Wurmser, impossible; an attack of
which the Prussian government would not hear before the
settlement of the question of the Bavarian exchange. He therefore answered
Coburg in the most favourable manner, and immediately
after the surrender of Mayence prepared to make the first disposition of his
troops against the valley of the Saare. The Duke of
Brunswick, indeed, had some doubts, as once before in the Argonnes, whether his
field-baking apparatus would be able to keep pace with
the army. But here, in the friendly and fruitful Palatinate, it was not possible to speak in real earnest of the starvation
of the troops; and in their front, the condition of the French allured them
more and more, every day, to a bold advance; for since the
Cii. VI.] ARRIVAL OF WALDECK AT HEAD QUARTERS. 139
end of July an ever increasing number of the old troops had been
withdrawn from these armies for the protection of Flanders, and had only been
replaced by recruits, or miserably armed peasants. The mere
prevention of the sending off these detachments from the French army would Jn
itself have been a result of the greatest importance to Coburg and Belgium.
But no sooner had the Prussian regiments entered the valleys of the
Hardt Mountains, in accordance with this plan, than count Wartensleben, the
Austrian plenipotentiary at head-quarters, announced to the king that he
expected within a few days the arrival of the imperial general, Prince von
Waldeck, with a new plan of the war drawn up in Vienna; and, immediately
afterwards, the arrival of Count Lehrbach, the Austrian ambassador at Munich, with important political communications. He
therefore begged that all important operations might be deferred until they
made their appearance. Waldeck, who presented himself at headquarters on the lGth of August, brought despatches from his court, which, however, contained views the very opposite
to those of Coburg. Wurmser, whose force had meanwhile been raised to o2,000
men, was to employ all his troops in operating, not to the west against the
Saare, but against Alsace to the south. For the attainment
of this object it was necessary to blockade the fortress of Landau, to beat the
French army of the Rhine, and to storm the lines of Weissenburg. When this had
been done, hopes were entertained, in consequence of a secret understanding with a party in Strasburg, of a German revolt in
Alsace itself, which would immediately deliver up the land into the hands of
the emperor. But to do this Wurmser needed, of course, the aid of the Prussian
army; and Waldeck therefore begged the king to lead back his troops from the mountains into the valley of the Rhine, and to shut in Landau
on the west, while Wurmser stationed himself between the fortress and the
river.
140
CATASTROPHE
OF THE COALITION. [Book VII.
By this proposal the scheme against Saar-Louis and
Lorraine was at once put aside; for the king could no more venture to
advance into Lorraine without the Austrians, than Wurmser could take Alsace
without the Prussians. The chief reason, moreover, of such a movement—the
approximation, of the two great armies to one another—was removed also on the Flemish side; because
the Duke of York, in a grand council of war, held on the 4lh of August, had declared that he could not join in any operation towards the interior of
the country, but must, according to the distinct orders of his
government, proceed in an exactly opposite direction, to form the siege of
Dunkirk, in doing which he demanded the cooperation of Coburg. It was in vain
that the latter pointed out the danger of such a dispersion of their forces: the capture of Dunkirk had been already spoken of in England in April
and May, and a decree to this effect had been definitively issued in July, more
especially at the instigation of Lord Auckland. 1 The
Duke of York considered the wish of his government to gain this long-prized harbour, as a compensation for the expenses
of the war, just as legitimate and well-grounded, as the occupation of
Valenciennes or Alsace by the Austrians; Coburg therefore was obliged to
submit, though with a sorrowful heart. But he proceeded to the execution of
the plan with all the more reluctance and languor. The French army in the camp
of Cajsar was at that time so demoralized and reduced, that its commander,
General Kilmaine, on the approach of the hostile columns, made no attempt at resistance; but, evading the blow, marched westward, and
endeavoured to take up a new and stronger position behind the rocky banks of
the Scarpe, where he stationed himself, no longer as a protecting force on the
road to Paris, but on one side, near the road, and in close connexion
with the French corps at Lille.
1 Vid. A circumstantial notice of in
the "Correspondence" of Lord this matter by Crawfurd and Jerry Auckland. Ill, 86.
Ch. VI.]
MILITARY BLUNDERS OF COALITION.
141
Enticing, therefore, as the open road to Paris might
appear at first sight, it would have been madness to hasten along it while
Kilmaine's forces were uninjured. There was, indeed,
no thought of such an invasion at the head-quarters of Coburg; but even for his
purposes, and for the thorough support of a war of
fortresses, the time for a battle on a large scale was evidently come. This is
all the more evident, because he himself was ordered, during the English
attempt upon Dunkirk, to assault Lequesnoi, which was about 79 English miles from the former place; and thus, in the face of the gathering
enemy, it would be necessary to separate the army into two nearly equally
strong—or equally weak— bodies. But whether from contempt for the indisciplined
mob of French soldiers, or from narrowness of mind, or from
apathetic resignation to the idea that in no case could any good result be
obtained—Coburg left Kilmaine undisturbed behind the Scarpe, sent York
with 35,000 men against Dunkirk, and himself prepared to proceed against
Lequesnoi. And all this was done at the very same' time that the attacks of
the Germans on the Rhine were exclusively directed to Alsace, just as if they
wished to suggest to the French that they should employ the army of the Moselle
to reinforce Kilmaine. It must be confessed that such a mass of
of political and military blunders has seldom been heaped up in any portion
of the history of the world.
On the Rhine, therefore, according to Waldeck's proposal, Landau was to
be blockaded on the one side by Wurmser, and on the other by the Prussians.
The whole object iof the new scheme was looked on with aversion at the Prussian
head-quarters, especially since the announced mission of Lehrbach seemed to
point very decidedly to new negotiations respecting Bavaria; yet they were not prepared to give a direct refusal, and for the present
only proposed a change of tactics. There was reason to fear that if the main
body of the Prussians entirely evacuated the mountains, and marched into the
valley of the Rhine against Landau, the
142
CATASTROPHE
OP THE COALITION.
[Book VII.
French army of the Moselle would push forward in their rear by way of
Kaiserslautern and threaten Mayence afresh. For this reason Brunswick proposed
to occupy the army of the Moselle by a detached corps,
to take up a strong position on the hills near Pirmasenz with his main body,
where he would stand exactly between the two French armies, on the crest of the
Vosges mountains. In this position he would have the three camps of the Moselle
army beneath him on the right, and the widely
extended position of the Rhine army on the left; so that he could roll up the
former on the one side, on his right wing, or turn the other on the left wing
of the lines of Weissenburg, by passing through the valley of the Lauter. This position was actually taken up with perfect success on the
13th and following days. Two camps of the Moselle army—consisting partly of peasants of the general levy, who had their wives and children with them
in the trenches—were almost completely dispersed by the first
demonstrations of the Prussian detachment, and Brunswick himself took the
heights of the Keltrich, near Pirmasenz, by storm on the 17th of
August, gave the French a bloody defeat when they attempted to recover them,
and fixed himself firmly on the broad ridge of the
wooded hill. Unfortunately Wurmser supplied a welcome pretext at the same time
for breaking off all further offensive operations. According to the plan
proposed, he ought to have remained stationary, either in the neigbourhood of Landau, or at any rate close to the hills; but instead of
this, he suddenly started off—in accordance with the first proposal of
Waldeck—towards the South and the Rhine, marched past Landau, and, after many
bloody skirmishes, drove a French corps out of the Bienwald to the
foot of the Weissenburg lines. As the left flank of
the Prussian position was hereby exposed, the king, very ungraciously, called
upon him to return, and got so angry during the correspondence, that he at last
sent a formal charge against Wurmser to Vienna. At this moment, however, the eagerly
expected
Cn.
VI.] AUSTRIA RESIGNS HER CLAIMS ON
BAVARIA. 143
Lehrbaeh appeared at head-quarters, and the military differences were immediately thrown into the shade by a serious political discord.
* We have already seen that Thugut, immediately after his entrance into
the Ministry,'" made the restoration of the old intimate relations with
Russia, the corner-stone of his whole political sytem. He repeatedly offered to
Catherine the complete
renewal of the poliey of Joseph' II., if she would but prevent the
aggrandisement of Prussia, and at any rate guarantee to Austria, in addition to
a smaller or greater part of Poland, some considerable territorial acquisition.
On being asked what territory he wished for, he
hesitated to reply; he preferred trying to induee Russia to make soma offer,
and to await the issue of affairs in Grodno. All parties, indeed, made it very
difficult to him to adhere to this threatening silence. The Russian Ministers told the Imperial Ambassador, Count Cobenzl, that they
would gladly to all in their power to moderate Prussia's lust of Polish territory; but they demanded in return that Austria should aecede to the
treaty of January 23d, and finally settle the whole affair, by a definite
declaration of her further pretensions ; on the other side, the
English government pressed for the establishment of some definite object of
their eom-mon warlike operations. England became more and more decided in her
opposition to the Bavarian-Belgian Exchange, but offered the Emperor, in its
stead," her ready assent to any extension of his frontiers whatever at
the' cost of France, whether on the side of Flanders, or that of Alsaee. In
Vienna theetwo
Colloredos, more especially, advocated the adoption of
this course, by which the powerful support of England would be secured; and
Thugut thereupon allowed himself to be induced in the middle of June to make a
declaration to Lord Grenville, on the part of the ministry, expressly giving up the Bavarian-Belgian
Exehange. It is true, indeed, that he silently resolved, even if he were
obliged to keep Belgium, to continue his efforts for the acquisition
144
CATASTROPHE
OF THE COALITION.
[Book VII.
of Bavaria, substituting Alsace for Belgium as a compensation to the Bavarian Elector. He therefore urgently demanded of the English Government the profoundest secresy in regard to
the new combination against Prussia, under the pretext that the king, out of
jealousy towards Austria, would not consent to weaken
France, unless the Bavarian Exchange were still put forward as a bugbear.
Prussia indeed had in the meanwhile declared, on the 10th of June, its consent to the Emperor's acquiring either Bavaria or Alsace, on condition,
however, that Austria should then acknowledge the treaty of St. Petersburg;
and as Thugut was once for all determined not to do this, he avoided for the
present making any definite communication to Prussia on this head. Meanwhile
the operations of war became more and more urgent; the king more
and more impatiently demanded some definite decision respecting the plan of the
campaign, and the question of compensation; and Thugut at last resolved to send
Count Lehrbach, the Austrian Ambassador in Munich, to the Prussian head-quarters, not, indeed, to come to an understanding, but to
amuse the king, as he reported to St. Petersburg, by empty negotiations, until
Russia and Austria were fully agreed upon some common course of action.
Lehrbach was in the first place to quiet the fears of Charles Theodore
the Bavarian Elector, respecting the intentions of Austria. The aged
Prince had always been ready to resign Bavaria, which he heartily disliked, to
the Emperor, in exchange for other possessions; but he was harassed on one side by the opposition of his cousins of Deux Ponts, and on the
other' by a powerful party at the court of Munich, and lastly by the
representations of English diplomatists. Thugut, therefore, sent him word
through Lehrbach that for the present there would
• be no further mention of the Bavarian Exchange, and that the Emperor would,
under no circumstances, take any step without .the knowledge of Charles Theodore. The
Cn.
VII.] LORD YARMOUTH'S UNPLEASANT
CANDOUR.
145
elector was greatly relieved by this communication, and immediately
after Lehrbach's departure he summoned the Bavarian diet, and gave them the
solemn declaration that he had never had any intention of exchanging Bavaria
for any land in the world. The Estates received his words with enthusiastic applause, and granted, in addition to the federal contingent
against France, 17,000 florins, to defend the country against any violent
encroachment.
It was under these circumstances that Lehrbach, on the 25th of August,
appeared at the Prussian head-quarters; a tall, lank restless
man, with piercing eyes, well known as a crafty negotiator,-a thorough
connoisseur of the affairs of the empire, and .a violent opponent of Prussia.
In accordance with his instructions he spoke first
of Bavaria, adding, that if this country was not to be
obtained, the emperor ought to demand the aid of Prussia in the conquest of
Alsace or Lorraine. Lucchesini, who had the task of negotiating
with him, enquired whether England would not, in that case, offer a decided
opposition to the Bavarian exchange. He had received from the English envoy,
Lord Yarmouth, a general, and, as we know, well-founded, intimation to this
effect. Lehrbach, however, replied in the most positive terms that there was
not the slightest ground for this apprehension; and that the
emperor, on his part, would never relinquish the plan of exchange. Whereupon
Lucchesini promised to report the matter to the king; but in the first place he
hastened to Lord Yarmouth, to learn if possible the truth from him. Lord Yarmouth, with the honest intention of i throwing down the wall of
separation between Berlin and Vienna, was at last induced to confess to
Lucchesini, not only that England had opposed the Bavarian exchange, but that
Austria had renounced the plan in a formal treaty. We i may
easily imagine what an effect this discovery of the I duplicity
of the Austrian cabinet would have upon the Prussian
statesman. As late as the 10th of June the king had signified in Vienna his
consent to the exchange, on condition III. K
146
CATASTROPHE
OF THE COALITION. [Book VII.
that Austria would ratify the partition of Poland. And now, not only
did the emperor persist in his resistance in the matter of Poland, but a claim
was raised by Austria to large provinces in
France, while she was convicted of sheer but double-dealing and deceit in
respect to the Bavarian exchange. The immediate effect was that the king
entirely suspended the warlike operations in Alsace, the
possession of which would have enabled Austria to
press with double weight upon the South of Germany. It was just at this time—on
the 27th—that Brunswick announced that a vigorous attack must be made on the
enemy, that the frontier could be crossed in two days march, and that his
position was so favourable that he should risk his
military reputation by any longer inactivity; yet he received orders, by return
of courier, to postpone all aggressive movements, from political
considerations. 1 In
order, at the same time, to show most unequivocally his continued readiness to oppose the Revolution, the king sent a fresh offer,
on the 31st of August, to Coburg, to join him in operating against the Saare
and Lorraine, and warmly urged him to bring his former plan of a campaign once
more before the government of Vienna. Coburg, of course, replied
in a delighted tone, and forwarded a warm
recommendation of the scheme to Vienna; whereupon Thugut immediately resolved
to dismiss this inconvenient commander-in-chief, and .to supply his place, as
soon as possible, by a more accommodating tool.
Meanwhile Lehrbach's negotiation, and with it the great Coalition, had
met with a disastrous fate. After a pause of ten days Lucchesini reopened the
conference, in which Lehrbach, in consequence of the
unpleasant frankness of Lord Yarmouth, found himself in a
very unenviable position. He could not well make any further use of the
Bavarian scheme, but he insisted, all the more decidedly, on the consent of
Prussia to Austria's claim to the French provinces. The
1 Wagner, Feldzug von 1793, p. 82.
Ch. VI.] AUSTRIA CLAIMS A POLISH PROVINCE. 147
answer, of course, was, that Austria must first of all accede to the
treaty of St. Petersburg, and guarantee the Prussian acquisitions in Poland.
But this Lehrbach positively refused to do. The Russian cabinet, he said, no
longer attached any importance to the adhesion of the emperor, but, on the
contrary, was ready, on the first opportunity, to award a share of Poland to
its old ally. 1 After all the hindrances which had arisen in Grodno, during the whole course of the summer,
to the aggrandizement of Prussia, nothing could he more displeasing to the king
than this fresh announcement of Austria's claims to Polish territory. For • the
present, however, he restrained himself, and avoided, making
any sharp reply, because he hoped, in a very short time, to be able to lay the
Polish treaty of cession before count Lehrbach, as a fait
accompli. The Prussian government had received the sketch of Sievers' plan
of the 25th of August just at the right moment; they overlooked, in
consequence of the riew complications with Austria, the unfavourable settlement
of the frontiers, and hastened to signify the assent of the king. "The
friendship of the Russian empress," wrote the king to general Mollendorf, "is too important to us at the present conjuncture, to allow of
our entering into tedious discussions for the sake of a smaE
gain." Feeling sure of bringing the matter to a conclusion, he sent off
suitable diamond snuff-boxes for the Chancellor and the Crown-general on the Polish side, and the order of
the black eagle for Sievers and Igelstrom at Grodno, and counted the hours till
the arrival of the courier, who was to bring back the treaty sealed and signed.
1 The king immediately caused a
Golz, in St. Petersburg, on the 25th
full
report of Lehrbach's negotiation of October.
In addition to this, Cse-
to be
sent to several of his embas- sar's reports arrived from Vienna,
sies—to
Caesar, the charge
d'affaires and
Sir Morton Eden's letters, of
in
Vienna, on the 27th of August; the 20th, to Lord
Auckland, and of
[to
count Tauenzien, in Belgium, on the 31st of August to Lord Gren-
the
2d of September; and to Count ville.
K2 •
148
CATASTROPHE
OF THE COALITION.
[Book VII.
Instead of this, however, came the above-mentioned despatches of the minister Buchholz, reporting that nothing was completed,
not the slightest security attained; that the Austrians
were actively intriguing, and the support of Russia at an end. The effect was
deep and painful. The king was at once determined not to
allow himself to be thus put upon. He remembered that at Merle he had only
promised his help in the French war for the one campaign of 1793, and that,
too, only on condition of a territorial compensation in Poland; he .considered himself free from every obligation to employ a single man
against France beyond his federal contingent, for another hour. Hitherto he had
carried on the contest against the Revolution with pleasure, but he was now
threatened in his interests and honour alike, and resolved at once to
bring the Polish matter to a decision, by the employment, if necessary, of all his forces. With this view he determined that a portion of
the Rhine army should return to the Anspach territory; that new regiments in
Silesia and Prussia should be called into active service, in order that
Mollendorfs force might be raised to 40,000 men. And in order to remove all
doubts of the seriousness of his intentions, the king proposed to leave the
Rhine army and repair in person to Posen. He had the less scruple in
taking this last and most extraordinary step, because Brunswick, on the 16th of
September, had successfully repulsed an attack of the
French on his position at Pirmasenz, and General Ferraris arrived from Vienna
with the repeated declaration of the emperor, that
he had no other -wish, on this theatre of the war, than the conquest of Alsace.
There was, therefore, no pressing danger for Prussia on the side of the enemy,
and nothing to allure her to military action of her own, by which the king could have been deterred from his journey.
These resolutions arose so directly and necessarily from' the situation
of affairs, that at the very moment they were adopted in Edighofen, they were
foreseen, and taken for
Ch. IV.] BREACH BETWEEN AUSTRIA AND PRUSSIA
149
granted, both by the ministers in Berlin, and by the Prussian
ambassador at St. Petersburg.
At the first intelligence of the proceedings in Grodno, Count Golz
declared to the Vice-chancellor Ostermann, that the Prussian troops would march away; whereupon Ostermann
manifested a lively indignation, expressed his full approval
of the demands of the Polish diet, and even blamed Sievers for having hitherto
gone beyond his instruction in favour of Prussia.1 The
Prussian ministry, however, instructed Buchholz to sign
the main treaty, and to reject the four additional clauses unconditionally,
with the threat of military force. Almost on the very same day, Lucchesini, at
headquarters, made the decisive declaration to count Lehrbach, that in the preceding year, the aid of Prussia in the campaign of 1793 had been promised on condition of receiving Austria's
support in Poland; that, seeing the evident disinclination
of the emperor to fulfil this condition, Prussia would no longer insist upon his aid: and that the king was now prevented by his
obligations to his own State from contributing any further, from his own
resources, to the continuance of the war against France.
2
• And thus from Thugut's folly and dishonesty, from Austria's shortsighted eagerness for gain, from
Russia's inconsiderate enmity to German interests—from
all these causes which had long been at work with terrible effect,—the calamity suddenly arose, and the rupture of the European coalition, in
the most important quarter, was openly' declared. The long
rivalry of Prussia and Austria had been mitigated in the preceding year by the
circumspection of Leopold, and •the devotion of the king; but now the paths of
Prussia and Austria diverged for nearly an age—an age which
was to be filled, in consequence of this separation, with infinite suf-
1 Hogguer, September 13th. - neral of Holland on the 16th Oc-i Haeften communicates an extract
tober. from this answer to the States-Ge
150
CATASTROPHE OF THE COALITION. [Book VII.
ferings, unexampled humiliation, and wide-spread convulsions. Throwing
off all sense of kindred, they separated from one another with the bitterest
feelings, although the poisonous fruits of their actions came to light at the
very moment of the breach. To whatever part of
the great theatre of war we look, in this September month, we see the forces of
ancient Europe crumbling away by internal decomposition. At the very beginning
of the Lyonese revolt, Piedmont had asked for an Austrian reinforcement of 12,000 men, and the imperial
general, de Vins, had urgently supported the demand, the granting of which, in
the then position of affairs, might have had important results. But de Vins
belonged to the school of Laudon, and on this account Lascy,
as president of the Aulic council of war, refused all assistance. Thugut,
again, hated Piedmont as much as Prussia, and rejected the demand, except on
the condition that Sardinia, in case of her enlarging her borders on the side
of France, should cede the Novarese territory to
Austria.1 The
consequence was that the attack upon Savoy, which had been successfully commenced in the middle of September, came to a complete stand-still, and the important prospect of relieving Lyons had
been no sooner opened than it-was closed again. It is easy
to conceive that all the zeal of Sardinia for such a calamitous and hopeless
war was now thoroughly extinguished, and it was succeeded by an
apathetic disgust, which a few years later brought on the most fatal consequences both to the house of Savoy, and to Austria. Such was the position of affairs in the southern portion of the great theatre of war.
The relation between Holland and her more powerful
allies afforded an exact counterpart to it, in the north. When the latter emulously stretched out their hands for fresh booty, the
States-General of Holland considered that they too must not neglect the
interests of their country,
Haeften
20th and 21st of July. Sir Morton Eden
to Lord Auckland,
10th
of August.
Cii.
VI.] .
DISCONTENT
OF HOLLAND.
151
and appealed, in the first place, to England to learn what could be
done for the extension of their territory. It was not exactly easy to find a
suitable expedient; since, as we have seen, Austria would not give up to the Dutch even a district in the province of Liege, and still less a part of
her own dominions; and although England continued to support the wishes of
Holland, the result was so nugatory, that, in the first ebullition of feeling,
the States-General thought of nothing less than withdrawing from
the alliance; and the Prince of Orange immediately received orders to withdraw
his troops from the English, and to take up a separate position near Menin. 1 In a
word, the grand Coalition was every where forced from its hinges; Prussia had formally renounced it; Holland and Sardinia were on
the point of following her example; and the offensive war against the
Revolution, which was, from the very beginning, carried on with too much deliberation, and on faulty principles, died
away on all points, almost without any merit on the part of the enemy. The
Parisian democracy, unchecked and undisturbed, had full leisure to collect its
powers after the pangs of anarchy, and then to proceed, in its turn, to attack
dismembered and divided Europe.
Thugut's policy, which had operated so ruinously on the one side,
proved itself impotent even in Poland, for the sake of which he had caused such
wide-spread disorder. Catharine, it is true, wished to render
Prussia as weak and insecure as possible
in that country; and had therefore, as we have seen, not only approved of, but
suggested, the course pursued by Sievers and Kossakowski. But in the then state
of affairs she could not afford to come to a serious breach with Prussia. On
this point Austria's renewed demand of a Polish
province left no doubt; for however disagreeable the
1 Tauenzien to the king of Prussia
ministers, 9th of September. Lord from Coburg's head-quarters, 2nd of Auckland
to the grand-pensionary, September.
Answer of the Prussian 24th of January 1794.
152
CATASTROPHE
OF THE COALITION. [Book VII.
Prussian acquisition might be to her, [she had, of course, not the
slightest inclination to make a further protest, if the consequence of' it was
to be the cession of other parts of Poland to Austria.
The empress had succeeded in obtaining a dominant position in Poland, and she
now resolved to bring the matter to a conclusion, according to the treaty of
St. Petersburg.
Sievers therefore was instructed to remove the additional articles which had given offence to Prussia. Whereupon Buchholz
had the pleasure of hearing Sievers express his deep indignation against the
Poles, who had deceived him by false statements, but who could not for a moment
longer expect any indulgence at his hands. The whole aspect of
affairs was entirely changed at once; Buchholz again met with nothing but
complaisance on the part of the "good ambassador," and received
unusual respect from the Poles. They immediately proceeded to put the last
finish to the treaty, and the leaders of the diet went to the ambassador to
consult with him on the conditions, and the external form, of the final act.
They all requested that Sievers would lend military aid, as on the 22nd of July
and the 29th of August, since they could not possibly yield
without apparent compulsion and protest. A large number
of individual deputies made it a condition that they should receive
considerable sums of money, which Buchholz, in the joy of his heart, agreed
without reluctance to pay—but not, however, until the treaty
had been concluded. After this agreement, Sievers, on the 22nd of September,
began to make a show of violence, by arresting four orators of the opposition
by Russian patrols, and sending them back to their
homes. Thereupon, on the 23rd, the diet was again
surrounded by grenadiers and artillery, and an imperious note was read to the
deputies, in which Sievers demanded immediate signature. For the protest, which
had been conceded to them beforehand, the diet on this occasion chose a new form, viz. a universal silence, which no exhortation
could induce them to break;
Ch. VI.]
CONCLUSION OF PRUSSIAN TREATY.
153
until at last, late at night, since the affair must somehow be brought
to a conclusion, Ankwitz, the deputy, proposed
that the silence should be considered to give consent, and Marshal Bilinski
thereupon declared the Prussian treaty to be concluded.
And thus the affair with Prussia was settled, and Frederick William, who was
approaching his new province in all haste, was able to place his army in this
quarter on a peace footing, and receive loyal addresses, garlands and
illuminations, in Thorn and Posen. Russia had for the moment renounced this
portion of the Polish booty. But she proceeded all the more rapidly to secure to herself the entire possession of the other provinces of the
republic. It is true that Catharine once more declined the proposal of King
Stanislaus, that the Grand-duke Constantine should be designated as his
successor: her grandson seemed to her too good for the part which the king of
Poland was destined to play. What this part was, was brought to light, immediately after the conclusion of the Prussian treaty, in a motion of the
deputy Ankwitz, to secure the safety of Poland by a perpetual alliance with Russia. On the 30th the chancellors of the diet sent a suitable
communication on the subject to Sievers, who, on the 5th of
October, promised his full consent to the petition, (which had been really
drawn up by himself) and immediately afterwards produced
the draft of the treaty in eighteen articles. By this treaty the two States
promised mutually to aid each other with all their forces in every war, in
which the command-in-chief would always fall to that power which furnished the
most troops; "Accordingly," continues the
document, "as Poland's political existence hereby gains a
great interest for Russia, the latter must be empowered at all times to send
her troops into Poland. and to have them maintained there." In the next
place the ambassadors of the two States at foreign courts
were to be directed to act together, as much as possible;
and, lastly, Poland was never to make any change in her constitution without
the consent of Russia. The complete
154
CATASTROPHE
OF THE COALITION. [Book VII.
subjection of Poland to the Russian power could hardly be more openly
expressed; the system of a vassal monarchy was virtually and unreservedly
exchanged for complete incorporation. "Your majesty's
troops," wrote Sievers on the 23rd to the empress, "have
by this act become Polish; you dispose of them as you dispose of the quarters
and the movements of the troops of Poland and
Lithuania. With regard to the present king we must hold the rod over him; the
future king will be chosen by Your Majesty, and he
must also have his task assigned him, and receive a major
domus, under the title of a Russian ambassador, invested with infinitely more power than ever the viceroy of Ireland or Sicily
possessed, or your 'governor-general of Novgorod, or your stadtholder of Twer." Whilst, therefore, Europe was tottering beneath the
convulsions of revolution and revolutionary war, Russia was extending her
conquests, after the long and secret preparation of overwhelming forces, over
the whole territory which lies between the Carpathians and the Baltic;
and, for the second time in the same year, she took undisputed possession of
more them 66,000 square miles by a single stroke of the pen. It is true that
the rulers at Vienna and Berlin felt the dangerous and continually increasing pressure of their colossal military neighbour; but
exasperated as they were against one another, and constantly occupied by
France, they had no power of interfering. The only effect which this unexampled
deed of violence produced upon them, was the increased desire of emerging as
soon as possible from the boundless complications of
the French war: The acceptance of Sievers' treaty, after a few sham-fights
about the wording of the articles, was a matter of course. After its adoption,
on the 16th of October, the deputy Jan-kowski, on the
18th, ventured to remark, that the so-called alliance, was a mere treaty of
subjection; but King Stanislaus closed his mouth by the irrefutable rejoinder,
that all resistance would only increase the evil.
Bilinski, the marshal of the diet, declared in the
name of the Polish government,
Ch. VI.]
CATHARINE
SUPREME IN POLAND.
155
that the new treaty would undoubtedly tend to the happiness of Poland.
Meanwhile Catharine drew together, in Ukraine, the Polish regiments which were at present stationed in the ceded provinces, and caused them
to be reinforced by large bodies of Russians: 1 it
was said that she was meditating fresh glories for her reign, in the final
completion of her Turkish schemes—in the overthrow of the Osman empire in Europe.
1 Hogguer's despatches during these
months are full of this subject
BOOK VIII.
REIGN OF TERROR IN FRANCE.
CHAPTER I.
PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT.
Difficulties
of the jacobins in carrying on the government.—The
commune advocates a levy of the people en masse.—instead
of .this a motion is carried for a fresh recruitment.—pireacn between hebert and danton.-L\w
against monopoly (accapAREMENt).
state-bankruptcy. requisitions.-money traffic of the parisian
municipality.—Opposition
of the bourgeois.—Party
contests respecting war in la vendee,—loss of
toulon.— convention and municipality decree new terrorising
measures.—laws respecting revolutionary army,
"suspects", fixed prices, and requisitions.—The
municipality receives a million livres a week.—THE girondists
brought
before the revolutionary tribunal.-THE committee
of
public
safety proclaimed as a provisional government.
By the end of July France was subjected to the rule of the Jacobins. After
having destroyed the power of the Girondists
on the 21st of January, and their political existence
I on the 2nd of June, they beat down the last resistance, offered by their nominal associates in the Committee of Public Safety, on
the 10th of July, and established themselves in the possession
of the highest authority in the land. The. revolt in the provinces had been put
down, or had died away of
I itself, except in three cities—which were daily more and
I more hardly pressed by superior forces—and in La Vendee^ which had no
internal connexion with the rest of France, and,
consequently, .had no hope, and scarcely a wish, to extend
the theatre of its contest. As they had, at the same time, no fear of any
serious attack from without, the victorious
I democrats at last saw themselves at the goal which they had been
pursuing for four long and eventful years. All that they had prematurely
proclaimed with inconsiderate joy in
' August 1792—all that they had reluctantly been obliged to
160
PROVISIONAL
GOVERNMENT.
[Book VIII.
yield for a short space to the reaction of
September—was now at last attained, and the blood and treasure of all France
was at their disposal.
The next object was to preserve the dominion which they had gained as
the prize of the contest, and to mature it into an enduring
and well-ordered government; a task which had peculiar difficulties for the
Jacobins—difficulties which did not arise, for the moment, from the thoroughly
bewildered population, but sprang from the nature of the rulers themselves, Their last victories over the revolted provinces
had been gained by their troops; but it was only too certain that the army
could not possibly, in the long run, be the real foundation of their power. A
genuine soldier would not easily despise any thing more thoroughly than the machinations of the clubs: how was it be possible then that he
would long lend himself to be their subservient tool? Robespierre, the men of
the Commune, and the minister at war, were deeply penetrated by this
conviction, and derived from it the apparent audacity with which they
disorganized their own armies in the face of the enemy. The army might, indeed,
be employed for the moment, to protect their frontiers,
or to put down rebellion, but they must look about them for other, more
lasting, supports of their authority at home.
These were already everywhere in existence, or at any rate in a forward
state of preparation, by means of the influence brought to bear for many
years past upon the proletariate. Every town, and almost
every village, had its club (in close connexion with the
Jacobins of the capital,) in which the democrats among the small artisans,
peasants, and day-labourers, collected, together with all the ambitious and
plunder-loving rabble of the place. This club managed the elections to civic offices, when the conventional commissioners allowed of any
elections at all; it furnished the members of the revolutionary committee, and
thereby exercised an almost unlimited police authority over the citizens. Its members,
Ch. I.]
•ANARCHY
AND AUTHORITY.
161
- too, formed the only remnant of an armed national guard, after the
disarming of the "suspected" persons. By these means, with the
revolutionary tribunal, and the ever-ready guillotine, in the back ground, and
lastly, with the army as a reserve in case of need, the
subjection of the surrounding country might be effected for some time, and the
great mass of the subjugated people might be regarded for the moment as
harmless.
On the other hand there was a near and very serious danger in the nature of these organs of government—of these props and associates
themselves. Untractable and anarchical, with every passion unchained, and
unbounded in their desires, they allowed themselves, indeed, to be employed for
the overthrow of their opponents, and the plundering of the conquered. But it was another question how far their leaders could reckon
upon their continued union, their assent to a systematic course of proceeding,
their obedience to the most necessary orders. The Jacobin mobs had from the very beginning found a common ground in the
rejection of all discipline, order and authority; but
they had neither the will nor the power to sacrificce the least of their
appetites to any man, even though he rose from among themselves. How often must
Robespierre, while he was striving to bring order and method into this
turmoil of obstinacy and shortsightedness, avarice and love of
plunder, by all the arts of varied calculation, have sunk down exhausted by the
hopeless task! How must he, in his perpetual suspicions
of the ambition of the generals, have secretly envied the future lot of a
dictator, to whom an attached army would always eagerly offer its well -
prepared and serviceable powers! Whichever way he looked, he only saw one or
two who were convinced of the necessity of a strong
government; and these had always a still stronger conviction that they themselves ought to be the heads of. it. And in fact, what process of
reasoning conld lay an obligation on the Jacobins of the Faubourg to obey the
Jacobins of the Municipality?—or mi
in. L
162
PROVISIONAL
GOVERNMENT.
[Book VIII.
the latter to obey the Jacobins of the Convention?—or on both.to submit
to the Jacobins of the Committee of Public Safety? They all felt as lords and
masters of the enslaved and proscribed nation; none of
these new sovereigns, therefore, had the slightest inclination
to concede to any of his companions a higher grade of power than his own. The
history of the Jacobin government, which we are about to consider in the
following pages, everywhere presents the picture
of an unexampled despotism over the mass of the nation,
and a never-ending feud among the possessors of supreme
authority.
When, on the 27th of July, Robespierre entered into the Committee of
Public Safety, the position of affairs was in no respect
legally settled. The Convention itself, having completed the new constitution,
was about to lose the powers intrusted to it. On the 18th of August, the
commissioners of the sovereign people were summoned to Paris, from' all the departments, to declare their acceptance of the constitution, amidst the parade of a great republican festival. When this had
been done, the Convention ought properly to have given place to a new assembly,
in which case,' the Committee of Public Safety, too, would disappear with
the body from which it had proceeded. The Committee, moreover, had no
independent existence, even though the dissolution of the Convention should be
delayed; but might, according to the law, be renewed by the Convention on the 18th of every month, or entirely done away with. But both the
Convention and the Committee very well knew what they had to expect from France
and the future, if they once surrendered the helm of power: the
Convention therefore was resolved not to permit a
new election, and the Committee determined to establish itself as a regular
government. As we have said, they no longer feared any resistance on the part
of the French people: what they had to deal with was the disinclination of the
other Jacobins, to whom such a turn of affairs would bring
no personal profit. The Con-
Ch. I.] DANTON OFFERS SUPPORT TO ROBESPIERRE. 163
vention had to fear the intractability of all non-deputies, especially
of the club and the Parisian municipality; the Committee were apprehensive, too, of the ambition of the ministries, more
particularly of Bouchotte and his friends; and dreaded above all things the
jealousy of the other members of the Convention itself. The
latter experienced these difficulties at the very first step which it took, on the first of August, towards the confirmation of
its power. Danton, who had been driven from his place, three weeks before, by
unfavourable circumstances, who had as little hope of advantage to himself from
a new election as Robespierre, and who still regarded a strong
government as a prime necessity, condescended to make
advances to the newrulers, and sought to better his own position by offering
them his support.' He was still influential and formidable enough to make them
readily accept his overtures; and it was he, therefore, who, on the 1st of August, surprised the Convention with a
proposal to appoint the Committee of Public Safety as a provisional government,
and for this purpose to make it a grant of 50 million livres. His speech, violent and boisterous, as usual, was indeed
applauded with obedient enthusiasm, but the matter itself
excited such an evident displeasure in the assembly, that the members of the
Committee hastened to disown the motion, and only condescended to accept the grant of money, on the following day. Danton bitterly complained that in spite of his previous understanding with them, they had
thrown all the burden of the unpopular motion on to his shoulders, and swore
that he would never enter into their Committee. Matters, however, did not
come to a'full breach between them, since both parties were fully occupied by a
common opponent, and were thus kept together in spite of all their personal
dislikes. These opponents were the united coterie
of the municipality and the war ministry, Chaumette
and Hebert, Vincent and Rousin, with their associates—the
party of the Hebertists, as they were generally called from this period. They had, indeed, up to this time
164
PROVISIONAL
GOVERNMENT.
[Book VIII.
got on very well with Robespierre, because the
latter had rested on their support and had consequently furthered their wishes;
they agreed, too, in important points—in their hatred towards the queen and
Custine, and in their friendship for Bouchotte and Rossignol. But that which henceforth irrevocably separated them, was the
simple but all important circumstance, that Robespierre had become the
possessor of the highest power in the State, while the Hebertists remained in a
subordinate position. Hebert and Vincent, who wished, above all things,
to possess power and its enjoyments for themselves, were not a little angry,
therefore, at the motion of the first of August, which would have given
unlimited power for an indefinite period to the Committee of Public Safety; and Vincent made a furious speech in the Jacobin club, on the 5th,
in which he proved that a violation of the holiest principle had been
committed—a crime against the sovereignty of the people. As the motion,
however, had been rejected in the Convention
itself, the quarrel in the club had for the time no further consequences: but a
new arrangement of parties had taken place, and soon afterwards an occasion for
a far more important dispute occurred.
The 10th of August, and with it the festival of the new constitution, was near at hand. The commissioners of departments
gradually arrived in Paris; the government, by no means certain of their
influence in the lately subjugated provinces, had them watched during their
journey and still* more closely in the capital itself. 1 Most
of them, indeed, were nothing but envoys of the Jacobin clubs in the provincial towns,—more violent, and in part still less educated, demagogues than their Parisians colleagues,—who immediately united with the mother-club, and fell entirely into the hands of Hebert and his friends. But besides these,
1 By the October hero Maillard
amounted to 22,000 francs. Conv. and twenty-eight special commission- Nat. 2nd
January 1794, report of ers. The cost of this surveillance Vouland.
Ch. I.]
PLAN
OF THE HEBERTISTS.
165
there was a minority of moderate citizens, who had been appointed by
real popular election, and who, resting on their temporary dignity, aimed, if
not at a restoration of the Girondists, at least at a general
amnesty in Paris. The Comite
de Sureti generate, 1 however, being informed of this, 'immediately
obtained powers from the Convention to arrest any deputy who should come
forward with such obnoxious plans; and the only consequence of this symptom of
the existence of a moderate party, was a brief
restoration of harmony among the Jacobins, and their decided predilection for
the most violent revolutionary tendencies. This profited 1 no
one so much as the Hebertists, who immediately used the favourable moment to
gain over the majority of the commissioners to their aims.
We may remember an old and cherished idea of this party —which they
actually carried out in several Departments, but were obliged to give up in
Paris after a single attempt—of enrolling all the wealthier, and otherwise hostile, citizens, in the regiments stationed on the
frontier; and at the same time arming the proletaries who sided with themselves, as a democratic force in the interior of the country. When, in
consequence of the dangerous turn which the war had
taken since the end of July, the cry was raised in every direction that the
army must be strengthened, the moment semed to them favourable for realizing
this plan in its full extent. As early as the 5th, the Commune made a proposition to the Convention for summoning the whole nation en
masse to arms, fixing upon those who were to march into the field by a system
of drawing lots in the different classes of age, and leaving the details of the
execution—i. e. the practical decision—to the communal and district councillors. In the speeches which were
held during the solemnities of the 10th—mostly in bombastic
and tasteless
» 1 .The highest police authority; de
Salut Public (Committee of Public not to be confounded with the Comite Safety).
166
PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT. [Book VIII.
style 1—nothing occurred but a few unimportant commonplaces;
but on the following day, at the Jacobin club, motion followed motion in quick
succession. First of all, Robespierre obtained universal applause, when he
demanded the head of Custine, increased exertions for carrying on the war,
and, what was of most importance, the prolongation of the Convention. 2 In
the next place a demand was made for a levy en
masse, first of the aristocrats, and then of the Sansculottes; and the club men and commissioners had
learned their lesson so well, that in spite of the scruples of Robespierre—who said that the measure smacked more of enthusiasm than cool consideration—it was resolved, amidst great applause,
to bring the motion before the Convention on the 12th. The
prospect which was now opened to the demagogues was indeed brilliant and
unexampled. A summons to arms of all the males in France!—what a confusion
would thus be caused throughout the country; what an opportunity would thus be given for using violence against opponents, and for enriching the
patriots! They appeared at the appointed hour, in solemn procession,
at the bar of the Convention, with one of the
commissioners at their head as spokesman. It was high time, he said, to put an end to the intrigues of the enemies of freedom, and save
the country by one grand measure. The nation must rise en
masse, seize all suspected persons, keep their families as hostages, send the
enemies of freedom to the frontier, and force them to
fight against the foreign foe, with the terrible troops of the Sansculottes
behind them.
1 Conv. Nat. 7. Vendem.
III. vention,
that, with a view to the
Chenier: "La settle fete du 10 aout new elections, the necessary
number-
1793
a coute a la nation 1,200,000 ing of the people should be
arranged.
francs, de tout cela il riest reste
que The position of the Dantonists, how-
du pldtre et des chiffons." 2 He ever, leaves no doubt that this
was
spoke
in opposition to Danton's friend not seriously meant; at
any rate
Lacroix,
who, in the morning, had months must pass before the census
obtained
a decree" from the Con- could be
completed.
Ch. I.]
PROPOSAL
OF A LEVY EN MASSE 167
The Convention shouted applause, as was always the case when a genuine
friend of the people delivered a thundering oration. But no one would
listen to the proposal itself, and least of all the members of the government,
who had the best reason to know the dangers which would arise from the
execution of so crazy a proposition.1
Danton undertook to avert the worst, by apparently yielding to the noisy crowd.
" Certainly," he cried, "the nation must rise en
masse, but it must be done in an orderly manner. Who can be better adapted for
the purpose than the 8,000 commissioners of the
French people themselves? they will swear to you, that each of them, in his own
home, will urge his fellow-citizens to the utmost; that at their summons the
people will either die, or complete the annihilation of all tyrants. Arrest all
suspected persons, but do not send them to the
armies, where they would only do mischief, but keep them as hostages, instead of their families; and give full powers to the commissioners to levy 400,000 men in the Departments against the
barbarians of the north." Hereupon there were fresh shouts of
applause, and promises to march to death or freedom.
Robespierre and Couthon added remarks on the conspirators,
the faithless officials, the supplies of arms and provisions; and every one
seemed at last contented, when the proposed powers for the commissioners,
and the arrest of all suspected persons, were decreed; and the Committee of
Public Safety was entrusted with the most important function, that of bringing
up a report concerning the execution of these weighty matters.
On the 14th Danton anticipated this report,
by proposing to formulise the powers of the commissioners more precisely, and
to'limit them to the levy of the first class—the citizens
1 Carnot wrote on the 30th of July ( that it could either not be
carried
to the Committee respecting a plan out at all, or would lead to a defeat
of
recruiting the whole population like those of Cressy and Agincourt. oi the northern frontier; he said
168
PROVISIONAL
GOVERNMENT.
[Book VIII.
from eighteen "to twenty-five years:
and the Convention, which on the same day appointed two military members—the engineer officers, Carnot and Prieur (Cote-d'Or)—as
assessors to the Committee of Public Safety, gave validity to the motion on the
spot. But this was, indeed, quite a different thing from the plan originally
proposed, since it did not drive political opponents from house and home, but
only summoned the youth of France to the army, without respect of parties. A
new delegation, therefore, from the commissioners and the Parisian sections, made its appearance on the 16th, bitterly complaining that the Convention had transformed a sublime measure of
deliverance into a mere vulgar recruitment. Their indignation was so loudly
.expressed, that the Committee did not venture directly to reject their prayer. Barere, accordingly,
to the lively satisfaction of the commissioners, caused the decree to be
proclaimed: "The French people rises en
masse; the commissioners of the people will collect arms and provisions; the
communal councillors will march at the head of the
people." Ridiculous as this bombast must have sounded to every reasonable
being, Barere brought forward some special decrees of execution on the 20th:
then, however, Danton intervened again, to the great relief of the Convention and the Committee. When he pointed out
that, in the midst of such a tumult, the people coidd neither be armed nor
provisioned, the matter was once more referred to a committee, who, on the
23rd, had the courage to declare, that the march of the whole population to the frontier was a chimera, which could only serve to
excite the ridicule of the aristocrats; and in their new propositions they
entirely agreed with Danton's views. And thus arose the celebrated law, which
placed all the citizens of France, from eighteen to twenty-five years of
age, at the disposal of the government for active service, granted thirty
million livres for the manufacture of arms, and, meanwhile,
collected the young men in the district towns for the purpose of drilling them.
Nothing more was said of driving the "suspects"
into the field of
Ca.
I.] STRUGGLE BETWEEN DANTON AND
HEBERT.
169
battle, or of the levy en masse, except in a few border disr tricts, where conventional commissioners of
Hebert's party drove the peasants into the camps, without any arms, or,
at best, with pikes, and sometimes with their wives and children, to the great
horror of the generals.
The grand measure of deliverance, therefore, was thus really changed
into an extraordinary and unbounded recruitment. It is
evident that it could be of no service to the armies until after the lapse of
several months, and consequently had no influence in delivering the nation from
the immediate dangers of war; nay, we shall presently see that, through the
perversity of the democratic leaders, it prolonged these
perils unnecessarily. It is another of those great myths, of which the history
of the Revolution is so full, that this proscription was the turning point of
the war. This very levy en
masse, which was expressly rejected by the Convention, has been
celebrated as the means of liberating France from the yoke of foreigners!
The city party was not a little angry at the frustration of .so well
conceived and promising a plan. It was once more Danton upon whom their
indignation principally fell; and soon
afterwards, through a personal misfortune which befell ' Hebert, it came to an
open breach between the two leaders. The matter of dispute was the appointment
of the minister of the interior. The former minister, Garat, a refined but unprincipled man of letters, had fallen completely under the
violent influence of Danton, and was on that very account persecuted, in every
possible way, by the Parisian party. For a time Danton's protection supported
him. The conventional Comite
de Surete" gdnerale, which
was, at that time, entirely composed of Dantonists, caused Garat's first
assailant, a member of the city corn committee—who had accused the minister of
starving the people—to be arrested as a disturber of the public peace; and soon afterwards Danton himself parried the blows of a more dangerous
opponent in the Convention—Collot d'Herbois, who was
closely connected with
170
PROVISIONAL
GOVERNMENT.
[Book
VIII.
the municipality. Garat, however, wanted courage for farther resistance, and, on the 15th of August, sent in his resignation to the
Convention; whereupon Hebert's friends brought him forward as a candidate, in
the full confidence of victory. Their disappointment, therefore, was all the
more bitter when Danton's influence once more prevailed, and one of
his most devoted friends, the procureur Pare, was chosen. Hebert's wrath now
knew no bounds. In his journal, the pere
Duchesne, and in the Jacobin club, a storm of the most venomous abuse was directed against Danton and his
"venal and treacherous creatures" in the Comite
de Surete generate. Nay, Hebert went so far, in the Jacobin club, as to propose the
formation of a constitutional ministry—i. e. one independent of the
Convention—in other words, the overthrow of the power
hitherto possessed by the Committee of Public Safety. A more express
declaration of war coidd not be conceived; every day a violent outbreak might
be expected.
For the present, however, matters were not carried so far. The two
factions had still common dangers and common interests: and it
so happened that these were sensibly affected in several ways, by other
questions, and they were thus brought to a brief reconciliation. In order,
however, to estimate the turn in affairs which now took place, in its full significance, it will be necessary to retrace our steps a little.
We may remember the successes which the democratic party had obtained,
in the spring of 1793, in politico-economical and financial questions. The
principle of the right to labour was acknowledged, the trade in-paper money
forbidden, a fixed price put upon corn, a forced loan on the rich was decreed,
and the debt of 110 millions, which the State had made to' the Commune, was
virtually wiped out. It is true that of these things, the right to labour, and the forced loan, only existed on paper, for the present;
and that the course of the assignats, in spite of all penal enactments,
continued to sink after the 31st of May; the
Ch. i.] terrible effects of the
maximum law.
171
fixed price of corn was, however, carried out in
most of the provinces, but by no means in all. Yet this one measure had been
sufficient to bring on the evils prophesied by the Gironde, and all competent
judges, to a frightful extent. No one liked to give away his corn at so low a price; the produce markets were not attended, and the supplies
were interrupted. In all the cities, and in the unfruitful districts which did
not produce sufficient for their own consumption, the distress was horrible
beyond all description.1 People offered triple the maximum price in vain; the com-dealers would not
venture to expose themselves to the united chicanery
of the mob and the law. In Montpellier pregnant women were crushed to death in
the despairing crowds before the bakers' shops; in Auvergne
starved children were found' on the high-roads; and in the rich city of Rouen
the inhabitants were unable to keep off the famine, though they had funds in
hand to the amount of twelve million livres. These lamentable reports arrived daily in the Convention from all parts of the
country; and so glaringly evident was the misery, and its causes, that, in
spite of all their fear of the Parisian mob, the majority ventured to raise
their voices, and, on the 1st of July, granted several alleviations in regard to the corn trade. The views of the Jacobins were very different.
They had only one method of averting the bitter consequences of violence, and
that was an increase of violence. If the exchange of paper money fell, in spite
of the penal laws, the only thing was to force it up again by
increasing the severity of the punishment. 2 If
the peasants would not sell at the legal price, the government had now the
power of forcing them to do so, on pain of death. No sooner had the first
Committee of Public Safety fallen, and Robespierre's
1 Moniteur (June and July) passim,
to depress the price of assignats, and
2 The government, however, carried
then to buy them up in large quan-
on
stock-jobbing on a grand scale tities, and sell them again at a profit
during
the whole summer, in order when a rise took place.
172
PROVISIONAL
GOVERNMENT.
[Book
VIII.
friends seized the reins of power, than Collot d'Herbois, the patron of
the Hotel de Ville, brought a motion before the Convention to punish every man
with death, as a usurer and monopolist, who
should possess a store of the necessaries of life—provisions, fuel, leather,
iron, cloth and clothes— without giving notice of the same to the magistrates
of his commune, and offering his goods daily and publicly for sale, at such prices as the authorities thought fit. It was the same day
on which Robespierre was elected into the Committee,
and the Convention confirmed the law without any opposition. Four days latter,
Cambon proposed a measure for raising the price of paper
money by lessening its quantity; in other words, by putting out of circulation
the 1,500 million <issignats
which bore the image of the king. Thereupon a few members ventured to
remark, that such a bankruptcy was rather calculated to depress the value of the residue; but these were violently called to order, and as, on
the very same day, their prophecy came true, Couthon, on the 1st of August,
carried a motion for increasing the punishment of selling assignats
at a lower than their nominal value, to twenty
years incarceration in chains. In order gradually to deprive the population of
all other means of exchange, and at the same time to lower the value of specie,
the investment of capital in foreign countries was forbidden on the 3rd—
according to the motion of Couthon—on pain of death.
Somewhat later the Caisse d'escomptes, and all similar financial societies, whose shares, it was said,
competed injuriously with the assignats, were dissolved; and on the 15th of August, according to Cambon's
report, the republicanisation of
the entire national debt was decreed. All the creditors of the State, namely,
were directed to send in the titles and deeds of their claims, on pain of
having them disallowed; and in lieu of such titles, the capital was entered in
a "great ledger of the national debt," and
five per cent interest secured upon it. In this case, the forced^ exchange of
an old and secure title for an extremely doubtful one, was an evident violation
Ch. L] THE "GREAT LEDGER OF THE NATIONAL
DEBT." 173
of public faith. But the reduction'of the
interest of all State debts contracted at a higher rate, and the conversion of
capital already fallen due into a yearly rent—in the case of the 433 millions
of the exigible debt, and the 492 millions of the compensation promised
for hereditary offices—was an open and unblushing robbery. The Convention was
not so particular, cared little about the millions of French citizens whose
property was hereby affected, and gave its sanction to the "great
ledger," which closed it accounts with 200 millions annual rentes
1 amidst general clapping of hands. 2
The value of the assignats, as we need hardly remark, was not raised
even one per cent, by all these violations of law; on the contrary, at the end
of August, a livre of silver was scarcely to be had for six livres
of paper. . The treasury, which received scarcely any taxes, and spent
200 millions a month for the war alone, had still no other resource than its
paper money, which was continually sinking in value. The law respecting accaparement
had just as little effect on the traffic in goods. In the same way as
corn, all other goods now began to avoid the market: the cafes
in Paris, e. g. were suddenly without sugar, because no dealer dared to
confess that he had a supply sufficient for the demand. It was still more
alarming that there were good reason for fearing that the same thing would
happen in the case of bread, at no great distance of time. It was evident that all
1 Report of Cambon. Buchez, Histoire
parlementaire de la rev. fr. XXXI, 446. 2 The great ledger, one of the few
creations of the Convention which have survived their
authors, has enjoyed in most histories of the Revolution a pretty general
laudation, especially on account of the clearness which it is said to have brought into the national debt. No doubt order is an excellent thing,
but in regard to debt it consists less in tabular distinctness, than in security and solidity; and a fraudulent bankruptcy cannot be made into an
honest transaction by mere clearness, nor was the Republic preserved from
any of its later bankruptcies by the orderly arrangement of the great ledger.
174
PROVISIONAL
GOVERNMENT.
[Book
VIII.
the threats of the law against accaparement
would not favour the sale; on the 15th of August, therefore, direct compulsion was added to indirect, and powers were
given to the conventional commissioners to make a certain requisition of corn
from every acre of land. "It is an excellent method," said Barere,
"by which the commissioners in Alsace have collected
100,000 cwt. in twenty-four hours." The operation
of the new law may be understood from this same example. In the most fortunate
case the Alsatian peasants received for their corn the price of the maximum in assignats— fifteen livres for the cwt.; as the market price was between 40 and
60 livres, they lost at least 25 livres per cwt., while the State thus raised an arbitrary additional tax of
2Va millions, in two Departments alone.
All these difficulties culminated, as usual, in the task of provisioning the capital, partly because the matter itself was of enormous
proportions, and partly because it was always managed and turned to profit by
the most unclean hands. We have seen that Cambon's refusal to throw new sums of
money into this bottomless pit, was the first signal for the coup
oVetat against the Gironde; and that, subsequently, the Commune had extorted
the maximum law, in order to be able to get the corn from the peasants at a low
price. But these means were far from being sufficient. On the one side, the peasants denied having any corn at all, or hastened to
sell it elsewhere; on the other, the finances of the city had been for years at
so low an ebb, that it was impossible to procure funds for the purchase of
corn, even at the maximum prices. The government, therefore, had to
interfere again. They did so, as against the peasants, by granting to the
Parisian agents, on the 15th, the right of military requisition, and by sending
bodies of troops into several Departments to support them, on the 24th. They helped the necessities of the city treasury by making a new
loan of 2 millions, on the 6th of August, and a week afterwards of 3
millions—sums for which the city was able to procure a supply of corn for
nearly
Ch. I.] EMBEZZLEMENTS OF THE PARISIAN DEMAGOGUES. 175
two months.1 The actual necessities of the people were supplied, but the
restlessness of the Hotel de Ville was by no means calmed. We do not mean that
any serious want on the part of the working-classes had been apprehended, in
Paris; on the contrary, all wages had once more risen considerably, in
consequence of the new conscription;—e. g. the usual day wages had reached the
unexampled height of five livres, and therefore whoever was willing to work was quite safe from
starvation. But the hiatus in those measures of the
Government consisted in this, that no provision had been made for the
personal advantage of the city demagogues, whdse pretensions and claims were
now greater than ever. Their object was, in short, to make the State grant the purchase-money to the full amount, not as a loan, but as a
gift; to take away their corn from the peasants without any compensation
whatever, and then to make the Parisian bakers pay for it at the original
price. From this double extortion a booty would accrue to the city officials
of vat least 7 millions a month, which, though it had to be- divided among
a large number of democratic accomplices, was always sufficient to form the
centre of great party movements.
Here again we meet with those sectional
orators, Roux and Le Clerc, who came forward in June as rivals of the
municipality in the question of the Constitution. On this" occasion, also,
they made use of the food question to rouse the mob against the rulers, whose
lucrative places they desired to gain for themselves. They
declared that Pache was a corn-usurer, that Hebert and Chaumette sold the bread
of the people for their own advantage, and that the people must bring these
bloodsuckers to condign punishment.
Their machinations were carried on for a long
I1 This and the following state- the
minutes of the Committee of ments are made on the authority of Public Safety.
176
PROVISIONAL
GOVERNMENT. [Book VIII.
time without any effect, but they became disagreeable to the
municipality and the Jacobins in general, because the
Bourgeois were also shaken from their apathy by these disagreements, and willingly lent their support to the new friends of the
people, against the magnates of the Hotel de Ville. Thus the Sections once more
shewed signs of life, and the municipalty
remembered with angry terror the rising of the Bourgeois in May; this last had
been a serious warning to all the Jacobin factions, how deeply the hatred
against their rule was rooted in the nation, and how necessary a firm union was to their ownexistence. It was, therefore, with the full
consent even of Robespierre that the Commune adopted vigorous measures' in this
direction, took Roux prisoner, and drove the Bourgeois orators from the
Sections by cudgellings and arrests. The Jacobins were unanimous in the
opinion that the aristocrats must be intimidated, the rich crushed, and the
traitors annihilated. The revolutionary tribunal, incessantly urged on by
Robespierre, sent Custine to the scaffold; complaints were continually heard in the Jacobin club against the Comite
de Surete generate, for keeping back the materials necessary for the trial of the
Girondists and the Queen. They must., it was said, go seriously to work to
incarcerate all suspected persons, to provide cheap food
for the poor, to raise a revolutionary army for the war against the native
aristocrats. The city party once more raised its head, Robespierre
energetically supported it, and Danton did not venture to swim against the
stream. On the 29th of August, Billaud-Varennes, always a confidential
friend of the municipality, with which he had sealed his alliance in the blood
of the September massacres, came forward in the Convention. He had just
returned from a mission to the Army of the north, had brought with him a number of complaints concerning its condition, and proposed the
formation of a commission to watch over the execution of the Convention's
decrees. Though this was an undisguised vote of want of confidence in the
Cii.
I.]
PREDOMINANCE
OF THE CITY PARTY.
177
Committee of Public Safety, Robespierre made a very feeble opposition
to it, and Danton only evaded the stroke, by carrying a motion for adding three
new members to the Committee; which was nothing more than a means of appeasing the Hebertists by giving them a number of seats in the
cabinet. .
The new predominance of the city party, and, which was the same thing,
the decline of Danton's influence, was clearly manifested, in the
administration of military affairs at home. Everywhere the military view of things gave way to the revolutionary. Once more the rulers paraded
their contempt for the troops of the line, for methodical tactics, of military
discipline, and professed to look for salvation to levies of the people en
masse, to lawless impetuosity, and pitiless cruelty.
With Dubois-Crance, who daily bombarded Lyons with shells and red-hot
balls, but was too weak to try a regular siege, the Committee of Public Safety
expressed their lively discontent, and, on the 21st of August, they sent off
Robespierre's confidants, Couthon and Maignet, to
bring up all the people from the neighbouring Departments, and then, without
any regard to Dubois-Crance, to finish the matter at once. The garrison of
Mayence was ordered to La Vendee, and the whole male population of all the neighbouring provinces was likewise called out against the
armed royalists. Until their arrival, Rossignol was directed to confine himself
to. defence, and not to begin the work of destruction until success was
absolutely certain. It happened, in the interval, that Bouchotte
dismissed the general of division Tunq, but that the order to this effect
arrived in the latter's camp at Lucon,. just as the main army of the Vendeans
was preparing to attack him with all its force. The conventional commissioners, Bourdon and Goupilleau, who happened to be there, being both of
Danton's party, and both already greatly irritated against the minister at war,
annulled the deposition of the general; and Tunq had the good fortune,
immediately after-
m. M
178
PROVISIONAL
GOVERNMENT.
[Book
VIII.
wards, to defeat the Vendeans with great bloodshed. Rendered confident
by this victory, the commissioners, on their part — when Rossignol, in
accordance with the system • of the Committee, forbade the further pursuit of the enemy — decreed the dismissal of the general-in-chief, whom they
justly reproached with utter incapacity in military matters. Rossignol,
however, had likewise friendly conventional commissioners
in his camp, who immediately hastened with him to Paris,
and there occasioned the most scandalous discussions,
both in the Jacobin club and the Convention. With regard to*the two generals,
it was universally allowed that, in a mdral point of view, one was as depraved
and infamous as the other; while, on the other hand, Tunq was known as an
excellent soldier, and Rossignol as a zealous patriot and destroyer of
aristocrats. This was sufficient to determine , the decision of the Convention,
and it was given entirely in favour of Bouchotte and Rossignol, and against the Dantonists. The two commissioners were
recalled, and Rossignol was restored to his post with great eclat. Joy and
triumph filled the minds of the whole Parisian party.
The noise of these abusive and quarrelsome scenes was suddenly
interrupted by a report, which threw all minds into a state
of the greatest excitement— the report of the loss of Toulon. We have already
observed that the same Jacobin intrigues were carried on in this city. as in
Lyons; and, at last, after a series of political murders and shameless robberies, a plan was developed for a
general plunder and annihilation of the whole upper
class. The latter had for months patiently endured the most galling oppression,
and were thoroughly frightened away from any attempt
at resistance by the events of the 31st of May. The club,
which in Toulon had a mass of sturdy sailors and rude workmen at their
disposal, fixed the 14th of July for the execution of their great scheme: a
list of several hundred victims was drawn up, and bands of murderers distributed through the different Sections of the city. In order to prevent the population
Ch.
I.] REVOLT OF THE BOURGEOIS IN
TOULON.
179
from making any counter-movement, the town-council issued a
proclamation, to the sound of the trumpet, that any proposal to summon the sections to an assembly would be treated as a crime
worthy of death. On the 12th, the club got up a military procession of its
bands through the city, to excite the enthusiasm of its adherents, and to
intimidate the Bourgeois, some of whose houses were already
marked with red crosses, as signs for the murderers. On this occasion, however,
terror made men bold. A poor artisan, the sadler Reboux, hitherto a zealous
republican, and an enthusiast in the cause of the people, revolted at such atrocity. He summoned a number of citizens, late at night, to a
remote church, and called upon them boldly to resist the murderers. His
proposition met with unanimous approval; the cry for the opening of the
sections spread through every quarter of the city; the town-council lost its
presence of mind at the very first moment, and when the national guard made its
appearance in the streets in full force, the bandits of the club dispersed
without striking a blow. In a few days the aspect of affairs was entirely changed. A new municipality was formed, the leaders of the club
were arrested, and five of the authors of the previous murders were sentenced
to death and executed. In short, the occasion, and the original objects, of
this rising were exactly the same as in Lyons; it was not a
struggle for political power, or constitutional forms, but for the personal
security of individuals.
If the people of Toulon had borne the yoke of the Jacobins longer than
the Lyonese, they now proceeded on [their way with all the
more despatch and determination. There were no Girondists among them, who,
while they execrated the Mountain, were zealous for the Republic: but the power
immediately fell into the hands of the higher class of Bourgeois, and
some officials of the marine department—calm and circumspect men, who, from the very first, clearly foresaw that they could
look for no forgiveness from the Convention,
M2
180
PROVISIONAL
GOVERNMENT. [Book VIII.
and resolutely commenced a contest of life and death. They had always been favourable to the constitution of 1791, aud they now
ordered the arrest of the two conventional commissioners
in Toulon, and proclaimed the restoration of the constitution under king Louis
XVII. They issued a summons through all the surrounding districts—to the crews of the fleet which lay in the harbour, and
to the army of Italy stationed round Nice—for their adhesion and support. They
had, however, but little success beyond their own walls. The smaller towns of
the coast were entirely in the hands of the Jacobins, and the
peasants were determined to watch the issue. The commissioners of the
Convention attached to the army, Barras and Freron, employed every means of
influencing the soldiers—raised their pay, distributed
daily rations of wine,1 and
declared that Toulon was in league with the English, and wished to give up the
fleet to the enemies of their country. They succeeded in this way in securing
the fidelity of the regiments; and when, at the end of August, General Carteaux
subdued Marseilles, the whole coast declared for
the Convention, and Toulon saw itself completely isolated and exposed to a
pitiless revenge. Under these circumstances the Bourgeois made up their mind,
on the 23rd of August, to take a step which had previously been falsely imputed to them by Barras: they begged the English admiral,
Hood, who, in conjunction I with the Spaniard Langara, was blockading the harbour, to come to their
assistance, and received a garrison of the allies into their fortress. The
admiral declared that he would keep the town and the
fleet for king Louis XVTL, until the conclusion of peace.
This was a dangerous blow to the Republic. The loss of their best
fleet, the raising of the royal - banner, the alliance between the opposition
at home and the European
Jeanbon's
report to the Convention
nationale, 9th
December.
Ch.
I.]
TRIUMPH
OF THE HOTEL DE VILLE.
181
powers—it was difficult to say which of these things was the most
perilous. The Convention could not find words wherewith to brand the baseness of this treachery. The people of Toulon, it was said, are not
Frenchmen, they are no longer even men, they only exist in the history of
perjury and felony. It was another signal to visit France with a fresh increase
of terrorrism, to unite all the revolutionary parties, and to bring the
policy of the government into accordance with the views of the most violent of
the factions.. The object in view was to subject the citizens throughout the
country to an omnipresent and arbitrary police; to threaten every hostile movement with immediate destruction; and, lastly, to attach
the tools of this tyranny, —the democratic proletaries—to the existing
government, by holding out to them the prospect of booty and enjoyment. Before
either the Municipality or the Club had issued a formal proclamation to
the people, the Convention manifested its readiness to give full
play to the wishes of the factions. On the 3rd of September they passed the
long-desired decree of execution, in the matter of the compulsory loan of 1,000 millions; ordered a new reduction in the price of corn; forbade the
corn trade in all parts of the country, and directed that Paris should be
provisioned by means of requisitions, like a fortress in time of war. Two days
afterwards , ' in full accordance with the views of Hebert and
Robespierre, they decreed the division of the revolutionary tribunal into four
sections, with an increased number of members, and thereby placed four criminal
courts at the disposal of the rulers, instead of one.
All faces at the Hotel de Ville were radiant
with joy. "It is.time," cried Hebert to the Jacobins, "to bring
matters to a conclusion, to form the revolutionary army, to send the Girondists
to the scaffold, and.to smite the aristocratic officers
one and all. Formerly this would have been dangerous, but
now we have the upper hand, and must bestir our
182.
PROVISIONAL
GOVERNMENT.
[Book
VIII.
selves."1 "It is true," said Robespierre, "that in spite of the
loss of Toulon, our position is a splendid one, but the usurers and the starvers of the people must be crushed: let us
exterminate the intriguers who dare to caluminate a patriot like Pache."2
"The Club," cried Rouyer, "must no longer talk but act; the
people must rise and carry the Convention with them; they must make their way into every house, seize the traitors, and deliver them
up to the vengeance of the law." Meanwhile this very people was rioting
before the doors of the bakers, and then crowding to the Hotel de Ville, where
Chaumette ordered a general cessation of work in the city for the
following day. He then went to the Convention to calm the fears of that body
respecting the character of this movement, and at the same time to warn them
against the aristocrats—i. e. against the Bourgeois population of several Sections. The tumult was continued in the halls of the Hotel de
Ville until late at night; the Jacobins declared their adhesion to the
movement; a bureau was erected on the Place de Greve, for the purpose of
drawing up a petition to the Convention; and the . mass of the people,
crowding round it, incessantly raised the cry for bread. After these
preparations Chaumette appeared in the Convention at mid-day, on the 5th, and
spoke the first word of the day — formation of a revolutionary army. A great wave of human beings followed him into the hall of the assembly, who settled themselves on the benches with shouts and clapping
of hands, and demanded the immediate passing of the decree. The joyful clamour
rose higher and higher when Chaumette descanted on the
question of provisions, and proposed to turn the gardens of the
Tuileries into a potato-field; when Billaud-Varennes demanded the immediate
arrest of all persons suspected by the people; when Danton, always ready to
swim with the stream of popular
Jacobin club, 1st December. — 2 Jacobin club, 4th September.
Cii. I.] MONSTROUS DECREES OF THE CONVENTION. 183
favour, procured a grant of forty sous a day for those who attended the
sectional meetings, in order that the poorer people might not, through poverty, be obliged to leave the field to the rich. Then a deputation of
Jacobins appeared, and put the finish to all these confused proposals. "Arrest all persons of noble birth,'1
cried their spokesman, "send the Girondists immediately to the scaffold;
let the columns of the revolutionary army march through the country, each
accompanied by a guillotine; let it work until the last traitor is dead; let
the sickle of equality be brandished over every head, and make terror the order
of the day."
The Convention answered the proposition of the
Jacobins, in the first place, by a decree, which denounced the punishment of death against the purchase or sale of assignats;
and next, by a decree for raising a revolutionary army of 6,000 men of
Paris, for the purpose of making war on the reactionists,
carrying the revolutionary laws into execution, and protecting the provisions
of the people. In order to secure the incarceration of suspected persons, the
law which prohibited house-searching in the night-time was abolished; the appointment of new members to the forty-eight revolutionary committees of Paris was ordered by the municipality, and an unlimited power of arrest entrusted to them.
And thus passed this new holiday in the annals of the Revolution.
Henceforward, as an orator of the Jacobin club remarked,
any Frenchman could at any moment be legally thrown into prison;—henceforward
every proletary was sure of his weekly pay, and every demagogue of unlimited booty from the property of his fellow-citizens. The city party began their rule in full triumph. Their friends, in the Convention
succeeded, on the 6th, in electing Billaud-Varennes, Collot-d'Herbois, and the
insignificant but like-, minded Granet, into the Committee of Public Safety;
and, on the 9th, in occupying the Comite"
de SureU generate by. a majority of their party.
A circular was sent round to the
184
PROVISIONAL
GOVERNMENT. [Book VIII.
conventional commissioners in the Departments, directing that, where it
had not yet been done, all offices of every kind should be taken from the
Bourgeois and given to the zealous Sansculottes.
And lastly, the municipality of Paris carried, off in full measure, the
rich gains which they had longed for. Every week the Committee of Public Safety
placed a million of livres at their disposal, nominally for the purchase of provisions, but, in
fact, as a compensation for leaving the Committee in quiet possession of
political power — as a democratic apanage.
For, even according to the calculation of the Committee itself, a sixth of those sums, at most, was spent in buying corn, since, for
the present, the magazines had been filled by the measures of August; and after
-a few weeks the columns of the revolutionary army began to move, and
soon spared the Commune the trouble of making any payments. "At last" said Hebert, on the 10th
of September, "at last the provisioning of Paris is secured."
The measures intended to realise, and carry out in detail, the system proclaimed on the 5th, soon followed. The 17th of
September produced one law respecting the necessaries of life, and another respecting suspected persons — the former
establishing absolute power over the property of the country, and the latter
destroying the personal freedom of its inhabitants. The former fixed the price of all kinds of corn and fodder; crushed the private trade in
these articles by a series of troublesome and even dangerous formalities, and
entrusted the commissariat of the armies to conventional commissioners, who,
for this purpose, received the right of requisition and, when
necessary, of confiscation. As previous experience had taught, that, under such
a system, a number of agriculturists would no longer till their fields, a
preliminary enactment had been issued, on the
14th, according to which the communes were to be made
answerable for the sowing of the lands; men, horses, and other cattle, were
made liable to requisition for this purpose; and all negligent
Ch.
I.] LAW RESPECTING SUSPECTED
PERSONS.
185
labourers were to be punished by imprisonment,
for not more than three months. Thus one measure of compulsion gave birth to
others: the State was on the way to become the only farmer, the only merchant,
the only manufacturer in the country — to undertake all the cares and labours
of civil society, and to mete out their daily
portions of bread to the inactive and impoverished masses. The system of
requisition, which assumed that the State was the supreme proprietor of every
thing, was daily reduced to practice: on the 20th, all the materials used in ship-building, — on the 27 th, all the trees fitted to supply
timber — on the 4th of October, all the mercantile vessels of the land — were
placed at the disposal of the State. The State itself fixed the price of the
articles, and, on the 29th, laid it down as a general principle,
that all wares should be taxed at the average price of 1790, with the addition
of a third; and that all wages should be fixed by the same standard, with the
addition of a half. A special commission was empowered to enquire into, and settle, these innumerable values.
Such was the state of things with respect to the rights of property. As
to the liberty of the person, the law of the 17th declared all citizens to be
"suspected," who had either shown themselves in any way friends of tyranny, or had not duly paid their taxes, or had not received a
card of citizenship from the local or sectional authorities. As this card was
issued by the municipality, and had to be countersigned by the revolutionary
committee, which could arbitrarily refuse its sanction — this
arrangement placed the freedom of every citizen
in the hands of a few persons, who had recommended themselves by party zeal to
the club of the place, or the conventional commissioners, as members of the
committee. Every suspected person" was to be
arrested, and guarded, at his own cost, in a locality specially prepared for
the purpose, until the conclusion of peace.
186
PROVISIONAL
GOVERNMENT.
[Book
VIII.
Incredible as it may sound, this absolute power over person and property seemed not extensive enough to. the Parisian party. When the
Convention, on the 18th, decreed that whoever spread false intelligence
concerning the war should be transported to Cayenne, Collot d'Herbois demanded
that the law should have a retrospective force. A remnant of shame
or mercy, to which the Dantonist Thuriot lent words,. decided the Convention to
refuse assent; whereupon Collot proposed that the prisons of "the
suspected" should be undermined, in order to blow them up
at the first manifestation of a refractory spirit. When
this too was negatived, he commenced again, on the following day, with
redoubled fury, by proposing that all merchants, who sold the necessaries of life at a high price, should be locked up; he said that he
had tried this experiment during his mission in
the Oise department, and had brought down the price of butter by one-half.
"In fact," he said, "the suspected ought not to be tolerated in
the land, even after the peace, but sent into perpetual banishment laden with the curses of jthe people." Even Robespierre protested against
this, but drew upon himself such a violent attack from his irritated colleague,
that he endeavoured to appease him by concessions, and recommended his first
proposal — respecting the incarceration
of merchants — as an example, at any rate, to the conventional commissioners in
the provinces.
After the men in power had once made up their minds to try the patience
of the French people to such a degree as this, and unreservedly to advocate the
most unheard-of tyranny, the last step — the official abolition of the constitution, proclaimed six weeks before — might be immediately expected. If the nation could endure the laws of the 17th, it
would also allow the continued existence of the Convention and the Committee of Public "Safety. The postponement of such a declaration could only, at best, revive the envious
ambition of the democrats who did not immediately enjoy the sweets of
office; and in fact symptoms
Ch.
L] IMPEACHMENT OF THE GIRONDISTS.
187
of this kind made their appearance towards the end of September. The
club of Cordeliers brought forward motions against the conventional
commissioners, who did not respect the orders of the minister at war; and -the
Jacobins, for a moment, supported them. This was an agitation similar to
that of Hebert for a constitutional ministry — an aspiration of Bouchotte and
the' municipality against the Convention. Another time it was the majority of
the Convention itself, the moderate men of the Centre under the Dantonist Thuriot, (formerly member of the Committee of Public Safety,
which he had left from dislike of Billaud and Collot) who, when Houchard and
other generals were dismissed, had shown symptoms
of resistance to the Committee. Neither of these movements had any result, but the Committee, nevertheless, determined to bring matters to an issue..
In the first place, Robespierre's friend Amar, on the 3rd of October,
brought forward the long expected impeachments of the Girondists in the name
of the ComiU de Surete ginerale. Besides
the twenty previously proscribed persons, it was directed against forty-two
deputies,1 who had been, for the most part, already arrested, and who were sent
to the revolutionary tribunal for immediate trial. Then came the seventy-three representatives who had signed the protest against the 2nd of
June, discovered at the house of Duperret—all of them members of the Right and
Centre.. Amar proposed to arrest them, and to allow the Comite"
de Surete" ge"ne"rale to
give a further report upon their case. On this point a
discussion took place among the rulers themselves. The extreme Left wished to
send them without delay to the scaffold, with the forty-two; but Robespierre
interfered, and carried Amar's motion. He probably intended
to make use of their services at some future time, and under altered
circumstances, against the Hebertists; and
1 This number is taken from the two
incorrect lists, authentic list. The
Moniteur has
188
PROVISIONAL
GOVERNMENT. [Book VIII.
for the immediate object — the unconditional
subjection of the Centre — the proposed measure was quite sufficient. This
becomes still clearer when we find that the sittings of the Convention, at that
time, were attended by scarcely 300 members,1 and
that the Mountain, in the absence of about 140 deputies on
missions, never numbered more than a hundred. Under these circumstances, the
elimination of seventy-three opponents had a double importance.
Thus secure of the Convention, the Committee of Public Safety came
forward, on the 10th of October, with the sentence
of death against the new Constitution. Ever since the 5th of September, they
had caused petitions to be sent up from the clubs and rural communes, praying
that the Convention would remain at its post as long as freedom
was in danger. This was so much a matter of course, that the decree did not
consider it advisable to mention it. Its essential provisions were to the
effect; that the provisional government of France, until the conclusion of
peace, was a revolutionary one; that ministers, generals,
and local magistrates, were under the superintendence of the Committee of Public Safety; that all authorities were bound to carry out
the revolutionary enactments as speedily as possible
; that the Committee, on its part, should hurl the revolutionary army upon the enemies of the Revolution, draw up exact
accounts of all the provisions in France, apportion to every man what was
necessary for his maintenance, and subject the rest to requisition. The report
with which St. Just brought in the law, in the name of
the Committee, frankly declared, in bombastic periods, the sentiments and
intentions of the new government. It announced to all officials, committees and
commissioners—in a to word all democratic rulers,—that the Committee demanded of them
1 About 200 never came out of than a
hundred were proscribed or the committees into the plenum; more absent on missions.
Cn.
L] THE COMMITTEE ASSUMES ABSOLUTE
POWER. 189
diligence, order and strict obedience. As a compensation to them, it was announced to the nation; that, for the foundation of the Republic, it was indispensable that the will of the
sovereign people should crush the royalist minority, and rule over it by right
of conquest. And thus this Republic, with brutal candour,
proclaimed that, being intolerable to an unfettered people, and inconsistent
with legal freedom, it rested on the sword alone. Its self-confidence was
sufficient to make it believe, that in this confession of weakness, it was
manifesting both power and courage.
190
[Book VIII.
CHAPTER II. END OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1793.
50,000
men despatched from the vosges to flanders.—officers of high birth ejected from
the army.—houchard general of the army
of
the north.-hls plan of operations.—battle of hondschotten.
—Dunkirk
relieved.— The
committee of public safety sanction houchard's measures.—Fall of le quesnoi, battle of menin, retreat of houchard.—Fall of houchard.—Jourdan general of the army of the north.—The austrians besiege maubeuge.—New french tactics. —Actual numbers of the troops and
armies.—Battle
of wattigxies. —End of the campaign in flanders.—Jourdan dismissed.—The
austrian's
attack alsace.-general pichegru.—general hoche.—
hoche
forms a junction with pichegru.—the former receives the command of the armies of the moselle and rhine.—and gains a complete victory over
wurmser.
We have seen, in the preceding book, the position in which the belligerent
powers stood to one another, after the fall of Mayence and Valenciennes. The
Sardinians came to a standstill on the Italian frontier,
because Austria obstinately refused the aid which was so repeatedly asked for.
On the Rhine, Wurmser directed all his efforts against Alsace, thereby removing
all ground of apprehension for the interior of France; and he had completely broken off friendly relations with Prussia. On the frontiers
of Flanders, Coburg stood with one division before Lequesnoi, Orange, with
another, near Menin', and York, with a third, before Dunkirk. The French
government had received full and trustworthy information, that no zeal for the war was to be found among the Allies, nor
any serious plans of aggression; and they were
Cii. II.] ARMY OF THE MOSELLE
TRANSFERRED TO BELGIUM. 191
therefore able quietly to take measures for safety at home, and conquest abroad.
According to the whole position of affairs, the northern theatre of war
was the most important to Paris, and the Rhenish, the least so. Even before the
fall of Valenciennes, therefore, the Committee of Public Safety had recurred to
the system of Custine (who had just been arrested), which was, to secure
success in Belgium, by drawing the Rhenish' forces into that quarter. On the
21st of July, therefore, they decreed that 21,000 men — taken partly from the
Moselle army, and partly from the army of the Ardennes— should march
to Valenciennes. • When this place had fallen, and Kilmaine driven beyond the
Scarpe, they issued an order, on the 8th of August, for the despatch of 30,000
more men from the Moselle army, for the transport of which a sum of five million livres was granted to the minister at war.1 It
was the only means, but it was perfectly effectual. In the northern Departments
the exhaustion and discontent of the inhabitants made further levies hazardous,2 and
there were no other troops of the line in the neighbourhood. It
is certain, therefore, that if the allied armies on the Rhine had prevented the
despatch of those reinforcements, by vigorous and well-conceived offensive
movements, France would have been without the means of resisting Coburg's operations. Now, however, the French had only to maintain
themselves in the beleaguered fortresses until the arrival of these
reinforcements; the Republic would then be sure of being able to oppose the
enemy at every point with overwhelming numbers.
In this expectation the government employed itself, during the month of
September, in what was called the patriotic
1 Minutes of the Committee. — by the
cavalry in great battues.
3 This levy was attempted later in
Deschampsto the Committee of Public
the autumm; the men deserted by Safety, 29th December; and on many
hundreds,
and were captured again other occasions.
192
END
OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1793. [Book VHI.
purification of the armies—i. e. the expulsion of all officers, whose
birth or opinions rendered them obnoxious to the new
rulers. It was of no avail to General Kilmaine that he had just brought the
northern army, by great skill and good fortune, over the Scarpe. "He was
not born in France,", said a commissioner, "and will never like
us;" — "He has laid open the road to
Paris," said another, "in order to cover the frontier districts; it
is evident that he has an understanding with Coburg." During his mission
to the Army of the north, Billaud-Varennes dismissed and arrested six generals
in one day. On a similar circuit, Ronsin denounced four generals, and
seventeen superior officers, as "aristocrats, noblemen, and
foreigners," all of whom, he said, were odious to the patriots. A charge
brought by a town council, a club, or even by a single patriot, was sufficient to ruin a general: Omeara,
the commandant of Dunkirk, e. g. was immediately suspended by Bouchotte, on the
information of a democratic surgeon. The troops were thus suddenly deprived of
their former officers, more than seven hundred of whom
were dismissed from the Rhine army within a few weeks; it was no wonder that
all discipline was lost, and that excesses of every kind were the order of the
day. In addition to this, the clubs cried out against the ill-treatment of
their warlike brethren, whenever the latter were punished;
the troops of the line and the volunteers were perpetually quarelling; and the
supplies for the army were every where interrupted, because even the military
magazines were used to feed the Parisian mob. Meanwhile, to increase the confusion, swarms of peasants belonging to the general
levy continually arrived; envoys from Paris hawked the journals of Hebert and
his associates through the camp; noisy tumults arose in the regiments against
treacherous officers and English gold; and the soldiers, brave as
they were, lost all their firmness and self-confidence when they lost their
discipline. They abused their generals for continually retreating, but^ at the
first alarm, threw away
On. H
]
CHARACTER
OF HOUCHARD.
193
their weapons and fled in crowds.1 And
thus it came' to pass, that the Army of the north, which at the end of July had
numbered 97,000 men — without reckoning garrisons— between Maubeuge and
Dunkirk, lost seventeen thousand men, 2
after the taking of Caesar's camp, without any serious battle; and
that all the bodies of recruits despatched to the army disappeared like dew in
the sand. The cause was always the same, the composition of the democratic
government, which squandered its boundless resources, amidst high sounding speeches and wild confusion.
General Houchard, the late commander of the Moselle Army, succeeded
Kilmaine as chief of the Army of the north. Custine had once said of him, that
he was well fitted to lead a division, but was a lost man if he ever undertook an independent command. This was a just estimate of Houchard:
he was a sabreur of slow conception and weak character, who had gained the favour3 of
the Committee of Public Safety by patriotic
boasting and abuse, and had thereby been inspired with a
brief confidence of victory. But he had no sooner entered on his new duties,
than he was carried away, without power of resistance, by the whirlpool of
cares, deficiencies and dangers. In every corps he found a number of popular
representatives who besieged him with ardent, or brutal,
and always contradictory, importunities. The minister at war
wrote to him that he must not listen to talented technologists, but to the
zealous Sansculottes;
and added, that he could not give him any particular advice, but that the country expected great things of him. The staff of the army,
like every other ruling body at that .time, was torn by internal dissensions,
and divided
1 This is all taken from the despatches in the military archives at Paris. — 2 According to the army lists in the military archives. — 3 He wished to employ the garrison
of
III.
Mayence
against the Prussians at once, in spite of the capitulation, because, he said, republican soldiers could not be bound by the promises
of a bad commandant.
N
194
END
OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1793. [Book VIII.
into three parties, each of which, with violent complaints against
their opponents, tried to get possession of the general. The most able of these
were unquestionably the General-Adjutants, Barthelemy and Vernon, who, fortunately for the army, soon obtained the lead, but who,
unfortunately for the general, were known as adherents of Custine, and
therefore hated by the Hebertists. Under these circumstances, it was impossible
to take a single step without discussions and hindrances; and while the
government incessantly urged him to make a bold advance, the general shrank
from every undertaking which was not certain of success, because the slightest
failure would certainly be punished by the conventional
commissioners as treason.
Houchard's first idea was to make a diversion against Maritime
Flanders, which was at that time almost entirely unoccupied; for which purpose
he drew off 3,000 men from the Ardennes Army, and portions of his most
important garrisons, which were gradually replaced by
national guards from the interior. But just at this moment, on the 18th of
August, he received news that the Duke of York was leading 37,000 men against
Dunkirk; and likewise of the disastrous battles in the forest of Mormal, by which Coburg prefaced the storming of Lequesnoi.
He determined, therefore, to await the arrival of reinforcements—which were
being transported in carriages from the Moselle Army—before undertaking any
expedition of his own. The danger of Dunkirk at first
sight seemed great. The garrison of 8,000 men was by no means
sufficient for the extent of the walls; the merchants
were exasperated by the laws of the maximum
and accaparement, and the sailors of the harbour were disobedient and mutinous.1
Fortunately for the French, the indolence and
disorder of the Allies were
1 Some information on this
point the correspondence of the war
min-in Rousselin, Vie
de Hoche, vol. II. istry. init. A more detailed account in
Ch. II.] YORK AND FREITAG- BEFORE DUNKIRK. 195
infinite. York took nine days to march about sixty-five miles, and on
his arrival'-had neither engineers, nor heavy artillery, nor other siege
materials.1 He looked in vain, to the very end of the siege, for the appearance of
the English fleet, so that the place remained quite
undisturbed on the sea-side. But what was still worse, the weakness of the
Allied Army made a complete blockade, even by land, impossible.
While York pitched his camp on the east side of the fortress, Houchard was able
to send continual reinforcements of troops, artillery, and
materials of all kinds, from the west; and before York could get his batteries
ready, the new commander, the energetic Souham, began to assume the offensive
at all points. York had posted about half his
army, under the Hanoverian general Freitag, about fourteen miles to the
south-east of Dunkirk, as a protection against the French camp at Cassel. But
the position of his divisions became extremely critical when Souham opened the
sluices on the southern front of the fortress, and thereby
laid the flat lands for a considerable distance several feet under water. By
this step immediate communication between York and Freitag was cut off, and the
former had no other line of retreat than the road to Furnes, on a narrow dam between the sea-coast and miles of swamp. In this position
the Allies received the attack of the French relieving army on the 6th of
September.
As soon as York's designs against Dunkirk had become clear, Houchard
had raised his left wing at Cassel—which would be exposed to the
first shock—to the number of 23,000 men, and then collected about 40,000 men in
the neighbourhood of Lille; while Coburg was observed on the Scarpe by at most
10,000 men of the main body, and by 12,000 men under General Gudin at Maubeuge. The
reinforcements from the Moselle
1 Ditfurth. "Die Hessen in Flan- official papers in the Hessian
archives. dern,
I, 106," on the authority of
the
N2 .
196 END
OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1793. [Book VITI.
Army, 22,000 strong, were only a few days' march distant on the
25th of August, and were destined partly to strengthen the corps which was
observing Coburg at Maubeuge, and partly to enable the main army to deal a
decisive blow at Lille. York and Coburg, each exclusively occupied with his own siege operations, took little notice of these accumulations of
troops. The only thing which Coburg did, was to summon
Beaulieu from Namur, with eight battalions, and to post him at Orchies, some
miles in front of himself, in the direction of Lille.
Besides these, as we have already remarked, 13,000 Dutchmen, under Orange, were
stationed exactly opposite Lille—in widely scattered
posts, and in complete isolation—between the two main camps, about thirty-three
miles from Quesnoi and forty-seven from Dunkirk.
Upon the knowledge of these facts, Barthelemy and Vernon formed a plan,
which, if energetically carried out, promised the most splendid results. It
consisted in falling upon the positions of the Dutch with 40,000 men, and,
after defeating and dispersing them, in following them up in
quick pursuit past Ypres on the north-west, and down the Lys to Furnes and
Niewport. From the superior numbers of the French this might be effected,
before Coburg received any certain intelligence of the object of the enemy's movements. When once they had reached Furnes, the French army
would be in the rear of the divisions of York and Freitag, who were separated
by the water, and threatened in their front by the camp at Cassel; the
republicans might hope, therefore, to capture, at any rate, York and his
soldiers, to the very last man, between the swamps and the sea. Coburg would
then hardly be able to maintain himself any longer in Belgium against his
victorious adversaries.
In a consultation held, on the 25th of August, with
the conventional commissioners, Vernon explained the particulars of this plan
with great zeal, technical knowledge, and eloquence.
Houchard supported him, and the commissioners gave a kind of half consent. But very soon a number of
Cii.
II]. CARNOT'S ANXIETY TO SAVE DUNKIRK.
197
scruples were suggested, the most important of which, after all, was,
that the scheme originated with a friend of Custine, "whose eyes,"
wrote one of the commissioners to the Committee of Public Safety, "do
not please me at all." The zeal of the
generals was hereby perceptibly cooled, and when a preliminary attack made upon
the Dutch, on the 27th, (even before the arrival of the Rhenish troops) had no
result, Barthelemy gave up the enterprise. "Our troops," he wrote on the 29th, "are still too little accustomed to order and
discipline, to allow of our beginning with such a bold game" — a game, he
meant, in which the intervention of Coburg was, after all, within the bounds of
possibility. In addition to this, a letter from
the Committee, dated the 28th, arrived in the camp, in which Carnot urgently
exhorted the geuerals to save Dunkirk. The loss of this city, he said, would
produce a ferment through the whole of France, while a victory over York
would be followed by a revolution in England (Carnot was
thinking of the Edinburgh Convention, which was to 'meet in September); this
question, therefore, he continued, was to be regarded, not so much from a
military as a political point of view, and powerful bodies of men ought to be hurried up as quickly as possible to save Duukirk at any price.
Accordingly Houchard determined to deal the heaviest blow, not from Lille
against the Dutch, but from Cassel against York—to send off 30,000 men to that
place against the latter, and with 50,000 men to fall upon the
15,000 men of General Freitag. On the 3d he reported to Paris the plan which he
had given up, and his reasons for doing so; and it was now Caruot who, on the
5th, by return of post, expressed his lively regret at the change; but acknowledging his own ignorance of the circumstances
of the enemy, he gave the general full power to act as' he thought fit. When
this despatch reached the camp, it was too late for a second change. The
struggle had already begun at Cassel, the army was
marching against Freitag's position in six columns, the two most important
198
END
OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1793. [Book VIII.
of which were led by Houchard himself, and Jourdan, who had just been
made general of division.1
From the vast numbers of the French, the final result could not
be doubtful. Yet the Germau soldiers continually displayed
their great superiority. A handful of Hessian chasseurs (Colonel Pruschenk),
and some battalions of Hanoverian grenadiers (General Dachenhausen) barred the
progress of the great columns of the enemy by their immoveable firmness, and
continual sallies, until the evening; — what might not have been done with such
troops by a leader of any sagacity or energy?2 Even
in the middle of the night, when the French, advancing
from their right wing, had already stormed the village of Rexpode, behind the
front of the allied centre, and had captured General Freitag, who was hurrying
up, suspecting nothing, General Wallmoden with 400
Hanoverians recovered the place by an unexpected onset, liberated his commander, and made it possible for
the other divisions to unite afresh further in the rear at Hondschotten. Here,
posted between the canal which leads to Furnes and
the gardens of the village of Leyzeele, with their centre at Hondschotten—a place protected by ditches and swamps, and only
accessible by a single narrow dam—the Allies, 13,000 strong, awaited in the
pouring rain, during the whole of the 7th, the attack of the French.3 On
the 8th, and not till then, Houchard renewed
1 We have enlarged so fully on these
events, which are taken from official documents of the military archives (some
of which are published in Legros' "La
Revolution telle quelle est"), because Carnot is very often said
to be the author of the first plan, and Houchard's deviation from it is
given as the chief reason for his execution; and because Houchard's movements
are every where represented as long prepared, and the
battle of the 27th as a mere feint; and lastly because Jomini and those who
follow him have stated the strength of the French at
Hondschotten, at about half their actual number. —
2 Conf. Knesebeck: Scenen aus dem Revolutionskrieg im
Archiv des histor. Vereinsfur Niedersachsen, 1845, S. 135 ff. — 3 Houchard to the Committee of Public Safety: "fattendis le jour et
fexaminai s'il etait possible de faire remarcher les
troupes
Ch. II.]
BATTLE
OF HONDSCHOTTEN.
199
the onset, with redoubled zeal, leading no less than twenty battalions
in person along the dam against the allied centre; while General Leclair endeavoured to push forward along the bank of the canal,
and General Hedouville charged the left wing of the enemy at Leyzeele. The
Hanoverians in the centre did not yield an inch, and kept up an artillery
battle for four hours against fearful odds, until they had fired their
last shot. The Austrians and Hessians at Leyzeele defended
themselves with no less gallantry, and four times drove back the left wing of
the enemy in wild confusion.1 It
was not until fresh reinforcements had been brought up,
which completely outflanked the place, and were already sweeping with their
shot the road to Furnes, the only line of retreat, that General Wallmoden gave
the order to retire. Even then, while the French at last took the dam by storm,
a Hessian battalion (General Cochenhausen) held Hondschotten, until the army had reached their camp at Furnes without further
accident.
In spite of all this heroic courage on the part of the Germans, in
spite of the error of the French in not throwing their chief force on Leyzeele, the key of the enemy's line of battle, the day had very
important results. The allies had lost 4,500 men; the corps, now scarcely
11,000 strong, had no chance of maintaining itself any longer at Furnes, if the
enemy pursued their advantage with energy. But if this place were
given up', every chance of York's escape was cut off. The French, however, had
also suffered terribly; their troops, though victorious for three days in
succession, were in dreadful confusion, and a great portion of them, in spite of the commands of their officers, were
au
combat: jamais chose ria ete plus only
a skirmish is taking place in
impossible. The
soldiers have neither the evening before
Rexpode." —
bread
nor spirits, great numbers of 1 Houchard's evidence at his own
them have
run back to
Cassel, trial. Houchard is retiring
to Herzeele,
200
END
OF THE CAMPAIGN OF
1793.
[Book
VIII.
employed in plundering the places which they occupied.1 The
main political object however—the relief of Dunkirk— had
been completely attained, and a division of the army marched into the town as
early as the 7th. Houchard saw before him, between Hondschotten and Fumes, a
marshy, and in some places inundated, plain, and this, too, like the approach to the battle-field of the preceding day, which had
cost him so much blood, could only be passed by a narrow road. Incapable as he
was of taking a comprehensive view of things, he could not make up his mind to
march into this unknown ground. Even Carnot, in his letter of the 5th, instructed him not to undertake any thing decisive, if the issue
were at all doubtful. In spite, therefore, of the importunities of the
conventional commissioners, he decided to halt. The Duke of York thereby gained
twenty-four precious hours, during which he withdrew from Dunkirk
(without any further loss than the thirty-two ships1 guns
intended for the siege), and collected his whole force at Furnes, to the amount
of about 30,000 men.
Houchard now completely lost all inclination to make any attacks upon the duke. His state of mind is completely reflected in his letter
of the 10th, in which he informs Bouchotte of his victory, and then
continues: "What-am I to do now? I have considered the matter thoroughly.
I do not think that I ought to march against Furnes, considering the strength
of the enemy, and the wretched state of the roads. It will be better to defend
myself here, to occupy the line of the Lys, and there to beat the Dutch. When
this has been done, I shall check the English, who have been terribly cnt up, with 20,000 men, and can march with 30,000 to the relief
of .Quesnoi." We see how painfully
he wrestles
1
"I had
only 20,000 men together", that after the capture of each village,
says
Houchard at his trial. Levas-
everybody, even the officers, imme-
seur
wrote to the Committee of Pub- diately hurried off to plunder, lie Safety on
the 16th of September,
Cu.
II.] MISTAKES OF GENERAL HOUCHARD.
201
with a task too difficult for him, how he weighs and wavers, and comes,
after, all to no determination. He had, however, the
satisfaction of receiving the full approbation of his superiors for his final resolution. Carnot, in his answer of the 13th, once
more expressed his regret at the abandonment of the first plan of the 25th, but
praised his intention of returning
with all speed to relieve Quesnoi, since the news from that quarter was highly
alarming; and he once more gave him absolute power to carry out his plans.
All the professional soldiers with whom we are acquainted, from general
Jomini to Marshal Soult, are unanimous in condemning these resolutions. They
all declare it to have been an error of the first magnitude, that Houchard did
not complete the destruction of the Duke of York—which was certain on the 8th,
and possible on the 10th—before turning against a new enemy.
But this fact no one has remarked— because no one has hitherto examined the
official documents —that these very mistakes of Houchard, either originated
with Carnot and the Committee of Public Safety, or were, at any rate, unreservedly praised by them. As, in the former case, (on the 29th of
August) Carnot's excessive anxiety about Dunkirk led to the abandonment of the
first comprehensive plan of attack, so it was the
fears of the government for Quesnoi, which affixed the
seat of ministerial sanction to Houchards errors of the
10th of September.
Punishment followed with no halting step. Against the Dutch, indeed,
the successes of Hondschotten were fully renewed: their scattered posts on the
Lys, attacked with triple force— partly on the side of Poperingen,
and partly on the side of Lille—defended themselves during the whole day, with
greater constancy than had been expected; but they succumbed at last to the
masses of men which were continually brought against them, and
were finally driven back, in utter confusion, towards Ypres and Rousseler
on the north, with a .loss of 3,000 men. Menin, their last head-quarters, fell
into the hands of the French, and was thoroughly sacked.
202
END
OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1793. [Book VIII.
General Beaulieu,— whom Coburg had pushed forward beyond Courtrai to
within a few leagues of Menin, to support the Dutch—did not venture to shew
himself during the battle; in short the victory of the Freuch appeared
complete. But disasters came upon them in another quarter.
Houchard had ordered a simultaneous attack on the Austrian divisions before
Quesnoi, where a corps of 7,000 men, which advanced from Bouchain, was
literally cut to pieces by twelve imperial squadrons (prince John of Lichtenstein); and, what was the chief point, when general Ihler pressed forward
from Mau-beuge into the forest of Mormal to relieve Le Quesnoi, he - learned
from the prisoners that all his exertions were in vain, since the fortress had
already been two days in the hands of the Austrians. He would not
believe it at first, but only too soon received melancholy confirmation of the
fact. The case had been the same here as at Mayence and Valenciennes. The body of the place was uninjured; materials and provisions
were by no means exhausted; but the soldiers lost
their zeal, the inhabitants were anxious to see an end of the matter, and the
commandant did not venture to resist any longer.
A mind of Napoleon's acuteuess and resolution, in Houchard's place, would not even now have given up the game as lost.
Though Coburg could dispose of his whole force, Orange, on the other hand, was
put completely hors de combat, and York was in bad case, and at a great distance.
The French general, by a few inarches, might have united an army of 80,000 men between their separated divisions,
and attacked one after the other with the greatest chance of success. But
Houchard was not moulded of such strong materials. He heard that York was
advancing by. forced marches against Courtrai, and it was
certain that Coburg would come up on the other side; he
looked more to the dangers which threatened him, than to his own means of
resisting them; he therefore determined to collect his forces —not for a
forward movement, but for a carefully covered
Cii.
II.]
THE
FRENCH RETREAT TO LILLE.
203
retreat. On the 15th he ordered his troops to recross the Lys to Lille,
to evacuate Menin, and to make a sham attack upon Beaulieu with the rear-guard,
to mask his own retreat.1 During this operation the loose discipline
of the "French, and their want of skill in manoeuvring, were once more
strikingly displayed. The evacuation of Menin had a discouraging effect upon
the corps sent against Beaulieu; their attack was feeble from the very first,
and the command to retreat dissolved
the bands of discipline; and when a few of York's battalions came in sight on
the north, the French fled in wild confusion over the Lys, leaving behind them
six hundred killed and two guns. Two days afterwards York, and Coburg united their forces in the neighbourhood of
Tournay, and the French columns took up their previous positions at Maubeuge,
Lille and Cassel. It was all over with the aggressive
plans of the 25th, and the deliverance of Dunkirk had been purchased by the
loss of Le Quesnoi. Nevertheless the total result of the
late operations was highly favourable to the French. For the first time in this
year they had succeeded in an enterprise, and the impression made upon them was
all the stronger, the more they had been struck by the excellence of the German troops. The soldiers had laid the first foundations
of self-confidence, and their leaders had received fresh proofs of the palpable
weakness of the hostile generals.
Houchard, however, was not destined to enjoy the fruits of his painful deliberations and exertions. When he led his troops over the
frontier, his fate was already decided by the party feuds in Paris.
The opponents of Barthelemy and Vernon had incessantly besieged the
minister at war with their complaints. For a while Houchard's
influence maintained the upper hand, and some of the agitators were suspended.
This only increased the
1 Levasseur to the Committee of
sequent occurrences at Menin, which Public Safety, 16th of September, in
previous accounts seem enig-This order gives the
key to sub-
matical enough.
204
END
OF THE CAMPAIGN OF-1793.
[Book VIII.
rage of their party; Buchotte's commissioners spoke with vehemence of
the friendship of those two generals with Custine,
and obtained, in the first place, the dismissal of Vernon. Complaints
were then made in the Jacobin club, that Houchard,
like Custine and Dumouriez, ill-treated the patriotic volunteers. Then the
conventional commissioners, Lacoste and Peyssard, two zealous Hebertists,
proceeded to declare that Houchard's treachery was fully
proved by his not pursuing the English. Lastly, letters
of the general were produced, written during his command
of the Moselle army, in which he treated with the Prussian commanders
concerning an exchange of prisoners, used bitter language against the
myrmidons of tyranny, and yet in their answers received assurances of their respectful devotion.. The main thing, after all, was
that Vernon's brother, an influential deputy of the Centre, violently attacked
Bouchotte and his friends on account of the general's suspension, and thereby made Houchard's existence a vital question for the dangerous faction. Their
adherents, as we know, were predominant in the Committee
of Public Safety; and the latter decreed, on the 24th, the
arrest of Houchard, Barthelemy and Vernon, and several officers of similar
opinions. When protests were made in the Convention, Robespierre put them down
with imperious emphasis, and extorted from the terrified assembly a vote of
express assent. The fate of the accused was a matter of
course. The investigation turned exclusively on the question, why York's army
had not been entirely destroyed; no new facts were elicited, and the
revolutionary tribunal unhesitatingly pronounced sentence of death,
without paying any regard to the approbation accorded by
the Committee of Public Safety to Houchard's measures.
The chief command of the Army of the north was now bestowed on general
Jourdan, on the ground of the ability displayed by him at Hondschotten. Jourdan was the first of the revolutionary parvenus
who were henceforward to shine at the head of the French armies, and
subsequently of the
Cu.
II.]
GENERAL
JOURDAN.
205
French state. He was the son of an insignificant surgeon in Limoges, 1 and
entered the army when he was scarcely sixteen years
old. After serving in the American war, he settled as a shopkeeper in his
native town, from which he carried his wares to all the fairs in the
neighbourhood. In 1791 he took service as a volunteer, and was soon afterwards chosen by his comrades, as an experienced soldier, to the post of chef
de bata 'dlon. In the disorder and lack of officers which prevailed in the Army of
the north after Du-1111^62' flight,
he rose to the rank of brigadier-general, in May 1793, and, two months afterwards, to that of general of division. He was as zealous
a republican as any one, but he displayed no eminent talent of any kind, and
his education was so imperfect, that his despatches of this period are full of
mistakes in spelling, and expressions smacking of the
guard-room. He was, however, brave, devoted and indefatigable;
and he shewed his sound sense by tenacious but fruitless protests against
the" perilous advancement bestowed upon him, until he was at last
threatened with arrest if he refused to take the command. He
felt somewhat relieved by the circumstance, that Carnot, on the 22nd of
September, hastened in person from Paris- to the frontiers to organize the
defence, by which, at any rate, the constant bickering with utterly incapable, and therefore doubly presumptuous, commissioners was avoided.
Carnot's presence, however, brought no other advantage with it, for neither the
deputy himself, nor the general whom he guided and protected, were able to
raise the quality of the troops, or to place the system of grand operations on an essentially better footing. The relative
position of the two parties remained the same as during the whole of the
previous struggle; the senseless mode in which the allies conducted the war
constantly gave the French a chance of victory; and the
unskilful manage-
According
to the Biographie
uni- verselle. Other
writers give different
accounts.
206
END
OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1793.
[Book
VIII.
ment of the French as frequently preserved their enemies from utter annihilation.
Immediately after Houchard's retreat, and the pause in the offensive
movements of the French, a new plan of conquest on the old pattern was drawn up
at the head quarters of the prince of Coburg. It was resolved to besiege
another border fortress, and again without
taking any.other notice of the French armies, than the placing of a corps to
observe them. Coburg's efforts were now directed against the fortress of
Mau-beuge, the garrison of which, including a fortified camp close to the town, was nearly 10,000 strong. For the blockade of this place, 14,000
Austrians and 14,000 Dutch, who were reorganised in Ghent after their defeat,
were designated. General Clerfait, with 18,000 imperialists, was posted on the
south of the Sambre to cover them; and the Duke of York, with
about 40,000 men, was directed to secure the frontier from Valenciennes to the
sea, by a long extended cordon. For this purpose 15,000 men, partly English and
partly Austrians^ were moved into the country
between Mouscron and Menin; the Hanoverians undertook to
guard the line from the Lys to the Ypres; the Hessians extended thence to
Nieu-port, where they rested upon the English garrisons of the last-mentioned
town and Ostend. 1
These troops, as was evident at the first glance,
had received no other orders than to ward off the attacks of the enemy. Jourdan
therefore might have contented himself with posting a small number of men to observe the allies, and bringing overwhelming numbers,
first against Clerfait, and subsequently against Coburg.
His army had at this period sufficiently increased to remove any obstacle, arising from a deficiency of numerical force, which
might stand in the way of energetic operations. The Army of the north,
exclusive of garrisons, amounted,
The numbers are according to the
lists. The superiority of force
so
often dwelt upon had no existence.
Cii. II.] NUMBERS AND CHARACTER OF JOURDAN'S ARMY. 207
on the 1st of October, to 105,000. The quality of these troops, indeed,
was not very satisfactory. The cavalry, even now,
numbered scarcely 9,000, the infantry of the line 30,000 men; all the rest were
national guards, volunteers, or recruits of the new levy, whom Carnot and all
the generals unanimously declared to be of very little use.
They were ready, indeed, to make a furious charge
against the enemy's batteries; but of persevering
steadiness in battle, of tactical capacity, and patience under toil and
hardship, not a trace was to be found among them. The government had no other
advice to give to the leader of such troops than to
throw them again and again upon the enemy, no matter whether in good or bad
order—no matter whether the loss incurred was great or small. The immediate
consequence of this system was an infinite waste of human life, which, however, caused the originators of the
system of terror but little anxiety, as long as they could collected
substitutes in the thickly peopled land. A further- result was apparent in respect to tactics; the attack was made with scattered bodies of men, and large swarms of skirmishers, to an extent which had never yet
been seen. The reason of this lay chiefly in the incapacity of the soldiers for
any other evolutions; or as, the official accounts expressed it, "the
impetuous courage of republicans needed
not the pedantry of art." But that which had the greatest influence on the
officers was the—not republican, indeed, but very
instructive—example afforded by the peasants of La Vendee, wl;o, having never
been formed according to military rules, first fired
from behind trees and hedges, and then by a wild rush broke through the lines
of their opponents. The Convention, whose forces were likewise very deficient in discipline, were recommended on all sides to
adopt this method, 1 and
the Committee of Public
1 Conf. e. g. Barere's report, Conv.
gust. The correspondence published nat. 26th of July;—letter of an officer in
the "Guerres
des Vendeens" is
full named Felix, Moniteur 1st of An-
of the same views.
208
END
OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1793. [Book VIII.
Safety of July lias the credit of learning a lesson from the most hated
of its enemies.
Still further and more painful""experiences were necessary to
induce the republican rulers to exchange the present mixture-of anarchy and tyranny, in the department of the army, for a more
judicious system. All which had hitherto made up the military
administration—commissariat and clothing, transports and hospitals —was in a
state of dissolution and ruin; and in spite of the arbitrary despotism, and the
enormous amount of materiel,
with which they now endeavoured to effect a reformation, the
consequences of the present disorder were for the time most terrible. A few
figures will suffice to bring these results before our eyes. The army of the
north, as we have before mentioned, contained 105,000
actual 'combatants; but the nominal strength amounted at that time to 140,000
men, so that the loss in detachments, men under arrest and sick etc., amounted
to more than a quarter of the whole army, 'and of these more than half were in the^ hospitals—an unexampled state of things in an
army stationed in its own country. At the end of the month the evil had
increased; when, of a nominal force of 1G0,000 men, only 115,000 were fit to
take the field. 1 The
case was the same in all the armies which the Republic
kept on foot at this period; in spite of the unlimited power and wild energy of
the government, the actual number of soldiers was always much below the
official statements.
The difference appears all.the more glaring,
because the leaders of the Mountain always followed the principle of falsifying truth itself by boastful representations. The most
-1 Not
including garrisons. In Aus- occurred.
In the spring of 1794,
tria
it was, at that time, an under- e. g. the imperial army in Belgium
stood
custom intentionally to exag- ready for the field amounted to 115,000
gerate
the nominal strength of the men, but the nominal strength was
army;
but sneh a difference as the only 160,000 including the garrisons, one described
in Franee seldom
Cii.
II.] THE FOURTEEN ARMIES OF THE
REPUBLIC.
209
striking example of these bombastic falsehoods is found, where one
would least expect to find it, in the statement of the number of existing
armies. Who has not heard it stated as, a certain and acknowledged fact,
that, in October 1793, the Republic had fourteen armies, and in round numbers a
million, or 1,100,000, Or even 1,200,000 soldiers, under arms? But the official papers of the
war-ministry, and the lists of the regiments, prove
that instead of a million, the strength of all the French armies present in the
field was 393,000 men, and, consequently in all, including the garrisons,
600,000 men;1 so that, according to the proportion pointed out above of one sick out
of every three soldiers, the nominal force would be
at most 800,000 men. It is still more surprising—although no historical fact is
more certain than this—that the much-lauded fourteen armies had no more
existence than the million soldiers, if, at least, the word army is used, in its common sense, of a considerable mass of troops under
an independent general. 2 In
March, the Convention had divided its forces into eleven armies, operating
independently of one another. But even among these the following figured in
autumn as separate armies: the Ardennes Army of 10,000 men, which was always
placed at the disposal of the generals of the Army of the north—the Armies of
the Rhine and the
1 At
the end of 1793 the lists give in round number: Army of the Ardennes and the
North 103,000; army of the Moselle and Rhine 100,000; Army of the Alps and
Italy 40,000; East and West Pyrenees 60,000; against La Vendee 90,000. Total in
the field 393,000. Garrisons in theNorth and the Ardennes 85,000; on the Rhine
and Moselle 59,000. We do not know the lists of the other
garrisons, but it is clear that the
sum-total would not exceed
III.
600,000.
2 In the depot de la guerre there is a special memoir on this
subject, based on the official documents, from which the following
statements have been taken. The more important contents of
it, however, were already published in 1808 in
the Tableau
de la Guerre de la Revolution, I. 376, but this publication1 made no impression upon the great
mass of subsequent French historians.
O
210
END OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1793.
[Book
VIII.
Moselle, which amounted together to 100,000 men, and had the same task,
that of fighting the allies in the Palatinate— the Armies of the Alps and of
Italy, in all scarcely 40,000 men, and both employed against the Sardinians—the
Armies of the East and West Pyrenees (small detachments of 31,000 and 28,000
men) which had only a few insignificant skirmishes
with the Spaniards—and, lastly, the Armies of the West, of Brest, and of
Cherbourg, which amounted together to 50,000 men
in June, and 90,000 in December; and were all intended for the one great
struggle against the Vendeans and the Chouans. These eleven armies, therefore,
were really only employed in five theatres of war, on only five distinct and
separate services, in which the multiplication of commanders-in-chief could only produce a very injurious effect on the
object in view. But even these only make up eleven, and
not fourteen
armies:
this last number, which was afterwards palmed upon the history of
the world, was arrived at thus; the 12th place was
given to the garrison of Mayence in La Vendee, although it was placed under the
orders of the general of the Brest army; the corps before Toulon— formed of the
troops of the Army of the Alps and Italy, and the national guards of the surrounding country—was called the thirteenth army; and,
lastly, came a so-called armee intermediate, which, however, was not created but only imagined. The formation of
this last army was entrusted, after the fall of Valenciennes, to general Belair, for the protection of Paris; but it really only served as a
depot for the recruits of the Army of the north, and after two months was
formally incorporated with it. 1 If
it is an honour to Jthe Republic to have set fourteen armies on foot in such a manner, modern
1 When at the end of December, at
the festival in celebration of the taking of the Toulon, the fourteen armies
were to be represented, and unfortunately the army of Mayence and the armee intermediate did not exist, the authorities
inserted in the programme: an Armee du haut Rhin; to which they added the Armee re-volutionnaire!
Cii. II.] JOURDAN
REPEATS HOUCHARD'S ERRORS. 211
Germany may evidently lay claim to a double measure of renown, since it
possessed from 1815 to 1866 no less than thirty-three!
These general observations were indispensable, both to place before us
a picture »of the revolutionary government, and to enable us to form a judgment
of the various operations of the war. It would evidently be unjust to estimate
the merits of the generals appointed to rule over
this chaos, according to the usual standard; and it is doubly clear that the
Convention, which had created all this confusion, acted with unheard-of barbarity, when it punished every failure with the scaffold.
The question—which under all circumstances remains
independent of the disordered state of the military administration—is as to the
relative merits of the generals in respect to creative ideas, ingenious plans,
and sustained energy; and in these respects Carnot
and Jourdan will not appear in a very different light from Coburg or Houchard. 1 For
it is very remarkable, that with the same tenacity with which the allies before
Maubeuge repeated the mistakes which had injured' them four months before at
Dunkirk, Jourdan held fast to those same mistakes
of Houchard, which had saved the enemy from utter destruction. He was no doubt
right to post the battalions of the new levy, as being utterly untrustworthy,
far away from the enemy at Vitry:2 but
it was an unnecessary dispersion of his forces to watch
every post of York's cordon by a superior force, and thus to render 50,000 men
between Lille and the coast unavailable for his main blow.
Consequently he had now only 45,000 men for the attack upon Clerfait, and he
once more owed
1 I may here refer to the correct levee, he writes on the 3rd, rCest pas and calm judgment of Marshal Soult,
tout-a-fait organise'e, la majeure
partie and
to the official papers of the cam- des batallions forme'es rfa point
oVar-paign
of 1794, which will be quoted mes, il ne peuvent remplacer les
an-in
the 3rd volume. 2 La nouvelle ciennes troupes.
02
212
END
OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1793.
[Book yTII.
it to the mistakes of his opponent, rather than to his own
arrangements, that he was still able to appear on the battlefield with nearly therefold superior numbers. At Wattignies, on this
occasion, on the 15th and 16th of October, all the characteristic
features of the affair of Hondschotten were once more seen. Jourdan, like
Houchard, made his attack with a number of detached
columns, which were unable to render each other mutual support; like Houchard,
too, he only gradually learned, in the course of the fight, the position of the key of the enemy's line of battle. As at Hondschotten, the German troops for a long time
repelled the attacks of superior numbers with unshaken confidence, perpetually rushing forward to deal an after-thrust; and it was not until
the second day, when they were driven from the key of the position—the village
of Wattignies—by a great accumulation of of the„enemy's forces, that Coburg
resolved to discontinue the siege and retire across the Sambre. Coburg effected this retreat in perfect order', undisturbed by Jourdan,
who was not at all sure of the result; and he carried
off twenty-seven captured guns without the loss of any cannon or colours of his
own. The result was the same in this case, as after the battle of Menin; the
Allies paused in their attack, but had not the slightest fear of any danger in
their own country.
Carnot was perfectly aware of the trifling nature of this success, and
hastened back to Paris to inform the Committee of Public Safety of it. But he
found the intoxication of victory so great among his colleagues, that he was
obliged, on the 18th, to send orders to the generals to
clear the French soil of the foreign hordes of robbers in a few days, and
either to drown the army of the tyrants in the Sambre, or to exterminate them in some other way. On the 22nd more special instructions
were sent: Jourdan was directed to cross the Sambre, to
surround the enemy, to throw him back in the portion of the country which he
occupied, to destroy
Ch.
II.] ABSURD INSTRUCTIONS SENT TO
JOURDAN.
213
his magazines, and to cut liim off from his communications. To this end he was to try a coup
de main against Namur, to send off one division against Mons, another against
Tour-nai, and to endeavour to form a junction with these, either by investing
Mons' and Tournai, or by taking up a position between these two towns and the frontier. It would have been impossible to issue orders more at
random, or less in accordance with the actual state of things, with the
condition of the troops—of whom a fifth were without arms, and two-thirds
without shoes—or with the position of the hostile armies, which stood
ready for battle between three captured fortresses.1
Carnot, therefore, in a special letter, added the remark: that it was by no
means wished that Jourdan should penetrate into the interior of Belgium, and
that the expulsion of the enemy from French soil was all
that was desired ol him. The general was thereby placed in the most painful
position; for between these contradictory orders only one thing was certain,
that his head was at every moment endangered. To make the matter still worse, another order reached him, which considerably diminished
his strength— viz. to send off 15,000 men to La Vendee, and the same number to
the Rhine army; so that, in spite of the continued stream of recruits, 90,000
men at most were left at his disposal.
In this embarrassment he did what he could; made a few demonstrations on the
Sambre, a few attacks on the Lys, and then induced a friend of Carnot's, the
conventiona commissioner Duquesnoi, to represent the utter impossibility of
further successes in the field during the severe
season The Committee withdrew its instructions, 2 but
Jourdan was soon made to feel how little protection Carnot could affor • him
against the displeasure of the government.
1
Opinion of Marshal Soult. moins imperieusement le systhme des
2 Carnot to Jourdan, 4th of No- operations. vember: Le
comite a cru devoir fixer
214
END
OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1793.
[Book
VIII.
Thus closed the campaign on the Flemish theatre of war. For a few weeks
longer the two adversaries harassed each other by alternate
attacks on either side of the frontier, losing more men from hunger, cold, and
fatigue, than in battle; until, at last, towards the end of December, both
sides took up their winter-quarters. Jourdan, by a sensible arrangement, united his troops in as large bodies as possible, that the new and
untrained,battalions might not be exposed to the attacks of the enemy. But as
it was hereby rendered possible for the light troops of the allies to undertake
plundering forays against unguarded border districts, the Committee continually urged him to extend his quarters—i. e. to adopt the
system of cordons, by which Coburg and York had lost the campaign. Jourdan
protested several times with increasing emphasis, and thereupon suddenly received orders, on the 6th of January 1794, to go to Paris and answer for
himself. On his arrival there he learned that the Committee had decreed his
dismissal on the same day: he might think himself fortunate that Bouchotte's
intercession saved him from the scaffold, which, in other cases, was
the regular consequence of such displeasure.
About the same time a decision, still more pregnant of consequences,
was taken on the Middle Rhine. We have still to relate how the internal discord
of the Allies, in this quarter, had had a still more
disastrous effect than the incapacity of the commanders in
Belgium; and how, at the same time, on the French side, a real military genius
had for the first time seized the conduct of affairs, and immediately obtained a most important success.
Before the king of Prussia left his Rhenish army, he had to be present
at one more attack upon the French army of the Moselle; and indeed it was only
with great reluctance that he turned his back upon the fresh breezes of the
camp, and the brilliant images of warlike glory. Ever
at the head of theHohenlohe column, he had seen how the enemy's positions were broken up, and the hastily collected hordes of
Cii. IL] CAPTURE OF THE LINES OF
WEISSENBURG.
215
peasants 1 driven back over the Saare. He then repaired to Posen; and
Brunswick soon afterwards received instructions to part with 6,000 men for the
blockade of Landau. He was ordered in other respects to continue his support to
the Austrians, but never to implicate the troops in such a serious undertaking, as to prevent their being at any moment at the free
disposal of the king. For in consequence of the negociation with Lehrbach, a
firm resolution had been come to, either to take no farther part in the war at
all, or at any rate not to join in it in the following year,
unless the Allies would pay the whole of the expenses.
After the Moselle army had been driven back towards the west, as
described above, Ferraris and Wurmser at last resolved
to undertake the long-intended storming of the lines
of Weissenburg. While Wurmser attacked these lines in front, the Prussians
descended from the Kettrich, and, having advanced through the mountains, might
have taken the French army in the rear, and thereby perhaps have ensured their
destruction. Such comprehensive operations, however, were
not to be thought of: the duke did not choose to expose himself to the Army of
the Moselle, and could not disobey the orders of his cabinet; he therefore
contented himself with placing 7,000 men from his left wing at the disposal of the Austrians, for the above-mentioned purpose. But
even these were engaged in no serious fighting, because the French-gave up the
much-lauded lines, almost without resistance, at the first volleys of the
Austrian columns, and made a hasty, and consequently a bloodless,
retreat to the immediate neighbourhood of -Strasburg (13th of Oct.). Wurmser
was full of haste and triumph, hoping to take Strasburg by a coup
de main, with the help of some royalists in the city; and was greatly pleased at
the reception which he met with from the population of most of the
villages. But the peasants
They
are called "Spiessbauern" in the German reports, and more
euphoniously
agricoles in the French.
216
END
OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1793.
[Book
VTII.
were soon disgusted by the robberies of the
Austrian "red-cloaks," (the Seressan Croats) and the brutality of the
French emigres, and manifested no further German sympathies; the conspiracy in
Strasburg was discovered by the conventional commissioners, and drowned in the blood of its authors.
At the same time, the relief of Maubeuge and the cessation of the
struggle on the Belgian frontier gave the Committee of Public Safety time"
and means to give a new turn to affairs on the Rhine also. Their
first care was directed to the internal and - external
strengthening of the troops. Since September the Rhine Army had numbered 52,000
men, of which, however, 14,000 were agricoles,
or peasants of the levie en masse, so that they could only oppose 38,000 real soldiers to the 46,000 under Wurmser. The Army of the Moselle had 36,000 men, of
no better quality,1 to resist Brunswick's well-disciplined army, which numbered 4,000
more. There was as little to be done with the new recruits of the general levy
in this quarter as in Flanders; the Committee, therefore, ordered them to be sent into the fortresses, the
garrisons of which were drafted off as much as possible
to the armies. Then, at the end of October, they decreed that 15,000 men should
be sent from the Army of the north and the Ardennes Army to the
Palatinate, the danger on the Belgian frontier appearing to be removed for a
long time to come. The appointment of an able commander-in-chief was equally
necessary for both armies. The Moselle army had had two commanders since Houchard, who rivalled one another in impotence and worthlessness.
Landremont, Beauharnais' successor on the Rhine, had been dismissed on account
of his noble birth, at the time of Houchard's fall,
1 According to the lists in the the
less notice because they con-war ministry. Gouvion St. Cyr gives tradict one other Conf.
e. g. N. 17 here, and in the following cases, a and 18. different-list,' of-
which l.-need take
Cu.
II.] GENERALS PICHEGRU AND HOCHE. 217
and no one could be induced to take the command,
through • fear of a similar fate; so that, at last, the conventional commissioners gave the appointment to Carlin, a dragoon captain, only because he was willing to accept it. We have already seen
how incapable he was; his incapacity was again shown in the
battle at the lines of Weissenburg, where he was simply unable to give any
other command than one for a hasty retreat. Under such leaders anarchy quickly
spread through all ranks. On one occasion a general of division rode over to
Strasburg to get instructions from the Jacobin club in that
city; on another, the general, in the midst of the enemy's fire, ordered his
war commissioner, on pain of severe punishment, to take the command of the
troops; whereupon the latter made off in all haste. Here, as every where else, the lawless terrorism of the Committee of Public Safety
produced, not strength and unity, but fear and dissolution.
Matters assumed a different aspect when, at the end of October, General
Pichegru became commander of the Rhine Army, and, at the
beginning of November, General Hoche was appointed chief of the Army of the
Moselle.
Pichegru had been a non-commissioned officer in the artillery, before the Revolution, and was, consequently, like all his
comrades since 1789, a thorough revolutionist. He was for a long time
president of the Jacobin club in Besancon, and as such was chosen commander by
a battalion of volunteers. In this capacity he entered the Strasburg garrison, where, in the absence of warlike employment, he continued to play a part in the Jacobin club, and by
that means rapidly rose to the rank of brigadier-general and chief of division,
without ever having been under fire. He was at that time in the prime of life,
always master of himself, cold and impenetrable. By a
well-sustained taciturnity he contrived to suggest
the idea of superior depth of mind; and he influenced the mass of the half
soldiers of that time all the more easily, because, being never diverted from
his
218
END
OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1793.
[Book
VIII.
object by amusements, he had really acquired
some valuable knowledge in various branches of military science. But he had
never been in battle, had never had- the conduct of great affairs, and it still
remained to be seen to what degree he possessed the eye and the genius of a general. It was enough for the Committee of Public
Safety that St. Just, who was at that time in Strasburg, recommended him. as a
man of strong character and a thorough republican. He was appointed at once,
and St. Just, at the knitting of whose eyebrows all the rest of
Strasburg trembled, condescended to overcome the last
scruples of the new commander-in-chief by encouraging words. Pichegru entered
upon his office, loudly declaring that the Rhine Army should once more assume
the offensive, and not lay down its arms until Landau
was relieved, and the French soil cleared of every enemy.
Lazarus Hoche, the new general of the Moselle Army, was a man of an
entirely different stamp, different party views, and a different future. He was
the son of an old invalide,
was reared in poverty and misery by his aunt, an old greengrocer, and
became a groom when a mere boy, that he might not remain a burden on his protectress. He was induced to leave this service by reading Rousseau's
writings, which opened to him, as to so many of his
contemporaries, the prospect of a boundless future. He was about to enter a
regiment destined for the East Indies, when he fell into the hands of the
recruiting officers of the French guards, and thus came at sixteen years of age into the barracks of Versailles. Strong and stately in person, and
full of zeal and courage, he would have been the pattern of a soldier, if his
violent temper and unruly pride had not incessantly involved him in quarrels
and vexation. He was perpetually under arrest, and with
difficulty kept down his wrath against his superiors; he saw before him a life
of endless slavery without hope or prospect of any kind. But the spirit which
dwelt in him sustained him: his thirst for
Ch. II.]
GENERAL
HOCHE.
219
.knowledge, his ambition, and the presentiment of his future greatness,
urged him on. In his leisure hours he carried water and worked as a gardener's
assistant; at night he knitted wollen caps, and embroidered waistcoats, until
he had at last earned a sum of money sufficient to buy the
books on mathematics and military history, for the contents of which his soul
thirsted. In this state of mind the Revolution found him, and we may
imagine with what delight he threw himself into its vortex. He joined in the attack on the Bastille, raved for Lafayette, and became acquainted
with Danton and Legendre. For a time he gained but little personal advantage
from the movement; he became a noncommissioned officer, and held this
post till the summer of 1792, when Servan observed the superior bearing of
his file, and made him a lieutenant on the spot. He then distinguished himself
at the siege of Thionville, was made captain, served as adjutant of General
Leveneur in the Belgian campaign, and after the battle of
Neerwinden was privately sent by the latter to Paris, to warn the government
against Dumouriez' dangerous intrigues. Hoche
discharged this delicate commission with devoted zeal;
made the acquaintance of Pache and Marat, and thereby formed relations with the
faction of the Hotel de Ville, with Bouchotte, Vincent, and Audouin, which
suddenly transported him into the most influential circles of the great
political world—to the very source of decrees, by which the fate of Europe was
decided. He entered upon this new position with the confidence and
ardour of genuine talent; from the very first moment' it seemed as if he, the
son of the invalide,
the stable-groom, had never done any thing else but lead armies and
rule over nations. He still spoke • the language of his
patrons, cursed like the plre Duchesne, swore to exterminate the traitors, the rich, and the tyrants; but in
the midst of all this passion mighty thoughts were germinating in him, which in
their development quickly cast off these
rude forms.
220
END
OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1793. [Book VIII.
On returning to the Belgian army, he could not conceive how any one
could make war in such a wretched manner; all that was grand, correct and
decisive, lay in all directions clearly before his eyes, and ready for his grasp; and with impatient urgency, and a full consciousness of
his own superiority, he besieged the Committee of
Public Safety with warnings and advice. "Cease," he wrote at the end
of August, "to divide our forces; collect an overpowering mass and seize victory by a bold advance. We are waging a war of mere
imitation, a war of puppets; we follow the enemy wherever they shew themselves;
we go to the point to which they lead us, without any plans or ideas of our
own. Cannot we consider what we ought to do, without first thinking of their
movements?" When Carnot read the memoir prefaced by the above
words, he cried: "This officer will make his way." Whereupon
Robespierre took up the document, read it through with
attention, and then said: "This is a highly dangerous man."1
There the matter rested. Meanwhile Hoche distinguished himself so greatly by
his restless energy in the defence of Dunkirk, that he was immediately afterwards appointed brigadier-general, and after a short
interval, general of division. In this position he renewed
his proposals to the Committee for the conquest of Belgium, repeating, in the
main, the plans of Barthelemy, urging them to collect large forces, and
unhesitatingly to give up all subordinate positions. "What matters,"
said he, "the destruction of a nest, when the decision of a
campaign, and the welfare of the country, are at stake?" He once more
spoke to the winds, for we have already seen what
1 This story is related by Carnot in
the Memoire against Bailleul and the I8th of Fructidor. The fact of his
calling the author of the memoir, four years after the event, a sergeant "qui /era son
chemin" when
Hoche had long become an officer, cannot invalidate the credibility of the
anecdote.
Cii.
II.] REPULSE OF HOCHE AT KAISERSLAUTERN. 221
sort of instructions were sent to Jourdan instead of these, at the end
of October.
About this time, a peremptory and immediate necessity arose of
appointing a vigorous commander over the Moselle army. Audouin remembered his
friend, and proposed him to Bouchotte; Carnot had no
objection to make, and the Committee confirmed the appointment. Hoche carried
with him to his new scene of action directions to relieve Landau at any cost;
but on his arrival he found the task almost hopeless. The army was weak dispirited and disorderly; he declared to Bouchotte
that he could do nothing, that whatever was done must be done by the Rhine
Army; and for this purpose he sent off a division of his forces to reinforce
Pichegru. But the aspect of affairs in that quarter was not much more
promising; the news from Landau became every day more alarming,
and new and urgent orders arrived from Paris. For a time, therefore, there was
helplessness in both camps, and Pichegru was obliged in his turn to send off
some battalions to the Army of the Moselle. At
last Hoche, at the repeated instigation of Bouchotte, resolved to attack the
Prussians in full force. But Brunswick, who had already resolved to take up his
winter-quarters, retreated slowly until he had concentrated about 15,000 men in the strong position of Kaiserslautern, where he
repulsed all the attacks of the twofold superior enemy, with terrible
bloodshed. Some attempts to storm Wurmser's intrenchments at Hagenau, which
were made at the same time by Pichegru, had no better result; this first
attempt failed completely.
But Hoche now threw off all consideration for the wishes and
instructions of the capital. His confidence was not in the least diminished by
the late events, and he wrote to Paris, proposing to lead two-thirds of his own troops, and the reinforcements which might
meanwhile be expected from the Ardennes, over to the Rhine Army, and then, to
break through the enemy at this point with irresistible
222 END OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1793.
[Book Vni.
force.1 The
influence of his friends induced the Committee to pardon his first failure, and
to sanction the new proposal. General Japonier, therefore, first marched down
the Lauter to the Rhine, on the 4th of December, with 12,000 men; three other
divisions of equal strength followed a week later, and
their arrival immediately brought the matter to a decision.
Pichegru, meanwhile, had kept the Austrians, who were posted between
the Rhine and the mountains, perpetually on the alert. Without making any great
progress, he inflicted constant losses on the enemy, wearied them out by
endless alarms and exhausting efforts, and thus prepared them for the last
annihilating blow. Wurmser, who saw his own divisions hourly melting away, and
those of the French continually increasing, urgently begged the Duke
of Brunswick for assistance. The latter only replied
by calling upon him to bring the Austrian army nearer to the Prussian quarters
by a retrograde movement, and day after day was lost in these negotiations.
Brunswick was not wrong when he criticized the
position of his colleague at Hagenau; but the real point was that, in
accordance with the wishes of his court, he did not choose to engage in any
great aggressive operations.2 He
did, however, hurry up in person with a few battalions, in order to help in
some measure to secure the important positions in the hills near Lemberg.
But it was already too late. On the 22nd Hoche arrived at the
head-quarters of the Rhine army, and held a brief and hasty considtation with
Pichegru and the representatives
1 Such is the statement of Soult,
who was at that time on Hoche's staff, and consequently in a position to know
the facts. The testimony of St. Cyr, who was at this time adjutant of a brigade
in the army of the Rhine, and who names Carnot as the author of the plan,
can have no weight against this evidence. — 2 Wagener says, page 196, that he
did not seem to know of Hoche's march; but the duke's despatch of the 21st of
September proves the contrary. {Feldzug von 1793, p. 230.)
Ch. II.] HOCHE ATTACKS THE
AUSTRIANS AT WERDT. 223
of the people. St. Just, who did not usually trouble himself about military details, appeared on this occasion to have no great
confidence in the young general; and called upon him to communicate his plan to the popular representatives. But Hoche shewed as little respect of
persons now as usual; without a thought of the danger which he ran in offending
this dreaded representative, he declared that secrecy was indispensable to
success, and pledged his head for the result. Lacoste and Baudot,
the commissioners attached to the Moselle army,
supported him, and St. Just, with proud silence, allowed him to have his way.
Early on the following morning he began to move against the right wing of the
Austrians. Their line ran from Drusenheim on the Rhine in
a north westerly direction, past Hagenau, to the mountains; and continued from
Reishofen almost due north, through Freschweiler, along the crest of the
nearest chain of hills, to Werdt and Lembach, where it was joined by the Prussian troops under Brunswick on the steep summit of the
Scheerhohle. Hoche perceived that these mountain posts formed the key of the
enemy's position, since, after their capture, the left wing of the Austrians,
and their centre, which projected towards the south, might be
taken in the rear and crushed between two fires. He therefore made his
principal attack upon Werdt and Freschweiler. General Hotze, who commanded at
these points, offered a brave resistance for a time, but was then completely routed, and the French took the villages by storm. Wurmser was only
rescued by the circumstance that Lembach and the Scheerhohle were held during
the whole of the day, so that he gained time to retreat across the Sur, and
take up a new position close before Weissenburg, between the Rhine
and the Geisberg. His troops were in great disorder, weakened by one-third, and
encumbered with 18,000 sick and wounded: an immediate pursuit on the part of
the French would have obliged him to continue his retreat
224
END
OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1793. [Book VIII.
without further fighting. But internal discord on the enemy's side once
more gave him a short breathing time.
It was
not without jealousy that Pichegru saw his young colleague make his appearance,
on his own scene of action, with so much ardour and
success. He threw no obstacles in his way, but he did little to support him:
while he was with the conventional commissioners at Hagenau, it came out that,
in the engagement of the 24th, the divisions of the Rhine army had exhausted their ammunition, and had received no orders from
Pichegru for their further movements. Hoche hastily furnished all the powder
and cartridges which his troops could possibly spare, and sent a most urgent
summons to Pichegru. But the latter declared that he did not know
where his divisions were, spoke of the dissatisfaction of his. troops at the
presumption of the Moselle army, and finally demanded the dismissal of General
Lefevre, who, he said, had insulted him by unbecoming importunity. Hoche did not hesitate a moment. He wrote, on the 24th, to the
commissioners, that it was high time to do away with the jealousy between the
two armies, of which Pichegru had spoken; and he therefore called upon them to
appoint General Pichegru commander-in-chief of both armies, by an
authoritative despatch. This letter led to a lively discussion at Hagenau. St.
Just was inclined to adopt this measure, and induced his colleagues to prepare
the decree; but no sooner had this been done, than Baudot and Lacoste recurred to their resolution, and carried their point on the, 25th, (in
spite of the decided disinclination of St. Just), that Hoche himself, and not
Pichegru, should be entrusted with the chief command of the operations.1
Pichegru and St. Just were equally offended, but, in the pressure of
the moment, did not choose to assume any responsibility. Hoche, on the other
hand, probably felt greatly astonished at his
1 Hoche's despatches to the repre-
Safety, of the 19th, and to Privat,of sentatives, of the 4th, 6th, and 18th the 23rd Nivose. St. Cyr's account is Nivose; to the Committee of Public hereby shewn to be entirely incorrect.
Cii.
II.] HOCHE DEFEATS WURMSER ON THE
LAUTER.
225
unexpected success, but had rio anxiety about his own personal safety;
he undertook the chief command with the consciousness of the hatred which
pursued him, and full of joy at the now certain prospect of victory. On the
26th, he renewed his attack on the imperialists along their whole line, and
routed them completely, after a short engagement. The Geisberg, which commanded Wurmser's communications with Weissenburg, was . taken by storm, and the French made
a rapid advance towards the Lauter. "Wurmser seemed utterly lost, but
Brunswick, breaking forth at the right moment from his
mountain fortress against the
i hostile
columns, once more brought deliverance, and secured his cojleague's retreat
across the Lauter. Then, however, no further stand was made, and in spite of
all the duke's appeals, Wurmser, overpowered with grief and rage, and lost to every hope, hastened back to the right bank of the
Rhine; whereupon the Prussian army also was obliged to give up the greatest
part of the Palatinate, and to content itself with holding a small district
round Mayence.
On the 28th of December, the French troops looked down
from the heights near Klingenmiinster upon the liberated fortress of Landau.
Just as the report of the guns, fired by the garrison in honour of the victory,
was thundering in the ears of the conquerors, a courier arrived from Paris with the news that the important city of Toulon, in the
distant south, had been wrested from the enemy. The joyful shouts of the troops
were redoubled; France stood enveloped
I by the bright rays of victory on every side, and against
i every
adversary. But a new turn of affairs was approaching
for the Revolution. In the preceding year, it had kindled the war to destroy
the Constitution; having suceeded in this, it had filled the land with
violence, misery and terror. But already the war was bringing
men to light who were
[ destined to be its lords and masters; the same December week beheld
the mighty triumph of General Hoche, and
| the first warlike exploit of Napoleon Bonaparte!
226
[Book VIII.
CHAPTER III.
OPPRESSION OF THE COUNTRY.
tyranny
of the conventional commissioners in the provinces.—seizure of all
specie.— general disarming of the people.—arrests in paris. —Trial of the
qceen.—plunder and closing of the churches.— WoRsnip of
reason.—Exasperation of the great mass
of the
people.—
cocthon and collot d'herbois in lyons.—SlEGE of toulon] cartaux and bonaparte.—treatment of the city by freron and
barras.— RoSSIGNOL'S
and lechelle's. operations against la vendee.
—
Campaign on the right bank of the loire.—Carrier
in nantes.
By the laws of September, the system which a year
before had been tested by the envoys of the Hotel de Ville, and been carried
out since the spring by the conventional commissioners,
attained the acknowledged empire over the whole of France. It was now a matter
of law that every man should lose his freedom, who
was obnoxious to the ruling class; and that every man should forfeit his life,
whom that class thought dangerous. It was a legal principle, that the State
might take whatever it pleased from all kinds of property; and that there was no protection for private possessions, even against the avarice of individual rulers. A state of
things unprecedented in the life of a great nation now commenced. Despotism,
which acknowledges no rights in subjects as against itself, is found elsewhere; it is found in the ancient oriental empires, and in
modern Europe; and where its duration has been short, it has sometimes led to
order, unity and grand results. But in this case, it was well known who was
oppressed, but not, who was the oppressor.
A lawless mob, excited by changing passions, and led by wrangling demagogues,
was now the despot of the
Ch.
HI.] CONVENTIONAL COMMISSIONERS IN THE PROVINCES. 227
French people: an organised anarchy was established in unlimited power—a contradiction in itself, which, wherever
it prevailed, could produce nothing but death and destruction. Let us first see
in what manner the laws of the 5th and 7th of September were carried out in the
country.
The form of proceeding is, in general, already known to us. The conventional commissioner who was present "on
mission" formed the centre of revolutionary action in each Department. In
the principal towns of the district he administered affairs in person, and
sent patriots, possessed of local knowledge, into the
smaller towns and villages, with unlimited powers of arresting and
confiscating. The first measure was always the assembling or forming of a
Jacobin club, which, consisting exclusively of proletaries, had the task of
instructing the lower class of people in the advantages accrueing to them from the new system; and rousing their
enthusiasm -by the prospect of luxury and power. The next step, generally, was
to fill the revolutionary committees with thorough-paced democrats, who, on
their part, unhesitatingly effected the arrest of all
the suspects
who were still at large. Meanwhile the conventional commissioner went through the lists of communal and district officers,
decreed the dismissal of those whom he regarded as respectable people, rich
egoists, or religious fanatics, and then called
upon the clubs to propose suitable Sansculottes to take their places. The
requisitions continued, meanwhile, their unchecked course. At first the commissioners adhered to the instructions of the law, which ordained the procuring of such materials only as were necessary for the equipment
and maintenance of the armies. But as there are very few things which may not
be, some how or other, employed in a great war, they extended their demands to
every imaginable kind of property, and soon dropped even this
last pretext, and took, without compunction, whatever their hearts desired.
According to St. Just's principle, that *he Republic ruled the land by right of
conquest, they levied
P2
228
OPPRESSION
OF THE COUNTRY.
[Book VIII.
contributions under the name of revolutionary taxes, the distribution
of which, among the individual citizens, was likewise regulated by the local
committees, according to political views and personal favour. If the population
of any place appeared inclined to resist such accumulated
ill treatment, they forthwith hastened to form a revolutionary army on the
Parisian model, and to appoint a revolutionary tribunal for the curtailment of
judicial proceedings; so that, in six months, there were few towns in France without a scaffold and a garrison of this kind.
In order to render the details of this system clearer to the reader, we
will follow a few of the commissioners in the exercise of their functions, and
form a picture of their operations from their own reports.1
Andre Dumont entered the Departments of Picardy, fully possessed by the feeling
that he had to metamorphose the people, to turn all existing institutions up-side down, and to annihilate all their supporters.
"Every day," he wrote, on the 4th of October, "I discover new treasures — money and assignats, silver spoons and
coffee-pots — all of them fair booty, because they belong to aristocrats or Emigres.
I cause all priests to be arrested who indulge themselves in
celebrating the Sunday; I found in a barn three black animals
concealed, whom they call monks, and immediately seized them." On the
28th, he reported from Beauvais that the peasants had refused to give up their
corn for the supply of Paris; whereupon, he says, a division of the revolutionary army of Paris made short work of them; and he himself
immediately deposed the town-council and arrested
all the malcontents. He forwarded a number of chests to the Convention filled
with plundered treasures, and
1 Where, in the following account, no particular authority is cited, our statements are
drawn from the
despatches
of the commissioners themselves in the Moniteur.
Cir.
III.] PROCEEDINGS OF DUMONT, ISORE, AND
RUHL. 229
declared, on the 3rd of November, that he had sent 400 images of saints from the north-western Departments to the mint, and that, in
the Somme Department, he had left neither lead, copper, nor silver, in a single
church. The representatives Isore and Duquesnoi, who
were established at Lille, conducted affairs in nearly
the same way in Flanders. They roused the club of Lille from its slumbers, as
they expressed it, received from it information against all the accapareurs, the
rich, and the aristocrats, living in the city, deposed the town-council, and
raised a revolutionary army of 1,000 men from the
proletaries of the place. "Everything belongs to the people and
nothing to the individual," was Isore's motto on this occasion.1 A
division of the army then marched to Douai, where, in a single day, fifty
persons were arrested, and all the authorities changed.
They proceeded thence to Dunkirk, where Isore caused a number of persons to be
transported, without ceremony, as usurers, confiscated their property, and
appointed a revolutionary tribunal to prosecute all
obnoxious persons. Here, too, the priests were^incarcerated and all the
churches closed.2 The
conventional commissioner, Ruhl, treated Champagne in the same manner; and when
in Rheims, he broke, amongst other holy vessels, the oil flask of St. Remy, and
sent the fragments of it to the Convention.3 In
Lorraine, Lacoste and Mallarme, attached as commissioners to the army of the
Moselle, were employed in the collection of revolutionary taxes. They first
induced the club of Metz to procure "the means of expelling the enemy;" the club then sent a deputation
to the popular unions of Nancy, Luneville and Pont-a-Mousson, and each of the
latter sent men of trust to accompany the envoys, so that the mass of the
voluntary
1 Isore to Bouchotte, November gros). — 3 Which, of course,
did not
4th
(vid.' Legros). — 2 Dufresse, prevent its being used
subsequently
general
of the revolutionary army, at the coronation of Charles X.! to Bouchotte,
December 6th (vid. Le
230
OPPRESSION
OF THE COUNTRY.
[Book
VIII.
taxgatherers increased at every step. They
extended their excursions to Befort in Alsace, where the revolutionary
committee, at their suggestion, laid a tax of 135,000 francs on twenty-five
persons, putting down one as an aristocrat at 3,500 fr., and another as an egoist at 7,000 fr., six poor artisans as fanatics at 3 fr. each and a
"moderate" rentier
at 1,000 fr. &C.1 The
plundered persons vainly sought aid from Herault de Sechelles, who had been
named commissioner for Southern Alsace: Herault, himself a member of the Committee of Public Safety, held the same views as Lacoste, and sent
word to Paris, in November, that he had everywhere chastised usury and
fanaticism, purified the clubs, deposed the authorities, and entrusted all
offices to the Sansculottes. "A deputy of the people," he wrote at this time
to his worthy colleague Carrier, "must always order the great measures,
but leave the execution of them to inferior agents, and never compromise
himself by written instructions."
Still harder, at the same period, was the
fate of Strasburg and Lower Alsace.2 In
the beginning of October, the representatives Guyardin and Millaud had carried
out a preliminary purification of the public authorities, named a police
committee for the whole Department, and decreed, on the 15th, the formation of a revolutionary army and a revolutionary tribunal.
The latter consisted of a malicious old canon named Taffin, a servile
"candidate of theology," and an uneducated gilder. The public
informer was Eulogius Schneider, a vagabond German clergyman,
formerly professor at Bonn, who began his office by
heavily fining a number of pedlars and huxtresses for exceeding the maximum.
But the terrorism was not developed to its full extent, until
1 From the papers of the Com-
which is
based throughout upon
mittee
of Public Safety. — 2 The public documents
and authentic
following is
taken chiefly from reports. Strobel's Geschichte des Elsasses,
Cii.
HI.]
ST.
JUST AND EULOGIUS SCHNEIDER.
231
the end of the month, when St. Just and Lebas
came to Strasburg as Plenipotentiaries Extraordinary of the Committee of Public Safety. At their first meeting St. Just roughly
accosted Schneider; "what is the use of all this punctiliousness? Don't
you know the crimes of the aristocrats better than that? In the four-and-twenty hours which you waste in inquiry, you
ought to procure as many convictions." He brought more than sixty Jacobins
with him from the interior, who received 15 francs a day and a free
maintenance, as apostles of enlightenment and the
French language; these men soon quarrelled with Schneider, aud made violent war
against all priests and churches. Schneider was all the more zealous in his
endeavour to secure the favour of St. Just by unbounded severity; he sentenced
the brewers of the city to a fine of 250,000 fr. for
avarice; the bakers were fined 300,000 fr. as enemies of mankind; one grocer,
to a fine of 100,000 fr. for violating the law of the maximum,
and an apothecary to 15,000 fr. for asking too much for his rhubarb;
and a long series of similar penalties followed
during the next two months. St. Just himself levied a compulsory loan of
4,000,000 fr. on the rich inhabitants of the city; and another of 9,000,000
fr., eight days afterwards, on the Department of the Lower Rhine; and a third of 4,000,000 fr., at the end of November, on the peasants of
Alsace, because they would only hear mass from their orthodox priests.1 In
addition to this came requisitions of shoes, beds, and all the cloaks existing
in the city. The churches and synagogues were closed, the holy
vessels confiscated, and the statues on the minster dashed to pieces, by the
express and repeated orders of St. Just. At the incessant instigation of the
representative the prisons were soon filled: at the end of 1793 more than 2,000 persons had been arrested in Strasburg—peasants, artisans, and
educated men, promiscuously—and were well
Convention
nationale 4th, 15th, 21st of November.
232
OPPRESSION
OF THE COUNTRY.
[Book VIII.
or ill treated according as they paid larger
or smaller sums to Schneider for their maintenance. The consequence was, that,
in December, Schneider himself was arrested by St. Just's command, and sent to
Paris; after which, Monet the mayor, an associate of St. Just, exercised a
juster, — i. e. an impartially unsparing tyranny. The
guillotine was in constant activity;1
"All the aristocrats," wrote St. Just to Robespierre, "of the municipality, the courts of law, and the regiments, have been put to death."2
"The property of the condemned fanatics,"
wrote Milhaud on the 23. November, "will bring 15,000,000 fr. to the
Republic." "Good people," said Monet to the people of Strasburg,
at this time, in a manifesto, "rise and bless your fate! Let the
mercantile spirit disappear from among you; let the tears of
the rich egoists be a spring of joy to the Sansculottes. The end of your long
privations is approaching, and the Republic is securing an inheritance for you
in the superfluities of the unfeeling rich."
If we now turn to the south of France, we see every
where the same spectacle. In the Jura the conventional commissioners Bassal and
Lamarque made a requisition of 1,200 beds and bedding, sheets to the amount of
5,000 francs, and blankets to the amount of 419,000 francs; and they declared, some weeks later, that all the gold, silver,
iron, copper, lead, wood, leather, soap, corn,
wine, spirits, and vinegar, horses, cattle, forage, and clothing materials,
which existed in the Department, stood at the disposal of the Republic.3
1 Gatteau to Daubigny, 27 Bru- pierre in the Jacobin club, November
maire H. (Papiers
de Robespierrv H. 21st. Nevertheless Buchez, full of
248);
"It was high time that St. Just admiration for
St. Just, writes:
should
arrive and deal blows with "Alsace was regenerated without shed-
the
axe at the fanaticism, sloth, and ding one drop of blood;" and Louis
German
stupidity, of the Alsatians, Blanc
faithfully repeats this, as
and
the selfishness and avarice of well as a number of other similar
the rich. Sainte
Guillotine est dans truths.
— 3 Sommier, Revolution
dans
la plus brillante activite! Quel
maitre le Jura, p. 267, 355, and elsewhere. bougre
que ce garcon-la!" — 2
Robes-
Cii. III.] SHAMELESS ROBBERY IN THE DEPARTMENTS 233
Puy-du-Dome was cleansed, and its patriotism reanimated,
by Robespierre's friend, Couthon. As early as September, before he had betaken
himself to Lyons, he deposed the officials, entrusted power to the clubs,
formed revolutionary committees and revolutionary tribunals; then followed revolutionary taxes and requisitions of every kind,1 and,
at the beginning of November, a thorough clearing out of all the churches; so
that he himself could report the value of the booty to the Convention as
amounting to several millions.2 The booty of Marseilles was likewise reckoned by millions;3 the
number of voluntary or forced emigrants from that city rose to 12,000, among
whom were the richest merchants and manufacturers ; and their whole
property fell by law under confiscation. Laplanche reported from
Bourges, in October,4 to
the Jacobins; "I have every where made terror the order of the day,
deposed the Federalists, incarcerated the suspects,
and executed the royalists; Orleans has produced 50,000 francs, and
Bourges 2,000,000, within two days. Baudot and Chaudron
gathered a no less plentiful harvest in Toulouse, where they kept 1,500
persons, among whom were all the officials of the Department, in custody, and
induced the club to issue an order for changing all gold and silver money into assignats.5 In
the Department of Aveyron, the leader of the
revolutionary army boasted that he had captured an infinite quantity of gold
and silver;6 while in Bayonne all the muslin and lace was laid under requisition, to make, as was said, trowsers
for the troops.7 Bordeaux was
treated by Tallien and Ysabeau with especial severity, in consequence of the
part it had played in the
1 Barante, Convention 3, 325. —
uniforms in the city." — 4 24 Vende-
2 Convention nationale 4th December,
miaire. — 5 Convention nationale,
— 3 Gasparin,
September 4th 1793 November 14. The Convention subse-
(Moniteur
7th October 1794); "The quently annulled this order.— 6 Con-
4
millions demanded by us will be vention nationale, November 10. —
paid
to-morrow; and besides this we 7 Convention nationale, 21. Messidor
have
made a requisition of all the III.
234
OPPRESSION
OF THE COUNTRY.
[Book VIII.
Girondist revolt. After carefully disarming the inhabitants, the
commissioners formed a revolutionary army, arrested all the leaders of the
previous movement, all the officials and richer
merchants — in all more than 15,000 men — and kept the guillotine in incessant
activity. Tallien, who, in the midst of this bloodshed, led a life of
ostentations gluttony, placed the church plate at the disposal of the theatres, and extorted enormous sums as revolutionary contributions—e.
g. more than two millions from three merchants.1
Fouche, the friend of Hebert and Collot d'Herbois, went on in a still worse
manner in the Departments Nievre and Allier, where he first equipped a revolutionary army, then deposed and arrested a vast number
of officials, and, lastly, ordered that all the coined money, and all the
valuables, with' the exception of female ornaments,
throughout the whole province, should be delivered up, on pain of the severest punishment. At the same time he directed his wrath
against the Church; caused images of Slumber to be substituted for the crosses
in the churchyards; incarcerated the priests without distinction, and, during the month of November, sent
large masses of church plate to Paris of the value of several millions. The
Convention clapped their, hands in applause at reports which were accompanied
by such weighty confirmation: the calling in of all the coined money, however,
was suspended, as a government measure;2 but
to make up for it, a law was issued, that all concealed articles of value
should be subject to confiscation.3 As
no one could possibly expose his ready money to the public, the commissioners
had in this decree an official right to declare every locked money chest
fair booty, and they made the most comprehensive use of the powers thus given.
The very mildest proceeding was to force the possessors to change their money
for assignats, and
this was done — e. g. by the younger Robes-
1 Cambon's
report of December' 3 November 13th. 13th 1794. — 2 November 25th. —
Cii.
HI.] HELPLESS SUBSERVIENCE OF FRENCH
NATION. 235
pierre in Provence,1 by Lacoste and Baudot in Alsace, who, in this way, scraped together
more than twenty millions in the Departments of the Rhine, in the
first months of 1794. The terror inspired was so great, that in these parts, as
well as in Nevers and Moulins, the citizens delivered up their dangerous wealth
without waiting for a summons. Competent authorities have formed an estimate, that within six months these acts of extortions brought
300 or 400 millions of coined money into the treasury, while the number of
persons arrested throughout France was more than 200,000. No one dared to think
of resistance, and no other instinct seemed to prevail in the
population than that of self-preservation, to be sought by submission and
retirement. Yet the Government always had a just consciousness of the universal
hatred which was kept down by this intimidation, and therefore sought additional material security in the decree of the 15th of December,
which, under pretext of warlike preparations, ordered that all arms should be
delivered up on pain of severe punishment. This measure was carried out with
such care and severity, that, two months later, the Government could
feel certain that from the Meuse to the Pyrenees, not a gun was to be found in
the cities and villages.2 If,
therefore, the elements of an insurrection had existed at that
period, the means of carrying it into effect would
still have been wanting.3
We need hardly remark that Paris set a fearful example to the provinces
in the path of this bloody tyranny. Its revolutionary army surpassed all the
banditti of the Depart-
1 Vid. His despatches in Buchez, 35,
426. — 2 Such was the
report of Mallet-du-Pan at that time, after accurate enquiries by the English
government. In Paris, however, the Committee of Public Safety considered it
necessary to increase the severity of the order, on the 23rd of July 1794; the
weapons delivered up at that time were restored to the citizens by a decree of the Convention, passed on the 17th of November. —
3 Mallet, Memoirs II, 8, 19.
23G
OPPRESSION
OF THE COUNTRY.
[Book VIII.
ments in worthlessness and crime. More than once, complaints had reached the Convention that Ronsin's
myrmidons had plundered the villages, extorted money and other valuables
from the peasants by ill-treatment of every kind, and had held the feet of a
farmer close to the fire on his hearth, until he gave up the key of his money-chest. In the city the number of imprisoned persons quickly rose
to 5,000. They all received a uniformly meagre diet, at the common cost; and
were only allowed to communicate, with their relations in writing. The
revolutionary tribunal was in regular and ever-increasing activity. On
the 14th of October, after an imprisonment of eight weeks in the Con-ciergerie,
exposed to ill usage of every kind, the Queen was brought before the court. She
appeared in a ragged dress, with grey hair, but with such a quiet dignity and resignation, that even the audience of this tribunal
could not withhold its respect and compassion. This feeling reached its height
when Hebert came forward as a witness for the prosecution.
He had tortured her son, now eight years of age, and
her daughter, now twelve, by inquiring whether the Queen had not lived in
unchaste connexion with the former. He had succeeded in extorting a signature
from the miserable boy — whom the cobbler Simon alternately beat and
intoxicated — to a statement containing this foul lie. And, that
the whole party might be branded with the infamy of these proceedings, the
Municipality expressly approved of his efforts, and the
Jacobin club applauded his report. He now came to the tribunal to befoul the
Queen, before her execution, with the charge of indulging in unnatural lust. At first she remained silent, but when called
upon to answer, she crushed him with the half-choked words; "A mother can
make no answer to such questions; I appeal to every mother here present." A deep murmur ran through the court, and the judges did not
venture to put any further questions. When Robespierre heard it he cried out:
"Miserable fool, he will make our
Ch. III.]
EXECUTION
OF THE QUEEN.
237
enemies objects of compassion." The final sentence
was a matter of course, and on the 16th of October the head of the
Queen fell upon the scaffold. She was followed j fourteen days afterwards, by
the imprisoned Girondists, Vergniaud, Brissot, and eighteen others: they lost
all composure during the discussion, and mutually
endeavoured to throw upon one another the guilt of crimes whieh had once formed
the pride of their policy; it was not until they found themselves on the road
to the scaffold that they recovered their proud and steady intrepidity. The tedious proceedings of this trial gave the tribunal an opportunity
for begging the Convention to curtail the legal
formalities; whereupon Robespierre carried a decree, that after
three days' discussion the jury might put a stop to further proceedings, by declaring that their'opinion
was made up. The political objects of this institution became more and more
visible, through the hypocritical veil of avenging justice. By the end of the
year the court had sent a hundred and twenty persons to the scaffold. Among these was Madame Roland, who, after the fall of her party, had
given up all care for her own personal safety — for her own ambition, happiness
and safety; and when her associates fled, she remained with quiet heroism in
Paris, awaiting her fate. In the midst of the political
catastrophe, her heart, which had hitherto only warmed for politics, had
conceived a deep affection for Buzot, one of her party friends, who was now
being hunted to death as a pro'scrit
in the neighbourhood of Bordeaux. Her only
feeling now, was that the prison and the scaffold would bring her deliverance
and blessed repose; and she went, not only with courageous composure, but with
beaming joy, to her death.1 Then
came Philip of Orleans, who," with a penitent and broken heart, loudly accused himself of his crimes against King Louis ;2 then
the aged Bailly, who
1 Douban, Etude sur Madame Ro- confessor in Nettement, Girondins, land, Paris 1864. — 2 Letter of his 172.
238
OPPRESSION
OF THE COUNTRY.
[Book VIII.
was delivered over for hours to the brutality
of a revengeful mob, but whose cheerful calmness no torments could disturb;
then Manuel, Barnave, and a long series of deposed generals.1 At
the sight of these triumphs the Municipality was filled with a consciousness of
its irresistible power. It was, after all, their
wishes and their views according to which France had been convulsed and plundered in
every direction. They had struck the note, which the conventional commissioners
caused to re-echo from north and south; they had scarcely any anxiety left,
but the fear of being outstripped by any of their pupils in the paths of
destruction. They were especially excited by what Dumont and
Fouche were doing against the old opponent of Revolution—the Church. Religious hatred and lust of booty here cooperated,
and in November the entire destruction of the
Church became the favourite theme of municipal
discussion. In the first place, Chaumette forbade all divine service
outside the churches; he then induced a few priests publicly to abandon their profession; and lastly, on the 7th of November,
Gobel, bishop of Paris, appeared in the Convention with a great train of
constitutional clergy, who, having been
introduced by the Municipality, solemnly renounced their old superstition in the face of the nation. The Mountain expressed its approbation by
vigorous clapping of hands; those of the deputies who held any ec-clesiatical
dignity followed the example, and Chaumette begged that the Convention would
consecrate one day of the republican calendar to Reason, as the
only true god. The agitation was then extended to the Sections, which one after
another closed their churches, and carried of the silver vessels, the embroidered vestments, and the valuable receptacles of
relics, either to the Convention or to the Hotel de Ville.
On the 10th, the cathedral of Notre-Dame was consecrated by a half-intoxicated
band of Sansculottes, in the presence
1 For particulars Conf. the ex-
burials," by Wilson Cooker, cellent essay "The revolutionary Tri-
Cii. III.]
ORGIES IN HONOUR OF "REASON."
239
of the Convention and the Municipality, to the goddess of Reason; the
representative of the latter—a complaisant beauty of the ballet—sat upon the
high altar in a dress of transparent crepe,
while her companions danced the carmagnole
around her. These scenes of riot were repeated every day, and were
zealously imitated, as we have seen, by the representatives
in the provinces. The citizens were enraged, but looked on at this, as at other
atrocities, in silence; only the women thronged by
thousands, with angry intrepidity, into the few churches which the rulers had
still left open for Christian worship. The Hotel de Ville spoke of them as
wanton huzzies, who wished to do penance for their sins; but, secure of victory in all other quarters, they allowed them to have their way.
Such was the administration which the September rule imposed upon
France as its regular and habitual government. Such was its course in all
those parts of the country, which had bowed to the
yoke with patient submission, and had not roused any special wrath oh the part
of the conquerors by active resistance. It is true that the rulers were not
without grounds for despotic suspicion even in these
quarters. However thoroughly the freedom of speech,
and of the press, was stifled—however timidly every man concealed his
excitement in the interior of his house, and his feelings in the depths of his
bosom—the tyrants were still made to feel the general ahhorrence by the
death-like stillness, and the icy coldness, with which the
masses of the people kept themselves aloof from their dealings. The
commissioners, without any exception, reported from the provinces, that the
people was well disposed but misled, that on their arrival it had no idea of its
own rights, and that the aristocrats and egoists had possessed complete
influence over it. In Paris itself the Jacobins were continually reminded of the indignation with which the country endured the
yoke of a minority, which was only strong through crime. We still meet, in November, with some
240
OPPRESSION
OF THE COUNTRY.
[Book VIII.
emeutes in single Sections, which ended, indeed, in the victory of the patriots, but were rightly understood by the Convention and
the Commune as a threatening proof of the enmity of public
opinion. In a word the Jacobins throughout the whole land felt themselves
alone, condemned to destroy with ever-increasing fury, if they would themselves
escape destruction.
The horrors which may arise from such an alternative were witnessed, more especially, in those parts of the empire which
defended their existence against the republicans, with arms in their hands.
After an heroic resistance, the city of Lyons, bombarded by Dubois-Crance's
batteries, and starved out by Couthon's bands of peasants, surrendered
at discretion, on the 9th of October.1 At
the same moment a violent quarrel arose between the two representatives, which
was only ended by the recall, nay, the arrest of Dubois by order of the
Committee of Public Safety. On the city, however, the
Convention, at the instigation of the Committee, passed sentence of utter
destruction: it was to be rased to the ground, with the exception of the
manufactories, schools and hospitals; the property of the rich was to be
divided among the patriots, and the insurgent
population punished according to martial law. Couthon, who was appointed to
preside over the execution of the sentence, had hitherto been inferior to no one in bloodthirsty party hatred; but in him fanaticism
had not entirely destroyed political insight, or,
perhaps we should say, human understanding, and he too was now struck by the
insanity of such a thirst for vengeance. He saw the suicidal madness
of annihilating this splendid city—an ornament to France and
a source of existence to hundreds of thousands—and that, too, after its
submission. He saw that the whole population, proprietors and workmen without
distinction, hated the Convention, but that, ex-
1 An exact account of the proceed-
de Thionville to the Convention ings is given in a report of
Merlin October 23rd 1794.
Ch. III.]
COUTHON
AT LYONS.
241
hausted as they were, they might still be calmed down by severity
against the leaders and suitable treatment of the masses. Moreover, even if he
had wished to proceed further he would not have had the
means. For half the peasants of the levee
en masse had run away before the capture of the city, and the other half, after
that event; a portion of the troops had begun their march towards Toulon
immediately after the capitulation; and the rest
resolutely refused to play the part of executioners in a general massacre of
unarmed adversaries. For all these reasons Couthon took upon himself, not directly to alter the decree of the Convention, but at any
rate to retard it by a slow execution. On the 14th of
October, he had appointed a court-martial for those who were taken in arms,
which, in six weeks, condemned about a hundred persons to be shot, and
consequently, according to our usual notions, had voluntary done enough to clear Couthon from all suspicion of a too soft-hearted humanity.1 He
then formed two soi-disant "commissions of popular justice," which, however, he bound so
closely by the customary forms of trial, that they had
not succeeded in passing a single sentence at the end of the month. The
demolition of the houses was delayed from day to day, and (which embittered the
club-men of Lyons and Paris most of all) Couthon strictly forbade the
plundering of aristocratic houses by individual patriots. Such conduct excited the greatest displeasure in the capital. When some one remarked, in
the Parisian Municipality, that the entire destruction of Lyons would deal a
deadly blow at French, commerce in general,
1 He writes on the 20th October to
Robespierre (papiers
de Robespierre I,
362): "Procure me, I pray, a resolution of the Committee of Public
Safety ordering me to Toulon. If I reach that place, and hell does not
intervene, the same system of open
III.
violence
shall prevail in Toulon, which has reigned in Lyons. As soon as Toulon has been burned — for this vile city must altogether
disappear from the soil of liberty — as soon as Toulon has been burned I will
come back to you again."
q
242
OPRESSION
OF THE COUNTRY.
[Book VIII.
Hebert replied, that trade and the arts were the born enemies of
freedom, and that it was, moreover, in the interest of Paris not to allow so
considerable a city as Lyons to exist beside it on the French soil.1 His
partisans quite agreed with his reasoning, that if, according to Couthon's report, the whole population of Lyons was unpatriotic, it must be
exterminated without distinction. Couthon, being informed of their views,
himself begged to be recalled, and on the 29th of October, the Committee of
Public Safety resolved to send another of its members, Collot d'Herbois,
together with Fouche,—who had stood the test so well in Nevers— nineteen picked
men of the Parisian club, and three thousand of the revolutionary army, to
Lyons, to execute the vengeance of the People. Other revolutionary armies were posted in all the departments bordering on Lyons, and then
the work of destruction was begun with ferocious joy. All the administrative bodies in the Department were superseded by provisional
commissions in which Collot and Fouche ruled with unlimited
powers, and, on the 16th of November, they proclaimed their system to the
patriots, in a series of long-winded instructions.2
"Everything"—it was said in this document—"is allowed to those
who act in sympathy with the Revolution; you were oppressed, you must annihilate your oppressors; the Republic will have none but
free men upon its soil, and is determined to extirpate all others; thirst for
righteous vengeance is your imperative duty; if you are patriots you will
recognise your friends, and bring all others to prison, whence they
will carry their heads to the scaffold; whoever possesses more than is
necessary for his existence, must give it up to pay the cost of the war and the
Revolution; all superfluity is a patent and insolent violation of the rights of the People; more especially seize all cloths, shirts and
shoes, which may be useful for the
1
Prudhomme, Crimes de la Revo- Ion de Monleon , Memoires
sur lution II, 62. — 2
Published in Guil- Lyous.
Ch. III.] FRANTIC BLASPHEMY OF THE DEMOCRATS.
243
troops; and above all things, let the so-called precious metals,
wherever you find them, pour into the treasury; finally, remember that the
republican has no other God but his country, no worship but that of freedom, no
morals but those of nature; and use all your power to overthrow
every kind of fanaticism for ever."
No one of these propositions was allowed to remain a dead letter. At a
festival given in honour of Chalier, a donkey was adorned with a mitre, made to
drink out of a consecrated cup, with a cross and a bible tied to his
tail. All the churches of the Department were closed, and all the priests put
into confinement. The demolition of the houses went on at a great pace, and in
a short time 14,000 workmen were engaged in it, and entire streets and squares were levelled with the dust. The executions went on for
some days at the usual rate; but no sooner had Ronsin arrived with his banditti, on the 25th of November, than a new
revolutionary tribunal was set up for the purpose of discovering the guilty without tedious formalities. Collot then wrote to Robespierre:
"there are no innocent persons here, except those who were in prison at
the time of the revolt" — and on the 4th of December the executions were
carried on en
masse by volleys of musketry. In seven butcheries of this
kind, 484 persons were killed, and simultaneously,
during the month of September, 101 persons were guillotined in the city of
Lyons; and in the Department, -1,600 according to the lowest, and 6,000
according to the highest, estimate.1 There could be no question of any in-
1 The Revolutionary Commission pects. On the other hand, Cardillot of
Lyons wrote to the Parisian reported to Robespierre (vid. Robes-Commune (vid.
their protocol 22nd pierre's papers II, 143) that not 1,600 Floreal) that they had executed 1,684 but 6,000 people had been put
to guilty persons, acquitted 1,682 inno- death by Collot's orders, eent ones,
and imprisoned 162 sus-
Q2
244
OPRESSION
OF THE COUNTRY.
[Book VIII.
vestigation in these cases; personal and local passions played
the principal part in the selection of the victims, and the most shameless
robbery went hand in hand with murder. In the city, trade and manufactures were
destroyed, the tillage of the land came to a stand-still, and in the spring, the country people could only be compelled to work in their
fields, by the threat of being shot. The troops of the line looked on at these
excesses of the Parisian gangs with boiling fury; things at last came to such a
pass, that for several days regular battles took place between
them, and the most alarming reports were sent to Paris on the subject. Collot
d'Herbois, however, did not allow himself to be diverted from his purpose, but
continued his arrests, robberies and murders, with
ever-increasing zeal. He himself lived in oriental
ostentation, und conducted himself with brutal hauteur.
No one obtained an audience from him without asking three times; a long
suite of antechambers led to his reception room, in which the petitioner was
obliged to remain at fifteen steps from him, and two
grenadiers stood at his side with their guns at full cock, and their eyes
fixed upon the visitor. His answers were curt and cold, and, in cases of
petitions for mercy, generally mingled with cynical derision; when asked for instructions by his tools, he often replied with intentional
ambiguity. At table he caroused every day with a crew of buffoons and dissolute
women, prepared sentences of death during the meal, and drank to the weal of
the Republic, while the thunders of the mitraillades
resounded from the place of execution.
While these atrocities were overwhelming the second city of the empire,
the citizens of Toidon still kept up a resolute
resistance. The Allied powers, too, had hastened to strengthen the garrison of this important place; it consisted, in September, of 6,521
Spaniards, 2,421 English, 4,334 Neapolitans, 1,584 Piedmontese and
1,542 national guards of
Ch. III.] DISSENSION OF THE ALLIES IN TOULON.
245
Toulon — in all, therefore, above 16,000 men;1 — a
force with which, in the weak state of the enemy, an energetic general might
have made the most dangerous diversions far into the interior of Provence. But
unfortunately the same disadvantages operated, here, on a small scale, which,
as we have already seen, had such a decisive and
fatal effect on the affairs of the great Coalition war. In the city itself two
parties stood opposed to one another—the constitutional
party of 1789, and the aristocratic and royalist party; —and as ill-luck would
have it, each of these gained over one of the Allied powers to their
respective sides, and thus involved them in their dissensions. The English
protected the constitutionalists, because they formed a majority in the civic
magistracies, and consequently were the official representatives of the
townsmen; whereupon the Spaniards took, with double warmth, the side of the
royalist minority, in which they found their own zeal for the church, and their
own views respecting ways and means. Prom this time violent dissensions arose on every point of the least importance, which crippled all
political and military movements. When the royalists, zealously supported by
the Spaniards, proposed to recall the clergy, the constitutionalists hesitated;
when the former wished to invite the Count of Provence to
Toulon, as regent of the kingdom, the latter induced Admiral Hood to oppose
their wishes. The Spaniards then brought forward a claim that the Toulon fleet
should be given up to their king as a Bourbon; but Hood emphatically refused, on the ground that the
capitulation of the city had expressly provided, that the fleet should be
1 These statements and those which
these months has hitherto been utterly
immediately
follow are derived from unknown, and consequently (e. g.
a
report of an eye-witness to the in the otherwise trustworthy history
king
of Prussia. I have given its of the
Department of Var by
contents more
fully, because the Lauvergne) disfigured by the most
internal
history of Toulon during absurd reports.
246
OPRESSION
OF THE COUNTRY.
[Book VIII.
given into English custody. From all these disputes, the feud assumed
so violent a character that an offensive movement
against the Republicans was not to be thought of; it seemed as if none of the
Allied generals could venture to march his troops out of the city, from
fear of leaving it in the hands of his rivals.1 And
thus the weeks passed away, and the Republic gained irrevocable time to stifle
this danger, too, with superior force.
At the beginning of the siege, and during the whole
of October and November, the condition of the republican army before Toulon was
in the highest degree critical. The conqueror of Marseilles, General Cartaux,
of the Army of the Alps, was stationed with 8,000 men on the west side of the city; General Lapoype, with 6,000 men from the Army of
Italy was encamped on the eastern side of the roadstead, and was separated from
his colleague by a steep chain of hills, on the highest point of which rose the
strong fortress of Faron. Lapoype was a soldier by
profession, and a violent revolutionist, but he was at the same time a quondam
Marquis, and a brother-in-law of the Dantonist Freron — reason enough
with the ruling metropolitan party to transfer the chief command to General
Cartaux, who, only three years before, had been a painter, and had gradually
risen in a battalion of volunteers by his violent club speeches. On the 13th of
September, captain Bonaparte arrived in his quarters, a
man who, as lieutenant, had distinguished himself by
his cool and quick resolution on occasion of the expulsion of the Marseillais
from Avignon, and had been entrusted by the Committee of Public Safety
"with the command of a siege-train. He found the general employed in
erecting a battery four or five miles distant
1 The English, too, complained of
Captain Cook, and Sir George El-
the
badness of the Spanish, and still Hot, to Lord Auckland, in the lat-
more of
the Neapolitan, troops, ter's correspondence III, 152. Conf. Letters of Sir Sydney
Smith,
Cfi. III.]
CAPTAIN
BONAPARTE AT TOULON.
247
from the enemy's fleet ; and after exchanging a few-words with him,
convinced himself of the utter incapacity of his commander. After the
first reconnoitre his quick eye discovered the key of the enemy's position; Cartaux, however*, did not understand his plan at all, and only
replied that he should warm Toulon for three days with his batteries, and then
proceed to storm in three columns. Nevertheless Vincent, Hebert, and other
patrons in Paris, supported him, and prevented Lapoype's appointment:1 and
when the Committee of Public Safety, in the middle of October, at last insisted
on the appointment • of another commander, Bouchotte would only exchange his protege
for General Doppet, at that time commander of the
Army of the Alps, a physician from Chambery, who, like Cartaux, had risen to
military honour as a demagogue. Doppet himself had some scruples about his own
capacity, so that he did not reach the camp before Toulon until the 9th of
November, at a time when the Committee of Public Safety
had resolved, in spite of Bouchotte's opposition, to sanction Bonaparte's plan,
and to transfer the command of the attack to Dugommier, of the Italian army — a
genuine and excellent soldier, who had grown grey in battles. Doppet received intelligence of this on the
10th;2 but before Dugommier's arrival, being engaged in a fight for an advanced position of the fortress, he suddenly ordered the retreat to be
sounded, when a hostile bullet killed his adjutant
close beside him, and brought the dangerous nature of
the trade of war clearly before his eyes. The soldiers loudly cursed his
cowardice, and the people who had appointed him to his post:
"When," they cried, "will these Parisians cease to send us
painters and physicians as generals?" Meanwhile Bonaparte had collected a park of
1 Some details on this subject in
Doppet's memoirs. Napoleon's will be found in the Vieux Cordelier, statements published in Gourgaud
and No. 5. — 2 The papers will be found Montholon are very incorrect.
248
OPRESSION
OP THE COUNTRY.
[Book VIII.
artillery of 200 guns; reinforcements poured in on every side; and the
army, which was gradually increased to 60,000 men,1
immediately felt the strong and steady hand of a tried leader. They were now able, without further apprehension of an attack from the Allies,
to commence the real assault of the place.
We need say the less respecting the military movements of the French army before Toulon, because Bonaparte's reputation has placed these occurrences
in the clearest light before the world. The city of Toulon lies at the bottom
of a bay about five miles long, which is divided by a promontory, jutting out
from the west, into two roadsteads , an outer and an inner one.
On that promontory, about a league from the city, the English,
rightly recognising the importance of the post, had strongly fortified themselves. Bonaparte's plan was, to abstain from a direct attack
upon the city, and to make himself master of that position, from which the fire
of his artillery could sweep both harbours, and oblige the hostile fleets
to leave them with all speed. He foresaw that in this case the Allies would not
expose their garrisons to certain destruction, but would also evacuate the city
without delay.2
Accordingly, during the night of the 16th of
December, the English fort was attacked by a picked column and taken after a
desperate resistance. The expectations of Bonaparte were immediately
fulfilled. The Allied council of war
unanimously declared
1 According to
the lists in the Sydney Smith, who was at that Archives de la guerre. — 2 The new time in Toulon, is very
interest-edition of the Correspondance
de Nu- ing:
"The nature of the ground is pole'on
I. shows
that he considered such round this extensive bay, that
this result very probable, but was unless we possess and maintain every
nevertheless prepared for the case height and every point for fifteen that the
garrison, in spite of the de- miles in circumference, the enemy \.arture of the
fleet, should determine would be able to force the fleet
to to stand -a siege. The opinion ex- relinquish their anchorage." Letter
pressed on the other side by Sir to Lord Auckland, December
12th.
Ch. III.]
FALL
OF TOULON.
249-
the place to be no longer tenable, and ordered the
speedy embarcation of the troops. The consternation of the inhabitants, who were wholly taken by surprise, was boundless, and was but little calmed by the offer of the admirals to take
every one on board the fleet, who had reason to fear for his safety under republican rule.1
Thousands thronged to the quays with their hastily collected goods, every one
tried to get before the others, and in the crowd women were separated from
their husbands, and mothers from their children, and several of the overloaded boats turned over and buried the fugitives in the waves. Night came
on and covered all this misery with darkness: the troops had already evacuated
the forts on the hills, and the Republicans soon began to throw shells from
thence on the confused mass of people, whose crowding now became
so desperate, that the ships were obliged on their part to fire upon the
fugitives, to prevent a fatal overloading of their vessels. At last, on the
19th, every thing was at an end. More than 4,000 Toulonese, including all who had in any way taken part in the revolt, were crowded together
in the ships. The English took with them a part of the French men of war and
set fire at the last moment to several others, as well as to a portion of the
arsenal.
When the columns of the Republicans marched into the
city, they found the streets deserted, the houses closed, and the whole place
as quiet as the grave. The first intelligence which some Jacobins brought to
the representatives of the people—Freron, Barras , and Robespierre the younger— was that the most guilty had escaped: but Freron replied,
that there would be no want of victims of vengeance, since the whole town had
loaded itself with disgrace and treachery. In the arsenal, about 400 dock-yard
workmen came to meet him: when he heard that they had been
employed during the foreign occupation of the place, he caused them to be
The
following details are taken from Lauvergne's Hist, du depart du Var.
250
OPRESSION
OF THE COUNTRY.
[Book VIII.
cut down on the spot. It was his intention, in fact, to
exterminate the whole population, and with this view he ordered all the
inhabitants to be driven, on the third day, to a place lying under the
batteries of a bastion, that they might be there annihilated by the fire of the
artillery. But here, as in Lyons, the army
refused to obey the commands of the bloody butchers, and General Dugommier
rejected the suggestions of the representative with angry pride. Freron then
had recourse to a revolutionary troop, the so-called Allobroges—originally a legion of Savoyard volunteers, afterwards a rabble
collected from the whole of southern France—which had already given proofs of
its usefulness in Marseilles. With these men he set on foot a republican fusillade
for three days successively, in which more than 800 citizens, selected
partly by chance, and partly on account of their wealth, fell beneath the
bullets of the Allobroges. A revolutionary tribunal was then established,
which, without proof or examination, butchered more than 1,800 persons within three months. A third part of these were destroyed for the sake
of their property, the rest from a mere delight in bloodshed. On occasion of
the celebration of a republican festival, eleven young and beautiful women were
sent to the scaffold, a twelfth was, indeed, pardoned on account
of her pregnancy, but her head was first laid under the axe of the guillotine.
The property of the condemned and the fugitives fell to
the State. At first the representatives had promised it to the troops; but
afterwards, under the pretence of an auction, it
was so shamelessly thrown away on favoured patriots, that e. g. an estate which
yielded 6,000 francs a year was sold for 10,000 francs in paper money. The
rulers in Paris looked on at this murdering and plundering with the greatest indifference. The more dangerous the insurrection had
been to the Republic, the less pity was to be found in any section of the
Jacobins for the city of Toulon. When some one expressed a wish to appoint milder successors to Freron and Barras,
Danton said
Ch. III.]
PUNISHMENT
OF TOULON.
251
"We want no soft-hearted maiden in Toidon, but only a guillotine
and a number of executioners." "The Toulonese," said Merlin of
Douay, "must all die, that the Republic may possess this stripe of coast
in full security." . These acts seem already to exceed all bounds in
atrocity. Yet they were still to be surpassed by the incalculable number of
victims, and the ferocious brutality of the murderers,
who, about the same time, brought the campaign in La Vendee
to a horrible conclusion. In that country, as we have seen, Robespierre
himself, with passionate eagerness, had enforced the
system of all-destroying terrorism; had carried the appointment of Rossignol as
commander-in-chief, and repelled all the attacks
of the Dantonists on the incapacity of his protege.
Such was the seed which he sowed, when his object was to destroy the
influence of the first Committee of Public Safety; the fruits came to maturity
after he had raised himself from the ranks of the opposition
to the highest position in the government. This attack upon La Vendee by the
Armies of Mayence and Brest, Rochelle and Saumur, and a levy of the national
guards of all the neighbouring districts—amounting in all to 70,000 troops of
the line, and more than 100,000 of the general levy—was
prepared at the same time on all sides, and commenced in the first half of
September with the greatest energy. A mighty girdle of fire surrounded the
unhappy land: villages, stacks of corn, and heaths, blazed up and disappeared in smoke; single detachments of peasants were defeated,
every living thing that crossed the path of the army was destroyed; and the
masses of the hostile army rolled forward towards the interior from all points
of the frontier, driving the terrified population before them. But
happily for the Vendeans, Rossignol was utterly unequal to the task of
conducting an attack on such a colossal scale, and from points at such a
distance from one another. He often remained hidden for several days together in the indulgence of idle debauchery; and when he did appear,
252
OPRESSION
OF THE COUNTRY.
[Book VIII.
he only destroyed the connexion of the operations by hasty and
ill-considered orders. Thus, for example, in the middle of December, he ordered
the divisions of Sables d'Olonne and of Lucon to retreat, thereby
bringing the Mayence troops under Canclaux1 to a
stand - still ; and yet he allowed the column of Saumur—consisting of 40,000
men under Santerre — to advance, without any warning, by itself. The consequence was that the insurgent chiefs Laroche-Jacquelin and
Piron, with about 12,000 men, very unexpectedly attacked the hero of the
Faubourg St. Antoine, on the 17th, at Coron, and dispersed his troops after a
short combat. The victors, by a rapid movement, then threw themselves
upon the nearest column of the enemy under General Duhoux, and inflicted a
bloody defeat upon them, on the 19th, at Beaulieu. By these victories the net
which surrounded La Vendee was torn in two important places; and at the same time the cessation of the attack in the west and south gave the
peasants time to collect and recover themselves. On the 19th, consequently, the
Mayence troops themselves were beaten, after a hard struggle, at Torfou, by
Charette and Lescure; General Beysser's force was dispersed at
Montaigu on the 21st; and the Army of Brest compelled to beat a retreat at
Nantes. When, in 'addition to this, General Mieskowski
was driven from the field at St. Fulgent on the 23rd, the Royalists, after a
ten day's campaign, saw their country entirely cleared
of the' enemy, a hundred pieces of captured canon in their hands, and the levy
of national guards dispersed to the very last man.
1 This is the only important point
in the mass of reproaches by which the different parties
endeavoured to load one another with the blame of the subsequent defeats;
and this point is sufficiently settled to the disadvantage of Rossignol by the
despatches published in the "Gtterres des Vendeens'" II,
144. — Conf.
Schulz, Kriege
in Europa II, 266,
and Poisson II, 434.
Ch. III.]
THE
WAR IN LA VENDEE.
253
But this heroism, which was displayed during six months in splendid
deeds of gallantry and self-sacrificing " courage, only brought a
momentary relief at best, since the peasants always dispersed
immediately after a victory, the leaders were divided* by jealous dissensions,
and the land saw its resources daily melting away under the continued ravages
of the enemy. Meanwhile the Republicans gained time and strength to repair
their losses, and after a short interval to commence a
fresh attack upon the exhausted districts. Rossignol, after his failure in La
Vendee, had exchanged his post for a command in Bretagne; but he was succeeded,
on Bouchotte's motion, by General Lechelle, a man of exactly the same calibre,
and like-wise totally ignorant of military affairs; one who was ready
enough to burn and plunder, but had not the remotest idea of the nature of the
land, or the duties of his position; and who, e. g., broke off the negotiations
of his first council of war, by ordering that the troops should "keep
marching on majestically and en
masse.'''' It was lucky for the army that he always carefully kept himself at a
safe distance during every engagement; which rendered it possible
for the more able generals under his command—Kleber
(who now commanded the Mayence troops), Marceau, and Westermann—to act independently. General Cauclaux had been punished for Rossignol's
mistakes, by dismissal; yet it was according to his plan that hostilities were
continued in October. Again the object was to march from the different
frontiers of the Bocage to the centre of the land; this time they formed two
chief columns, of which the one was to march from Nantes in a south-easterly
direction, and the other from Bressuire towards the north-west, and
finally unite in the country of Mortagne and Chol-let. These movements were
successfully carried out by Generals Kleber and Chalbos, amidst shocking
devastation of the land, and after several engagements of various fortune.
On the 16th
of October the two columns had
254
OPRESSION
OF THE COUNTRY.
[Book VIII.
reached Collet, and found themselves in the presence of the catholic
Army of the Bocage, which, surrounded by fugitives from all parts of the
country—women, children, old men, and sick
persons—prepared to try the last struggle. But all the efforts of the peasants
on this day were fruitless: the Republicans repelled one
charge after another, and towards the evening the whole army of the insurgents
left the battle-field, which was covered with 4,000 of their dead. With the
victors in their rear and the broad stream of the Loire before them, they were
lost, had not Lechelle's negligence opened to them a path of
deliverance, and given a highly unexpected turn to
the war.
The more clear-sighted chiefs of the Vendeans had often recognised the
necessity of extending the theatre of the war to the neighbouring provinces,
but had been unable to carry out their wishes in opposition to the peasants'
tenacious love of home. It was the Marquis of Bonchamps
who, on the day before the battle, had proposed crossing the Loire, and
exciting the catholic population of Bretagne to take part in the struggle, as
the last resource which was left them. At his instigation a division crossed the river at St. Florentin, while the engagement was still
going on, routed the nearest post of the enemy at Varades, and thus made it
possible for the beaten army — with the vast crowd of followers amounting to
100,000 men, of whom 30,000 were capable of bearing arms—to reach
the opposite shore in safety. During Canclaux's command, when the line of the
river was guarded with the most anxious care, such a success, which transferred
the war to an entirely new theatre, would have been inconceivable; but Lechelle, thoroughly occupied by the battles in the interior, had
forgotten all other precautions, and thus Bretagne, Anjou, and Maine, saw
themselves exposed, almost without means of defence, to the attack of the
Royalists. Kleber, indeed, strained every nerve to secure the towns on
the right bank, and to overtake the enemy's army, which was pressing
Ch.IIL] la roche-jacquelin defeats the republicans. 255
forward to the north. Unhappily, however, when he had just got sight of
the enemy on the 27th, not far from Laval, such absurd
orders arrived from Lechelle, that the young Laroche-Jacquelin, who at that
time commanded the Vendeans, inflicted a <complete defeat upon the
Republicans on the following day, and put their army to disorderly flight. Lechelle arrived just in time to see them disperse: he had such a bad
reputation among the soldiers, that when he addressed a flying troop with the
words "Why must I lead such cowards?" one of the soldiers replied,
"Why must we be led by such scoundrels?" He died soon afterwards of a violent fever, and Bouchotte hastened to hand
over the command-in-chief once more to his worthy associate Rossignol. The Committee of Public Safety confirmed the appointment, contented for the present that La Vendee had been transformed for miles upon miles to an uninhabited wilderness of smoking
ruins; and Rossignol, on his part, declared that he considered it an evil that
there should be humane people in a revolution. But the country was opened far
and wide, in all directions, to the victorious army of the
Royalists.
The consequences which might have resulted from the present position of
the Vendeans become clear to us when we remember the sentiments of the Breton
peasants, the vicinity of the English Channel fleet, and the possibility of a junction with Coburg and York. The misfortune of the Vendeans
was, that their troops were retarded and hampered in all their movements by the
enormous crowd which followed them; that their leader was
too young to exercise a commanding influence, and
the members of their war council continually at variance in their opinious.
They wavered for a whole week in Laval between plans against Rennes, Paris and
Normandy, and decided at last to besiege the little maritime town of Granville,
in order to gain secure means of communication with
England. It was not until the 14th of November, therefore, that the Vendeans
arrived
256
OPRESSION
OF THE COUNTRY.
[Book VIII.
at that place, and began the attack; but they were repulsed in a series
of battles which lasted two days, • and
Laroche-Jacquelin was compelled to retreat by a sudden despondency among his
men. . The peasants now tumultuously demanded to be led back to La Vendee, and
their incontrollable violence rendered all regular conduct of the war impossible* In this state of things, Rossignol came up with the combined
troops of the Army of the west and the Army of Cherbourg, believing that he had
already shut in the rebels at Dol, between the marshes of the coast and the
waves of the ocean; but he allowed himself, on the 22nd, to be
surprised near Antrain, and there suffered the bloodiest defeat of the whole
war. The Vendeans, although weakened by their late victories, and quickly
decreased in numbers .by the toils of a winter campaign, then marched undisturbed through Bretagne, reached the Loire at Angers, and prepared
to capture this city to secure their passage over the river. But General
Danican, although left by Rossignol for several days without any aid, made a
successful stand. The Vendeans, with their spirit once more broken,
turned their backs upon the city; and, what was by no means of less importance,
the Committee of Public Safety just at this
moment screwed up its courage, in spite of Hebert and Bouchotte, to remove the
mischievous bungler Rossignol, and to entrust the chief
command to the young General Marceau, an able and enthusiastic
soldier. From this time forward, while the spirit, discipline, and order of the
Vendeans were hopelessly sinking from day to day, new life was infused into all the movements of the Republicans. General
Westermann, by his perpetual cavalry charges, left the
insurgents no time to breathe; he chased them out of La Fleche to Mans, and
beat them there, on the 12th, in a decisive and annihilating battle. As no quarter had been given for a long time past—as all the wounded were cut
down, and aged men and women were shot as well as the soldiers—that one day
cost more than 15,000 people their lives.
The totally disorganised remnant
Cii. III.] CARRIER'S NOYADES AT NANTES.
257
of the Catholic army then wandered for weeks on the banks of the Loire,
vainly seeking an unguarded passage. Laroche escaped with a handful of men to
his home, and a few thousands found refuge and concealment in the houses of
sympathising peasants * in Bretagne; but all the rest were
either destroyed in a series of engagements, which lasted till the end of
December, or were dragged to the prisons of the nearest towns, to find a still
more horrible fate. The campaign in the north of the Loire was brought to a close by the utter destruction of the vanquished.
Meanwhile the representatives Carrier at Nantes, and Francastel at
Angers, had organised their criminal tribunals, or rather their murderous
bands, and were heaping up all the inhuman atrocities
which the system of terror had anywhere devised, into a ruthless mass of crime.
Their military tribunals sent from 150 to 200 persons a day to be shot; Carrier
then ordered the prisoners to be drowned by hundreds; of wholesale noyades of
this nature, which took place in Nantes, Saumier,
Angers, Paimbceuf and Chateau-Gontier, four have been officially proved as
coming from Nantes alone, in which more than 1,500 persons perished, and there
are disputed, but still highly probable, accounts respecting nineteen others. 1,560 Vendeans, who Ihad laid down their arms, trusting to a capitulation which was granted
them, were immediately massacred; several thousand other prisoners were carried
of by disease in the over-filled and plague-stricken prisons. The lowest sum-total of victims who fell during Carrier's four months' activity in
Nantes amounts to 15,000 — rebellious peasants, catholic priests, citizens of
Nantes, Jacobin proletaries ? just
as personal hatred,
intoxicated despotism,
1 Moniteur, 13. Frim. III. p. 308, . 2nd col. In this very place a witness declares that 400 children, whom
III.
he
had seen, had been drowned. Similar statements on the 11th and 16th of
Frimaire.
R
258
OPPRESSION OF THE COUNTRY. [Book VIII.
or local enmity, happened to bring them under the hands
of the executioners.1
1 The military commission in to be
executed in 21 days Conf. C. Nantes alone caused 4,000 people N. 8, Vendem. Ill; 1, 2, 3, Frim. III.
Ch. IV.]
259
CHAPTER IV. PARTY FEUDS AMONG THE JACOBINS.
PhILIPPEAUX
brings charges against the agents of the minister-at-war.
-the committee
op public safety experiences
the evils of
anarchy.—Robespierre
separates himself from the hebertists.— Influence
of fabre d'eglantine.—Robespierre's
first open attack on the hebertist faction.—robespierre
declares against atheism. —Coalition
between danton and Robespierre.—Law of
December
the 4th.—
desmoulins publishes the "vieux cordelier".-anger of
the
convention.-robespierre attacks collot d'herbois and bouchotte.—Robespierre in favour of a milder treatment of "suspects". —Collot
d'herbois returns from lyons.—Change in the position of affairs.—Robespierre changes sides.—Distress of the dantonists. —St.
just's influence on the party contest.—Couthon and st. just
order the confiscation of the property
of "suspects". — St. just
attacks
the dantonists.-unexpected attempt
at insurrection on
the
part of the hebertists--the committee resolves to annihilate
both parties.-fall of the hebertists.-dissolution of the
revolutionary army.—fall of the dantonists.—position of affairs.
■Such were the results which the Mountain had obtained ^luring its few
months' rule in the French Republic. The land lay overpowered at its feet,
plundered in every direction, fend everywhere deluged
with blood; the nation retained |no remembrance of the ruined past, it had been
driven far kaway from the hopes of the first period of the Revolution, and was
cut off from all chance of liberation.
But Nemesis, who always appears in the history of this Revolution endowed with a power corresponding to -the crime she
avenges, rose with frightful rapidity from (the blood of the civil wars. The
terrible atonement consisted fei this, that it was just by the crimes committed
at Lyons,
R2 •
260
PARTY FEUDS AMONG THE JACOBINS. [Book VIII.
Toulon, and La Vendee, that the feud between the rulers was kindled,
which was destined to destroy the yoke of the enslaved people, by causing the
mutual destruction of the tyrants.
Philippeaux, deputy of La Sarthe, had always belonged to the most
zealous party of the Mountain, and had voted for the death of the King, the
destruction of Dumouriez, and the omnipotence of the revolutionary tribunal.
But as commissioner in La Vendee, he had observed from a near point the mischievous and disgraceful proceedings of Ronsin and Rossignol,
and, after the defeats of December, he hurried back to denounce them
everywhere—in the Convention, in the club, and in the Committee of Public
Safety—as the cause of the long-continued failure of the war:
The former adversaries of Rossignol—Bourdon de l'Oise, Goupilleau and
Westermann—joined Philippeaux, and extended the agitation, which he had
begun, through the whole country. The Committee of Public Safety, however, who
regarded Rossignol as their own creature, rejected these
complaints at first with cold and almost menacing hauteur. Danton, with whom
Philippeaux was very intimate, had withdrawn shortly before from Paris, to
enjoy his new conjugal happiness; but Philippeaux was not to be hindered even by his absence, and continued to bring forward his
indignant charges on every opportunity. He thereby drew upon himself the most
violent counter-charges from some representatives attached to the Army of the
West, who were in alliance with
Ronsin; but various circumstances combined to place the Committee of Public
Safety in an impartial attitude, at least between
Philippeaux and his opponents.
In the first place the occurrences which followed one another with
startling rapidity on the banks of the Loire fully confirmed his
statements. After the passage of the Vendeans over the river, the Committee
began seriously to doubt the excellence of their present instruments, and sent
two of their own members, Jean-bon St.
Andre and
Ch. IV.] THE COMMITTEE FEELS THE EFFECTS OF ANARCHY. 261
Prieur, to reconnoitre the position of affairs and to urge on
Rossignol. In the next place Bouchotte's friends made an equally bad appearance
in other theatres of the war: Carteaux, who was at that time before Toulon—the fall of which the Committee were expecting with painful
impatience—was daily loading himself with disgrace and shame; and Couthon,
also, returned from Lyons in an irritated state of mind, ready to confirm all
the complaints which were sent thence concerning
Collot's and Ronsin's cruelties. In Paris itself, where the guillotine was
daily at work, the rulers observed •what a very unfavourable impression had
been made on the population. A crowd of beggars, to whom the Government paid
four-twenty sous a day, applauded the executiouer; but
with this exception it was found that, even among the proletaries, fanaticism
was stifled by compassion, and that among these hitherto devoted adherents of
democracy, attachment to the Republic was changed to
disgust and horror. The Committee thought it desirable to diminish the
shedding of blood, at least for a certain time—to incarcerate rather than to
decapitate, and to seek the property of the arrested ,rather than their heads —
a sentiment inspired, not by 'humanity, but by policy, but which,
nevertheless, inevitably estranged the Hebertists from them.1
The Committee, moreover, became every day moredis contented with its own condition. However unconditionally the nation was
subjected to its rule, it could by no means reckon upon order
trustworthiness and obedience in its own agents. The general lawlessness with
which the conventional commissioners, the communal
councillors and club-men, rioted in the blood and treasure of France, had a
most disastrous effect upon the finances. While the State
.treasury was complaining that the plundered citizens could contribute nothing
more to their favorite compulsory loan
1
Mallet du Pan, Mem. II, 65.
262 PARTY
FEUDS AMONG THE JACOBINS. [Book VIII.
of a milliard,1 only a very inconsiderable part of the
revolutionary taxes and requitisions came into the hands of the Government.
The articles of clothing which St. Just had confiscated in Strasburg were
rotting in the magazines, without any advantage to the army; of the fifteen million francs which he exacted from Alsace, scarcely a
third, and of Tallien's extortions in Bordeaux, not a farthing, was ever paid
into the treasury.2 It
was the same everywhere else. The taxes were for the most part spent in luxury
by the revolutionary committees, or pocketed by the
conventional commissioners, or otherwise squandered in the general
confusion. This was, indeed, the necessary consequence
of Jacobin principles; but a Jacobin government, just because it was a
government, could not possibly be contented with such a
state of things. Since the beginning of November the Committee of Public Safety
had been occupied with plans for reorganising the administration,
reconstituting a public service, and extending its own prerogatives. When, with this view, it considered the position of different parties, it
felt secure of. the gratitude of the Centre, and the adhesion of most of the
Dantonists. The old party of the Right had no longer any weight, but the
opposition of Vincent and Hebert was certain and dangerous, and the
first step, therefore, must be the humiliation of these adversaries. Of the
members of the Committee, Collot d'Herbois, Herault de Sechelles, Prieur de la
Marne, Jean-bon St. Andre and St. Just were absent;3
Carnot troubled himself very little about non-military
questions, and Lindet and Barere were accustomed to vote with the majority. But
Billaud-Varennes, usually a warm friend of the Hotel de Ville, was flattered by
the prospect of an increase of his own power; and Couthon had long regarded the Hebertists
1 Cambon's report of the 16th
of Frim. III. — 3 Granet had resigned December 1795.
— 2 Report of the immediately after his appointment, financial
Committee of the 6th of
Cn.
IV.]
SENTIMENTS
OF ROBESPIERRE.
263
with no other feeling than aversion and disgust.
Under these circumstances, the fact that Robespierre finally made mp his mind
openly to attack the Hebertists decided the question at once. v
We may imagine that it was not without reluctance that the dictator
entered on this path. The power of the opposite
party was alone sufficient to make such a course dangerous, and Robespierre had
always been a friend of cautious and concealed action. He had, moreover, risen
to power with his present opponents, had obtained his
most important victories by their support and friendship, and, in return, had
praised all the actions which he was now about to denounce. How could he break
with them without coming into conflict with his own past? But that which most
of all, perhaps, deterred him was, that he could not enter
into a contest with them, without seeking the aid of associates doubly hateful
to him. With the exception of a demoniacal ambition, he had no strong passion,
and possessed neither devoted warmth nor fresh enthusiasm. On the contrary, his whole nature was narrow and calculating, and his
acquirements were the result of painful labour. He was conscious of this
himself, and felt it bitterly, but still struggled on with restless and
unceasing efforts. No feeling, consequently, was more fully developed in
his heart, than a deep and spiteful hatred against those happier and more
gifted natures, who by their mere appearance gained affection and success; who,
perhaps, passed the day in frivolous enjoyment, and yet, at the decisive moment, suddenly took their station, with easy andacity, at the
head of the victors. Thus of all the leaders of the Gironde he had hated
Vergniaud most —the dreamy inactive man who, whenever he came forward, was
always alike amiable and irresistible. Danton, too, for the same reason,
had always been the object of his dislike— an object at once of contempt, on
account of his filthy debauchery, and of envy, on every
occasion which brought out his rude and boisterous energy. He had found the latter
264
PARTY FEUDS
AMONG THE JACOBINS. [Book VIII.
incessantly crossing his path, since the month of April, and had
employed every means of party warfare to drive him from the seat of government.
After having at last succeeded in this, was he once more to beg for his friendship and help, and to make his implacable hatred
yield to the claims of a transient political object?
That which at last brought him to this point was— we may be assured—no
impulse of humanity or justice, roused by the daily increasing atrocities of Collot and Hebert, Fouche and .Ronsin; for all the
regulations and laws which those men had required he had himself helped to
create; nay, in a great measure he had alone created them. He had always wished
to make the revolutionary tribunal bloodier-than it afterwards
became; he had signalised his entrance into the Committee by the decree against
La Vendee, which ordered a general massacre of more than 1Q0,000 people,
without distinction of guilt and innocence. But the same features of his character which separated him from Danton, repelled him also from the
Hebertists. The less fresh creative power he had, the more fully was the taste
for order, even to pedantry, developed in him: the less he felt himself suited
to bold enterprise and conflict, the more easily excited was
his distrust of the self-will of others. Now, the party of the Hotel de Ville
was made up entirely of lawlessness and disorder, and a breach with it,
therefore, was as much in accordance with Robespierre's
inmost feelings as with the general state of affairs.
To this was added a personal influence which had been operative for
some time past. Among the most confidential and intimate friends of Danton was
a quondam actor, Fabre d'Eglantine, a man to whom that well-known description of an older intriguant
may be applied, that he had no soul, but in its place only pools and
shallows on which the most experienced steersman might get stranded. He was
Danton's tool in all affairs which shunned the light—in his
Ch. IV.]
SECRET
PLANS OF HEBERT.
265
dealings with the royal civil list, and in the preparation of Hhe
September massacres. He was always to be seen, busy without any clearly defined
object, living in spendour without any visible income,. and feared by all the
world without I any
apparent reason. This man, who was in sufficiently bad odour at the Hotel de
Ville as Danton's friend, came on the 27th of September to Robespierre, with
secret and extensive disclosures concerning the plans of Hebert.1 The
object, he said, was gradually to break up the Convention,
by sending all the obnoxious or influential deputies to the guillotine—first
the seventy-three, then Danton and Lacroix, and afterwards Billaud and
Robespierre. At the same time, the Convention was to be degraded in public opinion, the Proletariate was to be attached to the party of Hebert as
originators of the law of^the maximum,
and lastly, by the help of the revolutionary army, the War Ministry,
and the majority of the Jacobin clubs, possession was to be openly taken of the chief power of the State. There was nothing improbable in these
statements. Hebert had already demanded that the War Ministry should
be made independent; and, only three days before, the club of the Cordeliers
had protested, at Vincent's instigation, against the interference of the
conventional commissioners with Bouchotte's orders; while, on the 25th,
Robespierre had to give a long explanation at the Jacobin club on
this very point. No one, therefore, doubted that Vincent and Hebert wished to
get the power of the Committee into their own hands; but it was another
question, how far this desire had, at that time, taken the form of a settled
plan. Fabre, however, from his long
1 There exists among the papers
confirm in this place, too, the cor-
of
the Committee of Public Safety rectness of Mallet's account (Mem. II,
a
sketch of a report written towards 39) and the entire untrustworthiness
the
end of November entitled Con- of that contained in Buchez, vols.
spiration Hebert,
from which
the 30 and 31. following statements are taken.
They
2G6
PARTY
FEUDS AMONG THE JACOBINS.
[Book VIII.
intercourse with the very scum of the city party, found no difficulty
in procuring credit for his statements by giving a number of remarkable
particulars, and he obtained an order to the Comite
de Surete -generate for the strict surveillance of these intrigues.
As soon as men once began to look at the proceedings of the Hebertists
from such a point of view, grounds for suspicion and complaint could not but
accumulate fast enough. We know with what a mass of
infamy these men had loaded themselves in their money dealings: and Fabre had
directed several of his charges against these delinquencies,
and had warned the Government against the ex-Capuchin Chabot, among others, and some of his associates. The latter, on their part, were prosecuting
the great finance companies in the Convention with noisy zeal, but, as was
alleged, had no other object than their own enrichment
and an increase of the pecuniary resources of the conspiracy. On the 8th of October, Chabot's friend Delaunai actually carried
a motion in the Convention for the suppression of the Indian trading
company: whereupon Fabre, supported by Robespierre, obtained an enactment, that
the property of the company should be sealed up, and its liquidation managed by officers of the State. Chabot and his associates thus
lost the chance of plundering the treasures of the company for themselves, and
a few days afterwards Fabre reported that they had offered him 100,000 francs if he would use his influence to repeal that decree. Similar
manoeuvres by the same authors could be easily brought home to them, and,
indeed, there was nothing of this kind of which they were not capable. Chabot,
especially, was as vile debauched and shameless a fellow as any runaway
Capuchin that ever lived. At this time he married the sister of a rich banker,
who hoped to derive advantage from the connexions of the patriotic monk; and
although an agent of Robespierre and Danton, named Dufourny, lashed him severely in the Jacobin club on account of this business,
Cn.
IV.]
THE
JACOBINS PROTECT HEBERT.
267
the Hebertists carried their point, that the club should send a solemn
deputation to his wedding. Robespierre was enraged, and his anger was not
softened when Hebert, immediately afterwards, spoke in his journal of the
rapacity of the vultures and wolves who governed
France. Dufourny immediately caused the circulation of
the number to be stopped by the police of the
Department, and, at the same time, had two men arrested, one of whom
had been engaged in furthering the correspondence of the Jacobins, and the
other in working upon the Parisian proletaries in Hebert's favour.1 But
the influence of the Hebertists once more prevailed in the club. The Jacobins, among whom Collot d'Herbois used all his influence in favour of
Hebert, procured the liberation of both, and sent the condemned number of the Pere
Duchesne to all the popular societies with whom they were connected.
During these skirmishes, which lasted
throughout October, the Hebertists displayed the warmest veneration for Robespierre, which the latter returned by a contemptuous indifference towards Hebert and Chabot, and secretly entered into closer
relations with Fabre, Camille Desmoulins, and Danton;
so that, by the beginning of November—when Collot's departure for Lyons gave
him a freer field in the Committee of Public Safety—he was ready to commence
the conflict. Hebert gave him an opportunity of announcing the change in his
attitude on the 8th, when the former charged the
conventional commissioners Freron at Toulon, and Duquesnoi, who was with the
Army of the North, of various abuses, and especially of protecting incapable
generals who were connected with themselves. Robespierre appeared, on the 9th, with Duquesnoi, called upon the latter to demonstrate, the virtual groundlessness of the accusations, and added, on
his own part, the general declaration, that there were two kinds of enemies to
the Republic; on the
1 Desfieux and Proli,
268
PARTY
FEUDS AMONG THE JACOBINS. [Book YIII.
one side, the weak and deluded patriots, who were only the echo of
their seducers, and, on the other, the disguised missionaries
of the hostile courts—of Pitt and Coburg—who calumniated the patriotic generals, and thereby endeavoured to divide the Republicans, and set
themselves up in the place of the Committee of Public Safety. The Assembly here
interrupted him with the cry that he must remain at his post; Hebert
answered not a word, and two days afterwards
solemnly withdrew his charges against Duquesnoi; he was evidently surprised and
embarrassed by the undisguised attack made upon him. Still
stronger was the impression produced on the utterly
weak and unprincipled Chabot, who already saw himself in imagination involved in the fall of the city party, and, in-his agony,
resolved upon a step of the most contemptible meanness. He went in person to
Robespierre, told him that Hebert and Chaumette had drawn him into a conspiracy
against the Convention in the preceding August; that the deputies
Julien and Delaunai had undertaken to procure the necessary funds; and that he
had joined them in order to make himself acquainted with their crime; but that
he now begged for strict investigation and condign punishment.
Robespierre did not neglect to follow up
this important advantage. On the 17th he made a report to the Convention, in the name of the Committee, respecting the foreign policy of
France, which, as regarded European questions, was entirely in accordance with Danton's views, and formed a most striking contrast to the
phrases—"overthrow of tyrants" and "universal war"—in
Robespierre's Rights of Man. He praised the system of a moderate policy,
offered the protection of France to the smaller States of Europe, and promised to all neutrals a strict observance of their rights. These
diplomatic utterances did not go beyond general principles, and the Committee
of Public Safety was still far from carrying them into action, but, on the
contrary, continued its revolutionary intrigues in the neutral
territory
Cii. IV.]
ROBESPIERRE OPENLY ATTACKS THE HEBERTISTS. 269
of Genoa, and remained deaf to the prayers of Sweden for help and
protection.1 In this report , Robespierre was thinking,
not of Europe, but of the factions at home. As he could not attack the
acts of the Hebertists, in which he had taken so great a part, it was necessary
to convict them of treasonable designs. Robespierre,
therefore, spoke of a party who loudly blew the war trumpet in order to isolate
France in the- world, and who sullied the Revolution with every kind of
abomiation, in order to estrange the love of the nations from it. He did not
for a moment leave his hearers in doubt as to whom he alluded, since he, at the
same time, warned them of the "cruel moderatism"
(of the former Committee of Public Safety) and
"the systematic exaggeration of false patriots" (Hebert and Vincent).
But he soon threw off all disguise, and revealed to his hearers Fabre's and
Chabot's disclosures, with a direct reference to the
Hebertists. "Punish," he cried, "the basest of all crimes—the
counterRevolution under the mask of
patriotism—the murder of freedom with her own weapons. All these threads are
gathered together in the hands of the infamous London ministers, and it is Pitt who guides all these pretended democrats; every indication, every
piece • of intelligence, every intercepted despatch, proves that an attempt is
being made, by bribing the venal deputies of the people, and assassinating those who are incorruptible, to
bring about the dissolution of the Convention."
The Convention listened to these statements with the applause which was now a matter of course, but did nothing themselves
towards taking the matter up. Whereupon Robespierre made another step towards
his object. In the evening, Chabot with one of his most intimate
associates, a merchant named Bazire, was directed to repeat his charges
officially to the Comite de Surete generate, which
thereupon detained them both, and at the same time ordered the ar-
1 According
to Stael's above-mentioned despatches.
270
PARTY FEUDS AMONG THE JACOBINS. [Book VIII.
rest of Delauny and a certain Julien. Robespierre's friend, Amar,
announced to the Convention on the 18th, that a conspiracy had been discovered
the object of which was the dissolution of the Convention. He was unable,
he said, to communicate further particulars, because other persons, not
belonging to the Convention, were implicated. These words referred to no less a
body than the Parisian Municipality itself. The Comite
de Surete generale was already engaged in preparing a formal act of impeachment, and it is
interesting to see in what colours this sketch of
a report endeavoured to pourtray the revolutionary
acts of Chaumette and Hebert. "They are aiming,"
it said, at "breaking up the Convention by bribery and calumny—at stirring
up the Communal authorities—at promoting anarchy
amongst the people, by the multiplication of powers—at establishing the sovereignty of individuals, by the exaggeration of
liberty and equality—and at the destruction of all faith in the immortality of the soul. They wish to make us odious in men's eyes by
immorality and lawlessness—to accustom the people to contempt of all authority,
to unbridled licence and the love of pleasure—to bring their creatures into
every office, and to squander the property of the State. They wish to establish
a tumultuous liberty, a violent equality, and a burlesque philosophy,
disgusting to every reasonable being; and finally to hand over the land, ruined by such means, to the tyrants."
Well-founded as all these reproaches were—with the exception of the absurd invention that the faction was in the pay of
England—it still appeared to Robespierre, on closer consideration, too
dangerous a thing to proceed at once against the city
party as a whole: this draft therefore remained hidden, for the present,
among the papers of the Comite
de Surete generale. In its stead it was resolved, in the first place, to undermine the
authority of the Hebertists in the Jacobin club, to strike down the
more important members of the party singly, and to take advantage of the
Cii.
IV.]
ROBESPIERRE PROFESSES DEISM.
271
intimidation of the rest to strengthen the power of the Committee of Public Safety. Accordingly, Robespierre
rose, on the 21st, in the Jacobin club, to denounce the wickedness and
sacrilegious conduct of the Hebertists. He had, indeed, never shared their
atheistic zeal, and, according to Rousseau's example, adhered to a belief in
divine Providence: but still his religion was pliant enough
to allow of his proclaiming in his sketch of "the Rights of Man," not
a personal God, but Nature, as the sovereign of the universe. His most intimate companions, St. Just and Couthon, treated the churches, as we
have seen, in a manner entirely in accordance with
Hebert's views; and we find the dictator himself, at a later period,
proclaiming, indeed, the existence of a divine being, but, at the same time,
warning men not to restore religious ceremonies. 1 In
short, if it had not been for political and party reasons, he would have been no more offended at the
annihilation of Christian worship, than he had previously
been at the persecution of the catholic clergy. The present object, however,
was to find some point of attack against the Hebertists; and
there could be no doubt that by taking up the question of religion, he would
earn the applause of millions, and, at the same time, follow the dictates of
policy. Even in Paris the ferment against the desecrators of the churches was clearly perceptible; while from the provinces
every courier brought the most urgent and alarming news. An agent in Lyons
reported that the rural population were prepared for any other sacrifice, but
that they would break out into wides-pread rebellion,
if their priests were not restored to them. In Bretagne the presence of the
Vendeans might be expected to produce the worst consequences,
if the peasants, who had long been in a state of discontent, were further
irritated by the destruction of their churches. In fact, the most
shortsighted observer could not overlook the danger, which irreligious
fanaticism was bringing
1 Debates of the Jacobin club, 25th
of May 1794.
272
PARTY
FEUDS AMONG THF JACOBINS. [Book VIII.
on the Republican Government. Robespierre spoke on this
point in the Jacobin club with enthusiasm and energy; he found happy and almost
inspired words, and, in spite of the < surprise of the club, obtained an
undoubted majority. Encouraged by this success, he
proposed to the club a general sifting of its members:
every one was to pass through an examination of his previous conduct, and was
only to be tolerated in the society, after he had safely stood this fiery test'.
Danton returned to Paris just at this time, and immediately seconded Robespierre's efforts with the
greatest zeal. He carried a resolution in the Convention, that no religious
masquerades should take place for the future in the hall of the national
representatives. At the same time he demanded that a strict enquiry should be instituted against all conspirators
in foreign pay; that the system of terror should only be used against the
really guilty; and that the powers of government should be developed and
enlarged. He met with some opposition when he advocated milder treatment of the weak and the neutral; 1 yet
the Convention passed the decrees proposed by him, and the immediate object—a
new law respecting the powers of the Committee of Public Safety—was obtained.
Billaud-Varennes had already introduced it on the 18th, but it had then been returned to the Committee to be remodelled. It
is a striking proof of the progress of reaction, that this law was discussed in
all its articles, and without opposition, on the 29th and following days, and
adopted en bloc on the 4th of December. By this enactment all the
authorities were placed under the direct supervision of the Committee of Public
Safety; every Minister was to make his report to it on the affairs of his
department, once a week; all revolutionary and police affairs were transferred to Communal councils and
revolutionary Committees
The
Moniteur mutilates the phrase out of
consideration for the terrorists of the Convention.
Ch. IV.] SEVEEE MEASURES AGAINST THE COMMUNE. 273
under the surveillance of the district officers,
who were to receive direct instructions on the subject from the two government Committees. But the heaviest blow to the Hebertists was the regulatio'n, that the revolutionary Committees of the
different Sections in Paris were no longer to be under
the orders of the Municipality, but directly responsible to the Conventional Comite
de Surete Generale. A series of other provisions had all the same end in view—to limit, nay
to destroy, the independence of the Communal councils, and to make them nothing more than subordinate organs of the government Committees. With
similar intentions the revolutionary armies which had not been formed by the
Convention were disbanded; the troops of this kind which were still kept on
foot were placed under military discipline, and prohibited from all
interference in judicial or police affairs—provisions which cut the very roots
of the power of the Parisian Municipality and its adherents. By the enforcement of this law, the Committee of Public Safety took possession,
not in name only, but in reality, of the whole power of the State.
The Commune writhed beneath these repeated blows, full of bitterness
and desire of vengeance, but uncertain whether to yield to their fears, or to
venture on resistance. As late as the 23rd of
November, they had answered Robespierre's speech in the club by closing all the
churches in Paris; but, on the 28th, they revoked their own orders with piteous
lamentations. On the 1st of December, they made an attempt to assemble about^
them all the revolutionary Committees of the Sections;
and, on the 4th, in consequence of the prohibition of the Convention, they
dismissed the men who were already present in the Hotel de Ville with a
patriotic embrace. But they now saw themselves and their friends continually threatened in new quarters, and with more and more dangerous
weapons. Since the fall of the Gironde they had completely ruled the press, but
they now received, from this side also, a terrible and double blow, when
in. S
274
PARTY FEUDS AMONG THE JACOBINS. [Book VIII.
Philippeaux published his charges against Ronsin and Rossignol; and Caniille Desmoulins founded a journal under the title of 11 le
vieux Cordelier" in which he pourtrayed all the atrocities of the Reign of Terror with
admirable eloquence, and referred them, after the
manner of Robespierre's report, to the treacherous plans of the Hebertists. The
impression made by these two publications was immense. Tyranny had
hitherto weighed upon the land with such a stifling weight, that a note of opposition, and especially such a bold and clear note as
Desinoulins now raised, appeared to the nation like the
announcement of a new era. It was only known to a few initiated persons, that
those writings were published at the instigation of
Robespierre, and consequently under the protection of the Committee of Public
Safety; that Robespierre himself corrected the sheets of the "le
vieux Cordelier'''' before they were printed off; and that it was really the Government
itself which in this way ventured an appeal to public
opinion. But the applause and the rapture which they caused was all the more
universal on that account; thousands and hundreds of thousands of copies
of the "le vieux Cordelier" were
circulated in a few days; they brought consolation and hope into the
prisons, roused the citizens in their Sections, and the peasants in their
villages, and excited the intimidated mass of the population
to loud expressions of fury against the stigmatized faction. The effect
produced by these writings in the Convention and the Jacobin club was not less than among the people
without. All those who in any degree took part with Hebert or Bouchotte
thoua;ht of nothing; but revenge on the audacious writer, who had ventured with
criminal hand to desecrate the sanctuary of the
democratic revolution. But even the other section of the
Mountain, the men who usually followed Robespierre or Danton, notwithstanding all their hatred against Hebert, were far from being of one
mind with Desmoulins. They had all taken as zealous a part in the
ill-treatment of the people as any
Cii.
IV.] REACTION IN FAVOUR OF THE
HEBERTISTS. 275
of the Hebertists; they had made and administered the laws concerning accaparence
and the maximum, concerning requisitions and suspects, as well as the friends of Pache and Bouchotte; they saw' themselves
convicted and condemned, in an equal degree with the latter, by the public
opinion to which Desmoulins had appealed. They certainly did not wish to give
up their omnipotent power to the Commune,
and were satisfied that its pretensions should he exposed
to suspicion as machinations of Pitt; but they intended,
to maintain their own despotism at any cost, and regarded every word which
Desmoulins directed against the system of the September
laws, as a deadly insult to themselves. And thus it happened that
by the publication of the He
vieux Cordelier'1'1 a change of feeling was brought about in the Convention favourable to
the Hebertists—a change which made itself quickly felt in the Committee, of Public Safety. On the 6th of December the Convention, on
the motion of the Committee, had forbidden all interference in the full
exercise of public worship, and had enacted, on the 8th, that no revolutionary
tax could be imposed without a decree of the Convention. Both these
regulations were in the highest degree disagreeable to the Hebertists; but they
at the same time limited the omnipotence of the conventional commissioners, and
the Committee—in the present sensitive and irritable state of its adherents—could not prevent the passing of an additional clause, on
the 8th, that both the decrees were only to have a prospective operation, and
were not to invalidate the commands already issued by the conventional
commissioners. From the incalculable number of orders already issued,
the effect of the decrees was really annulled by this provision. To the same
category belonged a law of the 7th, which confiscated, for the benefit of the
nation, the lands of all citizens whose sons or daughters had emigrated.
Nevertheless Robespierre still adhered firmly to his plan. The.
Municipality had been subjected to the Committee by
S2
276 PARTY FEUDS AMONG THE
JACOBINS. [Book VIII.
the law of the 4th of December; it had been beaten on the Church question in the club, and been proscribed in the public press by Camille
Desmoulins. The second half of the task, which had still greater influence on
the relative power of parties, had still to be performed—viz. the humiliation of the War Ministry, of which Philippeaux's
pamphlet had only given a preliminary notice. Barere made the first step in
this, direction in his report on two civil commissioners
of Lyons, who had been appointed by the Committee
of Public Safety, and were deeply implicated in the horrible crimes committed in that city. Barere exposed them to public odium
without ceremony; and the Convention decreed, on the motion of the Dantonist
Merlin, that a minute examination into their conduct should be made by the
Committee. These were two second-rate men, distinguished by nothing but their utter brutality; but, from the very
first moment, every one knew that their cause was bound up with that of their
patron Ronsin—nay, that the enquiry would necessarily reach the great chief
Collot d'Herbois himself. The presence of Collot in the
Committee had long been a cause of embarrassment to Robespierre, and this was
another reason for commencing the contest with the Lyonese affair; Couthon',
too, took a still more lively interest in every measure which was calculated to ruin his successors in Lyons. On the 14th, he carried a
resolution in the Jacobin club for instituting a strict enquiry into the
political and moral conduct of all the officials in the War Ministry. Two days
afterwards, Fabre d'Eglantine announced to'.the Committee, that
Vincent was again talking of establishing a constitutional Ministry; "We
shall," he said to one of the deputies, "compel the Convention to
make the ministers independent, as the Constitution prescribes; we are tired of
being slaves of the Committee of Public Safety." A member of the
Committee then shewed Fabre a letter from Bordeaux, in which the same intrigues
were announced, and allowed him to make a copy of the passages in ques-
Cii. IV.] ROBESPIERRE ADVOCATES MILDER MEASURES. 277
tion.1 It was, therefore, no doubt with the full consent of the Committee,
that Fabre, on the following day, made a motion in the Convention for the
arrest of Vincent. He likewise read a letter' of Ronsin, which Vincent had
printed and posted in all the streets of the capital, to
the effect that Lyons contained 120,000 inhabitants of whom only 1,500 were
innocent; and that, in a short 'time, the Rhone would receive the bloody
corpses of all the rest. Bourdon and others moved the arrest of Ronsin and Maillard; and being strongly supported by Couthon, further proposed
that the ministers should give an account of the character of every one of
their officials. We see that the Dantonists had taken up the part of public
accusers. But they were backed by the whole weight of the Committee
of Public Safety, and the Convention sanctioned all these proposals without a
dissentient voice. A further motion of Bourdon, indeed, to do away with the
Council of Ministers altogether, was referred to the Committee of Public Safety: it was, as we shall hereafter see, entirely in accordance
with Robespierre's views; but he did not consider
that the time was come for carrying it into execution.
Meanwhile the new turn of affairs had caused the greatest excitement
throughout the whole of France. Everywhere the
hope of a more humane Government revived, and the oppressed began to make
themselves heard; it no longer seemed a crime, at any rate, to pity misfortune,
to hope for better days, and to beg for mercy towards the persecuted. As early as the 13th, a numerous, deputation of women appeared
in the Convention to supplicate pardon for those who had been wrongfully
arrested. On the 20th, a more numerous body appeared, with still more urgent
petitions; and immediately after them came delegates from the Lyonese
citizens, who claimed, not only the mercy of the Convention for the victims,
but just punishment of the
Fabre
to the Comite
de Surete generale 11,
Pluv. II, in
Buchet 30, 383.
278
PARTY
FEUDS AMONG THE JACOBINS.
[Book VIII.
murderers. Robespierre spoke first on the Parisian petition; indulged
in the usual expressions of wrath against the aristocrats, and the enemies of
freedom, but ended by proposing that the two Government
Committees should be empowered to name commissioners to find out those who
had been unjustly arrested, and to propose their liberation to the Committees.
This was but a trifling consolation; it was still undisguised despotism without
a shadow of law; but it seemed an immense progress that revolutionary omnipotence should for once be employed in
the interests of mercy. The French people were so thoroughly enslaved, that
Robespierre had attained, by his opposition to Hebert, a certain popularity
among the middle classes, which was not a little increased
by the decree of the 20th. He was well aware of this, and thought it of great
importance; it afforded him the distant possibility of gaining new and
unexpected props to his power, if the Jacobins should one day entirely throw
off his yoke.
But the laws of God do not allow the same hand to
destroy the temple of Justice to-day, and to build it up again to-morrow. He
who once sins against freedom and morality, like the creator of the
revolutionary Tribunal and the destroyer of La Vendee, makes of his own misdeeds an insuperable barrier, which irrevocably cuts him off from
all return into the paths of righteousness. For four years Robespierre had
employed all the resources of his tenacious and indefatigable mind in
developing the system of popular despotism: he now found that the toils
which he had spread were wide aud strong enough to hold him in their meshes,
even against his own will.
Four and twenty hours after that Lyonese deputation, Collot d'Herbois,
the chief of the Lyonese murderers, appeared in Paris,
to the surprise of both friends and foes, and was received by Robespierre with
concealed anger, and by the Jacobins with tumultuous joy. He was well aware of
Robespierre's feelings towards him; he had watched the
Ch. IV.] RETURN OF COLLOT D'HERBOIS TO PARIS.
279
development of the reaction step by step, and he understood at a glance
the significance of that decree of the 12th of December. He quickly resolved
not to look idly on at the completion of his own ruin. Such an arbitrary return
from his post would have ruined any one else, but
he knew the forces on which he could reckon in Paris, and he hastened back to
collect and animate them by his personal presence. On the 21st he met the
complaints of the Lyonese in the Convention with proud superiority, denied the worst charges with a shameless brow, and vindicated
the rest of his deeds as glorious acts of revolutionary justice. The Mountain,
whose feelings had been wounded by Desmoulins, were favourably disposed towards
him, and the Convention pronounced its entire approval of the
measures adopted in Lyons. In the Jacobin club he assumed a far bolder tone.
"Two months ago," cried he, "I left you burning with the thirst
for righteous vengeance—to-day I scarcely recognise public opinion again; in
three days more I should have . been impeached. Are you no longer the
same? But no, you are not changed—you are still the friends of freedom, and the
defenders of the people: to you I may speak the whole truth, and need not, as
in the Convention, conceal myself in a mist of phrases." The
Club remained silent, and did not venture to express an opinion, either by applause or disapprobation. When Hebert then rose to attack Bourdon,
Desmoulins and Philippeaux, Collot's mighty influence was manifested: the club
summoned them to answer for themselves, and solemnly declared its respect
for Ronsin and Vincent. "What a piece of good fortune," wrote Hebert
on the following day in the Pere Duchesne "is this arrival of Collot, the
faithful defender of the Sansculottes; the giant appears, and the dwarfs,
who were about to harass the best patriots, creep away a hundred feet deep into
the earth."
The fact that just at this time Toulon opened its gates to the
Republican army, and the forces of the Vendeans
280
PARTY
FEUDS AMONG THE JACOBINS. [Book VIII.
perished in a sea of blood, contributed not a little to strengthen the
position of the extreme party. It was a new triumph of the existing system of
government; it was a new reason for taking no other notice of the hatred of the population, than by adopting new measures of punishment
and vengeance. Collot succeeded completely in enforcing his demands in the
Committee of Public Safety. Billaud and Lindet's own inclinations made them
ready for every terrorising measure; Carnot was still on bad terms
with Robespierre, in consequence of the latter's continued jealousy of all that
belonged to the army and military affairs;1 and
Barere gave way" to the pressure of Collot, as he had done, four weeks
before, to the wishes of Robespierre. The latter thus saw
himself all. at once outshone in the Committee, the Club and the Convention;
saw the majority in the latter, and with it power and future
success, secured to his opponents. The Jacobins attacked his allies; the
Cordeliers . presented stormy petitions in favour of
Vincent; and the Convention, at a hint from Collot, ordered a speedy enquiry
into the reasons of Ronsin's imprisonment. Robespierre treasured up these
defeats in his memory as fuel for future revenge; but with regard to his immediate course, he did not hesitate for a moment in his
resolution to go with the victorious party, at any sacrifice. This is perhaps
the point of his whole political career at which his ambition shews itself most
completely destitute of every honourable feeling— at which his
cowardice was carried to the extreme of shameful
meanness. Just a week after Ronsin's arrest he condescended
publicly to proclaim in the Convention his conversion
to the views of the Hebertists, and even to demand new victims for the persecuting fury of his old opponents.
The report which he brought up to the Convention, on the 25th, in the
name of the Committee, was nominally an expose
of the general principles of revolutionary government.
1 Conf. Nat 6 Germinal III, evidence
of Bourdon, Carnot and Levasseur.
Cii. IV.] MEANNESS AND HUMILIATION OF ROBESPIERRE. 281
"A constitutional government," he said "protects
freedom, a revolutionary government fights for it; the former exists in a state
of peace, the latter in a state of war; the former can allow
individual .citizens to do as they please, but the latter must concentrate all
its force for the overthrow of factions." He then pourtrayed the two
opposing parties of the "moderates" and the "over-zealous,"
just as he had done in his report of the 17th of
November. But as, on the former occasion, he did not hesitate to make this
dilemma the prelude to an attack upon the Hebertists, so he now declared with
equal violence, that if one must choose between the two, excess of patriotism was better than the absolute want of it. "Let us
beware," he cried, "of destroying patriotism in the hope of healing
it. We have seen that directly some necessary measures were adopted against the
over-zealous, all the partisans of the ancient tyranny,
with the traitors of Lyons at their head, came forward to calumniate all
genuine and ardent patriots." He concluded by proposing a decree, which
sent to the revolutionary Tribunal General Biron, a son of
Custine, and all who belonged to Houchard's staff;
and he demanded for this court a more powerful organisation, and a more
expeditious mode of procedure.
On the 26th it came to Barere's turn to recant, and he was, moreover,
charged with a motion designed to inflict fresh humiliation on Robespierre. He spoke in the name of the two Government Committees against
Robespierre's decree of the 20th, which ordered an enquiry, for the purpose of
finding out those who had been unjustly arrested. With loud complaints of the
indulgence lately shown to the aristocracy, and a condemnatory reference
to Desmoulin's " Vieux Cordelier," he launched out in praise of the law concerning suspects, and proposed to leave the examination of the impugned cases to a
section of the Committee of Public Safety. Robespierre could not suppress a feeble protest against this direct reproof; but Billaud
told him that all the
282
PARTY FEUDS AMONG THE JACOBINS. [Book VIII.
faults belonged to the first decree, which, he said, had been extorted
from the Convention in a moment of weakness. The decree of the 20th
was thereupon annulled, and no provision was thought necessary in favour of
those who had* been innocently imprisoned. The system of terror maintained its ground; those who thought that the people ought not to be
driven to rebellion by utter despair were entirely routed by the partisans of
extermination and annihilation.
The victors now thought of nothing but revenge for the dangers they had
just escaped; and the Dantonists, who had lately hoped to ruin their hated
enemies, now saw themselves attacked on every side. The
so-called purification of the Jacobin club afforded the first and most
convenient theatre for a cross-fire of mutual. accusations, which raged all the
more furiously, because it was well known that exclusion from the club would place the rejected party on the list of suspects,
and consequently on the direct road to prison and the scaffold. For a
time fortune wavered in the odious strife, and the two parties inflicted mutual
defeats on each other. But in January Collot's influence
continually gained ground, and the defeat of Bourdon, Philippeaux and
Desmoulins, became every day more certain. The attitude which Robespierre
assumed in the midst of this mortal strife was extremely singular. He was not
so entirely trodden under foot by his rivals, as
not to take every opportunity of manifesting his contempt for the Hebertists;
but he clothed it in general expressions of grief at the party feuds, which, he
said, ought to be sacrificed to the great interests of their common country. From this point of view he endeavoured to moderate
the violence of the charges brought against the Dantonists, and continued to
shew a certain affection for the friend of his youth,
Camille Desmoulins. But even in this case he brought himself
publicly to deny the part he had taken in ule
vieux Cordelier■," and even to propose that this journal should be
burned in the Jacobin club. When Camille, in the coolest manner, called him to
account
Ch.IV.] PROSECUTION OF FABRE D'EGLANTINE. 283
for this, he grew angry, and expressed his high displeasure that the
stiff-necked sinner should be blind to the generosity of a proposal to punish
him with such fatherly mildness. Towards the other .associates of Danton he had
no other sentiment than wrath at having been brought into
his present critical
position by his compliance with their wishes: this feeling was directed, of
course, most strongly against those whom he had previously hated,
Dubois-Crance, Merlin of Thionville, Bourdon and Philippeaux, and above all the real author of the league—Fabre d'Eglantine. He
wished in fact to destroy the latter, if it were only to stop the mouth of one
who knew so much; and, as we may suppose, Collot and Billaud entirely concurred
with him in this purpose. The
Dantonists themselves hastened the execution of this intention, by continuing
their attacks upon the War Ministry, even after the defection of Robespierre,
and by occasionally directing their blows even against the Committee of Public Safety, for its change of policy. On the 7th of
January, 1794, Bourdon, in the midst of other charges, began a discussion
concerning the money spent by Bouchotte on the "Pere
Duchesne;'''' and by the help of Danton succeeded in passing a decree that for the
future no Minister should receive money from the
Treasury without an express order from the Convention. Under existing
circumstances, the Committee of Public Safety declared this attack upon the
ministers to be an act of hostility against themselves, and hastened, in the next sitting, to obtain a revocation of the decree: but, at the same
time, they resolved to proceed without further delay against Fabre, whom they,
too, considered as the real author of the plot. On the 8th, Robespierre
overwhelmed him in the Jacobin club with a flood of general charges,
to which Fabre replied by calling upon him to specify the offences imputed to
him. Four days afterwards Amar announced to the Convention that Fabre had
tampered with the decree against the India Company—which
he himself had brought forward in opposition
284
PARTY FEUDS AMONG THE JACOBINS. [Book VIDI.
to Delaunai and Chabot—in favour of those swindlers, and had therefore
been arrested. Danton vainly endeavoured to have Fabre brought to the
bar of the Convention, and examined on the charges.
Vadier, in the Comite de Surete gen&rale, made
a violent reply; and when Danton thereupon ventured to ask that a more
circumstantial report of Fabre's proceedings should be brought up without
delay, Billaud cried out, that to fix a time for the report,
would be to suppress a case which deserved to be made as widely known as
possible. "Woe to him," he said, "who has sat by Fabre's side,
and yet believes in his innocence: I demand that sufficient time be given to
the Committee for a complete
investigation of these criminal intrigues." Danton could not doubt that he
himself would find a place in that report by the side of his persecuted
friends: Desmoulins said uLa
Convention est en coupe reglee, we shall all have our turn." The Committee, however, could not
as yet make up its mind to so hazardous a step as a direct attack upon Danton's
person. Robespierre was secretly engaged on his report concerning Fabre, in
which he abused the insinuating malice of that unfathomable intriguant, and, without mentioning Danton and Camille,
denounced Bourdon, Philippeaux, Merlin and Dubois, as Fabre's accomplices. But
either because his statements found no favour for some other reasons, or
because the Committee did not choose to end the affair
without overthrowing Danton, the draft was not adopted, and Fabre was kept in
the closest separate confinement until further orders. It
was strictly in accordance with these proceedings, that Vincent, Ronsin and
Maillard, were soon afterwards liberated, without any enquiry into the
charges brought against than. Robespierre took no part in the discussion on
this point; he remained for the present in his observant position, and made the
greatest exertions to recover his preponderance among the Jacobins. He spent several hours with them every evening, spoke incessantly, got the better of every other speaker, and sur-
Cn.
IV.] ROBESPIERRE'S POLITICAL
THEORIES.
285
passed himself in revolutionary zeal and patriotic public spirit. On
the 5th of February he delivered in the Convention, too, one of those long treatises, by which he loved to
give his political aims a theoretical basis, and which he this time threw into
the shape of a report, as he called it, on the principles of political morality
which ought to guide the French government. With
regard to the theory, his treatise contained rather a wordy exposition of the
dicta of Montesquieu and Rousseau—that political virtue consists in public
spirit, and, consequently, can only be perfectly developed
in a republican constitution, for the success of which, the extermination
of crime by terrible severity is absolutely essential. With regard to the
actual state of affairs at the moment, he still preserved his late attitude of
neutrality between the parties, by rejecting both the over-zealous
and the moderates — the Hebertists and the Dantonists—with equal decision: but
he subsequently allowed it to be seen, as he had previously done on the 25th of
December, that the Government, at that time, regarded the Dantonists as their real opponents. "They would like," he said,
"to guide the Revolution according to legal niceties, and decide, in cases
of conspiracy against the State, in the same way as in private law-suits. They
first tried to calumniate the Committee of
Public Safety itself, until its triumphs closed the mouth of its opponents.
Since then they have tried another means—that of crippling it in the midst of
high-flown compliments, and1[destroying the fruits of all its labours. All these complaints against the necessary instruments of the Committee1—all
the disturbing schemes which they call reforms—all this zeal in praising the
intriguants whom the Committee has been obliged to remove
from the public service2—
1 Bouchotte and his associates. —
after his victories in La Vendee, 2 Tunq and Westermann. The lat- but
was subsequently praised in the ter, too, was deposed immediately Convention on the 7th.
286
PARTY
FEUDS AMONG THE JACOBINS. [Book VIII.
this weak indulgence towards traitors1—this entire system of deceit and intrigue, the chief author of which is a
man whom you have just expelled2—all
these things are concocted against the Convention, and
are carried out in league with all the enemies of France."
Only two months had passed since Robespierre, in union with Fabre,
had resolved to direct these same attacks against the Hebertists. Fabre and
Hebert were just the same as they had been in November, but strength and
victory had passed to the other side, since Collot's return. This was sufficient to induce Robespierre unscrupulously to direct a criminal charge
against his former associate. But the long list of his acts of meanness was not
yet closed.
At the first moment he gained but little by this abandonment of his convictions. Two days after his report in the club, he had
sharply rebuffed two Hebertists of a lower order,- named Brichet and Saintex,
and had had them expelled from the society as traitors in disguise. During the
next night, all the corners of the streets in Paris were covered with placards, which, in the most violent terms, pourtrayed
Robespierre to the people as an ambitious tyrant. Under existing circumstances
he was unable to procure immediate satisfaction; and for many years he had
never suffered so great a humiliation within his own party. It had such an
effect upon him, that he was ill for several weeks, and took no part either in
the club or in the Convention.3
Collot thereby obtained a clear field among the Jacobins, and used his time in
enlarging his influence in that mighty popular association into
exclusive power.
About this time St. Just returned to Paris from a new "mission''''
in Flanders. He had left the
capital four months * before, and therefore found the relation of affairs
essentially
1 In the case of Camille Desmou- 2 Fabre d'Eglantine. — 8 Mallet du lins and the "Old Cordelier." — Pan, Memoires II, 66.
Cii. IV.]
ST.
JUST RETURNS TO PARIS.
287
altered. He had always been a warm admirer of Robespierre, but he was without doubt superior to his master in the power of taking a rapid resolution at the proper moment; and this was evidently necessary in the present crisis, if
Robespierre's influence was not for ever to fall between the two parties. St.
Just had no intention of giving up his post in favour of any Hebertist; he was quite agreed with Robespierre as to the necessity
of reducing the masses of contending democrats to submission and discipline ;
thus far, therefore, he sympathised with the movement begun, in October, by the
Committee of Public Safety against the disorders of the
Parisian mob, and the arbitrary madness of the Provincial commissioners. Bui he was all the less inclined, on that account, to hear of any
indulgence towards the aristocrats and egoists, of humanity towards the
arrested and suspected, or of justice towards an
infinite majority of the French people. On these points his sympathies were
entirely with Collot d'Herbois and Billaud-Varennes, and he rejected the
Dantonists all the more unreservedly, because he had exchanged personal insults with several of their leaders, and never forgot a personal
quarrel. It is said that he refused satisfaction to his colleague Herault after
a quarrel over their cups, and that the latter had thereupon treated him as a
coward and threatened to kick him. Camille Desmoulins, again, had
said in a number of his journal; "The young Tribune, in the consciousness
of his own importance, bears his head upon his shoulders with as much dignity
as if it were the Holy Sacrament;" whereupon St. Just cried out: "He
shall one day carry his under his arm, like St. Dionysius." If,
therefore, Robespierre was still bound to Desmoulins by a remnant of youthful
affection, St. Just was not inclined, in this case, to refuse anything to the
vengeance of the Hebertists.-
The part which he intended to take in the strife
of factions was seen immediately after his return, on the 26th of February, when he brought up a report in the name of the two
288
PARTY
FEUDS AMONG THE JACOBINS. [Book VIII.
Government committees, concerning the treatment of the suspects.
Ever since the Dantonists had made themselves the mouth-piece of the
general sympathy felt for those who had been arbitrarily arrested, scarcely a
day passed without a discussion on the subject. Subsequently to Collot's, return there were no more of those qualms of mercy which we noticed
in December; on the contrary, the principle was publicly laid down in the
Convention and without opposition: "That to exercise indulgence towards
the enemies of the Revolution was to murder the patriots." The
leaders of the Mountain, as we see, perfectly understood their position: it was
evident to them that they could only rescue their own lives by threatening all
differences of opinion with death. They could not condemn their system more emphatically than by the acknowledgment of
this fact: they were well aware of this, and the consciousness only spurred
them on to a further extension of their tyranny. We shall presently see in what
a state of depression the finances were at this time; it
was now that the question was raised, whether the law concerning the suspects
might not be turned to the advantage of the Treasury; and, on the 26th
of January, Couthon caused the two Government committees to be commissioned to report, within three days,
what advantages the confiscation of the goods of all suspected persons might
bring to the Republic. To the property of the Church, which had been
confiscated by the Constituent Assembly, and to the possessions of the Emigres,
which had been confiscated by
the Legislative Assembly, a third prize of no less magnitude, was now to be
added. It was at that time a question of the property of about 200,000 persons,
the number of which, as we know, could be arbitrarily increased at any moment,
as it was in the unlimited power of every revolutionary
Committee, to imprison any rich or obnoxious citizen as a suspected person.1 Enticing as this colossal
1 Conf. Oudot's report. Conf. Nat.
1st November 1894.
Cii. IV.] ST. JUSTS MEASURES AGAINST THE
"SUSPECTS". 289
booty was, the proposal lay unfinished for several weeks among the
papers of the Committee of Public Safety, until St. Just once more interfered,
and took it in hand with all the haughty severity of his character. He did not
hesitate a moment about the confiscation of the lands;
"Let the property of patriots," he said,
"be sacred, but let the goods of the aristocrats fall to the Republic, to
pay the expenses of the war which they have kindled." He contemplated
taking possession of the persons of his opponents on the same principle, and
employing the suspects
in compulsory labour on the roads and in the fortresses: but this was a
little too much even for his colleagues in the Committee, and St. Just was
obliged, very reluctantly, to give up his useful proposition.
The Convention, however, resolved on the 26th, in accordance with his motion,
that the suspects should remain under arrest till the peace, and then be banished for
ever; but that their goods should be immediately seized and employed in providing for poor patriots.
This last provision, which seemed to make over the booty not to the fiscus
but to the proletaries, was, as we need hardly remark, of the greatest
importance to the cause of the democratic parties. The material condition of
the people was worse than ever; in spite of all
grants and loans the provisioning of Paris came to a standstill in every
direction; the Government had been obliged to mitigate the law against accaparement,
and to bring the wages of labour also under the regulations of the great maximum tariff. The poorer classes, therefore, had matter enough for discontent
and agitation, and the Hebertists of the Municipality reckoned not a little on
their dissatisfaction, in case of a new revolutionary-
movement. But by the law of the 26th this instrument of. agitation was wrested from their hands. The proletaries
greeted the Committee of Public Safety with greedy thanks for having opened a
prospect to them of such an unheard-of change in the • distribution of
property, and rallied with devotion round a government
which could at
in. T
,
290
PARTY
FEUDS AMONG THE JACOBINS. [Book VIII.
will change every beggar into a rentier.
This law, therefore, though conceived entirely in
the spirit of the Hebertists, was nevertheless an
annihilating blow for the personal influence of Hebert and his
associates.
To the party of the moderates, on the other hand, it proclaimed the
victory of communistic principles, and afforded a new proof that Collot's
system had been adopted by Robespierre and his friends. This is what St.
Just had intended, and what he proclaimed without
reserve in the accompanying report. Threat succeeded
threat, in this document, against the moderates; he
plainly reckoned them amongst those enemies of the Revolution "to spare whom would be to murder the patriots." "We
must no longer look on," he cried, "in silence at the impunity of the
greatest criminals, who are only trying to break down the scaffold, because
they have before them the prospect of mounting it themselves." Danton did not venture to reply, although no one any longer
doubted how closely these words applied to him. He had been silent when Barere,
shortly before, had pronounced judgment in the Convention against the foreign
policy which aimed at peace, which, he said, was still
treacherously recommended by the moderate party—the same policy which Barere,
in Danton's reign, had for months advocated and carried out as a diligent
coadjutor; Danton had kept silence when Barere, in striking contrast to Robespierre's report of the 17th of November, declared war indispensable to the
weal of the State — perpetual war against all the tyrants of the earth; and he
was silent even now, when his opponents directed personal threats against him.
It seemed to him incredible that Robespierre was plotting
against him and seeking his blood, in league with Collot d'Herbois, after
having so lately begged his help against the latter and his partisans. He did
not remember- that he had been Robespierre's opponent for almost a
year, and that the abortive alliance had naturally increased the latter's
hatred tenfold.
Ch. rv.]
DISCONTENT
OF THE HEBERTISTS.
291
And besides this, he saw no remedy in the state of things around him,
and felt no energy in his own mind. And thus he remained, half disbelieving and half expecting his approaching fate, completely
inactive in the face of danger.
In this position of affairs the Committee of Public Safety, separated
from the parties and raised above them both, might, perhaps, have left them for
a time to themselves. But the decision came from an unexpected quarter.
The Hebertists in the Municipality and in the War Ministry had but little
pleasure in the triumph of their principles, because it did not in any way
conduce to their personal advantage. The Committee might rage ever so
violently against the suspects,
might deprive the citizens of their property
, and promise it to the proletaries, might issue numerous enactments which the
Hebertists were accustomed to praise as the essence of freedom: but still the law of the 4th of December existed; Chaumette and Hebert
still continued to be subordinate communal
officials, and Vincent and Ronsin subordinate State servants, without influence
on the government, watched in all their attempts to enrich themselves, and liable to be called to strict account. As lately as the 12th
of February Hebert had told the Cordeliers that not only the
moderates, but the tribe of bombastic orators who had invented for
him the name of an ultra-revolutionist—i. e. Robespierre
and his followers — must be got rid of. But instead of this, Couthon and St.
Just now acted, it is true, entirely in accordance with Collot's views, but in
return they shared in Collot's power, and made the Hebertists feel the weight
of government authority sometimes in one way and sometimes
in another. Thus Javoques, an old friend of Hebert's, was summoned from Lyons
to Paris to answer for the abuse which he had uttered against Couthon; and at
the end of February, Carrier himself, at Nantes, was made to feel the anger of the Committee, and was recalled to the Convention at
the instigation of Robespierre for having ill-treated, not only
T2 ,
292
PARTY
FEUDS AMONG THE JACOBINS. [Book VIII.
catholics and royalists, but good patriots. It is true that Collot introduced hirn to the Parisian Jacobius with loud praises,
but nevertheless he filled the Club of the Cordeliers, where Hebert and Vincent
were in the ascendant, with impetuous and noisy complaints. They
all thought it was high time for a revolt. In fact, the best of their
previous supporters were wavering. Since the 26th they could no longer reckon
on the proletariate for the advancement of their personal objects. The
revolutionary army, too, which was full of their* supporters, was dispersed by the Committee, who continually sent detachments
of them into the Departments, so that at that time scarcely three thousand
remained in the capital. Under these circumstances the Cordeliers heard, on the
4th of March, that one of their members, named Marchand,
had been arrested by the revolutionary Committee of his section
for using too great licence of speech. Then the long pent-up agitation broke
loose; they sent to the Comite
de Surete generale to demand the immediate liberation of the prisoner,
and at their next sitting, on the 5th, they ordered that the tablet of the
"Rights of Man" should be covered with black crape until the
oppressed people should regain its freedom. Carrier thereupon exhorted them not
to content themselves with words; insurrection, he said, sacred insurrection,
was the only means of curbing the criminals. Hebert supported him with curses
against the Ministers Pare, Desforgues, and Destournelles—against Philippeaux and Bourdon—against the seventy-three imprisoned
Deputies—whom, he said, nothing but traitorous ambition
protected from the guillotine. "Speak, Father Duchesne," cried a
general of the revolutionary army, "speak away, and the rest of us will
fight."
But they soon learned that since December the power with which they had once overthrown the Gironde had escaped from their hands. Vincent had
observed long faces, even in the Club itself, during the summons to rebellion;
in the city the proletaries looked only to the Committee of
Cn.
IV.] FAILURE OF THE HEBERTIST PLOT.
293
Public Safety; among the citizens there was but one voice of derision
aud disgust against Hebert and his associates. Nay, even the great Municipal
Council received their declaration, that they were
"preparing to exterminate all the enemies of the people, with irresolute hesitation. At the decisive moment their military
leader, Henriot, deserted to Robespierre;1 and
on arriving at the Jacobin club Carrier was obliged to stammer out a
declaration that the Cordeliers had only contemplated insurrection under
certain circumstances. In a
word the revolution of the Hebertists died of exhaustion at the moment of its
Jbirth. Humbly and tremblingly they retraced their steps; allowed themselves to
be reproved by a deputation of Jacobins led by Collot, and thundered against the calumniators who wanted to lay at their door the guilt of
rebellion against Convention and Committee. But all this availed them nothing:
they had furnished their enemies with a destructive weapon against themselves.
There exists no well accredited account of the deliberations of
the Committee of Public Safety during these decisive days, but the position of
affairs and the known results are sufficient to exclude all doubts respecting
the course of their proceedings. After the Hebertists had betrayed their own weakness, Robespierre demanded their
annihilation, and Collot d'Herbois was the less able to save them, because his
former connexion with them might expose him to the suspicion of having taken
part in their unfortunate attempt. As a
set
1 Levasscur, Me'moires, III, 40. This book in its present
form is apocryphal, since a .certain Achille Roche has
expanded one volume of Levas-seur's notes into four thick volumes (of which, by
the way, Louis Blanc takes as little notice as he does of the spuriousness
of Hardenberg's
Me'moires).
There is however no reason to doubt
of the correctness of the statement given above, since Henriot was notoriously
at an earlier period an associate of Hebert, and subsequently an adherent of
Robespierre.
294
PARTY
FEUDS AMONG THE JACOBINS. [Book VIII.
off, however, he and his friends demanded with redoubled energy a final
decision respecting the Dantonists, who—as had been proved—might be more
dangerous to the Committee in the Convention, than
Hebert or Vincent in the streets; and who for the last year had followed a
distinct and obstructive policy of their own, and had deeply offended the most
irritable of the present rulers. Robespierre, it is said,1 flew
out violently when Danton's name was first mentioned;
but at any rate he did not maintain his opposition
long. He stood alone in the Committee on this question; he had never liked
Danton, and he saw the incalculable advantage which the fall
of the Hebertists must bring him. It is certain that the Committee came to an agreement with respect to this grand double
sacrifice within iwenty-four hours. * On the 6th of March Barere brought up a
report to the Convention on the intrigues against the Republic which had been
brought to light in different parts of the country—in Lille, Havre,
Maubeuge, Landrecies, and above all at. Paris—by seditious placards and bread
riots, all of which were got up by Pitt and Coburg, but which would be
prosecuted step by step by the Committee of Public Safety. He would not, he said, make any further disclosures, since St. Just was commissioned
to do this at an early day; but meantine he demanded full powers for the public
accuser of the revolutionary Tribunal to prosecute the cUithors of
those intrigues, and to bring up a report upon them to the Convention
within three days. This was done: on the 9th this officer, Fouquier Tinville,
gave some information respecting the printed bills posted up in Paris. But it
was St. Just who spoke the decisive word, on the 13th, in the name of the Committee of Public Safety. His report, it is true, mentioned no
names, but it left little room for doubt. He most distinctly denounced the two
factions, separated only in appearance, who formed the great
1 Billaud, Conv. Nat. 9, Therm. II.
Ch.
IV.] FALL OF HEBERT AND HIS
FOLLOWERS.
295
conspiracy of the Foreign Powers—the spurious imitators of Marat, and
the cruel philanthropists. He declared that they were all unmasked and
surrounded, hemmed in on every side; and he caused every one to be declared worthy of death, who should plot against the power of the
Convention or the revolutionary government — or spread discontent respecting
the necessaries of life—or afford an asylum to Emigres,
or neglect to inform against a conspirator—or favour the seduction of the citizens and the corruption of public opinion. Under one
or other of these categories every political opponent, without exception, might
be brought, and thereby doomed to destruction.
The first flash of the gathering storm fell on the heads of the Hebertists. Hebert, Vincent, Ronsin, Desfieux, Proli, and fifteen
others, were arrested in the same night and handed over to the revolutionary
Tribunal: a day later the same fate befel the Procureur of the Municipality, in
whose stead Robespierre immediately carried the appointment of a man named Pay an, who was entirely devoted to his person. The
official head of the Commune, the Mayor Pache, was regarded as so submissive,
and Bouchotte, the Minister of War, so insignificant, that they were both spared for the moment. But on the 16th Amar appeared in the Convention with
articles of impeachment against Chabot, Bazire, Delaunai, and the most hated of
all the Dantonists, Fabre d'Eglantine. This faction was still more openly
threatened on the 17th, when St. Just brought a criminal charge
against Herault - Sechelles of having received an Emigre
into his house, in defiance of the law of the 13th. Herault was himself
a member of the Committee of Public Safety; it was evident that he must first
be driven from the seat of power, before the coup
de grace was given to his political associates.
The consternation which this approach of danger caused among the
Dantonists was immense, but they were all so thoroughly intimidated, that not
one of them dared to move,
296
PARTY
FEUDS AMONG THE JACOBINS. [Book VIII.
or to expose himself to danger by any token of sympathy with the
victims. They all remained quiet and silent. The minds of men in Paris were
thoroughly occupied by the proceedings against the Hebertists: the citizens were highly delighted that the monsters who had hurled
millions into misery were now overtaken by a just retribution, and the mobs
whom Hebert himself had accustomed to brutality and bloodshed, saw his head
fall beneath the axe , with the same indifference as that of any
other victim. He was completely unmanned and beside himself
with terror, and wept like a child, falling into one fainting fit after
another; while his friend Ronsin preserved his cold composure, and prophesied speedy vengeance on the authors of his misery.
After three days' discussion they were executed on the 24th amidst a vast and
rejoicing concourse of people. As an immediate consequence of their fall, the
Convention ordered, on the 25th, that the revolutionary army—which had been set on foot by them, and was entirely filled by their
spirit - should be entirely disbanded.
Meanwhile the Committee of Public Safety was eager to bring these
complications to a close by the destruction of the Dantonists. They were agreed
on- the main point, but at the last moment a difficulty arose in fixing upon
individual names. Robespierre was influenced partly by St. Just and
Billaud, and partly by opinions of an opposite character. It was Tallien,
especially, who had lately returned from Bordeaux—a friend of Danton from
the time of the September massacres, and therefore personally attached to him,
but thoroughly averse to the system of clemency—who once more made an attempt
at reconciliation, and brought about a personal meeting' between Danton and Robespierre. It had no result: Robespierre reproached him for
still supporting Camille and Philippeaux, and
therefore being a conspirator. Danton burst into tears.
"The proud man weeps," said Robespierre, and turned contemptuously
away. A certain Paris, one of the secretaries of the
revolutionary Tribunal,
Cii.
IV.] ARREST AND EXECUTION OF DANTON.
297
brought about a second conference between them, which was still shorter
than the first. "The royalists must certainly fall," observed Danton, "but we must strike no innocent person." "Who told
you," replied Robespierre, "that any innocent person had been put to
death?" "Do you hear, Paris," cried Danton, "no guiltless
person has perished"—and with that- he left the room without another word.
He then told his friends that it was time for them to shew themselves,
but at the first mention of a more definite plan he relapsed into his brooding
listlessness. Probably about the same moment the Committee had decided upon its
list; Robespierre now abandoned
Camille Desmoulins to his fate, and was so firm in his resolution respecting
Danton, that after signing his sentence of death on the 30th of March, he took
an excursion with him beyond the barrieres, as he had often done in better
times, and brought him back in his own carriage, as if he
had been an intimate friend. On the evening of the 31st Lacroix, Philippeaux,
Westermann and Desmoulins were arrested: Danton being informed of this and
advised to flee cried again and again, "They will not dare!" and in this state of mind the executioners of the Comite
de Surete generale found him.
The impression produced in Paris was indescribable. Many had seen these
events approaching, but no one had regarded them as possible; every one was now
astounded to stupefaction, and scarcely dared to
consider the causes, and still less the consequences, of such a catastrophe.
Never had the sittings of the revolutionary Tribunal been attended by such a
crowded audience; even the jurors trembled at Danton's
violent and threatening outbursts, in which he sometimes demanded the presence of the whole Convention, and sometimes •
claimed to be brought face to face with his accusers,
and incessantly invoked the sympathy of the nation with his thundering and
far-resounding voice. All his friends refused and
defence, until their witnesses had all answer been summoned and their
documentary evidence collected;
298
PARTY
FEUDS AMONG THE JACOBINS. [Book VIII.
the agitation among the audience who listened to Danton's words in the Hall, and at the windows, and even from the other side of the
Seine, hourly increased. At last St. Just obtained an order from the Convention
which empowered the Tribunal, in case of obstinate resistance on the part of
the accused, to pass immediate sentence. Thereupon a sentence of
death was at once pronounced, and on the 4th of April the author of the
storming of the Bastille, the originator of the September massacres, the
conqueror of La Vendee, and the prosecutor of its enemies, suffered death in the same hour.
Nine days afterwards Chaumette and some of the most atrocious agents of
the revolutionary army met the same fate; and with them the widows of both
Hebert and Desmoulins, the latter's friend General
Dillon, and the deputy Simon, as ah associate of Herault—in all twenty-five
persons, who had incurred their fate from the arbitrary hatred of individual
rulers, and suffered under the general charge of conspiracy with foreigners.
All those who during the last few months had in any way shown aversion to the Committee of Public Safety were struck
down by these blows. "The political horizon," cried Couthon on the
1st of April, "is clearing up, the sky is becoming bright, and the Republic is rising triumphantly from the midst of dangers." The most
important of his enemies slept in the grave; the few who, like Carrier and
Fouche on the one side, and Bourdon and Legendre on the other, had been saved
by influential intervention, were completely broken and filled with a crouching
fear of death. The Convention, which up to that time had not
easily denied anything to the powerful voice of Danton, showed a
cringing obedience to the rulers of the Committee; and the chief seat of
Hebert's influence, the War Ministry, had fallen
with Vincent and Ronsin. On the 1st of April the Convention, on
Carnot's motion, decreed the entire abolition of the Council of Ministers, and
oppointed in its stead twelve Committees,
Ch.
IV.]
TRIUMPH
OF ROBESPIERRE.
299
none of which had a sufficiently important sphere of action to be able to oppose its independent will to that of the Committee of Public
Safety.
And thus the Committee was now in possession of unlimited power over
the Convention, the State, and the People. Of its own members Robespierre no
doubt had carried off the lion's share of the booty. But lately
driven ] into a dangerous corner, he had been rescued by the ill-advised
attempts of the Hebertists. While, in the Convention, the relative power
exercised by himself and Collot was scarcely at all affected by Danton's execution, he was freed, in the city, from his most dangerous enemies by
their own fault; and Collot was at the same time deprived of his sturdy and
devoted followers. This soon became evident on the 6th of April, when Couthon
announced that during the next few days the Committee would lay
before the Convention an important report on political morality, on the objects
of the war, and on the worship of an eternal God; whose image, he said, the
Hebertists had not been able to tear from the hearts of the people. These were all characteristic cant phrases from Robespierre's former
system, to which he now brought back the Committee with a powerful hand. He
might justly regard himself as the man of the future, as the next master of the
French government.
But in this, in all respects, victorious
position, he shewed no signs of triumphant joy. Robespierre's consciousness of
being actual possessor of the whole power of the State seemed to have no other
effect upon him than that of making him feel that he was the principal object of the - nation's hatred, and inducing him to guard his life
by precautions of every kind. A number of strong and trustworthy men had been for a. long time accustomed to sleep on the
ground-floor of his house, and to accompany him whenever he went out, armed with heavy sticks. It was now observed that he had two
pistols near his plate at every meal, and that he never touched any dish until
300
PARTY
FEWS AMONG THE JACOBINS.
[Book VIII.
others had tasted .of it before him. He knew what a deep hatred divided the members of the Supreme Council— himself and
Carnot, Collot and Couthon, St. Just and Barere—from one another, and that each
of them saw in the life of the other a threatening danger to his own. He knew
that they were all viewed with abhorrence by the French people;
that every execution of an opponent diminished the number of their friends;
and that far and wide through the land there was no stronger feeling than the
desire of liberation. In Paris itself the number of prisoners had risen within four weeks from 5,000 to 6,000, and yet there was not a
Section whose meetings did not require to be watched with a jealous eye by the
police. The Bourgeois population, overpowered in open fight, stripped of all
means of existence, daily threatened in person and in property,
incessantly and everywhere opposed to the Government the only weapon which
remained to them—silent yet evident hatred of the deadliest kind.
The spring was now approaching, in which warlike operations had again
to be commenced. If splendid laurels were ripening on
this field to compensate the nation for their sufferings at home, the prospects
of the Government, even in this direction, were gloomy and unsatisfactory in
the extreme. If their Generals were victorious in the coming campaign, if the leaders of such colossal armies could display
themselves in warlike glory in the eyes of the people, then it seemed to
Robespierre's eye, sharpened as it was by anxiety, that he should be
immediately crushed by the weight of public execration,
that the tyranny of the popular. Tribune would sink at once before the sword of
the military hero.1
Consequently, one of the first measures taken after the unsuccessful rising of
the Hebertists was that
1 Billaud Conv. Nat. 20th April.
— Louis Blanc
VI, 223. "Robespierre
Moris's, despatches to Jefferson
13th voyait venir Napoleon." of March, 10th of April. — So
also
Ch.
IV.] ROBESPIERRE'S JEALOUSY OF THE FRENCH GENERALS. 301
St. Just removed General Hoche—the ablest, boldest, and most suspected of all the officers who had hitherto commanded—first
from the Moselle Army, and then into close confinement in Paris. It was with
difficulty that Carnot prevented for the present his being brought before the
revolutionary Tribunal.
Such were the anxieties of the Parisian rulers in case
their armies should be victorious. But if they should suffer defeats, or gain
only imperfect or indecisive victories ? France had, as we have seen, raised
enormous forces, but the Government well knew what sacrifices these armaments had cost the country, how much strength and property had been
squandered to no purpose, and how simply impossible
it was to carry on such a system for more than a single campaign. "We
must," said Carnot, "gain great and overpowering
advantages within the next few months; a moderate
victory would bury the Republic in ruins." 1
These affairs, however, demand a closer investigation. It is these to
which we must first direct our attention in order to see in a proper light the
European catastrophes of 1794.
Carnot
to Choudieu, 18th March, Depot
de la yuerre, Paris.
BOOK IX.
VICTORIES OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC.
Ch. I.] 305
CHAPTER I. FRENCH PREPARATIONS FOR AVAR.
RECRUITING IN
FRANCE.-Ne\V ORGANISATION OF THE ARMY.—ExPENDITUKE
OF the WAR DEPARTMENT.-TRAINING OF the TROOPS.-STRENGTH OF
THE FRENCH
ARMIES.-CARNOT.— DIPLOMATIC
CONDUCT and GENERAL
PLAN OF the WAR.-CaRNOt'S PLANS FOR the CAMPAIGN.
Ever since
September, 1793, France had lain under the weight of that organised mob which sent its agents into the smallest villages of the land, exercised an
absolute dominion over the persons and lives of the citizens, counted its
victims by thousands, and its booty by millions, and soon turned its fury
against its own members with the same cruelty as the rest of the
population. On every frontier of France war was being waged with the Powers of
Europe, and the Committee of Public Safety was resolved for a thousand reasons
to carry on the contest without let or limit. Iii spite of all the robberies committed by the Government, the Treasury grew poorer with the
impoverishment of the plundered nation; and to
provide the means of existence at home it was necessary to look out for foreign
booty. In spite of the terror which they inspired, the ruling party deeply felt the growing abhorrence of the citizens, and-
thought it advisable to send them away with all speed to the armies, to tame
them by military discipline, and to remove them to the borders, and beyond the
borders. In spite of the divisions in the camp of the Allies, the in.
, u
30G
FRENCH
PREPARATIONS FOR WAP.
[Book IX.
authors of the September massacres regarded peace with the rest of the
world as impossible; they felt that they must annihilate their enemies, if they
would not themselves rush to certain ruin. They
therefore collected all the resources of their land—men and property, ideas and
weapons, blood and treasure—by infinite and unsparing exertions, in order to
flood the countries of old Europe on every side with an irresistible stream.
We have had occasion to observe all that had been done for a similar
purpose in the earlier periods of the Revolution. To the army of 150,000 men
which was gathered on the frontier in the spring of 1792, the desire of opposing the attack of the Prussians had added 100,000 volunteers.
On the breaking out of the war with England a conscription of 300,000 was
decreed; and lastly, on the 23rd August, all males between 18 and 25 years of
age were ordered to hold themselves in readiness to march. In those Departments which were immediately affected by the war—namely, the
districts bordering on Alsace, Flanders, La Vendee, Lyons and Toulon—the levy en
masse, as we have seen, was actually carried out. All who were capable of
bearing arms in those quarters, whether well or ill armed, with or
without maintenance pay or instruction, were obliged to repair
to the camps; so that in this tumultuous way at least 150,000 men were driven
to the standards. But it soon became evident how many lives were uselessly
wasted by these hasty and foolish proceedings, and every effort was now made
to arrange the new recruits in some serviceable and military order. It might be
assumed that in the population of France, at that period, about 120,000
men attained the military age every year; the law of the 23rd of
August summoned eight such contingents to the field; and thus, after
subtracting those who were already in the regiments, a mass of 500,000 recruits
might be looked for. If we likewise
consider that the Royalists of La Vendee
Cii.
I.] CHANGES IN THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
ARMY. 307
and the cities of the South had at least 150,000 men under arms during
the autumn, we shall find that the French government, in the year 1793, drove
more than a million of their strongest men into the turmoil of a war which
daily grew more bloody.
Gigantic as these exertions were, the State was far from gaining the
whole advantage of them for the purpose it had in view. When the levy of the
23rd of August was ordered, the Hebertists were at the
summit of their political power, and were filled with hatred and suspicion
against all the existing military regulations. It had, indeed, been decreed
ever since February, that all soldiers should be made volunteers, that the
battalions of the two forces should be united in semi -
brigades, and their officers eleeted by the men thus united. But in the face of
an enemy advancing with superior numbers, such a disruption of the old
regimental system seemed to the generals and the Dantonist Committee of Public Safety quite too hazardous, and the execution of the deeree was
therefore suspended. After the renewal of the Committee, the order for the
union of volunteer and troops of the line was immediately repeated on the 12th
of August. But just at that time not a moment could be lost in saving
Dunkirk, in covering Alsace, and surrounding the Vendeans; it was impossible
therefore to think of making any radical changes in the organization of the
army, and the hated and dreaded regiments of the line continued to exist with theit aristocratic officers and staff. Bouchotte, the
Minister-at-War was, however, determined on no consideration to subject the new
recruits to these evil influences; he therefore ordered that the Communes
should manage the conscription, that the recruits of every district should
be collected into a battalion in the ehief town, ehoose their officers and
non-commissioned offieers from among themselves according to their need, and
then, after receiving their arms, mareh to the frontiers as a ready
U2
308
FRENCH
PREPARATIONS FOR WAR. [Book IX
made division. We have already become acquainted with the character of
the communal authorities of that period—the degree of their education and the
nature of their opinions— and we may easily judge with what
an amount of zeal tunmlt and confusion they carried on their preparations.
Popular commissioners, clubs, and revolutionary committees, everywhere
interfered by word and deed, and it was only the dictatorial authority of the
members of Convention who happened to be present, which
rendered the formation of the battalions possible. The political developement
had made such progress that the strictest obedience to the commands of the
Government and the Conventional Commissioners was enjoined upon the troops on pain of immediate death; while on the other hand suspicion against
their officers, hatred against the aristocrats, and notions of freedom and
equality, were disseminated among them with equal zeal. The new battalions
endeavoured to make themselves acquainted as well as they could with
the use of their weapons and military drill; but from the want of skilful
officers the progress made was extremely slow; so that the Convention, as early
as the 27th of September, ordained that the citizens of the new levy should relieve the garrisons of the fortresses, while the latter,
repaired to their respective armies. But the discipline and obedience of the
troops under the newly-elected officers was no less deficient than their
military training; the men, who had for the most part joined the army with
great reluctance, could not be brought into anything like military order, audi
soon melted away under the hands of their leaders by constant desertion. Those who remained wished at any rate not to serve as
privates; the new battalions, therefore, arbitrarily
increased the number of commissions, and thus it came to pass", that at
the end of October the Government learnt to their dismay, that
they would for the future have to pay 260,000 officers and non-commissioned
officers.
Ch.
I.] MILITARY MEASURES OF FRENCH
GOVERNMENT. 309
This decided them to make a complete change in their system by issuing
the new and comprehensive law of the 22nd of November.
According to this 'enactment, the mixed semi-brigades, on their arrival at the different armies, were to be formed into three battalions
each, one of the Line and two of Volunteers; the number of these was to be
raised to 210, and the already existing disciplined troops used as a nucleus
for them; the battalions of the new levy were to be all broken up, and
the men belonging to them enrolled in the semi-brigades as privates, without
any regard to their previous rank. Whoever resisted this change was to be
incarcerated as a suspected person; and whoever endeavoured to evade his duty was to be treated as a mutineer and shot.
This arrangement, according to which the semi-brigade was fixed at
3,200 men, ought, when completed, to have yielded a force of 672,000 infantry.
The cavalry, the formation of which was rendered very
difficult by the deeply felt want of horses, was to be raised to 90,000 men.
With this view all the horses of private persons throughout the country were
seized in August, and in October eight horses were demanded from every canton.
But in consequence of the utter ruin of agriculture and cattle
breeding, the result of these measures was far from coming up to the expectations of the Government; and all the violence with which individual
commissioners sometimes seized several hundred horses at once, in the same place, could not mend the matter. Equal zeal was manifested in
the casting of cannon, the formation of batteries, aud the collection of means
of transport and munitions of war. The manufactories of arms at Paris,
subsidised by the Government with millions after K millions,
were gradually enabled to furnish as many as a thousand muskets a day; and a
process was invented of employing bell-metal as a material for casting
ordinance. The Government assumed to itself the disposal of all the
310
FRENCH
PREPARATIONS FOR WAR.
[Book IX.
soil containing "saltpetre, and it soon became a patriotic fashion
among the more zealous or obedient citizens, to dig up their cellars in search
of this precious salt. There seemed no danger that the troops should want
sustenance or clothing, since whatever they needed was simply taken away from
the other inhabitants. We have already seen, in single examples, to what a
length this system was carried ; as one among many general
measures we may mention that, on the 18th of December,
all the shoemakers in the Empire were forbidden to work for anybody but the War
department and the Admiralty, during the ensuing months. In the bureaux of the
War Ministry and the Committee of Public Safety, investigations were carried on
and plans drawn up by night and day; no exertions, no
expense, no party feuds were allowed to interfere with the grand objects
of the war. For in the wish to conquer Europe all the factions were united; and
that same cruelty and violence, avarice and lawlessness, which rendered the Government of the country odious at home, served them
everywhere in good stead in the task of equipping the army. While the absolute
monarchs of Europe were obliged to show the most anxious regard to the weal and
opinions of their subjects, this democratic Government went on
its way crushing all obstacles under its iron heel.
The Finances, which generally play so important a part in the troubles
of war, may be said to have long ceased to exist in France. Cambon boasted in
the course of the winter, that the Government no longer
spent 3u0 to 400 millions a month as before, but only 180 millions, with a
double amount of forces; so successful, he said, had the administration of the
Committee of Public Safety been in promoting order and economy.1 Now, if we even subtract from this amount one-third as the loss upon
the assignats,
1 St. Just expresses himself to the
same effect; vid. Buchez, 35, 294.
Cn.
I.] RECKLESS EXTRAVAGANCE OF THE
COMMITTEE. 311
there still remains a war budget of 1,440 millions
of francs for the year; or if we reckon the army in round numbers at a million
soldiers, we find that each combatant cost 1,440 francs; while Napoleon, twelve
years later, estimated the yearly average cost of a foot soldier at 500 francs,
and that of a horse soldier at 1,000 francs,
including all expenses for ammunition, sustenance,
hospitals and fortresses.1 We
see how recklessly the Committee of Public Safety, though aiming at despotic
order, dealt with the blood and marrow of the land; and if in State craft the choice of an object often deserves less praise than the
attainment of it by suitable means, we shall only be able to accord to the
capacity of this Government a very qualified meed of approbation;
especially as many facts exist which compel us
considerably to raise the amount of the figures given by Cambon. On one
occasion during these months, when it was necessary to procure provisions from
foreign countries, the Government granted the contractors, for a supply of the
value of iy2 million, a yearly rent of 10 millions in the great
ledger of the Republic; 2 and if a single instance of this kind was possible, the daily waste
must have been infinite. Such a state of things was
terrible for the future of the country, but it was no less terrible for its enemies in the approaching campaign. For whatever this
Government required for the annihilation of the foe they were sure to obtain at
whatever sacrifice, if it was at all attainable by blood or money.
Meanwhile the greatest activity had prevailed in
all the camps ever since the law of the 22nd of November. Troops of
recruits, numbering hundreds and often
thousands of
1 In a letter to his brother Jo-
1,000 francs as the general average
seph,
to whom, however, he wishes for the whole army. — 2 Convention
to make
the estimate somewhat nationale, October 24th 1796. Conf.
low. Other calculations proceeding Yvernois, history
of the French
from
the revolutionary times give finances of 1796.
312
FRENCH
PREPARATIONS FOR WAR.
[Book XI.
men, arrived day after day.1 The zeal of individuals for military service
was seldom very great; the people entered unwillingly upon their unexampled
career of victory. The generals sent military agents into the provinces to
support the civil authorities, and yet the progress made was but
slow. In 6pite
of all the efforts of the Committee of Public Safety the young men
generally came without arms, and were enrolled promiscuously in the first
battalion that happened to be at hand. From the want of weapons
they could not be immediately drilled, and they therefore thought that they
might for the present go home again, and deserted in spite of the strictest
orders. The most urgent complaints
poured in from all the divisions of the army, until, at the beginning of February, the Conventional Commissioners attached to the Army of the North,
and the Army of the Ardennes, issued orders to arrest the parents
of every deserter, to confiscate their property, to incarcerate the
magistrates of their communes, and inflict upon them a fine of
4,000 francs. Hereupon most of the men
yielded, though with complaints and murmurs; their condition was pitiable
enough, since it was impossible in the exhausted Border lands to find decent
accomodation and sustenance for the continually increasing mass of
men, which amounted, in the Army of the North, for instance, to thirty thousand
men in the first fortnight of the year, and to about as many in the two
following months. The administration
of the army exerted itself to the utmost; like all the other
authorities of this period it acted with reckless violence, attained great
results for the moment, and immediately destroyed them again by its own lawless
confusion. In the beginning of March a
Representative demanded that no cattle should be sent from the
country into the camp, because, he said, the tillage of the land was at a
stand-still in the former,
1 The following is taken from
the documents of the military archives
at
Paris.
Crt.
I.] CHANGE OF UNIFORM IN FRENCH ARMY.
313
while in the hitter useless profusion prevailed; and a few days
afterwards another Representative ..sent the bitterest complaints to Paris of
the want — the horrible crushing want—ofe
provisions. * It was the same in all the departments
of the military administration; the general
result was that the rural districts were desolated, that the Army of the North
had a standing sick-list of from 20,000 to. 25,000 men, but that finally, by
the spring, the forces were ready to commence hostilities.
The formation of the mixed semi-brigades was
effected simultaneously with the introduction of the recruits, which naturally
gave rise to much delay and confusion. Here there was a want of a nucleus for
the battalions, and there of men to fill them up; and it was only gradually that matters could be adjusted. Even in the Convention
objections had been again raised to the breaking up of the old regiments,
and the War Committee had pointed to the confusion which would probably arise.
But Dubois-Crance carried his motion, as he had done the year
before. "It is well for freedom," cried he, "if the military esprit
de corps is destroyed; for it is just the troops of the Line who would be most
easily attached to the person of an ambitious general." It was the
inevitable fate of this revolutionary Government to
be obliged to look with incessant suspicion on the army which it had itself
created at such an enormous cost; the Convention repeated their order for the
formation of the semi-brigades on the 8th of January. Hereupon the troops of the Line laid aside the white uniform of the old Royal
army, although many of the officers could hardly make up their minds to assume
the blue coat of the Republican volunteers. But the slightest trace of a
reluctance of this kind immediately led to dismissal and
imprisonment; and in this way many hundreds of the old leaders were expelled from the army. In filling up their places the Authorities looked
chiefly to democratic zeal, and at first to little else, so that on the 15th of
February the Con
314
FRENCH
PREPARATIONS FOR WAR.
[Book IX.
vention was obliged to decree the removal of all officers who were
unable to read and write—a regulation which in spite of all the terrorism made
use of was only very gradually carried out.- With regard to military discipline, a great deal was said about obedience
to the national will—i. e. to the Committee of Public Safety—and the officers
were loudly. exhorted always to use the language of fraternity and sans-culottisme, and
not to oppress the troops after the tyrannical manner of the
ancien regime. The Government still continued to send large packets of patriotic
newspapers into the camp, which were distributed among the battalions, and read
out to the soldiers in the evening after drill to animate
their love of freedom. Everything was done to make the approaching campaign
.appear to them in the brightest possible colours, and the credulity of the
French peasants rendered this an easy task. Most of them were convinced that
the barbarous Austrians had in the preceding summer
impaled and roasted children, and that those Austrians who longed for freedom
would not charge their guns with ball in the ensuing spring, or fire upon their
French brethren. At the same time the most alluring prospects of comfort and plunder in the soon-to-be-conquered
Belgium were held out to them. It was, as we know, all over with the Girondist
idea of a grand league of the Peoples, for the realization of which the
monarchs were to be struck and their subjects spared. It had been officially declared in the Convention, that all the countries
about to be conquered were to be treated as hostile lands, and the Committee of
Public Safety had drawn up directions to the generals in this sense; the gist
of which was, that whatever was not clinched and rivetted was to
be taken away, and either given up to the troops or transported to France. The
Armies of the Rhine and Moselle had already set the example in the districts of
the Palatinate which they had occupied; they carried off from the towns and villages all that they could lay hands on—money,
clothes, furniture,
Ch. I.]
MORALE
OF THE FRENCH TROOPS.
315
cattle and provisions—and finally set fire to the empty buildings- The
moral effect produced by such influences on the army of the North may be gathered from the following
report of the 20th March to the Minister at War: "The army is firmly
grounded in the grand principles of republicanism; it seems too that its
morality is improving, and honesty is precious to many of the soldiers. There are indeed many exceptions. The majority of the tumults which we
have to punish arise from thefts, but the number of these has for some time
past decreased. Almost all our troops rejoice in the thought of giving
themselves up to plunder as soon as we enter Belgium." We see from
this that the Government, from its own immorality on the one side, and the
necessities of war on the other, had hit upon the right means of forming an
insolent soldateska. They demanded of the soldiers bravery in battle and political fidelity, but allowed them in return every kind of license and
enjoyment, and thus endeavoured to attach the troops to themselves by exciting
their highest enthusiasm and their lowest passions. The soldiers having once
got over the paiu of leaving home, were quickly filled with
warlike zeal, began to rave about the Republic which promised thein rich
laurels and a dissolute life, and soon became the terror of all their enemies.
But no feeling of duty was awakened in them, and they therefore quickly turned their backs upon the Republic as soon as a laurel-crowned chief
appeared; and ruined him too by that avarice and selfishness which the
Revolution had nurtured in their hearts, side by side with the thirst for fame.
Their professional training during the few months which were left for
preparation was, indeed, very deficient. There was still a want, as in the
preceding autumn, of skill in manoeuvring, and in the steady coolness necessary
for defence. Their leaders were well aware of this, but it caused them little anxiety. If the German troops fired with greater rapidity
than their own men, the French officers
316
FRENCH PREPARATIONS FOR WAR. [Book IX.
exhorted them to rush upon the foe with the bayonet—the darling weapon,
as they called it, of republicans. If ever their
undisciplined masses were scattered by a sudden panic, they calmly shrugged
their shoulders, because the fugitives could be just as quickly rallied for a
new attack. When their soldiers got into confusion at every attempt to execute some difficult movement, they taught them to despise all military
artifice, and to place a blind reliance in the impulses
of their own aggressive courage. Their maxim was, never to rest for a single
moment, to be perpetually struggling with wind and weather, harassing the enemy by skirmishes,
rushing upon them in heavy masses, utterly careless of the sacrifice of men;
the Republic, they said, has soldiers enough; all that signifies is
that it should be victorious, that the troops, the enemy, and the nation, should learn that the armies of France can never be beaten.
Such was the language which the generals held to the army, and the Government
to the generals. Impatient questions continually arrived from Paris, how long
it would be before the French armies surprised the enemy in the
field; nothing, they urged, was necessary for offensive movements but courage
and bayonets, and all hesitation or ill-will might be overcome by energy and the axe of the executioner. In accordance with these instructions the Allied army's widely extended
chain of outposts were kept on the alert at every point throughout the winter;
forty skirmishes took place in three months; and at the end of March the first
attempt on a large scale was made not far from Landrecy, about the centre of the enemy's position. Thirty thousand men marched against
Cateau, to which place the Austrians had pushed forward eight battalions which
were very embarrassing to the French fortress's line of communication. The
young soldiers, trusting to their superiority in numbers, threw
themselves upon the enemy with loud hurrahs; but when the latter stood their
ground with cool self possession, the left wing of the French immediately
paused, and the right-
Cii.
I.] NUMBER AND POSITIONS OF THE FRENCH
ARMIES. 317
wing, which had been pushing forward, dispersed in disorderly flight on the appearance of the Austrian reinforcements. It was a battalion of the Parisian levy which first began the
flight; they were followed in irremediable confusion
by a regiment of dragoons, and several guns
remained in the hands of the victors. "It is evident," wrote the Conventional commissioners to Paris, "that it would be dangerous to
lead these raw soldiers against the enemy too soon." The difficulty was
increased by the unusually rainy weather, they therefore
postponed the grand attack,, and were consequently
surprised by the offensive operations of the enemy.
The following were the positions of the French forces at that time. In
the South the Army of the Alps, consisting of 25,000 men under General
Dumas, and the Army of Italy, of 36,000 men under General Dumerbion, covered
the frontiers of Piedmont from Geneva to the Genoese coast. In the Pyrenees
82,000 men under Generals Dugommier and Midler stood opposed to about 60,000 Spaniards and Portuguese. *La Vendee and Bretagne, in which
countries the barbarity of the republicans had inflamed the revolt afresh,
occupied the attention of 103,000 men under General Turreau; the Army of the
North, stationed on the Belgian frontier from Dunkirk to Maubeuge, had
been raised to the number of 148,000 men, whose position was protected by
twenty-six fortresses with garrisons amounting together to 74,000 men. Next in
order came the Army of the Ardennes of 30,000 men from Maubeuge to the Meuse, which was intended to co-operate against Belgium. Then came the
Moselle Army, and in close connexion with it the Army of the Rhine, which made
up together a mass of 110,000 men.1 The conduct of these powerful armies, which
were
1 These figures all refer to the men , so that
the sum total of
effective
force. The garrisons out- the effective
force was 690,000
side
the rayon
of the Army of the men; the entire
force was 871,000
North
amounted to nearly 100,000 men. Me'moires de Massena I. 4,
318
FRENCH
PREPARATIONS FOR WAR.
[Book IX.
expected to deal decisive blows, was at present so arranged, that
Pichegru, the favourite of St. Just, had, in January, received the command of
the Army of the North, together with full powers, in
case of need, to dispose of the Ardennes Army under General Charbonnier.
Pichegru had been succeeded in the Army of the Rhine by General Michaud, and
while Hoche had been first removed to Italy, at the instigation of St. Just,
and then to a Parisian dungeon, the command of the Moselle
Army was entrusted to the obnoxious, but respected and little
dreaded Jourdan.
Ever since the fall of the Hebertists the centre of all military
operations lay, not in the War Ministry, which had been broken up into three subordinate offices", but exclusively in the Committee of
Public Safety, and more especially in the will of the only member acquainted
with military affairs—Lazarus Carnot.1 It
was a providential circumstance, well suited to the character of these extraordinary times, that a man of Carnot's
disposition should twice during the revolutionary troubles be placed in a position to decide the fate of Europe, although he was wanting in many of
the most important qualities of a statesman, and was at the same time free from all the vices of a demagogue. Carnot was born at Nolay, a
small town in Burgundy in 1753; he was the son of an avocat
who was blessed with eighteen children, and was brought up in poor
circumstances, but carefully educated. When only ten years old he betrayed his military tastes in the theatre at
from
the official documents. The current exaggerations may be hereby corrected. — 1 The Memoires sur Carnot par son fits 2 vols. Paris, 1863, give a number
of new and valuable particulars in addition to the
facts already published; but it is a matter of complaint that the author has
not circumstantially and thoroughly treated the most important portion of his
subject—the military and political activity of Carnot—relating
to which he had a number of authentic documents, but has used the
latter aphoristically for the illustration of the personal character of his
hero.
Cir.
I.]
LAZARUS
CARNOT.
319
Dijon, where, during a military spectacle, he interrupted the
performance, to the great amusement of the public, by loudly crying out that
the soldiers and the cannon must be differently posted, or* every thing would
fall into the hands of the enemy. He continued to manifest the same liveliness
of apprehension during the whole course of his education, and quickly attained to independence of view and ardour of conviction. From
his earliest years he displayed that indefatigable industry which always
springs from the genuine desire of mental freedom; he drew upon himself reproofs and punishments from his teachers
because he was incessantly at work, even during play hours, contrary to the
regulations of the school. Every new impression set him to work afresh with
passionate enthusiasm; he could not rest until he had arrived at a result in
accordance with his inward convictions. Thus, for example,
when he entered the military school at Paris he brought with him from home an
earnest and simple piety, and soon found himself exposed
to the ridicule of his playmates on account of his religions principles. He
bore this for a while, undisturbed in his
convictions; but being on one occasion ruffled in his feelings, he determined
to institute a searching investigation, and studied theology for several
years—in addition to mathematics and military science—with professional zeal, until he had come to a thorough understanding in respect to every
doubt which had crossed his mind; a process which, it is true, left him but
little of his childlike faith. By the side of this thoroughness and
extraordinary capacity for labour, there soon grew up in him a stubbornness
of mind, which in its varied consequences threw now a brilliant light and now a
dark shade* upon his character. He was not to be deterred from a great
undertaking by any difficulties, but he was also incapable
of giving up the pursuit of any phantom which he
had once caught sight of. For many years he employed his time and energy on the
problem of guiding an air-balloon at will, and considered
320
FRENCH
PREPARATIONS FOR WAR. [Book IX.
himself hardly compensated for his failure, when at
three-and-twenty years old he was already Captain of engineers, an esteemed
writer, and the discoverer of a great mechanical law. He had no passion but the
desire of knowledge; the allurements of the world did not exist for him; temperance and disinterestedness were matters of course in a nature like
his, which thirsted for knowledge alone. It was a no less marked trait in his
disposition, which knew no charms but those of intellectual truth, that he
retained and avowed all his convictions with unalterable firmness;
at this point of his character, duty and enjoyment, ambition and self-respect
united, while all the other goods of this world were entirely indifferent to
him. And thus he lived for study and science alone, without regard - to his external circumstances. It was a matter of
indifference to him when his lively comrades called him an original, and a
philosopher; he submitted patiently when his superiors in office punished the
independence of his criticism by a long imprisonment
in the Bastille. But when opposition was made to his views and principles, his
powerful and ardent nature was moved to its very depths. He was utterly wanting
in pliancy of mind; he could not for a moment look at a subject from another
man's point of view; and every opponent, therefore,
seemed to him to sin maliciously against indisputable truth.
He had hitherto only on one occasion, and that incidentally, taken any
part in politics; it was when in a panegyric on Marshal Vauban he had extolled
his system of taxation as one favourable to the
poor, and had emphatically condemned the barbarity of the existing abuses.
Exclusively occupied' with his own thoughts, he took but little interest in the
complicated problems of practical statesmanship, which engaged his attention only when they stirred some general human feeling in his
heart. As, therefore, his whole being was one ardent impulse towards
independence, the Revolution immediately and completely won him over to the
great cause of "liberty, equality, and fraternity." In 1791 he
Cii. I.]
LAZARUS
CARNOT.
321
was sent by the town"of Calais to the Legislative Assembly, joined
the left in accordance with his general views, and adhered with all the logical
consistency of a mathematician, or, as some will
say', with all the inflexibility of a savant,
to the views which he had once adopted. It was, in fact, in this case
too the power of theory which ruled him. He clung to the principles which he
had recognised as true, without deigning to cast a single glance at the more and more terrible consequences to which they
led—without a thought of the practical conditions of success—without a notion
that politics have to deal, not with propositions alone, but also with the
powers and passions of mankind. The very moral firmness of his character
made his dogmatic pertinacity all the more inflexible. He,
for whom no suffering or sacrifice was too great where a conviction was
concerned, could have heartily subscribed the words of Robespierre; "let
principle be maintained though the country perish!11 And
thus he, the scientific officer, voted for arming the mob with pikes—for the
emancipation of the soldiers from the law of blind obedience—for the rasing of
all the citadels in the fortresses, that they might not be made the means of tyrannising over the towns. And thus he, generally the
most just and conscientions of men, gave his vote for the execution of the
king, entered Robespierre's Committee of Public Safety, and formed a peculiarly
close relation with Collot d'Herbois, jBillaud-Varennes, and the
faction of Hebertists. For little as he sympathised with their utter vulgarity
of mind, he found among them a more lively zeal for war and military affairs
than among any other party, and was inclined to excuse their coarse brutality as manifesting unlimited devotion to their
principles. He was only once in the club of the Jacobins, and when there heard
a speech declaring that there were no genuine patriots but the members of that
club; he immediately decided never to set foot within its walls again. While
selfish passions were raging all around him, he never thought of himself; he III. V
322
FRENCH
PREPARATIONS FOR WAR. [Book IX.
who nominated and deposed generals continued to be a simple captain; it
was not until after two years of service that he rose
to the rank of major; after every journey undertaken in the public service, he
conscientiously returned the money which he had not used to the Treasury, to
the great annoyance of the officials, who had no columns for such an entry in their registers. As his whole attention was directed
to the public interest, without any regard to his own, he was gradually led to
oppose his colleagues on different occasions for the good of the cause. He
incessantly declared that the war against La Vendee would never
be finished until it was carried on in a more humane manner. He dared to choose
the generals of the armies, and even the officials of his bureau, according to
merit and capacity alone, without any regard to birth or party. He even ventured, now and then, to protect noblemen, and to appoint
returned Emigres
to office. This was bidding defiance to the bitterest hatred of
his party; but the danger which he thus incurred only made it still more
pleasing to his unbending nature to do what was right.
In such a course he could not fail to meet with opponents. As he always adhered in the main to the party of Collot and
Bouchotte, his breach with Robespierre and the Dantonists was open and declared
before the beginning of the winter. When Bourdon once came into the
Committee to demand the arrest of Bouchotte, Vincent and Pache — Carnot
and Collot d'Herbois attacked him so furiously, that he feared for his own
immediate imprisonment, and retired with suppressed rage.
Robespierre was by no means well inclined to Bourdon,
but he entertained a far fiercer hatred against the Hebertists, and detested
Carnot as much as any of them. "If I could", he cried, on one
occasion, "but gain a knowledge of these cursed military affairs, and be able to dispense with that
intolerable Carnot!" There was in fact no possibility of bringing about a
reconciliation between these two men.
Robespierre could
Cii. I.]
LAZARUS
CARNOT.
323
not pardon the stubborn, independence of his colleague, and Carnot revolted with increasing violence at every fresh en-eroaehment of
Robespierre. "You are a dictator," he cried * out to him one day
before the assembled Committee, amidst the timid silence of the other
members—"you are a dictator, there is nothing but despotism
in all your actions." 1 "
We need your services," said Robespierre another time, "and we
therefore .tolerate you in the Committee; but remember that at the very first
disaster of the armies you will lose your head."2 Such
threats excited in Carnot no other feeling than that of
bitter contempt; surrounded by hatred and threats he proceeded unmoved on his
way to the struggle with united Europe. He showed from the very first moment
what a strong and'confident will can effect in human affairs. Although he possessed no especial talent for military command, as we shall
hereafter see in detail, and though he manifested the same elumsy dogmatism in
the eonduet of warlike operations as in political life, yet his entrance into
the war of the Revolution was marked by extraordinary progress.
The main objects to be kept in sight—large views, energetic aggression,
formation of overpowering armies—had indeed been already
pointed out in 1793 by Dumouriez, Custine and Hoche. But at that period all
such attempts had only called forth the suspicions of the
demagogues, and brought their originators into irretrievable ruin. Now at last the genius of genuine war had an energetic
representative in the very highest seat of government,
and a new spirit of systematic regularity and courageous confidence was
diffused into the previously dilatory or disorderly movements of the French
armies. To understand the views according to which he gave the irresistible
force of unity to the confused and innumerable masses of the French troops, we must first take into consideration a series of other
circumstances, hitherto almost unknown.
1
Levasseur Conv. Nat. G, germ. III. — 2 Tissot, Carnot p. 65.
V2
324
FRENCH
PREPARATIONS FOR WAR.
[Book IX.
France was at this time surrounded by enemies on every side. At home
she had to struggle with La Vendee, and in the South to meet the Spaniards and
Portuguese in the Pyrenees, and the Sardinians and Austrians in the Alps. On
the Rhine and in Belgium, indeed, she had for the moment warded off the invasion of the enemy; but she had now for the first time to look
for the decisive collision, on the one hand with
Prussia and the troops of the Empire, and on the other with the Austrians and
English. In the face of these numerous enemies the Committee
of Public Safety was incessantly endeavouring to clear the way for its armies
by diplomatic successes; to draw over the neutral governments to the French
side,, and to kindle the torch of Revolution in the hostile States. While
Carnot directed the military operations, these foreign
affairs were presided over, with almost unlimited powers, first by Herault de
Sechelles, and then by Barere. These departments
of the Government knew no scruple, no hesitation, no shrinking from any
sacrifice, if it did but promote the great object in view.
Both departments dipped deep into the property of the French nation, attained
to great results, and saw immeasurable sums uselessly squandered by the
baseness and imbecility of their agents. Let us endeavour to take a general view of this propaganda— which has already come under our
notice—in its full proportions; now that it came forward
in a more complicated and systematic form than ever.
During the winter 1793—94, it was to three grand theatres especially that it directed its attention—Germany, Italy
and Eastern Europe. As regards Germany, there were French agents in almost all
the more important States—partly natives of kindred sentiments, partly
pretended Emigres aud double spies. Their task was to watch the armaments and movements of troops, to sound the feelings of the smaller
Courts, and to excite the Bourgeois and peasants against the existing order of
things. But the Committee founded its
Cm.
I.] FRENCH INTRIGUES IN HOLLAND AND
SWITZERL. 325
chief hopes, at this time, on a Revolution in the
two Republics which had separated themselves from the German Empire on the
North and South, and whose position promised the most powerful reaction
upon Germany in case of a revolutionary change;—we mean, of course, Holland and Switzerland. The unexpected issue of the last campaign had
filled the opponents of Orange in Holland with new life. In March the Committee
of Public Safety received information from the Hague, that, in spite
of all the watchfulness of the police, the country stood on the very
brink of a revolution, the outbreak of which in
Belgium would certainly follow the first victory of the French arms. The
neutrality of Switzerland enabled the French to maintain an accredited envoy in
that country, who made himself the centre of a constant
agitation which was spread through all the cantons. This office was still held
by the quondam Marquis Barthe-lemy, whom we have already seen actively engaged
in the Genevese troubles in 1792. He was now assisted by a former Abbe named Soulavie, a confidant of Robespierre, and now French
minister in Geneva, where the ruling democracy was eagerly imitating the
Parisian reign of terror on a small scale. These two vied with one another in
sending in hopeful reports and ever fresh demands for money. By the month
of March, 1794, they had already used 40 million francs, in return for which
they had sent some corn to France, but had spent the greater part of the money
in promoting a still unaccomplished alliance.
Greater progress had been made in Italy. In Turin
French money had secured access even to the Royal Cabinet. Its secretary Dufour
received a pension from the Committee of Public Safety, in return for which he
handed over the war plans, and the diplomatic correspondence with Austria, and formed a conspiracy with one of the leading merchants of
the city, the object of which was to betray Turin into the hands of the French
Army of the Alps. The plan was, that in
the spring General Dumerbion
should suddenly
326
FRENCH PREPARATIONS FOR WAR.
[Book IX.
occupy the neutral territory of Genoa, cross the Appenines from this
point, and then break into Piedmont on its entirely unprotected side. At the
approach of the French -columns the conspirators were to se't fire to the theatre, the churches, and other public buildings, excite a tumult and a
rising amongst the people, and open the gates of the city to the enemy under
favour of the general confusion. In accord--ance
with this plan Tilly, the charge d'affaires of the Republic at Genoa, was employed to form a
democratic party in that city, to gain over the Senate to an alliance with
France, or, in case of its refusal, to overthrow it by a revolt of the mob.
Similar intrigues were carried on in Florence; the Tuscan minister, Manfredini, had long been regarded as an adherent of the Jacobins; so
that in the summer of 1793 it came to a personal quarrel of the most violent
kind between him and the English ambassador, and England extorted the dismissal
of the French charge
d'affaires, Laflotte,
by open threats of war. 1 But the most important pendant to the Turinese coup d'etat was prepared in Naples. While the Government of that country was
exclusively supported by the clergy, and the lower
classes of the people, whom they filled with fanaticism—while the king
chatted with the lazzaroni of the capital, and the Minister persecuted every liberal movement in
the country with torture and the axe—the middle and more cultivated portion of
the population was deeply stirred by a more and more passionate impatience for political rights,
administrative reform, and social equality. Under these circumstances it was
not difficult for the French agents—who here, too, spent countless sums of
money—to form a grand conspiracy, which included several
thousand inhabitants of the capital, and aimed at a general rising of Southern
Italy, simultaneously with the expected outbreak in Turin. They had reason to
hope, at the first successful advance of the French troops, to see the flames
break
')
October 1793.
The Prussian resident Caesar to his Ministry.
Cii.
I.] NEGOTIATIONS WITH SWEDEN AND
DENMARK. 327
forth at the same moment in Turin, Genoa and Naples—Tuscany brought to a state of willing submission, and the whole peninsula
in flames.
With no less energy did the Committee of Publie
Safety take up most of the schemes of its Dantonist predecessors in respect to
Eastern Europe. The catastrophe of the 10th of May, and the 31st of July, had
for a time interrupted the intrigues which had been set on foot; but the interests of the Republic in this quarter were too
unmistakeable; and as early as August we find negotiations in full operation in
Stockholm, Copenhagen and Constantinople. Reuterholm and Stael, always actuated
by the same longing for French subsidies, kept Sweden firmly to its
onee professed leaning towards France. Stael, wlio had left Paris for
Switzerland after the 31st of May, succeeded with the aid of the diplomatist
Verninac, who was sent after him, in forming the draft of a new alliance, and hastened thence to Copenhagen, to win over the Danish Court also to
this scheme. The task, however, proved to be more difficult
than he had expected. It is true that the Danish Government had greatdr
apprehensions of the English supremacy at sea than of
Jacobin principles on the continent; nor were there wanting complaints of
infringement of the neutral commerce on the part of British vessels. But the
minister BernsdorfT, oppressed on the one hand by his fear of England, and on
the other by the threats of Russia, could not make up his
mind to a decided step. All that Stael could aehieve was a separate treaty with
Sweden, in which the two Powers mutually engaged to equip a fleet for the
protection of their trade against all illegal interference. This measure gave great offence both in London and St. Petersburg, while in
Paris it was regarded as unsatisfactory; and the-definitive treaty and the
payment of subsidies were not yet accorded to the Swedes, in spite of their
urgent representations. The Committee did not quite trust its greedy
ally, and refused to pay until Sweden had irrevocably broken with the Powers.
And thus the negotiation dragged on without result, to the great sorrow of the
Swedes;
328
FRENCH
PREPARATIONS FOR WAR. [Book IX.
they did not, however, allow themselves to
be deterred, but meanwhile, in expectation of the grand armed alliance, placed
all their diplomatic resources at the disposal of the French government. As
early as August, 1793, their dragoman Muradgea had vehemently urged the Turkish ministers to take part in the
European quarrel, and to save France, which was at that time so dangerously
threatened, by dealing a powerful blow against the Austrians. He had really
roused the Divan from its accustomed apathy, aud had paved
the way for the efforts of the French plenipotentiary.
This envoy suddenly found such a number of friendly statesmen with hands open to bribes in the Divan, that by the month of March he had given away four
million francs iu gold and diamouds; in return for which he received the repeated assurance that the war against the Emperor, or at any rate serious preparations for it, should almost
immediately be commenced. With this view Sultan Selim asked for a number of
French officers to place the discipline and tactics of his troops on a
European footing. The Committee of Public Safety gladly sent them, and thus the
same years in which Western Europe underwent its revolutionary new birth, also
saw the commencement of a fundamental change in the old Osman Empire. But for the moment the result was scarcely visible; the Sublime
Porte had been thoroughly exhausted by the war of 1788, its treasury emptied, and the numbers of its troops greatly reduced. The Divan,
well aware that an attack on Austria would immediately
bring the Russians into the field, wavered irresolutely
between ambition and fear, without any presentiment
of the storm which their impotent deliberations were gathering over the empire.
The Parisian rulers were all the more eager for the final result, because in case of a warlike resolution on the part of the
Porte, they could at once put an end to the hesitation of the Swedes, and give
the two States an effectual support and ready means of communication by a popular movement in Poland. The fugitive
Cn.
I.] EFFORTS TO ROUSE TURKEY AGAINST
RUSSIA. 329
patriots from tins' unhappy land had dispersed, some to Paris and
Dresden, others to Lemberg, Vienna and Constantinople; they kept up a secret
understanding with all the provinces of their country,
and received from France the requisite means for warlike preparations. With
their native restlessness and ardour they urged the
Porte to proclaim war against Russia; and promised * the Sultan and the
Committee of Public Safety, to fill the whole country
between the Vistula und the Dnna, between the Carpathians and the Baltic, with
the storm of a mighty revolution. If, at the same time, a Turkish army appeared
on the Danube, a Swedish force in Russia, and the French armies rolled like a
flood over Belgium, the Rhine and-Italy, what could
prevent the old monarchical constitution of Europe from being utterly unhinged!
The prospect was splendid enough to fix the gaze of the French rulers
by its demoniacal charms, and to suppress again and again the well-founded impatience which began to show itself. For as the demands for
money continually increased, while the results still remained problematical,
there arose in the Committee, from time to time, a painful doubt whether these
foreign connections were worth the enormous sacrifices which they
cost; whether they were not being cheated of million after million by empty
promises or thoughtless extravagance. The internal
fends of parties had their effect upon these questions also. In the beginning
of March, St. Just loaded Herault and Barere with bitter
reproaches, declared that they had wasted more than two hundred million francs on illusory phantoms, and proposed that all secret
expenditure should be stopped, nay, that all the correspondence
which had been carried on respecting these matters should
be published, with the sole exception of the Turkish negotiation. This quarrel
contributed no little to the fall of Herault, which took place soon afterwards;
in other respects, however, the Committee was far from approving of St. Just's proposals.
It was resolved to proceed
330
FRENCH
PREPARATIONS FOR WAR. [Book XI.
for the future somewhat more cautiously in the outlay of money, but in
the main to adhere to the previous course, and to adapt the plan of warlike operations to the system of the grand propaganda.
When the Government of France took all these complications into consideration, when they looked to the possibility of a revolution in Italy, and a combined movement of the Turks
and Swedes, when they remembered the weakness of Spain, the alienation between Prussia and the Emperor, and lastly the well-known pecuniary exhaustion of the two German
Powers, they could not for a moment doubt that among all the enemies of the
Republic there was none so dangerous, so troublesome and
destructive, as England. For it was England which had fixed the great Austrian
army in Belgium by her protest against the Bavarian exchange, and given that
army its direction towards the frontier provinces
which lay so near to the French capital. England alone
could enable the German Powers to make further considerable
preparations, by a liberal use of her pecuniary resources.
England alone could lay fetters upon Stockholm^ Constantinople, Genoa, Leghorn
and Naples, by an irresistible
display of her naval power; and strike from the hands of them all the swords
which they were about to brandish on the side of France. It was from these
considerations that the Committee of Public Safety had already resolved, in the
autumn of 1793, to deal a blow at the heart of
this mighty adversary, and to prepare a considerable force to attempt a landing
"on the English coast. For this purpose all the ship-timber and the whole
mercantile fleet of the Empire were placed at the disposal of the French Admiralty. A member of the Committee, Jean Bon St. Andre,
with infinite activity and unlimited pecuniary
means, superintended the equipment of a stately fleet in Brest to protect the
transport of the troops; and now that the rising in La Vendee had been put down, the Western army of the Republic seemed once more
at the disposal of Government, and it was
Ch.
I.] CARNOT'S PREPARATIONS AGAINST
ENGLAND. 331
determined to employ it in commencing this important maritime enterprise. Considering the extent of the preparations
required, it might have seemed doubtful whether they could be completed during
the ensuing campaign; the French Government, however, entertained no such
doubt, but on the contrary took the accomplishment of the expedition for granted; nay, they forced the other armies to adapt their resources,
their projects and operations, to the requirements of the English expedition.
These steps were, indeed, in accordance with the vast importance
of the latter, but they brought new difficulties
to those engaged on the other theatres of war, from which, as we
shall presently sec, the greatest dangers might have arisen, had the
opportunity been made use of by an energetic opponent.
Carnot was thoroughly persuaded that France was incapable of a second effort of equal magnitude with
that which she was now making. It was, he thought, absolutely necessary to
carry on the contest with the most rapid and crushing blows, and to force the
enemy to sue for peace before the end of the year. With a view, therefore, of collecting an absolutely overpowering
force at the most important points, he ordered that at
the Pyrenees, where the weakness of the Spaniards threatened no danger, and on
the Rhine, where a great desire of peace was imputed to the Prussians, the French armies should content themselves with defending their
own soil, or at most with capturing any near and important position on the
borders. But with all the more impetuosity was an aggressive war to be carried on in the South against Italy, and
in the North against Belgium. In exact accordance with the Turin plot, it was
determined that the Italian army should occupy the Genoese coast as soon as the
season became favourable, and should then fall upon Piedmont from the South,
and, after the capture of Turin, support the further
revolutionary movements in the Peninsula. From the strength of the democratic
party, and the ill feeling between the Austrians and Piedmontese,
332
FRENCH
PREPARATIONS FOR WAR.
[Book IX.
they had reason to hope for easy and rapid successes. In
Belgium, indeed, they had to make up their minds to a more severe and bloody
contest, but the vast numbers of his forces rendered Carnot certain even here
of complete and annihilating victory. In order thoroughly to understand his plan, it will be necessary to set before the reader the theatre
of war in its more general features.
In the year 1703 the Allies had taken three fortresses, Conde,
Valenciennes, and Le Quesnoi, about the centre of the Belgian frontier; and had
thus, as it were, driven a sharp wedge into the body of the Republic in the
direction of Paris. To the west of these strong places the broad plain of
Flanders stretches between the Scheldt and the sea, intersected
by the Lys; on their east we enter the hilly and
wooded country on both sides of the Sambre, and following the course of this
river we reach the Meuse at Namur, which likewise turning to the east at this
point, makes its way through the last spurs of the Ardennes, towards Liege.
This whole territory, as we see, is divided into three
districts, in the eastern of which the Sambre flows to the Meuse, in the
western the Lys to the Scheldt. In the central division, between the Scheldt
and the Sambre, the Allies had pushed forward their fortified point, and in this quarter—as was to be expected—they would unite their main
forces at the opening of the campaign, with a view to a farther advance.
Under these circumstances the most natural course for the French was to
collect an overpowering force between the Scheldt
and the Sambre, and immediately to attack Valenciennes.
But Carnot considered that a victory gained at this point would only drive the
enemy back to his fortresses, and would leave him the possibility of rapidly
reinforcing himself and assuming the offensive again. "We must
finish the matter," he wrote to Pichegru on the 11th of February, "in
this very year; we shall lose everything, if we do not make rapid progress, and
destroy the hostile army to the last man within three months; otherwise we
should have
Cir.
I.] CARNOT'S INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE
CAMPAIGN. 333
to begin afresh next year, and should perish by hunger and exhaustion;
I repeat, therefore, we must make an end."
In accordance with these views he gave the following instructions. At the central point above referred to,
opposite the lost fortresses, the French generals were to confine themselves to a vigorous and determined defence with about 00,000 men. On
the other hand they were to use every effort to procure continual
reinforcements for the Army of the North, and thus
enable themselves to commence an attack upon Flanders with more than
100,000 men, to capture Ypres, the chief place of the country between the Lys
and the ocean, to fight a bloody battle with the Allies, and deluge all maritime Flanders with their troops as
far as Ostend. While Brussels was thus made to tremble on the one side, the
Army of the Ardennes on the other—raised to the number of 40,000 men by some
divisions of the Army of the North—was to pass the Sambre at Charleroi, and after masking Namur to enter Belgium. At the
same time 20,000 men of the Moselle Army were to make a diversion against Liege
by marching through Luxemburg, with a view of dividing the attention and the
forces of the adversary. And thus, hard pressed on
every side, surrounded and harassed by continual assaults, it was hoped that
the enemy could not escape complete destruction.
The fundamental idea of this plan, therefore, was to outflank the enemy on both wings, and to enclose and crush his entire military power. As the French could reckon on a doubly superior force,
such a problem did not in itself seem hopeless of solution; but if we consider
their resources iu detail, we must confess that they only partially answered
the object in view. If Carnot wished to cut off and surround the
Austrians, it seems clear that the main body of the French would have been in
their proper place, not in Flanders, where they could do the enemy
no essential injury, but on the Meuse and Sambre, where they would immedi ately threaten his line of supplies and retreat. Carnot on the
334
FRENCH
PREPARATIONS FOR WAR. [Book IX.
contrary exposed his army to the twofold danger, either that the
Allies, without troubling themselves about the smaller divisions on the Sambre, would throw themselves in double force on Pichegru and
drive him into the sea; or that, disregarding Pichegru's progress in
Flanders, they would overpower the Ardennes army with
overwhelming numbers, and by thus threatening Paris compel Pichegru to a hasty return. All this would be avoided if a smaller corps had
been directed against Flanders, and the
strongest masses united on the Sambre; as, indeed, was proved by the result in
the most striking manner a few months afterwards. This is so evident, that all the professional critics—e. g. Jomini and Soult —cannot
find words strong enough to express their con-temptous disapproval. No one,
however, as far as we know, has as yet pointed out the motive which led Carnot
to make this great mistake, by which the success of the whole
campaign was imperilled. This motive, as may be decidedly proved from
Carnot's correspondence, was no other than the desire to promote the landing in
England. He hoped by the beginning of the summer to see the Army of the West before the gates of London, and'he wished, in case of need, to be
able to support it by a strong reinforcement; Pichegru, therefore, received
instructions at \all hazards to take up a position in maritime Flanders with
the greatest part of his division. Carnot hereby placed himself in
the most critical position which a general can occupy, that of pursuing two
completely disparate objects at the same time, and thereby necessarily forming
lame and inconsistent resolutions. This was a further manifestation of his, not exactly irresolute, but on the whole unpractical nature;
for true practical talent chiefly manifests itself by unity and consistency of
action.
Let us now once more review the whole field of these armaments and
preparations for war. We behold a vast realm of 24 million
inhabitants agitated to its very centre, dripping with blood, fermenting with
party hatred, but held together by an iron despotism, and armed like a giant
for
Cii.
I.] GENERAL REVIEW OF THE STATE OF
FRANCE.
335
the strife, with all its resources of men and
money. We see mighty hordes of men on every frontier, to which countless reinforcements are incessantly pouring, some armed for defence in
superior numbers, others'preparing to deal simultaneously
three great and distant blows at Turin, Amsterdam and London; and lastly, we see a net of diplomatic and demagogic
intrigues extending over the whole of Europe, along the glowing threads of
which revolt and war were to be spread through Switzerland and Italy, Poland
and Prussia, and over the shores of the Baltic and
the Euxine. And thus the Revolution rises more terrible and impetuous than
ever, no longer proclaiming freedom to the nations, but democratic violence against the Powers of ancient Europe. If we look only
at the amount and the variety of its resources, the
result seems already decided and all resistance necessarily hopeless.
But it is no less certain that the foundation on which this mighty
structure rose was everywhere undermined and crumbling away. Wherever we look more closely - into the nature of the French schemes and armaments, we
discern the suicidal effects of revolutionary violence and terrorizing crime.
The troops, drawn together against their will, had to learn in battle itself
their own capacity for war, and prove their fidelity to the flag
under which they fought. The leaders are directed to run all risks, because the
Government sees in the background of its colossal exertions nothing but
hopeless exhaustion, and knows that it can only choose between rapid victory and sudden collapse. In the midst of these tormenting terrors
it resorts to all kinds of schemes at the same time—schemes which seem to
promise the destruction of its enemies, but at the same
time mutually impede and destroy one another. It lavishes the material resources of the empire with boundless extravagance,
partly on the army, which in a healthy State would have been maintained at half
the cost, and partly on a diplomacy, which, while always chasing retreating
phantoms, has to pay for every
33G
FRENCH
PREPARATIONS FOR WAR.
[Book IX.
step it takes with millions. Notwithstanding all its efforts to attain
consistency and methodical unity, this Government cannot free itself entirely
from that spirit of anarchy in which it has been reared. It is able, indeed, to give a powerful impulse to the stream, but the force
of the stream itself is everywhere broken by immorality, laxity and
self-conceit.
The Revolution, therefore, on this occasion attained to no definite
result. The danger to the Powers of Europe was great, indeed, but
there were still many chances of crossing the French plans, of breaking through
the toils of Carnot, and leading the iron veterans of the old armies to victory
over the surging masses of the Republicans. But the errors of 1793 were destined to be repeated on a still greater scale: at the same
moment in which France was collecting all her strength to deal a fatal blow,
the Powers, allured by other hopes, were turning their attention to a new
theatre of war. The institutions of old Europe were to receive the
annihilating blow, not from the hands of its enemies, but of its defenders.
No other triumph was in store for the French armies but to fight a few bloody
battles with a voluntarily retreating adversary.
These resolutions of the Powers, so pregnant with consequences, were brought about by a political development hitherto, in
the main, unknown. We shoidd be unable rightly to comprehend any point in the
campaign of 1794, if we did not previously realise to our minds the questions and the cares which had agitated the policy of the European
cabinets since the autumn of 1793.
Ch. II.] 337
CHAPTER II. RUSSIAN PLANS AGAINST TURKEY.
Position
of the empress Catharine.—Her designs upon Constantinople.
Misunderstanding with Prussia.—State of affairs in vienna.—England endeavours to consolidate the
coalition against france.-tliugut regards prussia as a more dangerous enemy
than france.— England
continues to negotiate with Prussia.—The prince of coburg.—The emperor francis goes to Belgium.—Russia prepares for war against turkey.
Ever since the beginning of the revolutionary war Catharine II. "had gained triumph after triumph. Austria and Prussia
vied with one another for her favour; England was driven into an alliance with
her by the attacks of France; the kings of Spain and
Sardinia, the Princes of the German empire, and the French Emigres,
began to regard the Northern military State as the surest
asylum of legitimacy. Bold and wary at the same time, the Empress had made use
of this position of affairs to bring one of the
great ideas of her life almost to fulfilment. Poland lay fettered at her feet.
Nearly half this unhappy land had been incorporated with the Russian empire,
and the other half was subjected by the treaty of October 18th; and these great results had been attained at the small sacrifice of a
fair, but not very extensive, province to Prussia. A less
grasping nature would have rested satisfied with so splendid an acquisition;
the blood-red glow of such a conquest would have
seemed to others like the glorious sunset of an active life.~~ But for the mind
of this woman there was no limit and no repose. She was now in her sixtieth
year; her growing malady reminded her frequently enough of her approaching
end; but if she ever felt touched by the prospect, the
anticipation only formed an additional impulse to hurry on all her cherished
projects in, y
338
RUSSIAN
PLANS AGAINST TURKEY.
[Book IX.
to completion, before the night of death should descend upon her.
Yet she had reason enough to grant herself, her
peoples, and her neighbours, an interval of repose. Russia paid dearly for the
triumphs of her ambition. The recruiting of the army was only effected by the
greatest efforts of the government, amidst the strongest reluctance of the people. The troops, incessantly kept on the alert by her
endless plans of conquest, and moved from place to place by perpetual changes
of organisation, began to be at the same time exhausted
and demoralised. In spite of the increasing taxes, the
Treasury was in no department equal to its expenses; foreign credit was ruined,
and the national paper-money greatly depreciated. Agriculture suffered much
from the military proscriptions, and trade from the
prohibitory duties on exports and imports, enacted
for the protection of feeble manufactures. The position of the country,
therefore, was in every respect a depressed one. All classes of the population shared in the general distress, and in the towns, more especially,
the general feeling was one of anxiety and excitement. The Ministers were well aware of this, but assumed an external appearance of proud security. "We," said
Markoff on one occasion to the Prussian ambassador, "we alone of all the
Powers have no occasion to fear, or to contend against,
the French revolution on account of our own subjects." "In spite of
these proud words," added Count Golz in his report, "the Russian
government also are obliged to take the severest measures in several provinces
to prevent outbreaks." Much was concealed from
the Empress, who was always pushing on, and, therefore, did not like to hear of
obstacles. The year 1794 began with a long continued scarcity of provisions, so
that in St. Petersburg a pound of meat cost 10 sous (five pence). When
Catharine one day at dinner enquired the price of meat, her
favourite, Suboff, stated it at half, and no one dared to correct him. This
weak and conceited man enjoyed the greatest influence even in political
matters, and threw, first the
supple Vice-
Cii.
II.] CATHARINE
AND HER FAVOURITE, SUBOFF. 339
Chancellor Ostermann, and then even the proud Count Bes-borodko,
completely into the shade. He had succeeded in getting the Polish affairs
completely into his own hands; his credit had risen through the favourable
issue to which they had been brought; he strove, unlike most of the former
favourites of the Empress, not merely to gratify her passions, but likewise to
assume the position of an actual Regent, after the manner of Potemkin, and to
outshine his great exemplar both in the Polish and the Turkish
schemes. And Markoff again, in order to ingratiate himself with the favourite,
placed all his knowledge skill and unconscien-tiousness at the disposal of
Suboff.
Catharine was only too ready to meet these wishes. She had broken off the war with Turkey, three years before, with angry reluctance;
and the renewal of it was with her only a question of time and opportunity. She
despised with very good reason the military means of defence possessed by the
Porte, and considered the result uncertain only in case
France should aid the Turks with money, troops and fleets. It appeared to her,
therefore, a matter of the greatest consequence to make sure of England, which
alone was able to block up the passage of the French from the Mediterranean sea. There was no doubt that England woidd grant the Empress a
definitive treaty, only on condition of her sending her troops into the field,
not against Turkey, but against the French. Negotiations were constantly
carried on between the two courts for a giant expedition against the
French coast; Catharine tried endless expedients to make England subservient to her will by mercantile prohibitions, but attained no other
result than an increase of the proud firmness of England's attitude. Under
these circumstances what could be more welcome to Catharine than the
above-mentioned French intrigues in Constantinople—than the news which reached
St. Petersburg at the end of September, that Muradgea and Descorches were
goading on the Porte to attack her, and were daily gaining ground? If the
Turks themselves violated
Y2
340
RUSSIAN
PLANS AGAINST TURKEY.
[Book IX.
the peace, in alliance with France—if they attacked the Emperor of Austria in the rear with a view of relieving the French—it was
evident that England, far from continuing to
protect them,. must be grateful to the Imperial courts, and ready to aid them,
when they energetically repulsed this new disturber of the peace. Catharine
zealously seized the opportunity. No sooner had intelligence to the same purport arrived in Vienna, and the question been asked by the
Austrian court what Russia intended to do in case the Turks should attack
Hungary, than Catharine gave orders for the most extensive warlike
preparations. General Su-woroff hastened to the
Crimea to assume the command of the troops in that province and as far as the
Caucasus, amounting in all to 60,000 men. Prince Dolgoruki collected an army of
equal strength in the Ukraine; all the officers and men on furlough belonging
to these regiments were ordered to join their standards
without delay, and the Euxine fleet was got ready with the greatest zeal, that
decisive operations against Constantinople might be commenced at the very
beginning of spring. It was announced to the Emperor
in the most emphatic manner, that Russia, ever mindful of her duty as an ally, would make her appearance in full force on
the theatre of war, at the first hostile movement
of the Turks. 1
It was above all essential not to extinguish prematurely, by the weight
of these warlike preparations, the faint spark of military ardour in the
Turks. After long vacillation the Government at Constantinople had come to the
resolution to take a first, but still only a preliminary, step; an extraordinary Envoy was to be sent to St. Petersburg to demand a change in
the Russian scale of duties, fixed by the peace of Jassy; and in case of
refusal to threaten a breach of the friendly relations between the two
governments. The Rus-
Igclstrom's
communications to Buchholz. Buchholz's
dispatch to
the
king, Jan. 30.
Cii.
II.] INSOLENCE OF RUSSIA TO THE
TURKS. 341
sian court considered itself insulted by the mere announcement of such an embassy; Ostermann spoke with contemptuous scorn of the ambassador, whom he loudly and openly designated, before a numerous company, as "that ragamuffin, that
saucy rascal." A negotiation commenced under such auspices could not be of
long duration. While the Empress deferred her answer to the
question about the tariff from one month to another, Russian
agents were zealously employed in Moldavia and Wallachia in stirring up the
Rou-mans to a revolt against the Sultan. When the Turkish ambassador prepared
to make complaints on the subject, the Ministers redoubled their rudeness to
him; and when at last, in February, he received a
decidedly negative answer about the tariff, the Turks considered war as
unavoidable. It is true that their warlike impulses had entirely subsided; they
had allowed themselves to be somewhat excited by Descorches, as long as the danger was still distant; but now that it suddenly stood close
before their doors, they sank back in the feeling of their own utter weakness.
The Sultan, indeed, gave orders to set on foot an army of 120,000 men, that he
might not be surprised in a state of defencelessness by a
superior enemy; but all traces of a desire to commence the war had completely
vanished from his mind.
In St. Petersburg, however, they paid little attention to these
peaceful feelings, but looked only at the warlike preparations, which they immediately denounced as a fresh sign of increased hostility, and hastened to answer by steps of their own of an
equally hostile nature. The representative of Russia at Warsaw, General
Igelstrom, received orders to inform the Polish government that the army of the Republic must be immediately reduced to the
insignificant number of 15,000 men. As soon as this order had been complied
with, and the disarming of Poland thereby completed, about half the Russian
regiments which were now stationed in that country were to return home,
and be employed as a reserve in the Turkish war. Orders were sent to Lithuania and
342
RUSSIAN
PLANS AGAINST TURKEY. [Book IX.
Volhynia to collect large stores of corn, and to form colossal
magazines; General Soltikoff was nominated
Commander-in-chief of the two Southern armies, and the admirals of the Euxine
fleet were sent off in all haste to their stations. "Turkey will not
indeed attack us" said Markoff, "but the Emperor; and she shall then be made to feel what it is to insult an ally of ours."
Whether the Government in St. Petersburg really believed in such an
attack, or only put it forward as a pretext for their own warlike movements, it
was natural that their relation to Austria should be brought
prominently forward by this misunderstanding with the Porte. In our times
it is not necessary to prove, that in a serious war between the Russians and
Turks Austria can never remain neutral. When the helm of the Austrian State is
in the hands of a really strong and far-seeing statesman, he
will always resist the extension of Russian power to the south of the Danube;
if blindness or corruption preside over the.destinies of Austria, she will, at
any, rate, wish to share the booty with her dangerous neighbour. There was no more important question for Catharine than this. The
attitude which Thugut had assumed from his first entrance into
the Ministry, his declaration that, like Joseph II., he
wished to unite with no country more closely and intimately than with Russia, had been observed with the greatest satisfaction in St.
Petersburg. It is true that Catharine had not been able, as Thugut wished, to
undo the Polish partition which had been once agreed upon; but still, as we
have seen, she did her best to render the success of the Prussian King
late and difficult. And in all other respects she met the wishes of Austria
with the greatest readiness; the great object being to convert the Emperor to the Eastern policy of Joseph II.
The immediate effects of this new tendency
were felt, as could not fail to be the case, by Prussia. We have already seen
how her friendly relations to Russia had been disturbed and cooled in the
course of the Polish proceedings. Catharine
Cn.
II.] COOLNESS OF CATHARINE TOWARDS
PRUSSIA. 343
had sacrificed a Polish province to Prussia with the greatest
reluctance, had done everything to limit Prussian influence in Poland, and,
lastly, had seen with the greatest indignation that Prussia had almost entirely
withdrawn from the coalition against France, to dispose of her resources against Poland. This was
extremely disagreeable to Catharine in reference to the Polish question itself,
and also as a sign of independence which Catharine eould not brook in any of
her allies; and it was doubly disagreeable in reference to the interests of Russia. For in her intended war with Turkey Catharine had no
source of anxiety but the fear of French interference; she wished, therefore,
that France should be as hard pressed as possible within her own borders, and resolved to incite Prussia all the more energetically, because,
during the Oriental crisis, she was obliged to deal more gently with Austria.
All that had hitherto taken place between the two courts bore the stamp of this
resolution. As early as the 15th of October, 1793, when Catharine
received intelligence that the king of Prussia was going from the Rhine
to Poland, to conclude his treaty with the Republic, she wrote to him that she
rejoiced that Poland had meanwhile yielded; that she was all the
more glad, because Prussia could now devote herself with
all her soul to the holy war against the Revolution. When, therefore,
Lueehesini's note to Austria (of the 23rd of September) was made known, in
whieh Prussia roundly declared that she had no means for the further continuance of the French war, the official circles in St.
Petersburg manifested a virtuous indignation. They lamented that a groundless
jealousy against Austria should blind the king to the highest duty of all
crowned heads, the crushing of the Revolution. On the arrival of the
news of Wurmser's victory in the lines of Weissenburg, the Russian court
surrounded the Austrian Ambassador with the liveliest congratulations; while
Count Golz, shunned by everybody, only received a few short and half friendly words from the Empress herself. Almost on the same day
344
RUSSIAN
PLANS AGAINST TURKEY. [Book XL
she sent off a note to Berlin, in which she demanded, with insulting
vehemence, the co-operation of Prussia in the French war, on the ground of the last treaty of St. Petersburg. The Empress, it said,
would herself send troops, if the Porte were not threatening her with war at
the instigation of France; but she was all the more urgently obliged to remind
Prussia of its duties, and hoped that her wish, which was ouly
grounded on the love of justice and the public weal, would not be rejected in
Berlin, because its fulfilment would bring advantage to a third Power
(Austria), which did not stand high in Prussian favour. The king received these by no means polite intimations with tolerable composure, since he had
thrown off all his anger against Catharine after the submission of the Poles,
and again eagerly wished to return immediately to the war against the Jacobins,
whom he hated with a deadly hate. He had already begged the
court of Vienna to send a special envoy with whom he might come to an
understanding as speedily as possible. Under the influence
of the same feeling, he paid no regard to _ the uu-courteous form of the
Russian note, and contented himself with declaring that
there could be no cpiestion of any obligation on the part of Prussia to make
war upon France, since a vital condition of the Convention of St.
Petersburg—the accession of Austria—had not been fulfilled. He added, however, that Catharine might set her mind at rest, for that Prussia would
indefatigably fight against the Revolution, as soon as her financial
necessities were relieved by sufficient subsidies. Count Golz, on the other
hand, who felt himself personally insulted by the tone of the Russian
ministers, expressed himself more vehemently. At the
end of November a very sharp discussion took place between him and Markoff.
Golz declared that the above-mentioned note was more hostile towards Prussia than towards France;
Markoff in reply expressed his regret that Golz, who had hitherto been the
chief support of the alliance, had become so irritable. Golz rejoined that he
still considered this alliance very desirable, but that
Ch.
II.] CATHARINE'S LETTER TO THE KING OF PRUSSIA. 345
he was sorry to see that Russia was beginning to act without any regard
to Prussian interests, and was thereby compelling Prussia carefully to spare
her resources. Whereupon Markoff said, somewhat incautiously, that whatever
might happen Prussia had no other choice than to unite
with the other Powers against the Jacobins. Golz then broke out into a violent
rage. "Do not be deceived," he cried, "our troops fight bravely
against the French from feelings of honour and duty; but I tell you that against other enemies they would fight like tigers." The Russian
turned the matter off with general assurances of friendship: "It would be
as well," said Golz in conclusion, "to treat so important a military State as ours with a little more discretion."
Irritated feelings are only inflamed by
expression, when they arise, not from misunderstanding, but from facts. The
Prussian government, therefore, blamed its ambassador for his candour, and was
indeed soon made to feel its consequences. For Catharine answered the bold speeches of Count Golz, on the 3rd December, by a letter to
the king, the tone of which was far more imperious than the former note. After
repeatedly reminding the king of his duties to the good cause, and exhorting
him not to trouble the other Powers any longer by his eagerness
for subsidies, she calmed his fears of exhausting his own
land, and exposing it to jealous neighbours, by remarking that the king was sufficiently secured against these dangers by his alliances, especially if he himself respected them, and kept to his
engagements with his well-known loyalty. It required great self-control calmly
to overlook such language; but on this occasion, too, the main point was that
the king longed to be once more in the field against the Jacobins, and looked forward with deep sorrow to the entire exhaustion of his
pecuniary means. To carry on war without subsidies seemed to him simply
impossible; if he could obtain these he was ready to recommence the war at
once. For the second time he took no notice of the Russian reproaches,
and redoubled
346
RUSSIAN
PLANS AGAINST TURKEY.
[Book XI.
his efforts in Vienna and London to obtain a grant of money. His
Ministers did not all entertain the same opinions; some had no other object
than peace—no other wish than that the financial
negotiations should fail. With this view they had made an exaggerated estimate
of the sum which Prussia required to complete her armaments;—in all 22,000,000
Prussian dollars for an army of 100,000 men, to which
Austria was to contribute three, England nine, and
the German Empire ten millions. They did not themselves believe that the whole
of this sum would be granted; but they wished, before taking any further steps
themselves, to await the proposals and measures of Austria.
Unfortunately the position of affairs in Vienna was still more
unfavourable to the great cause of the revolutionary war than in Berlin; the
fact was that there were, at the Austrian court, many bitter enemies of France,
but very few advocates of an alliance with Prussia. Generally
speaking, moreover, the political condition of Austria at this moment was
everywhere very critical. In 1792 the Austrian Government,
without any serious consideration of means and obstacles, had returned, at the
instigation of Spielmann, to the Emperor Joseph's
policy of foreign conquest. In April, 1792 they had suddenly paused in this
career, because they saw themselves outstripped in it by their Prussian rival;
and they proceeded to protest against it, without foreseeing that they would thereby deprive themselves of Prussian support against
France, and thus imperil their own aggrandizement. Austria was thus brought
into an insecure and difficult position, suffering at home from exhaustion and
bitter party strife, and threatened from without by continually increasing dangers. The Emperor, assailed on all sides by the most
various and contradictory advice, distrustful of himself and everybody else,
and incompetent from his dislike of work to form an independent judgment, could
come to no resolution. He knew, indeed, in general that he Avished to
extend his dominions, to defeat his enemies, to humble, or
Ch.
II.]
POSITION
OF AFFAIRS IN VIENNA.
347
at any rate to annoy, his rivals; he wished, therefore, to continue the
war against the French until he had taken from them
a large province, and resisted for the present, with stubborn tenacity every
attempt to promote a peace But he was utterly at a loss for the means to
accomplish his objects; he held audiences and conferences every morning from early dawn, without ever forming any settled opinion, nay
without even gaining a clear understanding of the state of things. And thus,
disgusted with labour', he sank more and more into a state of melancholy and ennui,
against which he was utterly unprotected by any taste for
the fine arts or more serious studies; so that the Empress, a clever lively and
energetic woman, often looked about her in a sort of despair for suitable means
of amusing him—fireworks, menageries, local jests, &c. The Emperor's former tutor, Count Francis Colloredo, was the more eager
in supporting her in this endeavour, because, being quite unable to solve the
problems of political life himself, he saw his influence greatly on the
wane. With lively though silent vexation he observed
that the Emperor's favour was returning to his old friend, the adjutant Rollin,
a reserved and taciturn man, whom some regarded as honest and narrowminded,
others as deep and designing. This man became indispensable to the Emperor,
whose deference to his favourite's wishes was
doubly increased, when the latter, on one occasion,"threatened to leave
the court in consequence of a momentary predominance
of Colloredo's influence. Thus confirmed in his position, Rollin by degrees
obtained the entire conduct of military affairs; the old
rivalry between Lascy's and Laudon's schools, between the court war-council and
Coburg's staff, was completely thrown into the shade by
his influence. Rollin excluded General Lascy from
employment, with the same obstinate hatred as he persecuted
Coburg and Mack. His protege
in the autumn of 1793 was General Wurmser, whose plans of conquest
against Alsace he supported with the greatest zeal? and
thereby openly threw down the gauntlet
348
RUSSIAN
PLANS AGAINST TURKEY.
[Book IX.
to the Russian Government. In other respects, however, he troubled
himself little about politics in the narrower sense, and left the field of
diplomacy exclusively to Thugut, with whom he was on intimate terms.
The latter, who had risen, as we have seen, as an opponent of
Prussia and friend of Russia, had resolutely adhered to his predilections. He
had, indeed, the vexation of seeing that Russia was at last compelled to
consent to the Prussian-Polish treaty of cession; but, on the other hand, he had the satisfaction of knowing that Suboff had signified to
count Cobenzl the Emperor's full consent to the conquest of Alsace and Lorraine for Austria; or, if it pleased the latter better, to the exchange
of these countries for Bavaria. And as the English, too, had no objection
to such a scheme, Thugut consented, on the 18th of December, 1793, to give the
Empress Catharine an explicit statement of the claims
of Austria. He gave up, with reluctance, the idea of a complete partition of
Poland, but still reserved to himself a
rectification of the frontiers of Galicia. He was likewise prepared, at least
as far as Prussia was concerned, to accede to the treaty of January 23d, in
which, as we may remember, Russia promised to support the Belgian-Bavarian Exchange. He then demanded the French territories of Flanders,
Artois and Picardy on the one side, and Lorraine and Alsace on the other. But
as, in the existing state of warlike operations, and with the small reliance to
be placed on Prussia, the conquest of these provinces was extremely
problematical, he demanded the annexation of the Venetian territories, according to the old arrangement of 1782, although both Imperial courts were
living at the time in a state of the greatest peace with the harmless Republic of Venice. Lastly he proposed that Russia should guarantee
armed assistance against Prussia, in case the latter should in any way trouble
the Emperor by her hostility. On this account he was very anxious that Russia
should postpone her attack on Turkey until the conclusion of the
French war; but he gave the
Cn.
II.] ROLLIN, FAVOURITE OF THE EMPEROR
FRANCIS. 349
most distinct promise, that, after this period, he would support the
Russian plans in the East with all the resources of the Austrian Empire.
If we consider all these points in their connexion with one another, we
shalf obtain a clear insight into Thugut's whole political system. Since the
friendship of England and Russia was only to be preserved by a vigorous
prosecution of the French war, he is prepared tto
make a new venture in arms; but in return demands, in case of victory, no less
then five French provinces. He is, indeed, far from being confident of success,
and therefore marks out for himself in the event of failure
another victim, in the unarmed Republic of Venice, and
tries to secure for Austria, subsequently to a peace with France,
the possession of the Turkish border lands. There was, indeed, sufficient
ground for his doubts, if the armed assistance of Prussia was to be withheld in the approaching campaign; and to obtain this aid by means of the
subsidy demanded by the King of Prussia Thugut would on no account consent. In
accordance with the above mentioned suggestion of the King, he had, indeed,
sent Count Lehrbach to Berlin, but had only empowered him to listen to the proposals of Prussia, and to press for the
co-operation of the Prussian forces; not, as he significantly said in
Lehrbach's instructions, that we expect any efficient support, but because the
return home of the Prussian army, while our troops are
fighting far away in Belgium, would expose the Hereditary lands of the Emperor
to too great danger.
And thus, while the French preparations were being carried on on a more and more colossal scale, the further co-operation of Prussia was becoming in the highest degree improbable.- .Had
then Austria any prospect of making up for Prussia's withdrawal, by increased
exertions on her own part? Her leading statesmen were the last to flatter themselves with such a hope. The French, indeed, were incessantly proclaiming to the world, that under their banner a
350
RUSSIAN
PLANS AGAINST TURKEY.
[Book IX.
free people was contending against the slavish hordes of despotic
monarchies; but Thugut knew only too well that he did not
possess one tenth part of that unlimited power with which the Committee of
Public Safety drove its subjects to the shock of battle. In
reality the Austrian Government at. that time could only
freely dispose of the population of Bohemia. In the Archduchy and Steiermark, in Carinthia and the Tyrol, they had to consult the
provincial Estates, which they had hitherto been accustomed to treat as ,
nonentities, but were now for several reasons inclined to consider worthy of
respect. Democratic plots were discovered
in Vienna itself; high legal officials began to talk in their regular reports
of the "inborn rights of man;" and the secret police of the
post-office read in innumerable letters expressions of wrath against
the war,- the taxes, and the policy of the court. In this state of the
public mind, the Government feared to make new demands upon the country; nor
would they have got much by asking, since the national resources had been
greatly exhausted, and the last severe conscription in the Archduchy had produced only two thousand men.
There remained the two richest countries of the crown lands, Belgium
and Hungary. Both, as we know, had energetically resisted the encroachments of
Joseph on their constitution; and to both Leopold had made concessions— 'to the former very essential, and to the latter very comprehensive ones; and neither could now. be subjected to the burdens of
war, without the free consent of their Estates. After long and difficult
negotiations the Belgian lands did indeed grant large sums of money—a tax of eight, and a loan of fifteen, millions; in other
respects, however, their relation to the Government was extremely uneasy and
mutually irritating. Their new Stadtholder General, the Archduke Charles, had
attempted, by the advice of his Minister, Count Metternich, to
govern on popular principles, had removed all Joseph's Imperialist officials,
and given their
Cii.
II.] EMBARRASSMENT OF THE AUSTRIAN
GOVERNM. 351
places to the former leaders of the insurrection, and had given up all
interference with ecclesiastical and communal affairs. The clergy and the
nobility, consequently, overflowed at first with grateful
loyalty, but showed themselves doubly irritable and haughty, if Count
Metternich also dared, for once, to have a will of his own; and as this could not always be avoided, he was soon obliged to hear
from noble mouths that the Government of the French Jacobins
had been far more honourable and profitable than his own. On the other hand
every post from Vienna brought him distinct reproofs
from the Ministry for his unworthy weakness. Count
Trautmansdorf—a brother-in-law of Prince Colloredo, from whom, however, he was
separated by a family quarrel —who managed the affairs of Belgium in Vienna,
was continually urging him to greater firmness, in which he was warmly
supported by Thugut; so that both statesmen strengthened one another in the
conviction, that it would be the greatest gain for Austria if this eternally
restless and endangered country could be got rid of in a creditable manner.
The prospect which met the eyes of the Ministers in Hungary was not
more cheering. The storms of Joseph's reign still shook this powerful and
excitable country; all classes were resolved to preserve their national
privileges, and not to allow the Crown the smallest degree of arbitrary
power. Out of deference to this feeling, the Government had subjected them in a
very slight degree to the burdens of war; of the 115 battalions of musketeers
who were present in Belgium, and in the army of the Rhine, there were not more than thirteen Hungarian. There was now the most urgent
need of a great conscription, but this could only be granted by a Diet. It
happened that the deputies of several Comitats
were assembled at Pesth in December; the Emperor sent the Palatinus to that city in the hope of gaining a favourable vote: but they, on the
contrary, considered that the Hungarian regiments ought to be recalled
352
RUSSIAN
PLANS AGAINST TURKEY.
[Book IX.
from the army, unless the Emperor summoned a Diet. That the constitution was a reality was soon shown, when the Government
appealed to the good will of individuals, called upon them for contributions of
money, and opened recruiting bureaus. The Comitats
immediately declared the collection of contributions illegal, and the Comitat of Czemplin proceeded to inflict exemplary punishment on Count Almasi,
who had handed over some of his peasants to the Emperor's recruiting officers
against their will. Under these circumstances Rollin, influenced above all by
the need of soldiers, proposed to issue writs for a
Diet. But all the political influences of the court, without exception, rose in
opposition to his scheme. Foremost came the clergy represented by Count Colleredo, The "bishops had been guilty of many
arbitrary acts, and apprehended the-complaints of
Protestants and Greeks against themselves, if a Diet should be summoned; and
they therefore offered the Emperor 'a munificent present of money, if he would
spare the country the pest of a revolutionary Diet. Thugut, who was neither bigotted nor timid, and therefore little influenced by the
apprehensions of the clergy, feared on his own part that the personality of the
king was little suited to control the proud and audacious Magyar nobility. He
felt, moreover, but little
interest in the subject, because the object in calling [the Diet—the procuring
more extended means of war—was indifferent to him. The proposal was, therefore,
shelved, the German and Bohemian lands were subjected to a new war-tax which
immediately produced very peaceable sentiments in the
Viennese public; and the voluntary recruiting in Hungary was strictly
confined within legal limits. The result, as very soon appeared, was
insignificant. In regard to foreign policy, exactly the same feeling prevailed
in Hungary as in 1790—a feeling of indignation that the old Turkish
hereditary enemy had been allowed to escape by the advice 'of Prussia. Nobles
and peasants were still agreed in thinking that the French had done no injury
to
Cn.
II.]
DIFFICULT
POSITION OF AUSTRIA.
353
the Magyars, and that the latter would rather fight the Prussians than
the French; and lastly, that there was only one war in which Hungary would
joyfully engage—a war against the Turks.
Considering all things, therefore, the Austrian Government could not think of rivalling the French Republic in the display of
its resources. When they surveyed the more distant horizon, they saw that in
Italy they were on the worst footing with Piedmont; the two States mutually
upbraided each other for neglecting the duties of allies, and
Thugut was just sending an almost threatening ultimatum
to Turin, in which he demanded, as the price of further military aid,
the restoration of territory which had been ceded to Savoy in the Austrian War
of Succession. In the German Empire, as usual, there
was nothing but rivalry and jealousy among the Estates, as to who should most
successfully escape the burdens of war. Holland was full of ill-feeling towards
Austria, and now openly demanded, as the price of continuing to join in the war, that the Emperor should cede to the Dutch the forts
Lillo and Liefkenshoek near Antwerp, and a district between Roermond and
Maestricht. The Government at Vienna would listen to nothing of the kind; and
in this quarter too, as everywhere else, arrived at purely negative
results.
If we survey this long series of impossibilities—impossibility that the French, who could not be overwhelmed in the autumn of
1793, before the beginning of their great armament, should be conquered now after
its completion—impossibility
of gaining any effectual aid from the German Empire, Italy, or
Holland—impossibility of Austria's increasing her own military forces in any
considerable degree—there can remain no doubt, that a far-seeing and
calculating mind could only refuse the subsidy to Prussia,
and thereby reject all Prussian aid, with a decided indifference to the French
war, and with feelings which made it regard many other
III.
Z
354 RUSSIAN
PLANS AGAINST TURKEY. [Book IX.
i
interests as infinitely more important than a victory
over the Jacobins. And we cannot doubt that such feelings existed in full force
in the mind of Thugut. To please the Empress Catharine he was prepared to take
part in the approaching campaign, and had, for the present, no objection to make, if unexpected successes could be obtained with the
existing means. But he had no intention of making new exertions for the
attainment of this object; for if it should prove impossible to conquer Alsace,
he now hoped to annex the Venetian States instead. If he were
compelled to conclude a disadvantageous peace with
France, and perhaps to give up Belgium, he hoped to console himself with the
spoils of Turkey. He could soon reconcile himself to a moderate increase of the
power of France, if only the main object, the humiliation
of his Prussian rival, could be effected. The intensity of Thugut's dislike
towards the latter country increased with every hour. In the beginnig of the
year 1794, the evil tidings of "Wurmser's defeat on the Rhine arrived in Vienna. The effect produced was immense. For the moment ever
the star of Rollin was obscured by the disaster of his friend; and he was not
able, in opposition to Lascy and Prince Colloredo, to prevent the dismissal of
the old general. But Thugut was fully persuaded that the only
cause of the heavy calamity was the treachery—the open systematic treachery—of
the Prussian generals; and that the Duke of Brunswick had a criminal
understanding with the French. He was confirmed in this, as we know, groundless suspicion, by Lehrbach's despatches from Berlin, which repeatedly
affirmed that Prussia had secretly come to a friendly unterstanding with
France. The Emperor wa$ no less deeply affected by the blow. News had just
arrived of the fall of Toulon. Francis received the Prussian ambassador Lucchesini with sorrowful aspect. "I cannot", said he,
"complain of others, for I have myself committed great blunders and am
ashamed of myself." He then spoke of the duty of all sovereigns to stand
by one another in this great .
Cii.
II.] CONFLICTING COUNSELS IN VIENNA. - 355
danger. He was, indeed, unable even then to throw off completely his hereditary dislike; "I assure you," he said,
"that I have at this moment laid aside all jealousy against Prussia; when
we have peace again, every one can do what he wishes, but now we must act in
harmony." The substance of this lameutation,
therefore, showed that as soon as any other opening appeared he would again
withdraw from Prussia. A few days afterwards he was once more irritated by the demand of Prussia, that her troops should for the
present be supported by the Western Circles of the Empire, until the settlement
of the subsidy question; and by her suggestion that the Emperor should join
with her in bringing forward a proposal
to this effect in the Diet at Ratisbon. Francis saw in this common action a
degradation of his Imperial dignity, and therefore declined the request; and he
was doubly enraged when Prussia proceeded to bring forward the motion at
Ratisbon on her own account. Col-loredo added fuel to
the fire, and declared that Austria might carry on a most energetic war against
France, and yet entirely dispense with Prussian help; she must, he said, learn
of her enemy, and set on foot in the German empire— what was unfortunately impossible in Hungary on account of the constitution—a
general arming of the people, a levy of all the citizens and peasants en
masse. The Emperor, who, like the King of Prussia, was heartily desirous of
'war, was highly delighted with the proposal, and immediately sent off the
necessary orders to the Austrian ambassador at Ratisbon. The effect produced
was like that of a shell breaking through the ceiling of a quiet room. Such a
revolutionary step appeared inconceivable in the deep-rutted road of the imperial constitution, and utterly destructive- of
all the traditional order of the empire. Prussia, seeing that this measure
would- render the provisioning of her troops impossible,
entered a decided protest, and had an unusual majority on her side. But all these hindrances made no impression on the highly excited
Vice
Z2
356
RUSSIAN
PLANS AGAINST TURKEY. [Book IX.
Chancellor of the empire. He employed all the learning of his
journalists to prove that his plan was agreeable to the constitution, and he was never tired of representing with what mighty
masses of men the array of the German nation would march to meet the
Republicans. In the middle of January, while these negotiations were going on,
the youngest uncle of the Emperor, the Elector of Cologne, appeared in
Vienna. He naturally suffered great incon-a-enience
in his capital from his close proximity to the theatre of war, and wished to
animate the martial zeal of his nephew. On all other questions he was as
zealous an opponent of Prussia
as Colloredo, but nevertheless considered her cooperation in the French war as
altogether indispensable. He was, therefore, highly indignant with Thugut and
Rollin, whom he declared to be the authors of the late disaster. He found in
Colloredo a strong personal jealousy of Thugut, and
endeavoured to transfer the conduct of affairs to the hands of Lascy, who
advocated energetic offensive operations.1 But
while his intrigue dragged slowly on, as was usual at this court, an incident
occurred which brought the complicated crisis to a
sudden termination.
England now made the first of her grand attempts to unite the powers of
the continent in a firm league against the gigantic and ever-growing
Revolution.
Pitt's ministry, as we have seen, had entered into the war with the greatest reluctance, and had hitherto taken part in it
with only half its strength. An army of scarcely 30,000 men maintained in
Belgium, the blockade of a few French harbours, a war of privateers against the
enemy's commerce, the capture of some West India islands—this was all that the English forces had
hitherto effected. Nor had the Government of England shown any superabundance
of sagacity or skill. How deplorably had it
neglected to support La'Vendee and to make use of Toulon!—how shortsight-
1 Lucchesini to the king of Prussia,
Jan. 4th and 28th, Feb- 15th, March 5th,
Cii.
II.] ENGLAND TRIES TO STRENGTHEN THE COALITION. 357
eclly had it helped to bring about the general disasters of the late
campaign by the expedition against Dunkirk!—with what narrow greediness had
it now again sent off a considerable force on a useless
expedition against Guadaloupe or Martinique! When Lord Auckland warned them
that there was but one real object of the war—the suppression of the
Convention, for which end all existing means should be
employed, because every other advantage would follow as a matter of course—the
ministers were far from being able to deny it; but the expedition was
nevertheless allowed to depart from a fear of incurring the charge of vacillation, and because it was thought that, after the failure at
Dunkirk, some other spoils of war must be secured for England. No one would
have recognised in these miserable perversities the son of the great Chatham;
no one would have seen in him the future leader and arbiter of Europe.
But in this case too it was to be shown, that of all human gifts a strong moral
will is the highest and most fruitful. When his allies fell off, and his
enemies increased in power, then and not till then were the minister and the country fully conscious of the fact that they were at war; and
then, when others were longing for the end, they were setting themselves
earnestly to the real business of fighting. The armaments by land and sea were
quadrupled, the powers of the Government
against internal revolts increased, and the greatest activity directed to the
upholding of the European coalition. In St. Petersburg and in
Madrid, at the Scandinavian and Italian courts, English diplomacy strained
every nerve to resist the progress of the Revolution. To the same
end Lord Malmesbury, the most noted of English politicians,
was sent to Berlin at the end of December, to offer Prussia auy reasonable
assistance, if she were really impeded in her movements by want of
money. On his way— in Holland and Frankfort—Malmesbury
received very discouraging information of the state of feeling at the court of
Berlin, and was therefore all the more pleasantly surprised
358
RUSSIAN
PLANS AGAINST TURKEY.
[Book XI.
by the animation with which the king, with all the frankness
of an honourable man, expressed his longing for a fresh struggle with the
Jacobins. But whenever the English minister inquired
into the financial condition of the country, he received the same
unsatisfactory answer; the Treasury had been emptied by war and
luxury, and the people had been so heavily taxed during the last half century,
that desperate outbreaks might be apprehended in case of any further pressure. Upon this Pitt did not hesitate to take another step in advance, and on the 5th of February Malmesbury was empowered to offer
Prussia a subsidy of £ 2,000,000—of which England was to furnish two-fifths,
and Austria, Holland, and Prussia herself, one fifth each—if she would set on
foot an army of 100,000 men.1 This
offer was indeed far below the original Prussian claim of 22,000,000
Thalers; but the king nevertheless signified his assent, after some
negotiation, and the treaty was provisionally signed on the 12th, on condition
of obtaining the assent of Austria and Holland. As there had never been any
doubt with respect to the latter country, everything depended on the decision
of the Emperor. The question was now put to him—whether, in consideration of
the sum of £ 400,000, he was willing to keep an army of 100,000 men in the field against France. The question was backed by a
simultaneous announcement from the Prince of Coburg, that he had agreed with
the English in a common plan of operation for the approaching campaign, in
accordance with the views of Mack, but that he
should require a reinforcement of 37,000 men, not merely for the purposes of
offence, but to enable him even to guarantee the
1 It is a characteristic circumstance that the diplomatists of Vienna declared that this arrangement
originated with Prussia, and was not considered acceptable
in England. The English ambassador at Vienna, who was entirely won over by
Thugut, was fully possessed by this view of the case. This excellent statesman
regarded the- Austrian minister as an openhearted, candid, and entirely trustworthy man!
Ch.
II.] THUGUT'S JEALOUSY OF PRUSSIA.
359
defence of the country.1 Thus urged on every side, the court of Vienna was compelled to come to
a decision.
This decision had already been arrived at by those who now sat at the
helm of the Austrian State. The all important fact was, that the real guide of Austrian diplomacy at this
period, Count Thugut, hated and feared Prussia, his ally, far more than his
adversary, France.2 From a military point of view the recall of the Prussian army from the theatre of war appeared a great calamity; but Thugut, whose
dislike of Prussia had, since November, been growing continually stronger, had
now no more eager wish than the breaking up of this army. Perhaps he would have
consented to pay something for a few Prussian regiments, if they
were placed under the command of an Austrian general. But an independent
Prussian army seemed to him to be the greatest possible evil for
Austria—especially in her present position on the middle Rhine—because it lay
between the main body of the Imperialists in Belgium and their Austrian
homes. His bitter hatred of Prussia led him to think the King and his Ministry
capable of the worst possible designs—complicity with France, and even plans
for attacking Austrian provinces. For
this reason alone he would have wished to recall his own troops from Belgium to
Bohemia, and would joyfully have contributed to break up the Prussian army: we
may imagine, therefore, how decidedly he refused to pay even a single florin
towards its support. The Russian ambassador expressed his entire approval of these views in the name of
his Government—the same Government which shortly before had sent so emphatic a
summons to Prussia to continue the war against France. On
the 27th of February, Thugut sent a new explanation of the
state of things to
1 As nothing came of this plan,
ticulars are taken from
the des-
\ve
shall not enter into particulars, patches of Sir Morton Eden, (in the
These
may be found in Witzleben III State Paper office, London) and of
51
et. seq. — 2 The following par- Thugut,
(archives of Vienna).
360
RUSSIAN
PLANS AGAINST TURKEY.
[Book IX.
St. Petersburg, whieh betrayed from beginning to end the increase of
his wrath against Prussia. As before, he deelared himself ready to continue the war against Franee, if the Powers would guarantee a
sufficient compensation to the Emperor, and secure him against the malice of
Prussian policy. He would, he said, after the unfortunate turn of affairs,
considerably moderate his elaims to French territory, but must, all
the more, insist on being allowed full freedom of aetion in regard to the
extent of his acquisitions in Ve-netia. He promised Catharine efficient aid
against Turkey, but earnestly entreated her not to eommence operations against that eountry before the termination of the war with Franee. For
otherwise, if the Russian army were on the Danube, and the Austrian at the same
time "on the Rhine, the Prussians would be enabled to extend their power,
without fear or shame, in Germany and Poland. He, therefore,
repeated his request that Russia, with a view to putting a cheek on Prussian
greed, would keep a large force in Poland; and he expressed the inmost
feelings of his heart in these words: "It would really be a fortunate
thing if Prussia, by some open aet of hostility, would give us an opportunity
of bringing down this perfidious Power to her proper level."
It needs no arguments to prove that this desire of Thu-gut's—not merely
to protect himself from Prussia, but to attaek her in
eoncert with Russia—eould not possibly eoexist with a lively zeal for the war
against Franee. He was completely blinded by fear and anger,
and was as far as possible from the truth in his judgment of the Prussian
government, whieh had, it is true, but little desire to make fresh
exertions against Franee, but at the same time had no hostile intentions against Austria. Penetrated, however, with these sentiments, Thugut naturally regarded the fate of Belgium and the Rhine
with indifference. As he daily expected an attaek on Bohemia, he
preferred, as a matter of eourse, to^ sacrifice Brussels to leaving the
road to Vienna unprotected.
Ch.
II.] THUGUT'S INDIFFERENCE TO THE
FRENCH WAR. 361
He could not, indeed, immediately and openly avow his intentions. Independently of other obstacles, he had to deal with the sentiments
of the Emperor, who manifested no inclination to make peace with the Jacobins;
but, on the contrary, was just now inspired with double zeal by Colloredo for the struggle against the French.
Some weeks before, Count Mercy, formerly ambassador in
Paris, had proposed, in a letter from Belgium,1 that
the Emperor should go in person to that country, assume the command of the
grand allied army, and thereby bring fresh life into its movements. Francis had joyfully seized on this idea, which promised, him the
excitement of a journey in an unknown country , and, as was-to be hoped,
abundance of warlike laurels. Inspired by these sentiments he had assented to
Mack's above-mentioned plan for the campaign—which comprised an advance upon Paris—even before it had been communicated to the English for their approval. His views, therefore, differed widely from those of Thugut; and if he had possessed any degree of penetration or consistency he would have accepted Malmesbury's offer with eagerness. But on this occasion
Prince Colloredo, without intending it, rendered
his rival Thugut the most effectual assistance. His project of a general arming
of the people could not indeed be carried out; "never mind," said he, "we can still do without the Prussians."
He represented that there were only about 60,000 Prussian soldiers on the
Rhine; of which the Emperor could, at all events, count on 13,000 as the
federal contingent, and 20,000 in virtue of the February
compact; the deficit, he said, might be easily supplied, if the contingents of
the other Estates of the Empire were collected with sufficient energy, and
united into one grand federal army. The
objection was made that these loose
This plan
had already been
mooted but had been frustrated by
the
opposition of the Empress.
362
RUSSIAN
PLANS AGAINST TURKEY.
[Book IX.
ingredients would not be under arms before the autumn;1 to
which he replied, that during this interval the Prussians might he kept in the field, even without a subsidy. It was further remarked that
some of those forces were already in Coburg's army, and that the latter would
therefore be weakened by the formation of an Army of the Empire. Colloredo
consoled the objectors by saying, that in the worst case they must
for the moment suspend offensive operations in Belgium; that the English would
use every effort to prevent the French from getting the upper hand in that
country, and that Russia would be sure to procure some other territorial acquisition for the Emperor of Austria. By this course Francis saw
the two strongest wishes of his heart, at that period, fully satisfied^-the
journey to Belgium, and the rejection of Prussian aid; he therefore acceded to
Colloredo's proposal with great satisfaction, and made known his
resolution to Coburg on the 12th of February— the very day on which Malmesbury
signed his compact in Berlin. The fall of the English negotiation was thus
sealed beforehand; and Thugut had the satisfaction of seeing the only means of carrying on the war destroyed by the war party itself.
Hereupon Thugut and Colloredo informed the Marquis Lucchesini that
Austria was not in a condition to make the smallest contribution to the
Prussian subsidy. Lucchesini had received orders in
this case to announce that the Prussian army would march away from the
Rhine homewards, unless Austria had come to a more favourable conclusion by the
15th of March. But on the 28th of February the Austrian minister assured the
Prussian ambassador that he need not wait so long, as the
Emperor's resolution was
1 How well-founded this appre- does
not prevent the author from
hension
was is proved by every page considering Colloredo's policy, and
of
Vivenot's work (Herzog
Albrecht the
rejection of the Anglo-Prussian
von
Sachsen-Teschen) which,
however, scheme, highly laudable.
Ch.
II.] THE PRUSSIANS PREPARE TO LEAVE THE
RHINE. 363
irrevocable; that Austria was prepared for all contingencies, and only
demanded of the king 20,000 men, in accordance with the treaty
of February. Lucchesini soon became aware of the amount of deep antipathy by
which this decree was dictated and upheld. When the report of these stringent
measures spread through the city of Vienna, and the envoys of the petty
sovereigns of the Empire—who already saw with the mind's
eye the Prussians retiring, and the defenceless
territories of the Empire inundated with French soldiers—hastened
in their fears to Thugut, he consoled them by declaring that Prussia with these
100,000 men would have attacked — not the French—but the
lands of the ecclesiastical Princes; that the Emperor's
refusal had therefore saved the Empire from this danger for the present; and
that it was now above all things necessary to raise a large Army of the Empire,
which would for the future inspire respect into
French and Prussians alike.
The intelligence of this momentous resolution spread rapidly through
Europe, and agitated the minds of men in a different, but everywhere in a very
violent, manner. In Berlin it was taken as a matter of course that the troops
must leave the Rhine; and on the 11th of March orders were sent to General
Mollendorf—who had succeeded Brunswick at the beginning of the year—to march
back to Cologne, and thence to Westphalia. Nevertheless, the desire of the king to continue the contest against the Revolution survived
even this severe blow. Immediately after the arrival
of the Vienna dispatch, he had asked the opinion of each of his cabinet
ministers respecting his future policy, and had received answers essentially differing from one another. Count Alvensleben, who had
always manifested a stronger antipathy to Austria than to the French, was in
favour of recalling the whole army, conciliating the Russians by abandoning
Turkey, and making peace as quickly as possible with the French
Republic. Count Haugwitz, on the other hand, represented that as the king still
considered
364
RUSSIAN
PLANS AGAINST TURKEY.
[Book IX.
himself bound to the common cause of Europe, he ought now, after the
refusal of Austria, to come to an understanding with England and Holland alone; that while the 20,000 men
claimed by Austria remained on the Upper Rhine, a force of 50,000 men should be
placed at the disposal of the maritime Powers at Wcsel, in consideration of a
suitable subsidy, in order to defend Westphalia and Holland, and possibly
to exercise a decisive influence on the war in Belgium. The king did not
hesitate for a moment between these two views. He immediately empowered Count
Haugwitz to open a fresh negociation with Malmesbury in accordance
with his opinions. As early as the 7th of March the two statesmen held their
first conference; and Malmesbury, although he had no special powers" for
such a case, held out such favourable prospects, that the king sent a fresh order to Mollendorf on the 14th, to the effect that he was, indeed,
to lead the troops—with the exception of the 20,000 men—to Cologne, but was to
remain there, as in all probability the king in person would
undertake a new expedition into Belgium from that
city.
From the nature of the case no communication coidd be made to a third
party respecting these plans, before the final ratification of the English
treaty. The excitement and terror therefore continued to increase in the
territories of the Empire on the Upper Rhine, when the
Prussian regiments broke up their quarters and
prepared for their retreat. Of the Army of the Empire, of which so much had
been said, nothing was at present to be seen; the Austrian troops, in the
command of which Wurmser had been succeeded by General Brown,
recovered very slowly from the disasters of December; and the people generally
foresaw with horror, that the devastation of the Palatinate would be carried
over the Rhine deep into the heart of Germany. The generals at Coburg's head-quarters in Belgium sympathized in these feelings. Previously,
in the year 1793, they had laid the greatest weight on an operation of the
Prussians from the
Cii.
II.]
THE
PRINCE OP COBURG.
365
side of the Palatinate against the Saare and the Upper Meuse, as the most effectual diversion in favour of the war in
Belgium. Instead of this, they now looked forward to seeing a portion of the
Freneh Moselle army operating against the Lower Meuse and the eastern flank of
the al^-lied army in Belgium; while the army of the Rhine might take
up on a larger seale the part played by Custine in 1792—overwhelm Mayenee,
deluge the Rhenish lands from that city to Cologne, and completely surround the
Belgian army. Coburg had expressed these views in his answer to the Emperor's letter respecting the formation of an army of the Empire, to
whieh the Emperor replied: "I have taken note of the Prinee's letter, and
his objections will never divert me from the resolution, according to which the
army of the Empire is to operate independently." The Prince
likewise received an answer, exaetly in aceordanee with the views of Colloredo,
with respeet to Mack's plan for the eampaign; to the effeet that the latter was
under the influence of many illusions, from whieh it was necessary, in the interests of the great cause, to free the mind of the Prinee;
that the Emperor eould not send any further reinforcements
from his hereditary lands, and that all proposals of the kind, whieh could only
serve to annoy him, should accordingly be discontinued;
that if an attaek upon France was thus rendered impossible, it was a thing
greatly to be regretted, indeed, but to be borne with submission as a decree of
Providenee; and that the struggle was to be confined to the defensive. The
Prince was further eharged to appeal to the allied
maritime Powers for increased aid, since Austria was already doing everything
that lay within human power, and was about to prove the greatness of her zeal
by the faet, that the Emperor himself would repair to Belgium at the end of Mareh, and undertake the command in chief.
The Prinee of Coburg, notwithstanding his dissent as a Prince of the
Empire, was a thorough Austrian at heart, always ready to take the word of his
Emperor as inspired
366
RUSSIAN PLANS AGAINST TURKEY. [Book IX.
truth, and to respect all the orders of the cabinet with obedient
devotion. But on this occasion he was deeply moved, and in complete despair. He
had in all more than 160,000 men under his command, a very considerable force,
consisting entirely of excellent troops, with which a
general of the Napoleon stamp would perhaps have considered himself invincible
under any circumstances. The Prince was not wanting in the simple courage of a
soldier, and had often enough stood his ground with perfect
calmness in the midst of a shower of bullets; but he was crushed by the weight
of responsibility, which he was not capable of lightening, either by frivolous
unconcern, or creative genius. He only saw his own deficiencies and the
increasing dangers to which he was exposed—the long
frontier" from Luxemburg to Ostend, which he might
perhaps have to defend against double numbers, and the inundation of the Rhine
frontier on his flank and rear by the French, after the withdrawal of the Prussians; he was at a loss which way to turn, and the
generals about him, as well as the staff of the straightforward but weak-minded
Duke of York, were just as depressed as the Prince himself. In a fresh council
of war at Brussels, it was at last resolved to open the campaign from Valenciennes—that is from the centre of the allied army—by an
attack upon the neighbouring fortress of Landrecy; while Clerfait was to cover
Flanders on the right of that place, and Kaunitz the river Sambre, to the left.
"Your Majesty will be pleased to consider," wrote Coburg
to the Emperor on this occasion, "what it is to have to make up our minds
to besiege Landrecy, only because our position would become far more
unfortunate if we remained inactive;—what it is to be
obliged to say to oneself, that success is almost impossible,
because the enemy is in vastly superior force; I could wish that those \vho
have counselled your Majesty in Vienna, and frustrated all our plans, may be
able to answer for it before God, your Majesty and the world, but I very much doubt whether
Cii.
II.] ARRIVAL OF THE ARCHDUKE CHARLES IN
VIENNA. 367
they will ever be able to- do so." He appealed in equally strong terms to Mollendorf, to the
Dutch Government and to Malmesbury, in order to obtain at least a postponement
of the withdrawal of the Prussians from Mayence; nay, at his instigation,
the Archduke Charles resolved on the extraordinary step of going on his own
account to Vienna, and making a last attempt in person to bring about a change
in the prevailing system. Coburg had already twice begun a
letter to the Emperor resigning his command. But at the last moment, he could
never find sufficient independence, or selfishness, to turn his back upon his
Emperor and his troops in the hour of danger; and remained, at last, in the silent and faithful submission of a soldier at his post, where
he expected nothing but humiliation for himself and defeat for his army.
Meanwhile affairs in Vienna, once forced into the downward road, moved on by their own weight. In the sphere of politics, after the refusal of the Anglo-Prussian treaty, the Oriental
question naturally threw French affairs more and more into the background; and
the natural consequence was, that all the complaints of Coburg only served to
make men regard him as troublesome, and unsuited for his position. They demanded of him an energetic prosecution of the war, and
splendid triumphs, and at the same time obstinately refused him all
reinforcements, although they had, besides the necessary garrisons, more then
70,000 men at their disposal, and ready for action," in the interior of
the country. But Thugut thought that he must keep this force near at hand, as a
defence against the dreaded attack of the Prussians. It is true that while
Malmesbury's negotiations were in progresssuch
an attack was not to be apprehended; and therefore Coburg might for the present
try his fortune against the French. But Thugut would not trust his Prussian
ally for a single week, and was fnlly determined
on no account to expose the hereditary dominious to an attack. When now
the Archduke Charles most unexpectedly
368
RUSSIAN
PLANS AGAINST TURKEY. [Book IX.
arrived at Vienna, the Emperor was at first greatly alarmed; but after
he had learnt the object of his visit, he only treated him
very ungraciously, begged him not to interfere in his policy, and invited him
quietly to return to Belgium with him after the lapse of three days. The
Imperial brothers started on the 31st of March; on the following day Vienna was
surprised by the intelligence, that the Emperor, when in
Linz, had suddenly summoned the Prince of Waldeck, who had been destined for a
command in Italy, to his headquarters in Belgium. Waldeck was a
brave officer, who had lost an arm in the French war; a man of reserved but resolute character, strong party feeling
and unprincipled ambition, little to be depended upon
by his friends, but highly dangerous to his enemies. He had never made any
secret of his enmity against Coburg and Mack; the summons sent to him at this
important moment proved that Rollin too, in the new position of affairs,
had for once yielded to the influence of Thugut even in a military question.
Whilst the chiefs in the midst of their mighty armies in Belgium were
more and more unanimously inclining towards peace, the clouds of a new
war-tempest were gathering more and more thickly and darkly in the far East.
One Russian regiment after another marched from Poland to Volhynia, and it was
already considered certain that the army of reserve,
in the rear of Dolgoruki's and Suworow's troops, was to
be raised to the number of 70,000 men. The negotiation with England for a
definitive treaty of alliance was still carried on, but always stopped short at
the same point— the English demand of a Russian corps for the war against France. Catharine remained stedfast in her previous system
of opposing the French by diplomacy, but not by active warfare. And even this
system had to be suited to the altered position of affairs. It is true that
Catharine incessantly urged Prussia
to the contest against the Jacobins, but she was quite satisfied that Austria-
should adopt ua exactly opposite course.
Nay, she was angry when
Cii. II.] RUSSIAN MACHINATIONS AGAINST TURKEY.
369
England attempted to unite the two German Powers in
the coalition against France, and when Malmesbury placed the Prussian army at
the disposal of Austria for so insignificant a subsidy. When;the news of this
affair arrived at St.Petersburg, Markoff cried out, that no such proposal ought
to have been made to Austria, and observed that
Malmesbury always showed a talent for disturbing the most satisfactory
relations. At the very same time that the Emperor Francis was declining the
offers of England, a grand Council of ministers was held in St. Petersburg to consider the question of peace or war with Turkey. The
vice-chancellor Ostermann and Count Besborodko* declared the outbreak of
hostilities to be the greatest calamity which could befall Russia in her
present condition. Suboff and Markoff, on the contrary,
expressed exactly opposite views, and maintained them with a firmness resulting
from the certainty of Imperial support. In fact Besborodko soon afterwards,
about the middle of March, obtained leave of absence for several weeks, and
Ostermann, with many complaints, withdrew from all
active business. The plan which was sanctioned by the Empress, and declared by Markoff to be infallible, was to take up a defensive attitude on the frontier of the country with large forces, and at
the same time to deal the decisive blow against Constantinople by means of the fleet. The heart of the Osman empire being
thus struck, the Russians hoped that they should possess themselves without
difficulty of the dissevered limbs.
At this moment, however, a catastrophe occurred,
which, though foreseen by thousands, took the potentates of Europe completely by surprise, crossed all their previous plans, and
directed the thoughts of friend and foe into new channels.
in.
2A
370 [Book IX.
CHAPTER III. REVOLT OF POLAND.
Sievers
governs Poland.—He is recalled.—Patriotic conspiracy in
poland.—koscicsko.-parties
in berlin.—MaLMESBURY'S
negotiation.
—Treaty
of the hague between England and Prussia.—Revolt in poland. Madalinski.
—Kosciusko
raises his standard in cracow.— Battle
of raclawicze.— Successful rising in Warsaw.—Revolt in Lithuania.—Prussian preparations.—The king of Prussia goes to
POLAND.
The Polish Diet, after having signed the treaty of submission to Russia, sat at Grodno for about four weeks in great official
activity. Under the able wise and tutelary guidance of the Russian ambassador, a new constitution was drawn up, a
reorganization of the provinces accepted, and the administration of the courts
of law and the finances entirely remodelled. In short, if you listened to Sievers, it would seem that a new and happy age of prosperity was about
to dawn on the Polish Republic. It is true that this peaceful structure rested
upon crumbling foundations, and Sievers himself, with the best intentions,
brought on new convulsions. He knew and despised his former proteges,
the Confederation of Targowice; he saw how they stirred up hatred and
vexation in every part of the country, . and he conceived the idea of
strengthening the influence of Russia by making use of less odious instruments. No sooner had this change in the mind of the great protector made
itself felt, than the national wrath found vent, in the midst of the Diet
itself, against the men of Targowice; and in their very last sitting this
Assembly annulled all the decrees of the Confederation at a single blow.
Unfortunately there wae one decree among them, which forbade the wearing of the
military crosses of merit obtained during the late struggle against the
Russians; this prohibition was therefore swept away with the rest by the resolution of the Diet, and im-
Ch.
III.]
FERMENT
IN POLAND.
371
mediately these crosses of. merit once more appeared on the breasts of
the patriotic Poles. This occurrence gave great offence to the Russian
generals, and, in consequence of their report,
Catharine resolved to visit this first movement of an incorrigible national
feeling with the severest chastisement. She recalled her ambassador, who had
not known how to prevent such a scandal, with public marks of disfavour, and
entrusted his office to General Igelstrom, the haughty and
dreaded commander of her troops in Poland. She then demanded
of the trembling Polish government a signal repa-I (
ration, the extent of which, however, she left to the penitential feelings of the Poles themselves. The King
and the Standing Council, overstepping all their legal functions, proceeded to cancel the decree of the Diet, to renew the order against the
offensive crosses, and by a great deputation to implore the pardon of the
Empress. After this manifestation of unlimited submission, Catharine was
moved to a gracious indulgence, and declared herself satisfied. The horizon of
the Polish government was once more cleared, and it could now busy itself with
the domestic interests of the country.
But this official polity represented the Polish nation
only in name. It rested on the Russian garrisons, which, at the time of the
October treaty, amounted to about 40,000 men; but in the nation itself it was
surrounded either by herds of utterly indifferent and stupid peasants, or by factions which had no other feeling in their hearts than hatred
and thirst of vengeance. In the few larger cities—Wilna and Grodno in
Lithuania, and Warsaw and Cracow in the kingdom
of Poland—the citizens had not forgotten their short political emancipation in 1791; and the more rapidly and ignominiously their
liberties had been trodden under foot, the more warmly did they cherish in
their hearts the regretful remembrance of them. In the
rural districts, indeed, the majority of the magnates were under Russian protection and in Russian pay; but by their side there was
a mass of inferior nobility, who gnashed their teeth
at the injuries they had suffered from the war, the continued brutality of the
2A2
372
REVOLT
OF POLAND.
[Book IX.
Russians, and the unexampled degradation of the
Polish name. The army, which counted about 30,000 men, shared these feelings to
a man. The officers cursed their national disgrace, and the soldiers pined away
in misery and hunger; they all looked forward to the possibility
of a speedy and entire disbanding, which would leave them without the means of
existence, or, what seemed to them far worse, consign
them to incorporation with Russian and Prussian regiments.
As early as the summer of 1793 an understanding was come to between these different elements. One of the most influential of
the Warsaw merchants, Kapostas, had begun to hold preliminary conferences with
General Dzialinski subsequently to the month of May; and,
under their direction, a number of young noblemen
instituted secret meetings with officers of different regiments, who were sent
by their comrades to the capital for this very
purpose. These ardent and hotheaded youths soon came to the conviction that a
revolt was to be attempted, although they possessed
neither money nor materials of war, nor, for the present, any connections with
the provinces, or with a single foreign Power. The only question with them was,
who was to be the leader in the sacred war; and on this point, too, a decision
was soon come to, that there was but one man who
possessed at once the necessary capacity, and the confidence of the nation— the
hero of Dubienka, Thaddaus Kosciusko. Without any delay they sent an
announcement to him to Leipzig—where the General was residing at that time with his friends Ignatius Potocki and Hugo Kollontai, the chiefs of
1791, bewailing the misfortunes of his country, and by no means expecting so
early a summons—that he only needed to appear to set all Poland in a blaze.
Potocki regarded the information as
emanating from a few immature minds, and warned
1 Ssolowjoff, "Der Fall Polands" of Kosciusko and Kapostas. In other
p. 323. gives many hitherto unknown respects we, follow the official papers
particulars from later examinations of
the Russian state archives.
Ch.
III.]
THADDAEUS
KOSCIUSKO.
373
Kosciusko against hurling the country into still deeper misery, until
some general change should take place in European politics. The heart of
Kosciusko, however, firm and considerate as he usually was, beat so high at the prospect opened to him, that he determined at any rate
to see with his own eyes. He repaired in the first place to the Cracow
frontier, and soon afterwards into the interior of Poland, for the purpose of
consulting with General Wodzicki; while his friend and confidant
Zajonczek passed over to Warsaw to gather more exact intelligence. The reports
of the latter were certainly not encouraging. The wealthier class of citizens, notwithstanding their aversion to the Russians, shrank from all
fresh alarms of war; the higher nobility, even those who entertained
patriotic feelings, apprehended democratic movements among their own serfs, in
case of a revolution. Among the remainder there was restlessness and bitterness
enough, but little energy or self-sacrifice. Even amongst the
troops Zajonczek found much irritable discontent, indeed, but only two
generals, Madalinski and Dzialinski, were prepared under all circumstances to
proceed to extremities. He reported to Kosciusko that he could
only reckon, with any certainty, upon the army in the
country, upon the proletaries in Warsaw, and upon the
lower class of nobles in some of the provinces—and no where upon a rising of
the peasants. He therefore urgently warned him against making any premature and
inauspicious attempt.
But meanwhile Kosciusko's appearance had already borne its fruits. The
news of his presence ran with the speed of lightning through the regiments,
and, by means of their connections, through the provinces of
Ukraine as far as Courland. The
excitement among the troops and the nobles rose to an indescribable height;
everywhere the secret societies of 1792 were revived, and in a short time 700
societies, with more than 20,000 members, were formed, which bound themselves to a blind obedience for life and death to all the
commands of their "great father," as they called Kosciusko. Among so
many thousands there was not a single traitor;
374
REVOLT
OF POLAND.
[Book IX.
the land was suddenly agitated in all its parts by a restless tremor; but the Russians, though they observed it, had simply no handle by
which they could lay hold of the plot and its authors. In January intelligence
of the French victories at Toulon and .Landau arrived at Warsaw, and then, for
a moment, the popular joy broke through the veil of caution,
and a wild cry of enthusiasm resounded through the whole capital. Whereupon
Igelstrom, who had been for several weeks in a state of anxious alarm, caused a
number of persons to be arrested, some of whom were
transported to Russia without a trial, and others
tormented by long criminal investigations. But the excitement as suddenly
subsided again into a gloomy silence, and not a single further clue could be
laid hold of. Kosciusko had by this time once more quitted Poland, and, in order to lull the suspicions of the enemy, had undertaken a
journey to Italy. He employed this time in cultivating his relations with
foreign countries, obtaining money from the Committee of
Public Safety, and appealing to Turkey and Sweden for aid. The reports from Poland became every week more favourable. In
February the Russian battalions marched in long columns towards the East and
South; Igelstrom had scarcely 20,000 men left, all of whom he collected in and
around Warsaw, so that Cracow was almost
free from foreign troops, and the nobles of the Palatinate were all in favour
of immediate action. In the Ukraine the movement began among the former Polish
regiments, which, since the partition, had been taken into the pay of
Catharine. These troops were now massed together on the Dniester for the war with Turkey, and, already in almost
open mutiny, began to plunder the villages, and make the roads unsafe. In the
new Prussian province in the West, the ferment was kept up by Wybinski, the agitator of the previous year, who was busy among
the citizens of Posen, Gnesen, and Kalisch. The Clergy, meanwhile, excited in every family religious hatred against the Protestant
sovereign; and the well-meant pedantry of the officials irri-
Ch.
III.] KOSCIUSKO
FORCED INTO PREMATURE ACTION.
375
tated the peasants by new. and tedious formalities. Hitherto Ignatius
Potocki and Kollontai had been unable to believe in the possibility of
contending against Russia, but all these coincident movements in the country at
last overcame even their scruples; Zajonczek alone continued to
protest, and Kosciusko, who trusted in his exact observations, determined to
await the development of affairs abroad—especially of the French and Turkish
wars—and, in the mean time, to extend his connexions still further
through Russian and Prussian Poland. When the flames of war were blazing on the
Danube and the Scheldt, then, and not till then, should the avenging people
everywhere throw themselves on the foreign garrisons, and in one great hour every clod of Polish soil be appeased by the streaming blood of
its oppressors.
Scarcely, however, had these instructions been despatched to the
patriotic associations, when Igelstrom laid the commands
of the Empress,—which limited the numbers of the
Polish troops to 9,000, and of the Lithuanian to 6,000 men —before the
Government at Warsaw, and demanded the immediate dismissal of the rest of the
army. The Standing Council declared, as usual, their readiness to obey, but
were compelled to use the greatest circumspection in carrying out
the decree, as they had simply no means-of saving the dis- • banded soldiers
from starvation, and therefore apprehended tumult and robbery. Igelstrom, it is
true, offered to take them into Russian pay, but not a man could be induced to change his colours, and many weeks thus passed, before
the Polish Government dared to bring forward the decrees for breaking up the
army. This postponement was of vital importance to Kosciusko. For the
execution of his great plans he relied chiefly on the regular military
force, and its threatened annihilation rendered all
further delay impossible. Though the Turks and the French were not yet in the
field —though several Polish provinces were still unprepared— Kosciusko was
obliged to run the risk with what means he possessed. He
warned the Hotspurs of Warsaw, indeed, not
376
REVOLT
OF POLAND.
[Book IX.
to ruin everything by a premature rising, but on the 6th of March he
sent one of his confidants, Piramowitz, to Paris, to inform the Committee of Public Safety of the altered position
of affairs, to ask for money and officers, and to fix the 24th as the
commencement of the revolt in Cracow. He at the same time excused himself, for
not being able at once to come forward on the principles
of pure democracy in Poland, saying that he was obliged to
rest on the support of the nobility and clergy, and that it was necessary,
above all things, to preserve internal harmony. The envoy reached Paris in
safety, and received the sanction of the French Committee to all the
propositions of the General. They had no objection to the employment of
aristocratic forms in Poland; their only object was to gain
an accession of military strength against the German Powers; and how
serviceable the aid of Poland might be, in this respect, was
proved, even before a shot was fired on the Belgian frontier.
For just as the prospect of the contest with Turkey made the Austrian
statesmen indifferent to the French war, so the first movement in Poland
brought the long vacillations of Prussian policy to a like
decision. France, consequently, had the unexampled good fortune, on her
entrance into the arena of war, of seeing her great opponents vying with one
another in their haste to leave it.
We have already remarked that the king was very eager for the
contest with the Jacobins, but that scarcely any of those about his person
sympathised in his feelings. Of the Ministers Haugwitz was the only one who did
not condemn them; while Finkenstein, Alvensleben, and Geusau, the Minister at War, listened to the King in perfect despair, as he indulged
in dreaming of the scenes of the next Belgian or Rhenish campaign. What was of
still more importance, the personal confidants, of the
monarch, Lucchesini and Manstein, entirely agreed with
the views of the Ministers. The King's warlike ardour appeared to them almost
like a romantic vision, which must vanish at the stern
Ch. III.]
FALSE
POSITION OF PRUSSIA.
377
touch of reality. And, in fact, the Prussian Government was at present
in a thoroughly false and untenable position. To continue the war with
France, and at the same time to remain on the present ill terms with Austria,
was a contradiction in itself; the evil consequences of which Prussia was by no
means strong enough to bear. There was evidently but one choice. Either the King must forego his French laurels,
or make any, not too intolerable,
sacrifices to restore the alliauce with Austria. Unfortunately the King wanted
the strength of mind to resign himself to the inevitable,
or even to recognize the necessity of so doing. He felt that he was in
the right as against Austria, and he had good reasons for not sacrificing
either Bavaria or Poland to her; but he could not be made to see, that in .this
case no real understanding could be come to, and that,
consequently, the continuance of the French war was a folly. As long as he
remained in this mood, the sober and relentless common sense of Manstein had
the decided advantage over him. After the breach with Austria, all the nearest
and most practical interests of the monarchy called for peace. At home
there was the exhaustion of the treasury, and the apathy of the provinces;
abroad, the untrustworthiness of Catharine, and the undisguised enmity of
"Thugut. This was evidently not the position of affairs in which to
stake the last drop of blood for the sake of such allies, in an unpromising
struggle against the French. There was, indeed, another point, from which a
clearer eye might have taken a very different view of affairs; the armaments of the Committee of Public Safety might have revealed to the
genuine statesman the infinite danger which the nascent
military dictatorship was preparing for our quarter of the
globe. When this was once understood, that which under usual circumstances- might appear madness, would be the
highest wisdom; to escape Jena and Tilsit, the most painful concessions should
have been made to Austria. But such reflections only occurred
to a few English statesmen and French Emigres;
378
REVOLT
OF POLAND.
[Book IX.
neither in Austria nor Prussia do we find a trace of such thoughts
among any of the men in power. "No doubt," wrote Manstein to
Tauenzien at this time, " our cooperation against the French is very
desirable, but it must not be given at our expense,
for that would be to sacrifice ourselves for the common good, which would be
absurd." He was well pleased, however, that the negotiation respecting the
subsidies should go on, because Prussia and Germany would certainly obtain
a more favourable peace in Paris, the more thoroughly they
continued to be armed. He thought that when once the money was obtained, the
army should remain on the Rhine to protect the German
Empire with full force, while the King—if possible in concert with England and
Germany—should secretly find" out what terms
France was inclined to offer for the attainment of peace. As a channel for such
offers, an agent, formerly employed in Paris, named Cetto, had already started
for that city in January.1 In
his master's present mood Manstein could not directly check the
impatience with which Frederick AVilliam opened the fresh negotiation with Lord
Malmesbury; but the warm and impetuous zeal of the King for war was by no means
to his taste. He therefore threw every possible hindrance in the way of the negotiations, but was for the moment completely unhorsed by
a skilful thrust of the English diplomatist. Malmesbury, who was a
great amateur in the knowledge and treatment of individual characters and moods
—a clever, bold, and proud adept in the art of influencing important affairs by insignificant means—had made use of Haugwitz's jealousy against his colleagues, and had suggested to him to
transfer the whole negotiation to the Hague, and for this purpose to go with
him to Holland. The King, who consented to every thing which
might procure the means for a new campaign, repeatedly expressed to Malmesbury
his
1 Manstein to Mollendorf Feb. 24. to
Vieregg, Jan. 18. (Staatsarckiv
at (Mollendorfs Correspondenz)
Posch Munich.)
Cu.
III.] MALMESBURY'S
NEGOTIATION WITH PRUSSIA. 379
desire of taking the command of the army in person, and sent orders tto
Mollendorf, as we have seen, to lead the troops away from Mayence, indeed, but
not further than Cologne, where the King would probably join him and lead the army over into Belgium.
Perhaps if these instructions had been carried out immediately, no obstacle would have deterred the King from his purpose. But
unfortunately, after the Austrian refusal, Lord Malmesbury was without any
instructions from his Government,
and had opened the new negotiation at his own risk and responsibility. He was
on the whole sure of the assent of his Ministers, if he succeeded in keeping
Prussia to the Coalition; but, on the other hand, he did not at all know what
Pitt thought about the details of the war, or how
he would employ the Prussian army after the conclusion of the compact. During
his journey to the Hague he received the complaints of Coburg; the Dutch
Government itself addressed him in the same tone, and all implored him to use his influence in favour of protecting the
Rhine frontier. He was obliged to confess to himself that though his
negotiations had retarded the withdrawal of Prussia from the Coalition, they
had only accelerated the retreat of Mollendorf from Mayence.
The possibility presented itself to his lively mind, that Pitt might concur in
the views of Coburg and the Dutch; and he .therefore suddenly declared to Count
Haugwitz, that he would entirely break off the discussion, unless every
thing was left in statu quo on the Rhine, until the arrival of an answer from London. 1
Haugwitz, on his side, had letters from Mollendorf, in which the latter
expressed
1 The editor of Malmesbury's papers only mentions this important point incidentally in a note. This book, though it contains much valuable matter, is on the whole onesided and incomplete;
many despatches have been omitted or curtailed without recognisable reason, and the opinions are throughout extremely prejudiced. In the case before us, the circumstance that Malmesbury himself detained the
Prussian
380
REVOLT
OF POLAND.
[Book IX.
the greatest disinclination to a Belgian crusade; he therefore
determinedto prepare the fatal order according toMalniesbury's wish, and the
march of the Prussian army was stopped. Malmesbury had
soon reason enough to repent of his ebullition of feeling. No sooner had
the definitive negotiation begun at the Hague, than the answer arrived from
London, to the effect that England not only approved of the march of the Prussians to Belgium, but made it a condition of the subsidy. On the
other hand Manstein informed Haugwitz, that the king still wished to
go in person to the army, but that at present—chiefly on account of the
Emperor's being in Belgium,—he preferred the Rhenish theatre of war, and would
make his appearance in it with 85,000 men; while for Belgium, if England
insisted upon it, he would only grant 50,000 men. What would Malmesbury have
given, if he could only have annihilated his former protest against the march to Cologne! But it was now too late; Haugwitz would not hear a
word about any express obligation to carry on the war in
Belgium. As, however, in all other respects he showed the most ready
compliance, Malmesbury determined to seek a compromise. -Haugwitz promised, in consideration of a subsidy of 87,000 pounds
sterling per month,1 to
raise an army of 62,400 men, which was to be ready for the field four weeks
after the payment of the first instalment—probably by the 24th of May. The
conquests made by this force were to be at the disposal
of the Maritime Powers; while the troops were to be employed
in such quarters as seemed for the interest of these Powers, according to a
military compact to be concluded between the three States.
army
on the Rhine, did not suit the Editor's general
opinion, that the delay of the Prussians in leaving Mayence was a piece of
treachery, and he therefore slurs it over. — 1 Malmesbury's Diary III, 91. £ 50,000 were to be paid to
the troops, and £ 37,000 for food and forage.
Ch.
III.] MANSTEIN CHECKS THE KING'S MARTIAL ARDOUR. 381
The ultimate object, therefore, was to be in accordance with the aims
of the English, but the mode of obtaining that object, and the choice of the
theatre of war, were to be reserved for a future
agreement between the generals. Malmesbury, on his side, from a consideration
of the whole subject, regarded the choice of Belgium as certain; while the king
of Prussia, on the other hand, was rejoicing in the thought that he should at
last be able to go to the Rhine.1 This
real divergence of opinion, in the midst of apparent harmony, naturally brought
with it serious consequences when the time for action
came. But what was still worse, Manstein continued his endeavours to cool down
the martial ardour of the king, and every day brought
him fresh aid from the East in doing this. As early as the 6th of April he
wrote to Haugwitz, that the king wished to start for the army at once, and had
with great difficulty been induced to defer his departure for a week; but that he, Manstein, nevertheless considered this determination as
still doubtful; the absence of the king from Berlin, he said, appeared to him
extremely mischievous, more espe-v cially
on account of Poland; and the Ministers, he added, agreed in this opinion. He explained his view of the position
of affairs more at length, in a letter of the 10th of April; he lamented that
Haugwitz had granted the 62,000 men without making it a condition that they
should be employed on the Rhine; it was indeed natural, he
said, and
1 This exact account of the affair,
drawn as it is from the documents on either side, indisputably proves, we
think, that it is unjust to accuse Haugwitz of duplicity in this affair, when
he allowed, in his conversation with the English agent, the possibility of a war in Belgium, and afterwards assured Marshal
Mollendorf that the choice of the battle ground was still open. A letter of
his to Malmesbury, written in June, is still extant, in which he describes the
course of the negotiation in the manner stated above, and Lord
Malmesbury was not able to deny its accuracy.
382
REVOLT
OF POLAND.
[Book IX.
fair, that if the Maritime Powers furnished the money, they should
determine the arena of the contest; but he could not see how the army could possibly leave the Rhine, or what was to take its place. But
he added that the king must not even go to the Rhine. "The reason of
this," he said, "is the Polish affair. Igelstrom urgently begs for
our assistance; if we give it, no one but the king,
and he only in Berlin, can arrange the details. But he thinks of nothing but
the French war; I fear he takes the Polish matter— which by itself could have
no serious consequences—too easily." In the midst of these cautious and
anxious deliberations, the
wary politician comforts himself with help from above. "The Lord be with
you, my dear Haugwitz," he concluded, "and guide you in all your
ways; and He will do this, if we are only faithful to Him, and depend upon Him
with all our souls; this is all that is necessary, however dark the
prospect may be."
While he was writing these words, affairs in Poland had turned out much
worse than he had feared. The revolt had begun, and sjpread with a rapidity
which surpassed all expectations.
The disbanding of the Polish soldiers was to begin in the
first half of March. It took place in some regiments without difficulty; the
men dispersed with complaints and threats, and most of them took the direction
of Warsaw, which they succeeded in reaching, although the Russians had drawn a triple cordon round it, to keep off .the unwelcome guests.
But when the order reached Brigadier Madalinski, who lay in garrison at Pultusk
with ten squadrons of cavalry, he openly refused obedience,
collected his troops, and threw himself into*the low swampy grounds on the
Narew near Ostrolenka. The poorer nobles of the neighbourhood flocked to his
standard, and increased his force to about 2,000 men. The excitement caused
throughout the country by this step, and especially in Warsaw, was immense; the discharge of soldiers suddenly came everywhere to a stand-
Ch.
III.] IMBECILE CONDUCT OF IGELSTROM. 383
still; the Warsaw regiments dismissed sixteen men, and then declared to
General Igelstrom that they had fulfilled the order. The latter received, at the same time, the first trustworthy accounts from Lithuania
of the numbers and plans of Kosciusko's associations. He saw himself
all at once exposed to a danger which threatened the whole kingdom , and was as completely without presence of mind in this dilemma, as he had been haughty and obstinate in prosperity. To
the great encouragement of the Poles, he first of all had his furniture packed,
and sent his mistress off to Russia. He kept the Russian garrison in Warsaw
under arms day and night, wearied his troops, and formed a new
plan every day for crushing the revolt. After long indecision two small columns
were sent out against Madalinski, but these were no longer
able to overtake the bold cavalry chief, who had first turned eastwards against
the new Prussian province, dispersed the small posts of hussars on the
frontier, and plundered the public money chests in some of the districts; then,
taking a sudden turn towards the south, he crossed the Vistula, marched past
Warsaw, and made with all speed towards the districts of Cracow.
Igelstrom, utterly bewildered, sought help in every quarter, but could not make
up his mind to follow anybody's advice. Pistor, his
quartermaster-general, an able and energetic officer, called upon him to disarm
the Polish regiments in Warsaw; but he sighed and
said that that would cost a horrible amount of bloodshed, and make the revolt
general. The Prussian ambassador, Buchholz, called his attention to the
importance of the arsenal at Warsaw, the only large depot of arms in all Poland, and begged him at any cost to occupy the building with
Russian troops; but he only answered by an. urgent request that
Prussia would interfere, and occupy the whole country as far as the Vistula,
including Cracow and Warsaw. On the intelligence of Madalinski's marches, his
first idea was to leave Warsaw, where he was in the greatest danger between the
Polish garrison and the
384
REVOLT
OF POLAND.
[Book IX.
excited citizens, and to hasten after the Polish general with all his
forces. He was detained, however, by the increasing ferment in the capital,
where^the inns were crowded with needy noblemen, discharged soldiers, and
adventurers of every sort, and where the 25th of March was openly talked of as
the day for the general rising. From the country districts, however,
intelligence arrived that the great landowners had shown themselves very
lukewarm during Madalinski's passage, and had made their cooperation dependent on the aid of some foreign Power. Meanwhile the 25th passed
over in Warsaw without disturbance, and Igelstrom
thereupon sent off Generals Denissow and Tor-massow with 7,000 men against
Madalinski, stationed three battalions and ten squadrons some miles south of
Warsaw, and destined the main body of his forces, about 8,000 men, to keep the city itself in check.
It was just at this moment that the military revolt at Cracow avowed
its real character, and proclaimed itself as a national Revolution. On the
intelligence of Madalinski's exploit, Kosciusko hastened from Dresden; on the 23rd, a Polish battalion drove the few Russian companies which
were still quartered in Cracow out of the city; a few hours afterwards
Kosciusko himself arrived, and immediately took the lead of the movement. On
the 24th the troops and inhabitants took the oath of unconditional obedience to him. In an earnest and solemn
manifesto he pourtrayed the disgraceful subjugation of the country
by the Russians and Prussians, proclaimed the determination of the country to
conquer, or to die for freedom, and decreed the suspension of all the
authorities which had hitherto submitted to the enemies of the nation. He said
that until the country should be set free, he should assume the dictatorship,
and that the government at home , would be carried on by a National Council to be appointed by himself. He then, with restless activity,
arranged the administration of Cracow, appointed new officials, endeavoured
to procure money and
Cu.
III.] KOSCIUSKO'S VICTORY AT
RACLAWICZE.
385
provisions, and sent a summons to all the men in the neighbourhood
capable of bearing arms. Six days afterwards he left the city on hearing that
Madalinski, hard pressed by the Russians, was approaching by forced marches. He
went to meet him with a reinforcement of more than 2,000 men, collected on his march a few hundred peasants armed with scythes, and
having effected a junction with Madalinski first came upon the vanguard of the
enemy on the 4th, not far from Raclawicze.
This was General Tormassow with about 4,000 men—a force nearly equal to that of the Poles in numbers, and far ' superior in artillery.
Fortunately for the Poles he had separated some days before from Demissow,
whom, as a mere general of Cossacks, he did not choose to obey; and now again,
from jealousy of his colleague, he proceeded to make a hasty attack,
in order to reap the glory of conquering the rebels for himself alone. He
divided his force into three columns, which, separated by woody ravines and
hills, advanced singly against the Poles without
communications or reserves. At the very beginning of the
battle Kosciusko ' defeated the centre column by a bold bayonet charge, during
which the scythe-men rushed upon the Russian batteries, and cut down the
gunners at their guns. The enemy's wings were thus separated from one another; the right wing, however, repulsed an attack of the mounted
nobles, and Kosciusko's personal efforts were necessary at this point to decide
the victory; whereupon the last column left the field without further
resistance. The Russians lost about 400 killed, 800 missing, and 12
guns; yet the victors, in spite I of their small losses, were in such a state
of confusion and dissolution, that Kosciusko retreated during the night in the
direction of Cracow. The flying cavalry had filled the country as far as Cracow with the report of the defeat of the Poles; and Kosciusko
was so enraged at their cowardice, that he changed his nobleman's dress for a
peasant's frock,
in. 2
B
386
REVOLT
OF POLAND.
[Book XL
and swore to wear the latter until the nobility
had wiped out this shameful stain.
The news of this engagement fell like a thunderbolt upon Igelstrom. It
was not possible to keep it secret in Warsaw; it passed from mouth to mouth
with the rapidity of lightning, and became the watchword in
every quarter for the decisive catastrophe. The
position of the Russian general was all the more critical because Tormassow
after his defeat had made a lateral movement, and left the road to Warsaw open
to the victorious Poles. Tormassow begged for reinforcements with piteous complaints, and Igelstrom sent him the division which was
stationed at Lublin, after which he himself had simply no means at all of
isolating the capital, and keeping it in check from without. Pistor hereupon
entered into a negotiation with the Polish government, respecting the necessary means of keeping possession of Warsaw.
The leading men, who were conscious of being more hateful to the patriots than
the Russians themselves, were quite prepared to take up the contest against the
Revolution, and readily acceded to the proposals of
the Russian officer. But the conspiracy had stretched its ramifications even into the highest official circles, and it was in this
way that the conspirators gained information of all the plans aud arrangements
of the Russians. They learned that Igelstrom had not ventured to demand the
occupation of the arsenal by Russian troops, nor the disarming, of the Polish
regiments.1 They
hastened all the more to complete the works in the arsenal, and to distribute
the store of arms to the troops and citizens. They
determined at all hazards to take advantage of the favourable moment, and to
begin the
1 It was only an artifice to excite
disguised in Polish uniforms. His
the
citizens, when the shoemaker neighbour the tailor, he said,
who
Kilinski afterwards
(on the 11th) was employed to
make the uniforms,
spread
the report that the Russians had given him the information, were going to
occupy the arsenal,
Cii.
III.] IGELSTROM ASKS IN VAIN FOR
PRUSSIAN AID. 387
contest as quickly as possible. The troops were
worked upon by the generals Ozarowski and Mokranowski, and the artisans by a
shoemaker named Kilinski; and at the same time the word was passed to Grodno to
begin the revolt in Lithuania also, on the same day as in Warsaw— the 17tli" of April. To all. appearance the capital was quieter
than ever; but in secret the heads of the.conspiracy were actively at work, and
on the 15th distributed 50,000 cartridges to the population in one day.
Meanwhile Igelstrom repeatedly urged the Prussian general Schwerin to send him help; but the Government at
Berlin was unwilling . to believe in the extent of the danger, and the king,
especially, all whose thoughts were turned to the French war, did not choose to
fritter away his strength. He therefore
decidedly rejected the demand of Igelstrom that he should occupy all the Polish
country as far as the Vistula, from Cracow to Warsaw; he was unwilling, he
said, to meddle with Cracow, if it were only on account of the excitable jealousy of Austria. The violation of South Prussia
by Madalinski's march only excited in him the thought of incorporating the
border town of Zakrozyn, in the neighbourhood of Warsaw, which he had
been prevented by Sievers from obtaining at the last partition. General Wolky, therefore, was directed to occupy the place with some squadrons of
cavalry and two battalions of infantry, and then to place himself at the
disposal of the Russian commander, in case of need. But he was
far too weak to afford any effectual aid, and the
appearance of his orderlies in Warsaw only served to raise the exasperation of
the Poles to the highest pitch. With ever-increasing despair Igelstrom saw
himself entirely left to his own resources, which he regarded as utterly
inadequate.
For the moment, however, this depression of the
Russian general was his most dangerous enemy. The country had not yet risen en
masse, the. victory of Raclawicze had only brought Kosciusko a few bands from
Lublin and Chelm,
2B2
388
REVOLT
OF POLAND.
[Book IX.
and the rest of the provinces waited for the
example of the capital. In Warsaw the patriotic party could reckon for the
present on the Polish troops alone—four battalions of infantry, ten companies
of artillery and pioneers, and nine squadrons of cavalry—in all scarcely four thousand men; a force which could only become
formidable when bricked by a rising of the population, since Igelstrom had more
than double the number of Russian troops—namely, nine battalions of infantry
and eight squadrons of cavalry.1 But he himself, and most of his officers by his example, were thoroughly
paralysed by exaggerated ideas of their own danger. "I never saw
people," wrote Buchholz, "in such a terrible fright." All that
the cool-blooded and intrepid Pistor proposed to Igelstrom seemed to him equally dangerous and unfeasible; he could not even be
brought to remove his head-quarters from the palace of the Russian
Embassy,—which was situated amidst narrow and many-cornered lanes—into a more
open part of the city. He remained, as if chained to the spot by some
demoniacal influence, in torpid inactivity; and it was only with the greatest
trouble that he could at last be brought to agree to some definite plan of
defence. In drawing it up Pistor had an eye chiefly to the security of the headquarters, and the isolation of the Polish
regiments. As the barracks of the latter were situated at opposite ends of the
city, the Russian battalions. were pushed forward to each of these extremities,
with directions to prevent the entrance of Polish troops
into the interior of the city; but, in case of need, to retire to
head-quarters, and there form a united and imposing force. The disadvantageous
side of this plan, was, evidently, the remoteness of the occupied quarters of]
the city, and the distance of the several forces from each
other; in case of a contest, all depended upon their success in keeping and
acting together.
1 The disposable force was 7,9-43
Treskow, page 41, estimates them men; Polit. Journal 1794, I, 620. — at 8,400 men.
Ch. III.]
RISING
IN WARSAW.
389
On the 16th of April the city was quieter than ever; the insurgents had
just completed their preparations. On the morning of the 17th, about four
o'clock, a troop of mounted guards burst from their barracks and attacked a
Russian post in the neighbourhood of the Royal
palace. The report of the firing, by which the latter endeavoured to defend
themselves, was followed by several cannon shots from the arsenal as a signal
for the Polish troops and the insurgent people; the "Crown guards" therefore hastened in a body to the arsenal, and several companies
crossed over into the city from Praga in boats. Dzialinski's regiment, whose
barracks were in the Cracow suburb, prepared at the same time to force an
entrance into the old city, and in all the streets armed mobs were
formed, which fell with infinite fury upon individual Russians. Several hundred
soldiers, who were hastening to their divisions, orderlies and adjutants who were carrying orders from head-quarters to the advanced
posts, were slain in this way in the first few hours,
and often amidst cruel tortures; the communication between Igelstrom and most
of his battalions was completely interrupted. Before long a swarm of some
hundred workmen and soldiers moved from the lanes of the old city against the Russian head-quarters, but were repulsed with much
bloodshed by the one battalion and a half which was posted there. A second
and third attempt had no better result, so that towards ten o'clock the people
desisted from their attack, and contented themselves with blockading
the palace, and keeping up a continual fire of musketry. Meanwhile the chase
after single Russians continued without intermission. A portion of the mob came
upon two companies which happened on this day to be going to take the sacrament, —and had . on that account assembled unarmed in the
early morning for divine worship—and cut them down to a man without mercy. The
struggle raged equally fiercely in the Cracow suburb with the regiment
Dzialinski. Two Russian battalions, supported by some cavalry, separated
390
REVOLT
OF POLAND.
[Book IX.
into several divisions and occupied the entrances of the different
streets. They had received orders not to allow the Poles to pass, but not to
commence hostilities; and the leaders of the divisions, who were
addressed as friends by the Poles, and called upon in the name of the king, who
was allied with Russia, to give them a passage, were a prey to the most cruel
uncertainty. An attempt to get new orders from Igelstrom failed; Dzialinski thereupon attacked one of the Russian posts with his whole
force; and as the other, divisions in their stupefaction and bewilderment
adhered to the letter of their orders, and remained immovable each at its own
post, the Russians were speedily overwhelmed, nearly two companies cut to
pieces, and their line of defence bloodily broken through. About this time the
firing at head-quarters had already subsided; the Russian officers at a
distance thought that they had been overpowered and that all was lost; they therefore marched the divisions in the southern quarter of the
city, not back to Igelstrom, according to their orders, but to the
nearest gate. They hoped in this way to escape destruction themselves, and at
the same time to save the great park of artillery, which had been stationed
in a neighbouring village. The remains of five battalions—more than half the
Russian force—gradually assembled at this spot, and held a
confused consultation as to what was to be done next.
Their leader, General Nowitzki, saw nothing but danger and
disaster in every direction, and thought that there was no choice but between
disgrace and ruin. Several hours passed in inactive despair; then a surgeon
arrived from head-quarters, who had stolen through the Polish mobs, and brought new orders from Igelstrom to join him at all hazards. Soon
after noon, therefore, they once more prepared for an attack on the rebellious
citizens. Nowitzki told off about two-thirds of his men for this undertaking
under Colonel Klugen, who then moved forward in a long column, and
at first passed without resistance through the more thinly inhabited
Ch. III.]
DEFEAT
OF THE RUSSIANS.
391
streets of the suburbs. Gradually, however, as they approached the interior of the city a hostile fire was commenced; it came from a troop of perhaps
sixty Poles, who with a single gun boldly threw themselves in the way of the
enemy's force, and received the head of the Russian column with grape shot.
Colonel Klugen immediately halted; his soldiers murmured, refused to advance, or even to fire on the Poles. The despairing officer
stood for three hours in this way, hearing the thunder of the cannon from headquarters, and unable to advance a step. Towards evening he returned to
Nowitzki, and they both marched, helpless and bewildered, into the falling
darkness, with the sole idea of seeking deliverance from the nearest Prussian
or Russian division. The fate of Warsaw was thus decided. Towards evening; the
remnants of some of the battalions stationed in the northern parts of the city collected round Igelstrom; but they had all suffered
cruelly, the soldiers were in a great measure desperate' or stupified, and many
of them could not be prevented from plundering the neighbouring houses, where,
in their intoxication and isolation, they soon fell helpless
into the hands of the Poles. Fortunately for the Russian general things looked
no better on the enemy's side; Mokranowski, who had assumed the chief command,
was unable towards evening to collect any considerable force for a decisive attack. The night, therefore, passed in tolerable quiet, and
on the 18th, Igelstrom, roused from his long vacillation by Pistor, forced his
way with about 700 men through the Polish street-combatants, hard pressed and
several times in the greatest danger, until he reached the
gate, where he was received by the Prussians under General Wolky. Warsaw was in
the possession of the revolutionists after a two days' contest, in which, as
was afterwards learnt, scarcely 2,500 Poles had taken an active part,1
1 Pistor proves this in a very loss
of the Poles amounted to 209 exact account of the affair. The
killed and 147 wounded.
392
REVOLT
OF POLAND.
[Book IX.
but which, through the feebleness of their commander, and their own
want of courage and discipline, had cost the Russians nearly two-thirds of their army,1
eleven guns, and the reputation of military superiority.
The din of war and anarchy was heard throughout the city during the
whole day, even after the departure of Igelstrom. Small Russian detachments, sentinels who had been forgotten or cut off,
stragglers and plunderers, were dispersed by the mobs, and generally cut to
pieces. /Parties of soldiers who had been taken prisoners were dragged from one
building to another, and in their passage through tire streets too often
became the victims of the people's unbridled hatred. It was with
difficulty that the revolutionary leaders protected the members of the Russian
embassy; and they vainly strove to save the houses of the Polish magnates of the Russian party from plunder and destruction. Several members of the
last Diet—Ankwitz, Bishop Kossakowsky, the Hetmann Ozarowski and General
Zabiello—were arrested by the raging populace, and a Revolutionary Tribunal was
appointed to enquire into their acts of .treachery. For the time,
indeed, the armed workmen and vagabonds had completely
the upper hand. Mokranowsky was confirmed by acclamation in the post of
Commander-in-chief, and Zakr-zewski was placed at the head of the civil
administration; in the other departments the government
was carried on by a Provisional Committee, in which Kapustas and Kilinski
played the chief part in a sufficiently noisy manner. The patriotic ardour of
the richer citizens was thoroughly cooled on the very first day by these excesses; they saw their property in immediate danger from a
lawless mob, and trembled at the revenge of the great Powers which threatened
them from a distance. King Stanislaus
considered the fate
1 122 men wounded, 2,265
killed, more than 2,000 prisoners. Polit.
Journal,
loco citato.
Ch. III.]
REVOLT
OF LITHUANIA.
393
of Poland sealed by these acts of violence, but readily issued a
declaration that he made common cause with the nation, without however
inspiring confidence in any one.
Exactly similar catastrophes to that of Warsaw
took place at the same time in Samogitia and Lithuania. The indefatigable conspirator Jasinski had gained over about 200 men in Wilna for
the revolt—students, priests, officers, and Jews; he could moreover reckon upon
two companies of Polish infantry belonging to the garrison of the city. He
managed to lull the Russian general Arseniew into the most complete security,
by a show of openhearted frankness; so that the latter, after receiving many
warnings, called him to account at a ball, and asked him whether
it was possible that he was engaged in a plot. Jasinski replied with immovable
cheerfulness, that nothing in the world was impossible; and when the General,
entering into the joke, went on to ask him how he intended to overpower himself and his 2,000 Russians, Jasinski rejoined with perfect
sangfroid,
to the great terror of his accomplices, who were hanging breathlessly on his words: "Well," he said, "I shall surprise
and arrest you late in the evening in your dwelling, and
then easily manage the soldiers, scattered as they are through the town,-when
deprived of their leader." The general laughed, and was quite convinced of
Jasinski's innocence. But on the evening of the 23rd of April, the plan which
Jasinski had laughingly revealed was carried out with
complete success. First Arseniew, and then, in the
course of the night, 1,500 of his men were surprised and taken prisoners, and
the feeble remains of the Russian force, were driven with great bloodshed out
of the city. Upon this Colonel Sicianow, mistrusting his
own strength, evacuated Grodno also, and the whole of Lithuania was a few days
afterwards in a state of insurrection. In Wilna, too, the patriots fell with
the same fury as in Warsaw upon their Russianised countrymen; General Kossakowski was arrested, and in twenty-four hours was
hanged as a traitor to his country. The
394
REVOLT
OF POLAND.
[Book IX.
news of his excution at once decided the fate of his brother and the
other prisoners in Warsaw; they too suffered death at the hands of the
executioner on the 9th of May, after a short and irregular trial. The more
moderate patriots longed for the arrival of Kosciusko, because they expected
from his high feeling of honour a speedy termination to all these scenes of horror. But matters were already in such a confused and unhinged state, that three weeks passed before the general
received the slightest intelligence of the revolt in Warsaw. He was at that
time making the greatest exertions to arm the peasants in the palatinates of Cracow and Sendomir; but his efforts were entirely
frustrated by the apathy of the serfs, and the open disfavour of the landed
proprietors, who in every - peasant that fell for his country saw nothing but a
loss of income. Kosciusko, therefore, was for a long time unable to
renew the attack on Tormassow's Russians, until at last the troops of the line
in the province of Lublin raised the standard of insurrection, drove away their
Generals, who warned them of the consequences, and placed the zealous patriot Colonel Grochowski at their head.1
Further aid arrived from the Ukraine, whence some divisions,—amounting to of
6,000 men—which had been forced into the Russian service in the preceding
autumn, breaking through the surrounding garrisons, forced
their way, with desperate courage to Kosciusko.2
Henceforth the General might consider himself as the virtual master of the
whole Polish territory, with the exception of that portion which was actually
occupied by the remnant of the Russians, and the heads
of the Prussian columns.
Such were the reports which, on and after the 26th of April, burst upon
Berlin, hour after hour in uninterrupted succession, like peals of thunder,
announcing a catastrophe pregnant with the most momentous consequences. It was evident that contingencies were here arising, just as iin-
1 Zajonezek 109. — 2 Treskow 61, Zajonczek 117.
Ch.
III.] EFFECTS OF POLISH INSURRECTION ON
EUROPE. 395
portant to Europe as the consequenees of the Freneh war, and 'still
more immediately so to Prussia. Even before the
outbreak in Warsaw, Lucehesiui had sent in a memorial from Vienna, on the 7th
of April, whieh elearly delineated the ehange in the state of matters produced
by the Polish insurrection. It was all over for a long time to eome with the Russian plans of eonquest in Turkey; it was all over, therefore,
with Austria's hope of gaining for herself a share of Eastern booty. All the
more violent, of eourse, would" be the anger of Catharine against the
authors of this disturbance: the utter annihilation of Poland was without
doubt ■ already deereed in the excited mind of the Empress. This then
might eonsole the Emperor also for the failure of his Turkish sehemes. Nothing
was to be looked for with greater eertainty than an Austrian proposal for a third partition of Poland, which would at
once hold out a prospeet to the Emperor of obtaining the long-cherished objeet
of his ardent desires, and a rich compensation for the Freneh war. But how was
Prussia affeeted by these changes? The conflagration in
Poland threatened the Prussian State in a dangerous manner, sinee the rebellion
would in all probability soon extend to Prussian Poland.
Prussia, therefore, must arm, and must eome forward all the more energetically,
since she would have to maintain her influence, and perhaps her
political independence, against the rivalry of both the Imperial eourts. If
Prussia eould sueceed in crushing the revolt before the appearance of the two
Powers—if she were the first to occupy Craeow, and to seize this eity, whieh was equally important to Kosciusko and to Austria, with a firm
hand—then and then only eould she take up a dignified and deeisive attitude in
the Polish question. But to effect this, one thing was indispensable—to have
" the free disposal of all the forees of the monarehy. It was
impossible }o earry on a great war at the same time on the Rhine and on the
Vistula; that which had long appeared desirable—the with
39G
REVOLT
OF POLAND.
[Book IX.
drawal of Mollendorf from the French theatre of war—had now become a necessity.
The Ministers thanked the Marquis for this precise exposition of the only system of which they approved. But the memorial
had but little effect upon the king, in the first instance, because it reached
him almost at the same moment as the Hague treaty, and the
king had no taste for anything but the warlike glory which
was opened to him there. Yet even then a few regiments in Silesia and East
Prussia were placed upon a war footing, and pushed forward towards Poland. But these armaments were not carried on with
any great earnestness, until after the insurrections in Warsaw and Wilna, when
the whole of Poland seemed to be in flames, and, consequently, the eastern
frontier of Prussia seriously threatened in its whole
extent. Orders were sent in great haste to mobilise
64 battalions of infantry and 8,500 cavalry—in all nearly 50,000 men—with which
General Favrat was in the first place to cover and support the remnants of the Russian army, amounting to about 12,000 men. Hereupon Manstein ventured to hint—at first very gently, but soon more and more
emphatically—of what great importance the new theatre of war was to Prussia;
how uselessly she was sacrificing herself in the French contest for England and
Austria; how important it was to her to protect herself in
Poland, as much against Austria as against Kosciusko; and how, consequently,
the whole position of affairs demanded the personal presence of the King, not
on the Rhine, but on the Vistula. When he had got so far, however, he was interrupted by the decided impatience of the king, who was resolutely
determined to have his tilt with the Jacobins; the only thing which Manstein
could obtain was an accelerated order to Favrat to cross the Polish frontier as
soon as possible, and to commence the contest against the
rebels. Meanwhile Kosciusko tried to negotiate with Prussia through the
ambassador Buchholz, who was detained in Warsaw. He sent him word that he had with the
greatest
Ch.
III.] MANSTEIN ADVISES THE KING TO GO TO POLAND. 397
reluctance adopted hostile measures against Prussia; that he was ready
to make peace, and even to guarantee the present Prussian boundary, if Prussia
would no longer grant a refuge . to the Russian troops. He even promised to
leave the Russians in possession of the territory acquired in
the preceding war, if they made no further
attempt to interfere with the internal independence of the remaining Republican
territory. The king, indeed, decidedly refused all one-sided negotiations with
Poland, and directed Buchholz to answer all overtures of
this kind by demanding his passport; but Kosciusko's offer made a deep
impression upon him, inasmuch as it afforded the possibility
of quickly settling the Polish difficulty, and then proceeding with the
long-desired campaign on the Rhine. But Manstein
considered that the critical moment had now arrived. After secretly assuring
himself of the support of Geusau and the Foreign Minister, he declared to the
king on the 5th of May, with all submission, but with the greatest decision, that before the termination of the Polish contest His
Majesty must not go to the Rhine. The king unconcernedly replied that he could
not understand that; that he felt sure that the matter might be arranged by
negotiations in which he was by no means wanted. But Manstein had
considered his subject in all its bearings, and had a ready answer to every
objection, Hitherto, he cried, there could be no talk of commencing serious
negotiations, since every day brought news of fresh hostilities on the part of the Poles. Hesitation, he said, was no longer possible, but, on
the contrary, incessant and energetic action was
absolutely necessary; the king must leave Berlin on the 12th, reach the army on
the 14th, commence operations on the 15th, take Cracow and
Warsaw, drive the enemy over the Vistula, and then, if it must be so, commence
negotiations. "Or are we," he said at the conclusion of his
passionate declamation, "to disarm in the face of such an insurrection?
And if not, from what resources are we to maintain 50,000 men in the field
during
398
REVOLT
OF POLAND.
[Book IX.
the whole summer?" The king looked about in embarrassment for an evasive answer: "Can we," said he, at last,
"reckon on the support of the Russians in such an operation?" "I
should think,"' said Manstein, "that they will not allow the
affront offered .to them to go unavenged, nor leave us alone to do what we like
in Poland. In short," he continued with increased warmth,
"everything urges us to assume the offensive on the Vistula, and there alone. As soon as the struggle begins in that quarter,
we must signify to Austria that we are ourselves in the case of needing an
auxiliary corps of 20,000 men, according to the terms of our alliance; and if
Austria, as no doubt she will, refuses to send us aid, we will
recall that number from our own Rhine army, and can then quietly await the
issue." Here, however, the king flew out, saying that in this way the
French war would never be brought to an end, and that he wished to hear no more
of such proposals. Manstein remained unmoved.
"Your majesty," said he, "must remember that after all each of
our Allies is only playing his own game. Your Majesty alone keeps the common
interest in view, and desires to go honestly to work; but since all the others are selfish, Prussia will be a great sufferer if she does not
likewise look exclusively to her own advantage." This theme was as
inexhaustible as the list of complaints against the policy of Austria; the king
defended himself for a while, but at the end of the conference yielded
to the arguments of his adjutant. With a sigh he agreed to fix the 12th of May
as the day of his departure to Poland, and allowed instructions to be sent to
Mollendorf to make his arrangements for the possibility of the recall of 25,000 men from the Rhine.
The all-important step was hereby taken: the King had acceded to the
principle that the main interests of his State lay in the Polish, and not in
the French, war. To this Manstein held him fast, in spite of all his attempts to recur to the darling wish of his heart. At one time the king said
that he had received certain intelligence that the Rus-
Cir.
III.] THE KING CONSENTS WITH GREAT
RELUCTANCE. 399
sians were withdrawing entirely from Poland; at another, that South Prussia would revolt as soon as the troops marched off to Poland;
"We must, therefore," said the king, "beware of incautiously
assuming the offensive." It was not very difficult for Manstein to meet
such objections as these; for official intelligence had been received of the approach of Russian reinforcements; and as to the
ferment in South Prussia there was, of course, no more effectual method of
stopping it than a splendid victory over Kosciusko. The question of the recall
of the Rhenish troops presented greater difficulties; Manstein had
the support of the Minister at War, indeed, but he was decidedly opposed by
Mollendorf and Haugwitz, who energetically protested against such an open
breach of the lately concluded Hague Treaty. The king sided with them entirely, so that Manstein bitterly complained that none pulled at the
same rope with him, and proposed, in order to gain a supporter of his own
views, that Lucchesini should be recalled from Vienna to the King's
head-quarters in Poland. The king replied, to his
great astonishment, that it was still quite uncertain whether and when he
should be able to start for Poland. In his longing for the Rhine he had
actually discovered a not entirely groundless objection to the Polish
expedition, and made the utmost use of it. Immediately after the
beginning of the insurrection, Count Golz had received orders in St. Petersburg
to sound the views of Catharine respecting Poland; and after the entrance of
Wolky into that country, he was especially to enquire about Zakrozyn, and the compensation destined for Prussia
corresponding to her increased armaments. Golz reported that the catatrophe at
Warsaw had produced a terrible effect upon the whole of Russia, that one cry
for revenge and annihilation resounded through that mighty
empire, and that Catharine, scarcely able to maintain her composure,' had
ordered the speediest % preparations to be made. But with respect to her other plans, he said that
he had learnt nothing. She declared
-herself
400
REVOLT
OF POLAND.
[Book IX.
very grateful for the zeal of Prussia, but did not seem to trust
entirely to its continuance. She eagerly agreed to the proposal of the king to
rouse Austria from her neutrality towards Poland, and to induce her openly to
take part against Kosciusko. But with regard to the future
fate destined for Poland, he had been able to gain no information.
"Zakrozyn,1' said Ostermann, "is a subject of common interest, we will speak
of that hereafter." "We must not dispose," he said at another
time, "of the bear's hide, before the animal is
killed." The king made this reticence of the Russians the pretext for
declaring to general Manstein, on the 9th May, that he must after all postpone
his departure, until he received some clearer intelligence from St. Petersburg. Another long contest then began, which, however, ended like the
former one in the complete defeat of the King's wishes. "Heaven be
praised!" wrote Manstein to Mollendorf; "everything is once more in
good train." On the 14th the king left Berlin to take the command of his Polish army; Manstein was with him, and Lucchesini
hastened from Vienna to meet him. It was decided that Prussia should do nothing
more in the French war than what was absolutely unavoidable.
Let us now transplaut ourselves to the great
Western theatre of war, the blood-soaked soil of which only too quickly brought
to maturity the seed which had been scattered by the insurgent Poles.
Ch.
IV.]
401
CHAPTER IV. STRUGGLE FOR BELGIUM.
I Continuation of the war in la vendee.— Contests
in italy. — The
english
take corsica.—massena occupies saorgio.—arrival of the emperor francis in
belgium.—SlEGE of
landrecy.—fruitless attempts to relieve it.—landrecy
capitulates.—TlIUGUT prevents
further offensive operations.-VaIN
attempts of the french on
the
sambre.—plchegru gains a victory in flanders, near mouscron. —Coburg
resolves to go to flanders.—Negotiation of montgail-lard.—Battle of tourcoin.—Engagement at tournai.
While Eastern
Europe was stirred to its very depths by the plans of Russia and the explosion in Poland, the French war had already begun on the Ocean
and the Mediterranean; at first with many disasters to the Republicans, for
which they had chiefly themselves to blame.
We may remember the comprehensive plans of the Committee of Public Safety. On the one side the
long-prepared insurrections in Naples, Genoa and Turin, were to pave the way
for the armies of Dumerbion and Dumas over the Alps and Apennines, and put them
in possession of Italy. On the other, the French rulers hoped, after trampling out the last sparks of war in La Vendee, to be able to send
the Army of the West against the coasts of England in the beginning of spring, and to crush the most obstinate adversaries of the Republic beneath the walls of London. When these terrific blows had once been dealt, there seemed no doubt at all that
Austria, isolated on every side, would be easily overpowered; and then there
would be no limit in
ill.
2C
402
STRUGGLE
FOR BELGIUM.
[Book IX.
the whole of Europe to the arms of the Republic,
but the will of its Rulers. The French government, therefore, zealously urged
the commanders of the Army of the "West to commence operations even in the
middle of winter. Rossignol had been succeeded by
general Turreau, who had hitherto served in the Moselle Army—that is, an
officer was substituted for a Parisian demagogue; but unfortunately an officer
who was proud to call himself the friend of Rossignol,
and who intended to finish the civil war in accordance with the views of the
Hebertists. It was in the middle of January when he
undertook the command; at the time, therefore, in which Robespierre had once
more quarrelled with the Dantonists, and the Committee was again driven into
the paths of terrorism by Collot and St. Just. The Government, consequently, agreed entirely with the
general in his views respecting La Vendee; it was determined that the decree of
the 25th of August should now attain its long-desired accomplishment, and La
Vendee, in the literal sense of the words, be utterly annihilated. The burning of all inhabited places, the devastation of every
field, the cutting down of every wood, the removal of the few Republicans from
the land, the slaughter of all hostile or neutral inhabitants,
of whatever age or sex—these were the horribly simple outlines of Turreau's
system of war.1 He
thought that after having annihilated the great "Royal Catholic
army," he should be able to begin the work of devastation at once, since
only about three considerable leaders still kept the field, with small forces, in the interior of the revolted province; while, on the
coast, the somewhat stronger Charette was sufficiently occupied by General Haxo
at Nantes. In consequence of this weakness of his opponents, he did not scruple
to scatter his own forces over the whole
1 The official papers in
Guerre his Memoirs, that he had only been des Vendeens, Vol. Ill, show the the subservient tool of others, falsity of
Turreau's declaration in
Ch. IV.] THE "HELLISH COLUMNS" IN LA
VENDEE. 403
extent of the country, in order to carry the
devastation into all its districts at once. He therefore divided his troops
into twelve columns, which were to advance from different points towards the
interior, and step by step reduce the country to an uninhabited wilderness. These masses of men began to move towards the end of January.
Some of his officers, indeed, endeavoured to mitigate their task, which was
abhorrent to themselves, by the mode of its execution; others raised their
voices in warning against the political error of driving the
half-wearied rebels to despair, and therefore to fresh exertions; but their
orders were inexorable, and most of the instruments for carrying them' out had
long become callous to every form of horror. The'flames of the villages soon began to rise on every side; the inhabitants were slain as in a great battue,
the women dishonoured and then murdered, children and infants put to
death, amidst rude laughter, by tortures of various kinds. At first the
Republican army made considerable progress, and obtained some military
successes. The gallant La Roche-Jacquelin fell in the course of February;
Chollet, which in the preceding autumn had become a scene of
terrible remembrance for the Royalists, was once more occupied, and a broad
girdle of the country was transformed into a
smoking desert. But retribution for these atrocious deeds was close at hand.
The peasants, who since September had almost lost all hope, and were ready to
submit on condition that their lives were spared, once more banded themselves together in savage revolt, at the aspect of this pitiless
butchery. The old leaders Stofflet and Marigny, who had hitherto seen nothing
but timidity and exhaustion among their soldiers, suddenly found themselves
surrounded by thousands and thousands of men thirsting for
vengeance; and even in February they struck several of . the
"hellish columns" (as their enemies called themselves) with crushing
blows. Turreau now saw the whole extent of the land roused to fresh resistance,
and with shame and wrath had to announce to
2C2 ,
404
STRUGGLE
FOR BELGIUM.
[Book IX.
his Government, that he should need considerable reinforcements, even to maintain himself on the edge of the insurgent province.
When the season for great operations arrived, therefore,
the employment of the Western Army in the expedition against England had to be
indefinitely postponed.
The prospects of the French in the southern part of the wide theatre of
war—in Italy and on the Mediterranean— were not much more favourable. The domestic feuds had occasioned bitter losses in February, by enabling
the English to make themselves masters of the island of Corsica. The progress
of the Revolution produced the same effects in that country as in Lyons and
Toulon. At first the liberal enthusiasm had occupied all
minds," almost without distinction of parties: then a Radical faction had
arisen, which was soon divided into a Girondist and a Jacobin section. After
the victory of the Jacobins in Paris, the adherents of the Gironde had strengthened themselves in Corsica, as in the other Departments, by the adhesion
of all moderate men; and under the conduct of their old national hero, General
Paoli — formerly engaged against the Genoese—had attempted
open resistance to the Committee of Public Safety.
These general features, however, received a particular colour and distinctness
in Corsica from the peculiar local circumstances of this island. It was not
political principles alone which here came into collision; in this narrow
space, two contending ages of the world, and
innumerable family feuds, stood opposed to one another in arms. The French
Government, which had scarcely been in possession of the island a quarter of
a century, had spread the influence of modern civilisation and politics only through the towns on the coast. The mountains in the interior still
maintained their antiquated, rude, and patriarchal, forms of life. Peasants,
herdsmen, and hunters, lived independently—every village, nay, every family by
itself—careless about the Government, and in open feud with the
townsmen; protecting themselves
Ch. IV.]
THE
ENGLISH OCCUPY CORSICA.
405
sword in hand against hostile neighbours, and taking quick and bloody
vengeance for every insult. And thus the contention
of political parties was traversed, on the one side, by the
hostility between townsmen and mountaineers, and, on the other, by the
hereditary feuds of contending clans. When the Jacobins in the towns got the
upper hand, it was almost a matter of course that their opponents should be supported by the greater part of the mountain districts. After General
Paoli had assumed the leadership of the mountaineers, it was quite certain that
particular families, who were separated from him by hereditary hatred—e. g. the
Arena, the Ceracchi and the.Buonaparte—should join the
Jacobins. But in the interior the latter were far too weak; and after a short
struggle they were compelled, together with the Commissaries of the Convention,
and the weak garrisons, to throw themselves into the strong places on the coasts, where they were immediately blockaded by the insurgents on the land side, and by the English fleet by sea. In this
difficult position they manfully maintained themselves until February 1794,
when an English corps landed, and brought the insurgents
a plentiful supply of all the resources of regular warfare. Within a few months
afterwards the towns were compelled to capitulate, and the whole island was
occupied by the English.
This, though not a dangerous, was at any rate a vexatious, loss to France, and a serious blow to her maritime position and political
influence in the Mediterranean. It is true that the littoral States looked with
no favour on the settlement of the English in Corsica; on the contrary, the
greatest jealousy was manifested on every. side. The former Spanish
minister, Aranda, actually proposed peace and alliance with France in the
Council of State at Madrid, in order that Spain might / not be crushed by the
naval power of England. The Queen, indeed, thereupon banished him to a provincial town,1 but
1 Report of the Dutch ambassador Van
der Goes.
406
STRUGGLE
FOR BELGIUM.
[Book IX.
his views prevailed in official circles, and the Spanish ambassador at Vienna openly declared, that the naval power of Spain
urgently needed an alliance with France, whether as a
Monarchy or a Republic. But for the moment these views had no practical
consequences, since the capture of Corsica had greatly increased the fear, as
well as the dislike, of England. Under the" influence of this event, Naples promised 8,000 men for garrisons in Corsica,
and 12,000 men as a reinforcement of the Allied army in Lombardy. The
Grand-duke of Tuscany was induced to give his all-powerful favourite,
Manfredini, an adherent of France, a long leave of absence, which he was directed to spend beyond the frontier. In Genoa the
democratic party had just begun their revolt by a proposal to revise the
constitution; but the Senate now felt itself strong enough to frustrate all the
efforts of its opponents, to hold firmly to the principle of neutrality, and
to check the machinations of the French charge
d'affaires. And thus the only hope that remained to the French in Italy was the
conspiracy in Turin, and even this required that the French army should be
victorious, and approach near to the Piedmontese capital,
before the latter could unfold the banner of Revolution. It was, therefore,
almost a welcome event to the French, when, towards the end of March, the
Neapolitan police got upon the tracks of the democrats in that city, and prevented the outbreak of their plot by numerous arrests. For
the terror inspired by the discovery in this feeble Court was so great, that
the King would not allow a single soldier to leave the country; and thus the
Allied army in Upper Italy was disappointed of considerable and
ardently desired reinforcements. The state of public feeling in Turin then
became very depressed. Austria, after all the vacillation and disputes of her
Ministers, had really not more than 28,000 men in Lombardy, though the nominal force was 32,000; the Sardinian army amounted to 25,000, but was
completely demoralised by the disasters of the preceding year, the utter want
of funds, and the
Ch. IV.]
MASSENA
TAKES SAORGIO.
407
continual bickerings with Austria, and was therefore pre^ pared for the most unfavourable issue, even before the commencement of the campaign.
Such was the state of affairs when Dumerbion, in the beginning of April, prepared to attack the position of the Allies in the
Ligurian mountains.1 He was himself advanced in years and afflicted by
the gout, and generally gave his orders from his bed; but he was supported by
two clever adjutants, and had some excellent
generals—especially the strong and fiery Massena,—on his staff; and in
authority over him were three Conventional commissioners,
Salicetti, Ricord and the younger Robespierre, who at every step consulted Bonaparte, now Brigadier-general. The first task was to proceed northward
from the narrow shores of the county of Nice, ascend the crest of the Apennines, seize the nearest pass (the Col di Tenda), and thence rush down
through Southern Piedmont upon Turin; while at the same time General Dumas,
with the Army of the Alps, was making a corresponding attack on the Maritime
Alps and M. Cenis, from Savoy on the west. In order to protect the
Col di Tenda the Allies had taken up a strong position at Saorgio, a few
leagues distant from the pass, which General Bonaparte considered it dangerous
to attack in front. There was a simple means of evading it, by moving some miles along the coast to the east, as far as Oneglia; Saorgio
might then be taken in the rear, and attacked on all sides at once. There was
but one obstacle in the way; trie coast in question was Genoese territory, and
therefore neutral, and closed to the French armies. But such a
legal barrier was not of a nature to stop the Committee of Public Safety, when
it was a question of a palpable advantage, possibly fraught with important
consequences. As early as February the Commissioners sanctioned the proposal to occupy Oneglia; and on the 4th Bonaparte led a strong column
to that place,
From
the official papers in Vol. I. of Massena's Memoires.
408
STRUGGLE
FOR BELGIUM.
[Book IX.
took it after a short resistance, and gave it up to plunder, while Massena occupied the main body of the Piedmontese by an otherwise
fruitless attack upon Saorgio. The strip of coast was then occupied by the
French as far as Finale, the southern declivity of the Apennines as far as
Ormea cleared of the enemy, and Saorgio attacked on the 27th, from east and
west, with such vigour, that General Colli, with great loss and still greater
discouragement, evacuated all the hill redoubts, and withdrew his troops to the
heights of the Col di Tenda. It was in vain that he sent thence to the Imperial general, de Vins, who commanded the auxiliary corps of Austrians in Piedmont, to beg for aid; and equally
fruitless were the prayers of the latter to the Archduke
Ferdinand for reinforcements. There was an utter want of zeal, unity, and energy in this demoralised camp; and de Vins had" at last no
other consolation than the thought that "the wretched mountain
ravines" were of no consequence, and that he would engage the enemy in the
plains if he dared to come down. On the 10th of May, therefore,
the French succeeded by a well-planned flank movement in storming the pass, and
thereby fixing themselves in a strong position on the crest of the mountain
range", in readiness for further offensive movements. They now only waited
for the appearance of General Dumas on the heights of Mt.
Cenis, to give the Turinese conspirators the eagerly expected signal, and by
one mighty explosion to shatter the Kingdom of Sardinia.
The French government would gladly have waited for the more complete
development of affairs in this quarter, before
commencing the campaign against the Austrians in Belgium. But in the midst of
their unremitting and intense exertions in all directions, they had the
vexation of seeing their opponents get the start of them in
assuming the offensive. Carnot allowed himself no
rest; the greatest activity prevailed in all the camps in drilling
and training troops for the field; but many things were still in a very
incomplete
Cii.
IV.] ARRIVAL OF THE EMPEROR FRANCIS IN BRUSSELS. 409
state on the French side, when the Emperor
Francis, on the 9th of April—accompanied by his brothers Charles and Joseph,
his ministers Thugut and Trautmannsdorf, and his adjutants Rollin and
Waldeck—arrived in Brussels, assumed the command of the allied army, and gave orders to commence hostilities. Whilst the
Belgian capital once more resounded with the usual
manifestations of joy, and loyal addresses, deputations and banquets, rapidly
succeeded each . other, the troops were drawn nearer together, for the purpose of arranging them for the
commencement of operations. Count Clerfait, with 28,000 men, in Flanders,
formed the right wing, having two small corps of communication amounting to
10,000 men stretching towards the centre near Orchies and Denain. The main army under Coburg, York and Orange, 67,000 strong, extended from
Valenciennes to Bavay. Here the Emperor also fixed his head-quarters, in order
to direct the intended attack on Landrecy .in person. And lastly, Kaunitz, with
27,000 men, on the left wing, watched the course of the Sambre,
having pushed forward another corps of 8,000 men under General Beaidieu to
cover Luxemburg. They were all for the moment in the highest spirits. Count
Mercy held out a prospect of large grants of money, by which the Belgian E-tates were to manifest their gratitude for the royal visit. On the
11th, the Emperor announced to the Maritime Powers, that he would give up to
the Dutch the provinces they had so often demanded, as soon as he should have
wrested from the French the conquests made by Louis XIV., and
recovered for Belgium the frontiers of 1658.1 On
the 14th, the Emperor arrived in Coburg's head-quarters, where he was
delighted, two days afterwards, by a grand parade of the whole centre. It was
glorious summer weather; the troops made their most splendid
appearance, and the soldiers were full of joy at the thought of leaving their
close and wearisome winter-
1 Correspondence of the English
ambassador, Sir Morton Eden.
410
STRUGGLE
FOR BELGIUM.
[Book IX.
quarters, and marching in good earnest against
the enemy. The Emperor inhaled with delight the enlivening atmosphere of war,
and for once in his life he seemed raised above himself and all the doubts
which usually preyed upon him. The suspicious cares of his wonted existence were forgotten, and for the moment he had no other thought than
that of leading his magnificent troops as quickly as possible to victory and
renown. On the 17th the army was divided into eight columns, which extended
like rays from Cateau as their centre, and therefore separated
farther and farther from one another as they advanced; one portion moving to
the left against the neighbouring fortress of Landrecy, and the other to the
west, to clear the surrounding country, as far as Cambray, of the enemy.
This was an unwise dispersion of forces, which, with a different enemy,
might have proved fatal. But in accordance with Carnot's grand plan of throwing
his strongest force against the enemy's flanks, the French had not more than
four divisions in the centre—a force not indeed much weaker
than that of the Austrians, but which was also broken up into small bodies],
forming a loose and incompact belt from Avesnes to Cambray. They were
completely surprised by the attack of the Allies; their outposts retreated at all points after a short engagement; and the only column, that of
the Duke of York, which met with any resistance, drove the enemy back by a
furious charge as far as Guise. An energetic pursuit, in full force, might have
led to the most important results; it was in the power of the
Allies to disperse the enemy's centre and then
seriously to threaten his isolated right wing on the river Sambre. But neither
the Emperor's nor Coburg's views extended so far; they confined themselves to the more modest task of
storming Landrecy. The victorious columns halted in the evening, or retraced
their steps; and, on the 18th, were distributed in such a manner, that the
Prince of Orange undertook to surround the place, while the other
troops formed the covering
Cii. IV.] DEFEAT OF THE FRENCH ON THE SAMBRE. 411
force, which extended in a large arc to the right and. left of the
Sambre, to a distance of about twenty-three English miles.
Untaught, therefore, by the experience of the preceeding autumn, they
proceeded according to the same system which had
borne the bitter fruits of Hondschotten and Wattignies. Absence of a definite
object—dispersion of forces—sieges of strong places before thoroughly defeating
the armies preparing to come to their relief—these were the main features of the last year's operations, and were now to be the
characteristics of the approaching campaign. The consequences
soon showed themselves. The French, startled but not dispirited, soon returned
to the charge. At first, indeed, they were too weak to make any serious attempt; on the 21st the young soldiers of
Goguet's division ran away in the greatest disorder after a short skirmish;1 on
the 22nd the divisions of Balland and Fromentin were repulsed with equal
vigour; and on the 24th a column, which advanced
from Cambray, was met by Esterhazy's hussars, who overthrew the enemy by a
brilliant charge, and inflicted on him a loss of 1,700 killed and prisoners.
But the French commander-in-chief, who had hitherto been fully occupied in
Flanders according to Carnot's directions, now became
aware of the peril to which his centre was exposed, and sent the veteran
general Ferrand with 10,000 men to the relief of Landrecy. He might have
afforded far more effectual aid, and perhaps have destroyed the allied army, which had advanced so far into the interior, if he had sent,
not 10,000, but 30,000 men . from Flanders to Cambray, and thrown an equal
force on the besiegers from the Lower Sambre. In that case the latter, occupied
in the front by Ferrand, and exposed to heavy blows on the right
and left, could hardly have escaped a terrible catastrophe. But whether it was
that Pichegru did not consider such great
1 Moniteur, Floreal 12.
412
STRUGGLE
FOR BELGIUM.
[Book IX.
exertions necessary, or that he was fettered by Caruot's orders, he
too adhered to the system of operating at widely separated points, and not with
collected forces. Instead of uniting the greater part of his troops at the
point where his centre was threatened, he, just at this time, began to carry out Carnot's plan of operation on both wings—on the Sambre
and in Flanders—and thus threw away the chance of ending the campaign at once.
Even as it was—thanks to the mistaken measures of the Allies—General Ferrand
was able to attack their covering army with superior numbers; but
the vast superiority in the quality of the allied troops fully made up for
their deficiency in numbers. The battle commenced on the 26th along the whole
front. On the eastern bank of the Sambre, Ferrand had a long and obstinate battle with Coburg's Austrians—45,000 against less than
30,000—and seemed for a moment victorious, but was then utterly routed by a
desperate charge, led by General Kinsky, and compelled to make a hasty retreat.
The Duke of York, meanwhile, held the west bank of the Sambre with 17
battalions and 60 squadrons, resting on several hastily thrown-up redoubts,
against which General Chapuis was advancing from Cambray with two columns, one
of 26,000, and another of 4,000 men. The heads of these columns advanced under cover of the morning fog, close to the English position,
and drove in York's outposts from the villages in front of the redoubts. When
the fog dispersed, and allowed the duke to take a general survey of the widely
extended plain, the Imperial General Otto pointed out to him that
the long column of the enemy was entirely unprotected
on the left side, and Prince Charles of Schwarzen-berg was ordered to make an
attack at this point with the Imperial cuirassiers and nine squadrons of
English cavalry. The Prince hastened at a quick trot to
the extreme left of the English, line, and then wheeled, taking advantage of
the broken ground, against the French, who were on the point of advancing, from
the villages just captured, against the
Cn.
IV.] LANDRECY TAKEN BY THE ALLIES.
413
English trenches. He first came upon a small detachment of cavalry,
which dispersed in a moment, leaving their leader, General Chapuis himself, in
the hands of the enemy; then upon a battery of horse-artillery, which fired one
round, and then galloped off in utter bewilderment to the nearest
battalion of French infantry. The confusion at this point was indescribable;
every man discharged his piece at random, and the shattered bodies of men
rolled together into a confused mass. Schwarzenberg's troopers rattled up
with loud hurrahs, and in a few minutes the French column was dispersed; then
the second smaller division was overtaken, and the field covered with thousands
of fugitives, prisoners, dead and dying men.- Not a single battalion could be kept together, and 30,000 men were dispersed, almost
without resistance, by 2,400. The loss of the French on this day amounted to
7,000 men and 41 guns, and the issue of the struggle immediately decided the
fate of the beleaguered town. "While the din of the battle resounded on
every side, the prince of Orange opened fire from his trenches; a great number
of the houses were soon in flames, and the commandant, General Pouland,
despairing of relief, capitulated on the 30th. The garrison of
5,000 men became prisoners of war. And thus the Allies
had ta^en an important fortress under the very eyes of an enemy nearly double
their own numbers, inflicted upon him a loss of nearly 15,000 men and 143 guns,
and proved the tactical superiority of their troops
to be as great as ever. The first task of the Allies had been fulfilled
splendidly enough.
To a real general, who united sagacity with love of action, the way was
open a second time for the most brilliant success. A rapid and vigorous advance
would have sufficed to destroy entirely the
French centre, the defeat of which would have ruined the position of the enemy
on the Sambre, and thus laid open the whole country as far as Paris to the
Allies; — always supposing that the latter were in possession of the necessary means for penetrating so
far into the
414
STRUGGLE
FOR BELGIUM.
[Book IX.
interior of the enemy's country, while Pichegru's main army remained
intact. The troops had no other thought, after the battle of Cateau, than rapid
pursuit: they were elated by their triumph, prepared
for any fatigue, and utterly undisturbed by the cares of the
scientific military Staff. But unfortunately no one shared their feelings at
head-quarters, except perhaps the Emperor himself, who was utterly unable to indulge thein. It is true that as long as it was necessary to
continue the troublesome French war, Thugut preferred conquering to being
conquered, and was by no means pleased with the pusillanimous hesitation of the
Prince of Coburg. But while he complained of the sluggishness of the late
offensive operations, he still maintained that Coburg needed no reinforcements, if he would but make a resolute attack on the enemy. The
Prince, on the other hand, persisted in declaring all offensive movements on a
grand scale, without corresponding reinforcements, foolhardy and
inadmissible. General Mack, therefore, met with little encouragement when he
proposed a march in force into the interior of France, with the understanding that England would send the 62,000 Prussians,
which had been promised to her, in four separate divisions to Belgium. The
Prussian general refused, ou account of the proposed dispersion of his forces,
and the want of magazines; and Thugut protested still
more strongly against the plan, because he did not wish, in case of
victory, to find any Prussian garrisons in the longed for border provinces of
France. - How unfavourable his other political views were to an energetic war
of aggression against France, will be shown hereafter. He wished indeed that the army should be victorious in the field of battle; but above
all things that it should not withdraw too far away from the borders of the
German Empire. When the Emperor urgently demanded what was to be done next,
Coburg, worked at his plan of attack against the nearest fortresses
Bouchain, Cambray, and Avesnes; and contented himself in other respects with
sending small reinforcements to the points threatened by the
Ch.
IV.] RENEWED STRUGGLES ON THE
SAMBRE.
415
enemy, thus adapting his own measures to those of his opponents. The initiative, therefore, soon passed over entirely to the
French, who at the end of April were in motion in every part of the theatre of
war, and intent upon carrying out Carnot's great plan—indifferent to the loss
of Landrecy —and thereby deciding the fate of Europe.
According to this plan, as we may remember, a grand attack was to be
made by both wings, while the centre confined itself to the necessary
defensive measures. The great mass of the Army of the North was to enter Flanders on the West; the right wing, in conjuction with the
Ardennes Army, was to open an attack upon Kaunitz; and lastly, still further to
the East, a division of the Moselle Army was to distract the attention of the
enemy by a coup de main against Namur. These movements, for the sake
of which we saw the French neglecting the relief of Landrecy, had begun at all
points towards the end of April, at first in a manner sufficiently alarming for
the Allies, although the first operations of the French had only partial success. On the east, General Jourdan sent 40,000 men
of the Moselle Army against Arlon, in the country of Luxemburg, which town the
Austrian General Beaulieu evacuated after a short resistance; but being reinforced by Kaunitz with 12,000 men, he returned, and drove the
enemy out of the place, which they had so latety occupied,
in spite of their superior numbers. The French had not much greater success
against Kaunitz himself. General Charbonnier led the Ardennes Army, on the
27th, against Beaumont, where Desjardins' division,
coming from Maubeuge, formed a junction with him.
Kaunitz, who was far from being a match for them, retreated across the Sambre,
and contented himself with guarding the fords of the river at Charleroi, Thuin,
and Merbes-le-Chateau, as strongly as possible. The advance of the French
immediately came to a standstill; the generals disputed with Carnot about the
place where the river should be crossed—Carnot ordering them to make the
passage as near the enemy's main army
416
STRUGGLE
FOR BELGIUM.
[Book IX.
as possible, and therefore far up the river, while Char-bonnier—not
wishing to approach the enemy so closely— wished to operate far away to the
East, somewhere near Charleroi. Nearly fourteen days were passed in this manner, until Carnot reinforced the general
by two more divisions of the centre,1 and
raised the number of his forces to 60,000 men. Meanwhile Coburg, too, had sent
considerable reinforcements to the general under him, which enabled Kaunitz to
meet the impending attack with a force of about 32,000 men. The French
advanced on the 10th of May, crossing the Sambre at Thuin and
Merbes-le-Chateau. The rain poured down in torrents; the ammunition waggons
stuck fast in the soaked ground of the woods, which fringe
the river at this point for miles j and the French were at first able to make
full use of their superior numbers with the bayonet. They extended their line,
hotly fighting, nearly as far as Binche, where Kaunitz at last took up a % strong
position with the main body of his army round the
village of Rouveroy. At midday, on the 13th, Desjardins advanced against the
place with [five columns;2 the contest remained undecided until the evening, when Colonel
Kien-mayer fell upon the left flank of the enemy with
eight squadrons, dispersed them at the very first charge, and chased the
fugitives in all directions as far as the Sambre. Desjardins,
alarmed by this disaster, hastened to return to the right bank under cover of
the night; Charbonnier was obliged to follow him, and on the 14th not a
single Frenchman was to be found on the north of the
river. This first attempt upon the eastern wing of the Allies had failed, with
a loss of 4,000 men and 12 guns.
The affairs of their other wing in Flanders assumed, about the same time, an aspect less promising for the Coalition.3
1 Despeaux and Fromentin. After of
the North army. — 2 40,000 this Charbonnier had live
divisions, against 22,000 men. — 3 The best two of the Ardennes army
and three work on the contest in Flanders is
Ch.
IV.] DEFEAT OF CLERFAIT NEAR
MOUSCRON.
417
The French general in-chief, General Pichegru, had drawn together the
three strong divisions Moreau, Souham and Michaud, in all about 61,000 men,
between Lille and Dunkirk, while Feldzeugmeister
Clerfait had a very inferior force, and his divisions were scattered throughout
the whole of Flanders. The French ' crossed the frontier on the 21st of April,
Michaud manceuvering farthest to the west against Ypres and Nieuport, and
Moreau and Souham on both banks of the Lys—the' former
advancing on the left, and the latter on the right, of the river—intending to
unite and blockade the fortress of Menin. Clerfait was at this moment at some
distance, at Denain on the Scheldt, where he obtained the first intelligence of the threatened invasion by the Prince of Coburg, from
the papers of General Chapuis, who was taken prisoner at Cateau; upon which he
hastened as quickly as possible to relieve Menin. He first came upon a troop of
Hanoverians under General Oeynhausen, who had just taken the
position of Mouscron from the French after a sanguinary contest, and had thus
reopened the road to Menin. At this place Clerfait collected a body of about
10,000 men from various quarters, and was only waiting for some English auxiliaries of York's division before assuming the offensive, when,
on the 29th, he was suddenly attacked on his front and both flanks by more than
30,000 men of Souham's and Moreau's divisions, and entirely defeated after an
obstinate resistance. He was driven as far as the Scheldt,
near Tournai, before he could rally his men under the protection of the English
regiments, which had just come up. The
French, who had suffered severely,
Ditfurth's
excellent book, Die
Hes-sen in rfeii Niederlanden", 1793 —
1795—a work which has much more matter in it than the title promises, and
unites the most accurate research with the soundest jndgment. Neither III.
the
French nor Austrian literature has produced anything which can be compared with
it. In addition to this we have now Witzleben's Bio-graphie des Prinzen von Coburg.
2D
418
STRUGGLE
FOR BELGIUM.
[Book IX.
did not press him any further for the moment: but all prospect of
saving Menin was lost by this disaster. The place itself was in a miserable condition, and utterly incapable of maintaining itself for
any length of time. With the negligence which characterized the administration
of Austria at this period, scarcely anything had been done, during the winter,
to repair the works, and to lay up stores of ammunition and provisions. The
town, therefore, must have surrendered to the very first patrol of the enemy's
cavalry, had not its Commandant, the Hanoverian Hammerstein, been a man of iron
character. He was an old soldier of rude courage, who in war thought of nothing but war, cared little for the confusion at
head-quarters, but did what he thought best at the moment with independent
energy, and succeeded in inspiring every man in the five battalions of his
garrison, with soldier-like confidence. He maintained
himself in the half-open place until the 29th, on which day the fire of the
French blew up his powder magazine; whereupon he assembled
his officers in the evening, and declared his intention
of cutting his way with the garrison through the thick
masses of the surrounding enemy. The bold attempt met with perfect success.
Soon after midnight two columns, made up of French emigres, Hanoverians and
Hessians, broke through the Courtray and Bruges gates of the town. Immediately
a wild hand-to-hand fight arose, and a horrible confusion; the enemy pressed upon them with ever increasing fury,
the narrow streets were blocked up by their own artillery and that of the
French, and friends and enemies rolled on, in bloody struggle, in the darkness
of the night, scantily lighted by the flames of the
burning houses. But Hammerstein carried off his columns, and led the 1,200 men
whom he had rescued—a troop as brave as any in the world—to the standard of
Clerfait.
This happened on the same day on which Landrecy capitulated. On the same evening York left
Cateau for Tournai, with a corps of 10,000men for the support of Clerfait; and
Cn.
IV.]
OPERATIONS
OF THE HOSTILE FORCES.
419
after his arrival the army, amounted to 40,000 men. It was resolved, in
spite of the superiority of the enemy, to assume the offensive with these forces. The boldness of this intention
was not as great as might appear from the relative
numbers on either side; the French began to feel the fundamental error of
Carnot's great plan, which obliged their chief strength to operate
without any definite object far away in Flanders. Their troops formed a long
column from Lille to Courtray, projecting into the country towards the north;
and according to Caruot's wishes this column was to move farther and farther towards the northwest, towards Bruges and Ostend. But
Clerfait and York were stationed to the south-east of Lille, i. e.
on the flank, nay almost in the rear, of the French army; and they
could, therefore, deal a crushing blow at any point of the enemy's long line, and thereby held their numerically superior
opponents in check. This was so evident, that Pichegru summoned General Bonneau
with 20,000 men from Cambray to Flanders, and posted him between Lille and
Tournai, as a protection for his own basis of operations against York.
He had now about 30,000 men in Flanders,1 but
might have got into a difficult position, if the enemy had fallen with united
forces upon Bonneau, whom they might have beaten, before Souham from Courtray,
or Michaud from Ypres, could have come to his assistance.
.For the present, however, they spared him so fatal a blow. They resolved to
attack, not Bonneau, against whom they could have employed their whole force,
but Souham and Moreau. If they did not wish to give up their communications with Coburg entirely, they would
be obliged to leave a considerable part of their army at Tournai, and could
lead at best only half of it into battle. And thus their movements were once
more crippled by the dispersion of their forces. Clerfait began his march with only
16,000
■
1 Bonneau 20,000, Souham 28,700,
Osten 7,000 — presents
sous les Moreau
22,2000, Michaud 12,000, armes.
2D2
420
STRUGGLE
FOR BELGIUM.
[Book IX.
men, in order to seize the bull by the horns at a distance from his colleagues, and to attack Souham and Moreau in their front;
while York remained at Tournai, with 20,000 men, in complete inactivity,
Wallmoden being placed halfway between the two, for the
alleged purpose of keeping up the communication between them, but really without any advantage to either. The consequence was that
each party felt itself weak and liable to attack, and sent the most urgent
prayers for help and reinforcements to the Imperial head-quarters. The
impression was a deep one, and a number of excited and contending
opinions vied for the favour of the Emperor. From1 a
military point of view, the matter admitted of little doubt: the time had
evidently come for action, and the mode of action was not to be mistaken. The
grand operations of the enemy on both wings, for the
purpose of surrounding the Allies, were now clearly marked out. The French
position, in consequence of their late movements, now formed a great
semi-circle, at the west end of which 100,000 men were advancing into Flanders,
and whose eastern extremity of 60,000 men rested on the lower Sambre,
while the centre was only occupied by a thin chain of posts of 18,000 men. Both
flanks of the Allies therefore were more hardly pressed from day to day, and a
longer delay appeared impossible even to the most superficial
observer. Considering the plans of the enemy,, and the distribution of his
forces—considering that the Allied army, too, had assumed an exactly similar
position with a smaller arc—34,000 in the centre and 39,000 on each wing; and, lastly, considering that each of these wings had, in spite of
some losses, held its ground against tremendous odds, it was evident that a
chance of safety, and even of victory still existed.1 Everything depended, for the
1 The following military details are all
taken from the military
authorities
above cited.
Ch.
IV.] FAVOURABLE POSITION OF THE ALLIED
ARMIES. 421
Allies, on taking advantage of the dispersion of the enemy's forces,
and on collecting their own, so as, though weaker as a whole,
to be stronger at the decisive point. To effect this there were several
different ways. Coburg could either put the weak centre of the French hors
de combat in a few days, aud then turning to the left, and cooperating with
Kaunitz, roll up the French army of the Sambre, before
Pichegru could send a single battalion from Flanders to its aid. Or, on the
contrary, he might direct the blows of the Allied centre to the right, in
conjunction with York and Clerfait, against Pichegru's base in Flanders; if he succeeded in breaking through at this point,
the main body of the enemy would be cut oft' from Lille, from its supplies, and
its line of retreat, and be forced into the midst of a hostile country with its
back upon the equally hostile sea. Of these two enterprises
the former—the march upon the Sambre army—was the easier, as the enemy could be
attacked on this point with decidedly superior forces; but the latter was more
effectual, if it succeeded, because it would destroy the best part of the
French army. Moreover Kaunitz had stood his ground
alone on the Sambre, while Clerfait and York sent urgent petitions from
Flanders for assistance. The Prince of Coburg, therefore, was decidedly in
favour of leading the army of the centre to Tournay and Flanders.
The. Emperor had just sufficient power of
comprehension to enable him to understand the force of these considerations,
and to incline him to sanction the new plan. But there were other powers and
influences at work at head-quarters, which pertinaciously hemmed his way to this resolution at every turn. We may take it for granted
that Thugut adhered more firmly than ever to his own
views. The official summons from Catharine had arrived in Vienna, calling upon
Austria to send an auxiliary force against Poland; and
Count Cobenzl, the Austrian ambassador, wrote from St. Petersburg, that the
Empress, in case of the Emperor's compliance, would award him a very ample
share of the booty. Similar
422
STRUGGLE
FOR BELGIUM.
[Book IX.
demands and offers arrived from Italy. The Archduke Ferdinand in Milan asked for speedy and numerous reinforcements; and at the same time the arrival of a Sardinian ambassador was announced, who was empowered to offer Francis solid gain
for effectual support. Of almost still greater
importance was the circumstance, that while Austria was importuned for aid from
all quarters of the world, the desired opportunity of making peace with the
French Republic presented itself sooner than had
been expected. At Valenciennes, the epistolary head-quarters
of the Allies, a Frenchman arrived, about this time, who called himself Count
de Montgaillard, and- represented himself as an Emigre
persecuted by the democratic tyrants. He was
in reality a political adventurer, like many whom these troubled times produced, a peasant's son named Jaques Roques from the village of
Montgaillard. He was known even at school as a worthless fellow; he became a
soldier, then a speculator, and during the Revolution an
adventurer at the service of all parties. After the 10th of August he had joined Danton's party, and had been
frequently employed in the Belgian intrigues, and as a double spy about the
persons of Coburg and Mercy. After the fall of Danton he had passed as an
ever-ready tool into the hands of Robespierre,
and he now expressed a wish to make important overtures to the Emperor in
person, on the part of the Committee of Public Safety. As he was known to Count
Mercy as an agent, though a subordinate one, of the Parisian Rulers, he was
admitted to an audience; and he then came forward with the
declaration, that France was prepared to make a general peace on the status
quo ante. He made this statement, however, as a proof, not of the
weakness, but of the philanthropy of Robespierre, demanded a rapid decision, and, in case of refusal, threatened the Emperor with the dagger, which,
he said, was prepared for all crowned heads. His conduct appeared at the first
moment so unbecoming, that the Emperor
Cii.
IV.] NEGOT. BETWEEN THUGUT AND
MONTGAILLARD. 423
gave orders for his arrest: but Thugut and
Trautmanusdorf thought it nevertheless expedient to take his overtures into
consideration. His proposal was that France should give up her continental
conquests—Savoy, Nice, and the occupied districts of Belgium—and receive back in return Corsica and the West India islands. By such a peace,
Austria and Sardinia would make good their losses, while
England, on the contrary, would have to give up her conquests. This consideration rendered it probable that the Committee of Public Safety was not sincere in its overtures, but was only trying to
throw an apple of discord between Austria and England. On the other hand, the
Austrian government was sufficiently informed of the exhaustion of France, and
the difficult position of the
Committee of Public Safety, to render them unwilling to give up the chance of a
serious proposal of peace; and Thugut, especially, was the less inclined to do
so, because he had long desired such a turn of affairs. However this might be, Montgaillard's proposition
was extremely acceptable to Austria: what England would say to it was to be
seen hereafter; and as a letter of Lord Grenville's just arrived, reporting
that Montgaillard had been announced to him also, the Frenchman, in spite of
all his regicidal threats, was sent, not to Paris, but to
London.
In such a conjuncture of affairs, it did not seem wise to undertake any
important offensive movement, which, whether it resulted in victory or defeat,
might suddenly check Robespierre's love of peace, and would,
at any rate, remove the Austrian army still farther away from the Rhine,
Poland, and Italy, and involve it, perhaps irrecoverably, in this remote and
unfortunate theatre of war? Meantime news of fresh disasters arrived from
Flanders, which, for the moment, removed
all uncertainty, and once more gave the predominance to the war-party.
Clerfait's attempt against Courtrai had entirely failed, in consequence of the
triple superiority of the enemy. After
a sharp contest, on the 11th of May, he was
424
STRUGGLE
FOR BELGIUM.
[Book IX.
obliged to make a hasty retreat, and withdrew in tolerable order,
though very hard pressed, to the northwest, into the neighbourhood of Ghent.
York looked on with grief, but was unable to .afford assistance, being himself violently attacked on the 10th of May by general Bonneau, As at
Cateau, he owed it entirely to the excellence of his cavalry that the French
broke off the contest with heavy loss; but there was no possibility of his
doing anything at all to support Clerfait,
or to rescue Ghent. The Emperor would now hear of no further delay. He saw
before him the threatened ruin of a brave companion in
arms, and the complete inundation. of
Flanders; Holland began to fear for her maritime border-lands, and Lord Elgin, the English plenipotentiary at head-quarters,
exhorted him not to allow the French to obtain a firm footing on the coast:
orders were immediately issued to the different divisions of the Allied centre
for a grand flank inarch to Flanders.
We have seen what splendid possibilities were
connected with such a resolution, but we must also mention at once the
difficulties which lay in the way of success. The enemy, who had of late been
incessantly recruiting, and had thereby gradually rendered his garrisons disposable for field service, was continually growing stronger in
Flanders, and had now no less than 100,000 men on this theatre of the war. 1 The
success of the Allies, therefore, depended upon their making up for this
difference in numbers by bold and simple movements, by neglecting all
minor objects, and bringing all their force to bear upon the decisive point. To
this end it woulch have been possible to borrow a few thousand men from the
victorious Kaunitz for the temporary protection of Landrecy, to call in all the other corps of communication to the main army, and then, in
conjunction with York and Clerfait, to open the attack upon Pichegru with
80,000 men.
1 Including Michaud's division.
Ch. IV.]
MISTAKES
OF THE ALLIES.
425
Even this, the greatest fpree which could be collected,
was, as we know, far inferior to that of the enemy; the highest rapidity and
energy too were indispensable to success, and even cool calculation must regard
the boldest daring as the only real prudence. But the sentiments required for such a course of action, were, unfortunately for the
Coalition, entirely wanting at the imperial head-quarters. Thugut's and
Waldeck's opposition hung like a elog on the whole undertaking, and both Coburg
and Mack shrank in terror from every grand and apparently dangerous
measure. They clung to every foot of soil whieh they had once occupied, were
unwilling to leave either the Sambre or their centre unprotected, and thought
it neeessary to oppose to every hostile corps a fragment of their own force. They therefore left Orange behind with 11,000 men at Landrecy,
and a second corps of 4,000 men near Denain on the Scheldt. The auxiliary force
for the expedition to Flanders was hereby reduced to 2o,000 men, so that the
total strength of the army destined to carry out this great
scheme was only 62,000 men. Not contented with this, they drew up a plan of
attack which was, indeed, clearly directed to the furtherance of the great object—the cutting oft' of the enemy from his own
country—but condemned their own army of 62,000 men—whieh
had to contend against 100,000—to complete impotence, by its interminable
division.
We have now arrived at a point at which the fate of the whole campaign,
and the course of the modern, history of the world, was decided; it is indispensable therefore to enter somewhat more fully into the
details of the war than is our wont, and first of all to gain as clear a view
as possible of the nature of the ground.
The soil on which we now find ourselves has been for centuries the scene of great events, and consequently of great bloodshed. It was hence,
from the shores of the Seheldt and the Lys, that the Salian Franks once began
their triumphant inarch for the overthrow of
Gaul. It was here that
426
STRUGGLE
FOR BELGIUM.
[Book IX.
in later times the Empire of the Guelphs sank in the dust before the
victorious arms of Philip Augustus; it was here that the dukes of Burgundy, in
their struggle with the freedom of the Flemish cities, laid the foundation of
their power, which was destined to embrace the world; it
was here, too, that Louis XIV, sinking beneath deadly blows after his long
career of haughty prosperity, fought his last desperate battles against
Marlborough and Eugene. The ground, on which the fate of Europe was once more to be decided, is about 51 miles long and 46 miles broad, and forms
an almost regular square, between the coast of the North Sea on the west, and
the Scheldt, which runs almost parallel with it, on the east. It is an almost
level, richly cultivated, and thickly populated, district.
Between numerous stately and flourishing cities, village succeeds village, each
of which contains well-built hous*es, and is surrounded with gardens and
orchards. The fields are everywhere enclosed by ditches full of water, high hedges, or close rows of trees, which entirely prevent the
evolutions of cavalry. Every brook forms soft banks, and swampy environs, in
the rich and crumbling soil; so that the smallest streams can only be passed on
strong bridges, and no rapid progress by the side of the high roads can
be expected, even from infantry, and still less any change in the line of
operations. It is easy to see what immense advantages such a soil affords for a
judicious defence; and we shall see that it everywhere determined the character of the now impending
struggle.
About thirteen miles west of the Scheldt the Lys enters this territory,
flows parallel with the main stream past Menin
and Courtrai as far as Deynse, and then turns to the east, and falls into the
Scheldt near Ghent. The two rivers, therefore,
enclose on Flemish ground a long triangle, on the southern or French side of
which lies Lille, the most important of the border fortresses,
and on the Flemish side, Tournai, on the Scheldt. The position of the hostile armies
Ch.
IV.] POSITION OP THE CONTENDING
ARMIES.
427
in these regions was as follows. The French had encamped the divisions
of Bonneau and Osten, as the base of their attack, close by Lille; Moreau and
Souham, proceeding thence towards the north, had
first taken Menin, then occupied Courtrai, and, still moving northwards, were
just on the point of dealing the next blow against Clerfait. To cover their
long extended line in the west, Michaud was stationed a few leagues off, with
his front towards Ypres.
Of the Allies, as we have seen, Clerfait stood with 16,000 men near
Thielt, on the opposite side of the Lys, and on the north of the French column
of attack, by which he was separated from his colleagues; York, again, with
18,000 men more, was at Tournai, east of Lille, opposite to
Bonneau, and almost in the rear of Souham and Moreau. It is evident that if the
force of the Duke had been raised to 40—50,000 men, by sending him all the
troops of the centre, there was a chance of quickly crushing Bonneau by such superior numbers. If this attempt succeeded, Moreau and Souham
would have been cut off from all their resources, and would hardly have escaped
a fatal disaster. There was, as wc have said, some idea of such a plan at
Coburg's head-quarters, but the prince could not make up his mind to
the consistent execution of it. He did indeed designate the troops of Landrecy—23,000
men under the Archduke Charles and general Kinski—for an attack upon Bonneau:
but instead of sending York in the same direction, he divided his corps into two columns, which were ordered to march against
Roubaix and Tourcoin, close by Courtrai, and there to attack Moreau and Souham.
A few leagues farther to the north, again, the Hanoverians were to try their
luck against Mous-cron; and Clerfait, lastly, was to make a great
circuit round the French army towards the west, and then, depending on his own
resources, to force his way through the enemy to the Duke of York at Tourcoin.
In this way they hoped to break the French line, and drive them into certain de
428
STRUGGLE
FOR BELGIUM.
[Book IX.
struction. All the details were carefully thought out by Mack with the
map in his hand: all depended, however, on the double supposition, that every
column would punctually make its appearance on
the battle-field at the right moment, and that the 100,000 French, who lay
between them, would not tear the skilfully formed net by some unexpected
counter-movement.
The latter contingency, it is true, seemed for the present highly
improbable. For Pichegru so little expected a serious
attack, that he had just left his army in Flanders, and repaired to the Sambre to administer consolation and encouragement to the defeated generals. Souham and Moreau felt equally
secure: and when, on the 16th of May, their outposts reported some
movements" in Clerfait's camp, they set in motion more than 40,000 men of
their divisions, and without any suspicion of danger in their rear, crossed the
Lys to administer a severe lesson to the Austrian general. And thus the villages Mouscron, Ronbaix and Tourcoin, which they had hitherto occupied,
were left with weak defences, and the Allies might have
begun their attack on the 17th, from the side of Tournai, under the most
favourable auspices. The small corps of Hanoverians, indeed,
was repulsed from Mouscron with great bloodshed; but the Imperial general Otto stormed Tourcoin after a severe contest, and the
English guards, under York in person, fixed themselves
in Koubaix towards evening, before the French generals could recall their main force over the Lys. There is no doubt, therefore, that
they would have been still less able on this day to help General Bonneau, who
was thirteen miles further to the south, if Coburg had thrown his whole force
upon him; and consequently that the plan which we have just
sketched was perfectly feasible on the morning of the 17th.
Now, however, the advantages gained by York aud Otto were completely
isolated. Clerfait only ventured to proceed very slowly in a country swarming
with enemies, and towards the evening halted at Werwick, on
the left bank
Ch.
IV.]
BATTLE
OF TOURCOIN.
429
of the Lys —several miles distant from Tourcoin, his point of union
with York. The Archduke Charles, again, after a long and toilsome inarch, did not
reach General Bonneau until the 17th at midday; his
troops, although panting and thirsty from the heat of the sun, made a gallant
charge as soon as they came in sight of the enemy, and drove the French under
the guns of Lille; but they were far from being able entirely to crush the enemy, and render him incapable of further resistance.
Consequently when, towards the evening, the thunder of the cannon gradually
died away over the vast battle-field, the position of the Allies was this— that
neither Charles, nor Wallmoden, nor Clerfait, had performed their task; and therefore that Otto and York, who, each with
about 8,000 men had penetrated far into the enemy's line, found themselves in a
most perilous position, exposed on all sides to the attack-of the French. They
had a sort of presentiment of the state of things
at head-quarters, and sent word to the Duke of York
that he should receive a reinforcement of 15 battalions from the Archduke
Charles, in the course of the following morning. In the middle of the night
further orders arrived, directing him to press forward
on the following morning, and try to form a junction with Clerfait, in order to
complete the rout of the enemy.
But while the Allies were wasting the time in messages and promises,
the French were acting. On the afternoon of the 17th, when the
various plans of the former were being matured, Generals Souham, Moreau,
Macdonald and Reynier, assembled in conference at Menin. Reynier pointed out
how easy it would be to throw overwhelming masses upon Tur-coin from different sides, before the enemy's wings could send aid to their threatened
centre. Souham eagerly took up the idea. This general had served for five
years, up to 1789, as a common cavalry soldier. A giant frame of immense
strength, and a courage equal to any test, combined with a lively
understanding and sound judgment, gave him con
430
STRUGGLE
FOR BELGIUM.
[Book IX.
siderable influence among his colleagues at the outbreak of the
Revolution. After the war commenced he
rose rapidly from grade to grade, and was made general of division
at 33 years of age. The soldiers used
to say that under him they should not be defeated; an agent of the Ministry
wrote to Carnot, that Souham was a patriot "who would squash Pitt and
Coburg like mellow pears." Such a man was, of course, highly delighted at the idea of frustrating the
enemy's offensive movements by a sudden sally.
The others gave their assent, and appeals for assistance were
immediately sent off to Osten and Bonneau.
All the troops—more than 40,000^which had stood opposed to
Clerfait on the other side of the Lys, were marched rapidly back to Courtray,
to fall from the north upon Tourcoin and Otto's right flank. Moreau posted
himself in person at Werwick with 8,000 men against Clerfait, thereby securing the rear of the French position, and enabling York's late opponents
—about 12,000 men—to make an attack in front on the lost places. Lastly,
Bonneau stationed about 8,000 men at Lille to watch the Archduke, and about 4 o'clock in the morning he fell with 18,000 men, from the south, upon the Duke of York's left wing at
Roubaix. And thus at the first dawn of
day, the two columns of the Allied centre found themselves attacked by more
than four times their own force. Their
position was, from the very first a desperate one; York and Otto
had dispersed their troops in several small
villages, and the attack was made simultaneously upon all points, with
overwhelming numbers. General Monfrault
stood at Tourcoin with 6 battalions of Otto's column, and the Hessian general Hanstein, with 2 battalions, a league farther back, at
Watrelos. York had posted General Abercrombie with 7 battalions between the
villages of Mouveaux and Roubaix; the Hessian bodyguards*
at Lannoy, to cover his rear; and two Austrian battalions
on the road to Tourcoin, to keep up his communication
with Otto.
Ch.
IV.]
DEFEAT
OF THE ALLIES.
431
After a .short but sharp engagement Tourcoin was first taken by the
enemy, whereupon Monfrault took up a new position in the open field, close behind the village, and for three hours maintained the unequal
combat in close order and with unshaken courage. His troops formed a large
square, against which the French columns were shattered to pieces. To the right
and left, swarms of French tirailleurs and cavalry skirmishers
filled the plain; while in the rear the thunder of the battle which was raging
round Watrelos became louder and louder. At the latter
place the Hessian guards were attacked by no less than three brigades, but they
bore up against these fearful odds with iron
firmness, and it was not until nearly 8 o'clock, when their ammunition began to
fail, that they retired slowly and in good order, continually
firing on their pursuers, behind the little river Espierre. The rear-guard was just about to pass the brook when a few scattered horsemen came up at
full gallop, pursued by French chasseurs, and making
signs from a distance-to the grenadiers for help and .protection. It was the
Duke of York, who having been repulsed at Mouveaux, and, as
he thought, surrounded by the enemy at Lannoy, had given up the command of his
column to general Abercrombie, and ridden across country to Watrelos, intending
to escape in that direction to the Imperial head-quarters. Here, however, he was in more danger than ever, since the French
light troops in Monfrault's rear were swarming in every field; he owed it to
the swiftness of his horse alone that he was not immediately seized. Upon
hearing his cries the Hessians without hesitation faced about against the enemy, whom they put to hasty flight with their last shots; the duke
had so completely lost his presence of mind that he waded through the muddy
brook close by the bridge, and after reaching the opposite shore galloped off
without stopping. The most melancholy consequence of this
occurrence was, that the Hessians, retarded by their
self-sacrificing courage, were over
432
STRUGGLE
FOR BELGIUM.
[Book IX.
taken by stronger bodies of the enemy, and suffered great loss in
crossing the water. Nevertheless this gallant regiment had no
sooner reached the opposite shore than they once more took up a strong
position, and, with the aid of some Austrian reserves, resisted all the attacks
of the French on the same spot throughout the day. How important their heroic firmness was for the army, was sensibly felt, immediately afterwards, by Monfrault's column. • The latter held its ground
behind Tourcoin till nearly nine o'clock, and then, as the main road was
blocked up by the loss of Watrelos, retreated by a side
road, at first in good order, but being more and more impetuously assailed by
the French, their flank was at last broken through. Hereupon the most terrible confusion arose, the battalions got mixed with one another,
larger and larger bodies broke into disorderly flight, and at last the
whole mass poured back in wild haste to Tournai, close past the position of the
Hessians. If these too had given way, and the fugitives had found the enemy in
their place, hardly a man could have escaped.
The column of general Abercrombie experienced a
similar fate during the same hours. He, too, at first resisted the superior
numbers of the enemy with heroic gallantry. The English guards stood as if
rooted to the ground: and when Abercrombie at last gave the order to retreat, they retired slowly from Mouveaux to renew the same hopeless
contest at Roubaix with the same sang-froid.
They, too, like Mon-frault, were threatened by an overwhelming danger
in the rear; for Bonneau, attacking Roubaix on one side with one half of his division, had hurled the other, at 6 o'clock in the morning, against
the Hessian regiment of bodyguards at Lannoy, the taking of
which would have cut oft' the English from-all possibility of escape. Happily
for them the body-guards did their duty in the
same way as the Hessian infantry two leagues off at
Watrelos. Surrounded on all sides by eight times their numbers, incessantly
attacked by fresh assailants, sometimes with the fire of artillery, and
Cii. iv.]
defeat of the allies.
433
sometimes with the bayonet, they kept up struggle
for seven hours without yielding or wavering. They occupied the attention of
the hostile column so completely, that not a battalion of the latter was
disposable to harass Abercrom-bie's retreat. When the English retiring from Roubaix— the regiments of the line already in disorderly
flight, the guards still fighting in close order—came about 10 o'clock into the
neighbourhood of Lannoy, the French could only send one regiment of cavalry
against Abercrombie. Their charge, however, produced so great an
effect, that the English guards too lost their self-possession, broke their
ranks and hurried in breathless haste to Tournai. The Hessians still maintained
themselves in Lannoy till one o'clock, and when they had exhausted all their ammunition, their Colonel, Esch-wege, after firing his last
round, forced his way with the bayonet through the close masses of the
enemy, but not without leaving a third of his men behind him as killed or
prisoners. The enemy pursued no further, but contented themselves with
sending a column from this point against the flank of the Hessians and the
Austrians on the Espierre. A lively fire of artillery once more began; but as
the French made no attempt with cold steel, General Hanstein was able to hold his position till nearly seven o'clock in the evening, and to
lead back his troops uninjured to the general rendezvous— the camp at Marquain—close before the gates of Tournai.
When they arrived there, the same question burned upon every lip—the
question, what had become of the division of the Archduke Charles, and why
he had exposed them to the brunt of the enemy's overpowering forces without
making a single effort to support them? In fact, the conduct of this wing, on
the 18th, was not the least singular occurrence in this singular
battle. We have seen that the Archduke and General Kinsky had, on the 17th,
driven back the French over the Marque to Lille; Kinsky quietly bivouacked
during the night at Cheraing and the Archduke at Lesquin. Cheraing
in. 2 E
434
STRUGGLE
FOR BELGIUM.
[Book IX.
is less than five miles, and Lesquin, less than ten miles, distant from
Lannoy; and the latter is hardly a league from Monveaux. At Cheraing,
therefore, every shot which was exchanged.between the English and Moreau's division, after four o'clock, must have reached the ears of
the Austrians; the* thunder of the cannon from Tourcoin and Watrelos must have
been heard in the distance, and the advance of the enemy from all sides might
be followed by the direction of the sound. Kinsky's van was
formed of Hessian chasseurs, who could not imagine why no orders came to begin
their march. Their leader, Captain Ochs, in angry impatience, hastened to the
General at six o'clock in the morning, to represent'to him that the greatest disasters threatened their comrades in arms—that they ought to
hurry to their assistance as speedily as possible—and
that only very small divisions of the enemy stood in their
way. But general Kinsky declined all discussion on the subject in a cold and irritable manner, saying that he was ill, and was no longer in
command. And thus the troops lay inactive in the fields, watching the progress of the smoke which now enveloped Lannoy also, while the roar of artillery grew louder and nearer, and were not allowed to take a single step to support their hard-pressed
comrades. Similar quiet reigned in the cam]) of the Archduke. It is said that
the order to lead fifteen battalions towards midday to Lannoy, had reached him
as early as five o'clock in the morning, but that he was lying
during the whole of the forenoon deprived of his senses by an attack of cramp,
and therefore could not fulfil the order.1 Meanwhile
the Emperor, Coburg, Mack and Waldeck, remained during the morning in
Templeuve, and afterwards in Marquain, less than five
miles from the sick Kinsky, and less than ten from the senseless Archduke, and
must therefore have received intelligence of the
unhappy condition of
1 In his own report he mentions
attack of cramp.> Witzleben III, 21G, the receipt
of the order but not the 220.
Cii.
IV.] TREACHERY OF THE AUSTRIAN
LEADERS.
435
these Generals by seven o'clock at latest. The discussions which then
took place between them,, the suggestions of honour and courage/ of prudence
aud restraint, which were then made, the amount of painful
indignation, or cold-blooded calculation, which was there displayed, no one of
the parties has ever disclosed. Meanwhile the hours passed away, Tourcoin. and Watrelos were taken, Abercrombie defeated, and at last even Lannoy lost to the Allies. Then about four o'clock in the
afternoon, the longed-for order to march to- * wards Roubaix reached Kinsky's
van; the troops prepared with zeal, not indeed to avert the evil which had
happened, but at any rate to avenge it, when a new order arrived from
head-quarters—this time signed by the Prince of Waldeck— to the effect that the
Duke of York was already entirely defeated, and that the column was to march
back to the camp at Marquain. This was a confession that the day was lost, that the grand offensive movement of the Allies was abandoned.
Who can decide whether an energetic and well-timed intervention of the Archduke might not have completely changed the
fortune of the day, and turned the defeat into victory? No one can deny the possibility of such a turn of affairs, since the French, with
80,000 men, had spent twelve toilsome hours in beating 16,000; and
the advance of Charles would in all probability have relieved Clerfait, who, on
the morning of the 18th, had successfully advanced from Wer-wick, but was
obliged to make a hasty retreat over the Lys on the 19th. However this may be,
the Emperor's resolution to sacrifice his Allies and spare his own troops,
irrevocably determined the fate of the campaign, and the victory of France; and nothing but the narrowness of the military horizon of
Francis II could have enabled him to deceive himself upon this point, even for
a few days. The French had opened the campaign with greatly superior forces,
they had daily added to their strength in spite of all their losses,
and their numbers swelled in every part of the theatre of
43G
STRUGGLE
FOR BELGIUM.
[Book IX.
war, in a manner highly threatening to the position of the Allies. The
latter had no reinforcements to look to, no substitutes
for those who fell. Nay more, while the French recruits were daily forming
themselves in the school of war, the Allies, on the contrary, lost an old
soldier in every man that fell; and the value of the residue declined, because,
of course, the best men exposed themselves most freely.
Under such circumstances nothing but decided mental superiority could turn the
scale in favour of the Allies. If the talent of their generals did not break up
the masses of the enemy by heavy and rapid blows, the mere weight of the latter must at last inevitably
drag down the scale. But the Emperor had missed the opportunity of such
successes on the very first day of the campaign; he had missed it after the
fall of Landrecy; and now, on the evening of the 18th of May, it was lost for the third time and for ever. If, as we may suppose, the
Prince of Waldeck procured that decisive order in Marquain, he gained thereby a
point of the greatest importance to his whole political system; for he thereby
brought the Belgian war into such a position, that he might
with unanswerable arguments advocate the necessity of a retreat. Thugut had
hitherto declared that any reinforcement of the army was impossible, and that
the only safety lay in sudden and overpowering attacks; but now the time for such operations was gone for ever, and the war in Belgium
had become utterly hopeless. On the 19th of May he wrote a furious letter to
Colloredo, filled with complaints of the course of military operations
hitherto, but he had already come to a resolution in his general policy,
which inevitably guided this course to a complete catastrophe.
One more opportunity, however, was granted to the troops, at the very
last moment, of showing that the coming disasters
were not owing to the bluntness of their swords. On the evening of the
18th, it is true, infinite confusion prevailed in Tournai; the soldiers of
York and Monfrault roamed about the town and the camp, complaining and almost
mil-
Ch.
IV.]
BATTLE
OF TO URN AY.
437
tinous, and the most terrible consequences must have immediately ensued if the enemy had followed up their victory with
vigour. But when Pichegru hesitated for three days, the order and confidence of
the Allied troops were quickly restored. In a Council of war held on the 19th,
the Prince of Orange was the only man who maintained that all thoughts of
aggression must be given up, while the other generals, including even Waldeck,
advocated the possibility of another advance. 1
Coburg, especially, proposed that all the divisions of the army should be drawn together; and he promised with his united forces to
give the enemy a decided defeat within eight or ten days. 2
Meanwhile efforts were made to collect and refresh the troops, and to extend
and strengthen their position. Lastly, on the 22nd,
Pichegru moved up to-the attack, with all his forces, along the whole extent of
the Allied line. Another contest, which lasted twelve hours, was begun, in
which the Hanoverians, especially, displayed the most brilliant courage. In the
evening the French were obliged to retreat at all points,
with a loss of more than 5,000 men and five guns. By this success the
remembrance of the disasters of the 18th was completely effaced from the minds
of the soldiers, and the Emperor, too, who had by no means spared himself during the battle, once more looked forward with childlike
hope to the future chances of the war.
But the fruitlessness of this fresh bloodshed was evident to every
competent judge. Thugut saw that his time was come, and he determined without
further delay to call upon the Emperor to make a radical change in the
policy of Austria. On the 23rd he had just signed a treaty with the Sardinian
ambassador at Valenciennes, by which the two Powers mutually promised to
continue their efforts against the French.- It was further agreed between
them that if they should succeed in conquering French territory, the
1 York to Dundas, 19th May. 2 WiUleben III, 221,
438
STRUGGLE
FOR BELGIUM.
[Book IX.
latter should fall to Sardinia, and that the king, in return, should cede to Austria a portion of Piedmont of half the size.
The prospect of new acquisitions in Lombardy, which, was thus opened, completed
the indifference with which Thugut looked on the irrecoverably lost Belgium.
But it was another and more urgent interest, which was destined
to furnish the means of damping the previous zeal of the Emperor against
France—namely the Polish question, and jealousy of Prussia.
Ch. V.]
439
CHAPTER V. EVACUATION OF BELGIUM.
News
of the progress of Prussia in foland.— Thugut
and waldeck wish to lead back the army to germany.—tliey carry their point
with
the emperor.—francis resolves to return to vienna.— CaR-not's perverse plans for a landing in england.— SlEGE
and capture of ypres.—Fresh attacks of the french on the sambre.— Departure
of the emperor.—Carnot
summons jourdan to Belgium. —Army
of the sambre and meuse.—Battle of fleurus.—Retreat of the allies on the mecse. — progress of french in the
palatinate
and
pyrenees.-pause in warlike operations in belgium and italy.
— George
hi., king of Corsica.
Thugut had received the first news of the Polish insurrection while he was
still in Vienna. Such an event could not, in itself, be unwelcome to him, for
he had been working towards a Polish acquisition for
Austria during the whole of the summer of 1793, and he
now saw the chief hindrance to his wishes—the Russian-Polish treaty of
guarantee— swept away by the revolt of Kosciusko. He would doubtless at once
have entered with delight on the path of conquest in Poland, had not the thought of his Prussian rival again hemmed his way. "Still
worse" he wrote on the 10th of April to Count Cobenzl, "than the fear
of the Polish insurgents, is my dread of new measures
of Prussian dishonesty and turbulence; the Prussian troops have begun their inarch towards Poland, and General Igelstrom makes no
protest, but enters into an understanding with them. But we can-by no means
allow the Prussians to remain for any length of time in Poland, still less to
take up a position in Cracow. The Emperor desires no change, and no
acquisition in Poland, but only the right of garrison in certain border
fortresses. But all this . would be changed by a fresh aggrandisement of
Prussia. Russia will know how to prevent
440
EVACUATION
OF BELGIUM.
[Book IX.
this, and we beg to be informed what she intends to do in opposition to
Prussian rapacity. Reinforcement of the Russian army is the first thing to be
done; and then—in the name of Heaven!—postponement of the Turkish war. The
Emperor approves of the Russian plans, and is ready to
cooperate for their fulfilment; but at this moment the war with Turkey would be
fatal. Prussia would forthwith attempt new encroachments;
Austria, in order to oppose her, would be forced to make peace with France ou
any terms. Above all we must be fully assured that
Russia will not share her favour between us and Prussia. If Russia were to
allow Prussian troops in Poland, we too should have to march in, to secure our
portion in the last Partition."
This despatch, as we see, contains a complete programme, which
leaves nothing to be desired in clearness and decision. If Russia would remove
the Prussians from Poland, Austria too would forego the acquisition of large
Polish provinces, and rather endeavour, according to the previous understanding, to conquer French border
lands, aud subsequently share Turkey with the Russians. But if Russia allowed
Prussia to remain in Poland, or, still worse, to extend her dominions in that
country, either by direct encouragement, or, indirectly, by a premature war against Turkey, then Austria would do all in her
power to prevent it, and, if things came to the worst, make peace with France
on any conditions whatever.
The second case, as we know, of this alternative occured in Poland. The
Russiaus, hard pressed by the victorious insurgents, not only did not expel the Prussians from Poland, but' urgently
called upon them for aid. Not a small Prussian corps, but a stately army led by
the king in person, entered Poland, and marched towards the South to Cracow— the very point at which Thugut would endure no rival.
On the 25th of April Catharine announced this state of things to the
Emperor, and pointed out the indispensableness of Prussian aid, adding the
suspicious remark, that she had no intentions of attacking
the Turks, but that she was
Cu.
V.] KOSCIUSKO OFFERS CRACOW TO THE
AUSTRIANS. 441
apprehensive of hostile movements on their part. At the same time
Kosciusko, alarmed by the approach of the Prussians,
sent to the Archduke, as Governor of Galicia, an offer, to give up Cracow to
the Imperial troops, if Austria would remain neutral in the Polish war. These
pieces of intelligence reached Thugut after the middle of May, about the time
in which the battle of Tourcoin was fought. The moment for decision had come. The Archduke had begged for speedy instructions; a blow
might any day be struck in Poland which would deliver Cracow into the hands of
the Prussians. No more exact intelligence of Catharine's resolutions had arrived from St. Petersburg; but at all events the negotiations
commenced in December and February were now suspended, and perhaps the entire
good will of the Empress had been restored to the Prussians, who had so
promptly come to her assistance.
What was to be done in circumstances like these?
On the main point there could be no doubt; a promise of neutrality to Poland was not to be thought of, because it would have
broken off the all-important alliance with Russia. But perhaps it might be
possible to get Cracow out of the hands of the Poles
by an ambiguous, encouraging, and yet not binding, negotiation. It was, of
course, far more probable that Kosciusko would then refuse to treat, and that
the Prussians would thereupon conquer the city; then, indeed, nothing would
remain but to enter with full force into the Polish
dispute—thereby giving an impulse to the friendship of Russia towards the
Emperor—and »to wrest Cracow from the Prussians by diplomatic means if
possible, but, if necessary, by force of arms. We
already know what Thugut thought of Prussia; he believed that the
King was ready to seize the first opportunity of invading the provinces of
Austria. When, therefore, he prepared to acquire Cracow for Austria, nothing
seemed to him more probable than an open breach, perhaps an immediate war, with Prussia. But if it did come to this, nothing could be more
dangerous to Austria than
442
EVACUATION
OF BELGIUM.
[Book IX.
the absence of her most considerable army in Belgium, far from home,
with the Prussian troops between it and the unprotected
provinces. The Austrian forces, then, must, be rescued as soon as possible from
their perilous position, and be forthwith recalled to German ground, to inspire
respect into their Prussian rivals, and procure free scope for the imperial
policy.
As far as our historical evidence enables
us to surmise, these were the views, which, since the last warlike operations, prevailed in the minds of the leading men about the person of
the Emperor. Just as Thugut reached Tournay, General Mack, who was furious at the failure of his grand plan, gave in his resignation as chief of
the staff. He had no longer any hope of holding Belgium against the superior
forces of the enemy, and began to investigate the arguments of his political
adversaries, and to consider whether, under present circumstances,
it was not the duty of Austria to refrain from sacrificing her army, the most
important prop of the State, in a task which had become impossible, and to
withdraw it from Belgium to Germany to protect the other interests of the Empire.1 The
Prince of Waldeck, who succeeded Mack on the staff, undertook to make himself the organ of these views in the highest quarter.2 He
unreservedly expressed his conviction to the Emperor that
1 Conf. his memorial of the 29th of
May in Witzleben III, 265.
2 When speaking with the Duke of
York some days later, he threw all the blame on Thugut, which .the former
immediately reported to England. But York soon learned that
Waldeck agreed with Thugut's views and advocated them to the Emperor. (Witzleben HI, 275, 317.) He declared the same opinion, somewhat later,
to Count Dohnhoff himself (Dohnhoff to the King of Prussia Aug. 2nd. " Waldeck
m'a dit en propres termes que c'e'tait lui qui avait propose a. VEm-pereur de
retirer ses troupes des Pays-Bas") According to a report of Lucchesini
(June 19th) even Lascy himself, once the advocate of energetic warlike operations, had, under existing circumstances, lost all
hope, and now proposed to give up Belgium, to reinforce the Rhine army
with 50,000 men, and to sent the other troops into
Bohemia; and lastly, above all things,
to seek
Oil.
V.]
LORD
ELGIN AND THUGUT.
443
it woul d be inexcusable to sacrifice the strength of the country in
such remote and hopeless undertakings, instead of recalling them to the centre of Empire for more useful purposes.
He therefore deprecated any further attack upon the enemy; so that the latter
was able to fetch away the guns, left on the field in the flight of the
preceding day, under the very eyes of the victors. The
wrath of the English and Hanoverians, which had been excited by the conduct of
the Austrians on the 18th, was now fanned afresh: officers and soldiers openly
spoke of the remissness and treachery of their Allies; and the camp was filled
with endless feuds between the troops of different
nations. The English plenipotentiary, Lord Elgin, accosted
the Imperial minister on the same day, and asked him whether Francis, after
such hard struggles and such heavy losses, was not going at last to send some
reinforcements to Belgium, either from his Rhine army or some other quarter.
Thugut without hesitation answered in the negative,
and added that it was very doubtful whether the possession of the Netherlands
was worth any further efforts on the part of Austria. Elgin,
not a little surprised, endeavoured to • test the sincerity of the Minister; he
replied that in this case England would have to confine herself to the
protection of Holland, and was astounded at Thugut's indifferent reply, that
such a course would be the right one, and that no better
resolution could be taken than to evacuate Belgium immediately. "It is not
my fault," he added, "that the Emperor did not begin the campaign by this measure." "I cannot find expressions," reported Elgin, after this conversation,
to his government, "strong enough to characterize
the firmness with which
a
speedy peace with France." :'I have the most influential
persons in Vienna,
learned
these views," adds Lucche- is as certain as the fact that the"
sini, "through General
YVallis, La- subsequent course of events was ex-
s'cy's
friend and protege."
That Lascy actly in accordance with
their wishes, and Wallis were at that time among
441
EVACUATION
OF BELGIUM.
[Book IX.
this fatal "resolution has been adopted." The news flew rapidly through the camp, through Belgium, and soon through the whole
of Europe. Very little was known of the real motives of Thugut, or of his plans
in Eastern Europe; but the French agent had been
observed, and the Emperor's former desire of rounding off'
his dominions at the expense of Bavaria was not forgotten: a suspicion, therefore, suddenly arose, which agitated men's minds far and near, that
Thugut and Robespierre had come to an understanding,
that France should receive Belgium, and, in return, help
the Emperor to the possession of Bavaria. 1
Meanwhile the Minister, undisturbed by these reports, laid the
despatches from Vienna and Cracow before the Emperor, pointed out their high
importance, and concluded by proposing that Francis should immeditately return to Vienna, and thenceforward make his whole policy turn,
not on the French war, but on the Polish question. The meaning of this advice
was no longer doubtful. The army was considerably weakened, the officers
out of humour, the Allies alienated, and the enemy in full progress.
If Belgium was to be maintained, it would be necessary for Austria to collect all her forces, to procure help from every side, and to rouse the
Belgian people to the defence of their own country: it would be necessary to fill officers and soldiers with new enthusiasm, and to convince the
Allies of the Emperor's sincerity. If Francis had never come to Belgium, all
this might perhaps have been done without his personal intervention, but as he had himself, only four weeks before, repaired to the centre of action, his
sudden departure at the most pressing crisis could not but be fatal. We may confidently assume that he was greatly surprised and agitated by Thugnt's
communication. He had just given the Prince of Coburg the most positive assurances, had
en-
1 Cesar from Vienna to the king
communications from Jenisch the of Prussia, June 22nd, according to chief of Thugnt's Bureau.
Ch.
V.] THUGUT WISHES TO ABANDON
BELGIUM.
445
deavourecl to console him, and promised the'
most energetic efforts in the French war.1 He
was himself very eager, for the contest against the Jacobins, and a few days
before, the fresh laurels of the 22nd had greatly excited his cautious nature.
We may judge of his reluctance from the fact that the
deliberation lasted four whole days; it was, we see, an exact counterpart to
those long conversations, by which, three weeks before, General Manstein at
Berlin had carried off his sovereign from the French to the Polish theatre of
war. The circumstances on either side were exactly
similar. In both cases the personal inclinations of the Prince were on the side
of the common cause—the grand Alliance—the contest against the Revolution; and
in both they were opposed by the leading Statesmen, in
the interest of the selfish aggrandizement of their
own particular State. In neither quarter was a complete and avowed result
obtained in the first instance: but in both eases the personal wishes of the
monarch were virtually overborne by the particular interests of the respective Governments.
On the 24th Coburg received orders from the Emperor to summon all the
generals to a council of war, and to consider the question, in what manner the
complete overthrow of the Allies in Flanders might be
prevented, provided that they still remained victorious on
the Sambre. The very wording of the question indicated the feelings of the
Austrian cabinet, and the council of war was not slow in meeting them. Although
Coburg was of opinion, that by collecting all their forces on the Sambre, a fortunate turn might even now be given to the campaign, yet
the same generals, who, before the late battle, had voted for an energetic
attack upon the. enemy, were now, after the victory, just as unanimous in
declaring that all further efforts were hopeless. To his angry
astonishment,' York found himself the only one who still maintained the
possibility and neces-
The
reports of Elgin and York.
44G
EVACUATION
OF BELGIUM.
[Book IX.
sity of a resolute advance against the enemy.1 All
the others concurred in the opinion, that Belgium was
no longer tenable, that the evacuation of the country was unavoidable. The
general view of the question entertained in the highest quarters appears in a
memorial of General Alack, which
was signed on the 23d of May, and which professes to be the
result of deliberations held with the Emperor himself.2 This
result is, that military success against the French was no longer to be hoped
for, and still less the conquest of a border province of France; that, on the
other hand, the opening of negotiations of peace
with the Republic was both safe and advisable; that the only object was to
obtain as favourable terms as possible; that, in this case, the acquisition of
some French border fortresses appeared hardly feasible, and that it would be advantageous to Austria, only on condition that the
Maritime Powers and the Belgian Estates would furnish the money and troops
necessary to garrison them; that the question might, indeed, be put to the
Maritime Powers in this shape, but that there was little chance of
success; and, lastly, that the abandonment of Belgium would be no injury to
Austria, and that England might in future do what she pleased with that
country.
Whilst Austria thus gave up all hopes of success in the war in Belgium, while all her interest and all her forces were about to be directed
against Cracow, she had to suffer additional vexation, at the same moment, from
the Belgian Estates. The ever-zealous Count Mercy had just called on them for a
gratuity of four million florins. He had indulged the pleasing hope, that the personal presence of the. Emperor
himself would remove all opposition; and he had now to learn that his
proposition was entirely and uucon-
1 Witzleben III, "253, York to
sitions in the form of questions; but Dundas, "May, 26. — 2 Witzleben the order in which they
occur leaves HI, 268. Mack puts all his
propo- no doubt as to the answers.
Cit. V.] BELGIANS REFUSE TO AID AUSTRIA WITH MONEY.
447
ditionally rejected. The Belgian clergy, who were requested to make a patriotic sacrifice, not of their church plate, but of that
which they used at their own tables, drily answered, that they had long ago
sent all such valuable property to Holland.1 Once
more did Belgium, in defence of which the best blood of Austria had been so lately shed, manifest in this way its old self-will
and unproductiveness. How long were the most important interests of Austria to
be imperilled in the maintenance of such a worthless possession?
Under the combined influence of these impressions,
the Emperor resolved upon the decisive step. In the first place directions were
sent to the Archduke Palatine at Lemberg, to induce the^Poles to deliver up
Cracow, by holding out alluring but indefinite prospects. It was then resolved
to promise the Russians the most powerful support
against the Polish insurrection, but at the same time to ask for the closest
and most intimate understanding between the two Imperial Courts, to facilitate
which, the Emperor was -to return to Vienna. But above all, Russia was called upon to do her utmost in opposition to Prussian
malice, and to effect that an army of 33,000 Prussians should remain on the
Rhine. When an agreement had been come to on this point, Austria was to
undertake to lend armed assistance against Kosciusko. With regard to Belgium, even the Emperor now foresaw the
disastrous catastrophe which actually took place a month afterwards; and
without giving the detested order for retreat, he yet gave all the necessary
instructions in case such a step should prove unavoidable.2 He
once more sent a message to the Estates of Brabant, in which he bitterly
complained of the want of patriotic zeal in the country, and declared that he
would no longer sacrifice the strength of other parts of his Empire in the defence of Belgium, unless they immediately granted him a
1 Vivenot I, 125, from a report
mansdorf to Count von Kollowrath of Count O'Donnel of June 25th. in Vienna, in
the Archives at Brussels. — 2 Communication of Count Traut
448
EVACUATION
OF BELGIUM.
[Book
IX.
new levy of 40,000 men. The still smouldering feud between the
Government and the Estates would of itself have rendered
such an effort impossible; and even if the Estates had unexpectedly shown an
inclination to pass such a vote, nothing was more
certain than that it would be destroyed by the impending departure of the
Emperor. Even the most zealous adherents of Thugut's system could urge no
reason for a sudden retreat of the army, which, moreover, the Emperor woidd
never have consented to. On the contrary, consideration for
England, whose views on the Belgian question were sufficiently well known, was
of itself sufficient to make the avoidance of every unusual step desirable. For
the impending breach with Prussia — on account of which Thugut was endeavouring to withdraw the army from Belgium—rendered a good
understanding with England absolutely indispensable to Austria. But England, as
was well known, had no more lively interest on the whole continent than that of
keeping the Austrians in Belgium; and Thugut, who at this very
moment, in consequence of the Prusso-Polish complications, was wishing to
relieve his own financial difficulties by English subsidies, had the strongest
motives for showing the English warlike intentions, if not warlike successes. His communications to Lord Elgin had already excited a very
bad feeling in London, which he now made every effort to appease, by disavowing
the wishes he had so lately expressed, and representing the evacuation of
Belgium as the lamenable consequence of the fortune of war. The
chief object for the present was, therefore, the maintenance of the position on
the Sambre, the forcing of which would have enabled the French to threaten the
Allied army's line of retreat. Ten thousand men were sent from the camp at Tournay to the Sambre; but the victorious and warlike Kaunitz
was recalled, and his place supplied by the Prince of Orange, the earliest opponent of the aggressive war. As the Hanoverians at the same time were
put under the orders of General Clerfait,
Ch.
V.] '
FRANCIS PREPARES TO QUIT FLANDERS. 449
to secure the Dutch frontier, the army at Tournai sank into a mere
insignificant eorps of communication; and it was by no means flattering to
Coburg that the chief eommand was entrusted to him. No
attention was paid to the four captured fortresses; it was believed that they
could all stand a siege of several months, by which time it was hoped peace
might have been made with Ilobespierre. The conclusion of the whole matter was,
that though the Emperor neither determined upon, nor
ordered, the evacuation of Belgium, he gave'up all the measures neeessary to
defend the eountry. The army was to resist as long as possible; by this general
order the Emperor sought to screen himself from the reproaches of his own conscience and of his Allies; but the exaet opposite of
everything which was neeessary for defenee was really done. Contented with this /Success,
Thugut was now always ready to draw up eueouraging and warlike epistles
from the Emperor to the generals. Belgium was not yet actually
given up, but it was no longer a matter of any interest to Austria.
After this the last step was taken whieh proclaimed the adoption of
Thugut's whole system; the Emperor informed his army, by a general order, that
he intended rapidly to review the troops on the
Sambre, to hold one more consultation with the Estates in
Brussels, and when this was done to return to Vienna, where urgent affairs of
government rendered his presence indispensable. The surprise and
consternation caused by this manifesto are
indescribable. Although the Emperor assured the diplomatists at head-cpiarters,
that his only reason for wishing to return home was to hold a Hungarian Diet,
and obtain from that eountry reinforcements for Belgium, no one doubted that the army would immediately follow their monarch.1 The last patriotic
1 Lord Auckland (a brother of
husiastic admirer of Thugut) a good Sir Morton Eden, who was an ent- Imperialist, wrote to Pitt on the
* III. , 2F «
450
EVACUATION
OF BELGIUM.
[Book IX
emotions of the Belgian Estates were completely chilled by this
prospect; and as the French, at the same time, renewed their attacks on the
right and left , a boundless terror filled the forsaken land. Fear, wrath and
confusion, prevailed in every quarter. Some concealed all
their valuable property, others prepared to flee as soon as
the troops should be withdrawn: all official arrangements were broken up, the
streets were filled with emigrants, and in all directions, according to the expression of an eye-witness, the
image of chaos presented itself.
The French must have been immediately informed at any-rate of the new
distribution of the Allied forces, and this was enough, one would think, to
remove all doubts as to their own future mode of
action.' The more important the contest on the Sambre became, the more urgent
was the necessity of bringing up their main army to this theatre of war;
consequently, of turning from Flanders towards the east, pursuing Coburg as
closely as possible, and thus crushing their adversaries
between two fires. But the Committee of Public Safety had no
intention of issuing an order so dangerous to the enemy. On the contrary,
immediately after the battle of Tourcoin, Pichegru received new orders from
Carnot to complete his grand plan, i. e. to divert
his main strength from Coburg towards the sea-coast, and with this view to
capture Ypres and Bruges first of all. The enemy who had just been beaten,
therefore, was not to be pursued, but leisure was to be given him to recover and
28th
of November. "From the time that the Emperor, in last May, declared his intention to return to Vienna, it -was evident that the
Austrian ministers were impressed by the necessity of withdrawing from the
prosecution of the French war; and that they had resolved, with
this view, to leave the borders of Germany, the Austrian Netherlands , and Holland, to their fate. "My old friend the Count Mercy
transmitted to me from his death-bed a contrary assertion, and I must presume (that it was so? No, Auckland only says) that he
believed it."
Cn.
V.]
PICHEGRU
BESIEGES YPRES.
451
collect his strength, to deal fresh blows, perhaps, on the French
flank, or at any rate to effect his retreat with the desired safety and
convenience. From a military point of view such a proceeding
cannot of course be justified; but it becomes intelligible on the supposition
that, at this moment, the Committee of Public Safety wished to spare the
Emperor, and to throw all its weight upon England—a wish which was strongly impressed upon all.the measures of the French rulers at this period.
On the 26th of May the Convention decreed that no more English or Hanoverian
prisoners of war should be made; the Brest fleet received repeated instructions to gain decisive victories; all
the organs of the government overflowed with mortal threats against "the
modern Carthage." 1
Pichegru, therefore, was also obliged to obey. He divided his forces, placed
two divisions to observe Coburg, and one to keep off Clerfait, and with the two
others opened the siege of Ypres. This place was more considerable and in
better condition than Menin, but in consequence of the sluggishness of the
government at that period, it was inefficiently prepared; e. g. the plain in
front of the fortress had not been inundated by opening the
sluices, because, as the report said, much property would be thereby destroyed,
and the measure would meet with great opposition. The garrison consisted of
more than (5,000 men, one-third Austrians, and two-thirds Hessians; the commandant was the Imperial general Salis—formerly a brave officer but
now enfeebled by old age—who on the second day of the bombardment withdrew into
a bombproof casemate, and remained in this retreat till the end of the siege.
In this case, too, the resistance offered was entirely owing
to the excellence of the troops, which in spite
1 The army of the West was, in-
dprf: "We must, then, wrote Carnot, deed, obliged to send off strong divi-
postpone the attack on England, but sions to reinforce the Rhine army, it is by no means given up." Guerre which had just been beaten by
Mollen- des Vendecns III, 515.
2F2 •
452
EVACUATION
OF BELGIUM.
[Book IX.
of all their former disasters, disputed every inch of ground with
invincible self-devotion. General Salis, on his part, placed all his
hopes on the relief which he expected from without; but Clerfait, although his
force had been raised to 20,000 men, did not venture to make any attack for a
considerable time; and the French bombardment, which gradually destroyed one quarter of the town after another, threw the garrison into
a state of deep exhaustion from the incessant exertions it was called upon to
make. At last, on the 11th of June, Clerfait began to move, but was repulsed
after a short engagement by Souham at Hooglede, while the
garrison of Lille held the Prince of Coburg in check by a vigorous sally.
Coburg was completely broken and hopeless, but Clerfait ventured- on a second
attack upon Hooglede on the 14th. The battle on this occasion was somewhat longer and more obstinate, but the issue was not more favourable, nor
could it be so, considering the overpowering numbers of the enemy, and
the complete inactivity of Coburg. The garrison at
Ypres listened in anxious suspense to the distant thunder of the cannon, which alas! grew more and more distant as the battle
continued. After this second failure the courage of General Salis was exhausted, and on the 15th he put the question to his officers, whether he should capitidate. They unanimously answered in the negative. On the 16th the enemy began to draw his third parallel,
and in the course of the night completed a breaching battery, which, on the
morning of the 17th, opened a destructive fire against the nearest bastions.
Hereupon Salis again summoned a council of war; the supply of
ammunition was exhausted, and the officers acknowledged the impossibility of
holding out any longer. They therefore demanded an order to cut their way
through the enemy, after Hammerstein's splendid example at Menin; but Salis would listen to nothing of the kind, and angrily reproved them for
their unfeasible proposals. It was resolved, therefore, to offer to give up the
place to the enemy on
Cii. V.]
THE
BRAVE HESSIANS AT YPRES.
453
condition that the garrison should retire unmolested;
and the negociation was commenced in the course of the forenoon. But
immediately afterwards the intelligence spread through the town, that the
general had, without any resistance, signed the demand of Moreau that the
troops should be made prisoners of war. Then, for the last
time in the campaign, the pride of the brave soldiers' hearts broke forth in
wild exasperation. The Hessian battalions assembled in crowds with furious
cries, threatened to massacre their officers, and demanded that some one should lead them out to cut their way through the enemy, as
Hammerstein had done. But they found no Hammerstein there, and dispersed at
last to their quarters, as night came on, in impotent rage and humiliation. On the 19th they marched out with all the military
honours. The French saluted to the sound of martial music, and the garrison was
ordered to return the greeting by presenting arms for the last time, and then
to give up their weapons. But upon this a new tumult arose; the soldiers left
their ranks dashed their muskets on the ground, tore
their colours, and threw the fragments with curses and tears at the feet of the
French. "Now our honour is gone," they said, "now we will be
quiet." A murmur of approbation and respect ran through the ranks of the victors; "Those are fine fellows" cried the soldiers; General
Moreau rode with uncovered head along the column, and said: "These are
brave men, who deserve a better fate."
Coburg was interrupted by the news of this catastrophe in his
preparations for a third attempt to relieve the place;
and as, at the same time, evil tidings arrived from the Sambre, he declared
that he could do nothing more for Flanders, and that he should lead the
Imperial troops stationed at Tournai to strengthen the army of the Sambre. The duke of York had now to undertake the protection of the Scheldt and
the Dutch frontier alone, with his English, Hannoverian and Hessian troops,
without any other support than Clerfait's
Austrians. After Coburg had withdrawn
,454
EVACUATION
OF BELGIUM.
[Book IX.
on the 21stj York, too, retreated, on the following day, to the right
bank of the river, and stationed his troops in a wide arch, which ran first
towards the north behind the Scheldt through Oudenarde to Ghent, and thenee to
the west, behind the Ghent eanal, to Bruges and
Helvetsluys. Pichegru stood opposed with double numbers to this thin girdle: if
he were to throw himself with all his'Weight upon
Tournai or Oudenarde, nothing could hinder him from breaking through York's
position, reaching Brussels in three days' march with
60,000 men, and thereby separating York and Coburg in a manner equally
destructive to both. How decisive sueh a movement would have been for the campaign, and even for the whole war, will be better seen, when we have taken a nearer view of the simultaneous events in the Eastern
portion of the theatre of war—the bank of the lower Sambre.
■In this quarter, as we have seen, the French had made a first
attempt against the left wing of the Allies, but had been repulsed by Kaunitz
with great loss, on the 14th of May, near Rouveroi. Jourdan, who had received
orders to send off twenty or thirty thousand men from the Moselle army
to Namur or Liege, for the purpose of harassing the Austrians, was sharply
attaeked by the Prussians in the Palatinate, and driven beyond Kaiserslautern.
He had, therefore, enough to do to proteet himself on this side, and at the same time to make his preparations, between the Moselle and the
Meuse, for the march into Belgium. Affairs remained in this position on the
Sambre through the whole of May. St. Just, who was at that time with the Army
of Ardennes, and was arresting and beheading after the fashion of
the Reign of Terror, succeeded, indeed, in driving
the army once more over the river on the 20th, but had not made his
arrangements more suitably than Charbonnier had done; so that Kaunitz
was able to inflict another defeat on the Freneh on the 24th, to
capture 41 guns, and drive them across the Sambre with a loss of
Ch.
V.] ST. JUST DIRECTS OPERATIONS ON THE
SAMBRE. 455
3,000 men. When the Emperor, at this time, came to the resolution
slowly to evacuate Belgium, he was justified, in trusting to the
ability of his army on the Sambre to hold out for- a few weeks longer;
especially as it had received considerable reinforcements, by which its numbers
had been made almost equal to those of the enemy. It was not indeed allowed rest for a single day, for St. Just
drove his generals to incessant attacks, by constantly threatening them with
the scaffold; the Austrians, however, were able to maintain their ground,
because the French tyrant only understood how to punish, but not to command. Thus, nothing was more evidently and urgently necessary
for the French, than to bring unity into the movements of the combined army of
the Sambre: yet, instead of this, St. Just ordered that Charbonnier should
command on the Lower, and Desjardins on the Upper Sambre, and that
the latter, especially on days of battle, should consult the generals of
division, Kleber and Scherer. He paid as little regard to the consequences of
this many-headed rule, as to the strength of the enemy, or the distribution of his own forces: he had nothing to say to the generals, except
that they must immediately crush the enemy, on pain of losing their own heads.
After the fresh defeat of the 24th he repeated this formula with increased
solemnity. The generals represented to him that the troops were
exhausted to the last degree, and were in need of rest; and their words were
confirmed on the 25th, when Kleber's battalions, although
they had not fought altogether unsuccessfully, refused to advance, stood
apathetically in the midst of a shower of bullets, and
could not be brought to charge with the bayonet. Nevertheless St. Just
declared, with relentless brevity, that the Republic needed a victory on the
following day. Once more Charbonnier ventured to protest, and reminded him that Jourdan was on his march towards the Meuse with half the
Moselle army; and that it would therefore be in the highest degree perverse to
imperil the
456
EVACUATION
OF BELGIUM.
[Book IX.
Sambre army by itself before his arrival. It was all in vain. "The Republic" repeated St. Just, needs a triumph
to-morrow, and consequently an immediate attack: what it leaves to your
choice is the means of obtaining the victory; choose therefore, whether you
will gain it by a battle or a siege." In this
imperious obstiuacy he appeared to himself a very great man, superior, as a
republican, to all obstacles. The officers gnashed their teeth at the tyranny
which, with ignorant insolence, played with the lives of the soldiers, and the
fate of the campaign; but they were obliged to obey, with
wrath and contempt in their hearts. They chose the siege of Charleroi, since,
as we have just seen, Charbonnier had already wished to move in this direction,
and the army would in this way be brought nearer to Jourdan's sphere of operations. The execution of the plan, however, was miserably
crippled by the mistakes which had once for all become inveterate; two
divisions were left on the south of the Sambre, two were employed in bombarding
Charleroi, and two were stationed four or five miles above that
place, as a cover against the Austrians. In short, these ample forces were
again dispersed in the most mischievous manner, and exposed to partial defeats.
The penalty of such mistakes had soon to be paid. General Beaulieu had just arrived in Namur from Luxemburg with 10,000 men; the Emperor
Francis in person approached, on the other side, with a strong army from
Tournai; so that the Allies, after all their losses, were uniting at least
50,000 men at this spot, and might have attacked any single division of the
enemy with crushing effect. Happily for the French, the Austrians copied the
mistakes of their opponents on this occasion, as they had done at Landrecy, and
dispersed more than a third of their army in larger or smaller garrisons and pickets. The Prince of Orange, therefore, who, on the
30th, undertook the command-in-chief instead of General Kaunitz, had only
32,000 men at his disposal, with which, on the 2nd of June, he fell upon the
covering force of the French. A decided
Ch. V.]
FRANCIS
RETURNS TO VIENNA.
457
success was therefore out of the question, but at any rate the
excessive extension of the French position had this effect, that the
Republicans, after a feeble resistance, gave way at all points, raised the
siege of Charleroi, and fled with a loss of more than 2,000 men across the
Sambre. For the third time this river had been the scene of an obstinate
struggle, and always with the same result: the Emperor Francis now closed his
career in the field, in order to devote himself to political cares at
Vienna. He could not even now bring himself to confess to his generals the real
reason of ^his departure. He wrote to Coburg that it was not necessary to give
him special rules of conduct, since he was well acquainted
with the circumstances of the war, the position of the army, and the
condition of the men; that he was to look above all things to the preservation
of the troops, and the maintenance of discipline. The retreat, was not yet officially proclaimed, but the object of the Emperor's chief interest
was declared to be, not the defence of the country, but the preservation of the
troops.
Such was the state of affairs in Belgium at the beginning of June. Men
were familiarised with the idea that that country was untenable, and without value to Austria. The Austrians sought to avoid any
further battles as much as possible, and if they did engage in any more serious
contests on the Sambre, it was done, not to protect Belgium, but to cover
their own retreat. • In the face of the facts which now lie before
us, it will be impossible to repeat that the excellence of the enemy's generals
and troops led to this result. On the contrary, things had been brought to this
pass, in the first place, by the overwhelming numbers of the French armies, which presented to the Emperor a prospect, not of rapid
and splendid triumphs, but of a purposeless waste of his own best
forces; secondly,- by the obstinate opposition of the Belgian Estates; and
thirdly, and more especially, by the march of the
Prussians upon Cracow, which suddenly made the Polish question the focus of all
458
EVACUATION
OF BELGIUM.
[Book IX.
his desires and efforts. The plans of Carnot, and the military talents of Pichegru, as we have said, contributed little to this result; on the contrary, they would, more than once, have injured
their own cause in the highest degree, had not Francis and Coburg been equally
zealous in'making up for the enemy's mistakes by their own. It was, therefore,
a piece of irony, but not an injustice, of fate, that Carnot
conceived the first really genial and fertile idea in this campaign, at
the moment when the enemy voluntarily retired from the contest; and when
Carnot's efforts—which however does not detract from their intrinsic value—were almost superfluous.
Jourdan, as we have before remarked, had received orders, towards the
end of April, to move about 18,000 men of the Rhine army into the position
formerly held by the Army of the Moselle; and then to bring over 25,000 —
30,000 men of the latter through the territory of
Luxemburg to the Meuse, and make a diversion againt Namur or Liege. This
straightforward and zealous officer performed his task with an energy which
carried him far beyond the existing plans of the Committee. "Whether he surmised that no great activity was to be expected from the Prussian
army in the Palatinate, or whether he overlooked this danger in the hope of
achieving a more decided success, he resolved to transfer, not 25,000 men as
Carnot had ordered, but 50,000 men, from the Moselle to the Meuse.
It was not until the 20th of May that he had collected this body of men in
Thion-ville; but he preserved the secret of his expedition with the greatest
care, and the troops themselves had no suspicion of his object when he began to move, on the above-mentioned day, from Thionville towards
Arlon.' "The enemy," he wrote at this time>to Carnot, "has
retreated from Arlon to Bastogne. I shall follow him thither, and still
further, till I force him to a battle." This was General Beaulieu, who had just executed another splendid cavalry
manoeuvre against the French garrison of Bouillon, but now retreated before a
force quadruple his own to Namur, where, as we have seen, he
Cii. V.]
CARNOT SUMMONS GENERAL JOURDAN TO-BELGIUM. 459
arrived just in time to take part in the
engagement of Charleroi on the 3rd of June. Jourdan, cautiously advancing,
reached the Meuse at Dinaut on the 30th of May, and there received orders from
the Committee of Public Safety, not, as had been originally intended, to march down the stream to Namur,1 but
to unite with the Army of the Ardennes in the siege of Charleroi.2
Marching towards Thuin according to these directions, he arrived there on the
evening of the 3rd of June, in time to receive and protect the fugitives of the defeated Army of the Ardennes. St. Just had just been
summoned by the Committee to Paris, to deliberate about the party feuds in the
Convention; on his arrival he made a report on the previous ill-fortune of the
army, which he ascribed especially to the disagreement between
Desjardins and Charbonnier. He thereby secured the dismissal of the latter, but
he had still so little expectation of important aid from
Jourdan, that he proposed to give the command of the
Ardennes army to General Desjardins, not under Jourdan's, but
unter Pichegru's orders. But the Committee had before them a very unfavourable judgment of Pichegru on the capacity of General Desjardins;
then came the intelligence of the new defeat of the 3rd; Carnot, therefore,
sent off a resolution of the Committee to Thuin, on the 4th, which
confirmed the junction of the armies, gave to the whole mass of 100,000 men the
name of Army of the Sambre and Meuse, and appointed Jourdan to command it,
under Pichegru's superintendence.
This was no doubt the wisest measure which the
Committee adopted during the whole campaign. At last they made a step out
of their former perverse ways, out of the chaos of error and division, and
threw an imposing and
1 He had this intention as late as
the 21st, as Charbonnier informed General Bruce,
— 2 Order of the
8th
of Prairial,
printed in the Moui-teur of the
14th.
460
EVACUATION
OF BELGIUM.
[Book IX.
overpowering force on the decisive point of the whole theatre of • war.
But this single happy idea was not the fruit of clever
calculation, or wise thought, or of a new system of tactics: it was rather the
offspring of a transient necessity. It came however too late—at a time when
Austria had already determined upon the evacuation of Belgium—and it neither made any alteration, when carried into practice, in the prevailing
mode of conducting the war—for Jourdan, like his predecessors, adhered to the
system of minute columns—nor had it any influence on Carnot's general plan,
which still looked to Ostend, Walcheren and London. A closer
observation, therefore, cannot but considerably lower the estimate generally
formed of it. If it had been adopted four weeks earlier, and carried out with
energy, it would in all probability have determined the issue of the campaign in a few days: as it was, however, we can only say that the
formation of the Army of the Sambre and Meuse made it impossible for the French
rulers, by any fresh mistakes, to keep the Austrians in Belgium, which they
were already anxious to leave.
On the 6th, Jourdan came to an agreement
with the conventional commissioners in his camp,
respecting his future measures. They determined, in the first place, to leave a
full third of their forces—35,000 men—on the south of the Sambre, for the
protection of the country to the right and left of
Maubeuge; against whom, it would be difficult to say—since, after the struggles
of the last few weeks in this region, the weakness of their adversaries could
not be unknown to the French. They then crossed
the Sambre, on the 12th, with 66,000 men, almost
without resistance, since Orange, after the last engagement, had led back his
main body to the position at Rouveroi. The division Hatry, 8,000 strong,
thereupon invested Charleroi, opened its trenches, and began to bombard the place; the other divisions of the army were again drawn up,
in three separate masses, over a space of about 19 miles, with brooks, woods
and defiles
Ch. V.]
DEFEAT
OF JOURDAN AT CHARLEROI.
461
between them, for the purpose of covering the besiegers. In consequence of this disposition of the French force, Orange,
although only half as strong as his adversary, gathered courage for another
attempt to relieve the town. He once more designated about 33,000 men for this
service', as on the 3rd; he himself approached with three columns
from Rouveroi, while Beaulieu, with 11,000 men, advanced from Namur against the
right flank of the French —the plan being to attack the enemy's position on all
sides, early on the morning of the 16th. Jourdan, being informed of the movements of the enemy, felt all the disadvantage of his
extended line, and, on the evening of the 15th, conceived the resolution of
anticipating the Austrians by boldly assuming the offensive. The night was
extremely dark; at break of day a thick mist spread itself far and wide
over the country; the soldiers could not see more than a few . steps around
them in any direction. Towards three o'clock, at the first dawn, the troops
began to move; but about the same time the Austrians also were already advancing; an extremely violent collision took place, and a series
of bloody single combats, the progress of which was only known to the leaders
from the report of the guns. At first Beaulieu drove General Marceau back to
the village of Fleurus, and took the place by storm; in the centre
General Latour drove the division Championuet out of the village of Heppignies
by a bayonet charge, and prepared to attack Gosselies, the last position before
Charleroi. On the west wing, the battle between General Kleber and Wartensleben near Trazegnies and Forchics remained undecided.
Meanwhile Jourdan sent the division Lefevre against Fleurus; their approach
was concealed from the Austrians by the fog; but suddenly their battalions
rushed from the high standing corn against the enemy's infantry, drove
them by a murderous fire of artillery out of the place, and continued to
advance, in spite of the repeated attempts .of the Austrian cavalry to cut them
up. At the same time the' division
4G2
EVACUATION
OF BELGIUM.
[Book IX.
Morlot from Gosselies charged Latour, who, being also cannonaded from Fleurus, began to retreat, at first slowly; but was soon
attacked by some French cavalry reserves, under General Dnbais, which cut one
battalion to pieces, captured seven guns, and drove the Austrians nearly five
miles back to Frasne and Mellet. Still more unfavourable for the latter was the
battle on the west wing, where Kleber beat the Dutch with great loss out of the
village of Tra-zegnies, and where Wartensleben himself was wounded and obliged to leave the field. It was eight o'clock in the
morning, and Jourdan thought that the day was his own. At this moment, however,
.Orange once more collected all his strength for a last effort. He himself,
with the Imperii Generals Alvinzy and Werneck, hastened to Latour,
and in the midst of the tumult, and a shower of balls, rallied the wavering
column. General Petrasch led a last reserve of grenadiers against Fleurus, and
with these picked troops, which stood like a small but impenetrable rampart, he checked the advance of Marceau; so that Orange was enabled
to disentangle the division Latour from the fight and lead them over to
Beaulieu. A mass of nearly 20,000 men was collected in one spot; the battalions
were once more set in order and prepared for the attack; and with
their guns collected in batteries at their head, and
the band playing up, they once more advanced in double quick time against the
enemy. The division Lefevre, which in the heat of the advance had fired away all its powder, was scattered at once by the
shock of the advancing Austrians; Marceau was compelled to make a hasty
retreat, and the village of Lam-bnsart, the point
cCappui of the French right on the Sambre, was captured. It was now mid-day,
the sun at last broke through the fog, and suddenly opened
the prospect of the surrounding country; Jourdan, who was stationed on the
heights of Jnmet, between Charleroi and Gosselies, saw his right wing in
disorderly flight towards the nearest bridges, and the Austrians advancing up the stream from Lambusart,
Cii.
V.] JOURDAN INVESTS CHARLEROI
AGAIN.
4G3
and already threatening' the rear of his centre. He immediately summoned Morlot and Championnet from Melet and Gosselies to
the hills of Jumet; but scarcely had they taken up
their position there, when Werneek and Beaulieu were upon them, and by a last
charge compelled these divisions also to a hasty retreat
across the Sambre. Hatry followed without an attempt at resistance, and towards
five o'cloek in the evening Charleroi was relieved. General Kleber
alone, who commanded the French left, had maintained
his superiority, driven the Dutch out of every new position, and ehased them
for nine miles into the country as far as Roeulx. But after Jourdan's retreat
these successes were of no avail; Kleber could
not think of holding his ground alone upon the northern bank.
The victors had good reason to be contented with their day's work. With
the blood of about 3,000 eomrades they had aehieved the glory of driving baek,
for the fourth time, an enormously superior foree
over the hardly contested river; they imagined that now," sinee the
Moselle army also had felt the weight of their arm, they should have rest for a
long time to come; and Orange did not scruple, on the 17th, to send off four battalions to Tournay to reinforce Coburg. But he
over-estimated his suecess. The Freneh, who had nowhere suffered severely but
at Fleurus, were soon restored to order on the other side of the Sambre; and
Jourdan was entirely of the same opinion with St. Just, who had lately
returned from Paris, that a fresh attempt to cross the river should be made
without delay. Whereupon Orange sent off eourier after courier to recall the
detached battalions, and even to beg Coburg for reinforcements. For the present, however, he avoided a fresh engagement, and allowed Jourdan to
invest Charleroi again, and extend his line after the old fashion from
Trazegnies to Gosselies, and thenee to Fleurus and Lambusart. In spite 'of his
superior numbers the Freneh general was by no means at ease on this
blood-stained ground; he therefore buried his troops in
404
EVACUATION
OF BELGIUM.
[Book IX.
deep intrenchments, cut down the woods, and fortified the villages.
Meanwhile he learned from the inhabitants of the neighbourhood
that the Austrians were no where to be seen in any considerable strength; this
information seemed to be confirmed by a grand reconnoitring movement of the
French up the river, on the 20th,* with 40,000 men, since Orange without firing
a shot, continually retreated before them. Such a
course on the part of the Austrians was so unusual, that, though it was natural
to suppose that Orange only declined battle because he was expecting
reinforcements, St. Just—who agreed with the Committee in regarding Flanders as the only important theatre of war—began to fear that the
enemy might be concentrating his forces in that country for a decisive blow
against Pichegru. Carnot had just sent off instructions to Pichegru, on the
18th, to transfer 16,000 men from the Sambre to the coast of Flanders;1 and
it was entirely in accordance with similar views, that St. Just now ordered
General Kleber to leave the camp on the Sambre with 36,000 men, march to Mons,
and there threaten the Austrians in their position on the Scheldt. As Coburg arrived on the very same day in the camp of Orange at
Nivelles, Kleber, by obeying St. Just's instructions, would have been
completely isolated, and exposed to the united forces of the allies; and if he
should be defeated, Jourdan with the rest of the army would be in the
greatest peril. But St. Just had not the slightest idea of any such
contingencies; he listened to the tales of Austrian deserters and Belgian
patriots, about the wretched condition of the enemy's troops, and of the terror
which prevailed in Belgium, indulged in the most
splendid dreams of victory; and wrote to the Committee that the young man
1 From Jourdan's Memoires quoted by Louis Blanc XI, 164, who
however makes the mistake
of seeing in
these
instructions a subject of disagreement between Carnot and St. Just.
Ch. V.]
THE
FRENCH TAKE CHARLEROI.
465
whom the good fortune of the Republic had made German Emperor, could
not resist much longer, and would perish miserably, if the ^contest were"
only kept up with impetuous energy. He considered all danger
on the Sambre as completely past, and refused, with
insolent pride, to listen to Jourdan's protests against the sending away of
Kleber. Whereupon Jourdan openly declared that he would not obey the order, but
would appeal "to the Committee of Public Safety.
St. Just, who had just caused an artillery officer to be executed, because his
battery was not ready for action at the appointed hour, was furious at the
insubordination of the general; but before he could make up his mind how to act, intelligence arrived from Cambray, Cateau, and
Maubeuge, that the Austrian corps were every where marching 'towards Charleroi;
and Kleber's outposts were alarmed, for the first time, on the 25th, after a
pause of eight days. It was evident that a new attempt to relieve the
town was to be made, and Jourdan's resistance was brilliantly justified.1 The
bombardment of Charleroi was now continued with increased vigour, and with so
much effect, that the commandant sent an officer in the course of the forenoon to negotiate terms of capitulation. The fate of the
French army might have depended on an immediate settlement, but St. Just
adhered to his usual style of bombastic bragging, refused all discussion, and
threatened a general massacre, unless the gates were opened, and the town
surrendered at discretion,'before evening. He even forgot to inform Kleber of
the position of affairs, so that the general, who was on the point of attacking
the ad-
1 According to the papers in the
military archives, St. Just, at the time of his fall,
attributed his own error to General Jourdan, and this
III.
view
of the case was adopted in Buchez's work, from which it has been transferred to
other accounts.
2G
466
EVACUATION
OF BELGIUM.
[Book IX.
vancing Austrians, was only restrained, by the
hasty intervention of Jourdan, from an engagement,
the noise of which would have apprised the garrison of the approach of relief,
and hindered the surrender.1 The
commandant laid down his arms in the evening, and the French thus gained a firm basis of operations on the bank of the river, and
were able to bring up Hatry's division for the impending battle, and to await
with a force of 76,000 men the onset of the Austrians.
The Allies, even after Coburg's arrival, had only two-thirds of that number. Nor was the quality of these troops the same as
in the commencement of the campaign; the best men had been decimated in many a
bloody battle, and the great mass were dispirited by the report of the impending retreat. Yet there was not one of them who would not have
gone into battle with calm confidence; and the dispersion of the hostile forces
afforded, even now, the chance of a second victory, provided that the Allies
kept well together, and brought an overwhelming force
to bear upon one of the enemy's wings. By this
mode of proceeding, not only would the road to Charleroi have' been opened, but
the French would have been threatened in their communications,
and compelled to retreat beyond the river. Coburg, however, who had no intelligence of the fall of Charleroi, followed the same tactics as Orange
had employed ten days before. Occupying the attention of the enemy's centre by
pushing forward fifteen battalions (11,000 men), in two columns, he sent the
Princes of Orange and AValdeck against the left wing, under
Kleber—and Beaulieu and the Archduke Charles (who were seven or eight miles
off) against the right, commanded by Marceau and Mayer, near Fleurus and
Lambusart. The fate of the day, therefore, as will be seen at once, depended entirely on the result of the first
Soult's
Memoires.
Cn.
V.]
BATTLE
OF FLEURUS.
4G7
collision. If Marceau or Kleber were not immediately and entirely
broken, if they were only driven back towards Charleroi, they would but
strengthen the position of the French by their very retreat.
Every retrograde step would remedy the chief fault of their position—its
excessive extension; their divisions would approach
one another, afford mutual support, and derive the full advantage from their
superior numbers. And this was just the course which
events took on the 26th.
The battle was commenced before daybreak by the Prince of Orange, who
threw himself, soon after one o'clock, on Kleber's van (Montaigu's division)
which was posted close to the Sambre, at Vespe. The blow
was dealt with such force, that the French, after a "short resistance,
took to flight, and sought for safety on the other side of the river. ' Hereupon Waldeck, at about four o'clock, opened the attack upon Kleber
himself; a violent artillery contest arose, Tra-zegnies was taken by a
bayonet charge, the enemy driven out of the woods of Monceaux, and, about nine
o'clock, the , village of Marchienne on the Sambre—only a quarter of a league
from Charleroi—was taken by storm. But Kleber now hastened in person to General Morlot, who commanded the nearest division of the
centre, borrowed some of his battalions, and made a furious attack on Waldeck.
At the same time Jourdan sent the cavalry reserve, under General Dubois,
against the flank of the Austrians, and a howitzer battery cume up from
Gosselies, and shelled the woods of Monceaux; in short, though the Allies
maintained the ground which they had won, all further advance on their part
"was simply impossible.
A similar fate meanwhile befell General Beaulieu, at the opposite end of the line of battle, in his attack on the
enemy's right wing. Beaulieu established himself firmly in the wooded banks of
the Sambre, during an obstinate contest between the skirmishers of
either party. The French
2 G2
468
EVACUATION
OF BELGIUM.
[Book IX.
contested every inch of ground from behind their stockades, and the
Imperialists suffered severely as they advanced. It was twelve o'clock before
they had driven the enemy from their cover in the woods; whereupon General Marceau collected his division before the village of
Lambusart, and received the pursuing Austrians with a
murderous fire from twenty guns. Yet the latter, though whole lines of their
men were being mown down, dashed forward with the bayonet,
and with loud hurrahs put the enemy to flight. It was
in vain that Marceau threw himself into the midst of the tumult, and
endeavoured to rally his men; his horse was shot under him, and he himself
narrowly escaped capture; the great mass of his division, hotly pursued by the Austrian cuirassiers, fled beyond the Sambre. Unfortunately
the Archduke had hitherto vainly attempted to
drive the French out of Fleurus; Beaulieu, therefore, was obliged to halt, and
Jourdan gained time to send off General Lefevre, from the centre, with several battalions to Lambusart, and thus to afford a point
d'appui to his hardly-pressed right wing. Meanwhile the Archduke at last took
Fleurus, and formed a conjunction with Beaulieu; the two generals then advanced
amidst a heavy fire of artillery to what they hoped was the
decisive attack upon Lambusart. Thrice did their columns force their way into
the place, and thrice were they driven back; at length Lefevre left the smoking
ruins in the hands of the victors, and withdrew to his fortified camp behind the village, where Hatry's division arrived soon afterwards,
and threatened the exhausted Austrians with an entirely new* contest.
It was now three o'clock in the afternoon. The bloody struggle had been
carried on for twelve hours without decided
advantage to either side, and the day was to be looked on as already lost for
the Allies, for the simple reason that it had not long ago been won. Even if
the enfeebled troops, by a fresh miracle of bravery, should achieve a new
victory
Ch. V.]
RETREAT OF COBURG.
469
at Marchienne or Lambusart, their losses would be fearful, and they
could expect nothing but total annihilation, as soon as fortune, which they had
so boldly challenged, should desert them at any single point. Coburg was
evidently in no position to continue so hazardous a game,
since, as we know, he was fighting, not to hold possession of the country, but
to abandon it with as little loss as possible. Just at this moment intelligence
was brought by Lieutenant Ra-detzky—subsequently the famous Field-marshal, who with six horsemen had swum the Sambre, and stolen
through the enemy's division up to the walls of the fortress—that Charleroi had
already been twenty-four hours in the hands of the French; whereupon Coburg
immediately determined to break off the contest. His columns
retreated in excellent order, Beaulieu even taking with him some captured guns;
and the French had suffered too much to think of harassing the retreating enemy. Kleber alone made some attempts against Waldeck, whose
column was the last to leave the battlefield, but he was unable to gain
any important advantage. - Yet the French had on this day attained the long
desired object of fixing themselves on the north" of the Sambre; and
though their soldiers had gained but little glory,
their General reaped the greatest advantages from the battle of Fleurus.
To what degree this engagement would affect the issue of the whole war
still depended in a great degree on the future measures of the Prince of
Coburg. His army was by no means beaten, his troops, on the
contrary, were filled with the consciousness of their strength. If he resolved
to leave the road to Brussels apparently open to the French, and to lead his
whole army to Namur, he might, in the course of a few weeks, draw reinforcements from Luxemburg and Treves, and raise the number of his troops
to 60,000 men. By this means he would protect his communications with Germany,
and keep Jourdan in check on this side, perhaps
for months, as he had before done General
Pichegru, at Tournay, in an exactly similar position. If he took this course he
must, indeed, witness the levying of a forced contribution on Brussels by a
detachment of the enemy with indifference, but regard every important movement of Jourdan towards the north, as a signal for an energetic advance on his own part. Such a mode of carrying on the war, however, lay
entirely beyond his mental horizon. He therefore adopted the exactly opposite'
system, of covering all the roads by scanty posts, which were
instructed to retreat at the first serious onset of the
enemy. He caused his different divisions to retreat by the same road by which
they had advanced to battle—Beaulieu towards the east to Gembloux to protect
Namur—the centre, northwards, towards Brussels as far as
Genappes—and Orange, westwards, as far as Roeulx in the neighbourhood of Mons.
He hereby dispersed his forces in thin bodies of
12,000 to 15,000 men each, over an extent of more than 28 miles, in the face of
a pursuing enemy, who, within twenty-four hours,
could have collected an army of more than 100,000 men. If we consider, moreover, that the Duke of York, at the same time, scattered his
still weaker force in a still weaker line, from Tournay to Helvoetsluys, it becomes evident that the fate of the Allies was placed by these measures
entirely in the hands of the French. How many would have escaped, if Jourdan,
on the 27th, had marched with 90,000 men to Namur and Liege to bar their
retreat, and Pichegru at the same time, with an equal force, had
crossed the Scheldt— at Oudenarde for instance—thereby separating York and
Clerfait, and then continued his course unchecked, in Coburg's rear, towards
Brussels?
But the revolutionary system of war repaid the Allies at this decisive moment for the advantages which their errors had so often
conferred on the French. However much Coburg might do to thrust the booty
into the hands of the French.
MISTAKEN
POLICY OF THE FRENCH RULERS.
the latter were just as obstinate in refusing to seize it. On the
27th Jourdan wrote to Carnot, that he now saw two courses before him, either to
drive the enemy from the neighbourhood of Maubeuge, or to besiege Namur, which
latter would indeed afford greater advantages, but would also be far more difficult. He therefore begged the Committee to declare which of the two would best suit their general plans.
We see that he had no idea of the laurels which fate was offering him in such
rare abundance; and the Committee, on its part, by no means
felt itself obliged to diverge, in any respect, from their once adopted scheme.
They still adhered to the idea of employing their main force against the
Maritime Powers, and consequently directed their march to Flanders, towards the
west and the sea-coast. It is true that affairs in Belgium
had assumed such an aspect, as should have impelled both the French armies
towards the east, and promised the greatest results from an energetic movement
in this direction. The Brest, fleet indeed, in its first' attempt to run out, had been terribly cut up by the English at Quessant,
and had returned to the harbour with the loss of 7 ships and 8,000 men; so that
no reasonable man could any longer meditate a landing in England. But the wish
still existed in the minds of French politicians, to spare
Austria and intimidate England; and this inclination,
as far as we can see, decided the military measures of the Committee of Public
Safety.
Pichegru, with a perfectly correct view of the position of affairs, was
already beginning to move towards Oudenarde; but he
immediately received categorical instructions from Carnot, that the time was
come to sever the last thread which united Austria and England, by the capture
of Ostend. He was therefore ordered to occupy all west Flanders, and to make himself master of some point in that country from
which he could pay the English a visit in their own home: "For,"
added Carnot, "the Government has by no means given
up the plan of a landing in England." In ease the
number of vessels for the undertaking should not yet be sufficient, Pichegru was, at all events, to undertake a smaller preliminary expedition against the Dutch island of AYalcheren, to hold a
force of at least 16,000 men in readiness for this purpose,-and arrange all his other operations with a view ,to its support.
Pichegru hereupon broke off the attack, which he had already commenced, on Oudenarde, and collected the greater part of his
forces at Bruges, which city had been occupied by Moreau on the 26th of
June. Jourdan received analogous instructions on the 29th. He was not to
undertake any important operations either towards the
east or west, but to accommodate himself completely to Coburg's system of
little columns and slow retreat. Like Coburg he was to
send off" one corps to the right towards Namur, and another to the left
towards Mons, and follow the enemy's centre with his main body towards
Brussels. As a climax to these futile and paralysing proceedings, the Committee
of Public Safety decreed lastly, on the 4th of July, that both armies
should send back several divisions, to besiege the four fortresses which had been taken from the French; that, until these had
been recovered, the French generals should abstain from all important offensive operations, and content themselves with driving back the Allies beyond a line drawn from Antwerp to
Namur.
There is not, as far as we know, a single competent authority who has
hesitated for a moment in his judgment of
these proceedings. It will suffice to mention the French officers who have
subjected the campaign of 1794 to professional criticism. Servan,
Jomini, Jourdan and Soult, are unanimous in their condemnation of the orders
above mentioned, and the matter appears to speak
for itself in the clearest manner. Let us picture to ourselves the new disposition of the French forces: Pichegru,
with his 100,000 men, wasting his time in useless marches on the sea-coast; and
Jourdan's army, cut up into three divisions of 30,000 men each, separated by
long miles from one another. Nothing but his own will could prevent the enemy from uniting a
force of G0,000 men between these corps, overpowering
Jourdan's centre by a sudden attack, and thereby driving the two isolated wings
for the fifth time across the Sambre. Such an effort would have been by no means too much to ask of the, Allied army, for we have seen that it was
far from being defeated at Fleurus, and its internal organisation remained
entirely uninjured. The officers, indeed, manifested, since the departure of
the Emperor, a strong disinclination to any further useless toil, as
they called it; 1 but
the soldiers, though no longer enthusiastic,
were in every respect ready for battle. It is clear how thoroughly such a
revolution in affairs on the Sambre would have reacted upon Pichegru's eagerness to invade Flanders; and how
effectually it would have checked the advance of the French along the whole
border. This view of the matter was not without its advocates at the
head-quarters of the Allies, and a great Council of war, presided over by Coburg, once more resolved, on the 1st of July, to defend Belgium to the
uttermost, 2 and
with this view to employ a strong force, in the first place,
to attack Jourdan's right wing, and to protect the
town of Mons. But, on the same day, Ferrand drove the Prince of Orange out of
Mons; on the 5th, therefore, a second council of war decreed that further
resistance was impossible, and that Brussels must be evacuated on the 7th. The
inhabitants of this city had been trembling for weeks at
the fate which awaited them. Every one remembered the conduct of the French in the preceding year, and looked for still worse
things under the rule of Robespierre; all who had anything to lose endeavoured
at the last moment to escape. It was just the same in
Ghent, Antwerp, Louvain, and Namur. The nobles fled without exception, most of
the prelates followed them, and manufacturers and merchants conveyed their
property to a place of safety. Half the shops in Brussels were empty, and the fugitives, in great companies, crowded along the high
roads between the bodies of troops; the number of these voluntary exiles was
reckoned at more than 200,000. The Belgian government had already transferred
its seat, on the 3d of July, from Brussels to Malines, and had
exasperated the citizens, before its departure, by a fruitless attempt to
carry off the deposits in the civic treasury. From Malines they proceeded, on
the 9th, to Diest, thence to Ruremonde and Diisseldorf, followed by the majority of the officials. All the bands of society and government were
broken. 1
Meanwhile the fatal news was carried to the head-quarters of the Duke of York,
and excited no less commotion there than among the population of
Belgium. The Duke,, indeed, ever since the disasters of Tournay, had
anticipated such a termination; but. during the first
contests on the Sambre, he had forgotten this and many other cares, in
shortsighted thoughtlessness, and the daily recuring pleasures of the table.
Now, however, he was beside himself with rage. He learned from the Prince of Coburg that Generals Beaulieu and Quosdanovich had been attacked on the
6th by 30,000 French, and that, though they had repulsed the enemy, a retreat
to Tirlemont was considered indispensable. "The times are past then,"
the Duke replied, "when, on receiving intelligence of the approach of a
French crowd of double our numbers, no other question was asked than about the
place where we shoidd meet them. This retreat to Tirlemont will be continued to
Maestricht, and be attended by worse consequences than a defeat; to speak plainly, your Serene Highness, the British nation, whose
public opinion is not to be despised, cannot but consider
that we have been betrayed and sold." He then appealed
to the Archduke Charles, expressing the same convictions,
and begged him to reflect on the condition of the
provinces of which he (Charles) was Stadtholder General, and with a strong hand
to break through the miserable web of falsehood and meanness in which they were
all entangled. Coburg's reply is not extant; but the Archduke replied that if he had to follow his own inclinations, he should not
waver in his resolution for a single moment; but that he was entirely ignorant of the political state of affairs, and had received the most positive directions from the Emperor to act solely as a soldier, in his capacity of General of the Ordnance. "It seems only too true," he added, in conclusion,
"that we have been betrayed and sold; but if you have any positive proofs
, of treachery in your hands, I beg that you will not. communicate them to me, but send them to the Emperor."
Under these circumstances no course was left open for York's
weak army than a hasty retreat. Coburg came to an agreement with the Duke to
occupy, in the first instance,
a line behind the Dyle, from Antwerp, though Lou-vain and Gembloux, to Namur.
But he had no serious intention of keeping to his
engagement. The troops, after a feeble resistance, retreated as soon as the
French appeared. Coburg gave orders for the evacuation
of Namur, and initiated his complete separation from York,
by uniting Clerfait with the main body, and sending the
Prince of Orange to the English in his stead. On the 11th of July, Jourdan
entered Brussels amidst a dead silence on the part of the
citizens, and was soon followed by Pichegru with two divisions
of the Army of the North. On the 12th, the latter advanced against the Dutch
and Hessians stationed in Malines, and took possession of the
place, on the 15th, after an irresolute attack, and a
half-hearted defence. At the same time Kleber led the left of the Sambre army
against Louvain, which the Austrians abandoned, after a short engagement, and retreated to Tirlemont. The definitive separation of York and Coburg was thus formally declared. The former with his English and Dutch troops, and his German
mercenaries, moved slowly towards the North,—without being in any degree
harassed by Pichegru—with the intention of protecting the Dutch
frontier between the Scheldt and Herzogenbusch. The latter,
with his Austrian forces, retreated with equal deliberation, only occasionally
molested in his rear by Jourdan, to the East, and took up a position on
the Meuse between Ruremonde, Maestricht and Liege. If the French were under an
obligation to the Imperial head-quarters for the
resolution they had taken to retreat, the latter were now repaid by the
comparative ease and comfort with which they were allowed to carry out their
purpose. For since the fatal Council of war on the 5th, the demoralisation of the Austrian army had become complete. The officers spoke
without reserve of Coburg's incapacity, and the worthlessness of Belgium to the Austrian monarchy;
and the soldiers openly complained of insufficient rations, and the
disgrace which had befallen their arms. The sudden change in affairs brought
the military administration everywhere to a standstill; and the despair which
prevailed in every quarter manifested itself in the general loosening of the bands of discipline, and the loss of all military qualities.1
Meanwhile the above-mentioned movements had been completed. There was a general cessation of arms; and Belgium was in the hands of the French, whom fortune also favoured in
other theatres of the war. In May, Carnot had
succeeded,—very much against the wishes of Robespierre— in procuring the recall
of the equally brutal and incapable Turreau from La Vendee, and thereby
effecting an entire change in the system of warfare, and securing the adoption of wiser and more conciliatory measures. The immediate consequence was a considerable decrease in the insurgent
forces, so that the French government was able to send off 5,000 of the 80,000
men who composed the Army of the "West, to the Pyrenees, and 20,000 to the
Rhine, against the foreign enemy. Soon afterwards Generals Michaud and
Moreau succeeded, after many a hard struggle, in driving the Prussians from
their position in the Hardt mountains—which they had taken up in May—and
capturing Kaiserslautern, Neustadt, and Spires. In the Eastern Pyrenees Dugommier drove the the Spaniards and Portuguese from the French border
fortresses, which they had hitherto held; and on the Western extremity of the
range, Moncey stormed the enemy's lines at Fuentarabia and Ernani, and even
made a victorious advance into the Spanish territory.
In Italy, however, the progress of the French was far less splendid. Soon after their already mentioned successes in the Genoese territory,
the Army of the Alps also began to operate, and stormed, first the passes of
the little St. Bernard, then those of Mont Cenis, and lastly, the pass of the
Barricades. It now, therefore, stood, like the Army of the
South, on the ridge of the mountains, ready, as it seemed, to descend upon
Turin from all quarters. But just at this moment, the Sardinian Government, by
a happy accident, discovered the plot which was
fermenting in their capital. The treaty of Valenciennes
brought some Austrian troops into the field, and after July the state of things
became as quiet and peaceful in Turin, as four weeks after-Avards in
the Netherlands. We 'cannot Avell
doubt that in this field, too, the approximation
of French and Austrian policy had its effect on.the course of the war.
Manfrediui had already returned to Florence, and at his instigation the
Archduke sent the Chevalier Carletti—of all his diplomatists
the most favourable to the French—to Genoa, to take the first steps towards
a better understanding between France and Tuscany. But the more eagerly the
nearest kinsman of the Emperor entered into Thugut's peace-policy, the less
inclination did the mightiest of Austria's allies manifest to adopt that Minister's views. About the middle of June, England answered the
mission of Montgaillard by a decree of the notables in
Corsica, proclaiming George III. king of that island,
which had just been occupied by the English. The effect of this step was equally bad in Madrid, Genoa and Florence; the secretly growing
inclination towards France was fostered by the jealousy of England's maritime
power. It caused vexation even in Vienna. It was reported that Pitt had met the
offers of Montgaillard by a counter-proposition, to the effect that if
France would acknowledge
the sovereignty of Eng- land over the conquered islands, she might keep Belgium for herself. It
was not true, and it is not likely that Thugut himself believed it, but the
mere existence of such a rumour in Vienna plainly showed,
that, at this moment, Thugut regarded Robespierre with more friendly feelings
than Pitt.
END
OF VOL. III.