HISTORY
THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 1789—1795,
Vol. II.
HEINRICH VON SYBEL,
translated from the third edition
of the original german work,
by
WALTER 0. PERRY
BOOK IV.
CAMPAIGN
IN CHAMPAGNE.
CHAPTER I. warlike
preparations in germany.
CHAPTER
II. rule of the municipality of paris.
CHAPTER
III. election of the national convention.
CHAPTER
IV. onset of the allies.
CHAPTER V. retreat from france.
BOOK V.
COMMENCEMENT
OE THE WAS BETWEEN ENGLAND AND FRANCE.
CHAPTER
I. a general review.
CHAPTER
II. political parties in france.
CHAPTER III. brussels,frankfort, london.
CHAPTER IV. trial
of Louis xvi.
CHAPTER
V. beginning of the war between england and france.
BOOK VI.
SECOND
PARTITION OF POLAND.
CHAPTER
I. early policy of Russia.
CHAPTER
II. partition of poland.
preliminaries.
CHAPTER
III. partition of poland. the
treaty.
CHAPTER
IV. partition of poland. the
execution.
CHAPTER V. recovery
of belgium by tHe austrians.
CHAPTER
VI. change of ministry in austria.
BOOK IV.
CAMPAIGN IN CHAMPAGNE.
CHAPTER I.
WARLIKE PREPARATIONS IN GERMANY.
The catastrophe
of the 10th of August, which made the extreme democratic party masters of
Paris, rendered a hostile collision between the Revolution and the German
Powers inevitable.
We have already seen the commencement of the
dispute between these parties, and observed that it owed its origin
exclusively to the French National Assembly; and that it was especially the
Gironde which prompted France to attack the Emperor. Let us now pass over to
the German side, and observe how the development of
revolutionary hostility affected
the affairs of our country, and what resolutions the policy of the great German
Powers induced it to take. In doing so, we must return once more to the last
few months of the Emperor Leopold's life.
After the acceptance of the Constitution
by Louis XVI., the Emperor indulged for a time a confident hope, that the
French question was solved, and that he was relieved from all fear of trouble
from that quarter. He had cares enough upon him to make him heartily
congratulate himself on this result. In the German Empire, many of the
more powerful Princes were in a state of irritation against Austria, whose
recent friendship with Prussia—hitherto looked upon as the firmest bulwark
against Imperial encroachment —excited the liveliest apprehensions in Bavaria and Wurtemberg,
in Cassel and Hanover. In his own provinces also, Leopold found abundant
sources of future dangers. No one trusted the present calm in Hungary, and in
the lately subjected Belgium, affairs were so far from
being in a settled and consolidated state, that the Estates
of Brabant were in open opposition to the Government, and the Imperial generals were loudly calling for reinforcements. In foreign affairs, the
Polish question—the next in importance to the French—was still unsettled, and daily presented fresh difficulties.
Leopold had repeatedly renewed his proposition in St. Petersburg to recognise
the elevation of the Elector of Saxony to the hereditary throne of Poland.1 But
Catharine had not allowed herself to be drawn into giving
any answer; and the nearer she approached to the conclusion of a definitive peace with the Turks, the more openly she manifested in Warsaw
her aversion to the constitution of May. The Elector of Saxony, therefore,
hesitated to commit himself to the acceptance
of the throne of Poland; and Leopold was obliged to acknowledge that here
too everything depended on the firmness of his Prussian alliance; and he had every
reason to augur an unfavourable reception of his Polish plan in Berlin. All
these circumstances cooperated to dispose him as
much as possible against a war with France. The fact that Russia now began to
show the greatest favour to the Emigrés,
and to preach, at Berlin and Vienna, a crusade against the wicked Jacobins,
only served to confirm the Emperor in his peaceful
sentiments. He rightly concluded that Catharine wished to entangle the German
Powers in a struggle with France, that she might have her own way in Poland;
and he was not at all inclined to be the dupe of so shallow an artifice. Among his Ministers, Prince Kaunitz always had a conviction that a
French war would be the greatest of misfortunes, and the
Vice-Chancellor, Count Cobenzl, who held different opinions, was unable to gain a hearing from
the Emperor, who carefully avoided everything
which could afford the French a pretext for a quarrel. He received the new
constitutional ambassador, in spite of the most lively representations and
protests on the part of the Emigres and the Austrian nobility. When his Ministers were divided on the question whether the
Empire should insist on the restoration of the German Princes to their rights
in Alsace, or enter into negotiations for compensating
them, he decided for the milder course. At the same time he set about bringing
his alliance with Prussia to a definitive conclusion,
in order to secure to himself a firm support for every emergency.
On the 17th of November—a week after the enactment of the first edict
against the Emigres—Prince Eeuss made a communication on this subject to the Prussian Ministry, and on this occasion declared himself empowered to
commence at any moment the formal draft of an alliance. He enquired into the views of Prussia in respect to the number of men she
would furnish in case of war, and was satisfied when the Prussian Ministers proposed a contingent of 20,000 men. In fact he
always advocated the principle of acting strictly on the defensive. "We
are now convinced," wrote the Ministers to their ambassador at Vienna,
"that Austria will undertake nothing against France."
This persuasion was soon afterwards fully
confirmed by Kaunitz, who descanted in the severest terms on the intrigues of
the Emigres on the Ehine, which it was not in
the interest of any Power to support. It was ridiculous, he said, in the French
Princes, and in Russia and Spain, to declare the acceptance of the
constitution by the King compulsory, and therefore
void; and still more'so to
dispute the right of LouisXVI to alter the constitution at all. He said that they would vainly
endeavour to goad Austria into a war, which could only have the very worst
consequences for Louis and the present predominance of the moderate party in
France. He further enlarged on the blessings of the existing
Austro-Prussian alliance, and expressed his willingness to prepare a more
definite draft of the proposed treaty. Here, again, we see that without the
machinations of the Girondists, the revolutionary war would never have been
commenced.
It is true, indeed, that at this time a very perceptible change took
place in the opinions of the second German potentate—the King of Prussia.
Immediately after the Congress of Pillnitz, great numbers of
French Emigres, who had been driven from Vienna by
the coldness of Leopold, had betaken themselves to Berlin. At the Prussian
Court they met with a hospitable reception, and aroused in the King, by their
graphic descriptions, a warm interest for the victims
of the Revolution—more especially for the Royal
family, but also for the exiled nobles. Their representations had so great an
effect, that the warlike mien assumed by the Girondists
in December—which had caused so much fear and anxiety in Vienna—was regarded by
the King of Prussia with martial satisfaction. He was surprised, indeed,
at Leopold's longsuffering patience, but thought that he would not be likely
to submit to many more affronts; and meanwhile he loaded the Emigres with marks
of favour of every kind, and thereby excited in them the most exaggerated hopes. Yet the King was far from intending to risk any
important interest of the State for the sake of his protégés; he
had no idea of pursuing an aggressive policy towards France; and the only point
in which he differed from Leopold was in the
feeling with which he regarded the development of
the warlike tendencies of the French. His Ministers, moreover, were, without
exception, possessed by the same ideas as Prince Kaunitz; that a French war
would be a misfortune to all Europe. They had little trouble,
therefore, in inducing the
King to allow the Emperor Leopold—who was so much more nearly concerned—to take
the initiative in this matter, and even to receive the Austrian proposals with the greatest caution. "When the French Government
began to set on foot its first army, on the 16th of December, and to threaten
the Electorate of Treves, a petition arrived at Berlin" from the Emigres
praying the King to give them a refuge in Anspach and Baireuth; another from
Treves, begging for a Prussian corps of 4,000 men for its protection; and a proposal from Austria that Prussia should join in sending an identical
note to Paris. The King immediately declined the two first proposals,1 but expressed his readiness to join the Emperor in sending a strong
protest to the French Government against any violation of the
soil of the German Empire; but he thought that a general
declaration concerning the Revolution would be just as hazardous at the present moment as in the preceeding Summer. Such a step, he said,
would be critical and even compromising, if they were not in a position to
support their words by energetic deeds. He would not however, he said, evade a
definite wish of the Emperor, and he was therefore willing that the
manifesto should threaten an armed intervention, in case of any personal violence towards the Royal family, or the refusal of compensation
to the injured Alsatian Princes; but he was decidedly averse to making any
mention of constitutional questions, or even of the efforts of the
republicans. He concluded by saying; "As from the position of my
dominions, j I have no direct political interest in the matter, and should;
only intervene from personal sympathy with Louis XVI., and
as a member of the Empire, I should be obliged—should war unhappily arise—to
insist upon a just compensation, for any losses and dangers."
So far removed were they even in
Berlin—crowded as it was with Emigres—from any
active opposition to
the changes
in France, and from a war of principles against the Revolution!
In consequence of this declaration of Prussia, the Emperor, as we have seen, ordered that the Emigres in Treves should be
disarmed; and contented himself with giving notice in Paris, that his Belgian
troops would prevent any violation of the Imperial frontier. In the present
mood of the Parisian rulers, indeed, he could not deny the possibility of
a breach, and consequently Kaunitz instructed the Ambassador to lay before the
King of Prussia, on the 4th of January, the outline
of a definitive treaty. This document adhered throughout
to the ground of simple defence, and contained, with regard to
France, nothing but the clause, that both Powers should use their efforts to
bring about a European coalition. Negociations then went on smoothly for the
most part; the two Powers fixed the amount of the contingent to be furnished by each as a member of the Diet, and promised one another to
invite the other Powers, especially England and Russia, to cooperate with them.
It was only on two points that a difference in their respective views was
observable. The one concerned Belgium—Austria demanding aid against
internal rebellion, especially in the present disaffected state of the Belgian
population; while Prussia, on the other hand, would only assent to this, on
condition that a secret article should exempt Belgium from its operation. The second point of difference — respecting Poland — was of more
importance. Kaunitz, alarmed by the growing coldness of Russia, had already
several times sounded the Prussian Ambassador in Vienna concerning the views of
his Court, and had received, by express command of the King,
the answer, that Prussia could only regard the new Polish constitution as
seriously affecting her own interests;—that her Polish treaty of 1790 solely
referred to the protection of the Republic from foreign interference—and that not the slightest obligation could be deduced from it with
respect to the constitution. There was, indeed, at that time, a
way by which Prussia might perhaps have been rendered more favourable to the Austrian
views. The hand of a Princess of the Ducal house of Cour-land was open to
competition; and Prussia conceived the idea of using this opportunity of
placing the chief power in that Duchy in the hands of the younger Prince of Orange, who was entirely devoted to Prussian interests. If Austria
assented to this, and helped to carry out the plan by her influence in
Petersburg and Warsaw, Prussia plight perhaps consider herself compensated for
the aggrandisement of the house of Saxony in Poland, and learn to look with
more friendly eyes on the new condition of things in that Republic. But the
Viennese Government could not make up their minds to the increase of Prussian
influence, and politely declined the proposal. Kaunitz, however, still made the attempt to include Poland in the treaty, and inserted an
article guaranteeing the free Polish constitution,—vis. that
of the 3rd of May 1791. His despatch of the 4th of January approached the
matter very cautiously, but drew nevertheless a clear
and perfect outline of the Austrian system. It said that nothing ought to be
done without a complete understanding between the three neighbouring Powers;
that Austria would neither proceed in this affair without the voluntary consent
of Russia, nor endeavour to eclipse the Prussian influence
in Petersburg; that in Poland itself, no increase of power should be allowed
which could become dangerous to any of the three Powers, or further the views
of the Polish enthusiasts and democrats. But all these flattering representations had only one object in view; to render the main
point—the common guarantee of the new Constitution,
and the creation of Poland into an hereditary monarchy under the Elector of
Saxony—agreeable to the Prussian Court. The interpretation put upon this last clause is indeed touched upon, but as lightly and
considerately as possible. In the course of the narration it is quietly
announced that the Elector of Saxony, in case of his accepting the crown,
desired that it should remain for ever united with the Electoral hat of
Saxony; and
that consequently the succession to the latter should be transferred from his daughter to his brothers. "The Emperor," remarked Kaunitz,
"desires from personal delicacy, (the eldest of these brothers being his
own son-in-law) to abstain from all participation in this question; although he
too considers that the lasting union of the two crowns would most conduce to the interests of the three
neighbouring Courts."
The Prussian Ministers, it appears, allowed this so called Saxon plan
to remain for the time in abeyance; and in the main point, also, they were by
no means well pleased with the Austrian communications.
Before, however, any discussion of these questions could take
place, the French war party took another step in advance, and the decree of the
15th January, which virtually made the struggle inevitable, was promulgated—threatening the Emperor with an immediate rupture unless he distinctly
renounced the European concert. Leopold saw the danger approaching, but still
without being able fully to realize its imminence; he therefore laid before
Prussia a more detailed programme of his views respecting France, the
discussion of which once more manifested the purely defensive attitude assumed
by the German Powers. He laid great stress, as usual, on the necessity that all
Europe should take part in this great work, and that every idea of a counter-revolution, or the restoration of the former state of
tilings, should be laid aside. The King declared his full assent to' these
views. Leopold then proposed that the Powers should make the following demands
of the French Government; the withdrawal of the three armies from
the frontiers;—a cessation of the threats directed against the public peace of
Germany;—compensation for the injured Princes of the Empire;—restoration of
Avignon and Venaissin to the Pope;—and the acknowledgement of existing treaties with the States of Europe. To those points which had exclusive reference to the restitution of the former foreign relations of France, Prussia gave her assent; with respect to internal
questions, Leopold
thought they ought likewise to demand
full freedom and security for Louis XVI. and his family, and the renunciation
of all republican intrigues. Instead of this, the Berlin Government thought
they ought to require the dissolution of the Jacobin
club. To give effect to these demands, Leopold proposed that an army of 40,000
men should be held in readiness by each, of the two Powers; the King was of
opinion that at least 50,000 should he set on foot. Both Emperor and King agreed, without further discussion, that the Emigres should
remain entirely inactive. The last question brought forward was that of
compensation; on the discussion of which Kaunitz was at first very unwilling to enter, while the Prussian Ambassador
repeatedly maintained its absolute
necessity. Accordingly, the note of the 26th recognized the justice of such a
claim, both in case of actual war and of a mere warlike demonstration; and the
King, on his part, was ready to content himself with the concession of the principle; since
every more definite arrangement would at
the present moment be manifestly accompanied by the greatest difficulties.
On all these points, therefore, they were in the main agreed; but the
case was very different with the Polish question. With respect to this
the King had formed an unalterable resolution, and declared to his Ministers
that he would never bind himself to support the May Constitution; though he was
ready, he said, to guarantee the old Polish Constitution, or even to give a promise that he would not undertake any thing inimical to
the new one. In order unmistakably to make known his resolution on this head,
he gave orders, on the very same day, that the Marquis Lucchesini should at
once put an end to all illusions, by making an express
declaration at Warsaw, that the treaty of 1790 did indeed guarantee the
independence of Poland, but that as the May Constitution was of a later date
than the treaty, and had been made without Prussian cooperation, Prussia could
give neither aid nor counsel with respect to it. The Ministers had now the
difficult task of rendering this view of the matter
palatable to the Austrian Ambassador. In order that the
whole treaty might not suffer shipwreck on this one difficulty, they looked
about for intermediate expressions, and instead of the words "guarantee of
the free Constitution," they proposed the reading, "guarantee of a free
Constitution," by which neither an absolute rejection, nor a
decided approbation, of the new state of things
woidd be expressed. Under other circumstances, Leopold would hardly have consented to this compromise, since it did in fact impose upon him the
abandonment of his great Polish-Saxon plan. But the threat of the
French war left him no choice; and he made up his mind to sign the treaty, on
the above mentioned terms, on the 7th of Feb. This was the first of the baleful
effects which the fate of Poland was to experience from the warlike spirit of the French Democracy.
Before following any further the course of these events, two acts ought
to be mentioned, which were destined to exercise a powerful jindirect influence
upon them;—first, the conclusion of a definitive peace between Russia and Turkey,— signed at Jassy, Jan. 9th 1702,—by which Oczakov,
together with the sea-coast as far as the Dniester, remained in Russian hands;
and, secondly, the seizure, on Jan. 18th., of the Franconian Principalities of
Anspach and Baireuth for the King of Prussia;—the Cousin of the
King, who had hitherto reigned over these countries, having abdicated four
weeks before in his favour. Lastly, let us remember that about the middle of
February the moderate party in Paris had made various attempts once more to seize the reins of power,— the success of which would
have secured the peace of Europe.
All these circumstances had a similar effect upon Leopold —vis.
to divert his mind from all the negotiations
which he had been carrying on with Prussia concerning the
French war. He gladly believed, what he eagerly desired, that a struggle might
be avoided, which threatened to run counter to all his interests and wishes.
The mere possibility of the war had compelled him to witness,
without a syllable of opposition, the aggrandizement of his Prussian rival, by the acquisition
of half a million of new subjects; and doubly odious did the actual outbreak of
hostilities appear to him, in the event of which he had just
beeu oblfged to concede to the King a claim to compensation, that is to a fresh
increase of territory. The case was nearly the same in the Polish question. He had already seen the guarantee of the May constitution crumble away in his hands; and should he
be involved in a war with France, he had no means of preventing Prussia from
overthrowing that constitution, or at any rate from openly supporting the
opposite party in Poland. This danger became all the more urgent now that the Empress Catharine had the free disposal of all the forces of
her vast Empire. It was well known that Prince Potemkin had assembled all the chiefs of the Polish malcontents about him at Jassy.
This Minister, indeed, died in the midst of the plans which
were there in preparation; but the attitude of the Russian Ambassador at
Vienna, too, became every day more uncompliant. The columns of the Russian army
marched in ever increasing numbers from the Turkish towards
the Polish frontiers, and energetic operations on the part of Catharine
against Poland were to be expected at no distant period. Despatch was therefore
evidently necessary, if anything was still to be done in this affair according to Leopold's
wishes; and it was probably in connexion with this
that the Elector of Saxony, about the middle of February,
at last published his declaration concerning the May Constitution of the Poles.
In this document he reserved his final decision respecting his acceptance of
the crown, until he should have arrived at an understanding with the
three great neighbouring Courts. Meanwhile he stated the conditions which he
considered himself obliged to demand,— vis. the
ratification of the constitution by the provincial diets;—the extension of the
royal prerogatives in matters of legislation and war and in
foreign affairs; and—what was most important
for Leopold's "plan—the right of' succession for his brothers in
preference to his daughter.
Immediate intelligence of this step was received by the Government in
Berlin, who considered that the demands of the Elector must tend to strengthen
the power of the Government in Poland, and consequently
increase' the danger which might arise to Prussia from
the new state of things. The disinclination of the Prussian Government to aid
in such a work, or even to allow it to be completed, was continually
increasing. Yet they could not at present come to any definite resolution, and principally on account of the
complete uncertainty of affairs in France, before the denouement
of which—whereby, perhaps their whole system might suffer a violent
shock—they did not venture to take any decisive measures.
They therefore remained in an attitude of expectation, from which they could not be drawn even by a piece of intelligence which
nevertheless [excited the liveliest interest of the King. Count de Goltz, the
Ambassador in Petersburg, wrote word that he had at last obtained trustworthy
intelligence respecting the intentions of Catharine against
Poland. He had succeeded in getting sight of an autograph letter of the Empress
to count Snboff, in which she expresses herself in nearly the following terms:
"As soon as peace has been concluded with the Turks, my will is. that Repnin should repair to the grand army, draw together as many
troops as possible,—about 130,000 men, I think,—and inarch through the Ukraine
into Poland. Igelstrom will command a corps at Smolensk, and Soltikoff will
remain on the frontier with the troops of West Russia and Livonia. If
Austria and Prussia should make any opposition, as is probable, I shall offer
them compensation or partition." The King replied to the Ambassador with
expressions of his royal satisfaction, saying that Count Golz was the first who had procured for him the key to a right understanding of
these affairs. He added, that he must observe the
deepest secrecy respecting them,
and remain on the watch, but entirely passive, till further orders.
Considering the intensity of the present suspense, however, it was impossible that this state of inactivity could be of long
duration. It was like the moment of sultry stillness which
generally precedes the outbreak of a storm.
In the first place the most unfavourable news arrived from Paris. The
attempts of the Feuillants had failed; Lafayette had separated himself from
them and from the Court; and the zeal and confidence of victory among the Democrats were greater then ever. The Emigres in Berlin were
jubilant; they had always declared that no impression was to be made upon
the Jacobins except by the edge of the sword, and that all hopes founded on the
stability of a moderate middle party were futile. The King of
Prussia agreed with them, and determined to begin the unavoidable struggle as
quickly as possible. He told his Ministers that war was certain, and that
Bischoffswerder ought to go once more to the Emperor, rouse him from his lethargy, arrange a plan of military operations, and discuss the
question of compensation.1 He
would listen to no objections, and Bischoffswerder,
having received instructions from the King himself, left Berlin, and arrived in
Vienna, after a speedy journey, on the 28th of February. But
he was not destined again to discuss the fate of Europe with his
Imperial patron; for on the 29th the smallpox showed itself, of which Leopold
died after three days sickness. The greatest consternation and confusion reigned in Vienna. In the midst of the most
dangerous crisis, the State saw itself deprived of a steady and
experienced pilot; the most urgent dangers impended on the East and on the
West; no one knew to whom the young King Francis—lie
was as yet only king of Hungary and Bohemia-would o-ive
his confidence, or what course he would take; nay, his weakly and nervous
constitution rendered it doubtful whether he could bear —even for a short period—the burdens of his office. For the present he
confirmed the Ministers in their places, and expressed to them his wish to
adhere to the political system of his father. But even he could not conceal
from himself the danger which threatened him on the side of France; and he
therefore ordered one of his most experienced Generals, Prince Hohenlohe-Kircli
■ berg, to be summoned to Vienna, that he might take counsel with
Bischoffswerder respecting the warlike measures to be adopted by both Powers, in case of a French attack. At the same time, however, the Polish
question was, if possible, to be brought to a decision, aud Leopold's plan in
all its details was to be categorically recommended for adoption, both in
Berlin and Petersburg.
PRUSSIA
DREADS THE UNION OF SAXONY AND POLAND.
The crisis was now at its height. The policy of
Prussia for a long and eventful period was to be decided ou. It is important to
comprehend with clearness every stage in the progress of these events.
The Austrian Minister, Spielmann, had prepared the memorial on Poland, which Prince Reuss presented at
Berlin, on the 10th of March. It represented that Austria and Prussia had the
same interest in stopping a source of eternal embarrassment
and discussion, by strengthening the cause of peace and order in Poland. That
herein lay an especially powerful motive to make the crown of
that country hereditary; that for both Powers the Elector of Saxony would be
the most acceptable wearer of that crown; nor was it contrary to their
interests to extend the right of succession to the
brothers of the Elector, and in fact to each successive Elector of Saxony. The
important point, the memorial went on to say, was this, that Poland should no
longer be dependent on the predominant influence of any
one neighbouring Power. It ought not, indeed, to be so strong as to be able
to become dangerous to any of its neighbours; and this contingency
would be effectually prevented by imposing a limitation of its army to 40,000 men, by proclaiming its neutrality to all future times, and by
both the German Powers—as joint contractors—guaranteeing its constitution on
these conditions alone. Russia, it further said, would, it was hoped, give her
consent, since by any opposition to so wholesome a scheme, she
would betray an unpardonable lust of conquest.
When the King had read this memorial, in which the Saxon-Polish union
was brought forward, not as an idea of the feeble Elector, but as a proposal of
powerful Austria, he cried out, "We must never give our
consent to this." He agreed with his Ministers in the conclusion that
nothing would be more dangerous to Prussia, than the formation of such a Power
as would result from the proposed lasting union of Poland and Saxony—a Power, which, in alliance with Austria, could immediately overrun Silesia, and
in alliance with Russia, might be fatal to East Prussia. The proposed limitation of the Polish army appeared to him a mere delusion,
since it would be nullified at the first outbreak of a
war. "I am," said the King, "firmly convinced of the loyalty of
Austria, or the suggestion of such a plan would fill me with the deepest
suspicion."
In the midst of this angry and anxious excitement, which for a moment
alienated his heart from Austria, the King received a fresh and
no less important despatch from Petersburg. Count Golz announced the
first direct communication of Russia respecting Poland. "We see" (the
Vice-Chancellor, Count Ostermann, had told him) "in Prussia's repeated
request that we would communicate to her our view
of Polish affairs, no empty curiosity, or the
intention of throwing obstacles in our way, but a sincere
wish to come to an understanding. The position is a highly
critical one, and our interests run completely parallel.
Should Poland be firmly and lastingly united to Saxony, a Power of the first
rank
will arise, and one which will be able to exercise the most sensible
pressure upon each of its neighbours. We are greatly concerned in
this, in consequence of the extension of our Polish frontier; and Prussia is no
less so, from the inevitable increase which would ensue of Saxon influence in
the German Empire. We therefore suggest, that Prussia, Austria, and Russia, should come to an intimate understanding with one another on this most important subject."
Golz added that he had meanwhile pointed out to the Russian Minister,
that Prussia had never been consulted on the subject of the new Polish
constitution. He had, he said, no doubt, from
Ostermann's communications, that Russia would very soon openly bring forward
her plans of conquest; that her object was to gain possession of a new
district, which would establish a connecting link with her late Turkish acquisitions. With respect to French
affairs, Ostermann had spoken with great indifference, and always recommended
the strictest secrecy regarding Poland. He added, that the question lay
entirely with the three Powers; that if they were agreed, they might laugh at the rest of the world.
This communication sounded differently in the ears of the King from
that which he had received from Austria. The fears which agitated his
own mind and those of the Russian chancellor were identical. While Austria
called upon him to commit a political suicide,
Russia offered her aid in averting the most harassing danger, and even opened a
prospect of a considerable territorial increase. The King had no doubt to which
of the two Powers he ought to incline. He would have come to terms with Russia ou the spot, had not au insurmountable obstacle
existed in the new path which was opened to the aggrandizement of Prussia,— vie. the
Polish treaty of 1790; in which Prussia had expressly bound herself to protect
the independence and integrity of Poland. It is true
that in his opinion this obligation did not go to the extent of compelling him
to maintaiu the new constitution in opposition to Russia; that it was only a
weak
Ch. I.]
PRUSSIA BEGINS TO DESERT POLAND. 19
and impotent Poland to which he had promised his support in 1790; while
it was now really an entirely new State, which had been established without his
cooperation by the Constitution of 1791. The Russians,
therefore, might, as far as he was concerned, crush
this constitution; he should feel that he had acted up to his engagements if he
allowed affairs to be restored to the status
of 1790. But it was only too evident that the matter would not end
here, when once the Russians had entered Poland. If the May Constitution was forced to succumb,—not only to its domestic
opponents but also to the armies of Russia,—it was all over both with the
threatening power, and even with the independence of Poland itself, which would
virtually become a Russian Province. This
was perfectly clear to the King; "If Russia," said he, "does not
proceed in this matter with perfect disinterestedness, we shall be
involved in the most painful embarassment by the treaty of 1790. And it did not
admit of the slightest doubt that Russia would make use of the
opportunity afforded her, and at the very least take up a stronger position in
Poland than in 1790. Who indeed was to hinder her from doing so? The friends of
the old constitution in Poland were already entirely
dependent on Russia, and. the partisans of the new state of
things were quite as hostile to Prussia as to Russia. The only course would
have been to form a third party, which, by voluntarily returning to the old constitution, might have, deprived Russia of all
pretexts for invasion, and leaned for support not
upon Catharine, but upon the Prussiau King. But to perform this task with such
insufficient resources, and in the midst of such critical circumstances, would
have required far greater material power than Prussia at that time possessed. It might indeed have been possible if Austria had
energetically adopted the same view, and in conjunction with Prussia had used
every means in her power to attain their common object. Instead of this, however, the King of
Prussia had be-
B2
20
WARLIKE
PREPARATIONS IN GERMANY. [Book IV.
fore him the Austrian note, which proposed a guarantee of the Polish
constitution of 1791, and a complete union of Poland and Saxony. Under these
circumstances he decided that there was no middle course
between the Russian and Austrian plans. On the one side was his Polish treaty
of 1790, the immediate consequence of which would be a new breach, and perhaps
a war, with Russia, and the final result such a strengthening of Poland, as would throw back the Prussian State, into that subordinate
position both in Germany and Europe, which it had
occupied in the seventeenth century. On the other side there was, indeed, a
manifest breach of faith, but also the salvation of Prussia from a perilous dilemma, and perhaps the extension of her boundaries by a
goodly Polish Province. If he wavered at all in this conflict of feeling, the Parisian complications soon put an end to his
doubts. In quick succession came the announcements that Delessart's peaceful Ministry had fallen; that King Louis had suffered the
deepest humiliation; and that the helm of the State had passed into the hands
of the Girondist war party. A declaration of war on
the part of Prance against Francis II. might be daily expected,
and the Russian-Polish contest would then only form the less important moiety
of the European catastrophe. Austria would now be occupied for a long time in
the West; there could be no more question of the formation of a Polish-Saxon
State; and Austria could no longer be reckoned upon to
protect the constitution of 1791, or even to repel a Russian invasion of
Poland. Prussia was bound to aid the Austrians against France, and for many
months the King had cherished no more ardent wish than to fulfil this obligation with all his power. Simultaneously to oppose the
Empress Catharine, was out of the question. The latter had attained the great
object of her wishes—the German Powers were engaged in the West, and she
herself had her hands free for the subjugation
of Poland. The existence of an independent Polish kingdom was at an end, and
the only possible advantage to
Ch.I.]
FRED. WILLIAM AGREES TO THE PARTITION OF POLAND. 21
Prussia was to appropriate to herself a portion of the new Russian Province.
The King wrote on the 12th of March to his Ministers as follows:
"The views of Russia respecting Poland are then very different from the
obscure indications which Ra-snmowski gave to Bischoffswerder in Vienna. Russia
is not far removed from thoughts of a new partition; and
this woidd indeed be the most effectual means of limiting the power of a Polish
King, whether hereditary or elective. I doubt, however, whether in this case a
suitable compensation could be found for Austria; and whether, after such a curtailment of the power of Poland, the Elector of Saxony
would accept the crown. Yet if Austria could be compensated, the Russian plan woidd be the most advantageous for Prussia,— always provided
that Prussia received the whole left bank of the
Vistula, by the acquisition of which that distant frontier—so hard to be
defended—would be well rounded off. This is my judgment respecting Polish
affairs."
This was Poland's sentence of death. It was not, as we have seen, the
result of a long-existing greed, but a suddenly seized expedient, which seemed to be accompanied with the least
evil, in the midst of an unexampled European crisis. I shall leave it an open
question whether it was not possible under the then existing
circumstances to have acted with more political wisdom; but I
doubt whether we can reproach the King, humanly speaking,
for acting as he did, in that conflict of duties. One thing is certain, that in
this case too, the eternal law of justice has. been upheld, which demands atonement for every moral delinquency,
whatever may be the reasons and excuses urged in palliation. The breach of
faith towards Poland, however unavoidable, has been bitterly avenged on
Prussia; and that the warning might be the more deeply felt, it was avenged by the hand, not of the victims, but of the accomplice in the crime.
The resolution was taken, and the next question was, as to the
immediate steps towards its execution.
Before every
22
WARLIKE
PREPARATIONS IN GERMANY. [±Jook iv'
thing else, and as early as the 13th, an answer was given to Prince
Reuss, that Prussia would under no circumstances adopt the contents of
Spielmann's memorial; but must, on the contrary,
emphatically require the renunciation of every plan of the kind. In place of
it, an invitation was sent to Francis II. to give his adhesion to the agreement
respecting Poland, brought forward by Russia; and at the same time a
declaration was forwarded to Alopeus, Catharine's ambassador in Berlin, that Prussia entirely agreed with the views of
Ostermann, and wished as soon as possible to discuss the means for the
attainment of the important object. The opinion of the Ministers at that time
still was, that Russia ought not to proceed against
Poland, until the three Powers had come to a perfect understanding on all the
details of the question. And, generally speaking, it seemed to them important,
not prematurely to betray in St. Petersburg their readiness to join in the partition of Poland, the knowledge of which might
increase, to an excessive degree, the demands of the Russian Court.
With all the more zeal did Bischoffswerder urge upon the Court at
Vienna the necessity of coming to some energetic resolution
on French affairs. The attitude of the Jacobin Ministry left no doubt that war
was inevitable; and looking only at the state of things in Paris, the
expediency of a bold initiative was undeniable. But in Vienna the former
motives for a peaceful policy still existed in undiminished
force, and acquired redoubled weight from Prussia's rejection of the Emperor's
plan respecting Poland. Kaunitz told Colonel Bischoffswerder that Austria
saw herself left in the lurch by the other Powers, and persecuted by England with proposals for a vexatious mediation of peace; that she would
therefore only take up arms as a last resort, if the injured Princes of the
Empire, or a large portion of the French nation, shoidd formally call upon the
Emperor; or, lastly, in case of a French declaration of war. Upon
this Frederick William lost all patience.
It was in accordance with his
Ch. I.]
FRANCE DECLARES WAR ON THE KING OF HUNGARY. 23
nature to remain for a long time passive, then to blaze np suddenly, and for a while to break through every obstacle; and finally, in the
same manner, unexpectedly to sink back into inactivity. Since the resolution
taken on the 12th, his whole soid had been filled with fiery zeal for the
French war, in which he hoped to chastise the villainy of the Jacobins,
gallantly to rescue Louis XVI. and the Emigres, and, in conclusion, to enlarge his dominions by an important Polisb Province. In
answer to the communication which Bischoffswerder
made on the 27th of March respecting the Austriau programme, he sent word
that war had been determined on in Paris, and that consequently the only
question before them was respecting the conduct of the war. He himself, he
said, looked for safety to rapid and decisive action, and was ready to attack the Revolution with all his might. But he declared in the most
emphatic manner, that he would take no part at all in a sluggish war of mere
defence. The chief point in this letter—the certainty of war—was confirmed to
the Emperor Francis by simultaneous intelligence from Paris; and
thus the Austrian Government,—equally hard pressed by friend aud foe—resolved
with a reluctant sigh to draw the sword.
On the 20th of Aprd the French National Assembly proclaimed war against the King of Hungary and Bohemia. A fortnight later the Prince of Hohenlohe-Kirchberg appeared in Berlin
to settle some common plan for the campaign; and at the same time Kaunitz
directed Prince Reuss to enter into negociations on the political question of
expenditure and compensation. His note gave Prussia the choice of
four different systems; the first of which woidd have announced that the Powers
intended, with entire disinterestedness, to carry on a war for the monarchical
principle. According to the second system, the Powers were to content themselves with the promise of Louis XVI. to be answerable for
the expenses of the war in case of his restoration. By the third, they would
take material security for their outlay, by a
24
WARLIKE
PREPARATIONS IN GERMANY. [Book
permanent occupation of some of the Provinces of France. The fourth
contemplated the acquisition of territory of equal extent and intrinsic value
for both the Powers, and this last, added Kaunitz, woidd probably be
accompanied by the greatest difficulties. Count Schulenburg, by
frankly seconding the martial ardour of the King, had
acquired a leading influence in the royal councils, and carried on the negotiations with Prince Reuss almost without consulting his colleagues. He immediately sent a reply to the Prince, to the effect
that Prussia—as it had uniformly declared since the previous summer—could only
engage in the war on condition of receiving an adequate
compensation. Prince Reuss complained that by making these conditions, Prussia
was choosing the longest and most intricate of the
four paths which lay open to her, and declared that it was out of his power to
find available territories for the purpose required. At the same time he begged
the Prussian Minister to make some definite proposal, as
Austria would do her utmost to further the interests of her august ally. Both
statesmen well knew with what secret mistrust each of these Powers contemplated
the aggrandizement of the other; their deliberations
were therefore conducted with slow and anxious caution, and months passed by
before their respective demands were reduced to any definite
shape.
The difficulty thus experienced in making any progress in the main
question, afforded but faint hopes of an harmonious
cooperation of the two Powers in the impending struggle. Count
Alvensleben, who of all the Prussian Ministers was the least favourably
disposed to Austria, repeatedly warned his colleagues not to send a man into
the field until their relations with Austria were made entirely clear, and the acquisitions demanded by Prussia fully
recognized by Austria in a formal treaty. But the King could not make up his
mind to so straightforward a proceeding. With him the war against the Jacobins
was as dear an object as the acquisition of the Polish province, and in direct opposition to his
Ch. I.]
MILITARY ENTHUSIASM OF FREDERICK WILLIAM.
25
Minister he thought that the first thing was to come to blows, and that
the compensation would follow as a matter of course. To curb the Revolution, moreover, now seemed to him a truly royal task, and a
refreshing change in the monotony of life. All his thoughts
and conversation were directed to the possible events of
the campaign; he resolved to accompany his army in person; in the afternoons he would ride out in the pouring jrain to test his campaigning habiliments ; and in the evenings no one was more welcome to him than
some of the French Emigres, with whom he indulged
in alluring pictures of victory and restoration, and towards whom his generosity was so boundless, that within ten months he bestowed above
five million francs on the exiled Princes. For the moment no expression of
opposite opinions was able to induce him to take a calmer view of the matter;
although there was no lack of such opinions from the most
influential of those who stood immediately about his person. Even his
morganatic consort, the Countess Doehnhoff was opposed to the war, because the
worthless-ness of the enemy promised no very honourable laurels. Of still greater weight, however, was the influence of that powerful party, which was
not able to follow the rapid transition of the King from the long-accustomed
opposition to Austria to the adoption of an Austrian Alliance. This party had a
representative in Prince Henry; who, though for the moment
thrown into the background, was still a person of the greatest weight, and in
whom, after the death of the great King, the glory and the policy of the Seven
years war seemed to be embodied. The views of this party were, moreover, entertained by almost all the higher and older officers in the
army; and above all it reckoned amongst its adherents the general for whom the
chief command in the revolutionary war was destined—Duke Charles William
Ferdinand of Brunswick.
The Duke passed at this period without question
for the greatest military genius in Europe; and, indeed, even now,
26
WARLIKE
PREPARATIONS IN GERMANY. [Book IV.
posterity will not deny him the possession of many of the highest
qualifications for command.1 Those who saw him at this period, at his little Court at Brunswick,
were astonished to find in the champion of Crefeld
and Minden, and the renowned conqueror of Holland, a careful Paterfamilias,
a zealous partaker and patron of every kind of intellectual progress, and an
active and unpretending administrator.2 At
his accession his dominions were burdened with a debt of 7 million dollars,
four of which he paid off in eleven years.3 It is
true that his financial system was somewhat niggardly, and injured in some
degree the future prospects of the country, by cutting off even the most
necessary expenditure.4 But he gained the greater credit by imposing no smaller privations on himself than on the State, and by keeping up.
notwithstanding all his fame as a General, a very small army. When, in 1790, he
crowned all by relieving his people from all extraordinary taxation, he became
the most popular monarch in the German Empire. On the Duke of Brunswick himself alone the narrowness of his
circumstances exercised an unfavourable influence. His was one of those
natures, which, notwithstanding their great intellectual gifts and pure
morality, are wanting in that strength of will and lofty courage which are essential to every noble deed. He possessed more
perseverance than power, more caution than sharp-sightedness, more receptivity
than creative genius. Endowed
1 For the following we have chiefly
used the unpublished correspondence of Duke Frederick of Brunswick-Oels in the
Weimar library. — 2 Correspondence of Johannes von
Miiller. — 3 From the minutes, especially of the Exchequer. A thoroughly correct view of these matters is given in the Political Journal of
1781, p. 97. It is well to bring forward this statement, which dates eleven
years before the revolutionary war, because the fable still finds believers, which sees in this liquidation of debt a proof of the bribery of the Duke by Dumouriez. — 4 Saving was his only expedient; the
American subsidies make hut little show in the liquidation of debt, which
continued to be carried on slowly and steadily after 1792. No great progress,
however, was made after the campaign.
Ch. I.] CHARACTER OF THE DUKE OF BRUNSWICK. 27
with great penetration and power of observation, he often overlooked in
his multitudinous studies, the simple, the essential,
and that which lay close at hand. He loved too
much to look at every side of a subject, and formed the habit, most
questionable in a soldier, of recognising the relative
claims of an opponent—of giving too great prominence to the difficulties of
every undertaking, and the weak points of every plan. As a
natural consequence of this disposition he was extremely unwilling to express a
definite opinion, and liked Jbetter to hint at a measure, than openly to adopt
and carry it out. Almost involuntarily, he always preferred concealed and
unobserved modes of operation. He was perfectly conscious of his own weakness, as indeed such natures are formed
for self-criticism and self-torment. "I cannot resist it," he used to
say; "it is stronger than I am."1 When
met by opposition he became incapable of standing his
ground, even against the narrowest and most one-sided views, if they were but
maintained with warmth and decision. He was angry indeed with his opponent, and
doubly so with himself, for not being able to maintain the right—but he
un-variably yielded in every point. And what made the
matter worse, he could not, once for all, entirely give up his own opinion; but
partly from self-love, and partly from a sense of duty, he ingeniously enough
returned to the course which he had abandoned, and in this way, not unfrequently, incurred the suspicion of
double-dealing.
We may easily understand that such a character could not be improved by
eleven years' manceuvering in the ruined affairs of the Brunswick household;
and still more fatal to him was the prevailing tone of
the Court of Berlin. Under the two last kings, Prussia had received such a
thoroughly monarchical stamp, that no department of public business was well
conducted without the personal and uninterrupted cooperation of the Monarch
himself. But this impulse from the
1 Malmesbury's diaries, Dec. 7.
1794: Cela
est plus fort que moi.
28
WARLIKE
PREPARATIONS IN GERMANY. [Book IV.
highest Power of the Land had been wanting since the accession of
Frederic William IT. This King, however active his benevolence, and
lively his intellect, was by no means fond of labour, and was only too much
inclined to yield to passing moods and impulses—a disposition which in a State
like that of Prussia was sufficient to bring the Government in a few years almost to dissolution. The Court parties obtained an influence
in political affairs, and the Royal decrees were no longer the offspring of one
guiding will, but the resultant of opposing forces acting upon the mind of the
Ruler. No wonder then that indecision and confusion spread
widely on every side. We have already seen how much the State had lost its
influence in Europe. "How striking," said Count Goltz in 1791,
"is the difference between the uncertain and complex course of our present
policy, and the firm, decided and energetic
conduct, by which Prussia formerly acquired the respect and esteem of every
Power!" In Home affairs it was remarked that the wholesome separation of one department of business from another had
disappeared with the all-controlling and uniting spirit which
had formerly pervaded them; and that every body concerned himself about every
thing, as it suited his personal interest or his favourite theories. , The
Officers interfered in Church matters, and the Theologians in political affairs; the Diplomatists lectured the Generals, and
the Generals felt themselves called upon to give their
opinion on foreign affairs; a state of things by which each and all were
necessarily injured, and which gave the country an
Administration affecting piety, a bureaucratic Church, and
a political Army.
Unconsciously the ruling powers had fallen upon courses by which every
thing would inevitably be lost, that had hitherto constituted the traditional
excellence of the Prussian State—vigorous government—care
for the general weal—free development of mind, and a national policy. The
dalliance with rosaries and spiritualism at the Court, of which so much was
heard, was not thej cause, but the expression of this
Ch. I.]
KING
AND COURT OF PRUSSIA.
29
state of things. We need say nothing of the love affairs of the King,
because, in spite of all his weakness, he did not easily allow female influence
to direct him in any of the weightier questions of State. The venality of the
higher officials of this period has also been
greatly exaggerated. It is true that in the private documents of the
Revolutionary times, mention is often made of gigantic attempts to corrupt, but
also, with few exceptions, of their failure. It was not the secret crimes of Ministers, nor the dark intrigues of mistresses, nor any single
weakness of the King, which worked ruin to the State of Frederick the Great,
but the discord which existed between the fundamental principle of the
Constitution and the general character of the Monarch. Prussia, as a
purely military State, ought to have, had a born general for its head; but
Frederic William needed the firm guidance and support of a well developed
constitutional system. He could not even control himself, and the country over which he had exclusive power must inevitably fall.
On this quaking and unsteady ground, a person of the Duke of
Brunswick's character now found himself incessantly called upon not only to
play the part of General, but of party leader—a task which he must continually have despaired of accomplishing, and therefore yielded
more and more to his natural love of intrigue. The direction which the Foreign
policy was taking grew daily more repugnant to him, and yet he had neither
heart to oppose the King by a clear expression
of opinion, nor strength sufficient, either entirely to withdraw from playing a
part in the game himself, or to assume the position of a subordinate officer to
a superior in command. He detested the very idea of a war with France; not
however that he had any predilection for the Revolution, which just now
offered him the chief command of the French army, or that
the military power of the French Empire seemed formidable to him at this time.
On the contrary, it was at this juncture of affairs that
he
30
WARLIKE
PREPARATIONS IN GERMANY. [Book IV.
wrote to a friend:1 "I cannot conceive from what source the French are to get money,
since all the tax-payers in their kingdom are under arms, and the tax-gatherers alone are exempted from military service." While his
compeers, without one exception, despised the Revolution, and believed that—the
frontier once passed—they would have to deal with mere bauds of robbers led by
pettifogging lawyers, he, on the contrary, anticipated all that
was violent and horrible, as soon as an irruption was made into the boiling
crater itself.
"Our other complications," he wrote to the Prince of Oels in
May, "will unravel themselves, but would to Heaven we had done with these French devils." Strange, indeed, that at the commencement of a
war which was to fill the world, the leaders on either side should feel nothing
but their own weakness and the strength of their opponents! Lafayette had no
less apprehension of the Prussian armies than the Prussian Generalissimo of the Demon of Revolution!
These sentiments of the Duke were strengthened by political considerations. He entertained an equal dislike towards the Emigres2 and
the Austrians, and for similar reasons. In the eyes of a
Prince whose whole existence was centred in care for his country's weal, they
were both equally representatives of all those mediaeval abuses whieh in France
had caused the Revolution, and in Germany had rendered all progress slow and
difficult. It was with the deepest
vexation that he received, on February the 13th, the royal command to repair to
Potsdam, for the purpose of drawing up the plan of a campaign in aid of Austria
and the Emigres. He anticipated nothing but mischief from sueh a proceeding— mischief should Prussia be defeated by the irritated Revolutionists—and mischief should the power of her hereditary enemy—the
House of Lorraine—be doubled by Prussian victories. Yet he accepted the commission, attended the
1 Schlieffen's Denkwiirdigkeiten. — 2 The correspondence of his Privy
Councellor, Feronce, is filled with expressions of this sentiment.
Ch. I.]
BRUNSWICK'S
PLAN OF OPERATIONS.
31
conference in presence of the King, and on the 19th .despatched the desired plan for the campaign, for which Major
Count Tauenzien had furnished the materials.1
"It is," he says in the beginning of his expose,
"entirely the work of the King,
whose ideas I am merely expressing." But we easily divine that the very
contrary of this statement is true, when he proceeds to say, that far greater
exertions than were contemplated would have been necessary, had not the French
army been so demoralised. "Under existing circumstances indeed," he hastens to add, "no serious resistance
is to be apprehended;" a statement which he again modifies by suggesting
that it was not advisable to flatter themselves with the representations of the
Emigres, but to hold fast the conviction that all
possible exertions should forthwith be made, all delays avoided, and the
desired consummation brought about as speedily as possible; "for"
said he, it is impossible to calculate beforehand the turn which events may take,
and those who bear the sway in France are capable
of resorting to any extreme."
Meantime, whether they considered the war easy or difficult, when once the National Assembly had thrown down the gauntlet by
the decree of the 20th April, it behoved the German Powers
to consider how the danger was most speedily to be met; and in the beginning
of May, therefore, Hohenlohe-Kirchberg came to Sanssouci to consult the
Prussian Generals on their common operations. In accordance with the zealous
sentiments.of the King, it was already determined that a grand invasion of France was to be attempted. As regarded the details of execution, the plan of the Duke was
always taken as the basis of their consultations.2
According to this, a Prussian army—42,000 strong —was to make the main attack by way of Luxembourg,
1 This officer signed the original
draught, from which the completed plan (printed by Massenbach) differs but
little. — 2 The following is taken from the
minutes of the Conference. Con/.
Minutoli, Erinnerungen,
p. 22.
32
WARLIKE
PREPARATIONS IN GERMANY. [Book IV.
and after taking Longwy and Montmedy, secure the passage of the Meuse
by the capture of Verdun. The Austrians in Belgium, whose strength Hohenlohe estimated at 56,000 men, were to sendone corps to join the Prussians,
while the latter were still in the Luxembourg territory, and place another at
Ath to cover Brussels, and after taking, or alarming, Maubeuge, Philippeville
and Givet with their main army, push up the Meuse and unite
with the Prussians on the banks of that river;—on the crossing of which the
subsequent fortune of the campaign would depend. According to the lists brought
forward, Austria had at this moment only 11,000 men in the Breisgan; but 16,000 were already on the march, and 23,000 were ordered to
follow with all speed. It was agreed that these last should be led directly to
Mannheim, and by their operations on the Saar and the upper Moselle support the
movements of the grand army. For the defence of the communications
and the siege of the fortresses they reckoned on a Hessian corps. And lastly,
the French Emigres were to assemble at the first commencement of hostilities at
Phil-lippsbnrg, cross the Rhine at Basle, and in conjunction with Swiss forces, as was hoped, make a diversion either towards Upper
Alsace, or towards the County Palatine of Burgundy. This plan would take them
entirely away from the scene of the decisive movements; and we here see how the
old aversion of the Court of Vienna for the Emigres found a
representative, on the Prussian side, in the Duke
of Brunswick. Lastly, it was resolved emphatically to summon the sovereigns of the Empire to raise and arm troops, and thereby strengthen
the main army, or assist in covering the Upper Rhine.
If we survey these forces, we shall see that Belgium seems completely
secured; since the French, in expectation of a German invasion, could hardly
throw more than 60,000 men into that province; to meet which force 56,000
imperialists would suffice until the arrival of the Duke
of Brunswick. It was not consistent therefore with this statement of num-
Ch. I.] SLUGGISH MOVEMENTS OF THE AUSTRIANS. 33
bers, that Hohenlohe urged the immediate despatch of a Prussian Corps to Belgium. Prussia refused this request,1 on
the ground that the main attack, which would at once set Belgium free, must not
be weakened.
In this most important operation the German powers hoped to employ
42,000 Prussians, 23,000 Austrians from the Breisgau,
about 6,000 Hessians, and, lastly, the Belgian-Austrians, besides the corps
posted at Ath for the protection of Brussels. For this last purpose 16,000 men
would be more than sufficient, when once the Allies had occupied the line of
the Meuse; 40,000 men, therefore, could be spared to
increase the army of invasion, which would thus be raised to the strength of
111,000 men. We may regard this, under the existing circumstances, as the
minimum required for an invasion of Paris. The Duke of Brunswick indeed expected no great results from its operations and was indignant that
he had not been consulted about the "whether,"
but only about the "how"; and declared that while the French were burning with rage, he should be
freezing in ennui, which was all that he expected to get out of the
matter.2 It was all the more urgently necessary at any rate not to leave the
enemy any time for preparations, and above all not to give the Republicans the
opportunity of entirely crushing the royalist and moderate parties in Paris. Prussia could have assembled its troops in Coblentz before the
end of June— they began their march in five columns at the beginning of this
month3—but Hohenlohe chose to declare that the 16,000 Austrians destined to
protect the Upper Rhine could not reach Freiburg before the end of
June, while the 23,000 who were to join the main army could not be in Mannheim
before the end of July. Everything therefore was deferred to that period,
and meanwhile it was determined that the coro-
1 July 14tb. — 2 To the
Prince of Oels. — chrift fyc. ties Krieyes, XXII.
18. II.
3 Stranz, in the Zeit-
34
WARLIKE
PREPARATIONS IN GERMANY. [Book IV.
nation of the Emperor Francis might be leisurely celebrated in Germany,
and the dilatory States of the Empire urged to take up
arms. The melancholy consequences produced in France by this procrastination we
have already seen, and shall have to observe more closely.
The intelligence received from the German Empire afforded no better
hopes of accelerated and energetic action. In answer to
the very urgent note which Austria and Prussia submitted to the German Diet,
Hanover, with the consent of most of the Powers of Northern Germany, declared
that she saw no reason to interfere in a war between France and Hungary; that in the event of a violation of the German territory,
and a formal declaration of war by the Empire, she would furnish her
contingent. It was not particularly wise, in the face of the well-known plans
of the Jacobins, to lay so much stress on these formalities; Hanover,
however, could at any rate urge that she was simply adhering to the ground
which she had always taken. All the more undisguised was the selfishness,
indolence and cowardice, which showed themselves among the petty Estates of the Suabian, Franconian and Rhenish Circles; among the very same
Ecclesiastics and Potentates who, in the preceding year, had called so loudly
for the chastisement of the insolent Jacobins. The Circle of Suabia, after
lengthy discussions, conceived the sublime idea of suggesting the
formation of a loose association for mutual defence, by which no one was to be
bound!—and Franconia had the greatest apprehensions of dearth and famine
arising from the mere passage of a Prussian Corps through the country, even were all its requirements to be paid for.in ready money. The
Ecclesiastical Electors contented themselves with rude
treatment of the French Charges
(T Affaires at their respective courts, and with threatening proclamations against
those of their subjects who might betray any weakness towards Jacobinism. The Bavarian Palatinate, again, whose armed force was in a pitiable condition,
Cm. I.] WILLIAM, LANDGRAVE OF HESSE-CASSEL
35
zealously assured the Parisian Eulers of their neutrality and goodwill.1
The only exception to the spectacle of universal listless-ness was
afforded by William, Landgrave of Hesse-Cassel. This Prince governed his
conntry in the manner of a strict father of a family, or zealous
martinet,—following the principles -of Frederick the Great in
respect to order and discipline, parsimony and military
organisation, but without any of that feeling for mental independence and
culture which so peculiarly distinguished the government of the great Prussian
Monarch. The State in Hesse Cassel was completely
merged in the army. With a population of 400,000, a military force of about
14,000 men was kept np,2
which, in thorough fitness for service, was not inferior to any troops in
Europe. The Landgrave, who entertained the loftiest notions
of his sovereign dignity, and whose self-consciousness was enhanced by the
possession of such a force, had long been animated by the wish to obtain tbe
Electoral dignity for his dynasty. His ambition had not hitherto been favoured by fortune, and he was rejoiced at the
opportunity .now afforded him of obliging equally the two most powerful
Potentates of Germany. He had already frequently manifested his abhorrence of
the Eevolution. In September 1791 he sent secret orders to his Colonels, that on the very slightest disturbance, without any regard to the
civil authorities, they should fire on the people without mercy until all was
quiet. When the Elector of Mayence, a few months later, proposed to him to publish a warning manifesto in Hesse-Cassel also, against domestic Jacobins, he replied; "My subjects
have in all times distinguished themselves by their attachment to their sovereign, and would only feel insulted by such an
admonition, issued withont any adequate motive."
1 Correspondence of the French post, or
contribution, of 40,000 Tha-army of the Rhine.
Biron is loud lers, and a
military fund of 11 to ^ in his praises when he speaks of 12 millions. Bavaria. — 2 By means of an im-
02
3G
WARLIKE
PREPARATIONS IN GERMANY. [Book IV.
He likewise repudiated the proposal of an Imperial edict against
revolutionary movements, on the ground that the internal police must be left in
the hands of the respective sovereigns; and that in
Hesse-Cassel, especially, all necessary measures in this respect
had been taken long ago. But he declared himself ready to aid both his own
Circle and the Empire with a military force far exceeding the proper
contingent.1 He had subsequently the satisfaction of knowing that Austria and Prussia expressly mentioned him 10 the Imperial Diet, as the only patriotic Prince; and he then, without
further scruple, sent the lists of his troops to the Duke of Brunswick for the arrangement of operations. Yet, as a prudent
manager, he did not at first by any means rest satisfied with empty honours,
whether of the Electoral hat, or the laurel crown; so that a month's
correspondence was carried on respecting expenses
and compensation. The Landgrave demanded that Prussia should undertake the
maintenance of the Hessian troops; that the Emperor and the King should give
their votes for raising him to the Electoral dignity, and in the event of the
Duke of Brunswick's retirement,
transfer to him the command-in-chief of the whole allied army. It was evident
that these conditions could not be carried out, and it was at last agreed, on
the 31st of July,2 that
Hesse-Cassel should furnish, and herself maintain, 6,000 men for the campaign, in consideration of a promise of the Electoral hat and
fair compensation.
If we review these negotiations we shall see that they afforded a sorry
prospect of a fortunate issue to the campaign. The commander-in-chief was heartily averse
to the
1 From official documents given at
length in a work of great research,
unfortunately not yet published: "The Hessians in Champagne, on tbe Main
and the Rhine;" by Von Ditfurth. — 2 This is the date of the Hessian
ratification. The draft made by Prussia is
of the 12th of July. The Landgrave wrote his wishes with his own hand as
marginal notes, and concludes: L'on
se remet nniquement mix prowesses graeieuses de S. M. I'Empereur et de S. 31. Prussienne.
' Ch.I.]
DIFFERENCES OF OPINION AMONG THE THREE POWERS. 37
whole undertaking, many of those who were directly interested could not be shaken from the most complete torpor, and the
armaments of the chief Power were not sufficiently advanced to be used at the
most favourable moment.
But what was still worse, the fundamental condition of success—a real
understanding between Austria and Prussia-became every clay more difficult of
consummation. When once the King of Prussia had fixed his regards on a
compensation in Poland, he naturally endeavoured to
enter into close relations with Russia; and Austria,
with ill-concealed jealousy, soon followed his example. We shall subsequently
have to watch the developement of this affair in St. Petersburg in all its
details; we will only observe, in this place, that it
afforded Russia the opportunity of exercising a direct influence on the French
war also, and that the entanglement of different interests was rendered still
more complicated. While Austria would have preferred to exclude the Emigres from every kind of cooperation, whether political
or military, Russia, on the contrary, demanded that the Powers should officially place the French Princes at the head of the whole undertaking,
and only come forward as enemies to the Revolution
in their
train. It was at last agreed, by the mediation
of Prussia, not to assign any political part to the Emigres, but a subordinate
military cooperation. In like manner Russia pointed out the re-establishment of
the Bourbon throne as the exclusive object of the whole war, and therefore protested against any
dismemberment of the French Empire. Prussia, on her part, had little objection
to make; in Vienna the Government evaded any formal renunciation, but all the
more pointedly put the question,—from what other quarter, then,
the proposed compensation for Prussia was to come? The Russian armies were at
that time in full march towards Poland, and the rapid subjection of that
unhappy country was to be looked for immediately. Although Prussia very much disliked these one-sided and arbitrary measures of the Russians
before the conclusion of the proposed treaty,
38
WARLIKE
PREPARATIONS IN GERMANY. [Book IV.
she had no means at hand of frustrating them; on the contrary, Schulenburg now communicated to Prince
Reuss that Prussia intended to look for her compensation in Poland. The effect
which this announcement produced in Vienna clearly shewed, that since the death
of Leopold a new spirit reigned in the imperial palace—that all breadth of view in that quarter was lost, and that a restless
greed had taken its place. The same great interests of State which had made
Prussia hostile to Poland had raised up Austria as her protector; and Leopold
had made this principle the very focus of his entire policy. The
motive which influenced the son was the thought that though the aggrandizement
of Prussia was by no means pleasant, the new turn of affairs would not be
unacceptable, if Austria also obtained thereby a province in Poland.1 But the necessity soon arose of looking about for other propositions.
The Empress Catharine, who, by means of the negotiations
already referred to, had completely attained her object of diverting the German
Powers from affording any aid to Poland, regarded
herself as mistress of the whole Republic. She was not at all inclined to give up a portion of her booty to a third competitor; and least of all did she wish to concede such an extension of territory to Austria, which had so lately cherished the most
dangerous plans for the restoration of Poland. Neither in St.
Petersburg, therefore, nor in Berlin, did the negotiations
make any progress. In expectation of subsequently coming to a good
understanding, the Austrian Government began its military preparations and the movement of troops; and arranged a personal meeting in
-Mayence, between the King of Prussia and Francis II., for July, immediately
after the assumption of the Imperial crown by the latter. The nearer the time
approached, the more restlessly did the
1 Such a feeling showed itself in
Vienna as early as the end of March, immediately after the Prussian rejection
of Spielmann's memorial, and the warlike manifestations of Dumouriez.
Ch. I.]
DIVISION
OF THE POLISH PLUNDER.
39
Court of Vienna look about for some tract of
land which they might lay claim to as a suitable set-off to Prussia's
acquisition in Poland. In this state of suspense Baron Spielmann one day received the Russian Ambassador Rasumowsky, and talked
with him on the all-absorbing subject of the day. The
Russian suggested that Austria could not do better than return to the old plan
of Joseph II., of exchanging Belgium for Bavaria. Spielmann, who perfectly
appreciated the advantages of such a rounding-off of the
Austrian territory, expressed strong doubts whether the circumstances were favourable to such a scheme; to which Rasumowsky replied, that the only
obstacle, on which Joseph had been wrecked, —the opposition of Prussia—was done
away with by the alliance of the two Powers, and that, consequently, success was to be regarded as easy
of attainment. "In that case," replied Spielmanu, with a view of
sounding the intentions of Russia, "Prussia will demand an acquisition of
equal value for herself." "No doubt," said Rasumowsky in conclusion, "and this wdl certainly be found." The
word Poland was not mentioned by either of those Statesmen, just as Golt'^ at
St. Petersburg had made no express mention of a partition; but all parties
understood one another, and Spielmann hastened to urge Prince Reuss to a
confidential discussion of the new idea in Berlin. Almost contrary to his expectation be found a very ready hearing from Schulen-burg;1 the
Prussian Minister declared with the greatest precision
and frankness that his royal master would agree to the
Bavarian exchange, without any hesitation, if he former a Polish province of
proportionate extent. These words were sufficient to clear the atmosphere at
the Court of Vienna, and to put an end to the previous stagnation. The former aversion to the extension of the Prussian dominions into
1 Alvensleben even asserts in a much
irritated with a former colleague;
later
memorial that the memorial and he himself signed several des-
proceeded
from Schulenhurg himself, patches in 1792, which
give the above
He
was however, at that period, very account of the proceedings.
40
WARLIKE
PREPARATIONS IN GERMANY. [Book IV.
Poland was so thoughly cured, that Austria herself undertook to break the ice in St. Petersburg, and officially to propose to Catharine the Bavarian exchange for the Emperor, and the
acquisition of a Polish province for Prussia. The Russian Empress received this
communication with inward satisfaction; she could not
do otherwise than welcome the thorough change which the policy of Austria had
undergone. She saw in the plan of the Bavarian exchange a fruitful source of
endless complications to the German Powers, during which she herself could take
up a commanding position; and she had from the very
first, as we have seen, made up her mind to sacrifice some portion or other of
Polish territory to the Germans. At present, however, she had possession of the
whole country, and was determined, if she must make a sacrifice, that it should it be as small as possible. Her Ministers,
therefore, listened with the greatest coldness to the proposition of the
Austrian Ambassador. The Bavarian exchange, they said, might have been effected
even without a partition of Poland, but the French Revolution had, they allowed, so completely changed the general position of
affairs, that a compensation must be sought for Prussia, Ostermann added that
the case demanded the most serious deliberation—and the State-Councillor,
Markoff, was of opinion that half a campaign against
France hardly entitled Prussia to an- increase of power,
especially as Austria after all gained nothing in extent of territory by the
Bavarian exchange. They therefore adjourned the discussion, and declared
that they must await the result of the personal
conference between the two monarchs.
Meanwhile King Francis had gone to Frankfort, where his coronation as
Emperor was celebrated, according to the old established forms, on the 14th of
July. The King of Prussia set out at the same time to join his
army, whose columns were collecting at Coblentz for the invasion of France; and
on the 19th, 20th and 21st the Conference previously agreed upon between the
two High and Mighty
Ch. I.] AUSTRIA DEMANDS ANSPACH
AND BAIREUTH. 41
Allies took place at Mayence. Illustrious and distinguished men were
gathered together in the same city from all parts of the Empire. A large number
of the Princes of the Empire made their appearance,
attended by splendid retinues; prelates and officers of every
uniform jostled one another, and the ancient city was enlivened by the presence
of 10,000 strangers. In the castle of the easy Prince of the Church, the
festive music was continually summoning the guests to banquet, concert and ball; and in the evenings the Rhine reflected on its broad surface
the most brilliant illuminations. In short, it seemed as
if the ancient Empire wished once more, before the commencement of its
death-struggle, to display on its original and classic soil
all the remains of its old magnificence. Amidst the tumult of festivities the diplomatists Spielmann and Cobenzl, Schulenburg and
Haugwitz, met together for the decisive negotiation. At first their harmony
seemed to be complete; it was agreed that the
compensation of both parties ought to be equal,— that there was no ground for
seeking that compensation in France itself, but that on the contrary, it ought
to consist, for Austria in the Bavarian-Belgian exchange, and for Prussia in a
Polish province. When asked to what extent of territory Prussia would lay claim, Schulenburg designated the Palatinates of
Posen, Gnesen, Kalisch, Kujavia, and a portion of Sieradia as far as the
Warthe, which are about equivalent to the present Prussian
province of Posen. Hereupon the Imperial negotiators
brought forward an entirely new and unexpected demand. They now represented,—as
Markoff had already done in St. Petersburg,—that the exchange of Belgium for
Bavaria brought no increase of territory to the Emperor at all equivalent to what Prussia gained; and therefore demanded that, in the
event of the exchange taking place, the King of Prussia should add his
Franconian principalities of Anspach and Baireuth to the Austrian share. We may
judge of the indignation with which the King rejected this proposal; but as the Emperor insisted on it with
42
WARLIKE
PREPARATIONS IN GERMANY. [Book IV.
equal obstinacy, no course was left but to break off the whole
discussion, and to commence the war without any positive agreement; in the
hope that a more favourable moment might bring better counsels
with it.
And thus the leading Powers of Europe stood on the very brink of a
conflict—the shock of which was to sever two eras of the world from one
another—without the slightest foreboding of the
importance of the task before them, and without any other feeling than selfish
anxiety, and bitter jealousy towards their associates. What a change had taken
place in Prussian policy from the clearness, sagacity and firmness of Frederick the Great!—What a revolution in the principles of
Austrian state-craft, which three months before, had advocated the glorious
re-establishment of Poland, and was now the first to propose its partition!
What could be expected of a war against the Revolution, and ill
favour of ancient rights and privileges, the cost of which was to be borne by
the ancient Polish Republic, and by the old Roman
Empire, in the person of the Bavarian Elector?—What could be effected by an
alliance, the parties to which were considering above
all things how they might deprive their associates of their desired share in
the booty? They fell, not before the arms of the Revolution, but by their own
flagrant sin; "Quern
Bens vidt perdere, pi'ius demented."
Another and hardly less important
negotiation—-which was likewise carried on in Mayence—led to an equally unsatisfactory result. It was conducted in the greatest secrecy by a
plain untitled man, who was but little remarked amidst the gaily attired and
glittering throng which crowded round the monarchs—viz. Mallet
du Pan, the Envoy of Louis XVI. After the Monarchs had given him a very
gracious reception, he had long conferences with
Cobenzl and Haugwitz. In these the well-known wishes of Louis XVI. were discussed—that the Powers should confine themselves
to complaints of the breach of international law; should not enter into any
negotiations with the liberated King-; and leave to
Cti. I.]
MALLET DU PAN.
43
him the entire arrangement of internal
affairs. Both statesmen expressed their assent to these
conditions. They disclaimed, in the first place, all
intentions of aggrandizement at the expense of France. "They gave
me," said Mallet, "full security on this point;" he was
sharpsighted enough not to overlook the most certain
guarantee for their sincerity—the deep hatred which the two Courts entertained
towards each other. These conferences, moreover, gave the death-blow to the
declining authority of the Emigres. High as they had stood in the favour of the Court of Berlin, they had greatly lessened, even there, the
sympathy which had been felt for them, by their excessive pretensions, their
complicated intrigues, and above all their internal
discord. There existed at this time three parties among
them, which were at deadly feud with one another. The chief influence over the
Comte d'Artois was still exercised by Calonne, who had lately given great
offence in the Tuileries by his plan of proclaiming the Comte de Provence
regent of France. Mallet too had been thwarted by them in every
possible way in the execution of his mission; but he had now the satisfaction
of seeing the Powers thoroughly exasperated against them. "Where,"
asked Cobenzl, "after all their boasting, are their arms?—What use can we
make of them?—and how will their cooperation help us?" "They
wish," added Haugwitz, "to restore the ancien
regime, though the great majority of the French people are bitterly opposed to
it." Mallet strongly confirmed these sentiments, and when he repeatedly called their attention to the contrast between the system of Calonne
and that of Louis XVI., and pointed out the evil consequences of the former,
Cobenzl replied by declaring that the Powers took precisely the same view of
the matter.1
It was therefore resolved, on the 20th of July, not to
allow the Emigres to unite any where in large numbers, that their political
importance might be thoroughly destroyed. Not
1 Vid. the
official documents in the 1st Vol. of Mallet's Memoires,
44
WARLIKE
PREPARATIONS IN GERMANY. [Book IV.
more than 8,000 were to march with the Duke of Brunswick" — not
more than 5,000 were to join the Austrians in the Breisgau—not more than 4,000
the Imperial troops in Belgium. Bread and forage were to he
given them, and their Princes were to receive 200,000 florins for their
equipment. This, as was stated in the agreement, was to be irrevocably the last
payment; if the Princes refused these conditions, they were to be entirely and
publicly abandoned to their fate. The petty Court at Coblenz,
which was immediately informed on these points, received the message with impotent bitterness of heart. It was not only selfish reasons which excited
the wrath of these cavaliers; beneath all their vexation, that the good" old times were not to be restored, lay national pride, wounded by the
thought that the foreigners, whom in their hearts they despised, were to play
the chief part, instead of subordinating themselves in a fitting manner to the
descendants of St. Louis. The national feeling stirred the
hearts of Frenchmen at Coblentz as well as Paris; and it had been remarked that
after Biron's defeat at Mons, the old noblemen wept over the ill-fortune of
their revolutionary countrymen.1 The
worst thing was, that Louis X"VL himself had led the way in
degrading his Brothers; they could only ascribe it to the influence of Marie
Antoinette, the foreigner, the "Austrian;" and thus these champions
of the feudal throne joined in the abuse which the Jacobins heaped upon her
head. This fury against strangers from whom they were begging aid, and against
the Queen, for whose deliverance they were marching, was
never extinguished; and has diffused as many lies through the historical
literature of the period, as the party hatred of the Revolutionists
themselves.2
1 Stramberg's Coblenz,
from con- unhappily been brought
into Germany
temporaneous
notices. — 2 To this by the learned
but seandal-loving
category belongs
more especially Rhenish Antiquarius,
while in France
Michaud's
fiction concerning the cam- it met with due chastisement in the
paign in Champagne (Biogr. univ., Speetateur Militaire, XXXIII. suppl., art. Dumouriez, etc.) which has
Ch. I.]
MALLET DU PAN'S MANIFESTO TO THE FRENCH PEOPLE. 45
Mallet urgently advocated the publication of a manifesto, by which the
character of the war might be solemnly placed before the French people. He
called for heavy threats against the Jacobins, and tranquillizing assurances to
the peaceable portion of the population;—the former to do away
with the incredible security of the Parisian public in respect to the war;—the
latter to separate the mass of the people from the factions. On this account he
thought that no particular form of government should
be prescribed, but only freedom for Louis XVI.,
as the sole reformer and peacemaker. It woidd evidently not have
been wise, in the general insecurity, to have
anticipated particular constitutional paragraphs; nevertheless it cannot be
denied that there is a very essential defect in Mallet's
propositions. He agreed with the two Ministers, that the Germans should not
seek any acquisition of French territory, and that the restoration of Feudalism
should not be aimed at. As regards the object of the manifesto, one of these assurances was evidently just as important and practicable as
the other; but unfortunately only one of them was
mentioned in Mallet's project. And yet there was no doubt that as many French
hearts were boiling with indignation at the remembrance of the ancien
regime, as at the idea of' a foreign yoke; and the abolition of the former
might easily be completed, without the heedless anticipation of any particular
form of Constitution. There were three principal
points, which had nothing at all to do with the Constitution—in the
narrower sense of the word—or with the prerogatives of the King;—three points,
the importance of which had long ago been recognised
by Louis XVI., and were of the most vital moment to the welfare of the vast
majority of the people. These were: access to offices and
honours for all classes—abolition of feudal rights and Church
tithes. We have noticed above what an important influence
these questions exercised on the political and warlike
feelings of the nation; nothing therefore was so essential as to deprive
the war of
46
WARLIKE
PREPARATIONS IN GERMANY. [Book IV.
its revolutionary sting, by an unequivocal declaration on these three
cardinal points.
Unfortunately, however, Mallet's plan fell into the
hands of a zealous Emigre, the Marquis Limon, who drew up a manifesto, partly
founded on Mallet's proposals; and succeeded in gaining the approbation
of the Emperor Francis.1 Instead
of an additional clause against Feudalism, the document
only contained still more unmeasured threats, the
undignified nature of which could only irritate without intimidating. The Duke of Brunswick had not the energy to oppose his scruples to the will of the Monarchs, and signed the manifesto
on the 25th of July. We have already seen the effect which
it produced.
1 Mallet. Schulenburg was
subsequently won over, and through him the King.
Cn.
II.]
47
CHAPTER II. RULE OF THE MUNICIPALITY OF PARIS.
Feeling
op the country.—Flight
of lafayette.—Mob
rule in paris.— Police of the sections—Encroachments
of the municipality.— Revolutionary
tribunal.—Arming
of the proletaries.—Confiscation
and plunder.—resistance of the citizens.—murderous plans.— Desire
of influencing the elections to the convention.—Fruitless
resistance of the gironde.
Sucn was the point at which the sluggish and complicated movements of
old Europe had arrived, when the outbreak occurred in Paris, which destroyed
both the Monarchy and the Constitution of 1791. Those who caused it had to sustain a contest for life and death with
the whole of Europe, and to transform their country into one vast camp. For the
time, however, the position of affairs, convulsed hy the unchaining of every passion, was one of constant and uncertain fluctuation. Outside the walls of the
capital no one knew what course the victorious Revolution would take. The
victors themselves were especially doubtful what the country might say to the
catastrophe of the 10th of August. The cries of the different parties in all the provinces were so confused and discordant, that the most
unlooked-for and improbable events seemed possible. The first care of the
National Assembly was to secure the material organs of power; and as early as
the 10th of August they sent off Commissioners to the armies to administer
the oath of fidelity. On the 13th they issued a manifesto
to the nation, pointing out the necessity of the revolt, and calling upon the
people to provide for their own future, by means of a National Convention.
48
RULE
OP THE MUNICIPALITY OF PARIS. [Book IV.
Neither the secret instructions given to the Commissioners, nor the
language of the public proclamations, show any great confidence of success.
Condorcet, the author of the address to the nation, avoided the
slighest allusion to a Republic. Nay, he did not even speak of General
Lafayette, who had formed the chief subject of the last and most violent
debate. This was highly politic; for the mass of the population felt not the slightest interest in vexed questions of this kind; and the majority of
those who still engaged in political contests were as adverse to the
overthrow of Louis XVI., as to the rule of the Parisian Municipality. But there
were two feelings on which the country agreed—abhorrence of the an-cien
regime, and indignation at the interference of foreign countries. The whole
future success of the riding party depended on their suppressing for the
time all minor differences of opinion, and making
themselves the organs of these national
feelings,—representing Louis as the accomplice of the allied Emigres and
Powers, and leaving the nation no other choice than between the 10th of August
and utter slavery.
This error was already prevalent among the people. Wherever the Commissioners went, they found the minds of men excited, and the mass of
the people in commotion. In all the Departments the cry for war was heard above
the din of party strife. After the country had been declared to be in danger,
volunteers flocked to the standards, gave in their names to
the Communal Officers, and awaited their equipments and orders to march. In
this respect there was no difference among the provinces, with the exception of
a small district of Bretagne. The national feeling prevailed over every other, the Democrats wished to fight to preserve their liberties from the Prussians; and the friends of the
Constitution submitted to the tyranny of the mob, in order not to throw
obstacles in the way of the holy war against the foreigners. In Alsace a few days before the 10th, the whole population of Strasburg had
signed a vigorous
Ch. II.] REACTIONARY FEELING OF THE COUNTRY.
49
address against the Jacobins—whose club in that city only numbered 500
members—but they had also equipped a new
battalion for the defenee of the frontier, and saw no possibility of carrying on the war, if they deserted the last rallying point—the National Assembly. From Orleans, the Departmental Authorities, the Municipality, and 600
citizens, had sent up addresses against the proceedings of the 20th of June;
but in the beginning of August, they called on the young men to form free
companies; on the 10th they bewailed the fate of the King, and at
the same time sent out their recruits to fight against his
deliverers. In Brest, Belval, the Procureur of the Department, before the news
of the 10th arrived, declared that the deposition of the King would be not only
highly dangerous, but pernicious in its consequences;
"but," he added, "whether it be decreed or
rejected, the National Assembly must still continue to be our common centre, or
France must perish." These sentiments occur in hundreds of documents
dating from this period; and they manifested themselves all the more strongly,
beeause they were based both on the strength and the weakness of human
nature, and afforded the citizens free scope for the indulgence of their patriotism against foreigners, while they relieved them
from the dangerous task of opposing the Jacobins at home. All enthusiasm for a political ideal had been used up in the disorders
of the Revolution. "We are free enough," cried- some, "why
should we excite ourselves any longer?" "We are much too free;"
said others, "of what use are the rights of man, when every proletary can put his hand in every purse?" The Jacobins were
perfectly aware of this feeling among the masses, and were rendered no little
anxious thereby. "On the 10th of August," said a Girondist,
"3,000 workmen changed Franee into a Republic." Another was of opinion that the great mass of the people were enthusiastic for the Constitution; that in the towns, a longing began to
arise for the ancient despotism; and that people were only republican from fear
of the guillotine. The Cor
50
RULE
OF THE MUNICIPALITY OF PARIS. [Book IV.
deliers bear the same testimony as the Gironde. The leading organ of
the Jacobins at that time—"the Revolution of Paris"—acknowledged the
correctness of the above statement. They ascribe it, indeed, to the
intrigues of the Court and the wealthy, but they testify that the same persons
who in 1789 had done every thing for the Revolution, were ready in 1792 to
devote their powers to the King; and that this was the reason why the Duke of Brunswick no longer spoke of Counter-revolution, but only of the
restoration of order. Four-fifths of the nation, probably, had no more ardent
desire than to see a strong government restore the country to. repose,
and release the citizens from political labour. But on this very
account they put up with a Jacobin government, because, if they opposed it,
they must themselves come forward and risk their own persons. Eyen if the
National Assembly had committed an illegal act in suspending the King, the resistance of individuals to a decree of the National Assembly was not exactly legal. There was no organized body in any part
of the coimtry, round which the royalists could rally; the only societies which
at that time possessed life and power were the Clubs,
and these were in the very front of the Revolution. In these there was zeal,
energy and unity; the fend between the Gironde and the Mountain did not extend
to the provinces, where all worked vigorously together for one object. The
Constitutionalists, on the other hand, were at variance
with the adherents of the orthodox priests, and full of distrust towards the
foreign connexions of the King. All parties therefore resigned themselves to
what they could not alter, and derived consolation from the thought that they should now meet the foreign enemy with united powers. From
every quarter the National Assembly received intelligence that the country
submitted to the Revolution, accepted the fait
accompli, and was preparing to hold the election for the National Convention.1
1 Mortimer-Ternaux, the writer of
the greatest research among the Freneh, comes to exaetly the same result, after
a comprehensive examination of
Ch. II.] LAFAYETTE MEDITATES A COUP DE MAIN.
51
Under these circumstances the only quarter from which the Gironde, from
the very first moment, apprehended danger, was the camp of General Lafayette.
Countless eyes were directed towards him, "the eldest son of
freedom," as he was called by his friends. His
army was entirely devoted to him. He had long and irreconcilably broken off all
connection with the Democrats. He received intelligence of the Revolution
of the 10th in 36 hours;1
first from a soldier of the National Guard who had escaped from the carnage, and then from an officer of his own army who, on the evening of the
10th, had forced his way through the barrieres,
pistol in hand. He was only a few marches distant from Paris— the
Prussian army was still at Konz on the Moselle, on the other side of the frontier—he had therefore still a week before
the Prussians could reach his position. Would it be possible to make use of
these days for a coup de main against Paris! If he made his appearance there with oul) a few loyal
regiments, the National Guard would in all probability rally round
their old commander,2 and after the vote of the 8th he was sure of a majority in the
National Assembly. A few volleys fired on the
Marseillois might perhaps suffice to restore the reins
of government to constitutional
hands. He would then be as sure of the approbation of the provinces, as the
Revolution now was; for he too had the intention to oppose the Prussians, and
to repel all foreign interference. It was an undertaking full of danger, in
which the loss of an hour might expose him to defeat either
from the factions or the Prussians. But there was no other way. Everything
depended on the possession of the Capital—on energy and rapidity of action.
Such a proceeding was all the more urgently necessary, because he enjoyed the full confidence of the soldiers iu his
the
official documents both of the Na- out
troops, and had, nevertheless, tional Assembly and the Departments, for the moment, a chance of gaining — 1 Lafayette, VI. 242. — 2 On the over the National Guard.
28th of June he came to Paris with-
D 2
52
RULE
OF THE MUNICIPALITY OF PARIS. [Book IV.
camp at Sedan; while in the other armies both the Gironde and the
Mountain possessed very important adherents. The old dispute on the question' of offensive or defensive war was not only not extinguished,
but had been enhanced by the late party struggles. The Rhine army had been
since the middle of July under the command of Generals Biron and Custine; the
former was an old Orleanist, from the very first prepossessed
against Lafayette, and the latter had staked all his hopes on the Revolution
and, the war; and both, long before the 10th of August, had placed themselves
at the disposal of the most violent parties. We are already acquainted with the leader of the army of the South, General
Montesquiou, and his friendly relation to the Gironde. His conscience was
satisfied with having done his best to avert the late revolution, and he and
his army now silently accepted the fait
accompli. As the Gironde had their representative in this quarter, so the Mountain had one of still greater
weight, with the army of the North, in Dumouriez. When Luckner left this army
to go to Metz, Dumouriez was to follow with his division; but he took advantage
of an unimportant reconnaissance which the Austrians made against Orchies
to convince his immediate superior, General Arthur Dillon, of the danger of his
departure, and remained in his former position in spite of orders. Just at this
time Couthon, a friend of Robespierre, was staying at a
bathing place in the Department du Nord. Dumouriez made friends with this man,
on the ground of their common hatred of Lafayette, and in spite of the furious
indignation of the Marsha], the Parisian Jacobins prevented the War Ministry from punishing the insubordination of Dumouriez. We shall
see what dangers to France sprang from these machinations; but for the moment
Dumouriez was a good Jacobin, and inspired his division with the purest
democratic enthusiasm.
These circumstances could not remain unknown to
Lafayette. If he retreated before such dangers, no one could accuse him
of timidity,; if he acted in a harsh and dictatorial
Ch. II.] FEEBLENESS
AND VACILLATION OF LAFAYETTE.
53
manner, no one could impute to him a criminal ambition.
But being too self-complacent for the former course, and too indolent for the
latter, be chose the most pernicious of all. He declared his wish to oppose the
Jacobins, and at the same time sheathed his sword. He believed that he could not venture to leave his camp in the prospect of a
Prussian invasion. He could never rise above the
ideas of formal legality, although he was about to enter
into a life and death struggle with those who had obtained their power in contempt of every law. His first thought was—not
as to the choice of the regiments which might be most serviceable in an attack
on the Parisian Sansculottes,—but under what Civil Authority he ought to place
himself. For his wish was to defend the Constitution, and
the Constitution declared that the armed force was always, by its very nature,
bound to obey. He therefore awaited the orders of the People, at a moment when
the People had no other prospect before them than to fall under the power of
the quickest and strongest dictatorship. His intention was
to unite the Directories of the Departments,—as the highest Civil
Authorities—in a Congress, and to oppose this new
representation of the People to the rebellious minority of the National
Assembly. The Departments of the Northern frontier were ready
to second this movement, and the Municipalities showed a lively interest in it.
When Kersaint and his colleagues arrived in Sedan, and demanded the recognition
of the 10th of August, the Town Council caused them to be arrested. The Directory of the Department then issued, at Lafayette's
desire, a summons to all their Colleagues, and
thereupon—instead of acting and carrying the country with them—they again
waited to see what the country would say. Then they learned in quick succession, that each individual authority had submitted to the
orders of the ruling power at Paris, and that all the Generals, some through
fear, and others with enthusiasm, had acknowledged the 10th of August. None of
the Departments made any sign; the People was silent; and
54
RULE
OF THE MUNICIPALITY OF PARIS. [Book IV,
Lafayette said, "I have fought all my life for freedom; I cannot
use my resources in bringing about a civil war and a military
dictatorship." The captured Commissioners sent him word that
it only depended on himself to take the lead of the new government.' Servan,
the Minister, also made advances to him by letter, and promised him every
assistance. But Lafayette well knew that a reconciliation in this quarter was impossible; and in fact this show of friendliness was only a
snare, since the Ministry had already resolved, on the 14th, to deprive him of
his command;2 and on the 16th Servan sent off General Dumouriez's nomination as Commander of the army of the North, in the room of Lafayette.
The troops of the latter, which in the first moment would have followed him any
where,3 were already worked upon by Jacobin missionaries, and rendered
doubtful in their allegiance by the example of their
comrades in Flanders. The proceedings in Sedan we're well
known in Paris; fresh Commissioners were despatched thither,
and energetic measures prepared. Lafayette came to the conclusion that his
further presence with the army could only bring danger to the country. All that he could do to keep the army in a good state of defence in spite of
his absence, he did during the last hours before his departure. He gave his
orders for the case of an unexpected attack; asked Luckner to undertake the
chief command until further orders arrived; and on the evening of
the 14th August left his head-quarters, intending to make his way through
Belgium to the neutral ground of England. Three and twenty officers of
different grades and nearly a thousand soldiers joined him.4 In
the same hour the National Assembly impeached him for
high treason; on the following day he was arrested by the Austrians, and
1 VI. 148. — 2 Mortimer-Ternaux, Dumouriez's Memoires:
"two-thirds
III. 50. — 3 Kersaint's report on of the Army
of Flanders are Fayet-
the
28th. Even after Lafayette's de- tists."
Gonf. Beaulieu.
— 4 Letter
parture
some of the Corps stil re- of Dampierre to the Nat. Convention,
spected
and carried out his orders. April 23, 1793.
Ch. II.]
TRIUMPH
OF THE DEMAGOGUES.
55
on his refusing to give any information respecting the state of the
French army, he was condemned to a long and severe imprisonment.
This first danger was thus averted from the heads of the Parisian
democrats. France had submitted to them; they had now to
establish their rule, obtained by a bold coup
de main, and they were resolved to fulfil their task with unbounded zeal, and without scrupulousness as to means. The time for
half-measures was gone, and the great object now was to follow out the ultimate
consequences of the "rights of man." In the Hotel de Ville at
Paris,—where the real victors of the 10th sat in council,—they still spoke a
good deal of freedom, and almost ineessantly of equality; but among themselves,
they made it no secret that their real object
was, not to establish the rights of all, but the rule of the Proletaries, and
through them of the Demagogues. They desired vengeance for the past, enjoyment
for the present, and security for their future dominion. For the attainment of
these objects they had now abundance of means—the
powers and resources of the State—the organisation of the Clubs,—laws and
arms—popidar orators and banditti. Their whole system was comprised in one
sentence, which some pronounced with statesmanlike coldness, others with glowing passion, and at last with cynical insensibility—"the
annihilation of all opponents." By cutting down every one who differed
from [them they gained everything at once— revenge, booty, and secure dominion.
If the enemies of freedom were assassinated, freedom was no longer exposed to dangers from without.
Selfishness and fanaticism here played into each other's hands. The same men
who raved about universal equality and popidar sovereignty, thought it quite
allowable to bend this sovereign people beneath the yoke of their own
theories and desires. This was by no means the worship of mere numbers, but, on
the contrary, nothing else than self-adoration—the same fanatical dogmatism
with hich Charles Stuart declared every traitor to Heaven-de
56
RULE
OF THE MUNICIPALITY OF PARIS. [Book IV.
scended Royalty—and Cromwell's Puritans, every opponent of the
Heaven-inspired Saints—worthy of death. "Every one," they said,
"ought to be free, except the opponents of freedom."
Every form of despotism finds its justification in this formula.
That with such sentiments the victors of August 10th would not long
remain at peace with one another, was a matter of course. On the 11th
Robespierre entered the Assembly of the Hotel de Ville,
immediately acquired a predominant influence, and brought
with him to the Commune all the fulness of his hatred and suspicion. He must
have been astonished to be counted in this entourage
among the more moderate members, at any rate in form. The real hero and prophet of the Municipality was Marat, who from this moment
really begins his political career. The prohibition
of all royalist and constitutional journals was one of the first measures of
the new Government of freedom. Marat who without being chosen
by any Section took a seat in the Municipality proprio
motu, as "the friend of the People," appropriated four of the
presses of the State printing establishment, and from that
time became the official organ of the Revolutionary Commune. It is true that he did nothing but what he had already clone for the last three
years; he demanded that the freedom and prosperity of the Proletaries should be
secured by the simple expedient of murdering the Reactionists, and confiscating
their property. Nor did he gain any influence in fresh
quarters. The other party chiefs, even of the Democrats, still considered him
as half mad. But he occupied a higher position after the 10th August, because
his adherents became the leading power in France, which no longer exerted an indirect in-influence, as heretofore, by the noise of the
galleries, and the intimidation of the National Assembly, but took a direct part in the transaction of business, and set itself to reduce the
civilization and habits of the nation to the level of
the lowest Proletariate.
The National Assembly was considered in these circles
Cn.II.]
BRE A CH BETWEEN THE GIRONDE & THE HOTEL DE VILLE. 57
lukewarm and untrustworthy. A short time before the 10th August, Marat
had proposed to take the Royal Family prisoners, but to
decimate the Representatives of the People, as far worse traitors. Robespierrre
attacked no one more violently than Lafayette, and hated none more furiously
than the Girondists; under which two categories the whole Assembly was included. This body was allowed to exist for the present,
because it was essential for the control of the Departments, but it was to be
kept in strict obedience. To effect this the demagogues proceeded on the very
concise theory, that the People in a state of insurrection exercises
its sovereign rights directly;
since the 10th of August, therefore, the National Assembly had
lost its title.
The Girondists were perfectly aware of the existence of these views. As
early as the 11th some of the leaders of the party proposed, in the
Committee of Twelve, to pass a decree expressly confining the Municipality once
more to civic business. But some of their colleagues were opposed to the
motion, and others were afraid of the People, so that it never came before the Assembly at all. Nevertheless war was declared between the two
rival powers.
Meanwhile decree after decree was passed at the Hotel de Ville, with
the view of securing and extending its authority in all directions. The
first measure was the personal prosecution of the defeated
parties. The most important of these were the King and his family. The Commune
hastened to protest against his living in the Palace of Luxembourg, on the
ground that they could not watch him there. They would not even allow the National Assembly to assign to him the Hotel of the Minister of
Justice, although he woidd there have been under the surveillance of Danton.
They wished for the exclusive possession of this pledge, and above all they did
not choose that the captives should be in even half decent custody,
but in the close confinement of a common prison. The National Assembly
yielded, delivered up the King to the Commune, and on the 13th had him con
58
RULE
OF THE MUNICIPALITY OF PARIS. [Book IV.
ducted to the tower of the old Temple. Next came incessant arrests of
persons of all ranks and categories; and that no one might escape the barrieres
remained closed, and all passports were suspended. Formerly, the first
charge against snspected persons was brought by the juge
depaix; but now supervision, information and arrest, were all committed to the
hands of the Sectional Assemblies, with the composition of which we have become
sufficiently acquainted. To exercise the highest authority in such matters, the Municipality chose from their own number a Comite
de Surveillance, consisting of 15 members, and gave likewise to several Commissioners
unlimited power to imprison every suspected person. Lastly, they resolved that
a list of all the opponents of the Revolution
should be drawn up and laid before the Tribnnals.
The National Assembly allowed these things to go on. The Gironde felt
no pity for the King, and had themselves, through Gensonne, proposed to
transfer the political police to the Town Councillors.
But it was soon annonnced to the Assembly that the Municipality—which
had already superseded the Juges
de paix—had suspended the Committees of all the Sections, and the President
and Council of the Department, on account of their hostility to freedom; i.e. they had abolished, by an act of self-assnmed sovereignty, the
perfectly independent local Authorities on the one
side, and on the other, the superior Authorities to which they themselves owed
obedience. The National Assembly replied by a decree,
which, while it maintained the deposition of the previous members, ordered the
renewal of the Departmental Council by an immediate
election.
The wrath of the Hotel de Ville was great; for in the path on which
they had now entered, they wanted no superiors
over their own heads. The existence of a higher authority would have rendered a
certain amount of legality necessary, even if it were entirely filled with
partisans, which, in the present temper of the burghers, was by no means
certain to be the case. Until the capital had been
Ch. II.]
THE
VICTORY OE THE COMMUNE.
59
thoroughly intimidated no elections must be allowed; and the Jacobins
at once resolved, that the Commune should protest against the decree, and
support their petition with noisy arguments. Accordingly
Robespierre at the head of a deputation appeared at the bar of the Assembly, to
declare that the renewal of the Departmental government would be the germ
of discord; that the Municipality was elected by the People, and must exercise the omnipotence of the sovereign; or the People, to
preserve its sovereignty, would once more rouse itself to vengeance. The
Ginondists gnashed their teeth, but the galleries threatened, Danton's friends
declared in favour of the petition, and a decree was passed confining the
new Department to the business of assessing the taxes.
After this display of weakness, the Commune was secure of the
continuance of its power. There was now nothing left to check its progress—nothing which it would allow to be beyond the sphere of its functions.
The National Assembly had declared itself incompetent to
abolish the Monarchy, and reserved such a constitutional change for the Convention; but the Commune entertained no such feeble
scruples. It already dated its registers, "In the first year of the Republic;" and in order to shew the vanity of the idle hopes of the
royalists, they ordered the destruction of all royal pictures, insignia and
monuments in Paris. They interfered in the proceedings of the legal
tribunals, and even sent orders to another Department to
liberate the murderers of the Mayor of Etampes. They exercised a control in
foreign affairs, by endeavouring to hinder the Ambassadors of Parma and Venice
from leaving Paris, and even summoned them to be examined
before their bar. On the 12th they declared to the National Assembly that the
French People would never begin a war of conquest, but that they would certainly lend their aid to every nation which wished to get rid of its oppressors. The military preparations, therefore, were pushed on
with infinite zeal; bureaus were opened in
GO
RULE
OF THE MUNICIPALITY OF PARIS. [Book IV.
every street and square, where the volunteers entered their names;1 and
by command of the Municipality all the iron railings were removed from the
houses to make pikes, and all the bells from the Churches to make balls. This
sometimes caused a tumult among the friends of the Church, and the National
guard had to enforce obedience by arms. At the same time
the formation of a camp under the walls of the capital was commenced, and the
work of throwing up in-trenchments portioned out to the several Sections. In
short, business of all sorts was carried to the Hotel de Ville. As all other authorities were overthrown, every man betook himself to
the only one which still existed, and which zealously
drew all affairs into the sphere of its operations. Petitions,
advice, deputations, interpellations, and threats, rapidly
succeeded one another. Sometimes it was
volunteers who demanded arms; sometimes prisoners who wanted to be set at
liberty; sometimes Sansculottes
who desired to take vengeance on the tyrant's myrmidons of the 10th of
August; and sometimes Fcdcrcs who in the name of the People demanded the means of subsistence. The Municipality heard them all, and
decided on every case. Its sittings were held uninteruptedly, day and night;
the members ate in the hall at the expense of the city, and slept by turns in
the Committee rooms.
They had their bureau and their rostra, as in the National Assembly, and a
tumultous crowd of auditors, who often took part in the
proceedings, applauding or raising a disturbance according to circumstances.
Every body was armed; before the door of the Hotel stood shotted
1 It is eliaracteristic of tins
party, that in spite of all the exhortations of the National Assembly they
never allowed the battalion of Marseillois to go tu the army. They wanted these
men for the service of the Ja-eobin Club at home. Two mouths elapsed before they left Paris.
But they did not go to the Eastern frontier, which was threatened. On the
issue of a decree that they should defend the Sea-coast, they went home. After
this no mention occurs of the Marsellois. Ternaux, Terreur,
III. 126.
Ch.II.] the
sections intimidate the national assembly. 61
canon; and the whole appearance of the place was that of the
head-quarters of a revolutionary army of the People.
The chief attention of the Jacobins was directed to the prosecution of
opponents. On the 11th the National Assembly had appointed a Court Martial to try the defenders of the Tuileries; but the Commune declared
that the real offenders woidd not be got at in this way,
and demanded, on the 13th, that an extraordinary tribunal should be appointed
for all traitors. Every Section of Paris was to name a
member, and no appeal was to be allowed. Instead of this, the Assembly ordered
that the harrieres,
which had been closed on the 10th, should now be re-opened, and egress
from the city granted on showing a passport. Robespierre and Marat vied with
one another in opposing this expedient. Robespierre declared in the Hotel de
Ville that the opening of the harrieres
would lend security to every traitor; that the abyss was yawning on all
sides; that murderous plots surrounded the holy cause; that the conspiracy was nurtured in the very Assembly, and that the People must once
more save itself. The People in the galleries expressed their assent with loud cries of triumph, and spread their excitement and anger through the Sectional Assemblies. On the following day deputations thronged to the bar of the National
Assembly. The first extorted the withdrawal of the decree respecting the harrieres;
a second demanded the trial of the murderers of the People; and a third
declared that they would not leave the spot till the
decree was passed. This called forth a cry of indignation from the Assembly, and this deputation received no answer; but they heard a decree
which placed the families of the Emigres
as hostages under the surveillance of the
police, and ordered their horses to be seized for the army.
If, however, they hoped to appease the Municipality by this trifling
booty, they were greatly mistaken. Reports were brought to the Hotel de Ville
that the People in their righteous impatience were about to storm the prisons. The
62
RULE
OF THE MUNICIPALITY OF PARIS. [Book IV.
Hotel de Ville applauded, exhorted the people, however, to keep the
peace, and distributed money among them. On the 15th, Robespierre, referring to the temper manifested by the People, repeated his demand, and
succeeded so far, that a popular tribunal was empowered to try the guilty
without appeal. The influeuce of the Gironde, however, once more introduced a
few mitigating clauses into the decree. Upon this the Democrats lost all
patience; they warned their followers, indeed, against a partial, and therefore unwise, insurrection, but the Faubourg St. Antoine sent word to
the Hotel de Ville that they would sound the tocsin, unless the decree were immediately passed. Accordingly Robespierre's adherents gave
the Assembly grace till midnight, till which time they would defer the firing
of the alarm guns and the general call to arms. The decree was then passed
without further resistance, on the ground of
necessity. On the following day, the Sections brought the elections to an end,
and the first Revolutionary Tribunal commenced its operations. The Commune
added the resolution that only good patriots should be
admitted as counsel for the defendants, and that
even these might only confer with their clients in public.
Armed with such a weapon, the victorious party had in their hands the
life of every man who appeared dangerous to the fulfilment of their wishes.
Every member of the faction could procure the arrest of any one to whom he owed a grudge, by bringing forward his
name in his Section; and when once arrested, the accused bad no other guarantee
for his life than the good pleasure of the Hotel de Ville. After thus making
themselves masters of the lives of individuals, the next care of
the Jacobins was to render an outbreak of universal despair impossible, and for
this purpose to create a sufficient armed force. The old propositions for the
reformation of the Parisian National Guard afforded the means of doing this; and they were carried into effect on the 19th of
August. The existing 60 battalions were
dissolved,
Ch.II.]
DEMOCRATIC REORG ANISATION OPNATIONAL GUARD. G3
and organized in Companies, one for each of the 48 Sections. The Artdlery, which had hitherto been
distributed among the battalions, was now formed in separate companies, to each of which was added a workmen's company formed of
pikemen. And lastly, after the 10th August, it was a matter of course that not
only the possessors of property,
bnt all the citizens, were allowed and commanded to enrol themselves. By these
means the nominal strength of the Parisian army was raised from 30,000 to
100,000 men; but in reality the richer class,—which had always contained many lukewarm elements, and was now tormented and intimidated
in every possible way,—avoided military service as much as they did the
Sectional assemblies. And thus the previous traditions and ties of the corps
were lost and broken; the democratic influences were completely predominant, ;ind for extreme cases, the radical
elements—the artillery and the workmen—were united in bodies distinct from the
rest of the forces.
The importance of this innovation to the Burgher class must have been
revealed to the blindest by a supplementary proviso of the
Commune. The signers of the two petitions of the 8,000 and the 20,000 were
declared incapable of holding any civil office, or of bearing
arms;—nay, they were even to be imprisoned until their weapons had been
delivered up. It was an easy thing by this
expedient to disarm and imprison all those who had hitherto composed the
National Guard.
In the midst of this enthusiastic zeal for persecution, the long-vexed
question, concerning the fate of the non-juring Priests, was quickly decided. On the 23d Cambon1
disgraced Limself by the cruel motion, that they should be transported to
Cayenne, The degree of fanaticism by which the National Assembly was possessed
was indicated by the proposition of
1 Buchez joins the name of Vergniaud
to his, but the Monitenr only mentions Cambon.
64
RULE
OF THE MUNICIPALITY OF PARIS. [Book IV.
Brissot, who defended the Priests against Cambon's motion by saying,
that they ought not thus to ruin the colonies, since a
priest was more incorrigible than a vagabond. The decree at last assumed the
following form; that all non-juring Priests should leave France
within fourteen days, with a small viaticum.
In most of the Departments, every thing was
prepared for its immediate execution; the Priests were dragged into the towns,
and the mob were impatient to get rid of them.
And thus even the persons of the defeated party fell under the
democratic power of the Hotel de Ville. The Democrats were not quite so expert in the management of Terrorism as they became a year
afterwards. The component parts of the great engine of destruction were
subsequently rendered still more perfect, but all the essential factors had
already been discovered. The Police in the hands of democratic clubs (the
Sectional Assemblies were nothing else) the administration
of justice in the hands of a democratic Committee
bound by no law—the military power in the hands of the emancipated
Proletaries;—these were the germs of the whole system of government carried
out by the National Convention, in which all other Authorities were empty
forms, and the Revolutionary committees, the Revolutionary tribunal, and the Revolutionary army, the only effective elements. At both periods every mitigating regidation, every
protecting form, every obstructing law was removed; and everyT path
opened to the arbitrary despotism of the victorious
party. If this faction—which had no other title to power than material force
—had been the most numerous in the country, the unbridled
license of its principles woidd have made itself felt in its own internal
organization. But the more decidedly it was in the minority, and knew itself to
be so, the more deeply did it feel the necessity of keeping up a strict discipline among its members, of bringing the reins of power into
fewer and fewer hands, and giving its organs a more and more sharply defined
character. For of
Ch. II.]
SENTIMENTS OF ROBESPIERRE, MARAT AND DANTON. 65
all its leaders Robespierre and Billand-Varennes
had indisputably the greatest ability for this
task; and this their formal and tactical capacity gives the key to the extraordinary career of these two men, who possessed neither eloquence nor
courage, neither political nor diplomatic knowledge—and, therefore, none of those qualities which would seem to be
the most indispensable, in the condition of France at that period. At the time
of which we are speaking, in August 1792, everything was rudely sketched; the
military preparations were of a provisional and
makeshift character, such as woidd naturally be adopted immediately after a
bold coup
de main] but the most appropriate means were taken of placing France in a state
of siege, in which the Proletaries were to act the part
of the standing army.
Ths rule of the poorest class was the first and last object of the
whole system. "The poor man alone," said Robespierre, "is virtuous, wise, and fitted to govern." "The
rich," said Marat, "have so long sucked out the marrow of the People, that they are now visited with a crushing retribution." "We made the Revolution," cried Danton, "and
we intend to be paid for it." They therefore attacked with equal zeal the
property as well as the persons of the conquered party, to which last, as was emphatically declared, all possessors of property belonged.1
The Commune brought forward a most comprehensive proposal of this nature on the 11th of August;—that the National Assembly should forbid all trade in specie, i. e.
give forced currency to the assignats.
At this time silver was to paper as 100 to 160; and the poor, who for a
long time had had nothing but paper money, thought that they should now reach
firm ground; and even the Government, they imagined, must approve of a measure which gave them the power of continually making new issues
of paper money. The National Assembly referred the motion for the present
n.
1 Prudhomme, Sep. 1.
E
6g
RULE
OF THE MUNICIPALITY OF PARIS. [Book IV.
to a Committee, but hastened all the more eagerly to stdl the hunger of
the patriotic democrats from other sources. In the first rank of the
contributors, in this case also, was the King, and in the first rank of the
receivers the Parisian Commune. The Palace of the Tuileries was stripped of all its valuables on the 11th,
and the gold and silver plate was taken to the Hotel de Ville. When, on the
16th, reference was made in the Assembly to the
moveable property contained in the other royal residences, it was discovered that the greater part had been likewise removed by the
Commissioners of the Hotel de Ville;1 upon
which a decree was made that the residue should be sold and the proceeds paid
into the treasury. The Commune, however, seized on the treasures of the Churches, appropriated the plate, and coined money from it for
their own coffers. Pending this operation, they drew upon the State according
to their old custom, by carrying a decree through the National Assembly, which
granted 850,000 francs a month to the City police, the payment of which was to date from the 1st of January—in all nearly seven
millions. But these sums appear quite insignificant
when compared with the enormous confiscations decreed
by the Assembly towards the end of the month. The
first of these was directed against the Emigres. Their property had been under sequestration since April; it was now ordered to
be sold, and for the sake of enabling the sansculottes to become pmrchasers, it was offered for sale in lots of two or three acres, for which payment was to be made in the shape of an annual
rent. The creditors of the Emigres were to be satisfied to the
extent of the proceeds of the sale, and the purchaser was empowered to eject
the tenants, even if their contract had been made
with the former owner; in short nothing was wanting to characterize the
transaction as a barefaced robbery.2 The
same spirit animated two other decrees of the 25th and 28th, according to which
all
1 Mnnitaur. Roland, II. 339. — 2 Definitive decree of Sept. 2.
Cn.
II.] SOME OF THE SECTIONS OFFER
RESISTANCE.
G7
ground rents were to be treated as feudal rights—i. c.
abolished without compensation, unless they could be proved, by the production of original documents, to
be the interest of a loan. It is impossible to give even an approximate
estimate of the pecuniary amount of these violations of the law; but we shall
certainly not exaggerate in valuing the landed property disposed of by
the three decrees above-mentioned at 6,000 million francs. We
see that the National Assembly were no niggards in dealing with other people's
property; but the democrats were not a little incensed that their motion against trading in money was not immediately adopted. The men of the 14th of
July and the 10th of August, therefore, indulged, on the 16th of August, in language which breathed throughout the spirit of Robespierre. "Do the
rich then not see," said their spokesman, "that they can only secure
their own treasures by clothing the poor? But they are more obtuse than the
greatest criminals—they hope for protection from the Austrians. Your men of
genius seek the balance of political forces in hair-splitting speculations; but we have found it in our hearts.
To what purpose is the controversy about republic or
monarchy'? Create a government which will raise the poor man above his petty
wants, and deprive the rich man of his superfluity, and yon will thereby
restore a perfect equilibrium." The programme of
the contest which was henceforth to rage through the whole nation was thus
proclaimed at the bar of the National Assembly.
The population of Paris was already greatly intimidated; yet such
threats at these could not fail to arouse a certain degree of
resistance. On the 25th, one of the Sections, secretly
instigated by the suggestions of Roland and other Girondists, passed a
resolution to withdraw their Commissioners from the Hotel de Ville,
and to denounce the further action of the Municipality as an
usurpation. In a few days other Sections followed this example; yet the
influence of the Hotel de Ville continued to increase. Robespierre loudly
E 2
68
RULE
OF THE MUNICIPALITY OF PARIS. [Book IV.
demanded the heads of these traitors; the Commune arrested a great
number of persons, and the patriots remained undisturbed
in the Sectional assemblies. Yet this first impulse was sensibly felt, and the
more so when the nomination of electors for the
Convention began in Paris on the 26th. The fate of mob rale was called in
question, in the event of the great mass of the population taking part in the
elections. The present effete Assembly could be easily managed, but how would
it be with the National Convention, which the democratic
revolutionists had themselves demanded, and prospectively
invested with unlimited powers? Should the Conventional
elections return a majority hostile to the Hotel de Ville, the latter was
resolved on a contest of life and death, the issue of which,
however, it was impossible to foresee. The revolutionary faction therefore
prepared to control the elections by every means in their power, and at any
sacrifice. Their policy was comprehended in the single word-—terrorism, which was to be exercised on an increased
scale in Paris, and extended forthwith into all the Departments of France. And
thus from out the everlasting cry of treachery,
the scheme was gradually evolved of arresting as large a number of political
opponents as possible throughout the whole of
France, and of destroying them in prison by a general
massacre. By this means the revolutionists hoped to secure a majority in the
elections, and the predominance of their party for the future; and no longer to
have to complain that the new tribunal only
furnished the spectacle of one execution in two clays, or that the property of
the condemned fell to the Treasury instead of the patriots.
The exact point of time at which the chiefs of the Hotel de Ville came
to this resolution is determined by the following dates. On the 19th of August, Marat, in his journal "La
Republique," exhorted the people to massacre the traitors who were incarcerated in the Abbey; it was a folly, he said, to go
through the previous formality of a trial. On the 23d, the
Municipality called on the National Assembly
Cn.
II.] PREPARATIONS FOR THE MASSACRES OF SEPTEMBER. 69
to remove the persons accused before the State tribunal at Orleans to
Paris. As the Assembly did not agree to this, but only sent orders on
the 25th to curtail their trial, 1,200 or 1,500 men—ostensibly of the National
guard, but made up in part of ruffians from Marseilles, Bordeaux and Brest— set
out under Fournier and Lazouski for Orleans, to make short work with the prisoners. The National Assembly, indeed, issued a decree, on
the 26th, that the Ministers should send a sufficient force..to protect the
prisons; but the Ministers gave this commission to Fournier himself, and sent
two Commissioners, Bourdon and Dubail,1 with
him. On the same day Danton caused a list of all the prisoners in Paris to be
laid before himself as Minister of Justice, in order, as he afterwards said, to distinguish and rescue the innocent. The list of the
"guilty," therefore, was even at that time settled. On the-
28th, Laussel, the above-mentioned leader of the Lyons Jacobins, who was then
in Paris, wrote to his friends, at home: "Our volunteers have already been
two or three days on the road to Orleans, to despatch the prisoners in that city; tell me how many heads have fallen in Lyons; it would be an
infamous thing if any of our enemies escaped; take the proper measures,
therefore, for everything is favourable to a general masacre of the
disaffected."2
By the 26th of August, therefore, at latest, the resolution was
taken to direct a murderous blow against the opponents of Democracy through the
whole of France. It cannot admit of a doubt that the main object
was to control the elections for the Convention, 3
though the instigators of the plot
1 Vid. the
official documents in 2rd of Sept.—the first day of the
Lottin,
Orleans, II. 1. p. 354. They
elections—by mere accident. We shall
are
not in the Moniteur. — 2 Extract soon see that the
statement that he
from
the letter in Guillon, "Lyon," bad no share in the matter is false.
I.
123. — 3 This needs no proof. Morris, who
was invariably well-in-
Who
can persuade us that the cal- structed, writes, on the 23rd of Oct.:
culating
Robespierre postponed the "The sanguinary events which
have
commencement
of the massacre to the a ken place, and which were partial
70
RULE
OF THE MUNICIPALITY OF PARIS. [Book IV.
naturally avoided all mention of their real purpose. As was usual iu all the crimes of the Revolution, they brought forward, as a pretext, the dangers of foreign war—well knowing that they struck a chord which would vibrate in every Frenchman's
heart. We shall soon see how greatly this device contributed to make the execution of the bloody scheme possible; that it was only a pretext on
the part of the conspirators is incontestably proved by a comparison of dates.
It was not until the 2Gth of August, when Danton took the first step towards
the execution of the scheme, that the news of the fall of the
little border fortress of Longwy arrived in Paris.1 This
was the first disastrous intelligence which had been received in the capital,
and of any other dangers which may have threatened on the frontiers, during the
same jieriod, the instigators of the September murders knew nothing. The fall
of Longwy was of no great importance, as long as the French
armies had suffered no losses; and iu this respect nothing but what was
favourable had been reported in Paris. It was known that
Lafayette had fled, and that his army was animated by the best possible
spirit; but nothing had as yet transpired respecting the evils which had
resulted to the camp from his desertion. The Commissioners apprehended an
attack upon Sedan, and recommended the formation of a camp of
reserve; but they spoke in high terms of the courage and patriotism of the
army. Dumouriez, who had been appointed
in Lafayette's
executions
of great plans," &c. Cambon exclaimed in the Nat. Assembly
on Sept. 4th: "Les ayitateurs dont le but secret est de
se /aire nommer a la Convention Nutinnule." — 1 The Commandant, Lavcrgne, was compelled to capitulate by the terrified citizens. After he had demanded a
court-martial for more than a year, he was at last brought before the
Revolutionary
Tribunal and summarily sentenced to death. On the
announcement of the sentence, his wife, who was among the audience, cried out
in despair, Vice le Roi! She
was immediately seized, and declared that she knew no other means of dying with
her husband. The tribunal fulfilled her desire. Ternaux, III.
130.
Ch. II.]
CAPTURE
OF LONGWY.
71
stead, showed not the slightest uneasiness in regard to the Prussians,
but only spoke of the certainty with which Belgium
might be conquered. It is true that the position of affairs soon became more
alarming, but we may confidently repeat that the danger of the country from
foreign war had nothing at all to do with the project of the September
massacres.
No sooner, however, had the murderous resolution
been taken, than one cause of alarm after another arose on the frontiers. In
the first place, the army of Lafayette, most of whose officers followed the
example of their chief, fell more and more into confusion and disorder. Nothing wasj heard from the new Commander, and no intelligence was
received from Luckner. The Meuse, which in that country has many fords, was a
weak bulwark against an enemy supposed to be in five-fold superior numbers;'and
under these circumstances even
the capture of Longwy occasioned great alarm, both in the army, and in the
minds of the Commissioners of the National Assembly. They were informed by the
Commandant of Stenai, situated on the nearest passage of the Meuse, that
he could not hold the place against an attack; and they
resolved to return with all speed to Paris, and there to push forward the
necessary measures in person. Kersaint represented to the Minister that his
first care must be to collect a considerable force before Paris; "We do
not wish to alarm you," he said, "but to save you from a false
security; the danger is imminent; above all things send hither a Commander in
Lafayette's place."
Servan saw plainly that matters were becoming serious, and he had on
the 26th, immediately after the fall of Longwy, sent precise orders to
Dumouriez to lead all the forces he could spare to Sedan. But even he was very
far removed from any feeling of hopelessness or despair. "If,"
he wrote to the General, "yon are not able to prevent the enemy from
marching on Paris, throw yourself on his rear; Luckner will attack him in the
flank." These words contain the
essence
72
RULE
OF THE MUNICIPALITY OF PARIS. [Book IV.
of the plan of the impending campaign; they express the instinct of a
soldier, who derives consolation and calmness from his own courage. But there
were persons who drew different conclusions from the fall of Longwy.
From a military point of view it must have
appeared above all things necessary to send forward the whole of the armed
forces at that time in Paris, to the seat of war. But the Demagogues rejoiced
at the taking of LongwyT, which gave employment to their armed
followers in Paris, and enabled them, by raising anew the cry of treachery, to
extinguish in the minds of the citizens the last spark of compassion for the
Aristocrats. Both these tendencies displayed themselves,
side by side, and in opposition to one another, in the most glaring
colours. Cambon proclaimed, in the National Assembly, that the Fcdcres
would now hasten to protect the frontiers, and that Paris
alone would furnish 30,000; and the raising of this latter force was actually
decreed on the 27th. The Fcdcres,
however, appieared at the bar of the Assembly, violently protesting
against this reference to themselves; their proper destination,
they said, was Paris, where they had to guard the captive King, and protect the
National Assembly against the conspirators. Marat posted
great, placards at every corner of the streets, denouncing the decree
concerning the 30,000 men as a piece of treachery; "Not a man," he
said, "must leave Paris, for it was there that the real and most dangerous
enemy was to be found.11 The
chiefs of the Hotel de Ville were heard coolly to remark that France was far
too thickly peopled for a republican form of Government, and that about a third
of its inhabitants must be got rid of before bread,
peace, and liberty could be procured for the remainder.
On the 28th August Kersaint brought up his report, in which he lauded
the excellence of the army, dwelt strongly on the clangers of the war, and once
more urged the immediate formation of a camp of
reserve at Soissons. Danton then rose. He spoke, he said, as a revolutionary Minis-
Cii. 11.]
ARREST
OF "SUSPECTED" PERSONS.
73
ter; the danger had been exaggerated, but a new convulsion was
necessary to their salvation; the closing of the harrieres could not be continued on account of the now commencing movement of troops, and, consequently, during that very night,
all suspected persons, should their number even amount to 30,000, must be put
under arrest. The Government therefore, he concluded,
demanded powers to institute
a search for arms, even in the night-time. After the National Assembly had
granted the necessary permission, without any opposition, Danton took measures
at the Hotel de Vdle for the execution of the plan. First of all, he caused a
list to be drawn up of all the needy men in Paris,
for the alleged purpose of equipping them for the service of their country—but
in fact to augment the force of the Marseillois and their October hero,
Maillard, for the projected butchery. Then followed an
ordonnance which, according
to its introductory words, was intended to regulate the banishment of the
non-juring priests, as had been decreed by the Assembly; but in
reality ordered their arrest, for which the decree gave not the slightest
authority. These measures were then immediately put into
execution. All the communications throughout the vast city were barred at the
same moment, and armed bodies of from 40 to 60 men marched from the meeting
place of every Section into every street, occupied the outlets, and searched every house, first for arms, and then for suspected persons.
About 60,000 men, almost exclusively composed of pikemen and workmen, were set
in motion during this night. The result of their operations was 3,000 new
arrests, and the deepest consternation among all those who did not
belong to the now ruling class. A number of householders fled from the city, to
the joy of the Municipality, who immediately confiscated their houses with all
that they contained. A part of the arrested were released on the 30th August, but the gaolers were ordered to allow the others free
choice of food and drink—as was the custom in the case of all persons con
74 RULE
OF THE MUNICIPALITY OF PARIS. [Book IV,
clemned to death. Yet before the final catastrophe, one more effort at
resistance was made—it was the last!
Roland and the Gironde felt their position becoming more and more
intolerable. The reins of government had escaped from their hands; they
exercised no influence on the real business of the
State, or any of the measures by which the future of the country was to be
determined. They looked on at the machinations of the Commune, and the restless
activity of Danton; but though they might have some suspicion of what was in preparation, the solution of the enigma was entirely
hidden fr.om them. They had the consciousness of being tried patriots—they were
quite willing that the Aristocrats should receive a severe lesson, if their own
safety could have been guaranteed to them under the absolute
rule of the Municipality. Instead of this, their friend Petition was entirely
excluded from the business of the mayoralty, and Marat, moreover, daily loaded
him with the bitterest reproaches for his criminal indolence in such dangerous times. Roland was attacked with ever-increasing fury,
and at last the Municipality ordered Brissot's collaborateur
in the "French Patriot" to be brought before them to answer
for a calumnious article. Their patience was then exhausted, and on the 30th August the storm broke loose in the National Assembly. Roland brought a complaint against the Municipality on
the ground of the defective provisioning of Paris; Cambon charged them with
unauthorised interference with the administration of the public purse; Lariviere reported that a town-councillor, and
member of the extraordinary tribunal, had been
arrested for theft; and Roland again mentioned the attempt of another Communal
officer to steal valuables from the crown treasury, the Intendant and the General Inspector of which had, in a very suspicious manner,
been arrested by order of the Hotel de Ville. And when, in the last place,
Servan announced that all the officials of the War Ministry had
been kept in arrest during the whole morning by order
of the Commune, and the du-
Cn.
II.] FEEBLE RESISTANCE OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY. - 75
ties of the War Office thereby completely interrupted, a motion of Guadet was carried, amidst violent excitement, dissolving the Municipality of the 10th of August and summoning the Sections to a new election.1
Danton's friend, Thuriot, warned them, that a decree of this kind might
lead to disastrous consequences, but they were not to be deterred; and they
further proceeded to cancel the prosecution of Brissot's journal, and
censured the imprisonment of the priests. In this case, however, where the
Assembly had nothing but speeches to oppose to pikes, the denouement
was not far off.
In the evening the Ministers, and the chiefs of parties in the Assembly, had a meeting to consult on the war. Servan had little
comfort to give, and no further reinforcements in readiness. Guadet and
Vergniaud wished to send all the men in Paris into the camp before the city for
a final struggle of life and death; but there was no difficulty in demonstrating the futility, from a military point of view, of such a
proceeding. Roland and others then proposed a retreat to the South; but it was
evident that in deserting the customary seat of government, they would be resigning all its powers. Whereupon Danton rose, censured such pernicious
pusillanimity, declared that all retreat would be destruction, that the real
peril lay in the cooperation of internal and external enemies, and
concluded with these words; "The Royalists are
many, the Republicans are few; there is but one expedient, the Royalists must
be terrorised!" A significant gesture accompanied these words. The Assembly was silent; who would be counted as a Royalist?
The terror was already awakened. When, on the following morning, a deputation from the Hotel de Ville appeared at the bar
of the Assembly to protest against the decree of
1 These dates completely refute what
Louis Blanc says about the unreasonable and arbitrary caprice with which the
Nat. Assembly proceeded against the Commune. Blanc, on his
side, only mentions the robbery of plate, and passes over all
the rest in silence.
76 RULE
OF THE MUNICIPALITY OF PARIS. [Book IV.
the previous day, in the name of the sovereign people, which had invested the Municipality with unlimited powers and
sanctioned all its acts; when Tallien read an address drawn up by Robespierre,
which openly declared, that within three clay's the soil of liberty .would be
freed from the presence of the detested priests; when a noisy mob
surrounded the Hall of Assembly, prepared, as they said, to die, if necessary, with the Town-councillors;—no one ventured to utter a word of
censure, or protest. The Committee of Twelve were instructed to report once
more on the Municipality. The Girondists saw themselves deserted by the
cowardly crowd of their adherents; the Hotel de Ville remained masters of the field, and hurried onward, unopposed, to the execution of their schemes.
Ch. III.]
77
CHAPTER III. ELECTION OP THE NATIONAL CONVENTION.
the
metropolitan police committee.—MaRAT, massacres of the 2ND and
7th
September.—Threats
against the Girondists.—Booty of the municipality.— communistic decrees.—elections to the
convention in paris.—Failure of the democrats in the provinces.—Reaction among the burghers of paris.—proclamation of the republic.
For the
execution of their grand plot, the Revolutionists needed, in the first place, a
visible presiding central authority. Neither Robespierre nor Danton were willing publicly to lend their names, or to allow the
Municipality, or the Ministry of Justice, as such, to direct the general
massacre. The first body which presented itself as adapted for their purpose
was the Communal Comite de Surveillance, the
proper organ of the higher revolutionary police. This body, it is true,
existed at the time only in name, for the proceedings
of Sergent and Panis were too bad for the majority even of this Committee,
which had refused to take charge of any more
money or valuables without formal registration. Whereupon Panis promptly
procured a resolution from the Municipality which removed the 'conscientious
members, as not being au
niveau de la Jtevohdion, and empowered the others to fill up their number by a free election. The chiefs of the party thus created a convenient organ
of action, which willingly lent its name to the execution of any commands whatever. Round this centre were assembled Dan-ton, Robespierre,
Marat, Billaud, Manuel and Tallien, who deliberated
on all the particulars of the impending butchery, and decided on the ways and
means.1 Robespierre, impelled
78
ELECTION
OF THE NATIONAL CONVENTION. [Book IV.
by suspicion and party hatred, but not by lust of plunder, was for exterminating only the Noblesse and the Priests; but the others
would have been ill satisfied by such half measures, and they therefore adhered
to the more comprehensive plan. Danton, on the other hand,
opposed Robespierre and Marat, when on the 30th they called on the Comite
de Surveillance to arrest Brissot and Roland. Robespierre
denounced them as mischievous enemies of the Revolution;
but confessed that such a measure might bring danger to its originators. Marat
would listen to no considerations, so that Danton cried out that he
(Marat) would ruin them all. "If you were all fellows like me,"
answered Marat "ten thousand traitors would be cut to pieces." For
the present, however, the order of arrest was torn up, but the idea was by no
means abandoned by its two authors. There was no
little strife with regard to the ways and means of effecting the massacre.
Marat Avished simply to set fire to the prisons;
another proposed to drown the prisoners; but Billaud engaged to collect a
sufficient number of assassins, and succeeded in negativing the other propositions.1
The execution of the plot was fixed for the 2nd of September, as being a Sunday, on which day it was easier to
1 Pradhomme, Grimes,
&e. There lire neither external
nor internal grounds for doubting these statements. If any
body was likely to be well-informed it was Prudhomme. Louis Blanc, indeed,
ignores these facts, although he adopts other parts of the report into his
narrative as perfectly trustworthy, in order to prove bis
proposition that Robespierre no doubt, acted very
wrongly, but only in having listlessly allowed a bnteh-ery whieh he deplored.
According to his view the September massaeres were not the result of any
prepared plan, but of an universal outbreak of despair caused by the dangers of war. -He abandons, on this occasion, his usual position,
that in the Revolution the People always aimed at and
accomplished what was great and noble, while only individual intriguers were guilty of crimes. He also forgets a whole series of well-authenticated facts, which he himself
subsequently brings forward, and whieh Ternaux (Terreur, III. 515) completes,
and establishes their correctness beyond all dispute.
Cu. III.]
BASE
TRUCKLING OF THE GIRONDE.
79
assemble a restless crowd. From the large rmmber of
accomplices the secret was ill kept, and the didl pressure of anxious
foreboding weighed upon the whole of Paris. All those who did not belong to the
class of Jacobin Proletaries, remained in the silent concealment of their houses. The Section had been occirpied since the 27th in the
nomination of electors; the electoral meetings had never been so thinly
attended,1 and it was certain that only Jacobins woidd be returned as Electors.
The prisoners had expected an attack for many weeks past. The chiefs made
use of the last day iu liberating a few favoured individuals, partly rich men,
like the Prince of Poix and Beaumarchais who bought their liberty, the former
from Panis, and the latter from Manuel; and partly old acquaintances, who, like Daubigny, or Danton's cousin, Godot, had been arrested
for embezzlement and theft. The Commune, iu order
to cloak the systematic preparations of their nefarious plot, caused the harrieres
to be reopened; and Robespierre even brought forward a motion that the Municipality, in consideration of the prevailing
distrust expressed against them, should abdicate, and appeal to the people.
The proposal was, of course, negatived without a discussion. The National Assembly received the first intelligence that the Prussians were
before Verdun, and occupied the sitting with insignificant military
arrangements. The Gironde, it would seem, still hoped to come to a tolerable
understanding with the Democrats, since they had again, on
the previous day, given up their attack upon the Hotel
de Ville;—or did they make advances from fear? At all events they once more
showed their anti-royal side. Roland published a circular, in which he made
known to all the Communes of France, the alleged treasonable correspondence of Louis XVI., complained of the constitutional inviolabdity of
the King, and recommended to the whole nation the formation of clubs and
popular unions —a step which only excited the laughter of the Democrats. Their
time was now fully come. The danger whieh threat
80
ELECTION
OF THE NATIONAL CONVENTION. [Book IV.
ened Verdun was an effectual means of heightening the anxious fears of
the citizens, and their anger against the traitors to their country—and of deadening their feelings of compassion towards the victims. On
Sunday morning, Manuel, from the Hotel de Ville, summoned the People to arms.
Verdun he said, was attacked, and could not be held; the whole of Paris must
march out for its protection. It was resolved to call out all the
citizens for the struggle, and to encamp them, in the interim, on the Champ de
Mars. All suspected persons, and cowards were to be disarmed, and all the harrieres
closed; twenty-four Commissioners were to proceed to the armies and into the Departments, to extend the impulse given in the
capital; tbe other members were to close their sitting in order to describe the
dangers of the country in their respective Sections. Robespierre had already
proposed this step on the 1st of Sept., which was now adopted; and
these were the men who gave the signal in the Sections for the attack on the
prisons, while the tocsin was clanging and the alarm guns booming through the
streets. The citizens either remained timidly at home, or proceeded slowly to the rendez-vous
of their battalions. In the meeting-places of the Sections, no one was
found but the well-prepared and willing mass of
proletaries, who in several quarters passed a resolution not to quit Paris
until all traitors had been exterminated. Meanwhile Panis, Sergent
and their associates, constituted themselves, at the Hotel de Ville, as the new
Comite de Surveillance; and, in accordance with the decree issued by the Municipality two clays
before, associated Marat and five others with themselves
as colleagues. From this quarter the bands of murderers received their special
instructions, together with money and provisions; and the Committee further
gave orders for the liberation of all those arrested for debt, that the blow
might fall with greater certainty on the political
prisoners. The National Assembly at first only heard of the
decree of the municipality summoning all Paris to arms, and rewarded it, after
a pa-
Ch. III.] DANTON
"ELECTRIFIES" THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY. 81
thetic address of Vergniaud, with loud applause. The decree of the 30th
of August, by which the Assembly had dissolved the Municipality, had just been
recalled at the instance of the Dantonists, and only augmentation of the
Municipal council by new elections was ordered. The
Ministers, with the exception of Roland, now made their appearance for the
purpose—to use the expression of Danton—of electrifying
the Assembly; i. c. of asking it to entrust them with an unlimited dictatorship. Lebrun
began with the fabricated intelligence that Russia
was preparing to make war on France, and sending out an army and a fleet.
Servan followed with a demand of four million
francs for extraordinary war expenses. The minds of the Assembly were prepared
for what was coming. Danton rose and said; "The
country is about to save itself; the Commune has given a grand example, it is
for you to support the sublime movement of the People. We demand sentence of
death against every one who refuses to march. We demand sentence of death against every one who directly or indirectly throws obstacles in
the way of the Government. Boldness! boldness! and again I say boldness!—and
the country is saved." All demands were granted, and the
recpiired orders given, and with such unheard-of powers
the Ministers left the Assembly. Meanwhile some of the Sections
(Poissoniere, Luxembourg), at the instigation of the
Hotel de Ville, passed a resolution that, in consideration of the danger of the
country, the prisons should be purged, and the arrested
Priests and other suspected persons put to death in the dungeons of Paris,
Orleans, and other places; and that, with a view to uniformity of proceeding,
the necessary regulations should be procured from the Municipal Council.1
While blood was flowing in streams in every prison, Danton,
with his associates, Desmoulins, Robert, Favre
d'Eglantine, and their wives, sat down to a splendid bancpiet.2
ir.
1
Ternaux, III. 218. —
2
Prudliomnie, Crimes, &c.
f
ELECTION
OF THE NATIONAL CONVENTION. [Book IV.
The massacre began about 3 o'clock with the murder of twenty priests,
who were being transported from the Hotel de Ville to the Abbey, and were cut
down by the mob. incited by the Fcdcres, who served as their escort. After this, one band of
about sixty men occupied the Abbey, another the gaol of the Carmelites, a third
the Conciergerie, a fourth the prison of the Chatelet, and a fifth that of La
Force. These men demanded a register of the prisoners, took them for the most part singly from their cells, brought them before a popular
tribunal, which the leaders of the bands had formed by order of the Comite
de Surveillance? and pronounced judgment on them after a short examination. All the
accused were compelled first of all to empty their pockets;
these who were condemned were thrust out into the court of the house, and
immediately slaughtered. Horrible shouts of joy accompanied
every stroke; the murderers sometimes agreed not to strike with the edge of the
sword, that they might prolong the pleasure of their bloody work. The Commune
provided wine, the women mutilated the corpses, and children were made to drink
the blood of the Aristocrats. Manuel, Billaud, and the members of the Comite
de Surveillance weut about praising and encouraging the assassins;2 the different gangs mutually sent from the prisons to enquire whether
all was going on well, and received the desired answer amidst thundering shouts
of "Vive le Penple!" Thus matters went on during the afternoon and the whole of the night.
The feeling which prevaded in the city is difficult to describe. Even
in the democratic quarters men shuddered at the horrible details which reached
their ears; "But after all," they said, "it is necessary; the
Aristocrats would have butchered our wives and children, if
we had not got the
1 Copied in Grauier de Cassagnac, Les
Girondins, &c,
II. 156.
— - Gra-nier de Cassagnac, II, 35 lias collected these details of
their proceedings from the minutes of the Municipality.
Ch. III.]
THE
SEPTEMBER MASSACRE.
83
start of them." In the wealthier Sections, consternation, abhorrence and grief agitated the mind in turn; many thousand families
were in a state of deadly anxiety about their kindred, and awaited with eagerness the requisition of the armed force, which, as they
imagined,' could not possibly be long deferred. They were not yet aware that
all the Authorities were at the head of the bloody enterprise; that the Mayor
Pethion, with prudent selfishness, took the greatest care not to draw
the fury of the murderers on himself; and that Sauterre, the Commander of the
National Guard, was entirely at the beck of his brother-in-law Panis, and
Robespierre. And for advancing by themselves, and trying their fortune against the murderous gangs, the National guard had been too
thoroughly cowed and subdued, ever since the 10th of August. When a courageous
advocate, named Lavaux, undertook to . rouse the men of his
Section, he could only collect a strong patrol; when they
arrived at the nearest prison they had dwindled down to nine!
In spite of the tidings which reached them iu quick succession, the National Assembly obstinately proceeded with the order of
the day. Late in the everning they did indeed send a deputation to the Abbey, who returned with the report that they had not been able
to make their way through the crowd, and owing to the darkness had not been
able to see what was going on. With many of the members it was fear that kept
them silent; but there was also, among the Left, a large number
of participators in the plot, and a crowd of servile zealous spirits, who,
after the speeches of the three Ministers, feared by censuring the massacres to
injure the welfare of their country; and lastly, the Girondists had, up to this time, no objection to make to the massacre. For the
present they heard only of murdered Priests, Swiss-guards, and the noble young Sicarii;
and these were as much the opponents of the Gironde as of the
Sansculottes. To inspire the incorrigible royalist with profound terror
seemed to them conducive to the public weal.
The journalists of
f2
84
ELECTION OF THE NATIONAL CONVENTION. [Book IV.
the party, therefore, Louvet, Brissot and Gorsas, prepared to speak on
the following day of "the sad, but wholesome and necessary jurisdiction of
the people." The National Assembly preserved an utter silence
with singular unanimity.
At the Hotel cle Ville, on the contrary, the storm raged
fiercely. The Municipality reassembled at 4 o'clock, and news was brought that
the People were storming the prisons. The excitement was tremendous; for even
in this assembly there was a number of uninitiated, who indignantly raised their voices against bloodshed. In deference to these, it
was resolved to send Commissioners to the prison, in the first place to
liberate tbe prisoners for debt, but also to recall the People to a sense of
law and duty. But here again the democratic leaders were careful to name
the proper persons; the very men who were sent to arrest the massacre Were
seated at midnight in La Force as chief judges of the People, and leaders in
the bloody work. Robespierre at the same time recurred to his hatred of the Girondists. BiUaud-Varennes depicted in a circumstantial oration
the position of the Kingdom, whieh was threatened by foreign enemies, and torn
by domestic traitors. Whereupon Robespierre declared that as no one dared to
name the leaders of the conspiracy, he came forward to impeach
the majority of the Ministers, Roland, Brissot, and the whole Girondist
faction, and the wicked Committee of Twenty-one; and said that he would bring
forward proofs on the following clay, that they had all of them sold themselves to the Duke of Brunswick. The Municipality without hesitation
decreed that the Ministers had forfeited the confidence of the People.1 The
object was, no doubt, to unite the whole power of the Government in the hands
of Danton and the leaders of the Communal Council. This decree was also adopted in some
1 This does not appear in the
protocol of the Commune, hut is mentioned on the 3rd in the sitting of
the Nat. Assembly. Ternaux (III. 205) refers Robespierre's speech to the 1st of
Sept.
Cn.
III.] ROBESPIERRE DENOUNCES THE
GIRONDE.
of the Sections;1 some hundred armed men endeavoured to force their way into Roland's
house, and the Comite de Surveillance issued a warrant for the arrest of the Minister Brissot, and eight of the Girondists.2 This
was equivalent to a sentence of death against them all; but Danton once more
interfered, because he apprehended evil consequences to his own party. It was
finally agreed to rest satisfied with searching Brissot's house, and only to proceed further in case his papers should afford sufficient
grounds for so doing. Nothing whatever was found; yet Robespierre continually returned to, his charges against the Twenty-one and Brissot,
and the secret understanding of the Gironde with the
Prussians.3 He especially depicted in the most glaring colours4 the
sinister influence of Roland on the approaching elections for the Convention.
These occurrences lit up, as by a flash of lightning, the abyss which
yawned at the feet of the Girondists. Henceforward
an amalgamation of their own party with the Democrats
was impossible. Immediate clanger to their own lives was needed to force this
conviction upon them, and even now it made its way but slowly into the minds of
some among them. Roland took the lead. His journalist, Louvet,
was directed to publish on the 3rd of Sept. a new edition of the journal of the
2nd. of Sept., in which the warm approval of the murders was exchanged
for equally emphatic censure.5 In a letter to the National Assembly he denounced
1 Peltier (233), probably following
Louvet, refers it to Sept. 1st. —
2 According to Louvet on Sept 1st;
according to Pethion, Sept. 4tb; but the 2nd is established as the right date
hy Roland's letter to the Nat. Assembly of the 3rd, his placard of tbe 13th (Buehez, 18, 29), and the Memoires of
his wife (II. 20). —
3 Reports on this bead in the Nat.
Assembly,
Sept. 4, XVII. 443. — 4 Gadol to Mad. Roland, Oct. 10th.
That Robespierre, in the face of all these facts, simply denies in his letters (J ?nes commettans, No.
4, p. 60) all participation in the proceedings of the Municipality during the
days of Sept., only shows us how little we can trust to the truth of his assertions. — 5 Beaulieu.
86
ELECTION
OF THE NATIONAL CONVENTION. [Book IV.
tbe attacks made upon the Ministers, referred in covert language to the prison murders, and "induced that body to issue a
proclamation exhorting the People to respect the laws. No farther action
however was taken, and on the 3rd, at Roland's own
table, his wife discussed the events of the clay with calm indifference. The
feeling of anger began to spread very slowly through the National Assembly,
when the execution did not end with the death of the
priests and the Swiss, but the bloody work was
vigorously carried on on the morning of the 3rd, and the slaughter was extended
to all the other prisons of the capital,—in some eases nnder the express
authority of the Police. "If you wish," cried the impetuous Cambon in the National Assembly, on the 4th, "that the Municipality of
Paris should rule the whole Empire, as ancient Rome onee did, then lay your
heads on the block; if not, then fulfil your oaths; enforce the national will,
and chastise the intriguers, whose secret aim is to control the
Conventional elections." The indignation of the great mass of the Bourgeoisie
was likewise hourly increasing. The Presidents of all the Sections held
a meeting on the evening of the 2nd, at which Pethion attended, and military measures were discussed. On this occasion violent invectives and accusations were exchanged between the Girondists and the Democrats.1 It
became evident that no end of the outrages could be looked for unless vigorous
measures were adopted to put a stop to them. A body of National guards was
collected, and Pethion, in answer to repeated inquiry, declared that the
Commander Santerre had given the requisite orders; but these orders were still
wanting,2 and without them every man was afraid to make use of his weapons. The Presidents then appealed to Danton, as the indubitable
chief of the Ministerial council. He
summoned them for the evening to
1 Roland's letter to the Nat.
Assembly of tbe 3d of Sept. — 2 Evidence of the Presidents of
Sections before the Committee of Twenty-one, in Louvet,
133. Con/.
Pethion's evidence iu Buehez, XXI.
101.
Cn. in.]
MURDER
AND RAPE IN THE PRISONS.
87
a discussion, in which most of the Ministers, the President and
Secretaries of the National Assembly, Robespierre, Pethion and others took
part. They spoke in the first place with gloomy forebodings of the war; then
one of the Presidents of Sections brought up the subject of the prison murders,
and demanded that all who were there assembled should forthwith go and arrest the further progress of
popidar outrage. All were silent, till Danton cried, "Sit down, it was
necessary that it should be done." The man was not satisfied; he took
Pethion and Robespierre aside, and conjured them to use their influence with the Assembly to name a Dictator for 24 hours. Robespierre flew out,
saying "Beware, they would appoint Brissot." Pethion said not a word.1
We abstain from any further delineation of the particulars of these
horrible days. Enough has been brought forward to
characterize the motives, the authors, and object, of the atrocities committed,
and to assign them their proper place in the developement of the Revolution. To
enter more into detad than |was necessary for this purpose, would be to degrade
the vocation of the historian. Let us now sum up. In
most of the prisons the slaughter continued without interruption
until the evening of the 4th; but in some until the 6th and 7th of Sept. To the
shedding of blood every imaginable atrocity was added. In La Force the murderers killed the Princess Lamballe, the most intimate friend of
Marie Antoinette, insulted and mangled her corpse, and paraded her head before
the windows of the Temple to compel the Royal famdy to gaze on the horrible
spectacle.2 This
was their revenge for the firmness with which the King
refused to call on the King of Prussia to retreat from France.3 In the Salpetriere, a female prison, the
workmen
1 Evidence of Mandar, Viee-Presi-
done wonders in the way of warm-dent of the Seetion of the Temple, in ing up old lies. According to all Prudhomme, Crimes,
IV. 123. — the rules of criticism
and sound sense, 2 Clery, p. 21. Menessier. — 3 Here, the testimony of Malesherbes
must too, the Biographie Universelle has
be sufficient to prove that he did
88
ELECTION
OF THE NATIONAL CONVENTION. [Book IV.
of the Commuue first gratified their hist on their victims, and then
their thirst for blood. In Bicetre, where 5,000 criminals, lunatics and
invalids were collected, they butchered among several hundred other
prisoners 43 boys under the age of 16, and made use of artillery to slaughter
as large a number as possible, in the shortest time.1 It
is not possible to determine with any accuracy the
total number of the slain. Contemporary authorities speak of eight, ten,
and even fifteen thousand; the democratic writers of our own times will hardly
allow of a thousand, because the lists of the two principal prisons, which have
been preserved, only contain three hundred and eleven slain. But their conclusion would be made untenable by
the one fact alone, that during the tumultuous proceedings of the few last days
a number of arrested persons were never registered at all. Another
contemporaneous list of names gives 1414, another 1316, a third 1005, but adds that besides those in Bicetre, more than a thousand
people were murdered.2
These were not all political offenders; here and there common criminals were
slain, but in other cpiarters these last were liberated, and even enrolled
among the popular judges.3
While the murderers were thus carrying on their bloody
refuse.
And it is as certain that Frederick William received no sueh letter, as that
Louis never wrote it The assertion in the pseudo-memoirs
of Louis XVIII., that Orleans forged Louis' handwriting, is as unfounded as the greatest part of this book. — 1 Protocol of the Nat. Assembly, Sept. 3d. In Bicetre Henriot was at the head of the murderers.
— 2 The two latest investigators of
this subject, Granier de Cassagnac {Les
Uirondiiis) and Ternaux (Hist, de la Terreur), after
a close examination of documents, state the nnmber of slain, the former at 1532
and the latter at 1368. The number of murderers ;n all the prisons together was 187,
which affords a new proof of the systematic preparation
of the outrage by the city authorities, and the absence
of all participation in the great mass of the population. — 3 Prnd-homnie, Crimes,
confirms the considerations of Garat in Nov. (Sitting of the Convention, on the 13th)
that the less guilty of the released criminals were to
remain at liberty, but the robbers and murderers were to be brought back to
prison.
Ch. HI.]
PLUNDER
OP THE VICTIMS.
89
business in the prisons, the valuable property of the arrested and
persecuted was brought in large quantities to the Com
iff de Surveillance of the Hotel de Ville. The murderers seldom tried to appropriate
anything to themselves;1 and Representatives of the
Commune came to them, besought them not to sully the glorious day by theft,
promised them regular pay, allowed them to keep a few things, but brought the
greatest part of the booty into safety. In other cases, the Sectional
authorities to whose district the prison belonged had to
collect the effects, and then hand them over in a mass to the Comite
de Surveillance. No catalogues were made, no receipts were given, and all orderly
arrangement was avoided. If a Section had sealed up a packet, the Committee did not scruple to open it.2 In
the large halls of the Hotel de Ville they piled up chests and boxes, bags of
money and assignats, silver vessels and gold watches, rings and jewels, arms and
furniture—the fruits^ of house-searching, murders and liberations—without any distinction or arrangement. It is impossible to
determine, even approximately, the- value of these
objects, as no account of them was ever kept, and the action brought by the
Gironde against the members of the Committee was suspended by the fall of that party. A guess may be made at the amount, if we
consider that during the countless honse-searchings subsequent to the 10th of
August, the ready money was always taken away and assignats
(which then stood at 60 p>er cent), substituted
for it;3 that in the single night of the 29th of August, 3,000 persons, chiefly
of the weathier classes, were arrested, that at least 2,000 were put to death
and robbed in the
1 Once in the Conciergerie (Protocol of the
Commune). In
the Abbey. (Jourdan's Report). The murderers received from 6 to 24
francs pay, and plenty of wine. Conf. Ternaux
(III. 515), whose refutation of Blanc's palliating assertion, that they were
paid, not for the murder, but for removing the eorpses, leaves no doubt
on the subject. — 2 Sitting
of the Commune, Nov. 14; and Moniteur,
May 12, 1793. — 3 Morris to Jefferson, Aug. 8. 1793.
90 ELECTION OF THE NATIONAL
CONVENTION. [Book IV.
September massacres, and that all the valuables in the churches and the
royal and princely palaces 1 were
involved in this general pillage. Manuel consoled the imprisoned Clergy with
the prospect of being very soon removed from France, and they therefore ordered
their ready money for their journey to be sent into the prisons. Among others were three Bishops belonging to wealthy
families; and we may easily imagine what enormous sums must have poured in.
Sep-tenil was treasurer of the royal civil list; he himself escaped to England,
but his wife was robbed of more than a million's worth
in ussiyuats and jewels.'2 It was subsequently made known in the Convention, that the Commune had
property to the amount of 12 millions in their keeping. Another time complaint
was made that more than a million francs in gold had been taken from the articles entrusted to the Commune; while, on the other hand, Panis
boasted that he had saved nearly 2 millions for the country, of which there was
no entry at all. These few notices are sufficient to prove that the amount of
property stolen in these few days in Paris alone, can only be
reckoned by million's.
Such things need only to be mentioned to excite abhorrence, But there is something worse than blood-smeared robbery; we mean
the robbery which is committed with the weapons of legislation. The latter was far more deadly in its ravages, and ventured, moreover, to assume the
airs of a masterpiece of modern social policy. While the murderers of the Abbey were slaughtering the proprietors in Paris, the
decrees which the revolutionary chiefs wrested from the legislature
were undermining the property of the whole of France. On the 1st of September
the National Assembly ordered the fabrication of so much paper, that
1 The Hotels of the Princes
d'Ar-tois and Polignac were completely cleared, and the effects brought to the Hotel de Ville. Rev.
de Paris, 14,
498. — 2 Peltier, II. 31G. In
April
only a sum of 6700 fraucs was found to he protoeolled, and in its place a, like
amount in false bills. B. XXVI. 209.
- ' '
' Ch. m]
FRESH ISSUES OF ASSIGNATS.
91
the Convention was immediately enabled to issue 300 millions of new assignats. Exactly three weeks had passed siuce the Assembly had itself fabricated
an ecpial sum of paper money; those who wondered at such a colossal expenditure, were eulightened four days later, when they learned that
simultaneously with an entire suspension of taxation, the extraordinary
disbursements of the months of August had amounted to 98 millions—in addition
to all the current expenses of administration. When we, moreover, consider that scarcely 100,000 men, in condition
for service, were in the field, and that at home there were universal
complaints of a want of money for the purposes of military organization, it is
clear enongh by what channels the greater portion of these sums had
been carried off. All the principal political chiefs, too, of this period had
their hands in the public purse. As early as the 28th of August the Ministry
had received two millions of secret service money, which was almost entirely appropriated, without any account
being given, by Danton. On the 4th of September the Proletaries of the kingdom
were indulged with 12 mdlioiis more for the purchase
of corn; on the 5th the Sections received half a million
for the ecpuipment of the defenders of the country; and
on the 7th the Commune received nearly 2 millions, in addition to the previous 7 millions, for revolutionary necessities. In short, it was perfectly well understood how to direct the newly created paper money—which was draining
all the life blood of France—into the proper cpiarters.
Nor did the Ministry find any difficulty in sustaining this new issue
of paper by fresh securities. The lands of the "Emigres already promised a
supply of three or four thousand millions; but as, from the very first, some scruples, of which we .shall speak
hereafter, existed with respect to this property, the more cpuckly convertible
estates of the Knights of Malta, amounting to 400 millions, were added to the
more extended confiscation. The ruling faction, moreover, pressed
more heavily on the Emigres at the same moment
92
ELECTION
OF THE NATIONAL CONVENTION. [Book IV.
in which they left all non-democrats no other choice than between exile
and murder. They ordered that no dividends from property in
the public funds should be any longer paid to an Emigre; that every father of
an Emigre should fit out and support two soldiers (at a cost of nearly 2,500
francs a year) in the place of his son. It never occurred to them to make any distinction between those Emigrants who were in arms in
Coblenz, and those who had unwillingly fled, to escape the daggers of the
banditti.
Even the old regime had laid too great weight on the balance of the import and export of the precious metals;
and the Jacobins, who renewed all the abuses of the ancient system, attached
the very greatest importance to their measures against the exportation of
gold. On the 5th of September the National Assembly—on the
plea that the usurers were endeavouring to starve the people by carrying
off specie—forbid the export of gold and silver money; and on the lGth, of gold
and silver plate. We must remember here that the Commune had confiscated all
the hard cash they had found during tbe house-searchings, and exchanged it for assignats.
The prohibition therefore was quite unconnected with any views of
commercial policy.
The enactments of the 9th and 16th of September respecting the trade in provisions, struck still more deeply at the roots of
the nation's property and welfare. The bread question, as we know, was the practical type of what is now railed the
social question; and towards the solution of the former the first step was
taken, four weeks after the victory of the democrats, in the direction of
State-communism. Hitherto
the Proletaries had aimed at a fixed and compulsory bread tarif, and the
decision in this matter was usually left to the populace of each Commune. They
now resorted to a more hidden and universally operative system. They forbade
all interruption of trade, ordered a list to be
made of all the stocks of corn existing in the country, and instructed the
Authorities to compel the owners to send proportionate
Ch.III.] ELECTIONS TO THE NATIONAL CONVENTION.
93
supplies to market. We shall see how this first
step was followed by still stronger measures for gaining a control over private
property.
Such was the attitude assumed by this so-called Democracy in Paris in
the month of September; and with such unbridled
despotism did it deal with life and property! The Revolutionists attained
thereby their immediate political object, in-as-much as in the capital
they completely secured the election of their partisans to the Convention. How
essential the aid of terror was to their success, and how little
they trusted the popular feeling, was proved by an order of the Commune on the
29th,. that the nomination of electors shoidd be made by word of mouth, and
confirmed by the other Sections. Their object woidd be gained if the intimidation was successful in 25 of the 48
Sections. But it soon appeared that such precautions were hardly necessary. In
almost all the Sections the brawlers of the clubs had exclusive possession of the field, except where a few priests annoyed them with useless opposition. The leaders
were almost compelled to moderate the zeal of
their myrmidons, who spoke too candidly of the practical object of their
plans—the overthrow of property. The Cordeliers observed that luxury began to
hide its head in the capital; that silver plate began to
disappear. They warned their followers that the time was not yet come to strike
the aristocracy of wealth; that the Prussians would triumph if property were
abolished in Paris. They therefore exhorted the poor to be calm, assuring them that the day would soon
come—the day after the conclusion of the war—when the amount of a man's property would be regulated bjT the
law. This was the most moderate of the views which were broached to influence
the primary electors; we may imagine how thoroughly Jacobinical would be the electoral body chosen under such auspices.
Yet the Commune considered it advisable to subject even this body to a
suitable amount of terror, so small was the confidence which the band of
robbers placed in any French
94
ELECTION
OF THE NATIONAL CONVENTION. [Book IV.
citizen who did not immediately belong to their mob, or their gang of
assassins. It was determined that the electoral body also should hold their
meetings publicly in the Hall of the Jacobin club, the
galleries of which were constantly occupied by the armed admirers of
"Robespierre and Marat. Their sittings began just on the 2nd of September,
a day on which it would have required no little courage to defy the sovereign Peo]de, when it thundered out its approbation or its displeasure from
the galleries, in the course of the debates. Short work was made with the few
Feuillants who had slipt in in spite of the precautions of the Commune, and who were immediately turned out,
thanking heaven to have escaped with their lives. But fresh contentions arose, which strikingly confirmed the absolute necessity of compulsory means for the attainment of democratic objects. On
the one hand, the Gironde had so long been the leading faction
of the Jacobins, that it was impossible to exclude them at once; and their most
energetic and practical members—e. g.
Louvet and Gorsas, exercised a decided influence on a jjortion of the
electoral body. On the other hand, the Democrats were not entirely agreed among themselves; Robespierre, more
especially, was not always satisfied with the measures of Danton
and his associates. It was more essential therefore to begin with a resolution
that the votes should be given viva
voce (as in the primary elections), and every election
submitted to the satisfaction of the primary electors. After these
preliminaries the nomination of the first deputy took place on the 3d of
September. This was the very moment when the horrible massacres in the prisons
were at their height; the chosen deputy was Maximilian
Robespierre. The Girondists flattered themselves that they could at any rate
place Pethion, the virtuous Mayor, the celebrated Father of tbe People, by bis
side. But they were not even able, after he had been
elected in Chartres, to carry an empty vote of approbation in his favour. The
next elected were Danton, Collot d'Herbois, Camille Des-
Cn.
III.]
ELECTION
OF MARAT.
95
moulins; it was evident that the Gironde would hardly carry a single
candidate, although some of the Cordeliers were dissatisfied with Robespierre's
implacability, and were inclined to trust Brissot, &c.
But whenever an opinion in their favour was expressed,
Marat, above all, fell upon the speaker with the greatest fury, denounced the
persons proposed and their supporters in venomous
placards, and exhorted the patriotic People to clear the
ground of the venal creatures of Necker, Lafayette and Brunswick. His own election was, after all, a matter of some difficulty; the
debate which preceded it is highly characteristic of Marat's friends and
opponents, and therefore of his own position. The Democrats were ashamed of
him; he must go into the Convention,, they
said, not as the wisest and the best of men, but as a kind of leaven to raise
the mass. He was brought forward as a candidate on the 7th, supported by his
worthy friend the Capuchin Chabot. No one opiposed him on political grouuds; "but," cried Voidel,
"do you wish for a patriot, who refused to receive a sum of money due to him in ass?gnats,
and demanded specie?—a man of
honour, who when asked for payment by a creditor, eagerly begged his friend
Legendre to deny all knowledge of a sum of money deposited
with him?—a blameless man, who was maintained for two years in a cellar by citizen Maquet and his
wife, and who then removed Maquet by a pretended commission, and appropriated
both his wife and his furniture?" Marat made no reply, but his banditti
growled, "we shall see— the axe is still raised, and we still hold the
ropes of the alarm-bell." The Girondists opposed to him by way of
striking'contrast the English philosopher Priestly, who united the most decided
radicalism with a spotless reputation. At length
Robespierre declared: "there are philosophers enough in the Convention;
instead of bookmakers we want courageous champions—men who have been compelled
by despotism to hide themselves for years in a cellar." Danton concurred
and Marat became a representative of the nation.
96
ELECTION
OF THE NATIONAL CONVENTION. [Book IV.
The same result was shown in all the 24 elections of deputies—none were chosen but Dantonists and Maratists of the purest
water. The Gironde only carried one candidate, Dussaulx, a weak old
man, whom no one could fear. The last candidate was the Duke of Orleans, who
was supported by a number of bribed electors, among whom were some Dantonists,
and the Girondist Gorsas. But Robespierre and Marat would not hear of his nomination, and favoured one of the ornaments of the
Municipality, named Lhuillier. It so happened just at this time, that Marat had
the impudence to demand of the Minister Roland a public grant of 15,000 francs
for his panrphlet; and when Roland, who was the object of his constant abuse, contemptuously refused, Marat received the
money from the Duke. At this jjrice the latter gained Marat's support in the
college of electors, so that in the division he just obtained a majority. Even
this was disputed; but it was late at night; the
Secretaries were tired of the dispute, and therefore declared the Duke duly
elected. Thus Philip Joseph entered the Convention, to share in the regicide,
and to mount the scaffold.1
Most of the newly elected Deputies were
obscure but disreputable men, who had no other claim
than the fact that they were ready to lend themselves without scruple to all
the purposes, of the democratic faction. As it had been ne-nessary to employ
all the resources of intimidation to secure their
election, the revolutionary leaders were fully conscious of the impression
which their return had made upon the majority of the citizens. This was so
decidedly unfavourable, that they passed over in the
deep>est silence the resolution previously taken up with so much zeal, of procuring the ratification of the Sectional
assemblies. In its stead they determined to call on the Convention to exclude
all the deputies hostile to freedom. But what did
this party care for the sentiments of the citizens so long
as they retained in
1 Ducoing, Philippe
d'Orleans.
Ch. III.]
ANARCHY
IN THE DEPARTMENTS.
97
their own hands the power and the victory? The Parisian citizens might
grumble—might assemble in arms in some of the Sections for the protection of property and person, and bring their complaints against the
Commune before the National Assembly; but the
Municipality continued to put to death whomsoever they pleased, and the capital
bad no other representatives in the Convention than the men of the Mountain. If they were as successful in the
provinces as in Paris, France woidd be at the disposal of the Democrats; and
there was no want on their part of activity and exertion to bring about this
result.
On the very same day on which Robespierre was
elected, and the head of the Princess Lamballe displayed under the window of
the Queen, the agents of the faction were hurrying
through all the gates of Paris, to plant the red banner of revolution in the
provinces. Their prospects were by no means unfavourable;
for the blow of the 10th of August, which shattered the constitution and all
existing central authorities, had already produced the greatest confusion in
all the Departments. A zealous Jacobin, Jean Debry, described
the condition of affairs to the Convention a few days
afterwards1 in
the following words: "The way was opened in every direction to audacious
crime and selfish intrigue. Unknown authorities were arbitrarily erected in
every quarter. The citizen did not know who gave
him orders, or with what right the orders were given. One
power was raised in opposition to another, and impressed on the incipient rule of Freedom the character of an arbitrary despotism." It was every where the same as in Paris; everywhere the Clubs and the Revolutionary Sections seized the reins of
power; all that was necessary was to combine these various elements into one
grand whole. Immediately, therefore, after the National Assembly,
on December 2nd, had entrusted an unlimited dictatorship to the Ministers, Danton
1 Sitting of the Convention, Sep.
26. 1792. II. G
ELECTION
OF THE NATIONAL CONVENTION. [Book IV.
caused the nomination of his commissioners to be signed by the Council
of state. He summarily assumed to himself the selection of persons; Roland was vexed and angry, but saw himself outvoted, and signed.
The persons chosen by Danton, with ;few exceptions, were
members of the Municipal Council, and indeed the most violent, coarse, and
unscrupulous members of that body. As more aiid
more notorious characters were successively brought forward, Roland at
last withdrew his signature ; upon whieh Danton laughingly asked him whether he
was to send nothing but tender maidens. To prevent further delay, however, he
made use of a moment when Roland
had left the meeting to draw up the instructions. These were, precise and
simple enough; the Commissioners were to issue to all Authorities, whatever
re-cpiisitions they might deem necessary for the good of ,the country; and in
the case of corn supplies, they were themselves to fix the price. Besides these instructions the commissioners were furnished with more innocent directions which alone
they were to show. Even Roland had agreed to those which treated of their
relation to the Clubs, the excitement of public opinion, and the
acceleration of the preparations for war. But here too the Municipality of
Paris played the principal part. Although it had not the slightest official
connection with the other Departments, it named twenty-four envoys, in part the same persons accredited by the Ministers—a simple
method of playing hide and seek among the different persons and credentials, in
case of any reproach which might be subsequently directed against them. These
messengers received their instructions from the Comiie
de Surveillance of the Commune, under the subsequently so well-known name of
"Committee of Public Safety.'1 In a
circular to all the Communes of the empire, it was announced that the People
had destroyed a portion of the imprisoned conspirators by
an act of necessary justice, and all "fellow-citizens, brethren and
friends" were called on to imitate in their respective districts, this
urgent measure
Ch. III.]
DANTON'S
BLOODY MANIFESTO.
99
of political salvation. To increase its weight this circular was
countersigned by the Minister of Justice, Danton, and distributed in numerous
copies through -his bureaux. 1 Inn-ton, however, was not satisfied with this;
to increase the effect he added a manifesto of his own, in these
emphatic words; "Once more, citizens, to arms! let the whole of France
bristle with pikes, bayonets, cannons, and daggers; in the towns let the blood
of all traitors he the first sacrifice offered to liberty, that when
we march against the enemy we may leave no one behind who can trouble
us."1
Let us -consider all the circumstances of the case—the long continued
derangement of public and private affairs— the want and unruly license of the
Proletaries in all the provinces without exception—the recent example of
the latest revolution in Paris — the influence of Commissioners provided with
unlimited powers—and, lastly, the express commands of the highest judicial
authority, whieh could on its part appeal to a law awarding death against all who should disobey its orders,—and we shall allow that the
preparations for the Sicilian Vespers, or the Massacre of St. Bartholomew, were slight and harmless in comparison with the Jacobin
scheme of national murder.
Fortunately in this case the evil contained its own remedy.
The democratic leaders, in their struggle with the monarchy, had preached
universal license with so much effect, that they could not themselves now
reckon on very speedy or general obedience. They were a minority even in the capital, and only prevailed by means of their organization as a government. At a distance their ministerial influence was weaker, and
their numerical proportion still less favourable. They could take the Tuileries
by a coup de main, but to
1 The letter of the Committee has
glois, (Anger, 1789—1830,)
I. 262, been frequently published; but this from the archives of Angers. It has
circular of Danton is only found, as escaped even the industry of Ternaux. far
as we know, in Blondier-Lan-
g2
100
ELECTION
OF THE NATIONAL CONVENTION. [Cook IV.
subject the French people needed years of labour and unutterable crimes.
In some places, and those not unimportant ones, the Commissioners succeeded in their bloody machinations.
On their arrival in Lyons, they found the work already begun; for
Laussel's letter had immediately roused the Democrats to action. The desire of
influencing the elections was as operative here as in Paris, for the majority
of the inhabitants was by no means Jacobinical. But other circumstances were still more favourable to a violent outrage, than in the
Capital itself. The Mayor Vitet himself, although a Girondist, and a man of
cautious selfishness like Pethion, was of a more active nature than the latter, and was not cooled in his zeal by any personal quarrel with the
Cordeliers. The Commander of the troops in Lyons, too, was ready for any
sanguinary deed; being, as far as we know, the only French General in the year
1792, who placed his sword at the disposal of the bloodthirsty^
jurisdiction of the mob. To make this ease the more notorious, this leader of
the Lyons Septembrists was a German Prince, Charles Constantino
of Hesse-Bothenburg-Rheinfels. It is remarkable that this family, whose chief
distinguished himself by a merciless severity against the innovators, should
likewise produce the most desperate Jacobin who was ever perhaps born on German
soil. Prince Charles, or as he at that time called himself, Citizen General
Hesse, was about 35 years of age, had a long gaunt form, a pale
face, with remarkably high cheek-bones, large but dull blue eyes, and very
light hair. He spoke much and rapidly, and accompanied his speech with
incessant convulsive gesticulations, concluding every sentence by gnashing his beeth, the sound of whieh was more or less loud according to the
state of his mind. "If," said one of his auditors, "his deeds
are as wild as his words, one might imagine him to be a wild cat endowed with
human speech."'
The "wild" deeds unfortunately were 1 Nodicr's Souvenirs.
Cn.
III.] CHARLES CONSTANTINE PRINCE OF
HESSE.
101
by no means lacking. During the summer we find him continually engaged on the committees of the National Assembly, or among the Jacobins, in bringing
information against Ministers and Generals; and on one occasion, in a
war-committee, it was observed that Hesse was an indefatigable accuser, but
always vanished when proofs were demanded. The friendship of Yitet at last
procured him the chief command in
Lyons, where he immediately conceived the idea of supplanting General
Montesquieu in the chief command in the army of the South, and for this purpose
formed an alliance with the Jacobins of Lyons, for
mutual support. The attempt to overthrow Montesqniou was
unsuccessful for the present, and he directed all his efforts to the
furtherance of the catastrophe in the city. Hesse made the following
announcement on the 3rd, with great delight: "Liberty or death! Lyons will
at length be purified: the Mayor is calling
the National guard to arms, and liberating the city from all the
disaffected." Six days afterwards the first blow fell: while Yitet
occupied the National guard by a grand parade, three, priests and nine
cavalry-officers, whom Hesse had arrested on his own
authority three weeks before, were murdered, and their corpses dragged about in
the town by torch-light amidst the yells of the popidace. A list of two hundred
other victims had been prepared, but the wrath of the National guard expressed
itself so loudly, that the continuance of the butchery was deferred: As Yitet, however, always
refused to give the order for the armed interference of the guard, the educated
classes were so terrified that Hesse wrote to the minister on the 11th.
"The catastrophe of the day before yesterday has put
the Aristocrats and Emigres to flight, and given us the majority in
Lyons."1
It was not till after this that the commissioners of the Parisian
Municipality arrived in Lyons to reduce terrorism to a regular system. The murders of the 9th of September
1 Correspondence of the Army of the
South.
102
ELECTION
OF THE NATIONAL CONVENTION. [Book IV.
only appeared to them in the light of preparatory signals: they aimed
at subjecting the persons and property of all Lyons to their will on a grander
scale. A commencement was made by plundering the most important magazine of the
city. Crowds of women led the way; the National Guard, who ran
to arms of their own accord, were imperatively Ordered
to remain rpiiet, and the plunder was continued for four clays with
systematic regularity. Then the women, in the name of the sovereign people,-
decreed an extremely low tariff for bread, coffee, and
a number of other articles, which the Town-Council immediately sanctioned as a
law. Finally, at the express instigation of the Parisian Commissioners, a
nocturnal house-searching was set on foot in all quarters of the city, and several hundred persons were arrested. The middle classes
expected the great massacre to begin at every moment: but even the smaller
artisans, who formed the core of the Jacobin party in Lyons, were not yet au
niveau de la lievolution and refused obedience to their leaders.1 The
latter therefore made haste to hold the elections for the Convention, and succeeded in Lyons in carrying all the desired Democratic
candidates, and, in the Department at any rate a majority of republican
Deputies.
The occurrences in Orleans during the same days
were exactly similar.2 The arrival of a troop from Paris, which came with the alleged
intention of preventing the abduction of the State prisoners, was the signal
for every kind of violence and disorder. The prisoners were
in the first place robbed by their new keepers of everything they
possessed-several criminals were liberated—and the officials who were
commissioned to regulate the supply of provisions, were maltreated and
threatened with death.
The Government
1 Speeeh of the Jacobin Riard to the
Marseillois on their march. Mon-leon, I. IOC. Report of the Commissioners of the Convention on the 16th of Nov. They complain that even the Constitutional
priests were against the Revolution. — 2 Minutes and official documents in Lottin, Orleans,
2. purlie.
Cn.
IU.]
THE
SEPTEMBRISTS IN ORLEANS.
103
commissioner Bourdon gave the signal for all these excesses; so that
even his colleague Dubail declared that he only remained
in his post in the hope of thwarting the shameful decrees
of Bourdon. An order of the National Assembly arrived on the 3rd to send the
prisoners to Saumur, whereupon the Parisian army were
unanimous in their opinion that instead of this they should be sent to Paris
itself. Meanwhile Bourdon's intrigues had rendered
the troops of the line stationed in Orleans mutinous, and a small number of the
National guard went over to the Bandits. In short, the civic authorities of
Orleans, who were decidedly on the side of order, found themselves without any means of resisting the murderers. On the 4th of
September the column began its march towards Paris with 43 prisoners, reached
Versailles on the 9th, and in that place murdered all these unfortunates but
three, in spite of the energetic interference of the Mayor. But Danton
lauded the murderers from his balcony, for having performed an indispensable
act of justice for the good of the People.
The inhabitants of Orleans soon learned, however, that the Parisian
adventurers were by no means satisfied with these results. Their
leaders signified this in sufficiently emphatic terms. Bourdon reported to the
National Assembly on the 10th; "We have employed every leisure moment in
inflaming the patriotism of the citizens, rousing their public spirit, and raising the people to a level with their brethren in Paris. The
fruit of our instructions was the destruction of all the memorials of despotism
and fanaticism"—e. g.
a statue of Charles VII. and the Maid of Orleans—"the Abolition of
all the external badges of vanity, the epaulettes and
bearskins" —just as in Paris the officers and grenadiers of the National
guard were deprived of their distinctive insignia—"the transportation of the non-juring priests"'—they were forced to leave
the city, and on their way hunted like wild beasts—
"the formation of a third battalion of 800 men,—and lastly, the establishment of a Central Committee invested with
104 ELECTION OF THE NATIONAL CONVENTION. [Book IV.
the absolute power of the sovereign People"—in other words, a
centre of insurrection against all legal authority.
Yet public opinion in Orleans continued to be more adverse to the democrats than in Lyons. The elections to the Convention
on the 8th were entirely in favour of the Girondists, and it was not until afterwards that the Cordeliers succeeded
in carrying Bourdon instead of Brissot, who had been elected at first. The
Cordeliers were all the more active in bringing the question of
property to the same decision
as in Lyons. The corn riots, as we have seen, commenced
immediately on the arrival of the Parisians, and the consequent ferment
continued amongst the lowest of the people, and broke out on the 18th into open
revolt. A reputed corn-usurer was slain, and several houses plundered and demolished; the Mayor did not
venture on any energetic step, although the thievish crowd dispersed with
incredible cowardice when a single National guardsman fired off his musket. The
price of bread was lowered two sous a pound, according to the
desire of the rioters, which implied a loss of 200,000 francs to the income of
the city; and it was not until the revolt seemed rather inflamed than assuaged
by this concession, that it was determined to proclaim martial law. External order was thus restored, but the rioters remained united in permanent Sections, and drew up a petition to the
Convention against the intolerable despotism of the Town Council.
These occurrences give us a clear idea of the state of France at this time; and the course of things was in the main the same throughout
the country. The People would have nothing to do with the plans of the
democrats; the flames of disorder had every where to be kindled by the
Authorities or by envoys from Paris; and the outrages
which followed were looked upon with timid disgust hy the
inhabitants. In Rheims a number of priests and civil officers were burnt
alive by a troop of Parisian volunteers, whde the College of electors was
holding its sitting; and the
Ch. hi.]
opposition of provinces to the jacobins.
105
threats of the murderers compelled the latter to choose the author of
the outrage, a spinner of Rheims, as their deputy. In Sens, the Commissioners
of the Parisian Commune caused two young men to be put to death for
insulting a tree of Liberty; and they then reported to Paris that the
patriotism of Sens was greatly increased by this act, as was urgently
necessary. In Meaux, two other Commissioners told the Electoral assembly that the Municipality of Paris had seized the reins of government, that there
were no longer any laws and that they could do what they pleased. A few gens-ffarmes
whom they had brought with them from Paris, occupied
the prisons, stirred up the artizans and murdered
fourteen people. The National Guard was about to interfere, but was prevented
by its Jacobin commander. Everything was quiet in Chalons, until
Bdlaud-Varennes arrived from Paris and roused the proletaries; after his
departure, the local authorities, aided by the Commissioners of the
National Assembly,1
succeeded in putting down the riot. Sometimes the sentiments of the people were
more strongly manifested against the agitators. Thus the peasants of Vouton
were on the point of hanging the Commissioners, because
they were of opinion that the Jacobins were the cause of all the mischief; and
in Evreux they only escaped the same fate by an appeal to the Law of the 2nd,
which denounced death against every one who resisted the Government. But even
this threat was of no avail in Auxerre, where they were
driven from the electoral assembly, after they had related that the Commune of
Paris possessed unlimited power, watched and controlled the Government, and
invited all other Communes to fraternity. It availed them nothing in Angers, where the Town-council determined to make a complaint
before the National Assembly of Danton's circulars; nor in Lisieux, where the
Commissioners proposed a new division of lands, and were on that account
denounced to the Con-
1 Sitting of
Sept. 11th.
106
ELECTION OF THE NATIONAL CONVENTION. [Book IV.
vention. Id Marly, in liis and Ghamplitte, where the Parisian envoys took away all
weapons and horses in the name of the country;—in
Bernay, Rouen and Perpignan, where they called upon the people to murder the
reactionists—they were even arrested as disturbers of the peace.
Iu short by the middle of the month it was already known in Paris, that
the grand coup d'etat of the Septembrists had failed. "If any time
were left," wrote the Revolutionists of Paris, "the people ought to
reverse all the elections." "In every quarter," cried Marat,
"intrigues, roguery, seduetion and bribery have carried the day in the
electoral colleges;" "Roland has scattered gold by handfuls to
secure the election of Brissot's scribblers;" "What can you expect
from this scum of the Constituent and Legislative Assemblies?" He was not
long in finding means to overcome this difficulty: "Surround them,"
he said "with a numerous auditory— compel them to
complete the new constitution within a week —and at the first dereliction of
duty deliver them over to the sword of Justice." Such was the respect
which- the heroes of the People's sovereignty entertained for the will of the entire nation. They were resolved upon new revolutions, until
they had bent the inhabitants of France, as well as the King, beneath the yoke
of the metropolitan proletaries. They consoled themselves with hopes of the
future, towards which the sending of their Commissioners had paved
the way. The poorer people of the provinces had not forgotten that even the
organs of the Government once approved of the compulsory reduction of prices,
and a better division of land.1 For
the present, however, they had the prospect of a reaction and
struggle before them, and were determined to use, to the best of their power,
the time which still remained before the opening of the
Convention. The arrests began again, and were made without any statement of the
1 Lidon, in the
Nat. Convention, Nov. 26th; this ery was reechoed from all parts of the
Kingdom.
Ch. III.] REACTIONARY MEASURES OF THE GIRONDE.
107
charge, or of the authority on which they were made. On the 14th and
15th Sept. persons in the uniform of civic officials'were seen in several streets, who took away from the
passers-by, watches, gold chains and earrings, in the name of the country; and
in the night of the 16th the Crown Treasury jwas broken open and robbed of its
diamonds, one of which, "the Regent," was alone
worth 12,000,000 francs.1 A
good democrat, named Mazuyer, cried from the tribune of the National Assembly:
"Things are worse in Paris than in the forest of Ardennes."
But the result of the elections raised at length the courage of the Girondists. Supported by some of the Sections, they had laid
the foundation of an armed force, in opposition to the banditti of the Hotel de
Ville; and on the 11th of September they received a report from
Pethion, that the summonses to plunder and bloodshed were beginning to lose their effect. With this
encouragement they proceeded in the first place to nullify the influence of the
democrats in the provinces, by passing a decree on the 14th of September, that
the Ministerial Commissioners were strictly to abide by their
instructions; and that every Commissioner who should act in the name of the
Parisian Commune was to be arrested. On the 17th, the National Assembly
directed their attention to Paris; prohibited every unauthorized person from
performing any official act, on pain of
death; denounced the penalty of imprisonment for every arbitrary arrest, or
house-searching, and made the members of the Municipality answerable with their heads for the safety of all prisoners. The consequence
was that the Hotel de Vdle dissolved its
Committee of Surveillance, and that the democrats in the
1 Sergent afterwards gave a detailed
account of its subsequent fate in the Revue
Retrospective. The
Convention already knew something about them. Yet the Biographie
Universelle says
that the diamonds were employed to bribe the King of Prussia or his Generals,
and even names the Berlin Banker Treskow as the person with whom they were
deposited.
108 ELECTION OF THE NATIONAL CONVENTION. [Book IV.
Sections demanded a new revolt with indescribable fury. For the purpose
of inflaming men's minds they spread a report of a defeat which Dumouriez
was said to have suffered from tbe Prussians. Marat, in a bill posted on the
walls, accused the General and the Ministers of
treachery, and other plaeards demanded the murder of 400 deputies immediately after the close of the Legislative Assembly. But the plan
failed through want of sympathy in the masses, and the zeal of the
well-disposed Sections; and the National Assembly hastened on the 20th of Sept. to issue a comprehensive edict for the restoration of order in Paris. It was enacted, that
every citizen must be furnished by his Section with a card of citizenship, and
that every one who could not produce it should be arrested. This
measure drove the strange adventurers out of the city: times were greatly
changed since the 20th July, when the Gironde gave the signal for the arrival
of the Marseillois! It was further provided that the Municipality and the General Council of the Commune should be newly elected, and that
the elections should commence within three clays. Every house was declared to be inviolable during the night; the National Assembly was to receive notice of every arrest in the cities where this body held its sittings—the threat of leaving Paris is
worthy of remark;—and it was forbidden to fire the alarm-cannon or sound the
tocsin, without permission of the Assembly, on jpain of death. Lastly, it was
decreed that every Section should raise a reserve of 100 men, in
addition to the regular companies, to be placed under the command of the
General of division, for the preservation of internal order. Every other armed
force, except the National Guard, was to be subjected to military leadership and discipline, and coidd only be employed within the bounds of
France by the National Assembly.
By this measure the Fcderes, and the volunteers of the Departments, were taken out of the hands of
the Municipality,
Ch. III.]
OPENING
OP NATIONAL CONVENTION.
109
and a nucleus was formed of a military guard for the Convention.
Thus the Girondists became conservative after the September massacres, as far as lay in their power; quite as much so indeed
as the Feirillants a year earlier. They rose against the consequences
of their own principles, and succeeded for the moment in producing a certain police
effect. But it was impossible for them to attain any lasting political
result, because they themselves did not change
their principles, and therefore kept the sources of anarchy
still open. They complained incessantly of the
immorality of their, opponents, but they decreed, according to Condorcet's
wishes, freedom of divorce on a simple declaration of the parties. They had
regarded themselves incompetent to proclaim the Republic
by a decree of the National Assembly, but as individuals they all took the oath
of eternal hatred to the King and the Monarchy. We say nothing about the moral
value of such an oath; but even political prudence might
have told them that by taking it they rendered every other alliance impossible,
than that with their deadly enemies Robespierre and Marat. They imagined indeed
that they were lost, if the people began to consider them as reactionists: they
little knew what an infinite amount of sympathy and hope
was eagerly looking for a liberator from the tyranny of the Jacobins!
And thus on the 21st September the National Convention was opened, and
the proclamation of the Republic followed as a matter of course.
In deference to the new majority, the two leaders
of the Mountain, Robespierre, and Danton, began their operations by a disavowal
of their acts in September. Couthon, the most intimate friend of Robespierre,
proposed a recognition on oath of the sovereignty of the
people; "in order," he said, "to calm the minds of men
respecting a report that a party in the Convention were meditating
dictatorship, triumvirate and tyranny."
Danton proposed a practical recognition of
110
ELECTION
OF THE NATIONAL CONVENTION. [Book IV,
the people's sovereignty, according to which no constitution should be
valid without the confirmation of the Peopde. He further propiosed a
declaration on oath of the sacredness of all kinds of p)rop>erty, to
dissipate the rumours that another party in the
Convention were aiming at carrying liberty to the extreme of license.
Both these men well knew what was expected of them. Cambon, who hoped
to continue his financial artifices in this assembly also, considered it unwise to give an irrevocable guarantee of property. But
the Girondist Lasource explained to him, that pjroperty was the essential
prerequisite and basis of all law, and thereby succeeded in carrying both
resolutions.
The Gironde having thus shown its conservative
side, hastened to obtain pardon for its boldness by a redoubled revolutionary
zeal.
After the provisional continuance of all unrepealed laws, powers and
taxes had been decreed on the motion of Philip-peaux, Collot d'Herbois rose to
propose the formal abolition of the monarchy. Bishop
Gregoire, a so-called independent Deputy, who belonged to no party, but
generally voted, like Cambon, with the Gironde, demanded, in consideration of
the importance of the question, a formal enactment, with a statement of motives, — in other words, inquiry, reports, and discussion. Upon which
one of the most zealous Girondists, Ducos, briefly replied;
"The motives are contained in the well-known history of the crimes of
Louis XVI." After this, no one dared to raise any further objection, and the Convention decreed amidst solemn silence;
"Monarchy is abolished in France." The Assembly then broke out into a shout of triumph, while a troop of 150 Chasseurs defiled through the Hall to the sound of trumpets, and took an oath upon their swords not to return until they had annihilated all the
enemies of liberty. The enthusiasm excited by this resolution unfitted the Convention for
the
Ch. HI.]
PROCLAMATION OF THE REPUBLIC.
Ill
consideration of any other subject, and the sitting was adjourned amidst thunders of applause from the galleries.
It was no mere unmeaning form, that this debate of the Convention was
accompanied by military music and the crash of arms, for it decided not only the continuance of terrorism at home, but of war in Europe.
112
ONSET
OF THE ALLIES.
[Book IV.
CHAPTER IV. ONSET OF THE ALLIES.
Weakness
of the gehman army caused rv the small amount of thi; austrian forces.—weakness of the french resulting from anarchy. —Dumouriez
loses a week by his scheme op invading Belgium.— Servan
orders him to the argonnes —Taking of verdun.—Danger of the french.—dilatory movements of the duke of brunswick.—
clerfa1t forces the argonnes.—fresh delays of brunswick.— Faulty
disposition of kellermann's forces.—Disagreement between the kino and the duke.—fruitless cannonade at
valmy.—dumouriez begins a negotiation.—prussian proposals for a general peace.—
Dumouriez strengthens himself.—The French ministry desires a separate peace with prussia.—intervention
of lucciies1ni.
The King of Prussia passed down the Rhine on the 23rd of July from Mayrence
to Coblenz, where the Elector of Treves amused him with a continuance of the
Mayence festivities, and the Emigres overwhelmed him with
promises of -the happiest omen for the coming campaign. The army was collected
in its full strength of 42,000 in the camp at Riiben-ach—excellent and
magnificent troops, full of confidence hi themselves and their leaders, and a joyful eagerness for battle. With such means and
prospects, it seemed impossible that the enterprise could fail; the Emigres
rose in royal favour by their descriptions of the state of France; and on
observing this they enhanced the colouring of
their pictures. They dwelt most strongly on the monarchical sentiments of the
People, and boasted of their own good understanding with the enemy's officers. "I," said Bouille, "can answer for the taking of the fortresses, for I have the keys of all of them in my pocket."1
Under these circumstances it was unanim-
1 Minutoli, 141.
Ch. IV.]
THE DUKE OF BRUNSWICK AND THE EMIGRES.
113
ously agreed that there was no necessity
for wasting time over the plans of sieges drawn up at Potsdam; that in fact
there was nothing to do but to march straight upon Paris amidst the plaudits of
loyal Frenchmen. The King listened to these promises with eager ears, for they inspired the hope of a glorious, and yet not
tediously protracted, campaign.
The thoughts of the Duke of Brunswick, meanwhile, took a very different
direction. He hated the whole mass of Emigres, and amidst their buzzing swarm
iu Coblentz he was almost at his wits' end. "He
could scarcely find elbow room in the crowd of them; he paid compliment after
compliment, and made obeisances to the very ground, but his cheeks glowed,
and his eyes glittered like a tiger's." His vexation increased when he saw the nature of their ecpuip-ment for war, and observed that of
the 8,000 men for whom he had to find supplies, about half were combatants, and
the rest lackeys, hairdressers, cooks and vivand/fres.
He suspected the truth of their reports,
because they were the authors of them; and the more exaggerated the terms in which
they described the longing of the French for the presence
of their German deliverers, the more fully was he convinced
of the contrary. And if the aspect of his proteges
did not tend to render the prospect of war more
pleasing, the intelligence which he received from his allies irrevocably determined his judgment. His head-quarters were visited at this juncture
by the Austrian General Pfau from the Breis-gau, and the Prussian Major Tauenzien from Belgium.1 We
may remember that according to the stipulations of Sans-sonci, Austria was to
maintain 50,000 in the Breisgau, of whom 23,000 were to join the main army;
while 50,000 men were to be kept in Belgium, the larger portion of whom were to support the Duke of Brunswick by besieging the border
fortresses, or by direct cooperation with him. But
1 Tauenzien had been since the 21st
of May at the Austrian headquarters in Belgium, and was
afterwards attached to Clerfait's corps. Concerning
Bfau, con}. Massenbach
and Valentin!
114
ONSET
OF THE ALLIES.
[Book IV.
the Duke now learned that the Upper Rhine was covered, not by 27,000,
but only by 17,000 men, and that notwithstanding this,
Holienlolie-Kirchberg could only bring up 15,000 instead of
23,000 to his assistance;1 that
there were not 56,000, but at most 40,000 men, in Belgium, of whom General
Clerfait was ordered to lead only 15,000 to the main army,'2
while the rest, after subtracting the necessary garrisons,
were to be employed in a wild-goose chase to the distant Lille. Austria
therefore had furnished only 71,000 instead 106,000 men for the war; and the
invading army amounted to 82,000 instead of 110,000.3 With
this force a favourable result was not to be expected, and considering the
inadequacy of the force intended for the protection of Belgium and the Rhine,
failure would inevitably be followed by a rush of the enemy over every part of
the frontiers. If the general desertion of the enemy's troops, too confidently prophesied by the Emigres, should prove as fallacious as
the promises of Austria, the Duke was resolved to abide by his original plan of
operations, and only to secure a basis for a second and more energetic
campaign, by the capture of the fortresses on the Meuse.
He had always been opposed to the war, but he now viewed it with
abhorrence. He had never been famed for quick resolution or bold and rapid
action, but now he ap-
1 C4ebler, Austrian-
Military Journal, 1S33, II. 7, from the official lists states the number of men under Hohenlohe at 19,700, under Erbaeh
at 9G30, and under Esterhazy at 13,800. But Massenbach also gives exact lists
from I'faii's communications; all other estimates without
exception agree with these; the Austrian
Military Journal, 1812, I. 7, has rather lower
figures for Belgium; and we shall lind numerous examples in which
the official lists of the
Austrians
do not always distinguish the actual from the nominal strength of the corps. — 2 Tauenzien's Journal gives Clerfait 14,000—15,000 men, with which Gebler agrees. All other writers
estimate the remainder of tilo Belgian corps at 10,000 men less than Gebler,
whom we have followed above. — 3 Prussians 42,000, Hohenlohe 15,00(1, Clerfait 15,000, Hessians 5,532 (actual strength) Emigres 4,500 (rough estimate).
Cb. IV.]
slow
movements of the duke.
115
peared crippled in every movement by want of inclination, or, at best,
goaded on by momentary vexation. He saw his own reputation, and the prosperity
of the Prussian State, imperilled in a hopeless enterprise; the more the
King urged him on, and indulged in his own splendid dreams, the more uneasy and
irritable did his General become. The Duke wished for nothing more than the
capture of the fortresses on the Meuse, while the King left his
siege artillery at home as being unnecessary, considering the sentiments of the
French Commandants. The King was in a great hurry, yet lost several dayTs in
the parades and balls at Coblentz, and then scolded all the more at the slowness of the military movements. The Duke rejoiced
at the loss of every day, as he did not wish to proceed beyond the Meuse, and
feared, if the weather proved fine, that he should not be able to prevent the
King from advancing further. And thus the army marched up the Moselle
at a snail's pace, taking twenty days to go from Coblentz to the French
frontier. The two Austrian Generals did their best to meet the silent wishes of
the Duke in this respect. Clerfait did not make his appearance
at Arlon until the 16th of August, and Hohenlohe was four-and-twenty days in
marching from Mannheim to Merzig on the Saare. Meanwhile news arrived of the
revo-tion of the 10th of August, after the receipt of which the King could
think of nothing but an uninterrupted and hasty march on Paris. The
Duke gave way so far, that he consented to push forward to the Meuse
without previously capturing the fortresses of the Moselle. And thus at last,
on the 23d of August, they arrived before the little border fortress of Longwy, and forced it to capitulate, after a short bombardment, on the
26th. A passage for the invading army was thus laid open.
On the side of France little had as yet been done to meet this
invasion. When it is asked with whom the fault of this omission lay, the majority of the historians of the Revolution answer without
hesitation,—with the Government
n 2
116
ONSET
OF THE ALLIES.
[Book IV.
of Louis XVI., who regarded the Prussians as their
saviours, and naturally enough did nothing to resist the inroad. And they add
that the 10th of August had, at all events, the merit of setting the military
forces of France in motion against its foreign foes. Yet this view of the
matter is di-reetly contradicted by facts. In the first
place the Girondist Ministry, which had declared war, did everything in its
power to increase the military force, and to arm the whole country. That the
results they attained were so small, was not the fault of Lotus XVI., who was unable to counteract the very smallest order, but of the
dilatoriness of the Assembly in passing decrees—of the
want of money, and the general disorder in the administration. Servan, for
example, found that the stores of powder in Mezieres had been destroyed during the late anarchy; that tbe
gun manufactory of Charleville had only been able, since 1790, to turn out
5,000 guns a year instead of 25,000; that bis different measures for recruiting the army mutually interfered with one another, in consecpieuce of the disorder which reigned in every part of the
Administration, and at last produced no result at all.1 When
the Girondists were again succeeded by the Fenillants, the influence of the
King was not increased. Lajard, the Minister at War, was entirely governed by Lafayette; and though neither of them wished for
an aggressive war, as the Jacobins did, yet they were equally averse to
submission to foreigners, and the triumph of the Emigres. We may the more
implicitly trust to their assurances, because they could only expect the
axe from the Jacobins and the rope from the Emigres. With them it was a
question of life and death, to prepare themselves for an invincible resistance,
and thereby to restore peace as speeddy as possible. But all the hindrances on whieh Servan's measures had
suffered shipwreck operated against their wishes; and they were, moreover, ex-
1 Poisson, I. 432, dwells especially on the
difficulty of recruiting for the line, at the same time that the National
Volunteers were summoned, as the latter chose their own
officers from among themselves.
Cn.
IV.] DEFICIENCIES OF THE FRENCH
ARMY.
117
posed to the party hatred of both Girondists and Jacobins, who, as the
Prussians were still distant, did not hesitate even to weaken the defences of
the country, if they could but thereby humble the hated Feuillants. The
correspondence of the Ministers with the Generals leaves no doubt on
this point. They vied with one another in eagerness and activity. They devised measures for new levies, repairs of the fortresses,
and the instigation of an insurrection in Belgium;1 but
they always end by saying, that the desired object was not to be
obtained as long as their resources were crippled by anarchy, and the Parisian ententes
occupied the whole time of the Ministers. The work of entrenchment and
building fortifications had been going on in every fortress since February; each succeeding Ministry gave increasingly stringent orders to this effect. But what progress could possibly be made
when soldiers and workmen were ecpially insubordinate,
and the contractors were continually left without money? Here and there, no doubt, ill-will was added to other causes, since, up to the
Autumn, there was still a large number of aristocrats among the officers. But
infinitely more was done by the inexperience of the new popidar Authorities, who threw inumerable hindrances in the
way of mdi-tary operations by their unauthorized and mischievous interference. The reports of the Parisian Commissioners—who went at the end
of August into the Departments,2 and
are in this respect perfectly trustworthy—afford us a multitude of proofs. The result was certain enough, that not one of the border
fortresses—neither Metz nor Thioiiville, neither Verdun nor Sedan, neither
Naney nor Saarlouis—were in a complete state of defence.
When the German preparations began, Lafayette's corps in Sedan amounted to 19,000 men, and Luckner had about an ecpial number—after subtracting the
garrisons—in his
1 Lajard empowered Luckner, on the
25th of June, formally to acknowledge the Belgian Revolutionary
Committee. — 2 Published in part, in thr Revolutions
de Paris, Sept.
1792.
118
ONSET OF THE ALLIES. [Book IV.
Army of the Centre, in Metz. Rather more than 25,000 men, that is
nearly two-thirds of these troops, were regiments of the line; the rest were
National Guards, who, however, had been in the field for a year,
and in the camp for four months, and were in no respect inferior to their
military comrades. It was very evident, that the shock of the great German army
could not be sustained by these 38,000 men. Lajard, therefore, in July ordered General Montesquiou to send off twenty battalions of the
Army of the South to Metz, and had issued similar directions for Dumouriez with
regard to the six thousand men in the camp at Maulcle. From these two sources together, the line of
the Meuse would have re-reived a reinforcement of nearly 18,000 men, and
the total number of forces on that river would have been raised to 56,000
men. As, moreover, all the fortresses
were manned, and more than 11,000 men
on the Flemish frontier and 22,000 men (besides the garrisons) of the Rhine army were disposable, the
chances of the French and the Duke of
Brunswick with his 80,000 invaders, were tolerably equal; and there was
certainly no need of the Revolution of the 10th of August for the defence of the country.
But we have seen how the patriots of Paris, influenced by party
considerations, frustrated the intentions of Lajard. To oblige Montesquiou, the
Gironde prevented the sending off of the 20 battalions; to bind Dumouriez to
their party, the Jacobins procured him permission to
remain in Maulde. In the place of these measures they induced the National Assembly to declare that the country was in clanger; and on the 24th of
July, after a consultation with Luckner and Montesquiou, they caried a law for the organization of National volunteers. During these
proceedings, however, the revolution of the 10th of August occurred, and
universal disorder followed this grand coup of
the Cordeliers and Jacobins. In Paris they had still no other resource than fresh levies of volunteers, and the enlistment of the masses. The men
thus raised were collected, according to the suggestion
Cn.
IV.] CHARACTER OF THE REPUBLICAN
FORCES. llll
of Lajard, in a camp at Soissons, for the purpose of being equipped and exercised before they were distributed among the
different armies. We have the documents relating to this subject before us,
which give a wretched picture of the state of affairs during the whole month of
August. There was no lack of recruits;1 on
the 4th of August there were 6,492, of whom a part was sent to Metz and Sedan;
on the 21st there were 10,000 men in the camp, and of these, four battalions were sent to Metz. On the same day Servan reported 256 new companies from various districts,
whereupon the General of the camp, Dnhoux, replied with some consternation, that this addition would make up an army of 20,000, and
that he was a lost man if he could not provide for them. The prospect in this
respect was a gloomy one; for the great majority there were neither muskets,
shoes nor food. They therefore lived at the cost of the peasants, as in an
enemy's country; were constantly quarrelling with one another, and crying out
against the treachery of the government. The Generals in command deprecated" so great an addition to their numbers, which could only
diminish the scanty supplies allotted to the armies. They therefore hit on the
idea of dividing the camp, and quartering' the larger masses in Troyes, Rheims
and Soissons, and moving the best equipped to Chalons, nearer the
theatre of war, and gradually drafting them off thence to
the different armies. Luckner, whose unfitness for active service became daily
more evident, was replaced by Kellerman in the Army of the Centre, and
entrusted as Generalissimo with the superintendence of the camp. During the months of September he received, in
his new capacity, about 1,800 recruits a day; reckoning all together,
therefore, we find that up to the 20th of September the danger of the country
produced 60,000 men,
1 Of the officers of these
battalions were Brune, St. Cyr, Jourdan, Lan-
no
fewer than 46 subsequently at- nes, Massena, Moreau, Oudinot, and
tained
the rank of Marshals and Victor. Mortimer Ternaux, II. 112. Generals of
Division. Among them
120
ONSET
OF THE ALLIES.
[Book IV,
not half of whom could be counted on for active service, and who by no
means made up for the loss which the armies suffered from the disorders of the
Revolution—-from desertion, want of provisions and insubordination. This state of things becomes more palpable
when we find that in the months of July and August, 8,000 men were missing in
Lafayette's corps, 4,G00 in the Army of the Centre, and 4,000 in the Army of
the South,1 without any one being able to say what had become of
them. Though these are not quite ecpial figures to the number of volunteers
above stated, the difference was more than outweighed by the inferior quality of the new troops. In short, though the Revolution had done much to excite the feelings of the People
against the enemy, it had contributed in a no less degree to render the land
defenceless against a serious military attack.
Such was the condition of the opposing powers; the one was so reduced
in military strength that nothing but the courage of despair
could inspire the hope of a successful resistance; and the other was so weak in
the means of offensive warfare, that, under ordinary
circumstances, no reasonable man would have ventured the slightest aggressive
operation. The Duke of Brunswick was in constant
dread of a revolutionary power whieh had no existence; and the King relied on
the alleged feelings of the French people, of whieh the very contrary actually
prevailed. The latter illusion was dispelled quickly enough; but Brunswick adhered all the more obstinately to
the former; and his own weakness prevented him from observing the gaps and
flaws in the armour of the enemy. This was the course of things during the
whole campaign; it was not a struggle of force with force,
talent with talent, but a competition of deficicnces and errors. A mistake on
one side was immediately made good by a still greater blunder on the
other. Hence arose
1 According to the lists, and the
Correspondence of the Generals.
Ch.
IV.]
DUMOURIEZ'S
MISTAKES.
121
a number of unforeseen vicissitudes which filled the campaign with a series of critical situations; these, however, invariably
ended in nothing, so that the final residt was in accordance with the natural effect of the relative numbers. The longer the' attacking, and,
at first, superior party delayed, the weaker it became, whde the defenders were
strengthened by their very retreat. When both parties were in equal strength,
the invaders ceased to advance, and immediately afterwards
began their retreat.1
When the Prussians reached the French borders, General Dumouriez was
Commander-in-chief, having been appointed on the 18th of August. Had he
hastened to the Meuse with all his disposable forces, according to the instructions of-Servan, he might have reached Sedan in a week,
and, considering the weakness of the Austrians in
Belgium, might have safely taken 11,000 men with him. He woidd thus have
arrived in Sedan during the siege of Longwy, might have retreated without any hindrance to the Argonnes, covered Verdun, and joined Kellermann. An army of 50,000 men would have
been thus collected at this point before a single German soldier had appeared
on the Meuse; in which case the Duke would hardly have been persuaded to cross that river. The affair would then in all probability
have resulted in a tiresome campaign for the possession of the fortresses on
the Meuse.
But Dumouriez was far from considering the position of affairs on the
Meuse, and of his own corps in Sedan, as particularly
hazardous. His extended command only increased the ardour with which he
prosecuted his favourite scheme for. the conquest of Belgium. Instead, therefore, of
1
C. Renouard (Geschichte des has given especially full details of
framosischen Revoltttionskriegs 1702) the movements of the Hessian Corps,
has
related the particulars of this from written sources, campaign with great
exactness; and
122
ONSET
OF THE ALLIES.
[Book IV.
marching, he asked the Minister to aid him in his purpose by a
reinforcement of 20,000 men, and a sum of 4 million francs. "The conquest
of Belgium," he wrote on the 23d, "will outweigh the loss of two or
three fortresses on the Meuse; Lafayette's flight shows
the impossibility of a civil war, and the clanger of foreign invasion is not
great: the enemy will exhaust their strength before the fortresses, and advance
no further." On the 26th Servan replied by sending
him express orders to start for Sedan. Dumouriez unwillingly
obeyed, found everything in his new sphere of operations in the most wretched
condition, and was only still more confirmed in his attachment to his Belgian
project. He wrote to Servan on the 29th that no defensive war could be
carried on with such troops; that their morale
must be first raised by a striking success, which was only to be sought
in Belgium. To give greater weight to his representations
he assembled his principal officers in a Council of AVar, and laid his views
before them. The discussion of his proposal was of no
long duration, for no one knew how to meet the attack of the Duke with 19,000
men, or to bring forward a more promising plan. The
General dwelt on the exhaustion of the country, the inexperience of his troops,
and the superior numbers of the enemy. There was nothing left, he said, but to
reinforce Kellermann from the interior, to collect as many
volunteers as possible in Chalons and Soissons, and trust to a long defence of
the fortresses. Meanwhile the Army of the North ought to make a bold stroke in
Belgium, and thereby change the whole character of the war, and carry confusion
into the ranks of the enemy. The Generals present
signified their assent, and a year afterwards Dillon wrote, "I was
entirely convinced by what he said." A few subalterns gnashed their teeth
with rage, but they had no voice in the matter. The Council of War sent up
Dumouriez's proposal to the Minister as
their own; "Nothing but a desperate
Ch.
IV.] VARIANCE BETWEEN SERVAN AND
DUMOURIEZ. 123
venture," the memorial concluded, "can save us in this imminent peril of the country."1
So untrue is the statement of Dumouriez in his memoirs,
that this Council of War only considered the question of a retreat beyond the
Loire; and that he himself pointed out the Argonnes on the map to his adjutant
Thouvenot, with the words; "Here are the Thermopylae of France." The merit of pointing out this position belongs to Servan, the
Minister at War. As early as the 31st the latter sent a plan of the campaign to
the General, recommended the Argonnes to him, where he could assume the
character rather of an aggressor than a defender, and easily recruit his
strength from the troops on the borders of Flanders. On the following day he
repeated, in the name of the Conned of Ministers, both to Dumouriez
and Kellermann, the order to unite their forces in the passes of Grandpre and Clermont, in order to cover the capital on this favourable ground. He
was far from over-estimating the strength of this wooded position; the main
point in his eyes was the retrograde movement, by which the corps, hitherto
separated, and exposed singly to attack, would be united between
Paris and the enemy. In several subsequent despatches be spoke of a position
behind the Marne near Chalons, as still better suited to the object in view.
With regard to Dumouriez's designs on Belgium, he rejected them for several reasons. He was of opinion, in the first place, that the people
in Paris would raise a cry of treachery, and murder him as the author of the scheme; and he likewise thought that the conquest of Brabant would not prevent the enemy from marching on Paris, which would of itself ensure the
recovery of
1 First mentioned by Jomini, then
the officers present, General Dillon
called in question by Schulz, and and Captain Gobert. We are aston-
then
confirmed by Joinville from the ished to
find that the usually so
Protocol of
the Council of
war well-informed Poisson, I.
508, re-
Spectateur Militaire, XXX.). We peats in this place the fable of Du-
have
also consulted the reports of mouriez's Jlcnmires.
124
ONSET OF THE
ALLIES.
[Book IV.
the Belgian province. All that Dumouriez could have urged against these
conclusive arguments was, that his plan was not founded on the abstract rules
of strategy, but chiefly on the certainty that, if Belgium were threatened, the Austrians would immediately recall their
corps to that country, and that Brunswick would not venture alone, with 50,000
men into the interior of France.
But before the General could treat any further on this point with the
Minister, circumstances imperatively forced him to take the path
which Servan had pointed out. Brunswick had spent two days at Longwy,
in establishing depots and magazines, and then began his march towards Verdun;
for he, like the rest of the world, supposed that Dumouriez and Kellermann were on their way from North and South respectively, with the view
of uniting their forces in that place. It was on this account that Clerfait was
sent to the North towards Stenai, to check the conjectured march of Dumouriez;
while Hohenlohe beleaguered Thionville, after sending
forward the Emigres to the South to protect the flank and rear of the army
against Kellermann. By these movements the French forces were in a fair way of
fjeing entirely cut off from one another. Dumouriez, who had wasted nearly a week over his Belgian plans, saw himself suddenly surrounded on all
sides by overpowering dangers. He was still in Sedan, on the 31st, when the
Prussians reached Verdun, sent Count Kalkreuth's corps over the Meuse, and
began to bombard the place. Clerfait arrived on the same day with
13,000 men at Stenai, a few marches south of Dumouriez's position, and.
therefore between the latter and Verdun. The French General now saw that it was
all over with his hopes of Belgium. His thoughts then recurred to the Argonnes, not indeed as a position which would decide the campaign, but
as the only outlet by which he could escape being entirely surrounded. "My
little army,'' he wrote to Servan, "would be in a mousetrap, cut off from
Paris, from Kellermann, and its magazines, if the Prussians
Ch.
IV.] CONTRAST BETWEEN BRUNSWICK AND DUMOURIEZ. 125
were to occupy tbe mountains with 20,000 men; I must give up the Meuse,
leave Verdun to its fate, and shall perhaps be forced to march to Grandpre on
the Aire, and defend the pass of Autry, while a separate corps covers the
passes of Clermont." He was not a little enraged at the id-fortune which
had brought him into such a position, but he still attributed it to other
causes than his unnecessary loitering in Sedan. "These are the results
of your defensive warfare," he wrote on the 31st; "if it had not been
for the taking of Longwy, I should never have gone to Sedan; and now I am
compromised here, without being able to save anything." But notwithstanding
his displeasure, he continued to be entirely free from apprehension as to the
final issue of the war. Since he had learned that scarcely 60,000 were advancing against him,1 the
immediate danger only appeared to him in the light of a temporary obstacle in
the path of glory. "O that I had but my reinforcements," he wrote
to the Minister on the 2nd, "that I might give up this tedious defence,
and drive the enemy out of the country!"
If we could imagine the Duke of Brunswick endowed with a few sparks of
this restless energy, it is not easy to see how the
French divisions could have escaped his concentrated
force. And we may add that vice
versa, his sharpsighted wariness would never have allowed him, in Dumouriez's
case, to rnn so near to destruction: the rash confidence
in favouring fortune, with which Dumouriez incessantly imperilled the defence of the country, woidd have stood the Duke in good
stead in his aggressive operations;—especially if his army had been stronger by
50,000 men.
Meanwhile the position of the French grew worse from hour to
hour. On the same day, on which Dumouriez wrote those confident words, Verdun
capitulated. The works were
-mi
1 According to the report of his
spies, which were quite correct, more than
20,000 men were left behind,
partly before Thionville, and partly to cover the communications.
12G
ONSET
OF THE ALLIES.
[Book IV.
in a wretched
condition, the citizens showed royalist leanings, the Council of war lost its
head, and resolved to surrender on the evening of the 1st. The
Commandant Beaurepaire was found the following morning, swimming in his own
blood, with a discharged pistol in his
band.1 The next day the town was filled with the report that he had shot
himself in the midst of the Council of war, out of patriotic despair. It
was like the cry of the retiring garrison—"Ah revoir
in Champagne!"—an ominous commentary to the stories of the Emigres
about the royalist sentiments of the People. But Brunswick was still master of
the situation, and needed only to stretch out his hand to
take possession, in a few hours, of the grand object of all the enemy's
movements—the Argonnes. These mountains stretch from
South to North, nearly parallel to the Meuse, from St. Menehould to the
neighbourhood of Sedan. From the most southerly - of its
passes—the Islettes, near St. Menehould—Brunswick was at this time ten hours
march, but General Dillon, whom Dumouriez intended to send thither, a
march of eighteen hours. Count Kalkreuth had advanced on the 2nd to Varennes and Avoncourt, and could have reached the central and most important
pass, near Grandpre, in four hours, while Dumouriez Avas eight
hours distant, and Avas moreover
held in check by Clerfait. Even Avith a vieAV of supporting the siege of Verdun, it would
seem to have been advisable to push forward a corps to the mountains, whieh, in
case of failure, could have made good its retreat, without molestation, to the
main army.
But the mistakes committed by Dumouriez at Sedan, from a desire of
assuming the offensive, Avere
made good by BrunsAA'ick's
disinclination to attack. As early as the 1st of September, when he was
on the heights of St. Michael before Verdun, he had declared his
intention not to cross the
1 Mernm'res of
Gen. Lemoine, who was present and is even doubtful about the suicide.
Ch.
IV.] BRUNSWICK'S EXCESSIVE CAUTION. 127
Meuse.1 The prospects of a counter-revolution held out by the Emigres
had proved as illusory as the Austrian promise of 106,000 men. The occupation
of Longwy and Verdun, the siege of Thionville, and the protection of his
communications, employed full 20,000; an equal
number would be required for similar purposes during a
further advance on Paris, and 10,000 more, at the lowest computation, would be
carried off by battle and the wear and tear of the march; what then would
become of the handful of men who appeared before armed and desperate Paris? The matter was debated for hours, but was decided at last by the
personal wishes of the King. Contempt for the rebels still predominated in his mind, and he considered that he had not yet done enough
for his allies; he therefore ordered a further, advance
into the enemy's country. The more extravagant the boldness of this resolution
appeared to the Duke, the more urgently did he deem himself called upon to
observe the most solicitous caution. The smallness of his means, whieh would
have disposed a man of different temperament to display
the greatest daring, weighed heavily on his scrupulous
nature. It is a false conclusion, that because one of two combatants is
conscious of an unguarded point, the other must necessarily be able to hit it;
and Brunswick was always too much inclined to
forget the dangers of his opponent in an exaggerated sense of
his own weakness. Added to this was his unfortunate habit of never openly opposing the wdl of the King, but of carrying his own point by covert
means. Had he returned his Marshal's baton to the
King, rather than agree to what he considered a ruinous enterprise, the King
would hardly have persisted in his purpose. In this case, though no laurels would have
been
1 Lettres sur I'ouvrage intitule " Vie Dnke, and
published in England
de Dumouriez." According
to Malmes- through the agency of Staiupford.
bury, (Diary,
Jan 24. 1795,) the As far as we know the correspond-
book
appears to have been written enee of the Duke, it agrees entirely
under the superintendence of the with the contents of the book.
128
ONSET
OP THE ALLIES.
[Book IV.
gathered beyond the Argonnes, yet in all human probability the line of
the Meuse, with all its fortresses, would have been maintained. If, on the other hand, in spite of his own views, he had adopted
the King's plan, and carried it out with zeal and rapidity, he would hardly
indeed have put down the Revolution with 60,000 men, but he might have grained
brilliant victories over the French divisions. In either case
his own army would have remained in good condition, and morally superior to the
enemy; and would have formed an excellent basis for a future campaign. Instead
of this, the Duke went to work with a sigh, and prepared to cool down the royal rashness by his own tardiness of execution. He directed
his searching gaze in every other direction, but not forwards. He was not
informed of Dumouriez's movements, for the population,--especially in the
villages—who thought that the Prussians had no livelier desire than the
restoration of the tithes, kept timidly and angrily aloof, so that it was
extremely difficult to obtain spies. In this state of uncertainty, the Duke saw no reason for hastening to the Argonnes, since intercepted letters from Paris spoke of Chalons as
the rendezvous
of the French. He was greatly disquieted by Kellermann's marches on his
left flank, and still more so by intelligence of movements in the Army of the
Rhine, which seemed to indicate operations on the part of the French in the rear of the Allies. Consecpiently he would take no
step in advance until he had provided for the maintenance of his army for a
long period, and concentrated his forces as far as possible. He called in the
Emigres, ordered Hohenlohe to station a portion of his corps before
Thionville, and to join the main body with the rest; he likewise quickened the
movements of the Hessians, who being ill provided with means of transport came
on but slowly.1 Not until the arrival of the
latter in Verdun on
1 Brunswick wrote to Tauenzien on
the 7th Sept., that it was certain that the hostile army was collecting between
St. Menehould and Chalons and
Oh.
IV.] DUMOURIEZ OCCUPIES THE
ARGONNES.
129
the 10th, did he give orders for the resumption of operations; but it was now too late to reap the fruits of the King's
boldness, and nothing remained but the perils of an ill-supported offensive
movement.
Dumouriez had several days before withdrawn his neek from the noose; as early as the 2nd of September he abandoned his positions at Sedan, Mouzon and Stenai. Dillon, who commanded
his van, had a skirmish with Clerfait's Austrians;
but the latter did not venture to attack Stenai on his own responsibility, and still less to cross the Meuse. Dumouriez therefore was enabled
to reach Grandpre on the 4th of September, and Dillon arrived at the Islettes
on the 5th, after a most toilsome march through wood and swamp. The French were
not a little relieved to find the desired positions unoccupied.
Dumouriez remarked, "If the King of Prussia advances on Paris now, he is a
lost man." He began with great satisfaction to settle himself between the
wooded hills in the narrow meadow valley of the Aire, which intersects the chain of the Argonnes near Grandpre. The natural advantages of the
ground were strengthened by trenches and stockades, and Dumouriez began to
boast that the position was impregnable. The chief gain was that a pause in the
operations ensued, which Servan eagerly made use of to send
forward more troops. The number of volunteers from Paris rose on some
days to 2,400; it was the beginning of September, when enlistment was almost
the only refuge from the dagger of the Democrats. By the 9th 6,000 of these had reached Dumouriez, and the camp at Rheims promised to furnish 1,500,
so that he and Dillon together had now a force of 26,000 men. A still more important point was that, at the urgent instigation of Servan, General
Beurnonville at last received orders to lead 11,000 from the camps of
Maulde and Maubeuge to Chalons. Gen-
had
already thrown up lines in the woods; and that it was therefore of the greatest
importance to colleet all his forces to drive them thence.
l3U
ONSET
OF THE ALLIES.
[BookTV.
era! Duval, too, was on his way from Pont-snr-Sambre with a corps'of
5,000 men hastily collected from different garrisons,
which gradually increased to 10,000,! and occupied the most northerly pass,
near Chene le Populeux. On the South, again, Kellermann,
still farther strengthened by a division of the Army of the Rhine, was
approaching with nearly 24,000 men.2
These corps consisted entirely of troops of the line or old National guards. If
the Argonnes could be held till their arrival, a force of 70,000 men
would be collected, which would be daily increased by crowds of volunteers; while the enemy, from the very nature of the ease, must
inevitably melt away at every step in advance. Even Servan had no longer any
doubt of the issue; he would himself have preferred a
position still farther back, in order to put the failure of the all-important
junction beyond the range of possibility; but he was now full of resolute energy and inspiring hopes. "They may perhaps,'' he wrote
on the 4th, "kill a 100,000 of our men, but not many of them shall
carry back the news of their chivalrous crusade to Germany." Two days
afterwards, he added: "The Americans, in a worse climate, destitute of
arms and ammunition, maintained their freedom; why should
not we be able to do the same? Let us ouly pass through the dark hour with
courage, and we shall be free, and the last moments
of the counter-revolution will have come. These Princes know not of what a
desperate People is capable; let them find nothing
but ashes and ruins, and annihilate them as soon as winter begins."
Dumouriez was stdl more joyful and enthusiastic, wretched as was the condition
of his forest camp. "Of your pikemen," he reported on the 7th,
"I have not yet seen a single individual, but I
do not intend to make use of them until I am in
Germany, when I am chasing the flying enemy before me." "If the King of
1 Joirrville, 379. — 2 14,400 infantry, 4,900 cavalry,
and in addition to these, 4,000 men of Custine's corps who joined him in Toul on the 6th,
Ch. IV.] DUMOURIEZ ALLOWS HIMSELF TO
BE SURPRISED. 131
Prussia advances towards Paris," he wrote to Kellermann, "I
shall hang on his left flank; he will then have you at his heels, and the
Parisians in front of him; it will be a miracle if he
escapes."
But he had still to learn how dangerous it is to indulge in splendid
dreams, and overlook the path which lies at our feet. His position was not a
bad one, but by no means unassailable. The Argonnes are heights which rise to the moderate elevation of 330 ft. above the level of the valley.1
Their best defence is the softness of the clay soil, which in rainy weather
turns the roads into swamps; but if we look for impenetrable forests, narrow
mountain-passes, or steep and rocky ravines, we shall find no more of
these than in a hundred other parts of the subsequent theatre of war, which
scarcely gave occasion for the hurrah!2 of a
swarm of skirmishers.
If we once more imagine the two Generals to have changed places, there
is no doubt that Dumouriez, at the head of the Germans, woidd have
immediately forced the splendid positions of Grandpre and the Islettes at the
point of the bayonet; and that Brunswick, on the defence, would have retired,
calmly fighting, to his reinforcements, according to Servan's ideas; but
he would certainly not have allowed himself to be surprised without means of
resistance at any point in the chain of hills. And this is just what Dumouriez did.
On the 10th and 11th all the divisions of the Prussian army left Verdun, and marched towards Dumouriez's camp
1 A medium elevation of 100 metres
above the nearest valley;
Joinville, 375. — 2 Napoleon's words eoncerning the
weakness of the position are well known. To the same
effect St. Cyr, Campagnes da Rhin, I.
LXV. The Generals of that period had good reason, from the issue, to laud its
strength, and were able to do so because it was put to the test of an attack.
Of modern writers Ditfurth comes to the conclusion stated in our text.
Joinville, from the same data, has a somewhat higher opinion
of the position.
I 2
132
ONSET
OF THE ALLIES.
[Book IV.
at Grandpre. Hohenloke-Kircliberg and the Landgrave of Hesse, with
about 14,000, men watched the Islettes in the south of the main army; Clerfait
was on the north, having moved up from Stenai, with 10,000—11,000 men opposite
the pass of the Croix aux Bois—between Grandpre and Chene le
Populeux. On the 12th September all the French positions were reconnoitred, for
the most part without result; but at the Croix aux Bois Clerfait found only
weak outposts of the enemy, and pushed forward his van into the pass. He was indeed driven back again on the 13th by General Chazot, who was
sent forward in all haste with six battalions; but on the 14th Clerfait gave
him a complete defeat, recovered the pass, and drove Chazot
in the direction of Vouziers, away from his communications
with Dumouriez. Herupon the French evacuated Chene le Populeux also, which was
immediately taken possession of by the Emigres. A passage
through the mountains was thus laid open, and if Clerfait had pressed forward
without delay he might, on the very same evening, have closed
the pass of Grandpre in the rear, and for the moment shut in Dumouriez. This
would not indeed have ended the affair, since Kellermann and Beurnon-ville were
already so near that they might have come to the rescue in two days with 40,000 men; and Clerfait cautiously halted, and did not venture
by himself into the plains of Champagne which lay stretched before him. At all
events Dumouriez's position at Grandpre had become untenable, and consequently
his whole plan was overthrown.
But he was not long in recovering himself; a few hours after Chazot's
defeat, his troops fell into their ranks at-the approach of darkness, and made
a hasty march towards the South during the night. His intention was to give up
the level country as far as Chalons and Rheims to the
Prussians, to plant himself back to back with Dillon behind the Islettes, and
to call up all the other corps—Chazot from Vouziers, Harvdle from Rheims,
Dubouquct from Chene le Populeux, Beurnonville from Chalons, Kellermann from Vitry—to that
Ch. iv.]
FLIGHT
OF CIIAZOT'S TROOPS.
133
point. His retreat was not disturbed in the night, and, from the
difficulties of the ground in the forest, the Prussians coidd not have done him
much harm. The march of the 15th September in the plains beyond
the Aisne was more hazardous. He had only a few hours' start, as the Prussians
had entered Grandpre with the early dawn; and in spite of the energy of their
commander, his troops recognized their danger, and it soon became apparent that an energetic pursuit woidd have dispersed the armyr.
Towards midday the hussars of the Prussian vanguard came up with the French
rear. At the same moment Chazot's troops, which were likewise on their march to
St. Menehould, came in sight on the right flank. When the latter saw
the enemy, the panic of the Croix aux Bois was renewed; they broke their ranks,
rushed past Dumouriez's rear-guard, and communicated their confusion to the whole main body of the French army. "10,000
men," said Dumouriez, "fled before 1,500
hussars." Beurnon-ville too, who was moving on the same day from Rhetel to
St. Menehould, was also affected by the general terror; he saw Dumouriez's
columns from a distance, mistook them for the main body of the Prussians, and
drew back in haste to Chalons. Thus, if only the infantry of Prince
Hohenlohe, who led the Prussian avant
gttarde, had been at hand, the army of Dumouriez would have been scattered to the four winds. Bnt the Duke would not quit the mountains until he had
arranged the transport of his supply of bread through the defiles. He once more
made up by his sins of omission for Dumouriez's mistakes. The French General
soon rallied his regiments when they found that they were not
pursued, and occupied his new camp at St. Menehould on the 17th of September.
He remained here alone for two days, so that Brunswick might have attacked him
with two-fold superior numbers. The King was exceedingly displeased; "You don't look sharp enough," he said, "you allow the
enemy to escape;" guided by a true instinct, he desired a battle. But the
Duke was inexorable, and remained for two days in Landres, close
134
ONSET
OF THE ALLIES.
[Book IV.
to the pass of Grandpre, where he was busily engaged with the baking
and transport of bread. He then devised a manoeuvre for reopening the
communications with Verdun, gaining possession of the Islettes pass, and
effecting the destruction of the hostile army; and 'all without bloodshed,
perhaps without any fighting, merely by surrounding the enemy and cutting him
off from his magazines. This scheme was brought to maturity after slow and
hesitating examination of the ground on all sides, but was suddenly interrupted iu the very commencent of its execution tby
the King. The latter had received the false intelligence that the French had
begun to draw off towards Chalons, and immediately exclaiming that they
should not escape him a second time, he lead his arnry
without delay—not, as the Duke wished, into the mountains, but straight into
the plain,—not upon the flank, but upon the rear of the enemy, in the direct
road from St. Menehould to Chalons. They soon discovered that the enemy had
remained quietly in their quarters, but the troops were
now sure that they would at last soon be engaged, and with this prospect they
hurried forward with joyful enthusiasm.
Meanwhile Dumouriez had settled himself in his new camp, He lay with
his front towards Paris, and the Aisne in his rear, between two small
branches of that stream, the Auve and the Bionne, on the ridges which enclose
St. Menehould on the West. Before him lay a country much intersected,
consisting of marshy meadows. Late on the 18th Beurnon-ville, completely recovered from his panic, had joined the camp with his own troops and
seven battalions of volunteers from Chalons. This force now formed the right
wing of Dumouriez's army, which was increased to- nearly 40,000. On the 14th
Kellermann came up from the opposite side with 18,000 men, so that
the French had now the decided advantage in numbers, as Kalkreuth's Prussian
Corps was stationed farther back to protect the communications, and Clerfait
and the Emigres did not join the main army till
Ch.
IV.]
ENGAGEMENT
NEAR. VALMY.
135
the evening of the 20th. Before the arrival of the latter, therefore,
the Germans were not more than 30,000 strong. The moment was gradually
approaching, when the inevitable danger of widely extended offensive operations necessarily made themselves felt. The intrinsic
superiority of the Prussian troops over the disorganised soldiers and the
undisciplined volunteers, still preserved the balance between them, but the
decision could not be long deferred. At this crisis a fresh mistake on
the part of the French gave the assadants the last chance of a splendid
victory.
Kellermann was to have formed Dumouriez's left wing, and to have
carried the line of the army on the Southern bank of the Auve over the heights of Dampierre. By some misunderstanding of his instructions,
however, he had crossed the Auve, and pushed forward in front of Dumouriez's position. His troops were thickly massed together on the Windmill hdl of
Valmy, without the possibility of deploying, with low swamps on one side, a
single bridge over the Anve on their right, and the road to St. Menehould in
their rear blocked up by their own waggons. AVhen therefore the Prussian
columns coming from Massige reached the Chalons road, and then wheeled to the left against the French position,
Kellermann was exposed to the whole shock of their attack, and Dumouriez ;was
unable to send him direct or speedy assistance. At 6 o'clock in the morning
Kellermann caught sight of the first Prussian troops; at 7 o'clock began the cannonade, which immediately inflicted heavy loss on
Kellermann's Curassiers, and put a column under Chazot— which Dumouriez had
sent forward on the left near Valmy— to rapid flight. At 10 o'clock one of
Kellermann's powder-waggons blew up, upon which—to use Kellermann's
own words—the disorder became general, the waggoners ran away, and the front
rank of the infantry began to yield. The French officers had the greatest
difficulty in restoring some degree of order; but at the same time the Prussians formed three attacking columns, which with great alacrity
136
ONSET
OF THE ALLIES.
[Book IV.
prepared to storm the hill, so that Kellermann harangued his men with
redoubled zeal, and tried to encourage them by hurraing and
waving his hat. We pause for a moment in our relation to enquire into the views
of the best authorities on either side, respecting the position and prospects
of the opposing parties. "The timid anxiety which pervaded the French
troops," says the Prussian General Valentini, "and
the calm intrepidity of the Prussians, leave no doubt that Kellermann would
have been driven back upon Dumouriez, and both together hurled back into the
valley of the Aisne; and what losses must have been suffered during such a flight!" Gouvion St. Cyr, himself a republican general—who even
under Napoleon continued to pride himself on his origin—was of opinion, that
owing to the insufficient training of the French troops at this period, nothing
but a great superiority of numbers, or an impregnable position, could
have enabled them to make a successful resistance. "I have no doubt,"
he says, "that a great calamity would have befallen
us, if the Duke had carried out the attack according to the King's
orders." The parties interested took the same view of the matter.
Servan, the Minister, at once exhorted Dumouriez on the 18th not to engage in
any contest, but to retire according to Kellermann's wish towards Chalons and
the Marne; "The Prussians are lost," he wrote, "if we can
protract the campaign without fighting. Kellermann himself, as we may suppose,
does not speak so frankly as Valentini, but he points out instead another no
less pregnant clanger. In speaking of his detestable position, he observes: If
a Prussian corps (and there is nothing to prevent it) were to
occupy the heights of Dampierre and Voilemont"—the position originally destined for himself—"we should be entirely
surrounded in the low grounds near St. Menehould, cut off from Chalons as well
as Vitry, and therefore from all our supplies." Dillon,
who still held the Islettes against Hohenlohe, and thereby covered the rear of
the French army, regarded this movement of the enemy as so certain, that he
directed
Ch.IV.] BRUNSWICK ALLOWS THE FRENCH TO ESCAPE. 137
his men in that case to fill their pockets with potatoes, and to make
their way singly through the woods to the fortresses on the Moselle.1
But the very two fold chance of victory seems to have lamed the action
of the Prussians. One of their chiefs intended
to fight, the other to intercept, and they hindered one another. The King
wished to storm and defeat, and never went out of sight of the army; so that
those heights were never occupied by the Prussians. But the Duke was determined
not to fight under any circumstances, since at the
best it must cost him much blood, and he considered every loss as irreparable.
He was altogether opposed to the march upon Paris, as a ruinous enterprise, and
he feared by the loss even of a few thousand men to imperil his operations against the fortresses of the
Meuse, to which he still firmly adhered. When therefore the storming columns
had formed in high spirits at 11 o'clock he once more examined the position of
the enemy, and then informed the King that there must be
no battle. The cannonade continued, the commanders debated, and time passed
away. In the evening Kellermann drew himself from his dangerous position, and
occupied during the night the heights to the South of the Auve. When the Duke
on the following morning likewise pushed forward a few
divisions towards the South to threaten the communications of the enemy with
Vitry, it was too late. Kellermann's whole army covered this road, and the
Prussian demonstration was an empty show.
On the important clay of the 20th, scarcely 200 men had
fallen on either side. The impression made on both armies was tremendous. The
young French soldiers were highly elated at having stood their ground against
the warriors of
1 The Author of the Tableau
de had
the fairest prospect of beating
la Guerre de la Revolution, II.
119, Kellermann;
or, if he had occupied
comes
to exactly the same conclusion the heights
beyond the Auve, of
after
consulting the minutes of the checkmating Dumouriez. French Ministry at war.
Brunswick
138
ONSET OF THE ALLIES. [Book IV.
Frederick the Great; but a little while ago unsteady and inclined to
panic, distrusting both themselves and their leaders, they were now inspired
with the greatest joy and enthusiasm. The feelings of the Prussians were in an equal degree depressed. "We are
conquered," cried the old General of Hussars, Wolfradt,
"because we have not fought; for what other purpose did we come hither but
to fight?" Goethe, whom some discontented officers begged for a powerful expression of their feelings, gave them this very
correct, but equally sorry, consolation: "From this day a new epoch in the
history of the world begins, and you can say that you were present at its
birth." In reality, the crushing of the young
Republic was put quite out of the question on the very day of its
establishment. After the last opportunity of defeating the French armies
singly, at the moment of their junction, had been lost, the dady increasing masses of their opponents—the lateness of
the season —the falling spirits, numbers and strength, of the German
troops—decided the retreat of the Prussians. Dumouriez had long had no doubt
that it would be so, supposing the position of things to become such as
they actually became on the 21st. But the boldness with which he
had undervalued his own danger, was fully equalled byr the
freedom from prejudice with which he recognized the powerful means which were
still at the disposal of his enemy. The Prussians
had not been in any sense conquered; their superiority in tactics was
undiminished, and their numbers still sufficiently
large to deal dangerous blows. How would it be, he thought, if after breaking
through the Argonnes in the North, they were to pass the' French position,
skirting the mountains in the South, and thus carry the
devastations of war into the hitherto unscathed Lorraine? Or what if they were
quietly to return by the old route, and suddenly to attack the weakly
garrisoned fortresses of Sedan and Mont-medy, and by their capture secure themselves winter-quarters on the Meuse? We know that this very
thought occupied
Cn.
IV.]
DUMOURIEZ'S
WISE CAUTION.
139
the mind of the Duke, but Dumouriez felt himself
by no means strong enough to be sure of frustrating either of these
enterprises. From the number of the recruits who were now joining the French
army, he might perhaps see his force sufficiently increased within a few days; everything woidd be gained if he could keep the Prussians for this
space of time in their present position.1 He
determined therefore, if possible, to obtain this respite by negotiation.2
The French General could have no doubt that there existed among several individuals at the
head-quarters of the
1 Letter to Servan, Sep. 26: "I
am trying to raise the number of my forces to 80,000; till then I shall amuse
the enemy with fruitless negotiations." — 2 We shall detail these negotiations
in this and the following chapters the more fully,
because their real purport has been hitherto entirely unknown, and has heen the
subject of various conjectures and fictions. First, Marat and his associates accused Dumouriez of treachery; then Beauchamp (Alemoires
d'un homme d'Etat) made pretended disclosures adverse
to the character of Brunswick, which have been repeated a
thousand times, and even brought forward again by Menzel. More recently, the Legitimist Michaud bas set up a counterpart to the charges
of Marat by warming up with wonderful aplomh and numerous details the old Emigrants' fable, that
Brunswick, Haugwitz, &c. were bribed by the booty of the September
massacres and the crown jewels. Joinville in France, aud Stramberg in Germany,
have confidently followed his lead,
We
may spare ourselves a detailed refutation of this view of the matter by giving
an account of the actual occurrences from the best of all sources, the secret
papers of the negotiations themselves. We have also the
confident assurance that no other materials besides those which
we have made use of are in existence at Paris. On the Prussian side we • have
before us the reports of Lucche-sini to the Minister in Berlin, besides which nothing of importance is likely to be found. (We have
nothing to add to what we have said above, even
after the last explanations of Stramberg. So long as
Michaud and his associates bring forward no proofs of their inventions, it is
childish, in the face of authentic sources to ask for a special refutation of those idle tales, the authors of which
might have read the actual facts of the case, derived from official documents,
in the Tableau
de la Guerre de la Revolution, Paris
1808, II. 128)
140
ONSET
OF THE ALLIES.
[Book IV.
enemy, a strong inclination to peace. It is true
that he had no direct intelligence from the Prussians—for everything without
exception which is related of negotiations before the 20th is mere idle fable,
as the correspondence of both head-quarters equally proves. Brunswick had once, on the 14th, expressed a wish for a conference, but
Dumouriez, who was engaged in his retreat from Grandpre, declined the proposal.
But Dumouriez, who had been Minister of foreign affairs, needed no special
conference to discover a fact known throughout Europe, that the Duke
in his inmost heart woidd rather have fought against the House of Lorraine than
against the French, and that there were other influential personages who felt with him. As to the Austrians, their ardour for war
had cooled quite as much as that of their allies.
Hohenlohe-Kirchberg had on his side proposed a conference to Dumouriez; he was
a simple earnest man, who had grown grey in arms,1 and
never been anything else but a soldier; and he, at any rate, woidd not have
taken such a step without higher sanction. But Dnmonriez, who had always shaped his policy on the principle of war with Austria and peace with Prussia, rejected the Austrian proposals without
even communicating their contents to his Minister at Paris. But he eagerly seized the opportunity of approaching the King, who alone
possessed the necessary power, with the request that he would suspend
operations for a few days, and thereby gratify the dearest mditary wish of
Dumouriez.
During the cannonade of the 20th he had ordered General Leveneur to skirt the rear of the Prussians. The latter had fallen
in with the weakly guarded baggage of the army, at a point were no one had
expected a hostile attack. Vehicles of all kinds, the military
chest, baking materials, the field bureau, and military
hospitals, were all collected here; and it was only with difficulty that a
great disaster was
1 Opinion of the Duke of Brunswick.
Ch. IV.]
CHARACTER
OF COLONEL MANSTEIN.
141
warded off. In the tumult the private secretary of the King,
Lombard, aud some other civilians, were taken prisoner;1 and
Dumouriez, after liberating him on the [following day at the desire of the
King, sent him a short memorial through an adjutant, in which tbe growing
strength of the French, and the unpleasant position of the
Prussian army, were depicted. It also represented, that a
further advance of the Prussians would only aggravate the condition of Louis
XVI., without furthering the ambition of the French Princes; and above all, it emphatically declared that Prussia had no interest
in sacrificing herself for Austria, her constant enemy, and therefore offered
an arrangement, on the basis of the negotiations which had been attempted in
the Spring. The Duke immediately took up the idea with
great eagerness, and obtained the support of a man whom he had hitherto not
exactly counted among his admirers—Colonel Mansteiu, the General-Adjutant. The
latter belonged to a clique of Pietists which exercised an influence upon the
King chiefly through his need of ever fresh excitement.
Without entirely despising the enjoyments of this world, he assumed an external mien, all the more gloomy and reserved, because, in addition to
his sanctimoniousness, he had a still stronger spice of atrabilious ambition, which excited him to an active and suspicious opposition in
mditary matters to the Duke, and in diplomatic affairs to the influence of
Bischoffswerder. As a practical statesman he was a sheer egoist and materialist; recognized no other principle than the
expediency of the moment, and had just as little feeling for ideal or chivalrous aims, as for any policy founded on principle or considerations of ulterior good. Such a counterpoise might at times have been
advantageous to the devoted and generous
1 We give these details because it
has been universally said that Lombard allowed himself to he taken. He would
certainly have chosen another
place for the purpose. It is moreover certain that Dumouriez took the
initiative in the affair.
142
ONSET
OF THE ALLIES.
[Book IV.
character of the King, had the mental horizon of Manstein been
more extended, and his selfishness on all occasions a patriotic one. He would
then have seen that it may in certain cases be even prudent to subordinate for
a moment the immediate interests of the State to loftier views. We shall frequently find him engaged in such questions, and exercising
great influence; on this occasion, at Valmy, he made no secret of his opinion
that the conclusion of peace was urgently necessary. He was quite of
Dumouriez's opinion that Prussia allowed herself to be made use of by Austria
in an unwarrantable manner; that while the former was incurring cost and danger
for an object whieh concerned Austria alone, the latter only furnished a
handful of soldiers, and was sparing and strengthening herself, and intriguing against Prussia in Eastern Europe. With these
sentiments he eagerly listened to Dumouriez's overtures. The extent of his zeal
was shewn when Dumouriez, on the 22nd, sent to beg for a personal conference in
Dampierre. The envoy was Westermann, Danton's Alsatian friend, who
on the 10th of August had commanded at the storming of the Tuileries. But even
this person, disgusting as he was to the King, did not deter the adjutant. That
whieh most of all induced the King to enter into negotiations at all, was the diplomatic intelligence which had just arrived from
Vienna and St. Petersburg. Catharine still withheld the expression of her views
respecting Poland, so that the partition was as yet uncertain. The Emperor
continued indeed to advocate the cession of a Polish province to
Prussia, but he also adhered firmly to his condition of receiving Bavaria in
exchange for Belgium, and the two Franeonian Principalities besides. It was in
vain that the Prussian ambassador in Vienna represented
to him that in this way the gain of Prussia would
be reduced to null; all that he could obtain was the offer to give Prussia a
portion of Lusatia in return for the Principalities, as soon as the Saxon male
line should be extinct.
Under these circumstances, the war with France be-
Ch.
IV.] NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN FRENCH AND PRUSSIANS. 143
came extremely distasteful to the King, and on the 23rd, at Dampierre,
he gave his adjutant permission to make the following proposals to the two
French Generals, as the basis of further negotiations.
First; the King and his allies wish to have a representative of the French nation in the person of Louis XVI., with whom they
may negotiate a peace; which condition, however, is not to be understood as
implying a restoration of the ancieii
regime in any other respect.
2ndly; the King and his allies desire that all revolutionary propaganda
on the part of the French should cease.
3dly; it is wished (above everything else, might be added) that Louis
XVI. should be set at liberty.
Here then, we find nothing about Emigres, or Seigniors or
constitutional questions;—nor is there anything which points to the corruption
of Dumouriez, or the conclusion of a separate peace with Prussia. The
restoration of Louis, and the renunciation of revolutionary conquests,
make up the whole Prussian programme. But when Manstein bad brought forward
these propositions, Dumouriez was obliged to answer, on the following day,1 by
the intelligence that the Convention at its very first sitting had abolished Royalty. It was clear that the Prussian proposals had hereby
lost their basis, and that the further progress of the negotiation was rendered
extremely precarious. Dumouriez sincerely regretted this; for though military
cousiderations had given occasion to his first note, he
regarded peace with Prussia as the focus of all sound policy, and would have
gladly taken almost every kind of constitution into the bargain. The matter was
not, therefore, immediately broken off; a few messages passed betweeen the parties, for which the exchange of prisoners formed an excuse. An
entire week was thus spent, and Dumouriez fully attained his primary object—the
suspension of military operations.
1 Diary of Marquis Luccliesini,
144
ONSET
OF THE ALLIES.
[Book IV.
He made use of this interval with indefatigable activity in drawing his
reinforcements to his camp, securing what he had already gained, and opening
out new prospects. In Chalons and Rheims, General Harville and Sparre had drilled 10,000 men, which raised the army of Champagne to 70,000 men.
Dumouriez further urged the Minister to send 15,000 men of the Rhine Army by
way of Metz to Verdun—a movement in the highest degree
dangerous to the Prussian retreat. In the interval a quarrel with Kellermann and Servan threw great and unexpected
difficulties in his way. The former, who claimed all the merit of the victory
at Valmy, was irritated by the undoubted ascendancy of Dumouriez; and Servan
was incessantly urged in Paris to provide for the defence of the capital;
and they vied with one another in pressing Dumouriez to retire from his
hazardous position, beyond the Marne. Dumouriez on this occasion displayed his
great talents in their full splendour. His position, whieh on the 15th was perhaps a perilous one, now fixed the enemy to the spot on which
they stood; and he was just as little inclined to be driven out of it by the
Parisians as by the Germans. He was, at this time, the only man in France who
steaddy defied the roar of the capital; although the volunteers of
his army brought its echoes closely and sharply to his ears. It was no easy
task to keep his ill-disciplined, hungry, and quarrelsome men inactive, in a position in which the enemy cut them off from Paris and their magazines, where the supplies were often interrupted, while the negotiation
with Manstein appeared to the volunteers a barefaced act of treachery.
But Dumouriez was able to attach his soldiers to his person, to keep down the
volunteers, to inspire Kellermann with respect, and*to enlighten the
minds of the Ministers. The advantages of his system were seen in the dady
increasing distresses of the enemy. The Prussians were five days without bread;
the exhausted land could supply no more. Bad food produced sickness in man and beast; the cold wet weather, which had annoyed
Ch. IV.] DUMOURIEZ ADVOCATES PEACE
WITH TRUSSIA. 145
them on the march, settled into incessant rain, which drenched the
ground, destroyed the tents, and in a few days spread a
murderous dysentery through one third of the army. Under these circumstances
the prospects of the French improved everyday; and on the 27th
Dumouriez was formally raised to the chief command over Kellermann, a promotion
which implied the sanction of his plan of operations. An exhortation
was added that he should take the idea of falling backjjbeyond the Marne into
consideration; to which Dumouriez replied, by return of post,
that he should beware of obeying so foolish an order.
He continued his diplomatic exertions in the midst of these
mditary cares and anxieties. He strongly urged Servan not to let fall the
negotiations with Prussia. "I confess," he wrote on the 16th,
"that in my opinion, nothing would be so important to France as the separation
of Prussia from the Coalition. Hitherto I have only played the part of
battledore to keep the question in motion; but as the Prussians feel confidence in me as a quondam Minister, I could at once
proceed to actual negotiation, as soon as it seemed advisable to you." He would then, he said, demand of the King, recognition of
the Republic, evacuation of France, dissolution of the Austrian coalition, and
perfect neutrality in a war between France and Austria; and Prussia, on her
side, must content herself with a simple intercession on behalf of Louis XVI., without any express stipulations. "I have not,
as yet," he concluded, "made any overtures to Manstein on the
subject; but I have hinted that it is only in this shape that negotiations can
be carried on, and that, moreover, the French care but
little about negotiating at all."
These views were received with great satisfaction in Paris,
since the immediate danger was past, and the self-confidence of the
People knew no bounds. The parties in the Convention
thought of nothing but victories, revolution, booty and conquest; and the
execution of Dumouriez's Belgian
140
ONSET
OF THE ALLIES.
[Book IV.
plan was among the most cherished hopes of Danton as well as of Lebrun.
Nothing would conduce more to its success than a
rupture of the European coalition by a separate peace with Prussia. And what a
triumphant satisfaction would it be, if, in addition to the confidently
expected successes against Austria, they could win over the Prussian Monarch to the side of the Revolution! To effect this latter purpose,
they considered that they had allurements enough to offer, and the negotiations
were therefore zealously resumed^ but with the deepest secresy. In deference to
the Convention and the Jacobinical theorists, the Council of
Ministers decreed that Dumouriez should not treat with the enemy until they had
evacuated the soil of France; but Westermann and Benoit were secretly
despatched to the Prussian head-quarters, to conclude, if possible, a separate peace. Dumouriez, meanwhde, had endeavoured to prepare the
way. The proclamation of the Republic had not yet
cooled the zeal of Brunswick and Manstein. On the 26th the arrangement for the
exchange of prisoners was completed, in which Prussia made the important concession of silently passing over the Emigres. Still
however the King showed no inclination to desert the Coalition; and Dumouriez,
who gradually began to doubt of success, determined to press this all-important
point.1 On
the 27th he handed to Colonel Manstein a new memorial for
the King, in which he made the separation of Prussia from Austria his sole
theme, and purposely expressed himself in sharp and strong language, in order
to test thereby the real inclinations of Prussia.
But he had chosen a most unfortunate moment for this
communication. The day before, the Marquis Lncchesini— who, since the return of
the Minister Schulenburg to Berlin, bad managed the diplomatic business at
head-quarters, but had been absent for a few days in Verdun—had again been with the King, and bad completely changed the
appearance
1 II tie faut pas, he wrote, que ceci deyenlre en fotirberie royale.
Cu.
IV.] LUCCHESINI OPENS THE KING'S
EYES.
117
of affairs in that qnarter. He was a brother-in-law of Bischoffswerder,
but an intimate friend of Manstein. Like the latter, he regarded the Austrian
alliance which the former had concluded, as a folly; but
he also considered that his military colleague had
thoughtlessly entered on a path which could lead to no result at all. The first
thing that Lncchesini remarked was that Dumouriez had
shown no credentials from his Minister; nay, that in the present anarchical
state of Paris, it was doubtful whether the Minister himself had the power to
conduct such a' negotiation. He then dwelt npon the fact that Dumouriez alone
derived any advantage from the previous truce, which rendered his sincerity
doubly questionable, while nothing was more certain than that the very appearance of treating with the enemy would place Prussia in a
false light in the eyes of her allies. The truth of these representations
forcibly struck the King—who was, however, entirely cured of his war fever, and
extremely desirous of an honourable settlement—and he thought that he had been very inconsiderately
involved in dealings with the Republicans. In this mood he received the
memorial of Dumouriez, which was very ill adapted for
its purpose; the King was extremely angry when Dumouriez—in speaking of Prussia's adhering to the
Coalition—said, among other things, that he (the King) would thereby sacrifice
the weal of his State to an illusory sentiment of honour. Manstein was told to
reply, that Dnmouriez was welcome to his own principles, but that the King regarded fidelity to his allies as his highest duty. High
words were exchanged on this point, and the King, to use Lucchesini's polite
expression, "was not restrained by his kindness of heart
from expressing in strong language his displeasure
with the Colonel," as the originator of such a negotiation. A portion of
the royal anger fell on the Duke of Brunswick, who was compelled to issue a new
manifesto on the 28th, in which he repeated all the threats of July against the
French. The King himself was desirous of renewing
hostilities without delay; the Emigres were in
K 2
148
ONSET
OF THE ALLIES.
[Book IV.
raptures, and the Russian charge d'affaires, Prince Nassau-Siegen, offered to beg his Empress to send a Russian army
to join in the Spring campaign. Bnt even the Duke, in spite of his temporary
loss of favour, did not find it difficult to hinder any active
proceedings, as tbe relative position of the
two armies was entirely changed since the 20th. In an engagement with sick and
exhausted troops against an enemy double in number, nothing could be looked for
but entire defeat. On this head Lucchesini entirely agreed with the Duke, and
the idea of a battle was abandoned as soon as mooted.
If the Prussians were not to fight, their retreat became every moment
more urgently necessary. It was already sufficiently
dangerous for them to make their way through the boggy passes of the Argonnes,
with an army in superior numbers on their flank. Benoit
and Westermann arrived at an opportune moment. If Dumouriez had hitherto reaped
all the military advantages of the truce, it was now the turn of the Prussians
to lessen the evils of their retreat by skilfully prolonging
tbe negotiations.
Ch. V.]
149
CHAPTER V. RETREAT FROM FRANCE.
First
party contests in the convention.—All parties in favour of war and conquest.— propaganda in italy and
switzerland.—mllv
tesquiou
in savoy.-attempt upon geneva.— custine in spires and
frankfort.
— dumouriez and kellermann in favour of peace.— Fruitless
negotiations for a separate peace.—Brunswick's plans against the meuse fortresses.—b.ecall of the austrian troops.— Conduct
of francis ii.—Spielmann's
mission to head-quarters.— Negotiations
at Luxembourg.—The
merle note.
During the first days of the Convention, the Gironde, which had lately had to
tremble for its very existence, possessed no small prospect of acc|uiring
absolute supremacy in France. It predominated in the
Ministry, because Dauton, when chosen member of the Convention by the Electors
of Paris, had resigned his portcfeuille, and Roland's influence subsequently prevaded in home affairs. The
Gironde could likewise, in most cases, reckon on a majority in the Convention itself. Most of the elections had been carried in direct
opposition to the aims of the Parisian Commune and the Septembrists; against
whose dictatorship there was a general feeling, which would have enabled the
Gironde, had they made use of all the means in their power, at once
to crush their opponents. The Jacobins could not conceal this fact from
themselves. "All France is against us," said the younger Robespierre
on the 29th in the rostra of the Jacobin Club, "our only hope lies in the
citizens of Paris."1
Whereupon Desfieux raised his warning voice and said: "Friends and
associates, do not place too much confidence even in this last prospect; it is
only too certain that even here in Paris we should be beaten
1 Buehez, XX. 300.
150
RETREAT
FROM FRANCE.
[Book IV.
in any election which was made by secret vote." The Club therefore
prescribed to itself the strictest caution, and an almost
timid attitude of defence. The September murders were never mentioned except with the intention of partly denying, and par tly excusing
them; and Collot d'Herbois was looked upon as an incautious man, when he, on
one occasion, exclaimed without any circumlocution. "The 2nd of September
is the creed of our party."
But though the majority of the Convention was no
doubt hostile to the Jacobins, it was not yet fully under the o-uidance
of the Gironde. It was a similar case to that of the defunct Assembly; by far
the greater part of the Deputies kept aloof from all party
discipline whatever, and each individual voted according to his impressions
at the moment. Only about 30 adhered unconditionally to the Girondist party, and we shall see that even these frequently took
different sides on the most important questions. The removal of this disadvantage ought to have been all the more zealously aimed
at, because the Mountain held together like one man.
Nearly all the members of the Convention held revolutionary opinions. The measures taken by the Commune of Paris and its
associates in the Provinces, had at any rate
effected thus much, that the adherents of the aneien
regime, and the professed constitutionalists, had refrained from taking any part in the Elections. Even La Vendee—which was soon to
manifest in the most violent manner the opinions
and feelings of its entire population by a royalist revolt—had elected radical
deputies. The Gironde, too, sympathised in the democratic
tendencies of the majority of its colleagues; it was only in so far
conservative, as it feared the daggers of September for itself; in
all other respects it still retained its destructive principles. It was not
therefore in a condition to rally round it the other parties of the
Right,—the Constitutionalists and Priests, the Royalists and Feudalists—for the struggle against the 'Jacobins; and by
ChV]
ATTEMPT TO RECONCILE THE GIRONDE &THEMOUNTAIN 151
most of its legal enactments it undermined every inch of ground which it had gained from the extreme Left by its Police decrees. In
such a position of affairs, the most natural course would have been a
recoiitiliation of the two parties on the basis of a fair division of personal
influence; for this last was the only essential point of dispute.
There was scarcely any difference of opinion as to the objects to be aimed
at—only as to the means to be employed. An attempt in this direction was really
made in the first days of the Convention; the party leaders held a meeting, and Danton, especially, exhorted them to concord. But the blood
of September flowed between them; the Girondists demanded revenge for the
threats directed against themselves, and rejected the proposal
of a mutual amnesty almost as a crime; whereupon
Robespierre abruptly and haughtily broke up the conference.
On the 22nd, the Convention ordered a new election of all the
Government officials throughout the whole of France. Before the month of
August, almost all the Departmental authorities had manifested constitutional opinions, and were consequently abolished together
with the constitution which they represented. On the 23rd, Danton carried a
sinnlar decree against the legal functionaries. Billaud wished to do away with
the Courts of law altogether, since, he said, two umpires, named in
each case by the contending parties, woidd answer every purpose. He did not
carry his point, yet the choice of law officers was no longer restricted to professional lawyers, on the ground that they formed a particularly scandalous Aristocracy.
After this specimen of its democratic sentiments, the Convention heard an address from the Minister Roland on the general state
of the country. His report was a melancholy testimony to the effects of the
Revolution, and told of the crippling of agriculture, the
ruin of manufactures, the annihilation
of commerce, and the decay of national institutions
and public edifices. 'At the same time
he gave in
152
RETREAT
FROM FRANCE.
[Book IV.
every sentence, the signal of attack on the
Mountain, by designating their intrigues and
carelessness as the sole sources of the evil, and demanding hired troops for
the protection of the Convention and the Government. On the following day
Kersaint and Buzot, in accordance with the suggestions of Roland,
brought forward motions—the former for the enactment
of a penal law against the instigators of murder and homicide, and the latter,
for the formation of a guard for the Convention raised from all the
Departments. Both proposals were referred to a
Committee. An attack was then made on individuals: Barbaroux and Buzot
resuscitated the story that Robespierre, on the 9th August, had had himself
proposed to the Marseilles Fcdcres
as Dictator. The Girondists, in their turn, were accused of wishing to cut up France into a number of independent
States, on the American pattern. They replied that the
Parisians were striving to domineer over the Departments, as Rome
had formerly done over the Provinces; and then they themselves caused the unity and indivisibility of the Republic to be formally decreed. These contentions had no other result than to increase the general exasperation; and the attention of each and all was
soon solely directed to the material forces of either party. On the one side was the Commune of Paris — whose zealous proletaries
were greatly dreaded by the mass of the Deputies—and on the other, the Guard of
the Convention, by means of which the Gironde hoped to gain, in the first
instance, security of voting, and as a natural
consequence, to effect the complete overthrow of their opponents. Buzot brought
up the report on this question on the 8th October; it was ordered to be printed
and was then dropped. The Gironde had observed that a great number of Deputies feared to vote for this measure, which was execrated in Paris; they
therefore had recourse to the expedient of sending—without the sanction of the
law—for armed troops from the Departments friendly to them, by whose protection
they sought to encourage their adherents.
Ch. V.]
ASCENDANCY
OF THE GIRONDE.
153
It was Marseilles again which took the lead, and now raised soldiers
for the Government in October, as it had done for the Revolution in July.
Meanwhile the Municipality of Paris was
tormented in every way; an inquiry was ordered into its enormous robberies and
embezzlements; the Minister of Justice was commissioned to institute a general
investigation respecting the September massacre, and in the new elections of
the Commune, the principle of secret voting was strictly
carried out. Pethion was actually chosen Mayor by a large majority, and when he
preferred to keep his seat in the Convention, another candidate of the
Girondist party, the Physician Chambon, was elected in opposition to the Jacobin Lhuillier. Nine-tenths of the citizens, however, abstained from voting.
And thus the Gironde up to the end of October made continual progress;
but they had not gained any success of such importance as to guarantee the
future. That which aided them most effectually was the
arrival of the new Fcdcres; for such a listless indifference prevailed about internal politics, that a few thousand sturdy arms sufficed to inspire
respect into the Jacobin bands. But what a melancholy
expedient was it to have to defend the cause of order
by such purely anarchical means! Roland was well aware of this, and aimed at
the very centre of the evil by repeatedly demanding that the powers of
the Ministry shoidd be increased, and the Municipality deprived of the right of calling out the military. But his colleagues
considered these measures either unattainable in the Convention, or inconsistent with their previous political attitude; at all events no
proposition on the subject was ever brought forward.
The Jacobins were, therefore, doubly glad that the
finances of the State continued to be administered as heretofore. Cla-viere was
once more Finance Minister; and although, like his Girondist friends, he would
not hear of any formal abolition of property, or of fixed prices, forced currency, and prehensions (arbitrary exactions from French citizens by Civil
154
RETREAT
FROM FRANCE.
[Book IV.
authorities)—yet he did everything else in his power to shake the
influence of property, and to lead the State by constantly increasing demands on the public resources, into the paths of
wholesale robbery. On the 19th of October, the plunder of the Emigres was
continued, with the unanimous consent of the Convention, by an order to all
bankers and notaries, on pain of death, to hand over all
the money and valuable papers entrusted to them by the exdes to the Public
Exchequer. All the public Civd authorities had already,
on the 30th of September, been made answerable for the sale of the confiscated
estates; and when, a little later (17th Nov.), Manuel suggested that a
difference ought to be made between the Cavaliers of the Court of Coblenz, and
those who had fled on the 2nd of September, he was told that it was now a
question of the necessities of war, in which it was impossible to attend
to mere distinctions of law and justice. For the better security of the booty,
it was ordained (Oct. 23rd,) according to the proposition of Buzot, that the
punishment of death should be inflicted on every Emigre who was caught upon the soil of France. The application of the wealth thus
gained was analogous to the course pursued in the financial administration of
the former Assemblies. The city of Paris received first six, and then three
millions, for the support of the needy classes. Cla-viere increased
the number of small assignats;
and the Convention decreed a new issue of 400
millions. The Girondists could make no objection to these measures, because
they knew of no other means of meeting the ever-increasing expenditure. There was, it is true, one expedient
by which the State could be freed from a monthly outlay of 100 millions; and
this was the conclusion of peace—an expedient which, since the 20th of
September, the inclinations of the King of Prussia placed entirely within their power. But on this point the Mountain and the Gironde were
fully agreed; for they all had the same ardent impulse towards universal freedom and universal conquest. It
is evident that a party
Ch.
V.] PLANS FOR REVOLUTIONISING EUROPE.
155
which was at that time preaching about order and property in France,
was only digging its own grave by endeavouring to spread anarchy and financial
exhaustion through the whole of Europe.
As we have said above, there was no difference
of opinion among the parties on this head. Danton and his associates, the
Girondists Brissot and Claviere, and Dumouriez's friend Lebrun, had all the
same ideas respecting the revolutionary metamorphosis of Europe, as the
demagogues of the Hotel de Ville, and the fanatics of the Jacobin
club. The annihilation of all Kings, the republicanising
of all countries, and their union with France, were the only political views
which could safely he expressed in Paris. These ambitious ideas of taking the
world by storm were universally diffused. If Prussia coidd be lulled to sleep,
the overthrow of the German Empire was considered as
secured. On the appearance of a French army and fleet, a revolution might be
expected to break out in Switzerland and Italy. By a second
naval force it was hoped that the Turks might be roused to a fresh war against
the two Imperial Courts. England shewed herself at present cautious and
desirous of peace; and, at the worst, the French reckoned even there on the aid
of a republican party,
and above all of oppressed and agitated Ireland.
"What woidd then be left in our quarter of the world of the old state of
things ?
The first steps in this direction were taken as early as September.
Since the 10th of August, the Ministry had been constantly
urging General Montesquion to put into execution the long-planned attack on
Savoy, by which the flames of war were to be kindled at once through the length
and breadth of the Alps and Appenines. The most encouraging intelligence was
received from all parts of Italy. The diplomatic agents whom Dumouriez had sent out in Spring were indefatigable
at their respective posts. Heuin wrote from Venice that an obstinate resistance
would be met with in Germany, and that the Germans would after all only be
156
RETREAT
FROM FRANCE.
[Book IV.
conquered in Italy. He said that a French fleet ought to sail for
Spezzia, from which it should send an army by way of Sestri to Parma, Modena
and Piacenza; that Parma woidd furnish supplies in abundance, Piacenza heavy
artdlery, and Modena treasure to the amount of several mdlions; that neither Milan nor Mantua could resist such a
plan of operations, if rapidly executed, and that the
Papal towns of Bologna and Ferrara would had the French as
liberators. He added that if a second fleet were to make itself master of the
mouths of the Po, it might occupy Ravenna and An-cona,
and overpower weakly-defended Venice, almost without a
blow; and that though this plan would be costly in the first instance, the
French armies would subsequently be plentifully supplied by Italy, and the fate
of Europe be at once decided.
While reading these schemes, we fancy ourselves transported into the year 1796, and the head-quarters of the youthful
General Buonaparte. Proposals and reports of a simdar nature were sent in by
Salicetti from Corsica respecting the
Island of Sardinia, by Semonvdle from Genoa respecting Piedmont, and by
Chateaunenf from Geneva respecting Savoy.1 In
all epiarters they were canvassing the native population for the liberation of
the people by means of a French invasion. Henin reported on
the 18th August, that he had formed bands of trustworthy and zealous adherents in several parts of Italy, who only waited for the signal to
raise the standard of revolt. A secret understanding
was maintained with a party in most of the towns of Savoy;
and iu Geneva Claviere's correspondents Dassier and Flonrnoy2 were
actively engaged in raising the enfranchised citizens, and other inhabitants,
against the Patricians. This was a favourite object with Claviere, as he, a
native of Geneva, had been expelled from that city in 1782 by the
1 All in the Military archives in
Paris; Armie da Midi. — 2 Montesquiou,
MiJmoire juslificatif. Claviere's answer to it.
Ch. V.]
INTRIGUES OF THE FRENCH IN SWITZERLAND.
157
Aristocrats, and now hoped to satisfy his long-cherished vengeance. He
gained over Servan to his plans, by giving information of a stand of 20,000
muskets in the arsenal of Geneva; and Cambon, by a reference to the three
million francs in the Genevese treasury; he likewise took upon himself
to find some pretext of international law to justify the meditated attack. Intrigues of a similar kind were extended into
Switzerland. The French Ambassador Barthelemy, a skilful man who pursued his
ends with noiseless caution, gained over a considerable
number of adherents, especially among the younger men in Berne and Zurich, and
carried on a correspondence in all the Cantons. His overtures met with a
favourable reception in all the towns from the mercantile classes, who in the course of trade had come into possession of many French assignats,
and were afraid of losing by them in the event of a victory of the
Allies.1 The Government of Berne was the only one which had any clear insight
into the future, and saw that they had only to choose between
the suppression of the French, and the outbreak of a Helvetian, Revolution. They would therefore have preferred to join the
German side with all their forces, but were restrained
by the smaller Cantons, who wished for peace at any price.
It was upon this state of affairs that the French Government of August the 10th founded their hopes of success in the South of
Europe. Montesquiou was forthwith to begin the invasion of Savoy, and march
thence, without a moment's delay, upon Geneva, and thus threaten
Italy and Switzer-' land at once. General Anselme, under his orders, was then
to occupy the province of Nice, and Admiral Truguet to reconnoitre the coast
for a favourable point of attack. The sending off of 10 battalions to Luckner, however, caused an unexpected delay. Montesquiou had to
report that the rais-ino- of
recruits went on but slowly. "I
have not caught
1 Bouille, Memoires, Mallet
du Pan.
158
RETREAT
FROM FRANCE.
[Book IV.
sight of a man," he said; "the citizens are too much engaged
in public assemblies, and meetings of electors." Other disturbances of a still more serious kind arose from the intrigues of the Prince of Hesse, who wished for the chief command
himself, and therefore accused Montesquiou in Paris of
being a royalist and an aristocrat. This was going on in the last days of
August, and Servan gave Montesquiou to understand that public
opinion, which had now become an incalculable power, was
turning strongly against him. On the 29th the Council
of Ministers decreed the removal of the General, and Servan ordered him for the
present to suspend all further action. Immediately afterwards the Minister
received a despatch from Montesquiou of September
the 4th, in which he said that he could no longer
restrain the martial ardour Of his
troops, but could guarantee complete success in Savoy, and therefore earnestly
begged permission to begin his march. Hereupon the Ministry withdrew their
former decree; but the interruption had been made and Montesquiou
needed an additional fortnight before he could open the campaign. He was
however in high spirits, and sent word to Claviere, on the 11th, that all would
go well, and that by the 1st of October he would appear before the gates of Geneva. Claviere immediately wrote to Flournoy that the
liberation of that city from the tyranny' of the Aristocrats was resolved on,
and that nothing but immediate surrender could save it. His object in doing so
was to induce Geneva to solicit aid from Berne, which would afford an opportunity for intriguing on an
extended scale. The whole scheme would have been attended with uninterrupted
success, if Montesquiou had still acted in full concert with the others. But
the Prince of Hesse continued to attack him with redoubled bitterness;
and went at last so far as to publish accusations against him in a widely circulated Girondist journal. When sharply called to account for this
proceeding by Servan, the Prince replied: "I am not such a fool as to
bring forward charges unsupported by
Ch.
V.] OCCUPATION OP SAVOY BV THE
FRENCH.
159
proofs; I abide by my declaration that Montesquiou is a traitor; if yon
take offence at my plain language, yon are not
worthy of your office; do me justice or I shall make an appeal at
the bar of the Convention." This was written on the 22nd; on the 23rd,
Danton declared in the Convention that Montesquiou must not remain at the head
of the Army.
But for once the soldier got the start of the demagogue. During the night of the 21st, Montesquiou occupied the pass of San
Parelliano on the Isere with 19,000 men; the Piedmontese, who were 15,000
strong, made no attempt at resistance, but [withdrew in two columns to
Montmelian and Annecy. They were in fact quite
unprepared and irresolute, notwithstanding the many months which the French had
spent in getting ready for the field. Their King, it is true, had long inclined
to the Coalition, but Austria had met his overtures with the inveterate
suspicion with which she had always regarded Piedmont. In
the summer he received from Vienna the curt declaration, that it was a matter
of absolute indifference to the Powers whether he took part in the invasion of France or not.1 It
was Avith difficulty that he at last obtained a promise, that in case the
French assumed the offensive he should receive the aid of 8,000 Austrians from
Mdan. As, hoAvever, he was to maintain and pay them, he had neglected from parsimony to
send for them, and therefore found himself defenceless at the decisive moment. On the 25th the French Avere
at Chambery; Avhereupon the Sardinians evacuated the Avhole
province, Avith the exception of the Tarantaise. During the same time General Anselme
took possession of Nice Avith 10,000 men, Avithont a blow being struck. The inhabitants, Avhom
Montesquiou had called on "to desert their tyrants and enjoy the
blessings of peace in their cottages," responded to the summons Avith
friendly readiness; every thing seemed to be going on Avell.
A detachment Avas already
on its Avay to Caronge in the im-
1 Reports of Van Haeften, Dutch
Ambassador at the Court of Vienna.
160
RETREAT
FROM FRANCE.
[Book IV.
mediate neighbourhood of Geneva, in order, according to Montesquiou, to
inspire fear into the aristocrats, and to make a
diversion in favour of the democratic party. Geneva, thus directly threatened,
hesitated no longer to apply for aid to the confederate state of Berne.
Steiger, the Land-amman, immediately sent off 1,600 men, and ordered that a corps of observation of 9,000 men should be drawn together in
the canton of Vaud—a force quite sufficient for the present
security of Geneva.
* In the face of these brilliant successes, of course, the ridiculous charges of treason against Montesquiou
could not be maintained, and on the 8th of October the decree of dismissal was for the second time withdrawn. Bnt his late experiences had
a very cooling effect on the General himself. He was not by nature a bad
man, oidy weak and vain. Party spirit and the thirst for fame had
carried him away for a time, but he now returned to the paths of simple duty.
The claim of modern despotism, that the obedience of the soldier should be
limited by the precepts neither of religion nor morality, had not, at the period of which we speak, become a maxim of State policy; and least of
all in the French army, which had so lately heard from its existing rulers the praise of the unconditional duty of insurrection.
Montesquiou was resolved to omit nothing which could further
the real military interests of France, but not to demean himself to any
robber)- a la
Claviere. In the exercise of his command, therefore, he
soon came into conflict with his Government at almost every point.
The proceedings of Anselmc at Nice were highly
agreeable to the taste of Danton and Cambon. In his opinion the catholic
peasants, were not at all au
niveau de la revolution, and
consequently undeserving of its benefits. He had entered the country as a
friend and liberator, but he took possession of it in the name of France,
appointed new magistrates, and devastated the land by his
exactions in a worse manner than could have been done by a bloody
Ch. V.]
MONTESQUIOU'S
MODERATION.
161
war.1 He then, in the same way as Montesquiou had done at Geneva, marched
upon the equally neutral and still richer city of Genoa, and with peremptory
threats demanded a loan of 31 million francs. Montesquiou was enraged at this,
partly from his sense of justice, partly from policy; but when,
under the influence of these feelings, he made communications
to the new Minister at war, Pache, the latter immediately made Anselme
independent of his command, and associated with him three like-minded
Conventional Commissioners for the management of civil
affairs. The exactions were made as heretofore; while,
on the other hand, essential military measures, such as the taking of the important pass of Saorgio, were neglected.
All the more strictly did Montesquiou, at least in
form, adhere in Savoy' to the original programme. The royal officials were
removed, but the inhabitants were called on to choose their successors.
Meanwhile numerous envoys of the Government, and of the Jacobins, arrived from
Paris, who instituted affiliated clubs, and immediately
mooted the question whether Savoy woidd not prefer to join the great French
family, rather than continue in its own narrow independence.
In some districts a feeling in favour of such a union was manifested, but iu
Paris the clear-headed Servan was opposed to it.2
Bancal, too, warned the Convention against a policy of conquest which would
involve France in endless broils; and Louvet urged that at any rate the Savoyards should be allowed to exercise a real and undisturbed choice. To which Danton3
replied, that if a nation was silly enough to adhere to a bad constitution,
France ought not to yield to its wishes; that moreover the Convention ought to
constitute itself as a grand committee of rebellion against all Kings, and
appoint a smaller committee to take into consideration the means of bringing
about a universal
1 Servan's own words. 3 Sept. 28th. II.
2 Despatch to Montesquiou, Sept. 29.
—
L
102
RETREAT
FROM FRANCE.
[Book IV.
revolt of the Peoples of Europe. The Convention took the question into
consideration, and referred it to the Diplomatic Committee.
The affairs of Geneva became more complicated. In the year 1782 France,
Switzerland and Sardinia, had suppressed disturbances in
that city, and bad concluded a treaty with it to the effect, that in future the
three States should only intervene in its affairs in concert. That now, without
the permission of France, those 1,600 Swiss had marched into Geneva, was
considered as a breach of contract, and it was with a view
to this very breach that Claviere had taken his measures. The Genevese excused
themselves by the peculiarity of the case, and appealed to
former treaties, according to which, in the event of a war between two of the protecting Powers themselves, the town would
have the right of guarding its frontier by the aid of the third. But France was
inexorable. The French charge
d'affaires was recalled, and Montesquiou received orders to drive the Swiss
troops, by force if necessary, out of Geneva, but
otherwise to respect the independence of the Republic,
and only to demand the punishment of the offending magistrates. To these orders
were appended secret instructions to seize the 20,000 muskets, to destroy
"the nest of Aristocrats," as Claviere called
Geneva, to get hold of the money which had been carried there for security, and
by all means to leave a garrison of 4,000—5,000 men, and make the city a
bulwark of France. Montesquiou represented that he was not strong enough to undertake a war against Switzerland; that all the advantages hitherto
gained would be hazarded directly they forced the Swiss to give up their
neutrality;—that no real breach of treaty had taken place, and that it was
rather the machinations of Claviere which had induced Geneva to apply for help;—that the Swiss troops would
withdraw as soon as security was given Cor the independence of the city; and
that then France might safely reckon on the Genevese Democrats. Lebnm sent him word on of 8th of October, that
Cii. V.]
IMPEACHMENT
OF MONTESQUIOU.
1G3
he might either besiege or negotiate as he thought best, but that in
the latter case, the negotiation must end in the admission
of a French garrison, and the whole affair be so managed as not to put a stop to the French successes. Hereupon Montesquiou opened
a conference with the Swiss plenipotentiaries, and declared at the very
beginning, and in contradiction to the instructions he had received, that
France had no other desire than the removal of the 600 Bernese soldiers.
Geneva replied that it wished above all things to be at peace with France, and
would gladly content itself with a force of 600 men for
two months, for the preservation of internal quiet. Montesquiou warmly recommended the acceptance of these terms, and being
siqq)orted in the Council of Ministers by Roland, he received full powers to
settle all differences with the Swiss Diet. Accordingly
he signed a compact on the 23d October, to the effect that the 600 Swiss were
to remain till the 1st of Dec.; that the French batteries should retire to
a distance of 12 leagues from Geneva immediately, and the other troops on Dec.
the 1st;—and that all former treaties were to remain in force. It was at once
resolved in Paris not to agree to such a settlement of the
affair. The compact was not ratified, and a second and somewhat severer
modification of it, which Montesquiou sent in on Nov. the 2nd, was rejected
with equal vehemence, and on the 9th it was proposed to impeach the General as a traitor to his country.
"When I called upon him" cried Dubois-Crance, "to throw some
shells into the town, he answered, 'Don't you hear the wailing of the Parisian capitalists?'" Rovere, who brought up the
report, said: "Entrusted as he was with two highly
important missions, to spread the wholesome principles of the Rights of
Man, and as ambassador of the Republic to negotiate
with Geneva, he had nevertheless entered into an understanding with the
Genevese Aristocrats, and signed the disgraceful article
with respect to the retreat of the
l2
104
RETREAT
FROM FRANCE.
[Book IV.
French." Hereupon the decree of impeachment was carried without
opposition.
Montesquiou narrowly escaped apprehension by rapid flight from bis camp to Geneva itself. Owing to the weakness of the* French corps,
hostdities were not immediately commenced, but no agreement was come
to with Geneva. The sword remained suspended over the head of the little city,
and we shall see how quickly, and with what terrible force, it fell.
It was thus that the warlike propaganda began its course, and
simultaneously with it, that systematic draining of the neighbouring countries
in the South, which was carried on under the pretence of liberating them. Of
still greater importance, as regards the general
war, was the fact that at the same time this propaganda violated the territory
of the German Empire.
It has already been mentioned that the French possessed in Alsace,
besides garrisons to the number of 25,000 men, a disposable field force of
22,000 more (under the name of the Army of the Rhine), of which Biron was first
and Cnstine second in command. Of these Kellerman had received 4,000 for his
march into the Argonnes, and Dumouriez had subsequently
asked for 15,000 more, for a flank movement
against Verdun and the Prussian line of retreat. When however this demand
reached Paris and Strasbourg, these forces had been already otherwise disposed
of; for the German valley of the Rhine afforded a most alluring prospect. The greater part of the country was occupied by impotent
Ecclesiastical Rulers. The officials were mostly alien priests, who were bound
to the soil neither by the past nor the future, and who regarded their offices
simply as a source of personal maintenance. All the springs of
political life were relaxed; the finances and the troops neglected; manufactures and education in a very moderate state of
advancement, and the great mass of the population solely intent ou the
preservation of their personal inheritance.
Ch.V.]
THE RHENISH PRINCIPALITIES. GENERAL CUSTINE. 1G5
These evils were further increased by discord between the Bishops and
their Chapters, and between the Ecclesiastical Government and the Provincial
Diets. The modern ideas of freedom were rife in the
middle classes of the citizens, while the mass of the people were without a
trace of national feeling. The means of military
defence were miserably deficient, since the majority of the Rhenish Princes
thought only of peace and quiet, and one or two of them
even looked for friendship and support to Prance. At the time of which we speak
there were 10,000 Austrians in the Breisgau, under the command of Count
Esterhazy,—2,000 soldiers of Mayence with 1,200 Austrians in Spires,—and about as many troops of the Empire in Mayrence.
Count Erbach's corps of 7,000 men had been moved to the Upper Moselle since
Sep. the 11th. If the French-, who were already assembled in Strasbourg and
Landau, succeeded in getting a few days start (as they
most likely would) of Esterhazy, who had so much farther to march, there was
absolutely no obstacle to a victorious progress, and a conquest of the most
attractive kind.
General Custine was the first to direct his attention to securing these
advantages. This man, formerly a marquis of the ancicn
regime, employed in diplomatic missions and frequently honoured by the
confidence of the Emperor Joseph and the favour of the Prussian
Government, had taken part in the Revolution with all the pride and
self-confidence of an experienced politican and a gallant soldier. Like most of
his contemporaries he had no presentiment of the incalculable
vastness of the interests at stake, and no consciousness of the duties, the non-performance of which must bring about
universal ruin to his country. He saw nothing but the glorious fruits of
enlightenment, extension of power for France, and the promotion of his own personal interests. In his fiery zeal, he had advanced too far to
recede and was even obliged to atone for his title of ancient nobility by
shewing himself the most radical of all the generals in the Army of the
Rhine. In restless ambition he
166
RETREAT
FROM FRANCE.
[Book IV.
was quite on a par with Dumouriez, and he exceeded that General as much
in youthful indiscretion as he fell short of him in military efficiency.
Custine had already proposed an expedition against Spires in
August, and had received a reprimand for his inconsiderate
rashness from his superior Biron. What woidd be the sense, he was asked, of
sending off 15,000 men to a distance, while 100,000 Germans were preparing for
an overpowering attack on Paris? But Custine did not rest there. He had
several channels of communication with the ruling party of the Gironde, and
especially his friend Guyton-Morvean, who ranked among the more important
members of this party in the Convention. He continued, therefore, to press
his views and to make his preparations; and on the 9th of Sept., Biron himself
informed the Minister at War that Custine wished to engage in an enterprise,
and that he had left him at liberty to act as he pleased, and only recommended caution. Eight clays afterwards Custine himself proposed
to the Minister the expedition against Spfires, saying that the magazines of
the enemy ought to be destroyed, and the officials and clergy laid under
contribution, but that the people should be spared in order to gain
their affections. We see that he knew what the Parisians liked to hear. Servan
felt the weight of Dumouriez's objections, and even Custine at one time
favoured the idea of leading 18,000 men to Metz, but recurred at last to his former plan of attacking the ecclesiastical
Rhine country—the Priests' Road, as it was called. At last the Minister
assented, and Custine began his march on the 28th with 18,000 men. On the 13th
he attacked Spires, dispersed the garrison, and seized the
magazines in the city. General Neuwinger then advanced to Worms, and entered it
without the slightest opposition. Contributions were immediately
laid on Worms to the amount of 1,200,000, and on Spires of 000,000 francs—/.e.
on the Magistracy, Bishop and Clergy, for the citizens were
exempted; Custine's first
Z .V.]
TREACHERY OF THE LANDGRAVE OF DARMSTADT. 167
manifesto having proclaimed "war to the palaces of tyrants,' but
peace to the cottages of the just." The impression made by the successes of the French in Western Germany was immense, and gave
overpowering testimony to the rottenness of the existing state of things.
Universal consternation pre-vaded in the neighbouring city of Mayence, which,
in consequence of the disaster at Spires, had lost its troops. There
remained only 1,300 soldiers of the Empire (from Nassau and Fulda) and 800
Austrians—a force not half sufficient to hold the town, the
fortifications of which, moreover, were, in a miserably dilapidated state. The
Elector came in haste from Aschaffenburg on the 8th of Oct., but in his
good-humoured weakness he was easily persuaded by Stein, the Prussian Charge
d'affaires, that he ought not to expose his person to danger,2 and
returned to Wiirzburg the same evening. The Council
of regency which he left to supply his place sent off urgent petitions for help
to the Landgrave of Darmstadt, whose troops, 4,000 strong, would have secured the defence of Mayence. This Prince had made himself conspicuous, the very year before, as a
bitter enemy of the French, and had implored the Diet to assist him in recovering his territorial and seigniorial rights in Alsace, that, as he
expressed himself, "a Prince of the Catti, who had been revered for
centuries, might not become entirely powerless in his own land." But
all these fine sentiments bad disappeared without a trace. Lie
replied to the People of Mayence, that the French had treated his estates in
Alsace so well, that he did not wish to quarrel with them. All his forces
therefore were ordered to cross the Rhine and retire
to Darmstadt; preparations were made for a further retreat upon Giessen, and
the officials throughout the country were
1 Guerre aux Palais; Paix aux the particulars of which he himself
Ghaumieres. — 2 His despatches
to attended. The suspicion that he was
head-quarters,
Oct. 6th. Stein had an accomplice in
betraying the city
good
reason to offer' this advice in is quite unfounded, the interests of the
defence, to all
168
RETREAT
FROM FRANCE.
[Book IV.
directed to avoid offending the French and to give them good quarters sub
reservatioue reservandarum.* Under these circumstances Mayence resorted to the desperate expedient
of arming the people. The Students showed the greatest zeal and readiness, and the peasants of the Eheingau poured into the town, of
whom 1,500 were armed in two days. On the other hand the city had bitter
experience of its military defenders. On occasion of a false alarm the brave
troops of the Empire, above-mentioned, disappeared and were nowhere to
be found. There was no quarter from which aid could be expected. The Bavarian
Palatinate set up great boards on its frontiers with the inscription "Neutral Palatine Territory;" nay, the Authorities gave passes to
French spies under the names of Palatine
officers.2 In
Treves nothing was thought of but flight and safety. First the Minister, and
then the Elector, hastened down the Moselle to Coblentz, and a number of the wealthier inhabitants followed their example. No
empty vessel was allowed to leave the city, that the means of travelling might
be always at hand. The citizens beheld this shameful flight with indignation, and at last broke out into tumultuous
attempts to stop it; but it was all to no purpose. There was but one company of
Chasseurs in Coblentz. On the 12th of October, indeed, a reinforcement of
1,200 men arrived from Treves, and the inhabitants of the Thai Ehrenbreitstein
declared themselves willing to take up arms in
defence of the fortress. But the Government and the Council of war issued a
formal decree to the effect, that when the enemy advanced, a deputation should
be sent to offer a contribution—to deliver up the Prussian Magazines in Coblentz,—and, if it was desired, to give them possession of
Ehrenbreitstein itself. Amidst all these pitiful acts of cowardice, the fact
would be almost comic, were it not so humiliating, that Custine
'
Biron was able to send this circular forthwith to
Paris. — 2 Stein's despatches.
Cu.
V.]
CUSTINE
TAKES MAYENCE.
169
had no sooner dismounted from his horse at Spires, than he received a
letter from the Magistrates of Wetzlar, in which they assured him
that their town was in the highest degree neutral, and had no other wish than a
sauve garde.1
All this happened even before Mayence was taken. A weak flying corps of
the enemy, led by a verbose and very indifferent General, was sufficient byT its mere appearance to throw every head from Kehl to Cologne into
confusion. Custine had at first no idea of this, and determined to make no
further advance for fear of coming into collision with the Austrians. But
Esterhazy did not venture beyond Rastatt, and on the 6th
of October Custine reeeived intelligence of the state of things in Mayence. He
immediately proposed to Biron that he (Biron) should cross the Bhine at Kehl
with all his forces—that be himself should do the same at Phdippsburg,—and that with these united troops they should march against the
Austrians and the hereditary dominions of the Emperor. As Biron however refused
to leave Alsace, on account of the position of the Prussians iu Lorraine,
Custine determined on a coup
dcmain against Mayence; and during the night of the 16th he began a forced
march against the fortress. He relied on the badness of the garrison, the fears
of the Authorities, and, lastly, on his own secret understanding with some of the citizens. In his despatches
we find no mention of Major Eikemeier, who has been often suspected, but we do
find the names of the patriots George Wedekind and Bohmer, and of an officer of
Mayence named Stamm. The sight of Custine's columns was sufficient to strike
terror into their feeble hearts. The Commandant,
Gym-nich, proposed instant capitulation. The 800 Austrians left the city, and
in their perversity directed their march, not to Coblenz, but through the
Westerwald to Cologne. All the Public Officials took flight, and the French made their entrance on the 20th of October.
»
Custine to the Minister at War, Oct. 5.
170
retreat
from france.
[Book IV.
The news of this fresh loss fell like a thunderbolt on the German
Empire. The immediate expectation was that Custine would forthwith
occupy Coblenz and cut off the retreat of the Prussian army. There was in fact
much discussion on the advisability of such a
step amongst the French generals, and subsecpiently Custine was severely reproached for neglecting this opportunity. But it was impossible he should really be aware of the inextricable confusion prevailing amongst his foes. And at the very utmost he could
only have pushed forward 8,000 men to Coblentz, thereby exposing them to the
greatest peril in case of the arrival of the Prussians,
unless the gates of Ehrenbreitstein shoidd be immediately thrown open to them
by its panic-stricken garrison. The "cutting off" the retreat of the
Prussians by such a handful of men is, after all, a mere phrase. It would indeed have been unfortunate enough for the German frontiers if Coblentz had fallen into the hands of the enemy, but
in that ease tbe Prussian army could have marched unmolested from Treves to
Bonn and Cologne as well as to Coblentz. Custine, however,
was decided by the state of diplomatic relations at this time, to which I shall
soon refer. His object as well as Dumouriez's was to separate the Prussians from Austria, in pursuance of which he directed his attack in the
first place against the undefended German Empire, from whose Diet
Austria was just now zealously endeavouring to procure a declaration of war
against France. He therefore sent General Neuwinger to occupy Frankfort, and to
lay another contribution on the rich inhabitants; whereupon the poorer classes—to the great disgust of the revolutionary
General—declared that they had no fault to find with their richer
fellow-citizens. From Frankfort one detachment was sent
northwards to Friedberg, and another southwards to the Ncckar.
Custine issued a proclamation to the Hessian
troops, calling on them to desert their Landgrave—the
monster who did not seem aware that the judgment day had come for
Ch.
V.] THE PETTY SOVEREIGNS OF THE GERMAN
EMPIRE. 171
all unrighteous Princes. The effect of this manifesto was
the very contrary to that which he had intended. A deep and universal
indignation was felt throughout Hesse, in the army as well as among the people
at large. Every one took up arms, and a national war coidd have been kindled in a moment, had not the Landgrave
himself, in his perpetual dread of commotion, done all in his power to check
the popular feeling. But this was the only district where the will and the
power to resist were manifested. The people of Mayence indeed shewed both apathy and disinclination, when ordered by Custine to
constitute themselves a free people; but on the other hand, the Syndic of the
provincial diet, Lassaulx, arrived from Coblentz on the 26th, and in the name
of the inhabitants invited the General to come to their city, and to
deal mercifully with it. The Princess ofWied recommended herself to his
clemency; the Authorities in Bonn and Cologne began to pack up their goods,
and the Landgrave's famdy fled from Cassel. Nor was the appearance of things in Upper Germany at all more encouraging. Wiirzburg and Bamberg were
expecting the attack of the French with fear and trembling; Wiirtemberg and
Baden protested their neutrality; nay even the Ambassadors
of the Imperial Diet at Ratisbon hired vessels to
float down the Danube as soon as the French shoidd arrive at Nuremberg. What
are we to say to so humiliating a spectacle?—to such a self-abandonment on the part of all the Sovereigns, in a region of at least 8
million brave and industrious people, reduced by the badness of their
political constitution to such trembling fear of 18,000 Frenchmen? One
remembrance may suffice for an answer to this cpiestion; these were the
Ecclesiastical Territories, whose fall our
Ultramontanist party deplores; they were, moreover, the States of the Rhine
Confederation, who in after times have so often described their sovereignty as
the very essence of German freedom!
The confidence of the enemy kept pace, of course, with the
apprehensions of these potentates. "France," wrote Custine
172
RETREAT
FROM FRANCE.
[Book IV.
to the Minister on the 24th, "must not treat with the despots; it owes deliverance to every people; the time is come to make
despots bow their heads; the neutral Princes will rejoice
at every little attention which our Generals may choose to pay them."
"My Hessian proclamation," he announced on the 28th, "was only
the commencement of my grand scheme for the overthrow of all tyrants. The German Empire is already preparing to receive my
benefits; but it is necessary above all things to lull Prussia to sleep by the
offer of a French Alliance." Lebrun replied on the 30th, "Yon shall
have every possible support; sweep away the enemy from both banks of the Rhine;
treat the towns and the people with brotherly kindness, for
they are already well inclined to us."
Such was the state of things in the second half of October. In all directions the French Government manifested its desire to
rouse the people to freedom, to overthrow the reigning Princes
and conquer their lands. With regard to Prussia, the same notion still existed
of inducing her to sign a separate treaty of peace,—thereby securing her nonintervention,—and then dealing with divided Germany at pleasure. If we now transport ourselves to head-quarters at St.
Menehould, and examine events whieh took place four weeks earlier, we shall be
better able to follow the course of the negotiations directed to this grand
object.
Dumouriez, though sufficiently sensible of the advantages of a separate peace with Prussia, had formed too correct a judgment of the
internal condition of France, to allow of his lending himself unconditionally
to the inconsiderate fanaticism of the Gironde, or to
Danton's brutal lust of plunder. He was still full of enthusiasm
for the conquest of Belgium, but even this he would have willingly sacrificed
to the internal restoration of France. On the 29th
of September, immediately after receiving the Duke of Brunswick's last
manifesto,—in consequence of which he broke off the
truce-he wrote to Lebrun as follows:
"Although the people here,
Ch. V.] WISE MODERATION OF THE FRENCH GENERALS.
have an earnest desire for peace, and are only prevented by a sense of
decorum from obtaining it, yet I am fully convinced
that the King will never desert the Austrians. But even .on this
supposition," he addetl, "I am of opinion, that a general peace,
which we might obtain on glorious conditions, would be better for us than
the dangers of a long war; for neither money nor territory will be demanded
of us, and we shad not be so mean-spirited as to agree to anything dishonourable to ourselves." The reports of his colleague Kellermann were of a similar character. "Prussia," he
said, "will have nothing farther to do with
the Emigres, but will only treat with Louis according to the forms prescribed by the constitution. I think this an aeeeptable proposition, and we ought simply to send the King back to the
Tuderies."
What a strange contrast is presented to us between Paris and the army! On the one side, the Demagogues, who had kindled
the war to overthrow Louis, and now wished to continue it to revolutionise
Europe; on the other, the Generals, who had encountered the
danger, and now saw the laurels of conquest inviting
them in every direction, raising their voices for peace, with a moderation
which does them honour, in order to secure to their country tranquillity and
freedom.
Dumouriez, moreover, was perfectly right, in the main, in his judgment
respecting Prussia. The King, and all his Ministers and
Generals, were earnestly desirous of peace, but none of them were willing to be
the first to desert the common cause. Several reasons, any one of which would
have been sufficient, cooperated to produce this sentiment. The King would not sheathe the sword without having at least procured the
personal freedom of Louis XVI. He did not wish to break faith with Austria,
except in the extreme case of that Power manifesting any positive hostility
towards Prussia. And, lastly, he did not see any possibility, by
means of a separate peace, of fulfilling his wishes with respect to
174
RETREAT
FROM FRANCE.
[Book IV.
Poland. Their realization depended mainly on Russia, to which only a
few weeks before be had bound himself by a new treaty^ to
take part in the war against France—an engagement, the full importance of
which we shall learn in connection with subsequent events. All these
considerations, as we said before, rendered the conclusion of a separate peace impossible. But so deeply did they feel at the Prussian head-quarters the evils of the policy pursued—the loss of men,
money and reputation which had already been suffered—and
with such anxiety did they look forward to the dangers of a prolonged contest, that they would perhaps have renounced their claims on Poland, could
they thereby have purchased an immediate and general peace.
Every other question, however, gave way before the urgency of the task of conducting the army—greatly weakened as it was—safely through the muddy defiles of the Argonnes. Though firmly
resolved not' to conclude a separate peace, the Prussian Government received
the envoys, Benoit and Westermann, who arrived on the 29th of September, in the
most friendly manner; opened negotiations with them, and without
further delay began their retreat on the 30th. The French were so fully
convinced of their own superiority, and so buoyed up by their future hopes,
that there was little difficulty in lulling them into the happiest state of security. The Prussians took care to say nothing which could bind them;
it was sufficient to express at every opportunity the disinclination which they
really felt against the continuance of the war. Westermann, as it
seems, had other wchjMy
reasons for being easily satisfied—reasons to
which be was remarkably open—and he had more than one embezzlement on his conscience. On this occasion, he is said to have
pocketed 25,000 francs for his obliging manner of negotiating.1 At
all events he was full of triumph and enthusiasm;
uWhat would you have?" he wrote to a friend in
1 Morris to Washington, Jan. 7th,
1793,
Cit.
V.] THE PRUSSIANS PRETEND TO
NEGOTIATE. 175
Strasbourg? "I am omnipotent; I dined with the King yesterday ; Prussia is about to separate from Austria. The whole nniverse
cannot now do France any harm." The conduct of individual Prussian
officers, especially of Count Kalk-reuth, did the rest; for they purposely and
openly expressed their dislike of the Austrians and the Emigres. The honest
General Duval informed his friend Merlin, that all the Generals were united in the wish for separation from Austria, and alliance
with the French Republic. Nor was his statement
false, the error consisted in drawing a conclusion from these expressions as
to the sentiments of the King. Amid conversation of this sort, the Prussian
army cpnetly continued its march through the Argonnes.
Dumouriez himself again conceived hopes of a separate peace, and checked the
pursuit. Kellermann, who had at first been eager to
attack the retreating Prussians, was prevented from doing so, and was let into
the secret, which delighted him almost as much as it had done Westermann. He
announced to Servan on the 3rd: "The Prussians do not seem disinclined to desert the ■i -i Emigres;
we might gain them over at little cost and completely
crush the Emperor." He then threw a glance over other parts of Europe.
"We shoidd hand over concpiered Austria to the Prussians, who might strip
her of tbe rest of Silesia, and take possession of
Dantzic and Thorn; by which means she would get into difficulties with the Russians, and we shoidd send a fleet to their aid into the Baltic."
These thoughts were just as rife and prolific in the heads of the political chiefs in Paris, as in that of the General himself; and all that was
necessary on the part of the Prussians to reap the advantages
accruing from them, was to give them no direct contradiction. The Commissioners
of the Convention who were with the army sent
Westermann back to Paris with the most promising despatches, and zealously endeavoured to bring matters to a conclusion. But when the
Prussians had passed through the defiles and there was no longer any fear of
danger to their retreat, their duty
176
RETREAT
FROM FRANCE.
[Book IV.
towards Austria as confederates was immediately brought forward again;
and their final words at every negotiation were a truce which should include
the Austrian armies. The Commissioners and Kellermann
saw nothing iu this but a natural hesitation in taking so important a step as
an open breach of treaty, and an entire change of system; but Dumouriez, with his acnter judgment, returned to his original conviction,
and saw that the late negotiation had injured the French no less
deeply than the former one had done the Prussians. The enemy, whose divisions
were now reunited, had still about 60,000 men at their disposal; they were
greatly afflicted by sickness, but the French too had suffered equal fatigues, and for the most part with younger and weaker men. On the 5th
of October, therefore, Dumouriez announced to Pache, the new Minister at War,
that he was not in a condition to carry out his former plan, or to drive the
Prussians entirely from the French territory; that he should
therefore send KeUermann to try a coup
de main against Verdun. He likewise expressed his intention of strengthening
Champagne for the spring by new armaments, and of immediately employing half
his army in relieving Ldle, which had been beleaguered during the
last few weeks by 12,000 Austrians. He had resumed his designs on Belgium, and felt the most ardent longing to withdraw thither from the
present thankless theatre of war. He was certain that Prussia would not
conclude a separate peace, or France a general one;
his mind was now only occupied in finding means for future splendid conquests,
and he ordered Beur-nonville to lead 32,000 men of the French army to the frontiers of Flanders, while he himself hastened to Paris, on the 10th, to come to some understanding with the Ministry respecting Belgium. Kellermann was to continue the pursuit of the
Prussians with about 40,000 men.
In fact Brunswick had now a decided intention of completing the conquest of the Meuse fortresses,
according to bis former wish. Clerfait
was to take Sedan, Hohenlohe-
Ch. V.]
AUSTRIA'S
DISTRUST OF PRUSSIA.
177
Kirchberg was to continue the siege of Thionville, while the Duke
himself was to take post between the two at Verdun,
and to aid the one or the other ■
according to circumstances. In his excess of caution, he was not altogether
certain of succeeding; but as Dumouriez had already given orders for the
departure of 32,000 men, Kellermann in all human probability
would be unable to cross the Duke's purpose with the remainder of the army.
Brunswick would thus have secured a strong position in the interior of France,
from which with fresh strength he might have commenced dangerous offensive operations in the spring. In this
case the French might have had their intoxicating dreams of conquest cooled
down, and have lent a more willing ear to the Prns-sian desire of a general
peace. For it was clear that with opponents like Danton and Lebrun, it was
necessary to assume a commanding
position to divert them from their aggressive schemes. For this purpose
the King made strong representations in the beginning of October to the Courts
of Madrid and London; he was not inclined, he said, any longer to bear the
whole brunt of the war alone; England and Spain had no less
interest than himself in the object pursued—the restoration of monarchy in
France.
But no sooner were these plans formed than they received a death-blow
from a highly unexpected quarter. The Austrians, both in the army and in Belgium, regarded the conferences
between the Prussians and French with deep mistrust. Clerfait,
Hohenlohe-Kirchberg, and the Archduke Charles himself, viewed the matter in the
same light as Westerman and Kellermann, and expected every moment to hear the announcement of a new alliance between Prussia and France.
The French did all in their power to enhance the suspicion, by displaying their
friendship for Prussia more openly than was consistent with their actual hopes.
Kellermann, although not
remarkable for cunning, played his part incomparably
on this occasion. He told Count Kalkreuth, for example, that grievously as
Austria had sinned against the
II. m
178
RETREAT
FROM FRANCE.
[Book IV.
Republic, tbe wish of the King of Prussia was sufficient to induce him
to include the Austrians in the truce with the Prussians. Still stronger were
the expressions made use of to Count Lindenau, which emanated entirely from
Kellermann's well-known plans: that the French government were
aware that Prussia meditated a new partition of Poland; but that it would
rather rejoice at the strengthening of a power which must sooner or later be
its own ally. These and a hundred similar speeches were spread about, exaggerated and envenomed: it was of no avail that
Prince Reuss, the diplomatic representative of Austria,
was acquainted with all the particulars of the French negotiation; and he
himself complained to Lucchesini that he feared he
shoidd not be able to efface the impression of these
reports at Vienna. The Austrian Generals too were excessively anxious to get
out of France, where they feared to become the victims of an unexampled
treachery. They insisted upon always having Prussian troops between themselves and the enemy, and in this way caused frequent confusion in the route
of the march. On the 8th of October Hohenlohe-Kirchberg, when on one occasion he was to form the extreme rear of the march, wrote in a sort of
despair to the Duke, reminded him of his paternal
duty towards the whole army, and finally proposed to effect an immediate truce
on condition of a complete evacuation of the French soil.1
This was all mere folly, since the King was more firmly resolved than
ever to adhere to the Austro-Prussian alliance.2 His
real wish for a general peace, on the other hand, ought to have been fully
shared by the Austrians themselves, and the fact of his lending half an ear to
the French proposals had been as advantageous to the retreat of the Austrians,
as to that of the Prussians. But still it had a
decided effect
'Webringforward
these unimportant was actually made. — ' Reports of
details
because they are probably the Lucchesini to the Ministry at Berlin,
starting
point of a statement spread of the 9th, 17th and 19th
Oct. by the Homme d'etat that
such a truce
Ch. V.]
RECALL
OF THE AUSTRIAN TROOPS.
179
on the Government at Brussels, where they came to the resolution not to risk another drop of Austrian blood to aid the progress
of the Prussian arms, but for the immediate future to operate independently. On
the 8th of October, the same day on which Hohenlohe was pouring out his heart
in complaints, as we have seen, Brunswick received notice
that the .Government at Brussels had recaded the corps of Generals Clerfait and
Hohenlohe from the allied army. The latter was destined to take up a covering
position in the territory of Luxembourg, and the former to aid in the siege of Lille, where the force already on the spot was not sufficient to effect such a complete blockade, as was expected, to ensure
its surrender.1 At
the same time the first intelligence was received of
Custine's successes, and the Landgrave of Hesse
rushed headlong home, leaving express orders to his troops likewise to make
good their retreat as speeddy as possible. Brunswick was thus left with his
30,000 Prussians, and all hope of maintaining himself on French ground entirely
vanished. Even to leave a garrison behind in Verdun would
have been a useless sacrifice of the men who formed it; the fortress,
therefore, capitulated on the 13th, and the retreat towards Longwy was
continued. The difficulties and sacrifices of this retrogade movement increased at every step with the advance of
the season, and the growing weariness of the troops. They had no meaus of
transporting their guns and baggage-waggons but the forced labour of the
peasants' horses; the muskets were for the most part rendered useless by the constant rain, and dysentery raged with increasing fury. Under
these circumstances Kalkreuth's diplomacy again
did good service. He announced to Brunswick, on the 14th of October, that the
Commissioners of the Convention had consented to a truce including the Austrians; it is true that the conditions they laid down
were quite impracticable, but the negotiations at
1 Brunswick to Tauenzien, Oct. 8.
m2
180
RETREAT
FROM FRANCE.
[Book IV.
all events secured the safety of his
rear-guard; and the French Generals themselves could not hut laugh at his
having outwitted them and brought the Austrians too
safely off. The Duke, on his part, complained bitterly of these allies, who
threw many obstacles in the way of the Prussian Commissariat in Luxembourg, "as if," wrote Lucchesini, "they had
no more concern in the war than the Grand Turk." The state of feeling was
not improved by a final conference which the King held with Hohenlohe-Kirchberg
on the 16th, in which be endeavoured to persuade him at least to assist in
holding Longwy during the winter. High words were exchanged, but without effect. Hohenlohe declared that with the
instructions he had received, nothing in the world could keep him on the other
side of the French frontier; whereupon,
Longwy also capitidated on the 22hd of October, and immediately afterwards the
German troops entirely evacuated the soil of France.
At the same time a turn in diplomatic affairs took place, of the
highest conceivable importance to the fate of
Europe and the Revolution.1
The course of the campaign had, as we may imagine, been followed with
the greatest interest and suspense in Vienna. Francis n., although, as
Archduke, he had been at the head of the war party, had uttered nothing, since
the outbreak of hostilities, but complaints of the unhappy complication of affairs, and the loudest wishes for peace. There were
indeed sufficient grounds for such sentiments. The nation and the Treasury had
been exhausted by the still bleeding wounds of the Turkish
war; the internal troubles of Joseph's reign were still felt in their
consequences; the war with France was full of dangers, and afforded but little
prospect of advantage; and the Minister Cobenzl, as well as
1 All that follows here is derived
from the despatches of Lucchesini to the Ministers at Berlin, and of Van
Haeften, Dutch ambassador in Vienna, to the States-General of Holland.
Ch. V.]
SELFISH
POLICY OF FRANCIS II.
181
the greater part of aristocratic society in Vienna, were loud in their
expression of the sentiments to which Leopold had once given currency on the
French question. But beneath this abhorrence of war, the young Emperor
concealed thoughts of a very different kind. I shall have to speak
hereafter of the many occasions on which, since his accession, the persons and
aims of the reign of Joseph again made their appearance. Francis II., too,
liked to regard himself as the darling and successor of his great uncle, and was impatient to follow his example, and
to break through the narrow limits of the two last years.
He had never sympathised with the views of his father; his mind was not wide
enough to enable him to comprehend the far-reaching projects of Leopold; his temper, although seldom manifested, was too selfwilled to allow
him, after the manner of his father, to wait, to calculate, to yield for the
moment, and to return again to the charge. Thus, in the beginning of his reign,
when still under his Father's influence, he had brought forward
the Polish-Saxon scheme; but no sooner had he become familiar with business,
than he unhesitatingly became the first and most eager
advocate of the exactly opposite project of a Polish
partition, to which he was especially
attracted by the hope of territorial aggrandizement. It is true, as we have
seen, that the most serious difficulties arose in the actual execution of this
plan. The-chief supporter of the Bavarian exchange was
Baron Spielmann, a Statesman of Joseph's school,-who had possessed little influence in Leopold's reign. He was exactly fitted by nature to play the part of a subaltern official, and his technical knowledge rendered him almost indispensable in the State
Chancery; but to the conduct of great affairs he brought few other advantages
than an often very shortsighted zeal. To the Emperor, who
was not very fond of explanations or discussions, such an instrument was extremely convenient; and Count Cobenzl, who, from the great age of
Prince Kaunitz, was regarded as the real head of the
182
RETREAT
FROM FRANCE.
[Book IV.
Foreign office, began already to suspect a disagreeable rival in
Spielmann. The latter was continually explaining how Prussia's opposition to
the cession of the Franconian principalities
might be broken; and he firmly adhered to this conviction—to the great delight
of the Emperor—in spite of all the doubts of his colleagues. The unexpected and
unanimous resistance which France offered to the attack of the Powers gave birth to other plans. Hitherto all idea of conquering, French provinces had been rejected, from the wish not to
embitter all parties in France, and not to rob King Louis, for whose
deliverance war was being made. But now the restoration of the Bourbon throne seemed doubtful; and in spite of their own
disinterestedness, the German Courts saw the whole of France under arms against
the foreigners. In Vienna the notion gained ground in some quarters, that it
would be simpler to look for the desired compensation
in France, rather than in the complicated Bavarian exchange affair. For the
moment, however, Spielmann kept to his opinion, and carried his point in the
Ministerial Council on the 5th of September. It was resolved on this occasion
to begin two negotiations, one of which was to assume a
peaceful tone. As an abatement of revolutionary insolence was expected on
the approach of the Germans to Paris, Gmnt Mercy, formerly ambassador in
France, and Baron Thugut, the negotiator of the Peace of Tescheu, were to repair to Luxembourg, to be present as experienced Counsellors
at any negotiations which might be carried on in concert with Prussia. Even
Baron Breteud, the representative of Louis XVI., was summoned to this
Conference, to act as a counterpoise to the violence of the Emigres. But
all these proceedings were a mere empty show; the real designs of the Emperor
were shown only in the second, simultaneous, negotiation. Spielmaim, together
with Baron Codenbaeh. Actuary of the Cabinet, was sent directly to the Prussian head-quarters, to extort from the King the cession of
Ans-pach and Baireuth, in return for the acquisition of a Polish
Cn.
V.]
SPIELMANN
AND HAUGWITZ.
183
province; and above all things to dispose Prussia to a zealous continuation of the war. Cobenzl, though not very enthusiastic about these
objects, consented to this mission in order to get rid of the disagreeable
presence of Spielmann about the person of the Emperor; and the latter started
from Vienna to the theatre of war on the 12th of September.
It was~ long before he reached the end of his journey. The nearer he
approached the French frontier, the more slowly he travelled; in Belgium he
found the minds of men agitated and terrified by the failure of the campaign,
and the alleged treachery of the Prussians. At last, in the middle of
October, he arrived at Longwy, in great fear of falling into the hands of the
French. At head-quarters he found himself in the presence of an old
acquaintance, Count Haugwitz, who had been ambassador
at Vienna during the summer, had passed with Spielmann into France, and been
named Cabinet Minister immediately after his arrival. Spielmann was justified in looking upon this as a good omen, since
Schulenburg had returned to Berlin in disgrace, and
the only diplomatist remaining at head-quarters was Lucchesini,
who had always been disliked at Vienna on account of his stinging sarcasms, and
who, as a disciple of the Frede-rician school, was a violent opponent of the
Austrian alliance. Haugwitz, on the contrary, had been on an
intimate footing with Bischoffswerder since the times of the Rosicrucian
intrigue, and passed in Vienna for an
amiable companion, as well as a convenient politician. Spielmann, therefore,
was able to express himself all the more frankly and unreservedly. He
pointed out that Austria had really , not the slightest interest in continuing ' the war, and that the Emperor might very well
acknowledge the Republic, since the power of France must necessardy sink under
such a form of government.
If, under such circumstances, Austria consented to continue the war, she must
have some practical advantages set clearly before her; Prussia must agree to
Austria's receiving Bavaria together with Anspach and
Baireuth. It
184
RETREAT
FROM FRANCE.
[Book IV.
would he better, he continued, entirely to alter the character of the
war, without further reference to the restoration of monarchy in
France; to procure territorial compensation for the expenses of the war in
France itself; and for this purpose to alter the late defensive
alliance into one of offence.
These overtures completely withdrew the ved which had hitherto concealed the real character of the war carried on by the
German Powers. It never was, what it has been so incessantly called, an
aggressive war, or a war of principles. It was begun unwillingly to ward off
the attacks of the Revolutionists. It had, indeed, in the beginning,
called forth in Vienna and Berlin some avaricious schemes, nominally of
compensation, but in reality of concpiest. But hitherto the intrusion of these
selfish views—at any rate in the principal point, the treatment of French affairs—had been carefully avoided. The German
Governments, in their dealings with the National Convention, only spoke of the
restoration of quiet, order and peace. But now, all lingering scruples were to
be abandoned. What Spielmann proposed was, in fact,
to desert Louis XVI., to render all connection with the moderate party
impossible, and to give a fresh and tremendous impulse to the Revolution by
inflaming the national pride of the French.
Under these circumstances, there could be no thought, in any quarter, of a general peace. The King of Prussia had to contemplate
the disastrous conclusion of the late campaign, innumerable military
complications during the coming year, and the most troublesome demands on the
part of his ally. Goltz reported from St. Petersburg, that Austria was
pushing her claims to Baireuth and Anspach at the Russian Court, and that
Russia had undoubtedly resolved on the partition of Poland. The Russian
Ambassador at Berlin, Alopeus, who by order of his Government had repaired to head-quarters, overflowed with expressions of devotion and friendship.
After mature consideration of the circumstances, the King and all his
counsellors agreed that they must no longer
Ch. V.]
CONFERENCE BETWEEN BRUNSWICK & VALENCE.
185
hesitate, and that the time was come for energetic action. The King
first of all despatched an autograph letter to the Empress Catharine, on the
17th of October, informing her, that he had been forced by the inclemency of
the weather to retreat, but that he would not forsake the great
cause; but that before he could finally resolve on continuing the war, he, owed
it to himself and his people to determine in his own mind what compensation was
due to him; that the Empress having desired to know what he claimed, he had directed his Ministers to give every information on the
subject. These demands, however, had in the mean time been considerably
modified by Haugwitz. The latter pointed out that the claim of the King had
been confined to compensation for the campaign just closed; but that, as there was now no longer any doubt of
the continuance of the war, and a second campaign, the claim to compensation
must be increased in proportion to the increase of his exertions. The King in
the ardour of his Polish wishes, immediately gave his consent to
these propositions.
Before the decisive negotiation with Spielmann—who had been hindered by
sickness for some days—the Duke of Brunswick had another conference with
General Valence on the 21st of October, at the capitulation
of Longwy. The latter, to the great surprise of the Duke, declared that his
Government would consent to a general peace, if Austria would erect her Belgian
provinces into an independent State, or hand them over to a less powerful
ruler. In this- case the Convention would liberate Louis
XVI., and grant an amnesty to the Emigres. Such a proposal seemed to fit in
very well with the Bavarian exchange; and Haugwitz therefore hastened to communicate it to Spielmann, who immediately prevaded on Prince Reuss and Lucchesini to attend a further
conference with the hostile commander Kellermann, on the 26th of October, at
the castle of Aubange. Valence, who was also present, repeated his proposals,
and without further circumlocution named the Elector of Bavaria
as a
186
RETREAT
FROM FRANCE.
[Book T\
Prince whom France would willingly accept ,as future rule of Belgium.
It soon became evident that the Generals wer unprovided with full powers by
their Governments, am would not conclude even an
armistice, except on utterl; inadmissible conditions. Lucchesini therefore
hastened t< break off the hopeless discussion. The King, who had antici
pated this result, had at the very same time summoned th other Austrian
Statesmen —Spielmann, Mercy and Thugut-who were still at
head-cpiarters. He received them in th' village of Merle, close by the gates of
Luxembourg, an< communicated to them his irrevocable will respecting th
future campaign. . He repeated what he had written to thi Empress Catharine-—rejected once for all the cession of th< Franconian Principalities—and
demanded a larger compen sation in Poland, in the case of his raising more thai
20,000 men for the French war. He concluded by saying that Haugwitz was
empowered to lay before them his precise
demands.
Hereupon a very lively discussion took place in Luxembourg between Spielmann and Haugwitz. The former represented that the principle of perfect ecpiality in respect tc the
acquisitions of the two Powers had always been laic down; how then, he asked, could Prussia bring forward a plan, according to which she
demanded a Polish province for herself, while Austria would not obtain a single
square mile of land, but only a better rounding of her territory: Haugwitz
replied, that the principle of equality could only hold good in
the case of a war undertaken by two Powers by mutual desire and consent; but
that in this case Austria was alone attacked, and Prussia afforded help of her
own free will, to an extent far beyond her obligation as a member of the adiance. Prussia, therefore, he said, was justified in demanding
an indemnification corresponding to her exertions,
and in leaving Austria to seek compensation from the aggressor—France.
"This," cried Spielmann, "is something quite new; this is the grave of all alliances."
"I am con-
Ch. V.]
THE
NOTE OF merle.
187
vinced," answered Haugwitz, "that the Emperor will acknowledge the evident fairness of these principles." He then
spread out a map of Poland, on which the King had drawn with his own hand the
boundary line of his future province, which was nearly double in extent of that
which had been claimed in Mayence. "When," he said, "we have
taken possession of this district, we will
continue to cooperate against France with all our powers; but if obstacles are
thrown in our way, we will only furnish the 20,000 men, as we are bound to do
by the treaty of February; in which case wc shall indemnify
ourselves with a smaller province of Poland." He then handed to the
Imperial Minister a note dictated by the King_ at Merle, on the 25th, in which
these demands were formally stated. It was in vain that Spielmann summoned Prince Reuss to his aid. They disputed for
three hours, but Haugwitz adhered to his original proposition, and called upon
them to send the note to Vienna. "I must do it," said Spielmann at
last, "I am a ruined man!"
Under these circumstances the French negotiation
naturally fell to the ground of itself. Dohm, the Prussian Ambassador at
Cologne, indeed, sent word to Luxembourg, that an agent of the French Ministry,
named Mandrillon, had also made proposals of peace and alliance to him; but
Lucchesini, on the 29th of October, immediately drew up a
decisive answer, of which the following were the main points. "Since
France refuses to treat until her territory is evacuated, Prussia must insist,
on her part, that Custine should first of all withdraw from the territory of the German Empire. As the King continues to feel the deepest
interest in the fate of Louis XVI., he recpiires from the French Ministers a
previous statement respecting the means which they possess of liberating the
French Monarch. Lastly, the King cannot enter into any farther
negotiations without the consent of Austria." We shall see that the French
Government were not deterred by this communication, although their views were
already so extended, that it was impossible for Prussia to remain neu
188
RETREAT
FROM FRANCE.
[Book I\
tral, and no alternative was left her but war or alliance wit] France.
Dumouriez clearly saw this, and felt certain of th continuance of war. As early
as the 28th of October h forbade General Valence to indulge in further
diplomacy. I was only lost time, he said, except for the rogues who wishei to
lure on France by pretended negotiations; the Republl could not treat with
Brunswick, the author of the insidtinj manifestoes, and did not choose to bandy words with des pots about the freedom of the Belgian people. He
therefon urged the General to enter Belgium with his corps
d'arme as speedily as possible, and wrote to Kellermann to pasi by Luxembourg,
and throw himself on Treves and Coblentz "to municipalise
the Priests' high road." "It is absolutely necessary,"
he said, "to have 150,000 men beyond the border: during this winter;
partly to procure money and circnlati assignais,
and partly to avoid exhausting the resources o our own country in feeding our armies. I hope in the spring to shake hands with you across
Cologne. The Rhine mus be the limit of our campaign from Geneva to Holland—
perhaps to the sea. When we have accomplished this task then, come what may,
the European Revolution wil have made mighty progress." The
Ministry came to th< same resolution; all the armies, without exception,
were t< pass the winter on the Rhine.
And thus the Revolution, having wasted the resources o France, prepared
to seek subsistence, booty and concpiest beyond her
borders. The old Governments, on the othe: hand, no longer aimed at the
overthrow of anarchy, bu were pleased with the turmoil by which they hoped to
profit On the 29th of October, the Emperor wrote from Vienna tc the King of
Prussia: "Your Majesty may be assured of infirm
resolution to exert myself to the utmost against thi common enemy, and to
procure for both of us every gua rantee and compensation which we are entitled
to demand and able, with our united powers, to obtain." The impetuou: zeal
of Joseph II. spoke here by the mouth of his favouriti
Ch. V.]
"COME
WHAT MAY.,: 189
nephew, and the Powers which had taken up arms to check the spread of
revolutionary flames, were now entering themselves
on a similar course of violence. "Come what may,"— these
words of the rash French General became likewise the watchword of Germany and
France, and consequently, of European policy.
BOOK y.
COMMENCEMENT OP THE WAR BETWEEN ENGLAND AND FRANCE.
Ch. i.]
193
CHAPTER I. A GENERAL REVIEW.
The
middle ages and modern times contrasted.—Characteristics
of the french revolution. — coincidence of the french revolution with the
aqressive policy of russia.
We have carried our history of the revolutionary period down to the time
when the Communist democracy unfolded its victorious banner for the first time
in Prance; and after a temporary check, prepared itself for the last decisive
struggle. We have at the same time traced the effects of the
Revolution on the Continental States of Central Europe. Germany has been forced
into a defensive war; Belgium, Switzerland and Italy, are threatened with
dangerous invasions. At the same time the example of
the French lust of concpest begins to find imitators in
Vienna and Berlin, and the first symptoms appeared of the approaching extension of the movement, beyond its previous sphere, to Eastern Europe and
the Ocean. In every direction, therefore, the call to freedom, raised in 1789, appeared like the signal for despotism and military
violence. The history of the world can scarcely shew a turn of affairs so
tragical—so terrible a fall after such vigorous efforts, such a grand
develope-ment, and such enthusiastic hopes. It is a
moment well suited to ask ourselves the cpiestion, whether those hopes bore
within them the seeds of decay, whether that develope-ment was, from the very
first, necessarily unfruitful.
194
A
GENERAL REVIEW.
[Book V.
He who draws this conclusion from the failure of
the Revolution, and utterly condemns the movement of 1789, must overlook an
indestructible impulse of the human heart, and pronounce the history of Europe
for the last three hundred years to be one great lie.
Ever since the close of the Middle Ages, the
nations of Europe had been struggling to reach the same object—though not with
the same political programme—which the French Assembly of 1789 hoped to obtain
for France. That object was the removal of all unfounded and imaginary authority, the loosing of all arbitrary bonds, the
overthrow of all unnatural barriers. The world called
to mind the venerable words of Holy writ: "Thou shalt not make to thyself
any graven image, nor the likeness of anything that is in Heaven
above, nor in the earth beneath ..... thou shalt not bow
down to them nor worship them." Hitherto they had practised idolatry in every department of life, for they had attributed to all the institutions of human society, a heavenly origin
and a divine consecration. The visible Church in the
Middle Ages included the State, Commerce and Education, in its own sphere, and
thereby imparted to them its own character of holiness and immutability. All
that existed therefore was unassailable, not because it was good but simply because it existed. All things moved on in a clearly
defined, constant and unalterable course. The artisan adhered inviolably to the
path laid down for him byT his
fathers; the merchant set out on certain fixed days to travel over and over again the same eternal route; and the mode of tilling the land was as
unchangeable as the land itself. There was no employment which was not handed
over,to a close corporation, no possession which was
not subjected to some irreversible privilege; so that the
man who did not belong to one of the privileged classes had no means of raising
himself to a position worthy of a human being. All progress
was excluded from the world, every where form prevailed
over substance, and all forms were stamped with the
Ch. I.]
MEN
"BREAK THEIR BONDS ASUNDER."
195
same general pattern. Dnring five hundred years of the Middle Ages, the
world underwent, indeed, many territorial dislocations, but far less internal
change than takes place in fifty years of modern times.
But just because all those privileges which ruled the world formed a
single closely connected chain, the effect was all the more tremendous when the
mind of man, in its eager aspirations after nature and truth, fiad broken a
single link of its galling fetters. When Columbus
changed men's views of the surface of the earth, and Copernicus, of the
universe— when Luther had reformed the Church—the spirit of criticism was
roused to the examination of every department of life, in all countries and among all peoples. Mankind acquired the power of rejection, and began
to feel a delight in restlessness, and an eager desire of
progress. They resolved never again to acknowledge an authority which was not
founded on the nature of things; or a barrier, the
necessity of which was not clearly proved; or a government, which did not
recommend itself by genuine usefulness. The deve-lopement of the whole man,
untrammelled by arbitrary bonds, and supported by the laws of his own moral
nature—this was the great aim which now animated the nations
with irresistible force. It was this thought which glowed in the bosoms of the
champions of the Reformation, who, without regard to the authority or the power
of the ancient Church, only asked their own hearts where the Spirit of God was to be found. It was this thought which in art and
science struggled towards the light, deserting traditionary types and forms,
and looking only for absolute truth and natural beauty. It is this thought
which has brought about that revolution in the practical business of
life, which since the last century has changed the conditions of men, and burst
every commercial fetter, to the cry of unbounded freedom of labour. And lastly,
it worked with no less energy in the field of politics than in society, education and religion. We see that every Order in turn
endeavoured to open a future
N 2
196
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GENERAL REVIEW.
[Book V.
career for itself by its own power. First it was the kings and princes
of Europe, who in the name of the public good, the national weal, and the
common rights of man, commenced the contest against the
ancient institutions. The example of Louis XIV. was followed
and improved upon by the monarchs of Prussia; and these again by the majority of the German princes. Bold and gifted rulers in Denmark and
Sweden, Spain and Portugal, followed in the same track; and, lastly, even the
Austrian State—the truest representative of the old system—was
shaken to its very foundation by an imperial hand. There is not a spot in
Europe where the spirit of innovation, the impulse towards sterling truth and
genuine philanthropy, was not deeply felt.
This spirit—as it needs few words to prove—was creative and
benevolent in its aspirations, but at the same time destructive
and intractable in its whole nature and character. The ancient order of things
had passed away, but the new laws were very far. from being acknowledged or
carried into execution. The very ground on which men had to build was still
heaving beneath their feet, strewed in wdd confusion
with the ruins of tbe past, and the rude germs of the future; all the passions
of the human heart were set in motion, and force alone
appeared to rule the world. The century to which we owe a national provision
for the instruction of the people, an active
attention to the condition of the poorer classes, and general respect for the
life of the individual man—this century, we say, was in
its own mode of action both brutal and unmerciful. Whoever shall choose to
denounce it as the very native soil of barbarity and selfishness, will be able to bring forward as many facts in support of his
views, as he who expects to find in it the birth-place
of a blissful futurity. For because this generation
of men felt strong enough to refuse to worship idols, they too often worshipped
nothing at all but their own strength. While they sought to rid themselves of
all factitious authorities and arbitrary enactments, they forgot the
Cn.
I.] VARIOUS FORMS OF REVOLUTION IN
EUROPE. 197
eternal laws to which human nature itself is subject. When therefore
they had thrown off the bonds of external discipline,
they had no guide but their own unbridled passions. And the more difficult and
sublime the task which the century had to perform, the greater
the number of sorrows and excesses into which it must inevitably fall. Nay
more, it may be said that an historical idea, which unchecked and
nncorrupted in its course should be immediately carried out by the great mass
of a nation, could scarcely be one of sufficient
depth and importance to become the foundation of a mighty future. The idea of
modern freedom in its beneficent
course has, indeed, been made to serve the passions of individuals; but as its
intrinsic value can never excuse the abuses which have been carried on in its
name, so, on the other hand, it woidd be foolish to deny its vital importance
on account of those abuses.
If these remarks are applicable to the reforms undertaken by the
monarchs of the 18th century, they wiU have still greater force in connection
with the democratic Revolution of the French people.
This latter was not, as has so often been asserted, the commencement
of a new era; it is rather an integral part of a process begun three centuries
before. It aimed at the abolition of obsolete institutions,
which, proceeding from the ages of feudalism, answered no good purpose in the
actual state of France, and oidy oppressed the country with arbitrarily imposed burdens. It sought to win for mankind at large freedom
of intercourse and labour,—recognition of their dignity as men, and of the
principle of nationality-freedom of thought, and
religious liberty. Notwithstanding the difference of time and place, we
recognise the same deep impulses which had once brought Germany into conflict
with the Romish Hierarchy, raised Holland against Spain, England against the
Stuarts, and America against England. No less clear, however,
is the fatal aberration of the French Revolution, at its first entrance into
practice. While the
198
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GENERAL REVIEW,
[Book V.
other countries we have mentioned made it their first and foremost care to rear a new order of things amidst the ruins of the old, the
French Revolution declared war, not only against pretended authority, hut
against all moral laws whatever; and thereby unfitted itself to fulfil its
infinitely important mission. For freedom of intercourse and trade, it
substituted the plunder of proprietors; for universal equality before the law,
it substituted the persecution of the higher classes; and for the emancipation
of the conscience in religious matters, cruel ill-treatment of the princes of the Church. It knew no other means of improving a bad
government than the annihilation of every governing power; it sought to
restore equality by exterminating the rich and distinguished; and thought that
true freedom consisted in striking off the chains from every passion
and every crime. The aim of its policy seemed not to be rapid reconstruction of
the ruined fabric of the law, but the unbridled licence of every will;—and thus
for a space of two years there existed in France no influence and no law but that of brute violence. The sequel will shew us how
this sole remaining power proceeded unchecked to the most terrible extremes,
and how the greatest criminal proved on every occasion the most successful
statesman. AVhen once a state has entered upon such a path as this, it
becomes irrecoverably involved in a fatal chain of consequences. Not that
logical consistency of the reason, which may look down
with proud contempt on those who loiter and halt between two opinions; but that
moral concatenation by which —for the severer
punishment of transgression—every evil deed draws after it still greater
crimes.
It is true, no doubt, that in this case as in every other, a good cause
is furthered by every occurrence, and that in this sense freedom was furthered by the French Revolution. A century
would probably have passed over half Europe before the mouldering rubbish of
feudalism could have been removed by peaceful means. But this momentary accelera-
Ch.
I.] FATAL ERRORS OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 199
tion of progress is too often counterbalanced by lasting evils. The
Revolution has eaten away not only the political morality of nations, but their
political enthusiasm. It has scared away the governments of Europe from
reforms, as well as from acts of tyranny; it has
forced the Church into a false political attitude, filled the middle classes
with an immoral apathy, and the proletaries with unreasonable expectations. It clearly shewed, both in its first career (beginning with the year 1789), and wherever it has
again ^reared its bead, that it can have no other result than the first
Empire—a military State, which grants indeed an equality
of private rights, and an open career of service, but needs at the same time
commercial prohibitions, the control of education, and
ecclesiastical oppression; and which therefore brings with it the subjugation
of labour, thought and faith, instead of freedom,—and crushes instead of
fulfilling the claims of our national life.
Nor is it difficult to recognise the causes which gave that turn to
French affairs, which has been so fatal to the whole succeeding century. We do
not mean the errors of individuals or parties in particular
emergencies, but the more general source from which,
in France especially, a countless multitude of crimes and errors flowed, and
irresistibly impelled the State towards the abyss of
ruin. We need not look far for it, as we have said, and we shall see that it
has not the least connexion with the principles of reform. It is only too
terribly evident that this cause was the moral condition of France—and, indeed,
of old, feudal, conservative France. We cannot wonder that the storm of freedom
should level every existing institution with the ground, for they had all, for many ages past, been morally diseased and rotten to the
very core. The example of the Court, from the reign of Francis I. to that of
Louis XV., had poisoned the very life-blood of the higher
classes. During the same period the middle classes were
excluded more and more completely from all political rights, and consequently
from
200
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GENERAL REVIEW.
[Book
V.
all political training; while the masses of the people were ground
clown by unceasing misery and hunger. It was a state of things which may
without exaggeration be compared with that of the Byzantine Empire. There was
the same moral stagnation among the ruling classes, and the same wretchedness
among the despised rabble. There was, however, this difference; that while in Rome the utterly exhausted and despairing people
entirely gave up the State as lost, and threw themselves unconditionally into
the arms of a charitable Church, there was still sufficient national pride in
the French people to make them feel their own degradation, and seek redemption within the limits of the State by a furious
outbreak of despair. Under such circumstances every movement is necessarily
cramped and distorted, however sublime and pure the spiritual
impulse may be; and if no one undervalues Christianity because at
its summons the degraded Romans turned their backs upon the labours and duties
of the world, we ought not to condemn the idea of freedom, because her image
inflamed the contemporaries of " a Louis XV. to feroeity and crime. In a word, the Freneh Revolution failed, not because the destruction
of the old order of things was a mistake, but because the nation entered on the work of reform under a heavy load of inveterate immorality. It was not from amid the ruins, but beneath the shelter, of feudalism, that the avarice and selfishness, the violence and barbarism, grew up, which led the nation
from the rejoicings of that night in August to the horrors of the September
massacres.
Closely connected with this was another error,—which
also existed long before 1789—respecting the nature of freedom itself;—an
error, which not only marred the Revolution by the faults of the national
character, but brought it into direct conflict with the very essence
of that character. Men justly regarded the previous constitution of
the State as the source of their sufferings, and were naturally led to set an
exaggerated value on mere forms of government.
They had
Ch.
I.] CHARACTERISTICS OF THE FRENCH
PEOPLE. 201
experienced the misery which had befallen the
people under the Monarchy, and had arrived at the conclusion that the
sovereignty of the people was the only antidote to that poison. In the
bitterness of their hearts, rather than from a careful consideration of their wants, they accustomed themselves to consider freedom as
synonymous with a democratic constitution. They were confirmed in this error,
partly by general theories, and partly by the example of foreign nations; ana in the consideration of these they entirely lost sight of the essential points—the interests, inclinations and
capacities, of their own people. Whatever political shape the French nation may
take in future times, thus much is certain, that hitherto it has never shown
the slightest mark of a democratic people. If the essential
characteristic of the Anglo-Saxon race is contained in the one word Self-government,—that of the Freneh people may be defined as the constant tendency to Centralisation. Every great and glorious era in its history is marked by the progress, not of individual developement, but of
governmental power. All its virtues and weaknesses tend towards a
form of Monarchy which to other nations might almost appear a tyrannis;
and in fact all its efforts to establish popular rule have only aimed at a tyrannis of the majority, and not at the liberty of the whole people. At all
times, and in every class of the French nation, we see the liveliest enthusiasm for the honour of the State as a whole, but very little concern for
personal and corporative independence; and notwithstanding their splendid
political talents, and lofty capacity of self-sacrifiee, the French are wanting
in the most important elements of sound democracy—the strength
which bides its time, peaceful respect for law, and patient
energy. It would be highly unjust to depreciate a great nation—which under its
Kings has done so much to advance the highest aims of humanity —because it
happens to have no taste for a Republic; but it is
not the less evident on that account, that if the freedom of a people consists
in its living according to the laws of
202
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GENERAL REVIEW.
[Book V.
its own nature, then the effort to establish
democracy in France is antagonistic to liberty itself. This was made apparent in 1789, and has been proved again in our own times. The
declaration of the "Rights of man," which, couched in almost the very
same words, created in North America a flourishing Republic, became on Celtic
soil the starting point of a furious Ochlocracy.
For such in sober truth was the nature of the government, which, on the 10th of August 1792, marchefl over the smoking
ruins of the ancient royal palace, and hastened with
terrible energy to proclaim its character and its will to the nation at large.
Only a few weak obstacles stdl kept it back from the conrquest of the whole
kingdom; and the contests by which it gained entire mastery in the land, and
the measures by which it sought to rule it, will form the
subject of our present consideration. Like their predecessors, who, not content
with ruling France, had sought to extend their influence through neighbouring
countries, they too aimed at the overthrow of all the existing systems of the world, and began their machinations for the simultaneous
convulsion of East and West. This tendency too, like the communistic despotism
to which they subjected their own nation, proceeded from the very nature of
their government.
What revolution is in internal affairs, coucuiest
is in foreign policy. They both begin by refusing
to recognize established rights and vested interests. They may both be imposed
as a \ necessity upon a nation by the duty of self-preservation, and when
confined within the limits of necessity and duty, may be productive of the best effects. Of this nature
was the English Revolution of 1G88, and the Prussian
conquest of Silesia and West Prussia, which for the moment violated the forms
of law, but immediately afterwards
proclaimed the maintenance of laws and treaties as their guiding principle. But
no sooner does a State make the lust of conquest its principle of action, than
it also be-
p
Ch.L] analogy
between revolution and conquest. 203
comes entirely revolutionary. He who refuses to be bound by any
engagements abroad, will respect no rights at home. And the converse of this is
also true; he who acknowledges no law but the right of insurrection and brute
violence, will always settle his foreign relations by an appeal to
the sword. When ancient Rome conceived the idea of universal dominion, the demagogues became mighty in the Forum; and, on the other hand,
no party rose to power during the Revolution which did not immediately
form plans of aggression against some distant
country. Long before the Emperor Leopold had spoken of intervention to Louis
XVI., Lafayette was busy with plans for
revolutionising Belgium, Holland and Ireland. No sooner had Louis and Leopold
acknowledged the constitution of 1791, than the Gironde began
a war against Austria, Germany and Italy. Immediately
after the affair of Valmy, when the Prussians were eagerly desirous of peace,
Brissot, Danton and Billaud, were moving heaven and earth to throw all Europe
into confusion. We are now about to observe the
way in which this zeal for destruction daily increased, and gradually drew all
the States of Europe into its vortex. In doing so we shall see, by the way, how
completely all the other aims of the Revolution were lost sight of; and how, on this side also, all things tended towards a
mditary dictatorship.
But that which lent a peculiarly momentous character to the period—that
which increased tenfold the intensity of every crisis, and the terrors of every
danger—was the coincidence of the French aggressions in
the West, with the no less comprehensive and equaUy revolutionary policy of the
Russian Empire in the East. It will be necessary, therefore,
to bring forward the circumstances connected with this coincidence more prominently before the reader, and, in doing so, to extend the horizon
of our observation to the whole of Europe. We have already referred to the
policy of Russia; the effect of her war with Turkey, in 1790, upon Germany; the
silent opposition of the Emperor Leopold in 1791 to her
204
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GENERAL REVIEW.
[Book V.
schemes for the subjection of Poland and France; and lastly, the
important effect of her Polish policy on the relation between Prussia and Austria in the autumn of 1792. The more completely the attention of the States of Central Europe were
occupied by the Revolution, the more boldly and vigorously
did the Russian Cabinet press forward towards the fulfilment of its
all-grasping ambition. The French war and the partition of Poland—events of equal importance to Europe, and exercising a
reciprocal influence upon each other—were simultaneously carried [into effect.
While the other States of Europe became every day more and more dependent on
political events, these events were more and more completely under the
control of the only two great potentates, the French Committee of Public Safety
and the Empress Catharine.
Before entering on the details of these events, therefore, it is
necessary to get as clear an idea of the internal
nature and traditional policy of the great Slavonian military monarchy, as of the origin of the equally warlike government of France. It
is not a little interesting to trace the internal changes of the Russian
constitution, which rendered the continuance of
peace in Russia simply unnatural and intolerable. From highly dissimilar
causes, exactly similar results appear on the Seine and the Neva. As long as an
internal condition—produced in one country by the
Revolution and in the other by the events of centuries
of despotism—continued, there was no hope of legal security or peace in Europe.
Cn. H.] 205
CHAPTER II. POLITICAL PARTIES IN FRANCE.
Resources
of the french government.—November 1792.—State
of Paris. —Finances.— General
desire for war.—Plans against Spain,
italy and constantinople.— controversy respecting the german war.— Dumouriez advocates an honourable peace. — Custine favours a
warlike
propaganda. — The
ministers decide for custine. — treatment of louis xvi.
When Dumouriez had driven the Prussian army over the
borders, the position of the Republic seemed tolerably secure. The Government was unquestionably stronger than any which had
preceded it since 1789; the different parties by which it was surrounded had
mutually weakened one another; and the foreign war had
invested the Ministry with a hitherto unknown eclat.
In spite of party feuds there were few men in France who did not
rejoice at the retreat of the Prussians; and in spite of all oratorical
phrases, there was not one who did not know that the
enemy had been conquered, neither by the daggers of the September assassins,
nor the orations of the Gironde, but by the army under Dumouriez's command. The
Ministry therefore derived all the more strength from the prestige which a great mditary success always confers, because warlike and
national honour appeared to be the only living sentiment in the public mind of
France. The excitement of political contest had completely passed away. No one
could now be found who woidd incur a danger, or who even
cherished a wish, for any particular form of government, or any idea of
internal political life. Since the 10th of August, when the mob had triumphed
over King, Assembly and Constitution, the period of intel
20G
POLITICAL
PARTIES IN FRANCE.
[Book V.
leetual triumphs was gone. Gone were the days in which a success in the
rostra was a political act, and a movement on the part of the press, a
political event! Even the struggles of parties in the
Hall of the Convention had but little serious importance. They were for the
most part only the official expression of resolutions taken long before by the
real possessors of power; or at most a noisy
signal of some impending deeds of violence. He who would attain any real success must have the disposal of the
means of material power —money and the sword.
The Government at this juncture had the two strongest levers of
despotism in their hands—the avarice and the fear of men. They were assiired of
the attachment of the arm), both by the party politics of the Generals, and
the patriotic zeal of the troops, who were not likely to desert the colours
under which they had resisted half Europe. The organization
of the Home Administration was in ruins; the Departmental governments had just been submitted to a new election under
revolutionary auspices; and all regrdar and equable influence on the country
from above was out of the question. But we must remember how weak and
untrustworthy were the arrangements made in 1790, and it will then be
evident that their decay was rather a gain to the Government than a cause of
weakness. For in all the Departments there were, by the side of the dilapidated
local Authorities, Government Commissioners, into whose hands the general confusion had thrown the greater part of the local business,
and who were at the same time completely above the control of the citizens, and
absolutely dependent on the Ministers. From the fact that most of the offices
were hereditary, even the ancient Monarchy had nothing
approaching to the extent of influence now possessed by the
Government; and when compared with the utter helplessness
of the central Authority in 1790, the difference is immeasurable. There was,
moreover, the necessity of filling up afresh all the principal posts
in the Administrations themselves. Then
again the great in-
Cn.
II.]
POLITICAL
COLLAPSE IN PARIS.
207
crease in the army gave continual opportunities for making new
appointments; while the general disorder rendered it
easy to enhance indefinitely the gains of every office by embezzlement and
extortion. From these sources the Ministers derived an almost
inexhaustible supply of patronage, which secured them the services of a whole army of expectant adventurers, and candidates
for office; a state of things which had a most important effect on the relation
between the Cabinet and the Convention.1 For,
as we have already observed, the majority in the Assembly was by no means made
np by a party founded on political principle. The several party chiefs had
but a very small body of trustworthy adherents, while the great
mass, in whose hands the decision lay, was composed of a Centre, destitute of
political sentiments, and of daily decreasing political morality. Careless
of principles, they aimed solely at the enjoyment of political power, and found
little difficulty, therefore, in traversing within the space of three years
nearly the whole circle of the political compass. Whoever obtained the upper hand in Paris, whether by the arms of the Proletaries, the
National Guard, or the troops of the line, was sure to find a compliant Convention.
The state of Paris continued to be, what it had been since the
beginning of the Revolution, the vital question for all parties. At that
period the following characteristics of this mighty city were easily
distinguishable. The great mass of the popidation was in a state of apathetic
exhaustion, into which the massacres of September, the reaction which followed them, and the dangers of war, had successively thrown all classes.
No one felt any lively compassion for the fallen cause—for the King and the
throne. Few retained
1 Morris, the American Minister in
change of Ministry brought with it
Paris,
several times dwells on this comprehensive rpurations,
and every
circumstance
in his despatches; nor partypnrsuedtheiropponentsinpower
is it
difficult to follow him in the with
the reproach of multiplying
occurrences
of this period. Every offices.
208
POLITICAL
PARTIES IN FRANCE. [Book V.
any zeal for the Republic with its ever-growing burdens; enthusiasm and
public feeling in short had vanished, and the sole prevailing sentiment was the
desire of each individual to steer
a safe course for himself through the coming storms.1 This
applies to the highest as well as to the lowest class of the citizens,—to the
democratic artizans of St. An-toine, to whom the massacres of September had
been rather too horrible,2 as well as to the wealthy inhabitants of the more
elegant cpuarters of the city, to whom even the Gironde seemed much too
revolutionary and democratic.3 To
take an active part in public business was thought a disagreeable task. While
every body withdrew from service in the National
Guard,4 there was so little feeling of personal safety, that a large number of
Deputies always went armed with sword-sticks or pocket pistols.5 Even
the assemblies of the Sections showed no greater zeal, although these,
according to the official theory, were to be the proper
seat of the popular sovereignty. The average number of
voters in each Section was about 4,000; but in the assemblies themselves, only
a thin and ragged company of 150, 100, or even fewer, were to be seen, who made
decrees in the name of the Sovereign People according to their pleasure.6 The
elections by which the Municipality was at this time renewed were carried on in
a similar manner. At the most important—the election of the Mayor—only 11,000
voters could be brought together, that is, about a ninth of
those entitled to vote; and 7,000 of these, as we have seen above, first
elected Pethion, and, after his resignation in December, a physician
1 Moore, Jutirmd,
II. 450. — 2 Gadol to Roland; Buehez, XXVIII,
93. — 3 Beaulieu, Essais,
IV. 193, Gadol to Mad. Roland, Oct.
19. — 4 Report of the Commune to the
Convention, Jan. 5. — 5 Moore, Journal,
II. 235. — 1 Mnniteur,
Oct.
25.
The Fede're's spoke
on this subject in the Convention, Dec. 23rd. Birotean,
on the 29th, Gadol to Roland (Buehez, XXVIII. 91); 11 n'y
a quelquefois pas GO personnes; dont 10 du parti agitateur, le reste
ecoute et live la main machinalement,
Ch. II.] CHAUMETTE
AND HEBERT. 209
named Chambon.1 But even the energy of these, the most revolutionary
of the moderate parties, was exhausted by this one effort. At the succeeding
elections of Procureur and his Deputies, only 2,000 of that majority remained
on the scene of action. The Jacobins on this occasiou, by straining every
nerve, raised the number of their own voters to 5,000, and
thereby gained a momentary victory; but they also left to history an infallible
testimony to the fact, that even the great mass of the population of Paris
would have nothing to say to them. Those who were thus raised to the head of the administration of Paris were three friends of
Marat, and members of the September party. The new Procureur was Chaumette,
who, according to his opponents, was a runaway Capuchin, and according to his
own testimony had been first a cabin-boy, then homme
de lettres, and had lastly employed and maintained himself by revolutionary
dealings in Paris. His deputies were Real, and Hebert, who was distinguished
above the other two. He had formerly been ticket collector at the theatre, and
after the Revolution he edited the "Pere Duchesne,"
the foulest of all the democratic journals, in which with
curses and obscene raillery he led on the proletaries and vagabonds of the
capital, to the destruction of existing society.
At first however these appointments had by no means the
decisive importance which the character of the elected, and the influence of
Paris, might be expected to give them. The course of events no longer depended
on speeches and pamphlets, or even on votes and
elections. The real question was by how many armed men a
petition was backed up, and what forces an insubordinate party could bring into
the fieid. Here, .too, the state of things was at this time decidedly favourable to the Government.
The sluggish and
1 The tableau of the Sectional Jacobin opponent had the decided
divisions
is not without interest. In advantage
in the Cite,
and tbe
the
Faubourg St. Antoine also Cham- Quartier des Halles. bon
had a small majority; but his
210
POLITICAL
PARTIES IN FRANCE. [Book V.
ever-diminishing army of the National Guard was scarcely taken into
account. The Jacobins still possessed the bands which they had long ago raised,
and which since September had been regularly organized and paid, and
consequently kept up to a certain number by regular
additions.1 But these were too few in number to undertake any armed movement by
themselves, as long as the inhabitants of the Faubourgs continued in their
state of apathy. They were completely kept in check by the Federes summoned by the Gironde, whose numbers gradually increased to 5,000,
and who through Barbaroux's influence, were joined by the Marseiilois of the
10th of August.2 Under these circumstances the Government,
which stdl had a few troops of the line at its disposal in Paris, were complete masters of the situation; provided always that the two parties continued to balance one another, and
to hinder each other from getting entire possession
of the helm of the State. This is the most satisfactory explanation of the fact that the Government majority stcaddy
refused to listen to party accusations, whether made by Marat against the
Gironde, or by Louvet against the assassins of September.
But in spite of all these resources and fortunate chances, the Government could not conceal from themselves that the prospect
before them was full of embarrassment and danger. They were especially harassed
by the want of money, or, to speak more correctly, by the utter ruin of the
public finances. Assignats—every where assigncds—were
the sole resource. Their current exchange at this period had fallen to 60 per
cent of the nominal value; every new issue depressed them still more; every
fall increased the necessities of the Treasury and
rendered further issues un-
1 Mallet du Pan, Considerations
sur speaks
of Marat's vexation at the
la Rev. Franc. 64. Mem.,
II. 52. —
respect with which the Marseiilois,
2 Gadol's Correspondence is full of
more especially, had
inspired the
proofs
of this. Moore too (11. 422) Fauhourgs.
Cn.
II.] DISASTROUS CONDITION OR THE
REVENUE.
211
avoidable. They were involved in a vicious circle of ever-increasing
distress, which must sooner or later end in utter rnin. All efforts to bring back the revenue to a healthy state proved futile.
Several hundred millions of arrears still remained from the year 1791. Of the
tax on land and moveable property for 1792, (estimated at 300 millions) nothing
at all had been received on the 1st of November; and from the tax on
patents for that same year only 4 millions instead of 22; from the Stamp
tax 30 instead of 81; and from the Customs 12 instead of 20 millions.1 Even
these sums could only be obtained by forcing the Districts to hand over the money destined for local expenses to the Exchequer,2 by
which a new disturbance of all provincial affairs was caused, and double losses
rendered certain for the future. It became more and more glaringly evident that
the first requisite for the productiveness of land is security of
property; wherever this is precarious the prosperity of the citizen is wavering
and uncertain, and the resources of the State run dry. The most ruinous effects
were produced in this direction, as the winter approached, by the programme of the Septembrists. The cry which
their Commissioners had raised in favour of a
division of landed property, though for the moment
suppressed, had fixed itself in the memory of the poor; and the year 179&
ended in France as it had begun, amidst continual emeutes
of workmen and peasants. The same complaints poured in from all the
provinces. In Touraine the authorities lowered the price of bread at the
expense of the Commune, to prevent open violence. In Seine et Oise, where the
local government hesitated, they were compelled to
adopt similar measures by an armed insurrection. In Lyons, where all business
was at a standstill, and 30,000 men
were out of work, the
1 Report of Nov. 15. — 2 Report of Dec. 19. By the same
artifice the Consulate in 1803 effected an apparent filling
up of the deficit, which however is not mentioned in the work of Thiers.
o2
212
POLITICAL
PARTIES IN FRANCE.
[Book V.
Manufacturers gave 3 millions, and in MarseiUes the City authorities
gave 2 millions for the purchase of corn. In the North, Ldle and Thionville
received 8 millions from the State as compensation for losses incurred in war,
which they immediately devoted to the support of the people. The whole Centre
of the kingdom—the Departments of Sarthe, Eure and Loire, Loire
and Cher, Indre et Loire, Loiret and Correze, were in a dangerous state of
fermentation. On all sides there was a lack of provisions, and reports were
heard of persons being starved to death, of hardhearted Commissioners and treacherous corn monopolists.1 The
real causes of the distress might easily have been ascertained. The importations of corn from foreign countries ceased in conse-cpience of
the war, and the home trade was brought to a stand-still by the absence of legal protection. Every town and district kept back its supplies; Havre
would allow no provisions to be transported to Rouen, and Rouen would allow
nothing to pass through it to Paris; the neighbouring villages had to be
compelled by force to send supplies to the capital. While no private
person dared to engage in the corn trade, from fear of the lanteme,
or the guillotine, the different authorities ran up the prices by
unsystematic and hasty purchases. The Minister of the Interior bid against the
Directories of the Departments; and the agents of
the Administration of Paris against the Minister at War. The consequence was
that the Government paid 30 per cent more for English corn, than French corn
cost in the Departments on the West coast; that 240 pounds of wheat were bought iu one department for 20 francs and in another for
97; and that in the same Department the price varied nearly 100 per cent within
the space of a fortnight2. In
Paris the Commune kept down the price of bread at a
daily sacrifice of 12,000 francs. It was out of the question to
raise this
' See
the debates of the Convention in October and November. — 2 Dept. Finisterre from 20 to 35
fr. Moniteur,
Jan. 29, 1793.
Ch.II.]
INFLUENCE OF FINANCIAL QUESTIONS ON THE REVOL.
213
sum from the city funds; and as early as October the Convention was obliged to make a grant of 6 millions, and learned, as a
reward of their generosity, that the city was 20 millions in arrears with their
taxes.1
In such a state of things no one could expect a rapid improvement of
the finances, and yet the expenditure increased from day to day. On the one
hand the Government had to bear the burdens of the war,
which the universal profusion had increased to the
incredible sum of 140, 160, and even 190 millions a month; on the other
side they were weighed down by the distress of the people in town and country,
whose demands upon the public purse no one ventured to calculate; and to these
were added the* selfish claims of those in power, which a thorough change of system «ould have reduced to nothing. It is a striking
mark of the miserable corruption of the times, that the financial question had
greater influence than any other on the subsequent
course of the Revolution, and on the foreign policy of France;
and that there is no other point of view from which we can so clearly observe
the tendencies of different parties.
The Ministry and their adherents in the Convention had but one solution
for all these difficulties. No one thought of curtading the expenses; and Roland alone reflected on the means of introducing greater
order into the State. The other Ministers, elated by their success in the late
campaign, unhesitatingly adhered to their programme—to support the Republic by the booty of continued warfare.
Since their own Treasury was empty, their conquered neighbours must furnish pay
for the French armies; the mass of as-signats,
by which France was crushed, must be distributed among the surrounding
nations. The Revolution, these Statesmen thought, had
confiscated every thing in France which could be taken under any political
pretext; the next
1 Claviere, Financial
Report, Feb. 1. 1793,
214
POLITICAL
PARTIES IN FRANCE.
[Book V.
step was to make the other countries of Europe
assist in defraying their expenses. All -the reeent negotiations with Prussia
therefore were regarded, not as preparations for the conclusion of peace, but
only as weapons for future -victories; as long as there was a
revolutionary deficit, Europe could look for no repose.
There was but one voice in the Cabinet as to the necessity of continuing the war, and carrying it beyond the frontiers of France. Lebrun, the Foreign Minister, hated Austria, because it had enslaved his second home Liege; and England, because when he was supporting himself by journalism, it had refused him a pension. 1 He
had been inspired at an earlier period with his
cosmopolitan zeal by Brissot, and with his defiant insolence by Dumouriez; but he now seemed to have outgrown his instructors, and concocted revolutionary plans against the whole of Europe. Garat, the new
Minister of Justice, and Grouvelle, the Secretary of the Council, gave him
their unconditional support. Of the rest, the Minister of Marine, Monge, a
violent republican, rejoiced at every rupture with
a crowned head; Claviere, Minister of Finance, was waiting for an opportunity of seizing the treasures of the Belgian provinces; and the
Minister at War, Pache, seemed to have no other wish than to suit
himself to his colleagues and the popular opinion.
Even Roland, little as sueh a policy of plunder abroad agreed with his system
of order at home, was after all of opinion, that until the completion of the
constitution, the unruly troops and ambitious Generals
must not remain on French soil.2 All
therefore united their endeavours to carry the war beyond the borders of
France.
The different parties vied with one another in their eagerness to carry out these views; even the Gironde,
conser-
1 Letters from Miles to Lebrun,
published by the former, and made use of in the work of Herbert Marsh, which,
will be referred to presently. — 2 Dumouriez, III. 284.
Ch. II.] ALL PARTIES IN FAVOUR OF CONTINUED WAR.* 215
vative as it had become in other respects, still continued to rave
about the renovation of the world, the overthrow of tyrants, and the dawn of a
universal spring upon the nations. "We must break with all the Cabinets at
once," said Brissot.1 They seriously reckoned on the sympathy of the
nations, and indulged the hope that on the first appearance of the French
armies, they would drive away their oppressors, and enter into a revolutionary
union of brotherhood with their deliverers. The fiscal side of the ministerial plans indeed was little in harmony with this charming
picture; and Claviere, the Finance Minister, who cared
far more for the goods of the Belgians than their liberty, entirely disagreed
with his colleagues on this point.2 This
divergence of opinions, however, could only become
important after the victory, and for the present the
Girondists were as eager for invasion and battle as the Ministerialists
themselves.
The great body of the Jacobins had still fewer objections to make to
the proceedings of the Ministers. Since the quarrel
between Robespierre and Brissot, war had not been exactly a favourite word with
the Club, which had other and nearer wishes than fights and battles. But the
success-fid affairs of Valmy and Mayence had filled even them with enthusiasm; and the idea of overthrowing every tyrant on the
face of the globe was as warmly taken up by the Mountain
as by the Gironde. Robespierre, indeed, often chid the adventurous madness and
malicious cunning, with which the Ministers endeavoured
to extend the war beyond all hounds; but he would have reproached them with no
less bitterness for every step towards peace, as a certain proof of treachery.
His opposition to Claviere was only in regard to the mode
1 The Homme d'etat quotes an oft- improbable. The Girondists
hated
quoted letter
of Brissot to Du- Dumouriez heartily; Gensonne alone
mouriez,
in which these sentiments corresponded with him till the middle
are
enlarged upon. The contents of Dec.
and then likewise renounced
coincide
exactly with Brissot's views, his
friendship. — 2 Dumouriez,
yet
its authenticity seems to us highly III. 357.
216
POLITICAL
PARTIES IN FRANCE.
[Book V.
of committing violence. Claviere wished for foreign
plunder to spare his own countrymen further confiscations; Robespierre's chief object was to establish a tyranny at home, and he
approved of war only so far as it seemed to favour his designs. The policy of
conquest was still more certain of the support of the third
great party-chief, Danton, — the only one of the democratic leaders who had not
suffered from the reaction of September. As member of the Convention he had
resigned his place in the Ministry, but had made the greatest use of his former position to promote his personal influence. He
had, as we have seen, a hand in every transaction,
and had supported Dumouriez in the war, Servan in his military preparations,
and Lebrun in his negotiations with Prussia. He had taken care to bring forward his adherents in every Department; he had
formed connexions on all sides, and appropriated money from every source, with
a view to further operations. While the rest of his party were excluded from
all offices and honours, he was still able, in secret at least, to feel
himself a member of the Government; and this connexion had a
most important effect upon his general views. Enthusiasm for any ideal was a
thing of which he had never been capable; but now all his desires were
satisfied; his practical eye was sharpened, and his
zeal for the Revolution entirely at an end. He was convinced
that it would be a folly to talk any longer to the French of freedom; and
considered that the State had arrived at that stage of the Roman
Empire, when Cato was a fool and Cresar's
dictatorship a necessary evil.1 He
was too indolent to strive after this dictatorship for himself;' an alliance
with the Gironde was rendered impossible by the furious hatred which they bore
him; and he despised his own party from the bottom of his heart. He understood,
1 Morris to Jefferson, April 15.
1794. Danton always thought, and what was worse, expressed his belief, that a
popular Government was impossible in France, the State &c. &c,
Ch.
II.] FRENCH GOVERNMENT PREPARES TO ATTACK SPAIN.
217
of course, his own position too well to give up his democratic attitude; he still continued to be the mighty demagogue, the thundering orator of the club and the leader of the
Mountain; but in reality he had no other wish than to enjoy the booty
he had already secured, and to derive all possible advantage from the movement
for the future. He was therefore entirely in accord with the Ministers, in respect both to their expectant and neutral position between the different parties, and their lust of foreign booty and conquest; and it
was no small or unimportant weight which he threw into the scale.
At the end of October, therefore, the Government was resolved to assume the offensive on every side. Warlike preparations both by land and sea had been going
on since the middle of September against Spain. Not that the French Government
had any ground of complaint against King Charles IV., but the low state of the
Spanish army led them to hope for rapid and splendid success, and this was enough to influence the restless ambition of Brissot
and Lebrun. The Court of Madrid, in spite of all its wrath against the
Revolution, had followed the same course as the Emperor Leopold, and made the
acceptance of the Constitution by Louis XVI. a pretext for suspending
all serious preparations against France. When, however, the Gironde, at the end
of 1791, began their demagogical and warlike operations, and endeavoured to
raise an insurrection in the frontier provinces of Spain, the exded Princes met with liberal support at Madrid. But the Spanish
Government was far too weak and incapable to display any lasting energy in any
direction. On the 2nd of March 1792, therefore, Count Aranda, a veteran of
the liberal and philosophical party of the time of Charles HI., became
foreign Minister at Madrid. Aranda made no secret of his predilection for
France; and the military weakness of Spain made him
especially anxious to preserve its neutrality at every cost,
at the commencement of the war. Meanwhile, however, the 20th of June, the 10th
218
POLITICAL
PARTIES IN FRANCE.
[Book V.
of August, the September murders, and the abolition of. Monarchy,
rapidly succeeded one another in Paris, producing,
of course, a most terrible impression in Madrid, and
exciting grief, anxiety and indignation. The Spanish police kept a sharp eye
upon the French settlers in their country, and French exdes found a warm
reception at Court. The Spanish Ambassador at St. Petersburg made bitter complaints of the sluggishness of the German operations in the
field, which he said were cpiite inadequate to make head against the monster of
Revolution. But the experience of others made Spain stiU less inclined to incur
the dangers of a war;, and when the French Ambassador demanded,
in a threatening tone the withdrawal of tbe cordon of
troops in Catalonia, and the recognition of the Republic, Aranda not only expressed his willingness to concede these points, but agreed to pay
France 4 million francs as a compensation for its
defensive preparations.1 This
weak compliance fanned the warlike spirit of Paris into a blaze. Brissot
believed that on the first appearance of the French troops on the other side of
the Pyrenees, the tottering throne of Charles IV.
would crumble into dust; that at the first fluttering of the French flag the
colonies of South America woidd break out into tumultuous aspirations after
freedom.2 Under this impression Lebrun would have proposed
a declaration of war against Spain in October, had not the formation of
the army of the Pyrenees proceeded so slowly, that Servan just at this time
reported that he had not a single battalion ready to march. 3
The Ministers were all the more eager to strike decisive blows in the
already existing theatres of war. On the 10th of
October they came to a resolution, on a plan which had
1 From the correspondence of the Zeit
der franzosischen Revolution. —
Prussian
Ambassador in Madrid, as 2 Brissot
a ses Commettans, passim.
—
well
as of the Dutch Charges d'affaires 3 Correspondence of the Army of the
in
Vienna and St. Petersburg. Conf. South. Depot de la Guerre, Paris. Baumgarten, Geschichte
Spaniens zur
Cn.
II.] TURKEY INCITED AGAINST RUSSIA AND AUSTRIA. 219
been long under consideration, for the occupation
of Sardinia. Admiral Truguet received orders to hold a portion of his fleet in
readiness for this expedition. General Anselme in Nice, and General Paoli in
Corsica, were to furnish the land force, and the inhabitants of the island were to be invited to throw off the royal yoke.1 At
the meeting of the 24th of October, the "question of Naples was brought
before the Cabinet, and the discussion immediately enlarged the sphere of
observation. The French Government had long conceived the idea of employing
the power of Turkey to make an unlooked-for diversion in Eastern
Europe, against the attacks of Austria and the hostility of Russia. They had
induced Semonville, an old member, first of Lafayette's and then of Mirabeau's secret police—who on the fall of his former patrons
had placed himself with equal subserviency at the disposal
of their successors—to undertake a mission to Constantinople.
On his arrival there he was to rouse the Porte to a war against the two Imperial Courts, and to cherish an understanding with all the malcontents
among the Hungarians and Cossacks. Intelligence was
received, however, that Acton, the Neapolitan Minister, had already made representations to the Porte, to the effect that Semonville should not be received by the Turkish Court at all. Whereupon Truguet was
ordered to send off a squadron without delay to Naples, and to threaten that
city with bombardment, unless the King should give the Republic the most
striking satisfaction, by delivering up his Minister. When this had
been done, the victorious fleet was to convey the French Ambassador to
Constantinople, and spread the terror of the French arms along all the shores
of the Black Sea.
At the same Cabinet Council, on the 24th of October, the leading principles of the most important war—that against the German
Powers—were discussed and agreed upon. The
1 This 'and the following
information is derived from the Protocols of the Council of Ministers in the
Imperial Archives at Paris.
220
POLITICAL
PARTIES IN FRANCE.
[Book V.
decision on these points was influenced by civcumstances of a secret
and personal nature, by which the future course of events was to be mainly
decided.
Dumouriez had just returned in triumph from Champagne to Paris, in
order to discuss with the Minister his plan of operations against Belgium. He
was enthusiastically welcomed by the whole of Paris, with
the exception of Marat, who denounced him as a Cromwell and a Monk in one
person, and called him to account for his severity
against insubordinate Parisian volunteers. The presence of the General in the capital contributed no little to extend and influence the warlike ardour of the people. He was more conscious than
ever of his own strength and importance; his aspirations
had risen with his success, and his wishes took the form of imperious demands.1 His
ambition had hitherto led him to play the demagogue in order to obtain his
objects; now, however, the spirit of the soldier was fully awakened in him, and he showed only too plainly his contempt for the heroes of the desk, the rostra and the press, and his
disgust at the wild disorder of the State. He did not take much trouble to
conceal such sentiments; on the contrary, he frankly pointed out to the Ministers that it would be necessary to make him
Commander-in-chief of all the French forces, with unlimited power. It was only,
he said, by thus bringing unity and energy into their operations, that the war
could be brought to a rapid and successful termination. All the
Ministers, not even excepting his old comrade Lebrun, were greatly startled by
this unceremonious mode of proceeding; but they allowed him for the present to
bring forward and explain his plan of operations, the leading features of which are already known.
The objects
1 His Memoirs pass over his po-
Pache, and completely in the secret
sition
at this period, and indeed all despatches of the War Ministry, and
the
principal crises of his life, in the
Protocols of the Ministerial
silence.
The truth is revealed partly Council, in his published correspondence with
Ch.
II.] DUMOURIEZ'S PLANS OPPOSED BY
CUSTINE. 221
aimed at were to isolate Austria from the rest of Europe, to hold out
hopes of peace to Prussia, and to give Germany reasons
to be satisfied with the conduct of France. He accordingly
proposed that their chief efforts should be directed against the Austrian
Netherlands, but that even these should not be conquered, but really set free,
and thus united to their liberators in firmer
friendship. The armies of the Rhine and the Moselle were only to advance to the
Rhine, partly to support Dumouriez's movements in Belgium, and partly to avoid
giving offence to Prussia, and Custine was to evacuate
Frankfort. The policy of a general peace having been once for all rejected,
the war was to be waged with a view to political influence in Europe; but it
was to be directed towards fixed objects, and carried on with political and
diplomatic weapons, without the violent fluctuations, the
licence, and the rapacity, of the revolutionary system.
But just on this very account Dumouriez was not supported by a single voice in the Ministry; and he was met, moreover,
even on the military question, by the most decided opposition
of Custine, at that time a very popular and highly influential General. The
latter still indulged in the splendid dream of utterly unhinging the holy Roman
Empire. The King of Prussia, he thought, would make no great opposition to this if they promised him a considerable portion
of the booty, and more gentle and considerate treatment of Louis XVI. He urged,
moreover, that the spirit of freedom was rapidly spreading in
Germany itself; that he had awarded to Bohmer and Wedekind 500 francs a month for their services (Bohmer soon after received 6000 francs from Paris
as a gratuity); and that it would be as easy as it was necessary to extend the
blessings of liberty to these happy regions. He added, that he could at any
time acquire the important city of Mannheim for a payment of
1,200,000francs; and that his only reason for not having already surprised it,
was that the neutrality of the Bavarian Palatinate appeared
to him stiU more important for the present than the
222
POLITICAL PARTIES IN FRANCE. [Book V.
possession of the city.1 Under these circumstances he demanded a reinforcement of 40,000
men, the cooperation of the Moselle army, and the subordination of Dumouriez's
operations to the furtherance of his own. He declared
that if these were granted him, he would dictate peace to the Emperor in
Vienna, without giving France any other trouble than that of collecting German
contributions. All his despatches breathed a spirit of
devotion and zeal towards the Republic, which
placed him in a most favourable contrast to the haughty, arbitrary and didactic
Dumouriez.
The Ministry soon came to a decision. To invest Dumouriez with the chief command was not to be thought of, and he was
entrusted as General of the army of Ardennes,
—which was to be suitably reinforced—with the invasion of Belgium. It was not
till after repeated representations that he gained from them a resolution, that
at any rate all the Generals employed in that quarter should be subject to his
orders. In all other respects Custine's views gained the
upper hand. Custine himself was not recalled from the other side of the Rhine,
but was re-inforced by the Ministry to the utmost of their power. To support
him, Kellermann received order after order to press forward down the Moselle as far as Coblentz, however much
fatigued his troops might be by the tods of September. Dumouriez moreover was
directed, on the 24th of October, not to take up his winter quarters untd he
arrived at Cologne on the Rhine; which order had in view
to give as broad a base as possible to Custine's aggressive operations. All
these arrangements affected Dumouriez the more sensibly, because the same
Government which imposed so extensive a task upon him against his will, threw
every conceivable difficulty in his way in the execution
of it. The equipment of his forces was delayed, and it was only through the
good nature of
1 Protocol of the Ministerial
Council and the Correspondence of the Army of the Rhine, in the Archives at
Paris.
Ch.
II.] THE DEMOCRATS DEMAND THE KING'S BLOOD. 223
Santerre that he obtained the necessary artillery from the arsenal at
Paris; in short he found himself surrounded on all sides by jealousy and
suspicion. The Ministry, indeed, agreed to his proposal to treat the
Belgians as friends; and the Convention itself sanctioned a proclamation
offering them freedom and fraternity; but both Ministry and Convention were far from intending to allow the General the slightest
political influence* over the future Belgian Republic. On
the contrary, immediately after Dumouriez's departure the Cabinet came to an
agreement that no General should correspond directly with the Convention, or
promote his officers to a higher rank, or treat with the enemy under any circumstances whatsoever. All these resolutions are doubtless in
strict accordance with the sound principles of State policy, but at that time
they could only appear to Dumouriez as the offspring of hostile distrust.
In spite, however, of all these differences, the mditary power of
the Republic was once more set in motion, and the first step taken in a career
of which no one could see the end. But this external developement of the
Revolution coincided with the most critical of all internal questions, the fate of the captive King.
Up to this time the Government had no settled views respecting the
treatment of Louis XVI. Not one of its members probably had any wish to put him
to death; but whether alive or dead he was to them a source of embarrassment and danger. The Jacobins for many weeks
past had been incessantly calling for his blood; for in their case the greatest
cruelty was seconded by the most urgent party interest. What other theme,
indeed, could there be so pregnant as this with every human passion; so calculated to caU back to the minds of the Faubourgs every
event of the Revolution, and to kindle once more the fanaticism of its hottest
and bloodiest days? To the Jacobin club itself, which called the September
massacres its confession of faith, the sparing of Louis XVI. appeared
a crying monstrosity. The
224
POLITICAL
PARTIES IN FRANCE.
[Book V.
leaders were well aware that the majority of the people were better
inclined to the King than to themselves, and were therefore
eager to stifle the re-action with the blood of the Monarch. By themselves
however, they had not even the power to get up a discussion on the subject in
the Convention. If they spoke of the annihilation
of the tyrant, they were reproached in reply with the
tyranny of September. Other means must be sought to set the majority in motion.
These means were found in the relation of France to foreign countries. The independent members of the Convention—those who were guided not by a party chief, but by the Government,—shared the enthusiasm of Lebrun for the revolution of
Europe. They were of opinion that every fresh humiliation heaped on the head of
Louis would be a death-stroke to the cause of monarchy itself. If the nations
had not yet been enlightened as to the rottenness of royalty,
surely the last gleam of lustre would fade from the crown, if Louis were
forced, like a common criminal, to undergo the horrors of a public trial. They
had no more intention than the Ministers of putting the unhappy man to death; Barere, the genuine type of these men of no party, said that the
trial was just as likely to end in a sentence of further imprisonment; in which
case not the slightest change would occur in the personal fate of Louis. The
same view was taken by Danton,1 who
had received money enough from the King to allay his animosity against him.
Whde he breathed nothing but blood and death in the Jacobin clnb, he secretly
expressed his opinion that the Convention ought, for appearauce sake, to
condemn the King, but that they could afterwards bring
their sentence before the sovereign people for its sanction, from
whom Louis had nothing worse to expect than further incarceration.
The Ministers were decided at last by peculiar diplomatic
considerations to give the signal for the commencement of
Brissot a ses Commettans.
Cu. II.] LEBRUN'S ATTEMPTED BARTER. 225
the trial. The negotiations with Prussia dragged on, as we have seen, in an almost, resultless interchange of notes. Prussia insisted on the
admission of Germany and Austria to the treaty of peace. And though the King no
longer demanded the restoration of the French throne, he continued to express
the highest interest in the personal safety of Louis and the
royal family; and it was quite in accordance with these feelings that
Lucchesini answered the agent, Mandrillon, at Cologne on the 29th of October.
It occurred to Lebrun to make use of the humane sympathy of the King for a diplomatic master-stroke; and he commissioned Mandrillon to offer the King the freedom of Louis XVI., if the former
would forego his other claims, and enter into a separate
peace with France.1 Such
a proposal would naturally have the greater weight in proportion
to the imminence of the danger from which Louis was snatched; the Ministry
therefore no longer hesitated to allow the criminal proceedings against Louis in the Convention to take their course.
1
Beaulieu, Essais, IV.
302.
II.
226
BRUSSELS,
FRANKFORT, LONDON.
[Book V.
CHAPTER III. BRUSSELS, FRANKFORT, LONDON.
Occupation
of Belgium by dumouriez.—Pache,
the minister at war joins the mountain. — hls quarrel with dumouriez.—effect
upon belgium.— All nations summoned to freedom, nov. 19th.—Negotiations with prussia at coblentz. — lebrun proposes an offensive
alliance.— Breaking off of negotiations.—Storming
of frankfort.—Condition
of holland.—french plans of attack.—french intrioues in england.— Pitt's
desire of peace.—Enoland's
defensive measures.— Impression
produced thereby in France.—Postponement of dutch expedition—Exchange of the propagandist policy for a policy of conquest.
When Dumouriez, towards the eud of October, assumed the chief command in the
Belgian campaign, he found himself opposed by the united forces
of the enemy, which were drawn up in the neighbourhood of Mons. They were commanded by Albert, Duke of Saxe-Teschen, who
had just been joined by General Clairfait, on the hitter's return from Champagne. General Valence, who at the head of 16,000 men ought to have cut
off Clerfait's march at the Sambre, had been delayed by Jacobin intrigues; so
that, while Hohenlohe-Kirchberg with little more than 10,000
men was covering Luxembourg and Treves, Duke Albert had drawn together about
26,000 men under the walls of Mons. In this position of affairs, Dumouriez
determined to take the bull by the
horns, and discarding all strategical manoeuvres, to carry the
Austrian position by storm. By summoning Harville to join him with his corps,
Dumouriez raised the numbers of his forces to 40,000 men; his right wing rested
on the army of Valence, and his left on General Labonrdonnaye's corps of 20,000, which was to operate against Belgium; and he was continually
reinforced by the influx of volunteers. Under
Ch.
III.] DUMOURIEZ DEFEATS CLERFAIT NEAR JEMAPPES. 227
these circumstances the prospect of a hot engagement had nothing discouraging in it; on the contrary, Dumouriez -wished to reward
his troops for their patient endurance in Champagne
by the glory of a bold assault. He began his operations
on the 28th of October, drove in the first division of the Imperialists on the 3rd of November, and followed them up vigorously until the evening of
the 5th, when the Austrians took lip a position on the
heights of Jemappes, which was further strengthened by redoubts.
Both armies then encamped — each in a widely extended semicircle—with their wings nearly touching one another, so that their bivouac
fires skirted the entire horizon as with a mighty chain. On the 6th, at
daybreak, the French commenced the attack by a violent cannonade, which produced so little impression on the veteran
troops of the enemy, that in spite of their superior numbers, the French
leaders either did not venture to storm the Austrian position, or, where they attempted it, saw their men hastily retire. It was
not untd midday that Dumouriez succeeded in imparting
to his troops his own restless energy. He himself
stormed the redoubts of the left wing almost at the same moment in which his
adjutant Thouvenot was storming those of the right. In the centre Louis
Philippe—General Egalite —collected the retreating battalions
for a -final onset, which put the French in possession of the village of
Jemappes— the key of the enemy's position. Thereupon Clerfait commenced his retreat the more quickly, because Harville was already
threatening to cut him off from Mons. The Austrians
lost 6—7,000, and the French 4,000 men, but the fate of the campaign was fully
decided by the result of this engagement.1 It
proved the impossibility of resisting the superior numbers of the French; it
demoralised the Austrian army, which began to suffer greatly from desertion; and lastly, it gave the signal of
revolt to all the malcontents
1 Where we have deviated from the
public accounts we have followed the despatches of the Military archives at
Paris.
P 2
228
BRUSSELS, FRANKFORT, LONDON.
[Book V.
in Belgium. Mons capitulated two days after the battle, and the
citizens, who were thoroughly democratic in their opinions, greeted the General
as a liberator. "I expect,"
said Dumouriez to them, "to march into Vienna in four
weeks, and I shall there treat the Emperor with all imaginable
consideration."1 Eight days afterwards Brussels opened its gates to the victor; at the
same time Valence marched against Namur, and Labourdonnaye advanced through
Flanders upon Antwerp, and everywhere the fortresses capitulated. The Austrians were in hopeless retreat, and it was
not till they reached the Meuse that they stood their ground in a few
skirmishes on their rear.
As Dumouriez had marched out with 80,000 men, and after a single battle gained possession of one of the richest lands of Europe, it
seemed to depend solely on the will of the Government to use this powerful army
in dealing a destructive blow either on Germany or Holland. But meanwhile the Revolution had diffused its spirit
of disaffection and disunion even into its own army, and the terrible force
before which Europe began to tremble had no longer any real existence.
During the last few weeks a turn had taken place in affairs at Paris, which had the most important effects on the course of the Revolution in the following year. Hitherto, as
we have seen, the Jacobins had not a single vote in the Ministry. The Cabinet
was tolerably free from party bias; Roland was a decided Girondist; and if
Lebrun or Claviere had now and then an understanding with Danton,
it is difficult to say on which side concessions
were made. But in the beginning of November, the whole state of affairs was
unexpectedly changed. Pache had succeeded Servan as Minister
at War on the 19th of October. He had hitherto been a subordinate protege
of Roland, and had been recommended by the latter l'or promotion to the
important post, as a quiet hard-working and accommodating man. But no sooner
was '
Despatches of Van Haeften, Dutch Ambassador in Vienna.
Ch.
III.] PACHE INFUSES NEW LIFE INTO THE
MOUNTAIN. 229
he established in office than he bestowed all his attention and
services on the Jacobins, and threw himself into the arms—not of Danton or
Eobespierfe—but of Marat and the men of the Hotel de Ville, Chaumette and
Hebert. At the moment when all the resources of the land were employed in a
general war, the whole control of military affairs in France fell into the
hands of the wildest of all the revolutionary factions.
As parties then stood in Paris, this change was
not only a heavy loss to the Gironde, and a serious danger to the moderate
party, but effected an entire reconstruction in the interior of the Mountain
itself, whose position it infinitely strengthened. After the 10th of August the latter had formed & single and perfectly united body,
with the Jacobins and Cordeliers as their allied army,
the Municipality under Robespierre and Marat as their head-quarters, and the
Ministry of Justice under Danton as the seat of the highest control. It was by the cooperation of these agents that the
September massacres had been brought about.' Since then Danton had outgrown his
former associates; he no longer sympathised with the great body of the
Jacobins, and began with a clique of personal friends to form relations with
the independent men of no party in the Centre. Pache's connexion with Hebert
caused a second severance in the interior of the Jacobin faction, by suddenly
investing the Hotel de Vdle with an abundance of influence and wealth, such as it had not possessed even during the September massacres. This section of the ultras, therefore, now stood
firmly on their own feet, and felt that they had no longer any urgent need of
Danton's influence in the Convention, or Robespierre's support in the Club. We have already observed that at that time 160
million francs passed through the hands of the War Minister every month. Pache
gave his friends of the Hotel de Ville the freest access to his bureaux and his
treasures; made Vincent, Hebert's most intimate associate, his
Chief Secretary, filled up all the posts
230
BRUSSELS,
FRANKFORT, LONDON.
[Book V.
in his office with genuine Democrats, and entrusted the management of
the Commissariat to proteges of the Hotel de Ville. Thenceforward the
saloons of this Ministry were open to every demagogue, and all the officials
addressed one another with the familiar tu. The
Sovereign People walked about in wooden shoes among State documents and brandy
bottles, and in the evening the wife of the Minister
with her daughter and sister visited the barracks of the Fecleres,
to rouse their enthusiasm in the cause of freedom, and to alienate
their affections from the Gironde. The cause of mob-rule, which, since the
reaction of September, had with difficulty been kept alive from day to day,
received fresh life-blood and was once more strong and flourishing. We shall
presently see how the weapons thus supplied by Pache were employed in the trial
of Louis XVI.
With the new War Ministry the second epoch of the
Revolution began for the troops;1 and
what the 10th Aug. was for the State, Pache's Ministry was for the Army. During
the perds of the Prussian onset, the Democrats of September had not ventured to
meddle much with the regiments.
They were contented that the troops acknowledged and defended them, and allowed
themselves to be assisted in doing so by the national volunteers. With the
exception of a few emigrant officers, therefore, it was the same old royal
army, which just by means of the war was restored to its
hitherto slackened military discipline. The troops of the line, still differed
very decidedly from the national guards, and looked down with very candid
contempt on the volunteers. The higher officers especially,
the generals and their staffs, belonged almost without exception to the
liberal fractions of the old noblesse, who were ready to fight for
1 We needly hardly say that the as,
in consideration of the importance
following
account is "based on the of the case, which is not sufficiently
Papers
of the War Ministry. The cleared up in
the published accounts,
special
vouchers will be given in various details cannot well be spared, abundance in
the course of the events,
Ch.
III.] THE DEMOCRATS DEMORALISE THE ARMY.
231
their country and against the Emigres, but entertained towards the
Mountain and Hotel de Ville no other feeling than rage and disgust. But it was
to these very men of the Hotel de Ville that the army, by Pache's
interposition, was now subjected. They were well aware of
the feelings of the officers towards themselves, and
immediately resolved to free the soldiers as completely from the tyranny of the
Staff, as the citizens from the oppression of the moneyed classes. These
experienced Demagogues saw that it was only thus— only by proclaiming complete
insubordination—that the military spirit could be banished,
which metamorphosed a crowd of conscript peasant boys into the organized
members of an army, and distinguished them, both by
manners and the sentiment of honour, from the armed mob of the capital. Party
interest predominated over every consideration of country and the fate of the
war. The Austrians were beaten and driven far away. The reactionary sentiments
of the officers appeared much the most pressing danger, and,
at the worst, they hoped, under a new body of officers devoted to themselves,
to overcome any new difficulty which might unexpectedly arise.
None of the generals were made to feel the change at head-quarters more
quickly or more thoroughly than Dumouriez. Pache and Vincent knew his
irrepressible tendency towards political and diplomatic intrigue. They knew
that the army under his command would not long remain the passive tool of
Chaumette's and Marat's ideas. They had a correct foreboding that a
well-ordered and high spirited army was incompatible with the continuance of
mob government; and the more strikingly Dumouriez's
high capacity was brought to light, the more resolutely fixed was their
determination to ruin him before all others. The weapon
which lay readiest to their hands was the Commissariat of the army, the mode of
conducting which was closely connected with the principle on which
the war itself was carried on. Dumouriez fully intended to pay for all that he
232
BRUSSELS,
FRANKFORT, LONDON. [Book V.
wanted in Belgium in hard cash; and in general, by the exercise of order and consideration, to respect the well-being of the
country, and thereby to secure the prosperity of his own army. He
thought that the cpiestion of the re-payment of the total expenses should be
settled with the Belgian republic at the end of the war. Such
views however ran entirely counter to the schemes of all the Ministers. Some
were desirous of deriving advantage from the Belgian treasures as cpiickly as possible; others thought that no French silver,
but only French paper, should be put in circulation in Belgium. Pache's
officials were highly indignant because Dumouriez endeavoured to establish a separate and independent administration for Belgium;
aud the artisans in Paris pronounced it an act of treason to deprive them of
the profit of furnishing supplies to the army. On this point Cambon aud
Claviere entirely agreed with the Jacobins, and in spite of Lebrun's
scruples, it was resolved to cut up Dumouriez's plan by the roots. His Belgian
contracts were annulled, his agents were arrested and brought to trial, and in
their stead a Committee was appointed in Paris to make purchases for the army, under the presidency of a member of the Municipality named
Bidermann, and an Alsatian Jew, Cerf Beer. This board was exclusively empowered to furnish all supplies for
all the French armies, and was directed to contract for the necessary work, as far as possible, with Frenchmen alone. Hence it came to pass that
Belgian corn was transported to Paris, there to be ground and baked for the
army in Belgium: that the army of the Rhine received a large supply of shoes at
from 8 to 12 francs a pair, which were soled with pasteboard; and
that Dumouriez's cavalry had for many week no other fodder than what they had
taken from the Austrians. The worst thing was that, according
to the decree, even the operations of this Committee were not to begin till the
new year, while all the previous arrangements were annulled at once; so
that for six weeks, the army was officially directed to live on air, or by
plunder.
Ch. in.] DUMOURIEZ DISOBEYS THE ORDERS OF
PACHE. 233
When the complaints grew louder and louder—when the artillery
lost their horses for want of food, and four-fifths of the infantry went
barefoot in the middle of winter, and the volnnteers were deserting first by
hundreds and then by thousands from frost and cold1—when
Dnmouriez wrote that he could neither advance a step,
nor repel the attacks of the enemy, unless they sent him large suppilies and a
reinforcement of 20,000 men—the friends of Marat were beyond measure delighted
that the dreaded dictator had been disarmed; and Cambon declared that Belgium must pay for her freedom with her own money. The
Minister at War, who, as a good Jacobin, had no taste either for an aggressive war or for military glory, reported on all hands that he had
given every necessary orders; but the reports from
the army prove beyond all doubt that nothing at all was really done.2
We may easily imagine the effect which these proceedings must have had upon a general of Dumouriez's character. At the
commencement of the campaign, however great might be his contempt for the Ministerial scribes, he had no idea of resistance; but
the very measures which the Ministers adopted against him out of mistrust,
roused him first to disobedience and ultimately to revolt. He received the
order to force the circulation of the assignats,
but declared by return of post that it was impossible to execute it;
and he continued to draw ready money for his necessities, partly from French
sources, and partly from Belgian loans. Pache and Bidermann vied with one
another in sending Commissioners,
the gist of whose instructions was, to confiscate Belgian property under
varions pretences, and to excite the Belgian mob. The General, on the other hand, openly de-
1 The Volunteers of 1791, more- his
statements, and in spite of the over, had only taken service till Dec.
opposition raised to them by deI. 1792. — 2 Dumouriez in his Me- mocratic
writers, we can only con-moirs gives minute information re- firm their accuracy
from the M.S. specting these affairs. Thiers repeats' correspondence.
234
BRUSSELS,
FRANKFORT, LONDON.
[Book V.
clared, that he woidd allow neither robbery nor anarchy in Belgium. He
was immoveably fixed in this resolution both by private and political reasons.
He had been acquainted with Belgium, as we have seen, for many years,
and had thoroughly prepared the way for its conquest by his personal connexions. He had entered into relations both with the clerical
and democratic opposition to Austria; he had promised to both the fulfilment of
all their wishes, and immediately after the victory of
Jemappes, he had greeted Belgium as a free country and an ally of France. He
considered bis own honour, therefore, pledged to the friendly treatment of
the country. But he also considered it to the interest of
France that her Northern frontier should be protected
by a friendly and flourishing Republic, and that on this account Belgium ought
to be preserved from the excesses of Parisian mob-rule. And
lastly, it seemed to him highly desirable to shew himself to the Belgians in the light of a protector and liberator from the
power of the Jacobins, and thus to gain their support in case of need against
his own Ministry.
It was indeed no easy task to defend himself on all sides in such a
position. Having once occupied the country, he could not
possibly remain on an equally good footing with all the different Belgian
parties. He was obliged at his first entrance to make his choice; and, as was
to be expected, he decided for the democratic or Vonck party. While still at Mons, he proclaimed, with the sanction of the Convention, the
abolition of the existing Constitution and a new election of a provisional
Government by universal suffrage; on these conditions he promised to treat the
country as an ally of France. But the insignificance of the democrats
in Belgium then became apparent. It was only in Hennegau and Liege that they
really had a majority;1 in
almost all other places
1 For the condition of Belgium, and
the events of this-period, gathered from the official papers
of the different provinces and towns, vid. Borgnet, Hish
des Beiges, Vol.
II.
Ch.
III.] EXCITEMENT IN BELGIUM AGAINST THE FRENCH. 235
the people had to be forced by the French soldiers to hold an election,
and even then the members of the old Chambers were
for the most part re-elected. In Brussels the people broke the windows of the
Vonkites; the Church of St. Gudule, where the election was carried on, was
surrounded by French artdlery, and the electors were at last compelled by blows of the sabre to nominate the democratic candidates.
It was in vain that Dumouriez,—who was in constant fear of an outbreak of
Parisian lust of conquest—urged the Belgians to establish a general government,
and to raise an army of 40,000 men. The patriots in Paris took
great offence at this proposal, regarding such armaments as directed, not
against the Austrians, but against themselves;1 and
the Belgian provinces remained' immovable in their stubborn reserve. When the
destitution of the French army had reached such a pitch
that the starving soldiers were driven to exactions and plunder, the
ill-feeling of the people increased so greatly that Dumouriez
apprehended a revolt, and the Moniteur reported from Brussels, that the watchfulness of the General could alone prevent a fresh
revolution in the so lately emancipated city.
Amidst such difficulties and vexations the victor of Jemappes slowly
continued his triumphant march through Belgium. Those in power in Paris allowed
him to work his way as he best could. They had
themselves, (notwithstanding the ruin of their best army) no fear of foreign
countries; on the the contrary, they felt themselves in the middle of November
still nearer than ever to their grand object—the revolutionizing of Europe; and considered the moment
arrived to proclaim to the Universe the plans which
they had hitherto carried on in secresy. Many a speech on the liberation of
Europe had resounded from the tribune of the Convention during the debates
concerning the fall of Louis XVI., when, on the 19th of
November, some bailiwicks of the small Ger-
1 General Labourdonnaye to the
Minister at War (unpublished).
236
BRUSSELS,
ERANKFORT, LONDON.
[Book V.
man State of Nassau-Saarbriicken prayed for belp
against their Despots. In the existing condition of the world, this magnificent
circumstance seemed of sufficient importance to call forth a grand declaration
of French policy. The Convention, therefore, amidst
unanimous plaudits, issued a decree; that France offered her aid to all
nations who were striving after freedom, and would give her Generals the
necessary instructions to carry out her will. The decree was translated into all the languages of Europe, and ordered to be distributed
in every country. A subsecpient motion to the effect
that this decree did not apply to friendly governments was negatived by a vote
to proceed with the "order of the day."
In later times this decree has been often called a mere set of
bombastic phrases, or a clumsy boast, in which a sensible government
would see no danger, and least of all a casus
belli. But the opinion of the revolutionary parties themselves at that time
was a very different one. After, the publication of that decree, several London
clubs no longer hesitated publicly and repeatedly to
send envoys to the Convention to offer the fraternity of England, "about
to rise in revolt," and to receive in return the official assurance of
protection and assistance. Towards the end of the month the Diocese of Basle
made its revolution under the guidance of Gobel the Bishop of Paris, who
had been despatched thither by Lebrun.1 It
established itself under the name of the Rauracian Republic, and was placed
under the armed protection of General Biron. In Geneva the democratic party raised its head more boldly every day, and only waited for the
arrival of General Kellermann, who was sent to the Army of the Alps, to execute
its coup d'cldt. Deputations from Nice and Savoy arrived in Paris, the former despatched
by the provisional Administrators, and the latter by the
new popidar representation which had just been established
1 Protocol of the Ministerial
Council, Oct. 29th.
Ch.
III.]
SAVOY
INCORPORATED WITH FRANCE.
237
under the guidance of the French deputy Simon, and by the aid of French
troops. They both preferred a petition to be incorporated into the great family
of the French nation. This was a step beyond the
emancipation of the world; it was a practical commentary on
the meaning of the disinterestedness of the Parisian democracy. Gregoire, the
president of the Convention, in his reply, first announced that freedom was
about to explode in two different parts of the world—in England and in the
interior of Asia. He then enlarged upon the advantages
of union to both countries, and concluded with the
cry:—"All Governments are our enemies, all Peoples are our allies; either
we shall fall or all nations will become free." The incorporation of Savoy
was proclaimed almost without discussion amidst thunders
of applause.
It was impossible to announce the external objects of the revolutionary
policy by stronger words or more decided actions. In the former part of the
Revolution, France had renounced its respect for its own public law; and now, in the face of Europe, it proclaimed an equal
disregard for the law of nations. One step was the necessary consequence of the
other, andJLafayette's "Rights of man," in 1789, contained the very principle which was now carried out by force of arms by the General's successors and deadly enemies. "The Tricolor," he said, "wfil make the journey
round the world." The time was now come when the Parisians hoped to unfold
the banner of freedom simultaneously at the mouths of the Thames and the Danube, on the Ganges and the Missisippi. These plans remained indeed
unexecuted for the moment, on account of their very comprehensiveness, and the
haste with which they were formed. But-they are so important and remarkable as
characteristics of the French rulers at that period, and in
their bearing on the subsequent course of the Revolution, that we cannot pass
them by without closer examination.
Some of these schemes were immediately directed against
238
BRUSSELS,
FRANKFORT, LONDON. [Book V.
Eastern Europe, and had in view
the overthrow of the Austrian State and the humiliation of Russia. "We know that the French Minister
reckoned, on the one hand, on a rising of the Turks, and on the other,—and this
was by far the most important point—on the lulling of Prussia into
inaction. King Frederick William had
reached the Rhine on the 6th of November: some weeks then passed before any
resolution was come to concerning further operations; but this delay was caused by military and not by political considerations. In the first place the troops greatly needed
rest and refreshment, after the toils of their retreat from Champagne. Then again the leaders hesitated for a time
in their choice of the next theatre of war. On the one side Hohenlohe-Kirchberg begged
and prayTed
that they would not leave him to defend Treves alone against the superior
forces of the French; on the other,
Custine's threatening attitude seemed to
necessitate a movement towards
the Main, for the purpose of protecting the rear of the army. The King decided
at last for the latter operation, and the Prussian columns began their march
from Coblentz, across the Lahn towards the Taunus mountains. The allies continued
to proceed cautiously enough;
and the Duke of Brunswick was now
as little in favour of rapidity- and boldness as he had been on the
Marne. It was, therefore, during this
march that the first notice was received of the new proposals of the French
Ministry. Custine sent a message, on the 23rd, by the Landgrave of Hesse-Homburg, that if
Prussia would acknowledge the French Republic, the latter would restore its
conquests and set Louis XVI. and his family at liberty. Lucchesini immediately communicated it to
Prince Reuss, and then returned to Coblentz to learn from
Mandrillon, and the bookseller Mettra,— another agent of Lebrun,—further
particulars respecting the views of the Parisian riders. The latter had had a long conversation, the
day before, with Duke Carl August of Saxe Weimar. In this, as in all
the earlier negotiations, the irreconcdable
Ch.IIL]
NEGOTIATIONBETWEENMANDRILLON&LUCCHESINI. 239
difference between the Prussian and French views, between a general and
a separate peace, once more came to light. The course of the
conference-with Lucchesini was the same. The Marquis expressed his willingness
to acknowledge the Republic, and to treat with it under the traditional
diplomatic forms; but always on the supposition that a simultaneous understanding was to be entered into with Austria. When Mandrillon insisted
rather warmly on the French side of the question, Lucchesini cried out at last;
"Remember that the Powers are not brought so low as to allow laws to be
prescribed to them." Mandrillon drew in his horns, whereupon Lucchesini informed him that the two German Monarchs had already
named their representatives with a view to negotiations
with France.1 He
then dwelt on the deep interest which the King felt in the safety of Holland
and the House of Orange, and assured him that if these
were threatened, not only would peace with Germany be impossible, but England
would also immediately take part in the war against France. Finally, however,
he urgently begged to be informed what powers the French Ministry would be intrusted with in the proposed negotiations, and
desired that they should be expressly defined by the Convention.
Such a wish was natural enough under the circumstances, and only went
to prove the sincerity of the peaceable intentions of Prussia.
The French agents also regarded it as a symptom of a decided approximation to
their views, and suddenly took an important step in advance, by offering
Prussia not merely a peace, but an offensive alliance, with France.
Lucchcsini's letters contain no particidars of these proposals,
but we are able to gather them directly, from Lebrun's instructions to his
agents. "If Prussia," he begins, "insists on a general peace,
the negotiation must be broken off, for under no circumstances will we ever
come to terms with the Austrian Dynasty.
Prussia's objections, to a se-
He
meant Thugnt, Mercy &c.
240
BRUSSELS,
FRANKFORT, LONDON. [Book V.
parate peace are weak; for in fact it is not Prussia but Russia and
Austria that would have cause to fear it. All that is requisite is to come to a
decided resolution. Let Prussia secretly ally herself with us, and make her
preparations for war during the winter, ostensibly against France.
We have the means, in the meanwhile, of stirring up Hungary
and Bohemia against Austria, and Poland and Turkey against Russia. Sweden is
friendly- to us, and Bavaria, being well aware of Austria's designs respecting
her, will be easily gained over. At the beginning of spring we will all
immediately and suddenly cross the borders of Austria at the same time, and
with irresistible force. Austria will be dismembered, Poland will be free,
Sweden will seize the Baltic provinces of Russia, and Prussia wdl gain
by a single blow complete supremacy in Germany." "The French,"
he says in conclusion "demand nothing, and wdl take nothing, for
themselves; nay they are ready to leave Holland untouched,
provided the Prince of Orange manifests no hostility to the Republic on his side."
We shall not meet with many official documents which give us so clear
an idea as the foregoing, of the character and sentiments of the French rulers
at that period. It reveals a policy full of impetuosity and audacity, unbounded in its pretensions, and unscrupulous in its
means. Unfortunately its boldness was founded not so
much on a correct estimate of the task they were undertaking, and a clear conviction of ability to perform it, as on a passionate recklessness, which without calculating the
consequences, involved their country in an endless series of perils. A little
consideration must have convinced them that the King of Prussia was not to
be allured to the French side by such vast and lawless dreams, for the realization of which so many circumstances would have to
cooperate in a manner which could not reasonably be expected. The King abhorred
the Revolution from the bottom of his heart; he was deeply engaged in his negotiations with Austria and Russia,
and had
Cn.
III.] RECKLESS POLICY OF THE FRENCH
RULERS.
241
a strong regard for the forms of the Imperial constitution. And even
supposing that all these difficulties could have been overcome, and the King
had been entirely free to act according to the best
interests of Prussia, he could hardly be expected to enter into a contest of
life and death with the two Imperial Courts, the first result of which would be
to strengthen his enemy Poland, and to further the interests of Sweden, which was entirely devoted to France. None of the advantages
offered him coidd at all outweigh these perils; and the less so, because the
principal datum on which the whole scheme was founded—the sincerity of France
towards Prussia—proved on the first examination to be utterly
worthless. While the French Statesmen allowed their armies to fall into decay
to please the democrats at home, they endeavoured to make up for their military
weakness by diplomatic intrigues in all parts of the world, and thereby came into no less violent collision with Prussia, Holland and
England, than with Russia and Austria. They held out to Frederick William II.
the hope of supremacy in Germany; but among themselves they expressed the
joyful conviction, that even a friendly contact with France would suffice
to undermine the Prussian throne.1 They
talked of the inviolability of Holland, while they
were at the same time employed in organizing a
revolutionary attack on Amsterdam. They wished to rouse the Osmans against
Russia by means of their fleets, and did every thing in their power, by open
hostility, to force England, the first naval power in-the world, into an
alliance with Catharine. Never perhaps was a world-embracing policy carried on
in a more rash, perfidious and futile manner.
The King of Prussia, therefore, saw nothing in Mandrillon's
communications to lead him to suspend for a moment his warlike preparations.
His Ministers drily gave their opinion
1 Custine wrote to Pache to this
effect, on this occasion; and Desportes to the Committee of Public
Safety, in May.
II. Q
242
BRUSSELS,
FRANKFORT, LONDON.
[Book V.
that Mandrillon's impudence formed a strong contrast with the apparent
moderation of Custine's proposals, and that these negotiations ought once for all to he broken off. Meanwhile the army reached the
positions of Custine in the Taunus mountains; but in consequence of the
incorrigible sluggishness of the Duke, little ground was gained at first, in
spite of some bloody engagements. Custine, however, completely lost
his head at the very first collision; he sacrificed
his garrison at Frankfort by contrary orders; and had his opponent shewn more
energy, must have suffered very serious losses. The allies reached Frankfort on
the 2nd of December with the Hessian battalions in
the van, and prepared to storm the gates. Even here, at the very last moment,
Brunswick's hesitating indecision had a most disastrous effect. He allowed the Hessians to stand inactive for a whole hour under
a murderous fire, until a rising of the Frankfort workmen drove, the French from one of the gates, whereupon the Hessians carrried the town without further trouble. Custine
was soon afterwards obliged to evacuate the right bank of the Rhine as far as
the outworks of Mayence. He excused himself in Paris
by the treachery of the Frankfort people, and endeavoured to compensate for his
misfortunes in the field by forcing the free State of Mayence to beg for
incorporation into the French Empire. This was but a poor offset against the decided breaking off of negotiations with Prussia, in
consequence of the capture of Frankfort. The wrath of the Parisians was all the
greater, because at the same time the supplementary expedition against Treves
entirely failed.1 The
Austrians, although greatly inferior in numbers, maintained their position on
the heights of Pel-lingen; Beurnonville, who commanded in Kellermann's stead,
complained that he could not call for greater exertions from his emaciated
troops; and Dumouriez, to the great vexation of the Minister at
War, was able to say with truth, that he
1 Austrian Military Journal.
Cu.
III.]
DECLINE
OF HOLLAND.
243
had foretold what would happen, and that every thing had proved the
correctness of his prophecy.
And thus the new attempt to break up the alliance of the ' German
Powers was frustrated still more quickly than the similar steps of Dumouriez
and Westermann at Valmy. And what was still more important for the future, a
decided move was at the same time made against the other half of the
French intrigues; the Maritime Powers came forward in avowed opposition to the
Revolution.
We have seen how emphatically the King of Prussia had -laid down the
inviolability of Holland as a condition of peace with France, and how readily Lebrun had acquiesced, on the understanding that the
Prince of Orange would also remain quiet. As to Holland itself there could be
no doubt of its desire of peace. This land had ceased to be a great Power; the
people had gradually withdrawn their comfortable hands from the sword-hdt, and the Government had given up all
attempt to influence the fate of the world. The Statesmen of the Hague expended
all their force in the clumsy and complicated operations of their internal
constitution; the population took but little interest
in their dealings, which exclusively aimed, not at the
extension, but the mere possession, of the very feeble powers of government.
They carried on their trade with activity and honesty, cultivated their fields and meadows, ruled the money-market of
Europe, and covered all seas with their commercial flag. A strict attention to
religious forms pervaded all classes; the higher ranks manifested a taste for
elegant learning and solid luxury-; the houses of many an Amsterdam merchant outshone the palaces of princes in massive splendour; and in
the Hague, certain gardens were to be seen separated from the street by solid
silver railings. In their public life they still lived on the memory of a great
past, and kept up the institutions and collections which they
had inherited from their forefathers; but in their dealings with the present,
they lacked that activity and liveliness
which can only
Q2
244
BRUSSELS,
FRANKFORT, LONDON. [Book V.
spring from patriotism and public feeling. This
was especially evident in regard to the very
first condition of political independence, the capacity
for self-defence. The navy, indeed, was as good as ever, but the army was in a
deplorable condition. It consisted of a miserably fallen militia, some
enlisted troops of the line without discipline or martial
spirit, under aged and self-indulgent officers, and a few German regiments in
the pay of the States-General, who were only bound to the performance of
certain duties strictly defined in their contract.
Under such circumstances the Government only desired peace and neutrality, and
anxiously avoided everything which could draw on them the hostility of either
party.
In France, on the other hand, several inducements combined to recommend to those in power an attack on Holland. The
relations between Paris and Amsterdam were of very ancient standing, and to
acquire a predominant influence over the States General had always been a
darling wish of French diplomacy. That the Minister Brienne had cpiietly
looked on at the victory of the Orange party in 1787 over the aristocracy—which was at the same time a defeat of French influence by that of England and Prussia—had inflicted one of its deepest
wounds on the ancient Monarch)-. Since that time, the Dutch
patriots who had escaped to France had been petted and caressed by all the
successive revolutionary parties—by Lafayette and Mirabeau, by Dumouriez and
the Gironde. When therefore Lebrun's partisans took up arms against the Orange rule in Holland, it was only the renewal of the pursuit of an old
French object, to which Dumouriez's position in Belgium naturally
led. Then, again, this richest and weakest of all European States held out a
stronger allurement to the greed of an invader than any other country.
Cambon and Claviere cast longing looks at the bank of Amsterdam, by whose
resources they hoped to cut off the supplies of money from the whole hostile
Coalition. They knew very well that the wealthy population of that city
Ch.
III.] FRENCH MACHINATIONS AGAINST
HOLLAND.
245
hated the French Sansculottes as heartily as the republican assignats,
but from Cambon's point of view this was only another inducement to
war. "As you have no Church lands wherewith to
pay for your Revolution," said he on one occasion
to the Dutch patriots Abbema and Staphorst, "your business is to overthrow
the money-bags." Kersaint represented to the Convention that they
had no reason to spare the Dutch merchants, because it was only the proletaries who could really be the friends of France, and
these possessed no richly laden ships. In short
the French Republic was urged to make war upon Holland by the diplomatic
traditions of the ancicn
regime, and by the Girondist scheme of universal emancipation, as well as by
the robber policy of the Mountain.
It needs no argument to shew that with such an adversary, Holland might by energy and determination have secured repose, or at any rate delay. But the Dutch Government, in the full consciousness of its incapacity to
resist, only thought of ready compliance, by which the avarice of its enemies
was continually increased. In Paris they first hit upon the idea of opening the
navigation of the Scheldt to the sea, in spite of all the treaties by which the closing of that river was guaranteed to Holland for all
time. The French Ministry desired to make use of the splendid port of Antwerp
as a station for their fleet against England, whereby they also hoped to
acquire especial popularity in Belgium, as a counterpoise to the
influence of Dumouriez.1 But
before Lebrun proceeded to carry out this plan, he sounded the feelings of the
Hague through the Ambassador De Maulde. Whereupon the Grand Pensionary Spiegel
held out the prospect of a legal protest, but did not venture to mention
the possibdity of an armed resistance. This decided the question in Paris; on
the 16th of November the French Ministry proclaimed the freedom of the Scheldt,
caused a
1 Morris.
246
BRUSSELS,
FRANKFORT, LONDON. [Book V.
French squadron to enter the harbour of Antwerp, and, encouraged by the timidity of the Dutch, sent an order to Dumouriez on
the same day, to pursue the Austrians even into Holland itself in case they
retreated thither. Happily for Holland this case did not
occur; the Austrians retreated by way of Liege to the Rhenish provinces, and
Dumouriez occupied the city, on the 27th, amidst the rejoicings of the very
democratic population. Even the Ministry, which was at that time engaged in directing an attack upon Treves, Coblenz and Hesse,
ordered him to move either upon Cologne or Luxembourg, to support
Beurnonville and Custine. Meanwhile Dumouriez, who was thoroughly opposed to
this whole system, embraced with joy a proposal of
the Dutch demagogues, who promised to support him by a general revolt, if he would march his army across the frontier. It was indeed not
difficult to shew the advantages of such a proceeding.
After the decrees of the 16th and the 19th, Dumouriez
could not doubt that his plan would be approved of in Paris, and he
hastened to meet Pache's urgent orders to march upon the Rhine, by representing
the alluring prospects held out to him in Holland.1
There was in fact but one serious obstacle in his path— the certainty, that an attack upon Amsterdam would necessarily lead to differences with Holland's nearest ally—the mighty
England. It was a matter of course that England would not allow a French fleet
to remain for any length of time at Antwerp, and that it was
no more inclined now than in 1787, quietly to see the Orange rule in Holland
threatened. Hitherto, however, Lebrun thought that he had special means of
hindering a similar intervention; and these were no less than the kindling of a
democratic revolution in London and
1 The published correspondence not to be
found 'in the Military
between
Pache and Dumouriez con- Archives, but
all that is essential
tains something to this effect, but may be gathered
from the Protocols
Dumouriez
has made prudent omis- of the Ministry, sions. The letters iu question arc
Ch.
III.] WHIG LORDS AND FRENCH REVOLUTIONISTS. 247
Dublin, which was to be followed by a close alliance between the
Republics of France, England and Ireland. Such a change would evidently be of far greater moment to France than the subversion of
the Austrian throne; and the efforts made to bring it about were
correspondingly greater and more persevering. Lebrun was zealously employed in
gathering up all the threads of opposition and discontent which existed in
the British Empire into his own hands, with the intention of overthrowing the
existing constitution by a sudden move. The focus of these intrigues was the
French Embassy in London itself. When England, after the 10th or August, withdrew her Ambassador from Paris—on the ground that he had
only been accredited to the King—the French Ministry
at first resolved only to maintain secret agents in London.1
Pitt, however, plainly manifested his wish—notwithstanding
the absence of a formal recognition of the Republic—to live in peace and amity with the French nation; and
Chauvelin, therefore, received instructions to remain in London for the present
as a private person. The leaders of the Parliamentary Opposition had for some
time past openly frecpaented his house. He made himself the channel of a
lively correspondence between Fox and Condorcet, and between
Sheridan and Brissot; and it was more than once remarked
that the speeches of Lords Lansdowne and Lauderdale
agreed word for word with notes of Lebrun of the same
date.2
These grandees had no desire of either introducing
the Social Republic into England, or of making her a French province ; but they
did uot disdain to parade a leaning towards France, and to use it as a weapon of political offence, in their opposition to
the Ministry. Lebrun made use of them with silent contempt,3 and
rejoiced in having far more energetic allies.
There existed in London
1 Protocol of tbe 24th of August. — 2 Malmesbury's Diaries,
Dec. 1792.
_ 3 Kersaint speaks publicly of Fox in
this tone in the Convention on
the
3d of January.
248
BRUSSELS,
FRANKFORT, LONDON.
[Book v.
a number of democratic clubs with numerous branches in the larger
provincial towns. These occupied public attention with a noisy agitation for
Parliamentary reform and universal suffrage, and had gained a
large number of adherents among the populace, and a
certain amount of consideration with the liberal portion of the middle classes.
The latter, of course, were not allowed to know what was going on behind the
scenes—that the leaders of the clubs were in constant correspondence with the
French Government, to whom they avowed in so many words
their design of establishing an . English Republic. While petitions in favour
of a Reform-bill were exposed for signature at all the public places in London,
and stormy meetings demanded that the constitution should be strengthened and consolidated by liberal progress, Lebrun's agents were
laying plans for an armed revolt. They supplied muskets, powder and money, and
recruited a number of vagabonds for an attack on the Tower, whieh was to
furnish the democrats with weapons, and thereby put them in
possession of the capital. These agents were mostly old associates or new
friends of Danton—second-rate Diplomatists such as Benoit and Noel— proteges
of Lebrun, as the American Serre and the Irishman Ferris—and Claviere's old coadjutor the Genevese Duroverai.
The reports of these people 1
reveal, as usual, an abundance of quarrelling and wrangling in their own
camp; but as the autumn advanced, their confidence in the success of their
great plot increased. At the beginning of November, Lebrun was convinced that it only needed an energetic effort on the part of the
French to bring about an outbreak in London, and to place the government in the
hands of an English National Convention. The last link in
this chain of revolutionary
operations was Ireland, which was at this time the theatre of a double
political agitation—the one, a legal one
1 In the papers of the Committee of
Public Safety, and the Protocols of the Ministerial Council.
Cn.III.]
REVOLUTIONARY INTRIGUES IN ENGLAND & IRELAND. 249
among the Catholics, in favour of Reform—the other, of a revolutionary
character, carried on by the Protestant Dissenters,
whose object was to separate the country from England.
The latter, animated by puritanical hatred against Royalty and the
Established Church, were in close connexion with the most radical of the
English Clubs, and kept up an uninterrupted correspondence with Paris, from
which they weekly received assurances of powerful support. In accordance with these promises, France had, since September, 21 ships of the line at sea, 7 on the stocks, 30 frigates under
sail, and 23 ready to take in their guns and stores; and it was incessantly
repeated that England had only 16,000 sadors and marines in her service, and had therefore hardly the complements of 12
ships of the line at her disposal. Incredible sums of money were sent across
the Channel—at least 30 million francs by the end of the year-all, of course,
in assiynats,
which in England were cashed at about half
their nominal value. The French press too, of all colours, did their utmost to
inspire the two nations with enthusiasm for the great work of revolution..1
Pitt had hitherto adhered with unwavering firmness to the policy of
neutrality and peace.2 He repudiated,
of course,
1 For all these facts consult the
work of Herbert Marsh (Historical review of the policy of England and France
from the treaty of Pilnitz to the declaration of War), which is entirely '
based on documents. Lord Stanhope, in his Life of
Pitt, furnishes no new matter. The "Auckland
papers" (Vid. II. 472, 481) confirm the statements of Marsh and Stanhope. — 2 At the present day it is hardly
necessary to bring forward special proofs of this view of
the case, which was once so violently disputed, All the official
document-^, correspondence, and despatches, of the Powers and Statesmen
concerned, go to prove its correctness, while his opponents have not the least
shadow of testimony to bring forward. In July 1792 the English Ministers directed their Ambassador at the Hague
strongly to oppose the accession of Holland to the Coalition (Correspondence of Lord Auckland, II, 419). They were indignant with Prussia
on account of her Polish policy (ibid.
423). In September the Government declined to express its wishes respecting
France, on account
250
BRUSSELS,
FRANKFORT, LONDON.
[Book V.
the principles of the Revolution but he had no thought of active
interference. Burke, who interested himself with zeal and judgment in the
Emigres, was very much distressed by the shortsighted dullness of the
Ministers; and in the autumn of 1792, he told his son that he apprehended an alliance between England and the Revolution. The invitation sent to
England from Champagne by Prussia, to cooperate
with her, had no better fate; and it was ecpually in vain that the Chancellor
in St. Petersburg endeavoured with indefatigable eloquence to convince the
English Ambassador of the world-destroying character of the Revolution. Pitt's resolution remained unshaken. It is not
true—often as it was asserted under Robespierre and
Napoleon—that Pitt rejoiced at the material disorders of France, and especially
the ruin of her
commerce and its colonies, as being dangerous competitors
of England. The figures before him proved too clearly the importance of the
English export trade to France, especially since 1787. The inrpoverishment of
France would inflict a greater loss on English commerce than could be
compensated by any advantage which the revolt of St. Domingo might bring to the English sugar islands. Thus Noel reported to
Danton, on the 4th of October, that Pitt was on the point of empowering
Grenville to carry on an official negotiation, which might perhapos lead to the
recognition of the Republic, and the mediation of England in the war
with Germany. Noel, it is true, was urgent for further instructions ; and the English Ministers, he said, hearing nothing more from
Paris, would begin to believe in intentional deception. We knoAv, however,
that very different instructions were soon afterwards sent over the Channel,
and that the English Ministers were gradually forced to the conviction of the
aggressive spirit of the Revolution. As
late as the
of
England's neutrality; it confined itself to the general
wish that France should uot carry on a war of conquest, and should escape from
its existing anarchy. Ibid,
443.
Ch. III.]
PITT'S
EARNEST DESIRE OF PEACE.
251
6th of November, Lord Granville had communicated
at great length to Lord Auckland, the English Ambassador at the Hague, the
decided opinion of the Ministry, that the interests of England and Holland
demanded the maintenance of neutrality, even though such a course shoidd call
for an unusual exercise of patience and long suffering.
On the 13th of November, however, the Dutch Ambassador, Van Nagel, went to Pitt
to describe the danger of his country, and to receive assurances of England's
help in case of need. The Minister returned a definite answer, which he also commissioned Lord Auckland to repeat,
on the 16th, at the Hague. Yet Holland's best protection stdl seemed to him to
lie in the restoration of a general peace; and on the same day, therefore, he
despatched an Envoy to the German Powers to ask on
what conditions they would consent to a peace with France; and at the same time
expressed the wish of England to mediate between the parties.1 He
did not however succeed in making a favourable
impression either on Prussia or Austria. These two Powers were, for the moment, thinking more of their
intended accpiisitions than of peace, and England shewed no approbation either
of the partition of Poland or the Bavarian exchange. Both Courts, therefore,
avoided giving any definite answer to the English note.
Meanwhile the offensive measures of the French followed
one another in close succession; first, the violent opening of the
Scheldt—then, the warm commendation of the English radicals in the
Convention—the decree of the 19th of November—aud the intrigues of the French agents in England itself. The eyes of Pitt were slowly
and reluctantly opened to the change which had
taken place in the position of
affairs. He had hitherto placed his
pride in
1 Haeften to the States-General
Pitt's letter to his colleague, the
of
Holland, Jan. 9th. Stratton to Marquis
of Stafford, Nov. 13, in
Grenville,
Jan. 20. 1893. Lucchesini Stanhope's.Life of Pitt, II. 173, to the Ministry,
23. Nov. 1892.—Conf,
252
BRUSSELS,
FRANKFORT, LONDON.
[Book V.
peace, in the well-being and freedom of England: he had covered the
deficit, introduced a scheme for tbe payment of the National debt, and reduced
the army and navy. He had made preparations for the extension of political
rights in all directions; he had actively promoted the reform
of the electoral law, the security of the freedom of
the press, and the political power of the middle classes. He had likewise shown
an active sympathy in the fate of the Irish people, and the abolition of the
slave trade. All these plans, however—the completion of which was to bring the epoch of 1688 to a close,
and open a new era for England—all these hopes, were nipped in the bud by the
approach of the Revolution. The war hindered all financial
progress, and in the presence of anarchical communism, no
change in the existing laws could be hazarded. The machinations of the
Jacobins, which favoured the Russian lust of conquest in the East of Europe,
retarded the political progress of England in the West, for a whole generation. Pitt was well aware of this, and took leave with pain of the
objects of his previous policy. He had the proofs of the
plot for seizing the Tower, and information concerning all the leaders and the
main features of the revolutionary scheme, in his own
hands.1 No
choice was left him; he was obliged to think of the safety of his country; but
even then he never went beyond what was absolutely necessary7, and
eagerly caught at every chance of peace. The man, whom a narrow party spirit
has been accustomed to regard as the originator of all the
coalitions against France, was incessantly using his influence with the Powers
to bring the contest to an end.
On the 1st of December, a secretly prepared royal proclamation was made in London, by which a portion of the
1 Herbert Marsh asserts this with
Dutch despatches, both those of the exact details, but has
not gained Grand Pensionary Spiegel,
and of much credit, because, just in this case, Hogguer, Ambassador in
St. Peters-he does not give his authority.
But burg, the fact is fully confirmed by
the
Ch.
III.]
STATE
OF PARTIES IN ENGLAND.
253
militia was called to arms, and the House of Commons, which had been
lately adjourned, was summoned to meet on the 13th. The interval before the
opening of the Session was employed in strengthening the Government both in
Parliament and in public opinion. We must here call £o mind the origin of the
opposition which was then made to the ministry of Pitt. The Whigs of the former
century consisted of a group of noble families, which for a
long time struggled with the monarchical system of George III. for the
possession of supreme power. After many changes of fortune, they succumbed to
the genius of Pitt, who drew the monied power, and the higher middle classes, into an alliance with the crown against the influence of the great
Whig families. When, therefore, the French Revolution filled the world with the
noisy tumult of democracy, the Whig party was split up into several divisions;
in one of which aristocratic tendencies, and hostility to
French principles, preponderated, and in the other,
feelings of political opposition, and hatred towards the
existing Ministry. There were now three sections in the opposition—one entirely aristocratic and conservative, led
by Burke and inclining towards the Ministry, which,
however, they regarded as influenced more by love of rule than steady
principle; another under the nominal leadership of the good-humoured, but
feeble, Duke of Portland, but really led by Fox— aristocratic
in its composition, but liberal in its tendencies— the real reformers of that
period—who, though actuated by true English feeling, were inclined to the
French alliance; and a third, decidedly republican, connected with the Clubs
and the Irish—weak in Parliament, but dangerous to the
Government, as connecting link between Fox and tbe Clubs. In the cpiestion
which now occupied the whole political arena, Pitt could count almost too
certainly on the first of these sections, to which he himself appeared too lukewarm in his hostility towards France. The third must be crushed,
and the second either won over or broken up. An attempt was
254
BRUSSELS,
FRANKFORT, LONDON.
[Book V.
made to bring Portland and a few of bis friends into the Ministry, but it was frustrated by the influence of Fox over the
feeble Duke. Pitt was, however, more than compensated for this failure by bis
success beyond the walls of Parliament. Tbe tyranny of the French mob
had produced its effect, even on the other side of the Channel. The Commonalty (Tiers Etat) of England were enthusiastic for the oath of the
Tennis-Court and the storming of the Bastille; but the 10th of August rather
staggered them, and tbe massacres of September filled them with horror and disgust. They now called to mind all that they owed to the British
Constitution, and especially to tbe Ministry of Pitt. The militia flocked in
great numbers to the rendezvous,
loyal associations were formed in opposition to
the revolutionary clubs, and the press was almost unanimous in
supporting the existing state of things. It was one of those occasions on whieh
the whole weight of the nation in England is brought to bear on political
epiestions, and drives all the factions before it with irresistible force. On the 13th of Dec, when the debate was opened in the Lower House,
the Opposition was withered by this change in the political atmosphere. Its leaders were not even inclined to venture on a division;
but Fox declared with an oath that he would appeal to the LTouse, and learned from the result that only the
republicans, and a few evidently reluctant partisans of his own—50 out of
340—were on his side.
The victory of the Ministry was so complete and splendid, that its
opponents turned its very success into a reproach.
"Where," they asked, "is the danger, on account of which this
extraordinary manifestation has been got up? Where are the powers of the
insurrection, which arc to be combated at the sacrifice of England's liberties
and the friendship of France?" These observations
would, no doubt, have been well founded, if the Government had only had to do
with the radicals at home; but, under the circumstances, they were altogether
disingenuous, since no one was ignorant that the
Cn. III.] PITT RELUCTANTLY
PREPARES FOR WAR.
255
real source of clanger was the aggressive spirit of the French. The
nation was perfectly clear on this point, as Fox was taught, when, on the 15th
of December, he moved that England should recognise the French Republic, and accredit an Ambassador to Paris. This time no
division was come to in the House, and outside its walls nothing but curses
were heard against the late idol of the English populace.
Pitt, however, by no means abused his newly acquired power. He contented himself with the most necessary measures of defence. In order to thwart the intrigues of French agents he
asked for powers to establish an efficient police for the surveillance
of foreigners; to cut off the material resources of the insurrection, he demanded a law prohibiting the introduction of French paper
money, and the exportation of corn to Freneh harbours. He further proposed to
raise the armed forces of the Kingdom to 27,000 sailors and 17,000 soldiers—the
insignificant amount of which afford the very strongest proof
of the pacific sentiments of the Ministry.
Several weeks elapsed before these bdls had gone through the necessary
forms in Parliament; but from the moment when they were brought forward, no one
could doubt of their being carried. England, rising from deep
repose, stood before Europe, not armed as yet, and still ready to welcome
peace, but firmly resolved not to brook the slightest violation of her own independence, or the security of her allies. The
impression made in Paris was immediate and powerful; the
feeling pervaded the French people that they had found in England an adversary
which would oppose to the volcanic fire of the Revolution, the calm and
stubborn resistance of the rock.
The French Ministry received the first
positive tidings of the change of affairs in England as early as the 5th Dec,
immediately after the royal proclamation, and almost in the same hour as the
disastrous intelligence from Frankfort. Dnmouriez's proposition concerning the
Dutch war was at
256
BRUSSELS,
FRANKFORT, LONDON.
[Book V.
this moment under consideration; the result of which was not for a
moment doubtful. Since the French Cabinet wished,
as regards England, to watch the progress of affairs, and to act with double
vigour on the Rhine, Dumouriez was informed that the Ministers by no means
rejected his scheme against Holland, but considered it of more urgent
importance, at the present moment, to adhere to the previous
plan of operation, and drive the Austrians across the Rhine.1 They
were the more rejoiced at this resolution when, on the 7th of Dec, another
despatch arrived from Chauvelin, in which be made a report of a conversation he
had held with Fox and Sheridan. The nature of their communications may
be gathered from the fact, that the French Ministry immediately held a fresh
consultation on the Dutch enterprise, the result of which was a despatch to
Chauvelin, to the effect that the whole scheme was entirely
abandoned.
Dumouriez received this new order with transports of fury. Pache had
only spoken of his supporting Custine, and of a possible attack on Luxembourg,
and had alluded to, but not fully imparted, other diplomatic reasons;—all which was calculated to wound the sensitive pride of the General.
He immediately replied that since Pache had ruined his army, he could no longer
pursue the Austrians, to whom the Prussians, irritated by Custine's adventure,
bad sent fresh aid; and that he therefore protested against
the resolution of the Ministers, as entirely
chimerical. The latter were cjuite inclined to bring the self-willed General
before a court-martial; but the angry reply was immediately followed by Dumouriez's confidential adjutant
Thouvenot, who, after two exhaustive discussions with the Minister, succeeded
for the moment in effecting a compromise. Thouvenot gave up the attack on
Holland, and explained that his General had only declined at the present moment
to march on Co-
1 Protocols of the Ministerial
Council in the Imperial Archives at Paris. Pache to Dumouriez, Dee. 6th.
Ch. iii.] failure of revolutionary
propaganda.
257
logne, on account of the impossibility of provisioning his army. The
Ministers in return gave up the idea of holding a
court-martial, and resolved that both Dumouriez and BeurnonviUe should enter
into winter quarters. But the Parisian party was already so confident of its
own strength, that, in the face of this ministerial resolution, Pache announced to the General that the Council
insisted on the occupation of the Rhine: whereupon Dumouriez, who, in spite of
his exasperation, was bound to obey, sent on his van-guard to Aix-la-Chapelle,
but halted there on receiving the intelligence that
BeurnonviUe was in full retreat. This time Pache did not venture to repeat the
violation of the decree, and a complete cessation of arms took place from
Antwerp to Basle. The universal revolutionary propaganda paused for a moment in
its headlong course.
But if any one founded thereon a hope of seeing the zeal of the
Revolution flag, he was destined to be bitterly disappointed.
The "Republic had entered too far into the path of violence. The only
effect of the failure of the plan of fraternizing with the peoples, was to direct the fury of the Revolution against the peoples
as well as their rulers, and to substitute for the Girondists' smde of freedom,
the plundering schemes of Danton. The French Ministers even regarded it as a
compensation for the 'overthrow of their plans, that they were
no longer checked in the open display of their rapacity, by any consideration
for the fraternal union of all nations which they had hitherto so loudly
preached. If the peoples in their blindness took offence at the punishment of a despot, so much the better
for the. Revolution, which did not increase its dangers, by increasing the
number of its enemies, but only its booty and glory. If they rejected the brotherly hand which was held out to them, let them feel the
wrath of offended Liberty, and let their goods be employed in feeding their
conquerors. They had reasons enough in Paris to be 'satisfied with such a turn
of affairs. The month of November produced only 28 millions of revenue
258
BRUSSELS, FRANKFORT, LONDON. [Book V.
against 138 millions outlay, 122 of which were spent in the war.
Claviere considered that this was of itself sufficient to render it impossible
any longer to keep up the pretence of unselfish brotherhood in foreign countries; and Cambon frankly told the Belgian patriots, that France needed
their Church property to keep up the value of the assignors;
and that, consequently, Belgium must become a French province. They
therefore contracted the Propaganda's sphere of operations, in order to carry out their schemes of conquest more completely,
within narrower limits.
These new views were soon officially expressed. On the 15th of
December—two days after the opening of the English
Parliament, and the decree, of the French Council respecting the winter quarters of the army—Cambon proposed to the
Convention, that the neighbouring countries, whom they had hitherto invited to
freedom and self-government, should henceforward be made to bear the rule of
the sansculottes and
the cost of the ass/gnats.
"The object of tbe war," he said, "is destruction to the
pialace, and peace to the cottage; hitherto our troops have expelled the
tyrants, but class privileges still exist; if any nation wishes to deserve liberty and our friendship, it must do
what we have done; it must overthrow the privileged classes and give the sansculottes
a share in the government. You cannot allow any half-measures; a people
which does not choose to be entirely free, is your enemy; wherever we appear,
we must constitute ourselves as a revolutionary power.
The property of our enemies" he continued "—?'. e. of
all tyrants, churches, noblemen, corporations and rich egoists—shoidd be seized
as a pledge for the future liquidation of the expienses of war. We shall
relieve the poor by the abolition of all taxes,
and supply the deficiency thus caused from our own treasury, by means of our assignats,
which will gain a fresh security in the sequestrated property. Their
circulation in the districts occupied by us will be in this manner secured, and we shall be spared the costly purchase of silver
money for our armies."
Ch. III.]
THE
REVOLUTION DROPS ITS MASK.
259
These propositions were loudly cheered by the Convention. Robespierre
and his party, who took little part in warlike matters,
remained passive, or were rather perhaps inclined to disapprove. Danton's
associates warned the Convention against the alienation of the neighbouring
peoples, which might be the consequence of this decree; but they too were fated to see themselves outstripped by their own disciples, and the
great mass of the ministerialists with noisy impatience
decreed as follows.
"Wherever the French armies shall come, all taxes, tithes, and
privileges of rank, are to be abolished; all existing
Authorities annulled, and provisional Administrators elected by universal suffrage; the property of the fallen Government, of the
privileged classes and their adherents, is to be placed under French
protection; and, lastly, Conventional Commissioners are to be sent into the country to fraternize with the people; and
Commissioners from the Government, to provide for the maintenance of French
troops."
This decree needs no comment. Wherever it was executed, it subjected the occupied country at a single blow to the dominion of Paris; it overturned all the internal relations of life, confiscated the property of the richer classes, and
robbed even the poor by the ever-increasing depreciation
of the assignats.
It was answered therefore from all sides by a
cry of horror and disgust. The Belgian provinces sent up an energetic
protest, the Dutch patriots were reduced to silence, and among the Germans and
the English the last remnant of that sympathy vanished, which the remembrance of the spring of 1789 had awakened, and which had
partially survived the September massacres. By this decree, France gave up her
attempt to seduce the nations by a shadowy image of liberty; not however with
the intention of returning to the paths of peace and international law, but of declaring open war on the whole system of social order, in the
name of mob rule.
R2
:>G0
TRIAL
OF LOUIS XVI.
[Book V.
CHAPTER IV. TRIAL OF LOUIS XVI.
Competence
of the convention.—Review of the efforts to revolutionize foreign countries.—Private papers of the king.—Ferment in paris. — Communistic proposals.—Their rejection.—Commencement of the trial.—Chance in the views op the gironde consequent on England's
preparations for war.—Plan of appealing to the nation.— Examination
and defence of louis.—Debate on the sentence.— Predominance
of thf oironde.—Threatening
attitude of the democrats.—Agitation of the lower classes in paris.—Desertion of the troops to the democrats.—Sentence of death against louis extorted by fear.-execution
of the king.
In undertaking
to relate tbe last days and sufferings of King Louis XVI., we feel that we are
still more exposed, than in other portions of our history, to the objection,
that after the countless recitals that have beeu given of them, it is impossible to furnish any thing worthy the attention of the
reader. In respect to certain phases of the events to be described, we are
deeply convinced of the force of the objection; and shall therefore speak of
these only so far as is absolutely necessary to preserve the
connexion of our story. To this category belongs more especially the
pour-trayal of the personal sufferings, of which the dungeons of the Temple
were the scene in those horrible days—the series of brutalities whieh were
heaped upon the heads of the Royal Family1—the
cruelties which each of the persecuted ones experienced in his own person,
aud—far worse—was obliged to see inflicted on the nearest to his heart.
"We may further omit to speak of those parliamentary contests in which each party endeavoured to obtain for their actions, not the meed of
success—for this depended upon epiite dif-
1 Con/, the
Journals of the Princess Maria Theresa and Clery.
Ch.
IV.]
COULD
LOUIS BE LAWFULLY TRIED ?
261
ferent things—but the assent and approbation of
their eon-temporaries and their posterity. And, lastly, we may pass over a
number of siibordinate intrignes, which, though of little importance, have
nevertheless claimed a large share of curiosity and interest. We have no intention of adorning or encumbering onr story with any of these
thiugs; remembering that the catastrophe offers other,
less known but not less essential points, the clearer understanding of which
may, perhaps for the first time, enable us to pronounce an historical and moral jndgment. For it was not
the intrignes of impotent compassion, nor the speeches of criminal judges, nor
the sufferings of the victims, which determined the issue of this great
contest; and it will be our task, as far as onr sources allow, to point ont and establish the true causes and the essential
character of the events which followed. If therefore onr recital cannot hope to
affect, excite and agitate, the reader, like those of many of onr predecessors,
yet we trust that the tragic lessons, which the event in its
purely historical nature is calculated to teach, will not be altogether lost.
After Valaze, a zealous Girondist, had prepared the Convention on the 3rd of November, by a brutal and turgid description of
aU the crimes of the King, Mailhe, a member of the
Centre, proceeded, on the 7th, to ventilate the legal question, whether a
criminal procedure against Louis could be lawfuUy commenced, and what tribunal
was competent to try him. There was reason enough for such a preliminary qnestion, even for those who regarded the sanctity of ancient royalty as obsolete, and wished to treat Louis solely according
to the usual principles of the criminal law. They were prevented from founding
their charges against him on earlier occurrences, by
the general amnesty with which the Constituent Assembly had concluded its
labours in September 1791. For the following period, of course, the standard of
law was to be sought in the Constitution, which plainly declared the person of
the King inviolable, since it held the Ministry responsible
for all the acts of the Government,
262
TRIAL
OF LOUIS XVI.
[Book V.
There was, however, one exception to this rule; if the King should lead
a foreign army against France, or not formally
oppose such an undertaking, he was to be considered as having abdicated. From
this proviso two deductions might be made; that for this crime no greater
punishment was to be inflicted than the one specified, and that every other
act, even though performed behind the back of the Ministers,
was sheltered by the royal inviolability. Now it was just this crime of treason
against the country—conspiracy with Austria and Europe for the overthrow of
French liberty— of which he was accused by Valaze. But even supposing the charge were well founded—that his whole existence in the year
1792 had not been what it was, a feeble attempt to defend himself against the
Republicans—the penalty of deposition had already been inflicted on the 10th of
August, and there was no ground at all for further proceedings
against Louis.
All this was so clear and unequivocal that Mailhe, without any attempt at refutation, confessed that according to the laws of
1791, the whole matter was concluded by the abdication. The first step of this criminal tribunal was to abandon the ground of legality, and substitute
for it the two fulcra of all despots—the law of State necessity, and the
omnipotence of the Sovereign power. "You represent," cried Mailhe,
"the sovereignty of the nation; this sovereignty
is inalienable and indivisible, and cannot therefore be limited by the inviolability of the King; this inviolability would be a
sufficient plea as against all other authorities, but it is impotent as against
the nation. Now the nation demands vengeance, and the punishment of the
traitor, by the law of nature—by the same law according to which I shoidd stab
the murderer of my wife."
This view of the matter had important practical consequences. As the nation alone could reach Louis, its representatives, — /. c. the
Convention,—were the only possible tribunal.
As the Convention wielded the omnipotence of
Ch.
IV.] OBJECT OF APPEALING TO THE
PEOPLE. * 263
the sovereign people, it needed not to he bound by the usual forms of
criminal law. And lastly, as the Convention was in every sense the
Plenipotentiary of the nation, its verdict-needed no further sanction on the
part of the sovereign people itself.
As a great portion of the independent members
sided with Danton, in wishing to lay the matter ldtimately before the great
body of the primary Electors, we must look for the reason of the last of these
propositions in some immediate purpose of the Ministers. This purpose will be easdy recognized, when we recollect that in
the then existing balance of parties, the Ministry could
command a majority in the Convention at any moment, by means of its partisans;
and that just at this time it wished to make the trial of
the King subservient to its diplomatic aims. We see, therefore, that it was for
the interest of the Ministry to secure to the Convention, the entire and
unconditional disposal of the fate of Louis. Mailhe's report clearly shows how
strongly his regards were fixed upon foreign countries.
He speaks of Spain and Hungary, which, he hoped, woidd soon follow the example
of France; he concluded with the declaration, that the tottering of all
thrones, the progress of the French arms, the electric shock running through every heart,— proclaimed to mankind the approaching overthrow of
all Monarchs. On the motion of Billaud, the Convention decreed the translation of the report into every European language.
By the adoption of this report, the Convention would declare Louis to be a person devoid of all rights, whom they might use at their
pleasure,—according to the political recpiirements of the moment, as
booty—hostage or sacrifice. For the present they had only discussed the
preliminary cpiestion, between the inviolability of the King and the omnipotence of the Convention. But passion (prickly broke through all
forms, and the Convention was soon obliged formally to allow the speakers to
deliberate on every bearing
264 *
TRIAL
OF LOUIS XVI.
[Book V.
of the question—the competence of the tribunal, the forms of procedure,
the guilt, and the degree of punishment. On this occasion, the critical
position of affairs, the venom of party fends, and above all the terror
which—in spite of the reaction in the Conventional elections since
the September massacres —the democratic party still continued to diffuse, were
clearly seen. It was this terror which inspired the tone, though not yet the
matter, of the debate. The Members vied with one another in oratorical efforts to heap abuse upon the head of Louis; and even those who
endeavoured to save him from the axe, considered themselves bound to trample on
tbe crown. Mutual suspicions too came into play: the Jacobins suspected that
the Gironde were aiming at the restoration of Louis; the
Gironde were deliberating whether the Mountain desired the execution of Louis
in order to place Orleans on the throne: and thus the
bitterness of party feeling increased from day to day and
led to furious quarrels, during which fists were sometimes clenched,
and sticks and rapiers raised. The main question was for a long time undecided. Some voices indeed were raised amid the tumult which
indignantly denied the omnipotence of the Convention, and wished, in the
absence of all criminal law, at least to save the name
of judge from desecration, and openly to justify the decree on the grounds of
the national weal. It was Morisson, Fauchet, and above all Lanjuinais, who thus
resisted all threats and prudential motives with courageous
firmness. Louder and louder rose the complaints of the Mountain, that the
Convention, after having proclaimed its own omnipotence, did not proceed
forthwith to use it for the destruction of the Tyrant, but wasted its time in
hypocritical and liberty-destroying forms. St. Just was the
first to raise this cry, and thereby gained an important position in his party.
He, too, like Morisson, declared that they had no right to try the
King, from whieh, however, he drew the conclusion that Louis ought to be poignarded as an enemy and a prisoner of war; because the crime of having
been a King
Ch. IV.]
TIRADES
AGAINST THE KING.
265
• was sufficient to make htm an outlaw. St. Just, accordingly, spared
himself the trouble of looking for further proofs of Louis's guilt; and even
the rest of the members said but little on this point, since the real incentive
of all was not right but expediency and advantage. For in the midst of all this
fierce excitement, the secret calculations might be discerned—of the one party, to drown their domestic enemies in Louis's blood,
and of the other, to complete the European Revolution by the ill-treatment of
the King. From the Centre of the Assembly, especially, resounded the warlike tirades against Europe. "An impulse," cried Gregoire,
"has been given to the World, the nations are eager for liberty; the
volcano will break forth, and impart a new form to the globe; but if you should
let Louis go unpunished, Europe would be at fault, and the despots would
immediately turn the unfavourable impression thus
made to their own purposes." "You see,"
argued Thomas Payne, "that the crowned robbers of Europe have conspired
against freedom; you have caught one of the band, and you will not let him go,
until you have discovered the full extent of their
abominable machinations." This theme was harped upon with endless and yet
monotonous variations; for weeks the turbid stream of invectives rolled on
without a single fact being proved, or the business in hand advanced by a single
step.
In the midst of these outpourings of an only half-genuine fanaticism,
the Minister Roland came forward on the 20th to make an unexpected
announcement. He had been informed, be said, that Louis had
possessed an iron safe built into the wall of a room in
the Tuderies, for the preservation of important documents; he had thereupon
looked for and discovered the safe, and found the papers; in which, as he had
observed on a hasty perusal, the names of several Deputies
occurred; and he now laid them before the Convention " * * for their
inspection, as they would doubtless prove important to the trial.
We may here observe that Roland
was subsecpiently
266
TRIAL
OF LOUIS XVI.
[Book V.
charged by the Jacobins with having sifted the papers before making his
report, because several Girondists were compromised
by them; nay, that he had made Louis himself give information of what soon
turned out to be. a very insignificant discovery, in order to delay the trial. The Minister, in reply to this accusation,
declared (in contradiction to what be had said in the first instance), that he
had not read the papers at all, but had immediately ordered them to be carried
into the Convention. Louis, on his part, not only denied the
existence of the iron safe, but did not even acknowledge the papers, which were
laid before him, although they all dated from the period of the Constituent
Assembly, and were therefore anterior to the acceptance of the Constitution and the publication of the general amnesty. What still further
increased the uncertainty whieh rests on this subject is, that the
Commissioners of the Convention made no further search into the safe; and, on
the publication of the documents, declared
that there were several of them which they did not consider it necessary to
print, but had, in their stead, incorporated with the collection a
series of other important papers. The documents of the iron safe, therefore,
are in every way devoid of credibility; but the Convention, inaccessible to scruples of that kind, adopted them as evidence, caused a
number of carefully chosen and skilfully arranged papers to be printed, and
thereby confirmed a belief among the lower classes in Paris of Louis's treachery. The ferment in the public mind was greatly increased, and it was
even then a matter of doubt, whether the Government could control the issue of
the trial. The Jacobins pursued their object with redoubled zeal, and though
the investigation of those papers delayed the proceedings for many
weeks, yet the victory of the democrats in Paris was already so undoubted, that
they could once more venture to raise again the banner of their September
domination, in one of the most important departments of the National life. They seized on the social question, and with the same
declaration of the omnipotence
Ch. IV.] FAB RE'S COMMUNISTIC PROPOSITIONS. 267
of the State, which hung like the sword of Damocles above the head of
Louis, they now began to threaten the property of every
proprietor in France.
The evil tidings from Lyons had induced the Convention, as early as the
end of October, to institute a comprehensive inquiry into the sources of the
supply of provisions. On the 3rd of November, Fabre
of Montpellier brought up a report in the name of the Committees on Trade and
Agriculture. He laid great stress on the important fact that there was
sufficient corn in existence, and that the dearth was entirely caused by a
cessation of traffic. In examining into the cause of this
evd, he never thought of the general legal insecurity which prevailed, but
imputed the mischief to two great conspiracies—of the enemies of freedom, who
wished to starve the people—and of the usurers, who sucked their blood. He then proceeded to move that these disturbers
of the public weal shoidd be subjected to an increase of restraint and
pressure, and that every citizen shoidd be compelled, on the severest
penalties, to give information of the amount of his stock and offer it for sale, according to the requirements of the people. There was
but one step between this last provision and the declaration of the sovereign people's right to impose a fixed price on the goods of the
seller, by which all property whatever woidd be
placed at their disposal.
The debate on these propositions was carried on with the same violence
as that on the fate of Louis XVI., and was rendered the hotter, by the
increasingly threatening character of the intelligence from the Departments,
where the plundering
bands,—chiefly composed of the poorest peasants—continually
increased in numbers and turbulence. The Financial Committee, hard pressed by
Claviere, now at his wits' end, resolved to withdraw their salaries from the
Catholic Clergy, and thus to spare the State an annual sum of
70 millions. Whoever wished for a priest, said Cambon, on the 13th, might keep
him out of his own pocket. This was a
fatal
268
TRIAL
OF LOUIS XVI.
[Book V.
step; for it at once threw the Constitutional clergy into a hostile
attitude towards the revolutionary government. Greyheaded
parish priests were now to be seen, side by side with the bandits of September,
at the head of rebellious mobs; the dagger and the cross cooperated against the
Authorities and the possessors of property. A fixed price was put upon
articles of all sorts at Chartres, Courvdle, Blois, Beau-gency and Orleans;
corn, wheat, butter and eggs, were taken from the owners at a mere nominal
price, and if they resisted, they were openly plundered and threatened
with death. The general cry of the mobs was for a division of land, or a
reduction of rent; and the Government Commissioners,
who were without means of enforcing their authority,
or themselves held Jacobin opinions, nowhere upheld the law. The September
party, animated by this intelligence, and ensured of an increasing excitement
in Paris by the trial of the King, now came openly forward with their communistic programme. Beffroi represented to the Convention that the necessaries of life were not objects of private property,
and that the first dutyT of
the State was to overthrow the tyranny of the capitalists, which, he said,
weighed more heavily on the poor than the former domination of the noble
lords of the soil. Above all, the orator declaimed against the
fact—intelligible to us, but in his eyes only to be explained
by a wide conspiracy—that the sale of the Church lands had not increased the
number of small proprietors, but only the great landed
properties of the country. He called upon the Convention to check this growing
evil by the severest repressive measures; and especially to forbid .the union
of several farms—to annul all existing contracts of this kind—and to limit the trade in corn exclusively to those markets which were
under the inspection of the State. These views were expressed in an exaggerated
form, on the 19th of November, in an address from the Electors of
Seine-et-Oise, who demanded: that every peasant should be compelled to
bring a fixed quota of his crop to market, at the price
Ch.
IV.]
OPPOSITION
TO SOCIALISM.
269
fixed by the State; and that no peasant should possess more than a
certain number of fields, or employ more than a certain number of day
labourers.1 A week later the Commune of Paris raised its dreaded
voice to utter similar sentiments; complained of the union of
capitalists, who were endeavouring to suppress the Revolution by buying up provisions and starving the people; and called for
measures to annihilate usury, and to empower the Authorities to fix the price
of the necessaries of life.
If we consider these demands in their connexion with one another, we
shall have before us the very main spring of the
terrorist policy. They are the very same which formed the objects of the short
democratic rule in September; the same which had furnished matter of
controversy between the Parisian party and their opponents for three years; the
same which henceforward furnished the watchword for every
fresh revolutionary coup d'etat.
The moment of victory, however, was not yet come. So sharp a reminder
of the days of September aroused all opponents of Communism to unanimous
resistance. The Gironde, whose leaders now came
forward to plead the cause of personal freedom, and the sacredness of private
property, found themselves supported hy a large number
of independent members. Barere, whose only wisdom consisted in an instinctive
sense of the seat of power for the time being, caused a decree to be passed,
on the 26th, by which the Government Commissioners
were re-called, and re-placed by envoys of the Convention.
Feraud, Lidon Lequinio and Barbaroux, contended with warmth for unconditional
freedom of traffic, and unreservedly
exposed the real source of the evil. Even St. Just, intimately connected as he
was with Robespierre, gave them
1 All this is omitted in the
extracts is not in any part sufficient for
from
the debate given by Buehez a thorough
study of the Revolution,
and
Roux, whose work, though in- because the selection of matter is
dispensable
as containing much in- almost entirely
guided by certain
formation
not published elsewhere, political predilections.
270
TRIAL
OF LOUIS XVI.
[Book V.
his support on this occasion, and with great correctness of judgment
called for a diminution of the mass of assignats,
as the first step towards a remedy. Robespierre, cautious as usual,
contented himself with branding the unworthiness of the capitalists, deploring
the difficulty of controlling them, and recommending for the present the
acceptance of the Committee's propositions. He, too, clearly perceived
that the prevailing feeling of the Convention was decidedly against them. He
therefore sought with redoubled zeal to make the existing excitement
subservient to his other objects. When the Commissioners who had been sent to Chartres returned on the 28th, and gave a deplorable account of the
state of things in that city; when they told of threats and acts of violence,
employed even against themselves by an insurgent mob; when they mentioned a
priest as having made himself particularly remarkable amongst the
instigators; Robespierre rose with eager zeal to direct the wrath of the
Assembly against the clergy, and thereby to throw the guilt of the disturbances
on the counter-revolution. "There is no other means of restoring order," he cried, "than the execution of the King; by that and
that alone can yon crush the head of the serpent." Danton and Marat
expressed their emphatic assent, and when Buzot objected that it was not a
question of the King, but of respect for the law, Legendre
rejoined, "The author of the famine is a prisoner in the Temple." At
the same time handbills were distributed before the doors of the Convention,
calling on the people to behead Louis and the "Austrian woman," if
they wanted bread;1 and
the Convention agreed to Legendre's motion to close
the general discussion on the trial of the King,
and to print the speeches which were still in arrear. The lingering remnant of
hesitation on the part of the Convention was overcome by the city of Paris,
whose Sections, on the 2nd December, demanded an
immediate sentence against Louis, in the name
1 Moore's Journal, p. 407.
Cii.
IV.] THE CONVENTION CONSENTS TO TRY THE
HING. 271
of their "terrible tyrant-subduing portion of the Sovereign
People!" Robespierre spoke at great length on the
following day, and on this occasion he too made a distinct reference to the war
and foreign nations. "Do yon fear the Kings?" be cried; "a
pretty means of conquering them, to seem to tremble before them; of breaking up their coalition, to spare their accomplice! "What!-—will the
nations who hailed the declaration of rights with applause, be alienated by the
punishment of their greatest enemy, and not rather be filled thereby with
redoubled enthusiasm?"
This language coincided exactly with the most
cherished wishes of the majority, who just at this time, as we have seen, were
reckoning with great eagerness on a general convulsion
in Europe. After a stormy debate, an almost unanimous
decree was passed, by which the Convention confirmed Mailhe's
proposition, impeached the King, and took upon itself the whole responsibdity
of the sentence. "Louis must be tried," so ran the decree, "and
must be tried by the Convention." After two days the forms of trial were
fixed by a further enactment. A Commission of 21
members was to draw up the articles of impeachment, on the contents of which
Louis was to be personally examined;—whereupon sentence was to be immediately
pronounced. The Convention having displayed its
revolutionary zeal, coidd with a lighter heart reject
the communistic demands made upon it; and on the 8th of December, instead of
increasing the severity of the September laws concerning provisions and trade,
it abolished them altogether, by a declaration of entire freedom of traffic. The Jacobins took this rebuff for the moment with
tolerable patience, convinced that a victory in the trial of the King, would
enable them to re-establish their despotism over property and the material
relations of life.
Their opponents were pretty nearly of the same
opinion, and the Gironde began to regard the fate of Louis from a different
point of view. Since they had themselves occupied his former place, they had
become aware what kind of force
272
TRIAL
OP LOUIS XVI.
[Book V.
they had let loose against him; they learned what the consequences of a new victory of the Septemhrists would be to France and
to themselves.
It had in fact become clear, not only to the Girondists and their
opponents, but to every party, that their own existence was
bound up in the fate of the Prince, who was now a helpless captive in their
hands. It does not speak well for the foresight of the Gironde, that they now
for the first time attained to this conviction. For that every accession of strength to the party of the
Mountain was a question of life and death, and that
the trial of Louis must at all events redound to the advantage of the Jacobins,
appears so self-evident, that we can oidy wonder at the apathy with which the
Gironde remained for many weeks inactive in regard
to the trial of the King. The case was the same with this party, at this
crisis, as with many of their associates during the September
massacres. They did not recognize the danger, until it immediately threatened their own lives. Their feelings did not revolt at crime, until the
ground began to quake beneath their own feet. The Girondists too, as
instigators of the war of aggression, were blinded by their hope of
revolutionizing the world—a hope which was to be more
quickly realized by the degradation of Louis. And thus they wavered long,
remained inactive, and differed among themselves; we have just seen that it was
one of their own leaders, who, in the preliminary discussion, cast the first
stone at the head of Louis.
Gradually, however, new doubts began to arise in their minds. The
Jacobins had completely gained their object of agitating the lower classes
afresh. The people of the Faubourgs, deafened by the unceasing
cry of treachery, terrified by the threatening
bread riots, and worked upon by the well-paid agents of Pache, were boiling
with fury, and that not merely against the moderate party. Revolutionary passions blazed up again with increased violence. All the scenes were
renewed which preceded the former catastrophes of the
Ch.iV.]
LEANING OP THE GIRONDE TOWARDS ENGLAND. 273
Revolution. The popular orators of true liberty again appeared in the streets; the clamorous bawlers of the llallcs,
and the women of the fraternity club, were again
set in motion; seditious mobs collected, threats
were uttered, and occasional acts of violence
committed. The social question was made use of, in the streets, as a weapon
against the Gironde, as it had been, in the Convention, against the King. Louis
was called the head, and the Gironde the shield, of the usurers; and
thus the King and the authors of his fall were pierced by the same shaft.
During this state of things in Paris, the Gironde witnessed the
above-mentioned change in the foreign relations of
France, at the very moment when the Convention was about to bring the King
before the bar of their tribunal. No event could have wounded them more deeply.
They had always looked towards England with especial preddection; and peace and
brotherhood with the British nation, on the one hand, and
war against Austria, on the other, had always been the watchwords of their
foreign policy. By the adoption of this programme they felt that they had
separated themselves from the policy of the ancien
regime, which had steadily pursued the object of humbling
England byT the help of Austria; that they had likewise thereby placed themselves
in opposition to Lafayette, who had wished, in
1790, to preserve Belgium for the Austrians, by opposing England. By the same
policy they had driven the Feuillants from power in 1792, for having
corresponded with Austria and turned their backs on England and Prussia; and,
lastly, it was on this ground that they had had their first skirmish with Robespierre, when the latter opposed the war
with Austria, and manifested nothing but indifference and suspicion towards
England. In short the thought of the English alliance filled their past, and
was intended to be the guiding star of their future.
And now they were told, not only that the English
ministry was arming against them, but that the whole people of n. s
274
TRIAL
OR LOUIS XVI.
[Book V.
England was filled with hatred and contempt of the Revolution. Nor was there any doubt as to the reasons of this great change. All their English friends and their London agents unanimously
declared, that had it not been for the September massacres, Pitt would not have
ventured to frown upon them; but that by the display of the royal scaffold, he
woidd be able to drive the English people to a war of aggression
and revenge against them. The Girondists forgot bow much they had themselves
contributed to bring about this state of things; but they saw with grief, that
the very same events which gave strength to their enemies at home, were mining the most important interests of the nation abroad. The
effect of the news from London therefore was far greater on them, than on the
Ministers. The fiasco of the Propaganda, which only roused Claviere and Cambon
to pass the decree of the 15th of December, and therewith to
greater revolutionary fervour, induced the Girondists to retrace their steps, and to embrace with all sincerity a policy of peace.
They saw that what was chiefly wanted was a radical cure of domestic evils; and
they determined by one great measure to put an end to
the democratical disturbances.
About twenty of their leading men were accustomed at that time to meet
every evening in Valaze's house, under the presidency of Buzot, Salle and
Grangenenve, in order to prepare themselves in private conclave for the
questions of the day.1 They deliberated on the means of saving Louis, and came to the
conclusion that their own antecedents would not allow them to propose the
accpiittal of the King directly; they therefore sought for a method, if not of immediately bringing the matter to a conclusion, at
any rate of gaining time. They remembered that at the beginning of the trial,
Danton had spoken of a final appeal to the nation. They
1 Valaze's letters to his
Constituents in the Imperial Archives. Papers of the Committee of Public
Safety.
Cii.IV.]
THE GIRONDE FAVOUR AN APPEAL TO THE PEOPLE. 275
knew, moreover, that Lepelletier, a member of the Left, and Barere, of the Centre, approved of such a measure. They took up this
idea with eager zeal, for it seemed to them to promise other advantages besides
the deliverance of Louis. They were continually receiving intelligence from all
the Departments of the bitter aversion felt against the
party of September. The towns continued to send Federes
for the protection of the Convention; and even the clubs sent votes of
want of confidence in Marat to the Parisian Jacobins. The Girondists had no
doubt, that if the primary Electors of the Departments
could once be brought together—no matter for what purpose—they might be easily
induced to make a powerful demonstration of popular indignation against the
Jacobins. This consideration made them almost rejoice that the trial of the King had been carried so far, as to afford them the
opportunity of carrying such a radically healing measure. They therefore
determined to propose that the Convention should pronounce sentence on Louis,
and subsequently lay the matter before the assemblies of primary Electors for ratification.
It is easy to fix upon the weak points of this scheme. Whoever ruled
Paris, ruled the Convention also. Every thing, therefore, depended on the
question, whether the Jacobins could succeed in reducing
the Convention to submission by a new revolt in Paris.
Since the month of September, there had been only one
means of meeting this difficulty, viz. an
imposing armed force, without which, speeches, votes, and expressions of
popidar will, were of no avail. While the assemblies of primary
Electors were debating, a bread riot in Paris might have thrice overthrown the
power of the Convention. And even if the former could really be brought to
pronounce a vote of censure against the Mountain,
the means would still have to be found of enforcing
obedience. The Girondist plan of operations was therefore ab
initio futile. It would have been far better to employ all their energies in
bringing up larger bodies of Federes to
s2
TRIAL
OF LOUIS XVI.
[Book V.
the capital, and to take armed possession of the vantage ground. And
even if the objections to this plan were considered
insurmountable—they were indeed considerable—there were other ways stdl open to
them. Dumouriez was at this moment in open fend with
the Jacobins; the Gironde might have formed an alliance with him by means of
Gensonne, and the concpieror of Belgium was just the man to serve them as sword
and shield against the anarchists. They might, too, have come to an agreement
with Danton, who had himself
spoken of an appeal to the peopile, and thereby marked his separation from the
Jacobins. An understanding with him would have been sufficient to paralyze the
boldest bands of the club; for when once Danton had been sure of success he would have been little scrupulous about
ways and means.
None - of these methods were easy or free from danger, but they at any
rate afforded a fair chance of deliverance. It was necessary for the Gironde
either, resolutely to take up arms in their own name, or resolutely to unite all parties for the one great and important object—the
overthrow of the Jacobins. But instead of this, they kept up their old dislike
against Dumouriez; so that, in December, even Gensonne broke off the
correspondence which had been hitherto
kept up with the General, and openly displayed the same abhorrence of Danton as
of Robespierre and Marat. The consequences of this course were immediately
seen. In order to prepare the way for the meetings of the primary Electors,
Buzot on the 9th of December proposed the following declaration in the Convention: "The Sovereign People in its
mass meetings has the right of recalling its representatives
from the Convention if they betray their country." In the first instance
he obtained the approbation of the Convention by some
commonplaces about the sovereignty of the people, &c; but no sooner had the
decree itself been brought forward, than it was received with so much suspicion and opposition, that Buzot himself made haste to
Ch. IV.]
PACHE
AIDS THE JACOBINS.
277
propose the adjournment of the matter. But the attention of the
Convention was fully roused. Not only the Left, but even a great part of the
Centre refused to hear any more about the assemblies of the primary Electors, because they were convinced that the Gironde were only contemplating a
re • formation of the Convention, for the purpose of establishing their own
exclusive power. And thus this party completely isolated itself by the very
first step, and rendered it impossible
to make use of the appeal to the primary Electors for the deliverance of Louis.
The Jacobins saw the matter in its true light, and with a sure instinct
began to work in an opposite direction. That which weighed upon their minds,
was not the feeling of the Departments, which were far
removed from the scene of action, and at variance among themselves, but the
presence of troops of the line in Paris,1 and
above all of the bands of Girondist Federes.
The important influence which Pache's new position exercised over internal affairs now became apparent. He almost entirely
relieved the Jacobins from their fear of the troops of the line, by his
readiness to send them out of the capital, as soon as a sufficient pretext
should be pointed out; and in the present destitution of all the French
armies, such a pretext might at any time be found. It was necessary, on the
other hand, to win over the Federes
to the popular cause, by friendly means. Robespierre continually recommended this course to the Jacobins;—and the Club, the Hotel de Ville, and the Minister at War, cooperated to
effect this grand object. Every means of flattery, seduction,
and bribery, were employed on a great scale. What an important circumstance was
it, therefore, that just at this moment the treasury
of the War Ministry, which absorbed all the pecuniary resources of the State,
was completely at the disposal of the Jacobin party! After three months of
1 2,400 Gendarmerie, and 2,600
Cavalry. Report of the Commune to the Convention, Jan. 5.
278
TRIAL
OF LOUIS XVI.
[Book V.
office Pache left a deficit of 160 millions; we may imagine how long,
the party fidelity of 5,000—for the most part poor, uneducated volunteers,
could withstand such temptations.
It was under these circumstances that Louis XVI. appeared, on the 11th of December, before the bar of the Convention. Up to this time he had passed miserable days in the tower of
the old Temple, overwhelmed by his jadors with every kind of insult and abuse, deprived of every convenience of life, and entirely cut
off from intercourse with the external world. He found in ■ his religious faith the strength to
endure with feeble unresisting calmness. The only feature apparent in his
character was christian patience, and he exhibited neither
effeminate sorrow nor manly resistance. His behaviour was just the same during
his trial. Charles of England vouchsafed to his judges no other answer than a
threatening protest against the illegality of their proceedings. Louis did not murmur, when after a long
slow passage through the streets of Paris, he had
to stand in threadbare dress before the bar of the
Convention, wlnle Barere, as President, sat opposite to him in the seat of
honour. He entered on his defence, and endeavoured to prove his innocence of the long series of charges brought against him. When at the
close of his address he asked for legal counsel, the Convention sent him back
to prison, where he found an order from the Hotel de Ville, forbidding him for the future to see any of his family, as being his probable
accomplices. "Not even my son" he exclaimed, "who is only seven
years old?" After a long discussion this was granted him, on condition
that the child shoidd not return to his Mother. The King then gave up this last consolation in order not to rob the boy of a
mother's care.
Meanwhde the envenomed fend was carried on in the Covention with
ever-increasing bitterness. As the decisive moment approached, it became more
and more evident that in the minds of the majority, the affected
enthusiasm for freedom was giving way to an oppressive sense of justice.
Ch.
IV.] FURIOUS STRIFE OF PARTIES IN THE CONVENTION. 279
Having once assumed the office of judges by despotic enactment, they wished at any rate to exercise their
functions with external dignity and fairness. They wished to grant the King an
advocate, and to allow the latter free access to the prisoner, and to give them
both the opportunity of examining documents, and time for the preparation of the defence. The Gironde in some cases supported these
demands, especially when they could thereby gain time, or thwart the
Hotel de Vide. The Jacobins, on the other hand, with convulsive fury, strained
every nerve to wrest from the Assembly a sentence of death on that very
day, and in that very hour. Each of the demands made in favour of Louis led to
a furious quarrel, mutual accusations and noisy abuse. The commonest privileges
accorded to the worst of criminals could oidy be carried against the obstinate blood-thirstiness of the Mountain, after a struggle
of many hours. At last two advocates, and subsequently a third, were granted to
Louis, who was also permitted to have free communication with them; and the
26th of December was fixed for the defence.
The interval was spent by the various parties in constant endeavours to
weaken or destroy their opponents, before the commencement of the last great
struggle. The Gironde once more took up the absurd idea, that it was only as
partisans of PhOippe Egalite, that the Mountain was so
eager for the death of Louis; and Buzot thought that he had done a great thing,
when, on the 16th of December, he carried a decree banishing aU Bourbon princes
from France. His eyes were not opened by the fact that he was heartily supported by Robespierre and St. Just; Marat and a few
Cordeliers, however, who could not spare the Duke, to
whose purse they had free access, raised such a terrible storm in the
Faubourgs, that the Convention was compeUed, on the 22nd of December, to suspend the decree. On the 24th of December, Brissot, Debry,
and Breard, endeavoured, with equal ill-success, to divert the passions of the
people by a series of very phdan
280
TRIAL
OF LOUIS XVI.
[Book V.
thropic and democratic motions—the adoption of poor
children by the childless rich—the dotation of poor fiancees
by the State—the abolition of the right of inheritance of collateral
relatives, in favour of the State—and the imposition of a progressive tax on
the superfluity of the rich. It was all of no avail. The galleries answered
with the cry: that Louis must be sentenced; that whoever did not condemn Louis,
must lose his own head. The ferment in the streets was no less violent. On the
same day a citizen heard some artdlery men, on the terrace of
the Convention, discussing a plan of shooting Louis on the 26th, as he
returned from his trial. They were confident of success, and added, that as
there would of course be a tumult, they could easily make away with the royalist Deputies. What made the matter particularly
serious was, that these men reckoned on the cooperation of the Fcdcres;
but Roland, who was informed of this, comforted
himself with another report, that the Federes
only took p>art in the plot for the purpose
of preventing its execution. As, however-, the chiefs of
the Mountain themselves preferred a public execution to a murder, it was not
difficult to frustrate this conspiracy.1
On the evening of the 25th the Jacobins filled all the galleries of the
Convention with their myrmidons, that no friends of the King might gain
admittance during the night. For though they disdained to murder the King, they
employed every means of violence to wrest his life from the judges. In such a
state of things, the speech of the advocate for the defence,
De Seze—a young Parisian lawyer of great reputation,
whom the people had often borne away from the bar in triumph—was only a
testimony to posterity and history of his own talent and intrepidity: on the
result of the trial it had no effect at all.2 It is true that it made an impres-
1 Protocol of the Ministerial
Council, Dec. 24. Malesherbes, the King's advocate, received similar
information on the 23d. — 2 The aged Malesherbes, T argot's
friend, who had offered himself to the King as advocate, was unable
Ch.
IV.] DEBATE ON THE
VERDICT, DEC. 27TH.
281
sion, and the Mountain were furious at the emotion betrayed by many a
Deputy;1 but it was no longer a question of truth or feeling, but of power, and forces ready to do battle. Lanjuinais, who without belonging to the
Girondist party courageously resisted the encroachments of the Monntain,
proposed that the Convention should give up the title of judges, and decide on
grounds of the public good. The Mountain had proposed the same
course a hundred times, but they were now afraid that so open a confession of
illegal violence might shock tender consciences, and therefore opposed the motion with infinite bitterness. They would not now give up
the formal sanction of their violations of the
law,—the warrant to commit, not only murder, but judicial murder. Amidst
reproaches, accusations-, and invectives of every kind,—amidst the incessant
roar of the galleries—the contest increased in violence, tdl the contending parties came to blows, and at last adjourned the debate from
sheer exhaustion, without coming to any
resolution.
At last, on the 27th, the great debate on the verdict commenced, on which we may trvdy say that not only the life of the King,
but the fate of the Revolution and Europe itself,
depended. Complicated as the state of affairs had hitherto been, it was clear
to every one, that the death of Louis would be the victory of the only faction
which went on its way without any care about the preservation of peace— without any feeling for the liberties of its own
country. All the other parties had for a time made common cause with it, but
the conscience of all had been awakened at
to
speak. Target had declined the task, not from cowardice, as Wachsmuth— following the always mendacious Montgaillard—has repeated, in his '■'Geschichte Frankreichs zur
Revo-lutionszeit," but he feared that his ill health
would render him unequal to the task. He exposed himself to still greater
danger by printing an energetic
pamphlet in Louis's favour and causing it to be distributed among the excited
masses. Nettement, Etudes sur les Girondins, 90. — 1 Revolution de Paris, Dec. 29.
282
TRIAL OF LOUIS XVI.
[Book V.
one point or other of the downward course, and all recoiled
from the deed, which was to unite the horrors of the Revolution in one
sanguinary crime. It was solely for this reason that the Parisian party hurried
onward Avith so wild a zeal; because they knew that aU whom they could carry with them now, would be for ever subject to them—for ever separated
from the rest of mankind.
St. Just, who opened the debate, immediately applied himself to the question which, since the resolution come to by the
Gironde, had absorbed the attention of all parties—the appeal to the
People. His reason for opposing it, is very remarkable. "The appeal to the
People," he said "is the restoration of the throne, for the salvation
of the tyrant is the renewal of tyranny." That the mass of the nation, in
their assemblies of primary Electors, would preserve the life of the King,
was so certain a thing in his eyes, that he did not even stop to prove it, but
assumed it as a matter of course. He nevertheless endeavoured to steel the
courage of the Convention for the decision, by saying: "It is
not you who arc the accusers and the judges, but the nation who act through
you." He had no scruple in using the power granted by the nation, in
direct opposition to the plain will of the nation, by putting Louis to death.
Robespierre had expressed the same sentiment some
days before, when he said, that not even the sovereign will of the people could
be allowed to abolish the Republic. St. Just drew the simple conclusion; as
the preservation of the King would be dangerous
to the Republic, we forbid the sovereign People to will that he shoidd be
saved. It was impossible to confess more plainly that France had no sympathy
with the wishes of the Jacobins, and that their leaders had formed a settled
resolution to enslave the country.
The next speaker was Salles, through whom the Gironde for the first
time unfolded their new programme to the Convention
in all its detads. His words were no less characteristic
of the position of his party, than the nndisguisedly
Cii.
IV.] DEBATE ON THE APPEAL TO THE
PEOPLE. 283
despotic utterances of the Mountain of the views of the Jacobins. He,
too, began by involuntardy testifying that the mass of the French nation cared
little for the Republic; for he declared the condemnation of Louis to
be necessary to curb the Royalists. In other words, he confessed that nothing
but the solemn declaration that Louis was a convicted traitor would restrain
the nation from replacing him on the throne. But he then proceeded to advocate the appeal to the People as a means of appeasing the
other nations of Europe. This proved how great an impression had been made on
the Girondists by the late events of the war; for it is impossible to imagine a
more decided abandonment of their former most cherished wishes.
The Convention heard, for the first time, an unreserved and distinct statement
of all the crime and dangers into which an aggressive policy had thrown the
Revolution. With unanswerable clearness the orator pointed out, that the execution of Louis by the command of the Convention woidd
irretrievably cut off the possibility of retreat; and therefore advised, that
on a question of existence like this, the whole
nation should be called upon to decide. Lequinio replied by enlarging more fully on the declaration of St. Just, that the summoning of
the primary Electors was a certain means of kindling a civil war, and that the
intrigues of the Aristocrats would lead to the restoration of the throne.
Robespierre went, however, to the heart of the matter on the
following day, when he unsparingly laid open the ultimate plans of the Gironde.
"The appeal to the people," he said, "is' only an attempt to
appeal from the popular will, expressed on the 10th of August, to all the
secret enemies of equality; it is the surest means of
uniting the royalists and all respectable persons for the oppression of the
industrious, needy and innocent People." And indeed, if we translate his
democratic Shibboleth into common language, we find that he thoroughly understood the intentions of his opponents. It was not so much the
object of the Gironde to save the King at any price, as to make
284
TRIAL
OF LOUIS XVI.
[Book V.
use of his danger to rouse the middle classes to political action; by which they hoped to gather even their bitter enemies, the
royalists of all shades, under their banner, and thus overthrow the rule of the
Parisian proletaries. The laying open of this plan was in itself the most
weighty of arguments to an Assembly, the majority of which desired
the continuance of party struggles, and not a complete victory of the Gironde; Robespierre carried the cpiestion completely into the sphere of personal ambition, and thereby brought the
most powerful motives to bear on the majority. All that he added about
the practical danger of summoning the primary Electors was, indeed, singularly
weak. When he asked, how, in a state of war against half Europe, the votes of
44,000 Communes could be taken without confusion and peril, it might have been answered, that the reprieve of Louis was the surest
means of peace. When, again, he declared that an appeal to the people
would lead to civil war in France, he should have been reminded, that it lay
entirely with him and his associates to avert the evd, by submitting to the
will of the majority. But he, like St. Just, declared that virtue was always in
a minority in this world; that consequently the minority was always the
representative of justice and virtue, and no one, of course, could expect virtue to submit itself to vice.
The impression which he made was so considerable, that the Gironde
hastened on the 31st to put forward Vergniaud, the most illustrious of their
orators. His speech is one of the greatest masterpieces of all ages. He was a man of great mark, endowed by nature with a keen perception of
truth, and a splendid mastery over all the treasures of language. At an earlier period, he had been drawn by passion and indolence
alike into evil ways, but he was now purified by the sense
of his approaching and atoning fall; and with the hand of a master, he united
all the features of the existing state of things into one grand
and affecting picture. He did not enlarge on the guilt or innocence of the
King, nor
Ch. IV.] VERGNIAUD ADRESSES THE CONVENTION.
285
the justice or injustice of his punishment—but on the couse-cpiences of
regicide, aud the retribution which inevitably overtook the revengeful. He held
up before his hearers the war which woidd tear Europe in
pieces, the distress and starvation of France, and the discord with which the
victors would lacerate themselves and their country. Every word breathes the
warmth of moral couviction, every turn is ennobled by a proud and patriotic
grief; and even anger anil disgust are glorified by the
feeling of his own approachiug death. "I fear," he says in
conclusion, "that the views I am opposing will prevail; I know fuU well
what the cry of proscription means."
All that a genuine patriotism could say under the circumstances, was urged by Vergniaud in a
manner not to be surpassed. But the majority of his hearers were looking for
arguments of a different kind. He ought to have convinced some that they would
not jeopardize their precious lives by an honest vote; and others, that the lucrative sce-saw of party intrigue woidd not be put a
stop to by Louis's liberation. No sooner had the sound of
his words died away, than the stream of selfish hopes and cares flowed on in
its usual course. The great mass of the Deputies never
asked which opinion was true and patriotic, but which party was strongest in
Paris, and by what vote they could secure the greatest safety and the richest
booty. The answer to these questions could not be given with any certainty, and
the end of the great tragedy was as yet entirely
undecided. The aspect of Paris was depressing and disquieting for all parties;
every man felt that the future was surrounded by perils of all descriptions.
Under the influence of these feelings the middle classes gave themselves up to silent resignation, or manifested towards
the sufferers in the Temple a daily increasing, and more openly expressed
compassion. The Republicans experienced the reaction in the public sentiment;—they saw themselves shunned, repelled and despised. In some of the Sections the majority changed sides; in sev
286
TRIAL
OF LOUIS XVI.
[Book V.
era] theatres royalist allusions were applauded, and more than once
the' Marseillaise was drowned by the song: "0 Richard!
01 mon roil"'1 The
democrats beheld these signs of the times with redoubled fury, and tried to
raise their courage, by noise and tumult. Marat had long sounded the sentiments
of the majority, both of the people and the Convention, aud described the
position of affairs with shameless
sincerity. "The only means" he cried "of securing the victory to
justice, is to force the traitors to do their duty; the rascals of the
Convention can only be kept in the right path by fear of the people's
vengeance; when the ex-king has been beheaded and Roland turned
out, the reign of equality will begin; ye good and weak patriots rally round
me."2 The patriots and especially the Civic Authorities proceeded to act
upon this summons.
In order to secure to themselves the superiority in armed forces, they
drove the better classes from service in the National
Guard by every kind of insult, and strengthened their own party, by enrolling
aU the cjuarrelsome and plunder-loving rabble from all
quarters of the kingdom.3 The
Sectional Committees of Police proceeded to make innumerable arrests, as
they had clone in September. The Jacobins declared
that they would not quit the field without a contest for life and death. One
Section declared itself (as on the 8th of August), in a
state of permanent insurrection; another informed the Convention that even if
the latter pronounced a verdict of acquittal, either Louis shoidd die or all
republicans perish.4 The
Hotel de Ville once more passed the illegal resolution that the names of
the 8,000 and the 20,000 should be printed, and held up as objects of wrath to
all the friends of freedom.6 And all these proceedings produced
1 Revol. de Paris, Dee.
29. Jan. 5. 27th, Luxembourg. Gensonne
in the
— 2 Journal de la
Rep. Franc., Convention,
Jan. 2nd. Bourdon in
Dee.
13. — 3 Report of the Commune the Jacobin
Club, Dec. 30. — 0 Revo-
to
the Convention, Jan. 5. — 4 Dec. lution
de Paris, Dec.
29. 24, Section Theatre Francais. Dec.
Ch.
IV.] EFFORTS OF JACOBINS TO GAIN OVER THE FEDERES. 287
so great a feeling of terror, that more than 14,000 persons fled from
Paris in the last week of the year, to escape a repetition of the September
massacres.1 It became evident that the sympathy of the
great mass of the people was on the side of the King and the Gironde, but the
boldness for unscrupulous action on that of the Mountain. Where the powers of
the Hotel de Ville fell short, the Police Committee of the Convention—at that
time the most powerful organ of the political police,
and filled with followers of Danton and Marat—came to its aid. The Government
and the Gironde had no other means of resistance than the 5,600 Federes.
But in this body, too, more and more alarming symptoms showed themselves; and the Gironde—which had hitherto resisted the zeal of the Jacobins
in hurrying on the trial— now began to wish for a termination of the crisis,
notwithstanding the favourable intelligence
which they were continually receiving from the
provinces.
The longer the discussion in the Convention
lasted, the more violent became the agitation on either side. On the 3rd of
January, the Police Committee reported that a correspondence
had been discovered between Louis and the three leaders of the Giroude, Vergniaud, Guadet and Gensonne. This was nothing more than
the letters of the 20th and 26th already mentioned, which had been delivered by
Boze, and therefore a full statement of the fact was sufficient to clear the accused from all reproach of royalist intrigues. But in the excited state of the
public mind, a shade of suspicion still rested on them. Outside the walls of
the Convention the mob was raging in full conviction uf the treachery of the
Gironde; in the Convention itself, more than one of the independent members were anxious about the consecpuence of a victory of the
Gironde, and the unfavourable impression made by Buzot's motion respecting the
electoral assemblies was confirmed and extended. When
Chronique de Paris, Dec.
2G.
288
TRIAL
OF LOUIS XVI.
[Book V.
Barbai'cmx, on the 4th of January, moved the closing of the debate he
was answered at great length by Barere, who was himself one of the advocates of
the appeal to the People, but who now demanded that sentence of death should be pronounced against Louis by the Convention alone. It is
impossible to imagine a more striking testimony of the state of public feeling.
Meanwhile the Gironde thought that they had no reason to despair of
victory, and they now directed their attention to the all-important cpuestion
of the police of Paris. On the 9th of January, at the new election of the
Conventional Police Committee, they succeeded in filling all the posts with
their own adherents, and thus gaining an organ for the surveillance of the capital. But the Jacobins were not long in making their
countermove. They made continual efforts to win over the already wavering Federes;
the Hotel de Ville demanded 120 pieces of artillery from the War
Minister, for the Parisian Sections; and the Commune,
on the 13th of Jan., ordered that all the theatres should be closed, as a means
of exciting the masses. Every Section formed for itself a Committee of
surveillance, with unlimited police authority, and the Gravilliers Section
proposed the establishment of a great Police Committee for
the whole city; nay, even demanded the formation of a jury for the prosecution
of all "appellants"—as the advocates of an appeal to the people were
called. At the same time the social question was again brought forward. On the 13th, a deputation of 48 city Districts
appeared before the Convention, and proposed the equalization of the value of
paper money and silver. No one, of course, expected that the request would be
granted, but an opportunity was afforded of shouting to
the Gironde, amid the applause of the galleries, that they protected the
usurers, and would come to a dishonourable end. The effect of all these
machinations was very considerable. Riots took place every evening in front of
the theatres; some bands of the Federes
sent in their adhesion to the Jacobins, and on
Ch.
IV.] CONVENTION CONVICTS LOUIS OF HIGH TREASON. 289
the 14th the guns, whieh had been readily given up by Paehe, rattled
through the Streets. All the attempts of the Gironde to
thwart these proceedings by an order from the Convention were in vain. And thus
with open preparations for an armed revolt before their eyes, the Convention
proceeded to give their votes on the fate of Louis.
As early as the 13th a contest took place
respecting the order in which the different questions should be voted upon. Tbe
Gironde thought that the question of the appeal to the People should be decided
first, while the Mountain wished to bring it on last. At last Fonfrede carried
a motion, that the question of gudt or innocence shoidd
be answered first of all, then that of the appeal, and lastly that of the
penalty. This was in aeeordance with the wishes, but not, as soon beeame
apparent, with the interests, of the Gironde. After the Convention had almost unanimously declared Louis guilty of high-treason, 283 members
voted for the appeal to the People, and 424 against it. At least a hundred of
the latter had no wish for the King's blood, but they saved themselves for a
favourable vote on the penalty,1
partly from dislike of the other plans whieh the Gironde founded on the assemblies of the Electors, and partly from fear of the Parisians, who for
that very purpose denounced the appeal to their bands as the very acme of
treason. On this point, therefore, the defeat of the Gironde was
eertain, and they felt it all the more deeply because a considerable number of
their party had voted with their opponents. With renewed courage the Jacobins now prepared for the last struggle respecting the sentence of death; they knew that the
rejection of the appeal by no means implied success* in this main ob-jeet of
their efforts, and they strained every nerve to banish the last remnant of
independence and courage from the Convention. They caused the report to
be spread from various quarters, that the gates of the city were to be
closed, the
II.
Moore's Journal, p. 574.
T
290
TRIAL
OF LOUIS XVI.
[Book V.
prison massacres renewed, and the Convention destroyed together with
Louis, if it endeavoured to impede the vengeance of the people.1 Such
threats, indeed, had never been wanting, but they had never exercised their
full force until now, because just at 'this moment the only weapon of the
Gironde shivered in their hands, when the desertion of the Federes
to the Parisians was completed on the 17th. This decided the matter:
the independent members of the Convention felt like men who stand
unarmed before a hungry pack of wolves; and they threw the
head of the King to them as a means of effecting their own escape.
Sheer violence alone, therefore, on the one side, and pale terror, on
the other, decided the majority of the Convention to vote for the death of Louis; and not any kind of political calculation or enthusiasm, and
certainly no aversion to royalist reaction, nor the too eager intoxication of
freedom. On this point the most initiated of the men of that period, both among
the authors and the victims of the catastrophe, were perfectly
agreed, and expressed their conviction publicly, and in the Convention itself,
without any qualification or contradiction. As early as the 5th of January,
when one of the Sections of Paris threatened a revolt, Guadet, one of the leaders of the Valaze faction, said that the Federes
alone prevented the execution of the threat. And now Robespierre
announced to his electors that it would have been all over with freedom, if the
Federes had not seen through the Girondists' intrigues; but that they had fortunately at the last moment, in common with the
Marseiilois, done justice to the Parisians, joined the people, and thereby
given faction its death-stroke. He spoke still more openly in the Convention
three mornings later. "On what did the salvation of the country, and
the punishment of the tyrant, depend? On the courage of the people, the energy
of the patriots, and above
1 Report of the Mayor to the
Convention, Jan. 16. reason'' he added "to believe these reports"
"I have
every
Ch.
IV.] THE FEDERES DESERT TO THE
JACOBINS.
291
all on the unexpected adhesion of the Federes.
If they had remained blind for two days longer, the tyrant would have
been acquitted, and the edge of the sword turned against the patriots. But their fraternization with the people discouraged the intriguers, fettered the hostile faction and turned the
scale in favour of the patriots." The Federes
themselves addressed the Convention to the same effect on the 4th of
March: "Our union with the Jacobins," they said,
"saved Paris, and brought the tyrant to the scaffold; we resisted all the
efforts of Barbaroux to gain us over to the appeal to the People; if we had not
been in Paris the inviolability of Louis XVI. would have destroyed the Republic." 1
It is very clear that no legislative Assembly, whatever party might
predominate in it, would have listened in silence to sueh declarations, if
their truth had not been indubitable and universally known. And even in this
case, these repeated boasts throw a glaring light on the depth
of the political confusion which prevailed. What a pitch of corruption must
have been reached, before an ambitious party could consider it advantageous,
incessantly to remind the nation that the Convention voted under the fear of bayonets! They knew that they had irrevocably drawn upon
themselves the abhorrence of the country, and they were
therefore compelled to support their cause by force alone. It was not, then,
without good reason that they incessantly boasted of their
deeds of violence. They employed but one language towards the enslaved nation: oderint
dwn metucmt—hate but fear!
1 To the same effect Amar, in the
act of impeachment against the Girondists (Conf.
Meillan, 294): Paris aurait nage dans le sang, et la tiberte etait perdue peut-etre
sans ressource, si tes Federes, appeles dans cette ville par les catomnies,
n'avaient pas abjure les erreurs dangereuses.—Mais Us vi-rent, Us s'indignerent
de I'audace avec laquelle les Deputes calomnxuteurs tes avaient
trumpes. lis se reunirent aux Jacobins, celebrerent avec les Pa-risiens vne
fete eivique sur la place du Carrousel oil Us avaient force de se rendre le
bataillon de Marseiilois egare's par Barbaroux. La frame des Conjures fut" rompue.
T 2
292
TRIAL OF LOUIS XVI.
[Book V.
And thus terror reigned in the Convention, and compelled it, on the
16th of January, to complete with trembling hands
the murder of the King. By the dawn of that day, the troops of Fournier and
Maillard, the bandits of the 6th of October, and the day-labourers of the 2nd
of December, filled all the courts aud passages of the building. The hours passed in preparatory discussions, and it was not until 10
o'clock at night that the voting began. The Hall was dimly lighted, the
Deputies went about in restless silence, or talked together in a low voice; the
galleries were crowded with armed bands mingled with female
fanatics, drinking and smoking, who roared out their abuse from the darkness
whenever a vote for acquittal was given. No one doubted what would happen if
the sentence of death did not gain a majority; some few were roused by the feeling of constraint to indignation and defiance, but the greater
part yielded to their fears, not only for their own life, but for the future of
the country. The day before, Yergniaud had spoken with the advocates of the
King, and had expressed his abhorrence of the sentence of death; he
was among the first to vote, and when he saw the threatening crowd before him
gnashing their teeth, he voted for death!1 More
than twenty Deputies of similar opinions followed his example; they coidd not,
they said at a later period, kindle a civil war to save
one human being.2 In their case there was stdl some thought of the public good; but
exanrples of undisguised selfishness were not wanting. "Good
heavens," said Count Coehon, in the splendid days of the Empire, "I
thought Louis quite innocent, but was I to allow myself to be maltreated
as a traitor to the people!"3 The
voting by nominal appeal continued throughout the night and the
following day. At
1 Ponjoulat, Rev.
Franc., I.
395. From the mouth of a collaborateur of
Deseze. — 2 Harmand de la Meuse, anecdotes
relatives a la Revt/I. — 3 Villiaume, Hist,
de la Revol. H.
3G2.
From an ear-witness. The author is a decided democrat, but says that he could
give 20 similar cases.
Ch.
IV.]
THE
VOTE ON THE SENTENCE.
293
midday, a few yards from the Hall of the Assembly, the proletaries of
the Sections were celebrating their feast of fraternity with the Federes,
on the Place du Carrousel. In the same hour the Hotel de Ville resolved
to propose a tax upon the rich, from the proceeds of which
bread should be supplied to the poor. At eight o'clock in the evening, the
voting in the Convention was concluded; and just at this moment a despatch
arrived in which the King of Spain asked for a postponement of the trial, to allow time to mediate a peace between France and Germany. All the
most powerful momenta—mob violence, communistic tendencies, and revolutionary war—were crowded together in this final act of the sad
tragedy; and all impelled in the same direction. Robespierre,
who had so often spoken against the war, and who, at a later period, brought
forward the declaration of war as one of many reasons for sending the
Girondists to the scaffold, now spurned a peace whieh would have compelled him to spare Louis. "Tyrants," said Danton,
"are only vulnerable in the head; with the tyrants of Europe we can only
treat by battles—I vote for the death of the tyrant." So the chief journal
of the Jacobins had said on the 12th; "Let the war begin in the Spring,
there is nothing between the fall of France and
liberty on the one side, and the annihilation of Austria and all the
Bourbons on the other." On the motion of Danton, the Spanish despatch was
shelved, and the result of the division deelared.
Of the 721 members present 361—a majority of one—had voted for
the death of Louis. 26 had joined in this vote, but had demanded a discussion
on the question whether the execution of the sentence ought not for political
reasons to be deferred; 13 had made the postponement a condition of the verdict of death; and 321 voted for imprisoment or some other
punishment.1 The Jacobins had every reason to be satisfied with the result; for it
was now evident that the
1 According to tlie list revised on
the 18th,
294
TRIAL
OR LOUIS XVI.
[Boor V.
Assembly was ruled by fear of their threats. They all the more
imperiously demanded that the last obstacle—the proposed
postponement—should be immediately removed. Tal-lien with shameless affectation
called on them not to prolong Louis' death-agony; and
Robespierre—who little thought that the same man, from similar motives of
humanity, would one day advocate his destruction—supported him. They contested the question during the whole of the 18th; until the President,
late at night, adjourned the sitting without any
decision having been arrived at. The boldest members of the Mountain were
inclined to prolong the sitting and to seize the reins of government at once.
On this occasion their supporters among the people forced their way into the Assembly itself, and a confused and noisy discussion was
carried on until midnight in the half-lighted hall. Santerre, however, assured them that their victim would not escape them on the
morrow, and they separated—after a short and more private
consultation of the chiefs—with the understanding that they were to meet again
in full force, at an early hour on the 19th. It then became evident that the
majority had not hesitated on the previous clay from a newly awakened
independence, but only from a last remnant of shame. The
result of the division, which was not ended till after midnight, Was, that
380 voted against and 310 for the postponement; and the matter was
irrevocably decided.
Let us now take one more glance at the Temple and its occupant. Louis had for many weeks entertained no doubt as to the issue of
the trial, and was prepared for the worst. The first intelligence of the
sentence was brought to him by one of his advocates, the venerable Malesherbes,
who wept bitterly. The King embraced him quite composedly with the
words, "Death has no terrors for me—I build my hopes on the mercy of
Heaven." He remained in this frame of mind throughout the intervening
days, without either sorrow or anger, and almost cheerful; as far as he himself
was concerned, he had left far behind him all earthly hopes
Ch. iv.]
LAST
HOURS OR LOUIS XVI.
295
and wishes. "I do not fear death," he said to his Chamberlain, Clery, "but I shudder when I think of the Queen and my,
unhappy chddren." He overcame even these feelings; and felt a deep
compassion for the nation which had delivered him into the hands of his
tormentors; "I see," he said "a long series of horrors, and an eternal feud, in which France wdl lacerate herself." And
thus he passed throccgh the last and bitterest agony—the parting with his
family—whom he left behind him defenceless and friendless in the hands of
barbarians. After one outbreak of long accumulated grief for the space of
two hours, after one never-ending embrace amid tears and sobs—"now,"
he said, "that too is past!—why must we love and be loved in the midst of
such sorrows—let us now think only of the one thing needful—our eternal
salvation." After peaceful sleep he awoke on
the morning of the 21st with a feeling of physical
weakness, and could scarcely resist the cold of the morning: but he quickly
nerved himself by the remembrance of God's eternal justice, and unmoved by the
brutal insults of his jaders, and with a last look at
the windows of his loved ones, he mounted the carriage which was to bear him to
the scaffold.
He was the only human being in Paris whose soul was at peace on that
dreadful day. The less hardened adherents of the Revolution
writhed under the weight of conscience— the Gironde saw its own fall
approaching—aud the Jacobins gnashed their teeth at the loneliness in which
they were left to celebrate their triumph. All the shops in Paris were closed
during the clay—the silence of dull consternation rested on
the city—and in the evening, the theatres, which were opened by command, were
thinly attended. "The 100-mcn," said a Jacobin journal, "were melancholy on that day, and this contributed not a little to
the gloomy aspect of the city." "We
have burned our ships behind us," cried Marat.
This was the most concise expression of the real state of affairs. The foundation stone of the Republic was on
this
296
TRIAL
OF LOUIS XVI.
[Book V.
day laid by murderous hands in blood, and every part of the growing
structure was cemented with blood and murder. The victors of the 19th had now
no alternative in France but their own death, or the annihilation of all their
opponents. They were not discontented with their position, because they looked upon the overthrow of all existing institutions as their own proper mission, and the great object of the
Revolution. They did not see that although wars may be carried on, yet States
cannot be founded, by such means. But in reality, though
their crime rendered the restoration of the throne infinitely
more difficult for the moment, it also destroyed the future of the Republic. A
great and civilized nation cannot in the long run endure to feed on a crime and to be ruled by murder.
Ch. V.]
297
CHAPTER V.
BEGINNING OF THE WAR BETWEEN ENGLAND AND FRANCE."
French
design of incorporating Belgium
which England regards as a casus belli.—France vainly endeavours to intimidate England.—
New plans against Holland.
— Proceedings
in Belgium. — England
remains firm.—The
french ministry pauses.—The
question decided by the victory of the jacobins in TnE kino's
trial.—Dissolution
of the ministry.—Dumouriez
attempts a fresh negotiation.—France declares war against the maritime powers.—Pache chosen mavor of paeis.—Democratic reorganisation of the army.—Declaration
of war against spain.
The victory of the Jacobins on the 17th of January, not only settled the
question of Louis's execution, but that of the war between France and the
Maritime Powers. Not that the King of England felt any great zeal to make a
crusade as the blood-avenger of Louis in favour of the inviolability of
all thrones; such sentiments were at that time only found in one crowned head,
which in practical matters showed little capacity—the King of Prussia. But
England.had material interests of the highest
importance which were greatly endangered by the
greediness of the Jacobins, and the defeat of the moderate party of the
Convention became, therefore, the signal for a general war.
Since the beginning of December, the French government had contracted
their far-reaching schemes within definite limits. They were
compelled to give up the hope of revolutionizing the German Empire and
establishing a Republic in the British Islands; but they
were all the more determined in the resolve to subject the countries which had
hitherto been occupied in the name of freedom, to the
rule
298 BEGINNINGOFTHEWARBETWEENENGLAND&FRANCE.[Bk.V.
of France. This object was more especially pursued in Belgium by Danton
and three other Deputies, who were sent as Commissioners of the Convention to that country on the 30th of November. They were directed to
enquire into the condition of the Provinces, and to consider Dumouriez's complaints against Pache and the Committee formed to purchase
supplies for the army. Their reports revealed the
abuses existing in the administration of the army, the most crying of which
were removed by the Convention.1 Other
evils Dumouriez himself, after the pause in the hostilities,
attacked and remedied with undiminished vigour; e.g. he
succeeded in cashing his assignats
at the bank of Amsterdam at a very fair exchange,2 and
in raising 60 millions by several loans from the Belgian clergy; and was thus
enabled for the time to secure supplies for his army without oppressing the
population. But his political relations with the Commissioners of the Convention, and consequently the position of Belgium
itself, grew worse and worse. Danton indeed endeavoured to maintain as much as
possible his confidential intimacy with the General, and promised him a speedy
deliverance from Pache's troublesome
interference, and a gradual improvement in the state of
Paris. But as regarded Belgium, he remained inexorable in his determination to
plunder, revolutionize, and finally incorporate that country. There was once
for all no other course, he said;—the financial necessities of France were already too urgent, and the ambition of
the Parisian Sansculottes
too much inflamed; whoever wished gradually to lead them back to better
order, ought to be particularly careful not to thwart them in this foreign
question. "We shall not inquire how much Belgian money he and his
colleagues put into their own pockets, since there is no proof of theft, and
yet no reason for believing in the disinterestedness of Danton; at all events
their proceedings in Belgium were of the most
hateful kind. They were well aware of the aversion of the Belgians to the pro-
1 Decree of Dec. 15th. — 2 Mcmoires,
III. 379.
Ch.
V.] PASSIVE RESISTANCE OF BELGIAN
CITIZENS.
299
ject of incorporation, and as the immediate employment of force
appeared to them hazardous in Dumouriez's present frame of mind, they
systematically set to work to bring about a state of
general confusion and dissolution. No authority was left intact, and every
effort was made to overthrow the lately elected
government, and to bring in tbe Sansculottes
of the purest water as the sole possessors of power. In a popular assembly at Liege, Danton bitterly complained that not a
single traitor had been put to death; his agents in Brussels stirred up the mob
against the Municipality; and every where union with
France was made the watch-word. It was certainly very
remarkable with what firmness the entire population resisted these schemes. It
was not the small Imperial party which came forward at this crisis; the
Noblesse and the Clergy were too much intimidated to express their feelings
openly; and even the peasants and the proletaries of the
towns—who in Belgium were good Catholics and under the influence of their
priests— kept aloof in fear and anger. It was the sentiments of the middle
class of citizens which were most openly and strongly expressed. Sturdy artisans, honest guildmasters, and patriotic merchants, who out of
hatred to Austria had joined the'Jacobin clubs in crowds, made themselves heard
at their rheetings. And when their opposition was stifled, they left the clubs
in a body, and thereby threatened the very existence of those instruments which had become so essential to the French.
The Commissioners had no other means of keeping up the appearance of
popularity, than filling the empty benches with the scum of the French
battalions—the most disorderly of the volunteers,—who in the
character of the sovereign Belgian People vied with one another in proposing the union of their cities with France. Such was the state"
of things when the Decree of the 15th of December was published, which invested
the Commissioners with all the attributes of omnipotent despotism. Dumouriez
gnashed his teeth in impotent fury, and determined to go to Paris
300
BEGINNING OF THE
WAR BETWEEN EN GLAND & FRANCE. [Bk.V.
himself, and get the measure annulled. He once more advised the Belgians to lend the strength of union to their resistance,
and—since the Decree spoke only of those countries
which had adopted no definite constitution—to eleet representatives to a
Belgian National Convention. By this means,
he said, they might unite the scattered forces of the towns and provinces, and
withdraw the country from the operation of the decree by the establishment of a
republican form of government. Even this course of jnoceeding would, have been
unavading, in opposition to the will of the Freneh
Government; but not even the attempt was made, because the majority of the
Belgians adhered to their ancient laws, aud rejected the
very notion of a Convention. In Brussels, indeed, a meeting of the Sections
took place for the purpose of carrying out
Dumouriez's suggestion; but no less than 17 out of the 21 elected were decided
partisans of the old constitution. The matter, therefore, was carried no
further in the other provinces, and the elected of Brussels were summarily imprisoned by the sansculottes,
or, as one of the leaders here called his company, the sanseliemises.
After that nothing more was said about a Belgian Convention. Nor could
Dumouriez produce any effect by his personal influence on the Rulers in Paris. It was idle to talk of resigning, for he was not in a
position to deal a decisive blow against Pache; and the representations made by
him to Cambon in a conversation respecting the Decree of the 13th of December,
only drew from the selfconceited and irritable Deputy a sharp rebuff. In
short the incorporation of Belgium Avas a
settled matter.
This determination most injuriously affected the good understanding hitherto kept up Avith
England. It may be said, generally speaking, of the 18th century, as of
the present day, that the one-sided aggrandizement of one Power Avas neArer a
matter of indifference to the other PoAvers
of Europe. Attempts of this nature occurred more frequently then than noAV,
because the standard of public morality Avas a few
de-
Cn.
V.]
THE
BALANCE OP POWER IN EUROPE.
301
grees lower than it has since become. Europe has passed through the
rude discipline of affliction in the school of the Revolution. Many of these
attempts succeeded, because many States had yet to
win their natural and proper position in tbe European system; but they all of
them met with great resistance and were accompanied by violent and widely extended political convulsions. If the first Partition of Poland was not
resisted by the Western Powers, it was only because the
times were not well adapted for giving a thorough and final check to the
encroachments of the Russians, and because the participation of the
German Powers in the act of spoliation was felt to be an advantage to all
parties. And on the other hand, at what a fearful
cost of blood did Frederick the Great obtain possession
of Silesia!—and with what decision did Europe hurl back the restless ambition
of Joseph II! Aud so, in. the present case, it was a matter of course that
England would interpose both by word and deed directly France prepared to
take possession of Belgium. The attempt to revolutionize London and Amsterdam,
by stirring up the popular masses in those cities, had induced Pitt to take
defensive measures, and the decree of the 15th roused England to
uphold the balance of power in Europe, even, if necessary, by an offensive war.
Every thing was here combined to produce an impression on the public
mind in England, that a flagrant international wrong had been committed. England had guaranteed the possession of Belgium to the Emperor in
1790—and the closing of the Scheldt to the Dutch, and its political position in
Holland to the House of Orange in 1788. Under an imperative sense of her own
interests, she had struggled for centuries to prevent the French
from gaining a footing in Antwerp and Ostend. Prudence, fidelity to treaties,
the retrospect of the past and the hopes of the future—all called loudly upon
her not to allow the balance of Europe to be disturbed, and least of all in Belgium. A French expedition to Brussels might be borne with,
and even the establish
302 BEGINNING
OF THE WARBETWEENENGLAND &FRANCE [Bk.V.
ment and farther developement of a Belgian Republic might be patiently
observed and watched; but a permanent occupation of Belgium by the French was
sufficient to rouse any English government to take up arms. Such an event
touched England in many respects more nearly than a Russian occupation of the Dannbian territories would affect Austria.
The French Ministers by no means deceived themselves as to the state of
things in Europe. Pitt, on his part, had stated to several of their envoys that
be was very desirous of peace; that he was willing to
dispense with all diplomatic formalities, and—in spite of the non-recognition
of the Republic—to treat with their Ambassador
Chauvelin, and even with their secret agents, directly they produced definite
powers of negotiation; but what he could not allow,
was an aggressive policy of conquest on the part of France, and a violation of
the rights of English allies.1 This
language produced a great impression in Paris; for
however bravely the Ministers had talked of overthrowing
the English despot the) saw all the evils of a war with England the more
clearly, the nearer theyT
approached it.2 There were even some who spoke and acted in favour of peace. Lebrun's
principal Chef de bureau, Maret, had endeavoured to come to an understanding with Pitt in personal interviews. Even the secret London
agents, Noel and Benoit, began to make their reports in a conciliating tone;3 and
de Maulde, the ambassador at the Hague, in consequence
of his leaning towards peace,4 was
unceremoniously recalled from his post. The intrigues
and despatches of Chauvelin, on the contrary, produced
the very ojjposite effect. This Marquis, who had once belonged to Talleyrand's
clique, had been sent to London
1 Lord Grenville in the House of correspondence,
91. — 2 Morris. — Lords, Feb. 1. 1793.
Brissot's report 3 Miles to Lebrun, 'Authentic
Carlo tbe
Convention, Jan. 12. Pitt's rcxpondence &c. — 4 Vid. bis
report words to Maret in Miles's Authentic in
the Pub/iciste, 2.
Yentose VIII.
Cu.
V.] CHAUVELIN'S ATTEMPT TO FRIGHTEN
PITT.
303
in February to bring about an alliance, and if possible a change of
Ministers. In his high and splendid post he indulged
his vanity and independent spirit to the utmost, and left the business of the embassy to the superior dexterity of Talleyrand. But
the 10th of August deprived him of this valuable assistant (who would probably
have been ready enough to accept the Republic, but was inexorably rejected by
it), and at the same time stripped his position of all its
official splendour; since England did not immediately recognize the Republic, nor, consequently, its ambassador. Chauvelin
however lost no time in recommending himself to the new powers at Paris. As
quondam aristocrat he took care to display a double amount
of coarse and arrogant patriotism, and determined, above all
things, to force Lord Gren-ville to acknowledge the Republic, and himself as
its representative. He still placed some hope on
the London democrats, was convinced
that Pitt would not dare to go to war, and continually exhorted the French
Ministry, to energy, as the surest means of extorting peace.
Such exhortations, as we may easily suppose, found a welcome hearing
from the French Ministers. Lebrun forbade all the
other agents from entering into any kind of negotiation
with Pitt; and informed the latter that communications from England were only
to be made through Chauvelin. All that Pitt had said about his desire for peace
was regarded in Paris as a proof of weakness and fear. The French rulers
resolved to act with tenfold energy, and by louder and more terrible threats to
frighten the English Minister away from all interference in continental
politics. With this view Chauvelin delivered a despatch to the Ministry iu London, on the 27th of December, in which he discussed all the
complaints made by England against France;—the decree of November 19th—the
opening of the Scheldt—aud the threatened invasion of Holland. He declared that
Holland was quite safe, but that the other two questions were irrevocably settled. He called on
England to lay aside her
304 BEGINNING OF THE WAR BETWEEN
ENGLAND & FRANCE. [Brc.V.
unworthy wavering, and to declare whether she chose to begin a war with
France on such insignificant grounds. To increase
the effect of this note, the Minister of the Marine issued a public circular,
on the 30th, to all the Jacobins of the maritime towns,
stating that King George wished for war, and that he should therefore effect a
landing in England, throw 50,000 caps of liberty on her shores, and raise the
English republic on the ruins of the throne. On the following
day the Convention decreed the appointment of a Committee for general
defence, with open reference to a war with England; "which," said the
member who brought up the report "we have no reason to fear, since our
fishing boats are ready to carry 100,000 men across the Channel, who will put
an end to the contest on the ruins of the Tower." It was in
connexion with this that Lebrun at this time drew \\p instructions for Genet, who was to go to North America as ambassador.
This envoy was directed to negotiate an alliance with a view of
punishing by exclusion those Powers which aimed at
commercial monopoly—especially, Lebrun weut on to say, as
France had a special interest in protecting herself from
England and Spain.
The state of things in Paris therefore was that the Ministers did not exactly wish for war with England, but
were determined to keep Belgium and the Scheldt, and therefore endeavoured, in
the first place, to intimidate England by a harsh demeanour. Unfortunately this
course of conduct was by no means well adapted to the actual state of things. Pitt was far from wishing for war, and still less to
undertake an expedition for the punishment of the regicides. On the contrary,
he was in many respects more peaceably inclined than even Lebrun supposed; but
his willingness to yield had its fixed limits, and his firm, austere
and logical mind was utterly inaccessible to intimidation. Chauvelin's threats,
which brought the possibility of war so close before his eyes, had no other
effect than to make him look about for means of increasing the warlike resources of his country, and to
Ch. V.] PITT'S STRENUOUS EFFORTS TO
PRESERVE PEACE.
305
inquire of Spain, in the first place, whether she would make common
cause with England in the coming war. In Madrid the liberal Aranda had been succeeded in the conduct of public affairs, on the 15th of
November, by the ex-lifeguards-man Godoi, now Duke of Alcudia, the favourite of
the Queen. The latter, partly from fear of the French arms, and partly from a
desire of interceding for the deliverance of Louis the XVI., had
offered neutrality to the French government on the 15th of December, and
therefore declined the proposal of an armed alliance with England.
What tended in a still greater degree than this failure to increase the
inclination for peace in England, was the simultaneous communication of the Austrian ambassador in London, from
which Pitt received the first official intelligence of/the plans for the
Partition of Poland and the Bavarian Exchange. Both these schemes appeared to
him prejudicial to the stability of Europe, and the interests of England;
but he considered the Partition of Poland as by far the worst and most
pernicious of the two. Now it was evident that England coidd offer no effectual
resistance to this measure, if she herself had a great war upon her
hands; and she therefore hastened to take the most energetic steps in every
direction towards the maintenance of the peace of Europe. Pitt held out to
Austria the prospect of English assistance in the matter of the Bavarian Exchange, if that country woidd consent to make terms with France under
his mediation. He declared in Berlin and St. Petersburg that a
counter-revolution in France was not to be thought of; and that, in his
opinion, all ground of war would be removed, if France
gave up her conquests, and respected the rights of other States.1 He
made no mention of the French Constitution, nor even of Louis's
personal fate; he demanded nothino- but the observance of the principle which
the Con-
1 Grenville to Lord Whitworth in St.
Petersburg. Goltz to the Prussian Ministry, Jan. 2L
306
BEGINNING OF THE WAR BETWEEN ENGLAND &FRANCE. [Bk.V.
stitiient Assembly had so solemnly proclaimed, that France did not aim
at concpiest. Only one thing was wanting, to which the wishes of the French
would naturally be directed —a formal recognition of the Republic by the
Powers. Pitt had oidy too much reason not to lay anyT
stress upon this in Vienna and St. Petersburg for the present; but this recognition was virtually comprehended in the proposed conclusion of peace; and with regard to England herself, he took care to
let it be known, that, provided always France gave up her concpiests,
he was not averse even to this concession.1 The
answer which Lord Grenvdle returned, on the 31st of December, to the note of
the 27th, was in full accordance- with these views. He repeated that Chauvelin,
whom the new government of France had not accredited,
could only be regarded as a private person; but that- England gladly seized the opportunity of making known, even through him,
that she earnestly desired peace, and would never take up arms as long as
France abstained from violating
the security and independence of foreign States. The policy of England was
clearly and unecpiivocally comprised in these simple propositions.
But the French Ministers either continued to found their hopes on the
weakness of England, or overcame the dread they had hitherto
entertained of an English war; at all events they adhered to the course which
they had already adopted. It was in vain that de Maulde, who had just arrived in Paris, assured them, as the result of his communications with the Grand Pensionary Spiegel and
the English Ambassador, Lord Auckland, that peace with the Maritime Powers was
certain, if France did not incorporate Belgium, aud war just as certain if she
did. The French Cabinet resolved to increase the intensity of the crisis, and to go as near to a declaration of war as was possible
without an open attack.2 They
had again received favourable intelligence
1 Miles to Lelirun, Jan. 2 ; with
comments by H. Marsh, 377. — 2 From the Protocols of the Cabinet
Council.
Ch. V.]
CHAUVELIN'S
NOTES OF JAN. 7TH.
307
from other quarters. The democratic revolution had at last broken out
in Geneva, and that important town had already placed itself under the
protection of General Kellermann; Custine again began to
speak of the possibility of a truce with Prussia if full powers to treat were
entrusted to him; and in the Bay of Naples, Admiral Truguet had obtained, not
indeed the extradition of Acton, but at any rate the recognition of the
Republic and an unarmed neutrality. The self-confidence
of the Government was thereby raised afresh, and Chauvelin received
instructions no longer to remain upon the defensive, but to bring forward
charges against the English Government, on account of their violations of international law.
He obeyed these directions in two notes, bearing date the 7th of
January, in which he demanded the repeal of the Alien act, and the laws
respecting the French assignats and the export of arms and corn. He professed to see in these
enactments either a violation of the commercial
treaty of 1786, or a proof of undisguised hostility. These examples, however,
were not well chosen; since the provisions of 1786 respecting the strangers'
police, had been entirely lost sight of by the French even in the passport law of May 1792; and all the other laws had been caused by
the universally known propaganda of the Freneh agents in London. Lebrun may himself have felt this, and therefore have laid the
chief weight on a third note which he drew up in Paris on the same day. After he had once more pointed out the unfounded nature
of England's apprehensions, repudiated all desire of conquest,
and promised to limit the occupation of Belgium to the period "whieh the
Belgians needed for the establishment of their freedom,"
he concluded with an open declaration, that if England notwithstanding
continued to arm, France would be compelled with regret, but without fear, to
prepare for war.
The French rulers therefore expressly adhered to the acquisition of Belgium; for the foregoing phrase about the
u 2
308 BEGINNING
OF THE WAR BETWEEN ENGLAND & FRANCE. [Bk.V.
establishment of Belgian freedom had pretty nearly the same meaning as
the distinction made by the Emperor Nicholas, in 1854, between the conquest and the custody of Constantinople,
and really threatened England with war if she did not lay aside her arms. Such
being the prevailing-sentiment of the French Cabinet it was
soon induced by circumstances to proceed still further in
the same direction. On the very same day on which
Lebrun had signed the above mentioned repudiation of all aggressive tendencies,
the Cabinet received a memorial from several Dutch patriots, in which they
described the defenceless state of Zealand, and called for a rapid attack upon that island. After they had given further
particulars on the 8th, the Ministers remembered
that Dumouriez was still in the neighbourhood—he had retired into the country
to wait for a final answer to bis complaints — and invited him on the 9th to give his opinion on the plan. As he had himself four weeks
before sketched a similar expedition, he took up the idea with the most lively
zeal, was soon busily engaged in the details of its execution, and already saw
himself at the head of an independent Batavian Republic,
gloriously raised above all the annoyances of the last few months. The
Ministers, it is true, did not advance quite so quickly. They regarded war with
England as nearly certain, but wished to wait for the English answer before actually commencing hostdities; they therefore came to the resolution
to take all preliminary measures for the Dutch expedition, but to postpone the
execution of them.1
With these prospects in Holland before them the Ministry were less
inclined than ever to delay taking complete possession of Belgium. By the 8th the appointment and instructions of 30 Government Commissioners were signed, professedly for
the purpose of providing for the French
'
Protocols of the Ministry, Jan. 7th, 8th and 9th. Dumouriez indeed wrote to Miranda on the 10th as if "his" plan bad been
already sanctioned,
Ch. V.]
THE
ANSWER OP ENGLAND.
309
army according to the decree of December 15th, but with secret orders
to acknowledge no other authorities in Belgium than
the Municipalities, to assume the control over them, to bring the assignats
into circulation, and by every means to prepare the way for a formal
union with France.
We see that the courage necessary to take the offensive had gradually
sprung up again, and had now attained its full height. But
that it had not yet struck very deep root in the Ministerial circles became
evident immediately afterwards, when the expected answer
arrived from London. The tenor of this reply was such as any one who was acquainted with England at that period might
have foreseen. A despatch from Chauvelin arrived on the 11th, to the effect
that his protest against the Alien Bill had not been accepted
at all. The next clay Maret received a confidential communication from London, in which the alternative of resigning the Belgian booty, or
fighting the Maritime Powers, was set before him with all possible clearness
and decision; and on the 18th, Lord Grenville declared that the English
preparations could not be suspended, but that, on
the contrary, England was determined to oppose
by arms every encroachment on the part of France.
At first there was an outburst of anger. On the 13th the Convention
issued orders to equip 30 ships of the line, and to build 25 new ones. With the
former it was intended that Colonel Laclos shoidd make an attack on British
India. On the 14th, the Ministry settled that the land forces were to be raised
to the number of 500,000 men. But in their secret hearts very anxious
considerations began to arise; it was easy enough in the rostra to
trample England in the dust, but those who had the actual execution of the work
soon felt the difficulties of the task; in short the Ministry began all at once
to beat a retreat on all points. As early as the 14th, express orders were sent to General Miranda to do all in his power to ensure the
neutrality of Holland. Three days later a further postponement of the
expedition
310
BEGINNINGOFTHEWARBETWEENENGLAND&FRANCE.[Bk.V.
against Zealand was ordered, and on the 16th the instructions of Genet were subjected to a modification, whieh substituted for the proposed offensive alliance with America, the offer of
free trade with the French colonies, if America would guarantee their
possession to the French Republic.1 Such
was the position of affairs in the middle of January; — the French government
was wavering, and ready to give up all further offensive operations, if they
were only permitted to retain Belgium and the Scheldt. They dreaded a contest
with their calm and powerful neighbour; but it cost them infinite pain to
resolve on observing the necessary conditions of peace. It would be difficult
to say which of the two would have been most distasteful to them at this
moment—the commencement of a war with England, or the giving up of
Belgium. Who knows how long they might have hesitated if they had been left to
themselves! But just at this moment a decision was forced upon them, not by
foreign Powers, not by the hostility of Kings, but by Parisian factions, and a new victory of the Revolution at home.
We have seen how, since the month of December, the Gironde renounced
their old policy of conquest, opposed the condemnation of Louis in the
interests of peace with Europe, and proposed the appeal to the People for the sake of the English alliance. Almost all their leaders —
Sables and Vergniaud, Valaze and Brissot—were agreed in this course, and
regarded Pache and Danton, and consequently all the measures taken against
Belgium, with the most violent indignation.
Had they retained the upper hand in the great struggle of the King's trial, and
once more seized the reins of government, there can be no doubt how the
irresolute waverings of the French Ministry would have ended. The freedom of
Belgium and peace with England woidd have been the leading
principles of their syTstem.2
1 Protocol of the Cabinet Council,
Jan. 14th, 16th, 18th. — 2 That Brissot brought up the report
of the Committee on the declaration of the war is
Ch. V.] ROBESPIERRE'S
HATRED TOWARDS ENGLAND. 311
But instead of this, their party was beaten, disorganized, and almost
outlawed. The Hotel de Ville, Pache, Danton and Robespierre, united and full of
courage, felt themselves masters of France. Some of these were the originators of the system of plunder pursued in Belgium, and they were all alike
convinced that either they themselves, or all the Princes of Europe, must be
drowned in the blood of Louis. When these men had attained to power by the
desertion of the Federes and the humdiation of the Convention, it was a
matter of course that they resolved to keep possession of Belgium, because she
was rich, because she had been con-cpiered by the arms of the Revolution, and
more especially because a king of England protested against her incorporation with France. In this chain of
events the sentence of death against Louis was the signal for a general war.
If we consider more closely the part taken in these transactions by the different fractions of the Mountain, and the motives by which they were impelled, we find that Robespierre was chiefly influenced by the feelings expressed by Marat in the
words, "We have broken down the bridges behind us!" He had so often
declared that the head of Lotus must fall, in defiance,
and to the destruction, of all tyrants, that he now calmly prepared to meet war
as the necessary consequence of preceding events. Though no friend of that
aggressive policy which delights in the mere din of war, he was the more easily
reconcded to the extension of the field of operations,
because England was the new enemy. For of all the nations of the earth, the
English were the objects of his greatest aversion; partly, perhaps, because
they were regarded with favour by the Gironde, but
principally because
no
argument against what we have said. He himself declared shortly afterwards that
he had spoken against his own opinion, on behalf of the Committee. The
discussion on the appel cm penple leaves
no doubt of the correctness of this assurance. If the war
with Austria was the work of the Gironde, that with England
was exclusively the work of the Mountain.
312
BEGINNING OF THE W ARBETWEEN ENGLAND &FRAN CE. [Bk.V.
they were so self-dependent, and enjoyed so large a measure of personal freedom.
The others were impelled by the wants and desires already spoken of. They wanted the lands of the Belgian Church as a
security for the assignats— the Belgian taxes for the Treasury — and Belgian posts and offices
for meritorious Sansculottes.
They represented that it would be disgraceful to give up a single inch
of the battle-fields which were soaked with the blood of Frenchmen; and in some
quarters the cry was once more raised that France must claim the Rhine as her
natural boundary. No one had any regard for the rights of
others — especially if they were crowned heads — or for the preservation of the
European system, in which they saw nothing but a congeries of insanity and rottenness. Here and there, the last sparks gleamed of that
enthusiasm with which France, some three years
before, had entered on her mission of liberating the world. In short, feelings
of every kind were brought into play—honour and meanness, avarice and devotion,
fanaticism and love of pleasure. But unhappily for France, whde the better feelings still lived in the great mass of the people,
the lower impulses predominated in the hearts of their leaders. The few men of
higher morality7 who
belonged at that time to the Government, and were able to observe from a nearer
point the motives which influenced its important decisions, turned away in
disgust. Maret, a man of unblemished character, devoted
industry, and keen powers of observation, was able to relate very remarkable
things concerning the causes of the English war,
which came before him, as one on whom the labours of the Foreign Ministry
principally fell. "Great effects," he said, "arise from trifling
causes; France might have preserved peace with England without any sacrifice,
if the French government had not once for all desired war; and this desire
was roused by the fact, that a few dozen influential and conspicuous persons had speculated for a fall in the funds, and consequently
Ch. V.]
RETIREMENT
OF ROLAND.
313
would have been ruined by the continuance of peace. We therefore owe
all our misfortunes," says Maret in conclusion, "to the manoeuvres of
the Stock Exchange."1 There is no reason whatever to doubt this statement, to which we need
only add the remark, that stock-jobbing did not indeed produce the war, but was alas! one of the characteristics of the state of
affairs, from which the disorganization of Europe during the Revolution
proceeded.
We are justified in presuming that the French Cabinet itself
entertained no doubt of the consequences of the King's execution; yet it no
longer entered into express discussions on this point, because its own
stability was shaken and almost destroyed by the catastrophe
of Louis' death. Roland was the first to see the position of affairs in its
true light; he comprehended that his party had
staked their futurity and lost; and therefore resigned his office, to which no
power was any longer attached. Ever since the 11th of January, although he
still attended the sittings of the Cabinet, he had refused to put his signature to the minutes;2 and
now he retired into private life, saying, "The bad have gained the
victory." Few men had contributed more than he to the fall of Louis; and
yet even before Louis' days were ended, Roland looked upon the death of the
King as his own ruin. Another vacancy was near at hand at the opposite
extreme of the Ministry. As the proportions of the war extended, the more
deeply was the incapacity and want of principle of Pache felt, in spite of aU
his services to the triumphant party. The greatest zealots of the Hotel de Vdle
could no
1 Malmeshury's diary, Aug. 30. for
Pitt. — 2 Protocol of the Ca-
1797;
taken down at Lille from Ma- hinet
Council of the 21st: "The
ret's
own month. The Memoires
sur undersigned
hereby testify that though
la vie du Due de Bassano testify,
in ac- Roland refused to sign the Protocols,
cordance
with Maret's statements, to he was present at the meeting and
England's
readiness to make peace; took part in the divisions." Garat,
and
certainly the Napoleonist Minister Pache, Monge, Lebrun. is
not to he suspected of partiality
314
BEGINNING OF THE WARBET WEEN ENGLAND &FRANCE. [Bk.V.
longer publicly defend him after the Belgian Commissioners of the
Convention had established the enormous deficits in the Treasury,
consecpient upon his administration. His party guaranteed his personal
impunity, but it was evident to all that the hours of his Ministry were
numbered.
As Roland and Pache were by far the most prominent members of the
Council, their retirement virtually produced a
complete ministerial crisis. The usual consequences soon appeared in the
absence of unity, the one-sided action of individuals, and general feebleness
of purpose. It is only by this insecure position of the Cabinet that we can explain an unexpected episode, which occurred at the very
last moment before the final decision.
Dumouriez had been more powerfully and deeply shocked by the death of
Louis than Roland himself. He had always esteemed the King, had often defended him, and had almost unwillingly deserted him before the overthrow of
the throne. Having saved the Republic from the Prussians, he now saw in the
fall of the Monarch the victory of his own deadly enemies. Even during the last
days of Louis he had taken many steps to avert the final
catastrophe; but in this case, as in all others, he found himself completely
powerless. He was now half-mad with grief and rage, and probably for the first
time in his chequered life, he gazed into a gloomy future without a plan and without a wish. De Maulde found him in this state of mind and
exhorted him not to despair of his eountry. "The rascals," he said,
"may triumph for the moment, but the State remains, and calls on us all
the more urgently to work for its deliverance." Dumouriez,
who was not the man to sigh away life in brooding list-uessness, once more took
courage, and derived fresh energy from Benoit, who had just returned from
London. The latter informed him that Pitt still regarded the preservation of
peace as possible, if a more prudent negotiator were sent
in the place of the restless and tactless Chauvelin, and that no one appeared
to the English Minister better suited for the
Ch. V.]
DUMOURIEZ WISHES TO NEGOTIATE WITH ENGLAND. 315
post than the conqueror of Belgium himself. In
bis present mood Dumouriez was greatly excited by this communication. He
thought of nothing but the overthrow of the Jacobins, and almost detested his
once darling scheme against Holland, because it now formed a part
of the political system of the Jacobins. In spite of all that had passed,
he determined to do his utmost for the
maintenance of peace, and he hastened to the Cabinet to extort from them his
appointment to the Embassy in London.
The Ministers must have regarded him with no small astonishment, remembering that no longer ago than the 9th the same man
had depicted with equal animation tbe taking of Flushing and Amsterdam. lie met
with an unceremonious repulse from Pache, Monge and Claviere ; but when left
alone with Lebrun he soon discovered that the latter was becoming more and
more uneasy in the sultry atmosphere of European politics, and finally extorted
from him permission to make a last attempt. First of all, the recall of
Chauvelin was signed on the 23d; then de Maidde was ordered to the
Hague, and Maret to London, in order to give preliminary notice of Dumouriez's
diplomatic mission. Dumouriez wished to wait for the answer in Antwerp, equally
prepared for a journey to England, or a war against Holland. On the 25th he attended a meeting of the Cabinet,—at which they took into
consideration the forces at their disposal in case of a naval war—and was
highly gratified by the result, which was very favourable to his wishes. In
striking contrast with the bombast of the speeches in the Convention, a
protocol was drawn up in the retirement of the Conned Chamber, at the close of
the deliberation, to the effect: that the Mediterranean fleet was reported to
have suffered greatly from storms— that the preparations in Brest woidd not be completed at the prescribed time, and that there was
great want of money and provisions; that it was therefore advisable to
concentrate all their force on the war by land, and, in case of a naval war, to
limit their operations to*the defence of the French
316
BEGINNING OF THE WAR BETWEEN ENGLAND & FRANCE. [Bk.V.
colonies. The facts on which these resolutions were based induced the
other Ministers at any rate not very vigorously to oppose the negotiation
proposed by Dumouriez.
But no one felt any genuine zeal in the cause. Maret, who ought to have
started on the 24th, did not leave Paris till the 26th. Even then he was
without definite instructions—which Lebrun promised to send
after him—and on his arrival in London he found the complication of
affairs greatly increased. After the note of the 7th, Pitt had regarded the war as unavoidable, and was confirmed in this opinion, when,
on the 17th, Chauvelin with categorical threats demanded his own immediate and
public recognition.
Pitt looked on this step as proceeding solely from the wish to obtain a
somewhat plausible pretext for the proposed breach, and he said to the
Lord Chancellor Loughborough, on the 20th: "If the
French wish for war, let them begin it, we have
money enough, more serviceable vessels than they, and the feeling of the
country is more in our favour than ever." Then came the
bloody event of Jan. the 21st The effect produced by it in England was as great
and general as that of the September massacres; so
that Pitt had no hesitation in ridding himself of the dangerous presence of Chauvelin, on the 24th, by sending him his passports. The public mind was filled with so much disgust and abhorrence,
that the war against the regicides became henceforward highly popidar in England. Pitt nevertheless paused in his course on
the arrival of Maret, and in the very first interview with him declared his
willingness to treat. News arrived from the Hague of de Maulde's analogous
communications. Lord Auckland had sent off three couriers in succession, and agreed with de Maulde
in opening the conference with Dumouriez without further
delay at Moerdyk. King George too, notwithstanding the hatred which he entertained against the Jacobins, was inclined by his sense of religious duty to leave nothing untried to preserve peace. In short
de Maulde, on the 3rd of February, flew to Du-
Ch.V.]
THE CONVENTION PROCLAIMS WAR WITH ENGLAND. 317
mouriez at the French head-quarters, with joy and triumph in his heart. Dumouriez received him with tears in his eyes. "The
future," he said, "will appreciate the miracle you have performed;
the present rejects it—I have received orders to commence the war!"
This decision had been arrived at in Paris immediately after Dumouriez's departure. It was not without good reason that Lebrun had faded to furnish Maret with instructions; every discussion broke down at the same point—the certainty that
England would resist the incorporation of Belgium, and that the victorious party in Paris would just as certainly refuse to forego that measure.
Yet even the latter would probably have waited to see the result of Dumouriez's
embassy, if Pitt had not thought fit to dismiss
Chauvelin. The Ministers considered this step as a formal declaration that England considered herself already in a state of war;
and the Jacobins could never forgive the insrdt of daring to blame their most
glorious deed—the execution of the King—by breaking off
diplomatic relations with them. When Chauvelin arrived
in Paris, his personal report by no means tended to allay their indignation.
The Council of Ministers immediately called together the diplomatic Committee of the Convention, and an overpowering majority had no other
idea than that the war was already present; so that it seemed to
them almost a point of honour to get the start of the enemy in the formal
declaration of it. A report embodying these views was sent to the Convention,
and before their decision—the nature of which no one doubted—was made known, orders to commence hostdities were despatched in every direction.
Monge sent off bis instructions for the naval war to all the seaports; and on
the 31st Dumouriez received orders to open, the attack on Holland with all possible speed. He was directed first to take Venlo and
Maestricht, and then to penetrate into the interior as quickly as jDOSsible,
that he might seize the marine stores in Amsterdam,
the Helder, and the other ports, before they were de
318
BBGINNINGOFTHEWARBETWEENENGLAND&FEANCE.[Bk.V.
stroyed or damaged. In accordance with the report brought up by Brissot
on the 1st of February, the Convention proclaimed war against England and
Holland. No opposition was made; no one showed either apprehension or enthusiasm; the decree was passed like any local bill, almost
without discussion. Was the Convention so confident of victory? or were they
impelled forward by fear of still greater evils? Did they act under the
influence of irritated national honour? or did they vote a general
war, which was to last for- twenty years, in utter indifference to its effects
on the public weal? All these feelings no doubt cooperated, but in the main
they advanced with eyes blindfolded, because they could no longer stop where they were.
The position of affairs in the interior was very remarkable—a kind of middle state between the old and new regime—in which no positive system was laid down—no party predominant—and no
authority in full or healthy activity. The rule which
the Gironde and the Centre established, after the events of September, had been
overthrown by the victory of the Jacobins; and yTet,
notwithstanding the coufusion which prevailed in the ranks of their enemies,
the Jacobins were not in a position to take a decided lead, or to form a
purely democratic government. They were impeded, as far as we can see, by two
obstacles. In the first place, the victors of the 21st, though firmly united in
their opposition to Louis and the Gironde, were entirely at variance with one another in their views of the future. Hebert and Chau-mette
regarded no one with greater veneration than Pache; while Danton looked on him
with aversion as having demoralized the army, and
Robespierre—though he heartily approved of Pache's proceedings against the Generals—found the power of the Hotel de Ville
somewhat inconvenient to himself. There were, moreover, other decided democrats
in the Convention, who in spite of the similarity of their views, regarded the
Hotel de Ville and its leaders with a certain jealousy. In short
the j>arty, as a whole, did not even make
Ch. V.]
DISCORD
IN THE MOUNTAIN.
319
the attempt to take direct possession of the government; thongh we may
perhaps regard two acts of the Convention, which took place at this time, as a
preparation for doing so. These were, first, the new election of a Police Committee, for the holding of which the Left availed themselves of
a thin house on the 22nd, that they might fill this supreme
police tribnnal with their own adherents; and 2ndly, a declaration that
Deputies should not for the future be ineligible for offices of State—since, as
a Girondist remarked, the retirement of Eoland had removed all danger that the
Right should exercise any influence in the appointment of Ministers. The effect
of these silently operating differences in the heart of the Monntain itself,
was seconded by the attitude of the Centre, which by its very
subserviency prevented the Parisian party from dealing
the final blow. If the Convention had acquitted Louis, or the Ministry had
conceded the evacuation of Belgium to the Maritime Powers, the Hotel de Ville
and the Jacobins would have made a new revolution,
and ajmointed new rulers. As it was, they had no kind of pretext for doing so;
and the Communistic Democracy saw itself, nolens
volens compelled to defer the final coup
d'etat to the next resistance. A considerable time
might elapse before this would be offered, since the Centre, under Barere's
guidance, was resolved to consent as heretofore
to every measure, in order to maintain their partizans in the possession of
power,- and to swim on the top of the revolutionary stream,
no matter in what direction it might bear them.
The most urgent care was for the present to concentrate the military
forces for the widely extended war. It was already resolved to send
Commissioners of the Convention into the Provinces to take all necessary measures for the public safety. This was at the same time a
new step towards the more and more openly professed
object of centering all power in the hands of the Convention. The Committees were employed on laws for recruiting and organizing
320 BEGINNING
OF THE WAS BETWEEN ENGLAND & FRANCE. [Bk.V.
the army, and the reconstruction of the War Ministry; but no final
resolution could be come to as long as the all-important
persona] question remained undecided. The demo-**
crats violently opposed the resignation of Pache, while the Centre exposed with
increasing energy the utter worthless-ness of his administration. No one could
imagine how a further cooperation between him and Dumouriez could any longer
exist; and Dumouriez again seemed indispensable for the
conduct of the war with Holland. An attempt which the Abbot Sieyes made to
render the administration of Belgium independent of Pache, and to entrust it to
a Commission with Dumouriez at its head, might perhaps have solved the difficulty, and reconciled even Dumouriez himself to the incorporation of Belgium. But this expedient was opposed
both by the Right and Left. For once Salles and Robespierre were agreed; the
Gironde and the Mountain joined in warning the Assembly
against the ambition of the General, and Sieyes' motion was rejected by a
considerable majority.
There was now no longer any choice. The complaints against Pache
continued to accumidate; the Belgian Commissioners openly declared from the
rostra of the Convention, that 150 millions of
expenditure were still unaccounted for: and while the Diplomatic Committee was
already discussing a proclamation of war against Spain, the Military Committee
received intelligence, that after three months of warlike preparations, the Pyrenean fortresses were
still without works, the troops without arms, and the batteries without ammunition. The condition of the other armies was not much better; the number
of men had decreased in the last few weeks, through the desertion of the Volunteers alone, by 60,000 men. The democrats were compelled to
beat a retreat, and the Centre consented to build golden bridges for them. In
the first place, the question of the deficit in the military chest was hushed
up; "These accounts of the War Ministry," said Barere,
"cannot be unravelled, and we must therefore pass
Ch. V.]
DISMISSAL
OF PACHE.
321
a sponge over them." In the next place the Mayor of Paris,
Chambon, resigned his office, and thus enabled the democrats
to bestow on their favourite a position just as lucrative,
and almost more important than that of Minister. It was not until the 2nd of
February that the Convention decreed the dismissal of Pache, and appointed (by
the united votes of the Centre and the Left1) Dumouriez's friend General Beurnonvdle, Minister at War.
In spite of all this gilding of the bitter pill, the Convention received a grumbling vote of want of confidence from the Federes,
who sent up a martial deputation to demand a testimony of respect for the esteemed citizen Pache. The Convention appeased them by
quashing, two days afterwards, at their request, the proceedings against the
September murderers, and allowing them, in the same week, to suppress a
theatrical representation, at which they took offence,2 by
murdering the bill-stickers and maltreating the audience.
The democrats had moreover, in the main, every reason to be contented.
For the Centre, encouraged by the personal changes in the Ministry, no
longer threw any difficulty in
the way of reconstructing the army in exact accordance
with the wishes of the Parisian party. We shall enumerate the different
measures as briefly as possible, because they clearly shew their own
character. They began, on the 2nd, to lay the necessary
foundation of every armament by issuing assignats
to the value of 800 millions. They then gave orders to raise 300,000
recruits, thus doubling the existing forces.3
Every Commune was to allow three days for volunteers to offer themselves, and
then to complete its con-
1 The Gironde voted for Du-chatelet.
— 2 La chaste Susanne. — 3 Besides the Army of the Pyrenees,
which was now being raised, there were at this time no less than eight armies
in the field (—of the Coast, of the North, of Belgium, of the
ii.
Ardennes,
of the Moselle, the Rhine, the Alps and the Var), amounting altogether to scarcely 150,000 men. The garrisons in France, the
Gensd'armes and the Invalides made up 50,000.
Poisson, II. 138.
X
322 BEGINNING OF THE WAR BETWEEN ENGLAND & FRANCE. [Bit. V.
tingent by election. For this purpose all National Guards from the age
of 18 to 40 were to hold themselves in requisition
until the required number was completed. France thus received from the hands of
the Republic the first law of compulsory service. The
compensation for this new loss of freedom consisted in an increase of military
licence. Up to this time, the volunteers enrolled since the month of September had served in separate battalions by the side of the troops of the line. They had mostly distinguished themselves by uproarious
patriotism and utter want of order; had elected their own officers, and
generally agreed ill enough with the regulars. On the motion of Dubois-Crance,
it was now resolved that the troops of the fine shoidd be amalgamated with the National Volunteers in
mixed semi-brigades, in which two-thirds of the officers—up to the rank of
hri-gadier—were to be appointed by election, and the other third according to
seniority, not in rank but in length of service.1 The
mover of this proposition explained the purpose
of this arrangement as foUows: "The object is to mingle the two kinds of
troops, not by changing the volunteers into regulars, but the regulars into
volunteers; you must not fear by this change to disorganize the army,
for its present condition is disorganization; you are,
we know, all ready to grant the soldiers the higher pay of the volunteers, but
they also desire their privfieges, and only throng to the national battalions for the sake of freedom. You are lost,"
he concluded with admirable naivete, "if you do not make all your soldiers
volunteers, and yet at the same time proclaim the compulsory service of all citizens." When Isnard depicted the dangerous
effects of the elective system on subordination and
discipline, he was put down by the remark, that the Aristocrats of all ages had
talked about discipline; and St.
1 So that when the post of major
self. St. Cyr reports how, in accord-had to he filled up, a non-commis- ance
with this rule, a useless old sioned officer took
precedence of a private became in a few weeks a captain who was younger than
him- staff-officer.
Ch. V.]
LICENTIOUSNESS OF FRENCH TROOPS IN BELGIUM. 323
Just explained to them—and justly from his
point of view— that this measure alone could preserve them from mditary
tyranny. The only point which the Right could carry was, that the amalgamation
should not take place untd the end of the approaching campaign. Even the
Hebertists thought it too hazardous to break up all the existing
divisions of the army on the very eve of a great contest.
By these decrees the destruction of the military system aimed at by
Pache was legally effected. The Repuhlic prepared
to infuse democratic opinions into half a mdhon armed men, and thereby to give
the deathstroke to the ancient social system of France, and the independence of
Europe. The volunteers of the Belgian army understood the meaning of the new
law as well as the new recruits;1 and
both began to act in their quarters as if they were in an
enemy's country. They robbed, peasants of their horses, demanded luxurious
maintenance, filled the camp with crowds of loose women,2 and
laughed at the exhortations of their powerless officers. The rulers in the
Convention saw in these proceedings
only another bidwark of freedom against the military
aristocrats, and had so little doubt of the serviceable-ness of their soldiers,
that on the 14th of February they decreed the incorporation of the Principality
of Monaco, and the Bipontine District of Schaumburg—on
the ground that France must be extended on every side to her natural boundaries, the Rhine, the Pyrenees and the Alps. Three weeks later, in the
midst of the tumult of the impending civil war, commenced the long-prepared attack on Spain. The execution of Louis XVI. had excited a
storm of indignation, not only at Court, but far and wide throughout the land,
and had suddenly decided the Spanish Government to join
1 Goraas, Courier,
March 23, gives that the Convention
interfered by a details. Borgnet has a quantity of law, intended to
secure the means documentary evidence respecting the of transport — which these
women Belgian army. — 2 This had ar- claimed for
themselves — for the rived at such a pitch in the Spring, military service.
X2
324
BEGINNING OF THE WAR BETWEEN ENGLAND & FRANCE. [Bk.V.
the great European coalition. When, therefore, the French Ambassador,
with violent threats, demanded the ratification of the treaty of neutrality which had formerly been offered to him, he received his passports as an
answer. Hostdities by sea began at once, and on the 7th of March Barere induced the Convention to declare war against Spain, "in order to
overthrow the throne of the Bourbons, and to carry
liberty into the beautiful country South of the Pyrenees."
The real position of affairs was every day more and more sharply
defined. The dream of universal liberty had vanished. How far removed seemed
the time when the lower classes of the people had applauded
the abolition of privdeges, as the foundation of the legal equality of all
citizens! Having once entered on the path of violence, they could now be
satisfied with nothing less than the absolute rule of the proletaries over their social superiors. The
leaders of the Parisian mob, intoxicated by the blood of the King, forced the
French peasants into their service by the decrees of the aindess Convention,
that they might lay on the whole of Europe the yoke of their unruly desires. In
the face of this furious onset every other consideration
gave way for the moment; England and Germany found their whole power engaged in
the struggle, and in the East of Europe the Russian lust of concpiest had the
same free scope as that of France in the West. The death of Louis XVI., by rendering the breach between England and
France irremediable, delivered the Poles and the Turks a prey to the ambition
of the Empress Catharine.
BOOK YI.
SECOND PAETITION OF POLAND.
Ch. i.]
327
CHAPTER I. EARLY POLICY OF RUSSIA.
Military
and ecclesiastical constitution oe Russia
subsequently to the 16th
century.—Consequences
of the want of private property.— Character
of peter the great's reforms.—Abolition of the principle
of legitimacy in the succession to the crown.—Aggressive policy.—Old and] new Russians.—Catharine n.—Her plan of conquering poland
and turrey.—HeR objects, and
the relation of
austria and
prussia to them--attitude assumed
by leopold ii.
towards
russia.
During the years which intervened between the warlike exploits of Frederick II. and Napoleon, the Empress Catharine II. sat on
the throne of Russia. She ruled over this colossal empire for more than 30
years, extended all its frontiers, raised herself to a
dominant position in Europe, and maintained a sdent, nay a trembling
obedience at home. She, a woman, accomplished this, though born in a foreign
country and reared in a foreign religion, without possessing a shadow of legal title to the crown, and after having murdered her husband; she did it
too, under the very eyes of a son, who alone had any claim to rule. She
accomplished all this in a court which she herself fdled with shameless
immorality, in the midst of a people who regarded her with deep aversion,
by means of an army in which she neither inspired, nor placed, the slightest
confidence for a single hour. It could be no small talent which made itself a
sphere of action under such circumstances; but there was no other country in the world besides Russia, where even the greatest genius for
ruling could have accomplished such a task.
When we look for the starting points of modern civilization in the West, our attention is sure to rest upon the
328
EARLY
POLICY OF RUSSIA.
[Book VI.
great religious wars, the discovery of the New World, and the revival
of classical learning. In Russian history all these are represented by the rule
of the Mongols,—who in the 13th century subjected Moscow to their yoke —
and the liberation of the country from these barbarians
in the 16th century by the Grand Duke of the Kremlin. In these struggles the
polity of the old Grand Dukes perished; a polity which, though in many respects
sui generis, was
in the main simdar to the contemporaneous institutions of the West, and
afforded a prospect of similar progress. But all the germs of this nature were
trampled down by a century of Asiatic rule. Nothing remained but petty Lords,
who, in humble dependence on the Khans of the Golden
Horde, ruled over a population crushed by a double
weight. Ecclesiastical independence, strong corporations,
intellectual progress—all these life-springs of the West were here utterly
unknown.
When at last the Princes of Moscow worked their way to
independence out of the ruins of the Mongol Empire, a new era began, which had
nothing in common with the past. The new rule, even in the interior of the
land, was from the very first one of concpiest. A warlike prince who called his companions to horse, rode forth with them to subdue the
neighbouring districts, the lords of which he destroyed from the face of the
earth (unless they took service in his army), and distributed their lands among
his followers under the constant obligation of military service; a
government which regarded every accpiisition only as a means of further
concpiest, and ado wed no other impulse or thought to arise in the heart of its
people but that of war;—such is the picture of the Russian Empire in the time of the German Reformation—in the reign of Elizabeth
of England, and Henry of France! We find no trace of the Commonwealth of the
Greeks, with its exuberant life, or of the Roman State, based on inflexible
laws, or on the rich individuality of the Germans—not a trace, therefore, of the elements of which Western States have been composed.
The distribution of lands
Ch. I.] ASIATIC
CHARACTER OF THE RUSSIAN POLITY.
329
among the Bojards did not create an aristocracy, since every fief was only granted in usufruct, and at will, in the same way as
among the Osman Timarli. The principle was laid down, that all the property of
the subjects was held on condition of service to the Czar in his wars; and the
most important of his revenues were not the regular taxes, but
the extraordinary exactions. "They are pleased in Moscow," said the
English Ambassador, Fletcher, "when the Governors depart for their
provinces poor, and return to Court rich, because the Czar in that case takes
from them the larger half of their booty; and in
the same way, since all property really belongs to the Czar, he exercises the
right of preemption in every lucrative branch of trade,
and buys and sells at his own price." Since the subject in Russia
virtually possessed only so much right as pleased the
Czar, the administration of justice was only so far
impartial as the Czar required it to he so; otherwise every sentence was
publicly bought and sold. We see here a state of things in aU respects purely oriental—the old Persian administration—the
Turkish mditary system—and the Mahometan omnipotence of the Caliph.
This is not the only point in which the contrast between the
German-Italian nations and the Russians is apparent. The religion as well as
the civd policy of the latter points towards Asia. When we
consider the effect of Divine Worship on the public life of nations, we may
distinguisb two fundamental forms of religion in their history. According to the one, religion is simply the Law which God lays down for the world; and, consequently, the Church, as the organ of the Omnipotent
will, is the supreme ruling authority, furnished with visible
depositories of its power, and armed, like every other dominion, with the right
of judging and punishing. This is the prevailing view in the East, on which
both Islam and Judaism are entirely founded, and certain elements of which were
transferred from these religions into Mediaeval
Christianity. The other form sees in
330
EARLY
POLICY OF RUSSIA.
[Book VI.
religion the inward relation hetween creature and Creator, the deep
personal union hetween the spirit of man and its original Source, the influx of
Divine grace and salvation into the thirsting soids of created beings. The
main-spring of the former is the commandment, of the
latter the glad tidings—of the former, discipline, of the latter freedom—of the
former, the subjection, of the latter, the emancipation, of the individual. The
latter is the ground on which the Christianity of the Apostle Paid grew up; on which every reaction of a personal longing after
salvation takes its stand against the benumbing influence of ecclesiastical
forms. It is the only mode of thought in connexion with which Church life has,
at any period, prospered among the Germans; Russia,
on the contrary, has never known any other than the Oriental view of religion.
It is true that the Romish Church of the Middle Ages undertook not only
to give spiritual life to the individual, but, at the same time, to bring the
whole world into subjection.
It disciplined the masses of the people, exercised a surveillance
over the laws of the State, humbled Kings, and made war on infidels
with fire and sword, by land and water. But a complete carrying out of this
system was rendered impossible in our regions, both by the
character of their inhabitants and the force of circumstances. The Church was
not strong enough to take complete possession of the secular power; and on the
other hand, it was far too strong to allow the Monarchs to assume the position of Heads of the Church. And thus Church and State continued separate under different leaders, and space was found between the
two for the growth of independence in the mind of individuals. The union of
ecclesiastical and secular power in one hand could alone have rendered
despotism complete: but in the West, fortunately for freedom, Emperor and Pope
were at feud with one another; while in the East the union of the two powers
crushed every germ of original thought.
Russia derived its Christianity from Constantinople, where
Ch. I.]
ABSOLUTE
POWER OF THE CZAR.
331
for a long period a submissive clergy had done homage to the Emperor as
the apostolic and angelic Bishop of foreign affairs. The clergy had from the
beginning been dependent on the Grand Dukes; then came the Mongol storm;
and the military despotism which subsequently arose subjected the Church of the
country as completely as the State, and ruled over the minds of men as
absolutely as over their lands. "The Russians," said the Imperial
Ambassador, Herberstein, "worship St. Basil, St. Gregory and St.
Chrysostom,—allow no sermon to be preached in their churches, because it might
contain heresy, and believe and follow every thing which the Czar lays down as
the orthodox faith." We know that from that period there has been no
developement of Chrisian doctrine, no earnest care of souls, and no inward
sense of religion. Here, too, despotism had an innate suspicion against every
intellectual movement, and the Jesuit Possevin bitterly complained of the utter want of education: "The man who
wished to learn anything," said he, "would become an object of
suspicion, and not get off without punishment." Salvation depended on a
connexion with the external Church; and this Chinch
followed with blind devotion all the commands, not of a priest, but of a
soldier. The Patriarch indeed governed
the Church but the Czar rided it.
Where the Monarch unites in his own person all the prerogatives of
military chief and supreme pontiff over all his subjects, the very
idea of personal freedom is entirely excluded. Private property in the German
and Roman sense existed only in appearance. An Englishman of the 16th century
observed; "The poorest man in onr country says of his house, it belongs to God and me; but the noblest Russian
says, it belongs to God and the Czar." Nor was this by any means a mere
loyal phrase, but an accurate description of the real state of things.
"For though there is indeed," explains Fletcher,
"a legal distinction between fiefs and hereditary
estates—i. e.
between those lands which are granted by the Czar in usufruct, and
those which pass
332
EARLY
POLICY OP RUSSIA
[Book.
VI.
from father to son as hereditary property—yet these possessions too are subject to civd and military service, and like the former
were confiscated when that service was ill performed. In fact no hereditary
possessor could prosper without obtaining fiefs from the Czar on
condition of service; the dependence of all therefore was equally complete, and the Monarch was virtually the
sole possessor of land and people.
This absence of fixed property was found again, under very peculiar
circumstances, in a still lower grade—among the peasantry. Under the influence
of the Russian form of government, which suppressed every idea of individual
rights, the legal status of agriculture in Russia remained the same as Caesar had found existing
among the Germans nearly 2,000 years before. The individual had no abiding
property in the land, but the Commune distributed it
afresh among its members, at suitable intervals.1 But
we find in Russia something else, which was utterly unknown to the early
Germans—viz. that every Commune had a Lord, who
had the right to sell the Commune together with the land; and that at the head
of all these Lords was the Czar, the oidy real possessor of all the soil in the
Empire.
For the political life of Russia this system had the following results. In the lowest class of
the people, which was thinly scattered over immeasurable tracts of land, an
actually starving 'Proletariate could not easily arise. The Commune provided for the sons as they grew
up, as well as it could, either as small farmers, or in some
itinerant craft, or in the service of the lord and the Czar. The serfdom of the peasants was not indeed established by law until the reign
of the Czar Boris, and received its final completion
from Peter the Great; but virtually nothing had existed in the
land for many centuries but dependence and vassalage, which had taken so strong
a hold on the minds of the people, that a German traveller, in 1557, exclaimed
with astonish-
Haxthausen,
Studicn.
Ch. I.]
THE
CZAR AS PATRON OF THE POOR.
333
ment: "This people takes more delight in slavery than in
freedom." It was a common saying, that the Czar was less than God but more
than man; the bishops and popes taught that he was the interpreter of God, and
that he acted towards
his subjects with justice or cruelty, according as they had deserved well or
ill of the Almighty. It was however a traditional feature in this State, where
one great despot had risen above many smaU ones, that the Czar was considered as the protector of the poor against the
magnates. Even Iwau IV., the bloodiest tyrant perhaps of all ages, was lauded
as the father of the common people, and has been handed down as such in tale
and song, even to our own times. The title of Patron of the poor, was no less strong a pillar of the Czar's omnipotence, than that of Defender of the faith and of the Church.
The want of property iu the land had the same effect on the national
character of the Russians, as on that of the ancient Germans and the Asiatic Nomads. It discouraged any strong attachment on the part of the people
to their native soil, diffused a feeling of restlessness through the masses,
and thus afforded the government the most serviceable
weapons for its incessant wars of aggression and conquest.
From the Jong continuance of this system in Russia —nearly a thousand years—its
results have been more thoroughly developed in that country
than in any other part of the world. It has been observed, that even in the
present day, great hordes of people incessantly wander about in this
vast empire, that no provincial dialects exist in Russia, aud that the Russian
loves his country, indeed, but is utterly devoid of the feeling of home.1 It
is impossible to imagine a better material for warlike operations; and the Muscovites had no sooner shaken off the Tartar yoke than they
became a burden and a terror to all their neighbours. "The Czar," a
prince of Wallachia once exclaimed, "sleeps in his chamher,
Haxthausen.
334
EARLY
POLICY OF RUSSIA.
[Book VI.
and yet continually increases his empire." Even when they were at
peace for a short time with the Western States, the Russian vassals were at any
rate in the field against the Tartars, and the Cossacks took possession of the boundless regions of Siberia. A peace to them
was but a truce, and every acquisition only a stepping-stone to further
plunder.
These external relations agreed only too well with the law and religion
which prevailed in the Russian Empire. Where Church and
State are one, the State becomes the armed organ of conversion; and conversely,
every war of the State is at the same time an affair of the established Church,
and the national faith. The rest of the world is therefore the abode of
infidelity and heathenism, and the orthodox Czar and
holy Russia are performing a religions duty, when they turn the edge of the
sword against the heathen. It was by the diffusion of such ideas that Mahomet
roused the Arabians to the conquest of the world, and the Papacy summoned the Western nations to the Crusades. Such a power can never
maintain a sincere peace, because it does not acknowledge in its neighbour—who
is in its eyes the enemy of God—any capacity for the possesion of rights. It
may indeed for a few dccennia
content itself with stealthy and watchful
preparations for war; but a real disarmament would be an abnegation of the very
principles of its existence, and a forerunner of its own dissolution, as has
beeu seen in the Saracen wars of the Middle Ages, both on the Christian and the Mahometan side.
But we may ask, how could respect for the rights of foreign nations
arise iu the minds of a people, in whose own land the notion of right was
dependent on the will of the Czar? As, on the one hand, every concpiering
people draws down the weight of despotism upon itself, so, on the other, every
despotic ruler is necessarily driven to foreign conquest. And thus throughout
the 16th century the vassals and hereditary landowners of Russia were almost
incessantly in the saddle,
Ch. I.]
CHANGES
INTRODUCED BY PETER I.
335
to exalt the name of their Czar in Europe. Then came the disastrous
times when the dynasty of Iwan was dying out— the fall of Boris—the contests of
the false Dimitri, and the united attack of the
Poles and Swedes. In the midst of these distresses Michael Romanoff mounted the
throne and with great difficulty re-established the weakened Empire. No sooner,
however, had it secured itself from destruction, than Russia began a new series
of wars of conquest, and the Czar Alexei already
acknowledged that in the impending contests with the West, his empire would
feel the necessity of introducing European modes of warfare. Not long afterwards, Peter the Great, inspired with these hereditary principles, began his mighty career. It is
impossible to estimate his energy and sagacity too highly, but we are perhaps
inclined to overrate the political importance of the innovations which he
carried into effect.
Not long before the accession of Peter, a traveller, who had made a long sojourn in Russia, writes; "This country
differs in every respect from the rest of the world, and the Russians are
entirely Asiatic, and not in the least European, in their mode of life. Their
dress, their festivals, their domestic habits,
their polity, and their entire manner of living, partake more of the coarse
luxury of Asia than of European civilisation." The external peculiarities
here spoken of, Peter I., with restlegs energy, endeavoured to remove. He
employed all the resources of his arbitrary power and
unbending will to introduce the social refinement, and the manufacturing
industry, of Western Europe into Russia. He succeeded in this up to a certain
point; he did not metamorphose the great body of the people, but he made the commencement of a town population, and placed a society formed on the
French model at its head. He did not effect much in this way for the general
progress of the nation, but he caused a schism in it which most powerfully
influenced the course of Russian policy for more than a century.
If we take a general view of his political reforms, in the
336
EARLY
POLICY OP RUSSIA.
[Book VI.
proper sense of the words, we shall immediately see that he never
sought to undermine the fundamental principles of the Constitution, but ou the
contrary, amid all the changes which he made, was careful to uphold and
strengthen them. His work may he characterised by saying that he still
further exalted the Asiatic power of the imperial crown, by regulating and disciplining its resources in the European manner. An army
formed on European principles took the place of the tumultuary levy of the
vassals; a change by which the former importauce of the
Bojards was destroyed, and the crown was enabled, without any risk1 to
proclaim the vassals as full owners of their fiefs. The
civil government and the administration of justice were put into thorough
order; the number of imperial officials was
increased, and the control over them rendered more
constant and complete. .It was of no avail for political freedom that the towns
chose their own magistrates, siuce even in them the Czar had the right of
carrying out his will iu every particular. The constitution of the village Communes remained untouched, as well as the
uncertain mode of cultivating the lands referred to above. The sole change was
to empower the lords of the soil, not only to sell the peasants with the land, but to employ them in whatever domestic or manufacturing labour
they pleased. But the most important point was, that the union of Church and
State was not merely upheld, but rendered stiU closer. In the place of the
Patriarch of Moscow,—the nominal head of the Church—Peter substituted a
holy supreme Syuod and made himself its president. By this act he publicly
assumed the Headship of the Church, in form as well as iu reality.
By all these innovations the government was strengthened
1 Under the Empress Anna, Ukase
existed in Esthonia and Livonia were
of
the 17th of March 1731. Thence- bestowed
on their holders in full
forward the obligation to furnish possession as alodia,
in 1783, by a
recruits
took the place of feudal mil- Ukase of May 3. Vid. Home Tooke,
itary
service. Some fiefs which still De la
Russie, III. 227
(Edit. Fran?.)
Ch. I.]
UKASE
OP 1722.
337
i
without any change in its character. All its peculiar oriental features
were preserved intact; there was still the same universal
absence of personal rights at home, and the same impulse towards war and
conquest in respect to foreign countries. Nay, the structure of arbitrary
despotism attained its final completion in the ukase of 1722, which gave the reigning Czar the right of nominating his successor, without any regard
to the usual rights of inheritance. We are here reminded of the system of
adoption in the old Roman Empire; and, indeed, admirers of the Russian polity
have dwelt upon the fact that Trajan and the Antonines attained to
power in this manner. But the ecclesiastic position of the Russian potentates, which gave them a greater power over their people than any
which the Roman Emperors possessed, again reminds ns of the East, where for a
long period the successors of the Caliphs were likewise appointed without
any regard to blood relationship. Peter therefore placed his law of succession
under the protection of the Church as well as of the State, and denounced
against every violation of it, not only temporal death, but
everlasting damnation.
But as all excess invariably injures the cause it seeks to further, so
it was with the newly enhanced power of the Russian monarchy. The notion of
legitimacy vanished from the empire of the Czars, as it had done before from that of the Caesars and the Caliphs. Hitherto the
subjects, indeed, had possessed no rights as against
their sovereign, but the position of the sovereign himself was regarded as tbe
very essence of all law: but henceforward the succession of
the Czars to the throne was independent of the law—-the sport of Imperial
whims, of Court cabals, and at last of the praetorian guards. Peter had issued
this ukase after the execution of his eldest son, that he might raise the
Finland peasant, whom he had chosen as his consort, to the
throne, in preference to his younger son. From this time forward every
succession was the result of a revolution. Tbe descendants
of Peter and his brother Iwan alternately expelled ono
S38
EARLY
POLICY OP RUSSIA.
[Book VI.
another; and the horrible saying which was current after the murder of
Paul I., that "the Russian constitution is a despotism
modified by assassination,", may be applied to this whole period. There
was henceforward no other source of power in the Empire than brute force.
None had more fatal experience of this truth than the neighbouring
States. The progress of despotism at home increased the lust of foreign
conquest. We ought, indeed, to distinguish some of Peter's undertakings from
the others. There are conquests which, though made in defiance of existing treaties, are indispensable to the attainment of the legitimate objects of the State which makes them;
there are others which have no ground but that insatiableness of human nature, which is attached to all irregular desires as their
bitterest punishment. Peter began with the former, but was irresistibly
impelled by the latter. No one could blame him for
endeavouring to obtain an opening for his Empire to the Baltic at the cost of
the Swedes, and to the Black Sea at the cost of the Turks: but the unprincipled
character of Russian policy was exhibited in all its nakedness, when he filled Poland, his ally, with troops, deliberated on a
partition of the country with the Polish king, formed a treacherous party among
the Polish nobility, and strengthened all the elements of domestic
anarchy in that unhappy land. Wtth the same view
he undertook to guarantee the Swedish constitution, that he might have an
excuse for preventing all improvement. He then allied
himself with the Duke of Holstein, in order to turn that Prince's quarrels with
the crown of Denmark to his own purposes. He gained a firm footing in
Mecklenburg by another marriage, and at last was only prevented from entirely
subjecting that country, by the firmness of England and Prussia. In this
violent manner Russia made her first entrance into the field of European politics. Her plans for obtaining absolute sway in Poland, for guiding
Sweden according to her will, and for spreading toils around North Germany, Avere
developed in
Ch. I.]
THE
OLD AND NEW RUSSIANS.
330
rapid succession. Peter had even begun to
look forward to a domestic revolution in England, which he hoped to produce in a manner exactly in accordance with the principles of the
treaty of Tilsit, by an alliance with France. None of these schemes were in any
degree necessary to the internal prosperity of Russia: but they
were a natural result of the composition of the Imperial constitution, and
were, therefore, handed down to all succeeding governments of whatever
materials they might be composed.
Under the successors of Peter an uninterrupted
civil contest was carried on between the
descendants of the old Boyards on the one hand, and the foreign parvenus
raised, by the favour of Peter on the other. We should be doing it too
much honour to call this a contest of principles: it is true that in respect of mental progress and social forms, the one party inclined
more to the Asiatic past and the other to the European future; but in regard to
politics, it was a mere personal cpiestion, a struggle for the possession and
enjoyment of power. The old Russian party, while they were
excluded from the government, made several attempts to limit the power of the
crown by aristocratic privileges; but they had no sooner regained their
influence, than they professed the doctrine of absolute monarchy with a zeal equal to that of their opponents. Peter's domestic institutions were
sometimes more and sometimes less zealously supported;
hut neither the old Russian nor the European party ever thought of making any
change in the army, the established church, or the policy
of aggression and concpiest. The despot always feels himself outside of his
people, and uses them only as means of personal glory or sensual enjoyment.
This separation between Monarch and subjects was only increased by the
reform^of Peter, which changed the government but left the masses untouched; and it never occurred to any one in
St. Petersburg to forego a foreign war out of regard to the sufferings of the
people. The new Russians despised the nation which they ruled, and used it
without
y2
34U
EARLY
POLICY OF RUSSIA.
[Book VI.
hesitation as materials of war; the old Russians despised the
neighbouring nations, whom they had no scruple in destroying by every means in
their power, as infidels and heretics. Both parties had need
of military glory—the former that they might flatter the national feeling at
any rate in one point,—the latter to prevent the army from falling into the
hands of their opponents. Under all circumstances, therefore, the impulse towards boundless concpiest
remained in full force. The colossal empire was, as it were, ruled by a
military colony, divided against itself by deadly antipathy, but always
inspired with an impatient desire of overrunning the world with fire and sword.
Under the Empress Anna, who allowed herself to be guided by
the new Russian party, the Turks were humbled in the South, and the decided
preponderance of the Russian arms over these ancient enemies firmly
established. In the North, Courlaud, hitherto a Polish fief, was completely subjected to the commands of the Russian court, while the Russian armies
marched into Poland and out again at pleasure, and decided the succession to
the Polish throne without the shadow of a pretext. Somewhat later the Empress
Elizabeth restored the old Russian party to power; but
nevertheless it was her government under which Russia first appeared as a great
Power to decide the internal troubles of Central Europe. Idle, frivolous and
dissolute, as this youngest daughter of Peter was, she was not contented with dictating laws to the Swedish Diet through her Ambassador, and
fixing her garrisons more and more firmly in Poland.
She lived to see the first entrance of Frederick the Great into the field of
polities, and her Chancellor, vrith the instinct of ambition, immediately saw that the consolidation of Northern Germany under
Prussia was not advantageous to Russian plans and dreams. Elizabeth, therefore,
joined the grand alliance against Frederick, and in the Seven year's war
compelled Eastern Prussia, whieh had only just been occupied, to do
homage. This was her personal revenge for some sarcastic remarks
Ch. I.]
DYNASTY OF HOLSTEIN-OLDENBURO.
341
of Frederick on the loose female rule in St. Petersburg; it was the
political retaliation for the opposition of Prussia to
Peter's plans against the Baltic coast of Germany.
It is well known that the dynasty of Eomanoff died out with Elizabeth
in 1760, and that the now reigning family of Holstein-Oldenburg was raised to
the throne in the person of Peter III. It is known likewise
that Peter, according to Russian custom, endeavoured to undo all that his
predecessor had accomplished; that he offered the King of Prussia a favourable peace, and regarded him with enthusiastic veneration; while he manifested towards all that was Russian a
most supercilious contempt; that he embittered against him the two main pillars
of his throne—the Clergy, by seizing on the lands of the Church, and the Army
by the preference he shewed to his German Life Guards. In a few months the alienation was so general that it only needed a resolute
leader to bring on the catastrophe. This part was assumed by Peter's own
consort Catharine. She had come to St. Petersburg as an unknown princess of
a petty German State —the sovereign of which derived his chief
importance from his position as general in the Prussian army—and had been
recommended by the Prussian Court for her docility and good breeding. During
her first years in Russia she endeavoured to escape notice; but
after she had well reconnoitred the ground on which
she stood, and observed the narrow-minded brutality of her husband, the effete
indolence of the Empress, and the low cunning of the Ministry, she felt that
she was called upon to play the part of mistress. She soon showed that she was not to be diverted from the object of her ambition by
womanly, or even humane, feelings. She had been brought up as a Lutheran and
received a French education; but when she saw the mighty influence exercised by
the Russian clergy7, she
zealously and publicly made profession of the Greek religion in
its most orthodox form. Repulsed by her husband with ever-growing dislike, she
assumed the appearance of silent humility and submissiveness;
342
EARLY
POLICY OF RUSSIA.
[Book VI.
but neglected no opportunity of attaching Russia to her person, by every possible tie. And thus it came to pass that she, a
stranger and a heretic by birth, soon became chief of the old Russian party:
and when at last she threw off the mask, she received
the homage of the bishops and the guards at St. Petersburg, of the regiments
and the popes in the provinces, and of the most energetic and orthodox portion
of the population throughout the whole empire. Peter III. fell from his throne without being able to make
the slightest resistance, and was strangled by some ambitious friends of his
consort. The Grand Duke Paul was passed over in the succession, since it was
not exactly from maternal affection that Catharine had incurred the clangers of a revolution.
The same result is observable in all the important events which took
place in this country. The notion of legitimacy is absolutely wanting. Force
alone is the means for the attainment of right; the temporary possessor of which is then considered as the representative of God, until a new
concpieror hurls him back into insignificance.
Never did an intricate course of life conduct a human being more
exactly to the position he was calculated to fill, than that which led
Catharine to the Russian throne. Her inward
consciousness corresponded fully to her imperial power; the vigour of her ideas
enabled her to range through the whole of her empire, and its moral corruption
was exactly suited to the violence of her passions. Her whole character was made up of contrasts; she was benevolent and pitiless,
dissolute and industrious, circumspect and impetuous;
but all these contradictory cpialities were absorbed by the growth of a
colossal, world-embracing, ambition. Almost every one who came within the sphere of her personal influence
was irresistibly attracted by her. Her external appearance
was extremely engaging; her figure was of middle height, and at a more advanced
period of life inclined to corpulence, and her manner was at once graceful and digni-
Ch. I.]
CATHARINE
II.
343
fied.1 Her forehead was clear and lofty, her eyes calm and bright, and it was
only the lower part of the face which betrayed by its coarser form the strength
of her appetites. In the pleasures of the table she was extremely
moderate, and in private intercourse full of the most winning cordiality. It is a singular trait in one who murdered her husband and
supplanted her son, that she could not live without a troop of little children
in her apartments, who were told to call her
mother, and whom she herself clothed and taught, and loaded with presents. From
the very beginning of her career she showed herself indefatigable iu business,
sharp-sighted and well-informed. It was observed that she united the carefulness of a woman with the comprehensive glance of a
statesman; that she judged of men and circumstances with accurate penetration,
and continually furnished her ministers with their guiding
principles of action and their most successful projects.
But two pernicious impulses—the very worst which can possess the heart of a
woman—the love of fame, and an inordinate passion for the other sex, poisoned
her whole existence. We shall not repeat the oft-told tale — how her
uncontrollable temperament drove her into the arms of one
favourite after another—how the heir to the kingdom sprang from her adulterous
intercourse—and how nameless enjoyments, and untold treasures, were scpiandered
on low and abandoned men. We might look with astonishment at the inexhaustible strength of a character, which in the depths of this
corruption preserved its intellectual activity, were not the remedies of the
disease still worse than the malady itself. For there is no doubt that she was
saved from perishing in the depths of sensuality, by an excess of a
more refined and intellectual voluptuonsness—by the delight with which she
revelled in ambition and the lust of power. With impetuous eagerness she
entered on the inheritance of Peter the Great; and all the schemes of power and war which had arisen in
1 Malmesbury, I. 534. 539,
;U4
EARLY
POLICY OF RUSSIA.
[Book VI.
his unruly heart, were formed by this woman into a grand, elaborate and
enduring system. When we enter into the sphere of her plans of conquest, we feel ourselves once more transported into the East, as we did
when considering her debaucheries and extravagance; every thing is on a grand
and gigantic scale, rising far above the European standard, and sinking below
the level of humanity. Mild and wise as was her rule in her own
immediate neighbourhood, it was fearful in its more distant operation. In
external affairs she was impeded by no right, and bound by no promise; no means
were too abominable for her to use; and while she exchanged panegyrics on freedom and the rights of man with Voltaire, she raised herself
to a height of self-deification, at which the submission of two quarters of the
globe seemed the only possible pedestal of her glory. As she is, perhaps, the
only one of her sex who knew how to playT the
part of Empress, courtezan and housewife, at the same time, she is also
distinguished among the concpierors of the world, by the fact that
notwithstanding all the audacious extravagance of her projects, she retained
her cautious coolness and reflection
to the end of her life, While her glowing fancy carried her wishes beyond all
bounds, she always remained in her actions within the limits of what was
practically attainable. She had the power of
incessantly gratifying and bridling her boundless passions; of revelling in
sensuality and ambition to an unexampled degree, and yTet of
governing without intermission both her court and herself.
Catharine's reign marks the amalgamation of the two contending parties in Russia. She herself belonged to
the one by birth, and to the other as the ladder by which she rose to power.
She was clever enough to attract and to subdue the more capable men of all
opinions; she satisfied some by taking in hand a number of European reforms,
and reconciled others by
allowing these innovations to fall into decay, after bringing them forward in
an ostentations manner. Her administration began with the same measures as the
French
Ch. I.]
CHIEF
OBJECTS OF HER AMBITION.
345
Revolution thirty years afterwards; vie. the
confiscation of Church property, and the issue of assignats.
By the former she completed the subjection of the altar to the throne,
and the latter furnished her with the necessary means of carrying out all the plans by which she intended
to change the character, and to extend the frontiers, of her empire. As her
truly royal mind impelled her to guide, to work, and to lead the way in every
department, she would have wished to perform memorable deeds at home as well as
abroad; but her ambition was only too soon directed—either
by the vanity of her own restless heart, or the irresistible tradition of
Russian policy—into the more ostentations paths of warlike
greatness. The greater number, therefore, of the institutions
which she had founded were left in ruins. Of the 240 towns
which she ordered to be planned, the majority were wretched villages, some
only posts with the name of the future places, and one, a mass of splendid
palaces without a single human inhabitant. She commenced canals and hospitals, decreed a new code of laws, and worked at the new
organization of the internal administration; but she forgot to carry them out
and complete them amid the cares and excitements of the wars, by which, during
a whole generation, she discpueted and ruled the policy of Europe. It
is not possible even for the most gifted regent to bless a land, which has to
serve as the tool for the accomplishment of colossal objects foreign to
the real well-being of the State.
The foreign activity of Catharine was directed to two principal
objects, the way to which had in some degree been prepared by former
potentates, but which she was the first to bring into close connexion, and to
follow up on a grander scale as the great ends of Russian policy. These were, the incorporation of Poland, and the annihilation of the Turkish Empire.
Since the reign of Peter I., Poland had remained in viutual dependence on the
will of Russia; so that it was often said in St. Petersburg, that Europe had
long been
346
EARLY
POLICY OF RUSSIA.
[Book VI.
accustomed to see Russia alone settle the Polish broils. But before the
reign of Catharine the Russian Court had taken no step to destroy the
independence which Poland had hitherto enjoyed, at least in name.
Both in relation to the great Powers and to the Poles themselves, a vassal King
of Poland seemed a most convenient tool of Russian supremacy; —just as a
well-known despatch of Count Nesselrode in 1830 describes the advantages which the Russian power in the East derived from the continued
existence of the Turkish Sultanship. In the beginning of her government,
Catharine herself entertained the same views on this point, but gradually changed them, and formed at last the fixed intention of reducing Poland from dependence into complete subjection,
and to reduce the country to a Russian province. This change in her views was
not made rapidly or easily, since the former system as well as the latter had
its own peculiar advantages. The rule of Russia operated more
effectually when Poland became a Russian province; but that rule had more
extensive bounds while Poland was a separate but dependent
State. Russia was not yet strong enough to undertake
the concpiest of that country for herself alone, and was therefore
obliged to allow the neighbouring German Powers to share in the booty. We shall
have an opportunity of observing how deeply Catharine felt this disadvantage;
and it is certain that in the various partitions of Poland, she was always the last to make up her mind; and that she could truly say,
that she never would have carried out the measure but for the pressure of the
German Powers. A partition of Poland, we must remember, appeared to her in a
different light from that which it assumed in the eyes of the other
nations of Europe, who were not concerned in it. While the latter only saw in
this act, the plunder and oppression of an independent people,
Catharine looked upon it as the curtailment of a Russian fief, and the cutting off of a Russian province,1 She
consented to it because she was 1 This disposes once for all of what Sniitt (in his two works, Suwarroio
Ch.L]
CATHARINE DETERMINES TO INCOEPOEATE POLAND. 347
obliged to do so, and she consoled herself by looking to the future,
and by the increase it brought to Russian power in Europe. We may here make use
of the words, which one of the best informed of the Russian Ministers addressed
to the Emperor Alexander iu 1814;1 the
destruction of Poland, he said, was almost the exclusive subject of modern
Russian history; it was undertaken for the purpose of bringing Russia into immediate intercourse with the other nations of Europe, and opening to her a more extended theatre
for the employment of her power and her talents, for tbe gratification of her pride and her passions, and for the advancement of her
interests; to frustrate the consequences of this successful
plan, would be to attack the unity of the government. It was.- not so much, therefore, regard to Poland herself, as to the
rest of Europe, which decided Catharine's choice. Poland might have been kept
in obedience, after Catharine had forced the crown on the head of one of her
former favourites—the utterly unprincipled Stanislaus
Ponia-towski; but in order to use the country as a purchase for the lever with
which she might move Germany and Europe, it was necessary to take actual
possession of it. There must be no longer any intermediate State between the Russian and the German borders. The Germans might be allowed to take
possession for a time of some frontier districts, but there was still the
future, in which the loss might be made good. It was exactly in accordance with
these views that Alexander —who had broken with Napoleon in 1810 on the
question of the independence of Poland—proclaimed, in 1814, the restoration of that country under his own supremacy, and therewith a return to the old system; it was the easiest pretext
und Polens Untergang,
and Fre- that this was the cause of Poland's
de'ric II., Catherine, et le partage de fall. If
that suggestion had not been
la Pologne) has
said about the origin made, Poland would, it is true, have
of
the partition. The first official
remained undivided but would have
suggestion
eame no doubt from Ger- fallen as awholeinto Russia's hands.—
many,
but we are not to conclude 1 Pozzo
di Borgo, Vienna, Oct.
20,
348
EARLY
POLICY OF RUSSIA.
[Book VI.
for recovering a portion of the provinces
which had fallen to Germany. We need not point out how his successor renewed
the incorporation of Poland, and how accurate the calculations of Catharine
have proved.
Catharine's second plan of establishing a Russian throne in
Constantinople, was based on equally comprehensive views.
The singular mixture of ardent fancy and cool calculation which characterized
the Empress, was here brought to light in the most striking manner. The scheme
itself was a grand one, the execution of it alike bold and patient; and every step was taken with so much caution, and on such plausible
grounds, that the very existence of the plan has often been made a matter of
doubt. She laboured in this case as in that of Poland, with a view to future
generations—contented to have shown to them the goal, and
resigned to the thought that she had prepared the way for others to the darling
object which she herself could never reach. This far-seeing repose in a
heart glowing with ambition is all the more wonderful, the more clearly she recognized the vast importance of this conquest for the
subjection of more than one quarter of the World. Her imperial glance had
rested not only on the Danube and Constantinople, but also on Minorca, the Peloponnesus and the shores of the Caspian Sea. We see that the Bosphorus, like the Vistula, were chiefly prized as
stages of a still further progress. The two projects
were intimately connected with one another, and in their combination formed a
mighty system of attack which embraced the whole (of Europe.
Let us see what attitude the European Powers assumed iu the face of the
approaching danger.
It was, of course, the two German Powers, Austria and Prussia, who were
most immediately affected by the progress of Catharine. Nothing was more
favourable to Russia than the fact that these two
Powers stood opposed to one another with the bitterest jealousy7, and
that their views on the Polish question, more especially,
were fundamentally different.
Ch. I.]
FIRST
PARTITION OF POLAND.
349
Austria felt herself bound to the Poles by
all her traditions; while Prussia, on the contrary, bad grown to her present
power in continual contest with them. The attitude assumed by each in the
beginning was in accordance with these different circumstances. Frederick II., to whom Polish Western
Prussia was as absolutely necessary as the Baltic ports had formerly been to
Peter, immediately allied himself with Russia; while Austria shewed every
disposition to oppose the Russian project by force of arms. But in a short time this antagonism was somewhat mitigated. On the one
hand, Poland was found to be in a state of such hopeless ruin, that Austria
despaired of her preservation; and on the other, Russia threatened the
existence of Turkey so seriously, that Frederick began to be anxious about
his own independence. Overtures were therefore made in 1770 hetween Frederick
and the youug Emperor Joseph; and in 1772 an agreement was come to between the
three governments respecting the first partition of Poland, and a limit drawn to the already dominant power of Russia over that country^
by the participation of Austria and Prussia. It was
Russian regiments, and not Polish, which at that period played the masters in
Western Prussia and Galicia, and which, after the partition,
made room for the German troops. Though it was no splendid result which was
thus attained by the proceedings of 1772, yet in the then existing condition of
the world, we may regard it as an unexpectedly favourable one, It was no small
gain that only ten years after the Seven years' war,
Prussia and Austria, in alliance with one another, should bring the Oriental
question to a decision.
Unfortunately the harmony of the German Powers, by which alone Central
Europe was protected against the attacks of Russia,
was of no long duration. The evils which the restless policy of the Emperor
Joseph II. had brought upon Europe, are more perceptible in this connexion than
in any other. His unhappy ambition to acquire for himself the inheritance of the Bavarian house of AVittelsbach, caused a
350
EARLY
POLICY OF RUSSIA.
[Book VI.
complete revolution in Oriental affairs. It was this which interrupted
the good understanding which had been come to with Prussia, in respect to the
affairs of Poland; and Joseph hastened to gain the
good will of Russia by an unconditional sanction of her warlike
plans against Turkey. Catharine shewed the greatest readiness to meet his overtures. She had long ceased to set airy value on her alliance with
Prussia, ever since King Frederick had shown himself, though not hostile, at
any rate independent, in the Polish question; and had briefly expressed his
policy^ by saying that he was wdling to be tbe friend, but not the slave, of
Russia. Whilst Frederick excited the impatience of the Empress by
reasonable representations, Joseph obtained her entire affection by flattering
all her jmssions. Catharine now thought him the cleverest and most amiable
prince in Europe; while the heir of the Prussian crown, whom Frederick sent to St. Petersburg to support his policy, apj>eared to her
stiff and narrowminded, and drew upon himself her personal dislike for the remainder of his life. In fact Catharine began to bate the
King because she was obliged to respect him; she received
the long-expected intelligence of his .death with joyful satisfaction, and no
sooner had she observed the inferior firmness of his successor,
than the war of 1788 broke out on the Danube, by whieh Russia hoped to gain the
Bosphorus, and Austria, Belgrade and Munich.
We have already seen, in connexion with German affairs, by what
circumstances these plans were frustrated in the moment of their execution: but
it will be no unnecessary repetition if we again call to mind the most
important points. For the third time in the 18th century,
England and Prussia opposed the progress of Russia towards universal power, and for several months Europe stood on the brink of a
general war. It was averted by the unexpected death of Joseph II. and the
different attitude assumed by his successor Leopold. The
latter not only gave up all thoughts of Turkish and Bavarian conquests, and
thereby
Cn.
I.]
LEOPOLD
WISHES TO RESTORE POLAND.
351
deprived Catharine of ins alliance and cooperation, but no sooner were
these disturbances settled, than he sought for Austria a new possession iu
Northern Europe, which brought him into direct hostility with Russia. He
endeavoured to restore the Austrian influence in Poland, took the
constitution of the 3rd of May 1791 under his
protection, and alarmed Catharine by the prospect of a complete internal
restoration of that unhappy country.
By this change in the policy of Austria the previous relations of the other European States were
entirely altered. In St. Petersburg men mourned for the death of Joseph II. and
could hardly conceal their anger when Austria and Leopold were mentioned.1
Prussia regarded with ill-concealed jealousy the strengthening
of Poland under Austria's protection, but for the
moment the danger on the side of Russia appeared far more ui-gent. She
therefore consented to acknowledge the constitution of the 3rd of May, with the
view of isolating Russia; and on the 25th of July 1791, she completely gave up the system of Frederick H. aud entered into a
preliminary treaty of friendship) with Austria. It was at this period that the
occurrences in France began to press heavily on German politics, and it was
generally believed that the alliance of the two German Powers was
principally directed against the Revolution. But just as Prussia, on her first
entrance into this treaty, had, not France, but Russia in her eye, so Austria
declared in September, that the French question was settled by Louis' acceptance of the Constitution. The two Powers had no other object in
their alliance, than the defence and preservation of the existing state of things. They were entirely agreed in their views
respecting France, where they hoped by an imposing display of power to bring back the Jacobins to peace and moderation. As regards
Poland, indeed, their secret wishes were greatly at variance. Austria hoped that Poland would
1 Ssolowjoff, "der
Fall Polens," p.
263.
352
EARLY
POLICY OP RUSSIA.
[Book VI.
acquire lasting consistency under the new Constitution, and be
inseparably united with Saxony; Prussia, on the other band, would gladly have
seen Poland free from foreign influence, but internally weak and
powerless. This divergence of views however did not for the present
lead to any breach. The increasingly warlike spirit of the Jacobins daily gave
the friendship of Prussia a higher value in the eyes of Austria; the Emperor, therefore, on the 7th of February 1792, was induced
to sign a definitive treaty in entire accordance with
the views of Prussia, and to promise his protection, not to the new
Constitution of Poland, but to some free Constitution or other. All the
European Powers, and more especially Russia, were to be invited to take part in the transaction.
The Empress Catharine received intelligence of these proceedings with ill-concealed rage. It is true that the new treaty
condemned Poland to eternal insignificance, but it also placed the tutelage of
the ruined State, not in Russian hands alone, but in those of the
three Courts in common. To this Catharine was resolved on no account to agree.
Towards the Poles themselves she had no other sentiments than wrath and
contempt. She heard with suppressed anger of the insults to which her friends in Warsaw were daily exposed on her account, and observed
with lively satisfaction the feebleness and incapacity with which the new
Polish cabinet entered on the administratron of affairs. As early as May 1791,
she gave orders to General Soltikoff to station an army of 42,000 men
near Polotzk, and directed Prince Potemkin to hold still larger masses of the
Danube army in readiness, as a support.1
After the conclusion of the truce with the Turks in August, the preparations
against Poland were carried on with increased zeal, and on a
more extended scale. The chiefs of the fallen party in Poland met with an
honourable reception in Russia, and were encouraged by
1 Milintin, Kriey von 1799.
Ch.
L] CATHARINE'S MACHINATIONS AGAINST
POLAND. 353
express promises of support. Every thing was prepared to deal a
crushing blow at the constitution of the 3rd of May, and to make Poland bow
more humbly than ever before the despotic will of Russia. There was no question of resistance on the part of Poland in her
state of indolence and confusion; Catharine's only anxiety arose from the
German Powers, and especially from Leopold, who with the greatest frankness and
unconcern had recommended his Polish-Saxon plan to her consideration. She
wished if possible to prevent them from interfering at all in the Polish
question. "Should they oppose my plans," she wrote at this time,
"I shall try to appease them by offering them some other compensation, 01 even
a Polish province." This was her intention in the most unfavourable case;
for the present, she hoped to amuse them by holding out prospects of this kind,
until Poland was once more occupied by Russian armies, and theu to decide according to her own arbitrary pleasure. Nothing therefore could be
more opportune for her than the warlike tone assumed
against Austria by the French in the spring of 1792; for it was certain, that
if a great war should break out in Belgium and Italy, the Emperor could only
assist the Poles by his good wishes. "I rack my
brain," said Catharine to a coufidant, "to make the Viennese and
Berlin cabinets interfere in tbe affairs of France. I
should like to see their hands ftdl of business, that my own might be free; for
I have very many unfinished schemes before me, and
Austria and Prussia ought to be fully occupied that they may not hinder
me." 1
Subsequent events, as we have seen, were entirely in accordance with her wishes. The Gironde seized the helm of the State, and
urged on the commencement of the war against Germany with
passionate eagerness. At Vienna the Emperor Leopold died, and his
successor stood inexperienced, undecided and covetous—assailed on either side
by the mi-
ll.
1 Smilt, Suwarow,
II. 359.
354
EARLY
POLICY OP RUSSIA.
[Book VI.
portunities of Russia and France. The Court of Berlin received intelligence of the plau for uniting Saxony and Poland, and was
therefore completely cured of all sympathy for the latter country. Catharine's
wishes were fully realized; the two German Powers were
otherwise engaged, and were compelled to abandon Poland to the superior force
of Russia. The King of Prussia now recurred to the idea which had been
previously mooted by Russia, and seeing the impossibility
of protecting Poland, he wished at all events not to leave the whole of that
country at the disposal of Catharine. The Empress at this time proposed a
negotiation with the two Powers on the fate of Polantl; and the King resolved
to demand a Polish province for himself. He took it for granted that
Russia would take no steps against Poland before
coming to a final understanding with Germany. But in fact the more evident the
wishes of Prussia became, the more zealously did Catharine urge on her warlike
preparations, that she might as soon as
possible take exclusive possession of Poland, and then, as
mistress of the situation, rid herself for ever of the troublesome interference
of the Germans.
Cn. II.] 355
CHAPTER II. PARTITION OP POLAND. PRELIMINARIES.
Catharine
supports the polish malcontents.—Prussia inclines towards Russia.—Catharine
proposes a separate treaty to Prussia.—Austria
makes. attempts in st. petersburg to obtain the same.—conquest
of
poland by the russians.-prussian alliance of aug. 7tH 1792.—
Internal
condition of Austria under Leopold
ii, and under Francis ii.—Haugwitz's negotiation in Vienna.—Proposition that Prussia
should receive oreat poland, and austria, bavaria.—discontent of francis ii.
Since the autumn of 1791 the chiefs of the Polish malcontents had been assembled in St.
Petersburg. The most distinguished of those who came from
the kingdom of Poland were Felix Potocki and the crown general Rzewuski; from
Lithuania, the Brothers Kossakowski—the elder of whom had
been Bishop of "Wilna, and the younger a general in the Russian service.
They met with a splendid reception, because the overthrow of the May
constitution must in any case be the first step in the Russian undertaking.
Catharine admitted them into her Court circle, gave them a handsome monthly pension, and entered into confidential consultation with them through her Ministers. They abused the wicked democrats
of Warsaw, who by abolishing the privileges of the nobility had destroyed
the ancient freedom of Poland, and with it the bulwark of
political conservatism. They lauded Russia as the refuge of the true old
Poland, and as the guardian of legal order; and they claimed her assistance, in
the full self-consciousness of irreproachable patriotism. The Empress for some months avoided giving any definite answer, but in the
meantime concluded a definitive peace with the* Turks at
Jassy, and collected a splendid army on the Polish frontier. It was not until the
z 2
356
PARTITION
OF POLAND. PRELIMINARIES. [Book VI.
Gironde had seized the reins of power in Paris, by which the war with
Austria was rendered certain, that she threw off her reserve, promised the
Polish nobles her armed assistance in restoring the authority of law in Poland (at the same guaranteeing the integrity of the
Polish territory), and allowed Potoeki to draw the outline of a Confederation,
in whieh he and his adherents were to unite in subjecting Poland to their ride.
At tbe end of March, Prussia's declaration of the 13th arrived in
St. Petersburg, in which she expressed her agreement
in Catharine's views respecting Poland, and her readiness
to adopt the settlement proposed by the Empress. Prussia explained that she was
only prevented from immediately
proceeding to action, because, according to the treaty of the 7th of February,
she was bound to hear the views of Austria. This was all that Catharine wanted
for the moment, it was sufficient to assure her that Poland would receive no
aid from Germany. On the 8th of April, therefore, she sent orders to General Kachowski to lead 04,000 men of the army of the Danube—well-disciplined troops, whose valour bad
been tested in the Turkish war—to the Southern frontiers of Poland. At the same
time General Kretschctni-koff began his march from the
North and East with 32,000 men towards Lithuania. The superiority of the Russian forces was overwhelming; there were scarcely 50,000 regular soldiers in the whole extent of Poland, and even these were
miserably armed, without discipline, and badly paid.
Under these circumstances Catharine was not to be turned from her purpose by an
Austrian despatch, in which Kaunitz still recommended the union of Poland and
Saxony as tbe best expedient. When mice assured of a. mutual understanding with Prussia, and of
a. Freneh war, she paid no further regard to Austria's dissent, and promised
herself to make the Court of Vienna pay as dearly as possible, for its desertion of Joseph's policy, and its efforts for the restoration
of Poland. For the present, she contented herself
Ch.
II.] RUSSIAN TROOPS ON THE POLISH
FRONTIERS.
357
with directing her Ambassador in Vienna to assume a cold and proud
attitude; and when, soon afterwards, the two German Courts laid their February treaty before her, she refused her adhesion to it, and
clearly manifested to Count Goltz her wish to come to a separate understanding
with Prussia. In Berlin the King regretted the bitterness of Catharine towards
Austria, without whieh Power nothing could be definitively
settled. But he was not the less gratified by the favour shown by the
Empress to Goltz, and evinced his feelings by his conduct towards the Poles,
drily answering their terrified complaints of the Russian preparations, by saying that the quarrel did not concern
him.
Under these circumstances Catharine sent her final instructions to Baron Bulgakow, her Ambassador in Warsaw, on the 30th of
Aprd. Kachowski, she informed him, would enter Poland between the 12th and 22nd
of May, and at the same time the new Confederation woidd be proclaimed on the
frontiers, under the direction of Felix Potocki. Thereupon
Bidgakow himself was to present to the Polish Government
the Empress's declaration of war, and was to refuse to enter into any discussion with a view to its modification. The excitement in
Warsaw was already very great; the machinations of the Russian party, aud the
accumulation of troops on all the frontiers, showed that the breach was close
at hand, and the prospect violently agitated the hearts of the Poles.
There was a talk of doubling all the taxes, raising
loans in foreign countries, and a levy en
masse; but the want of money and mutual distrust prevented any practical or
effectual measures. Throughout the whole of Lithuania
there were only a few weak garrisons, numbering together about 15,000 men. On
the Southern frontier in Podolia, between the Dniester, the Bug and the
Dnieper, the young Poniatowski was stationed with 20,000 men, so that the Poles
had every where to deal with an enemy of threefold their
own strength. Kachowski crossed the frontiers on the 18th of May, and
immediately afterwards Felix Potocki, protected
358
PARTITION
OF POLAND. PRELIMINARIES. [Book VI.
by a Russian division, proclaimed his Confederation at Tar-gowice.
Kachowski deployed his forces according to a well-considered plan, continually
outflanking his opponent, so that the Poles, fearing to be completely
surrounded, hastily evacuated Podolia without a blow.
In Volhynia they fought a Russian division near Zielence with great bravery but
with no success, and it was not untd they had passed the Bug betweeu Dubienka
and Brzesc-Litewski that they had time to breathe. As General Kretschetnikoff
had at the same time pushed forward with ecpial vigour, occupied Wdna,
proclaimed the new Confederation in that town with great pomp and amidst the
shouts of the people, and then forced his way to Grodno, the larger half of
Poland was overpowered in about six weeks with scarcely any difficulty.
Tbe political game of the Empress was developed simultaneously with these proceedings in the field. On the 25th of May, her
Ambassador Alopeus delivered a note in Berlin, in which Russia held out the
prospect of armed assistance against the French,
proposed to the Prussian Court a disinterested war of principles
against the Revolution, and the conclusion of a separate alliance. The King
replied that in the first place, though he did not intend to make a war of
conquest against France, he must at any rate claim
compensation for his expenses. With regard to the alliance, he expressed
the highest satisfaction at the friendly dispositions
of the Empress, but declared it necessary previously to communicate with
Austria; aud he called upon Russia on her part to
bring forward a complete draft of the proposed treaty of alliance. He was at
that time fidl of zeal for the war with France, and for the Austrian alliance;
he wished to act in concert with Austria even in the Polish cpiestion, and to confine the Russian ascendancy within certain bounds;
be therefore communicated the offers of Russia, with all possible speed, to the court of Vienna. The intelligence naturally made a strong impression in Austria, which was greatly increased by a confidential communication of Count
Cii.
II.] FRANCIS n. PREPARES
TO ABANDON POLAND.
359
Schulenburg, that Prussia looked for compensation in the acquisition of
a Polish province; Francis IT. was hereby induced
to make a great and immediate change in his line of
policy. In Leopold's reign, an almost declared enmity had existed between
Russia and Austria; but Prince Kaunitz now expressed a wish to renew the old
alliance of Joseph and Catharine. While Leopold had made the restoration of Poland his first object, it now occurred to Francis II.
that the acquisition of a Polish province would be no less agreeable to him
than to Prussia. Kaunitz, however, first attempted to take a step in the
direction of the treaty of February; he drew up a declaration in which
Austria and Prussia jointly demanded a share in the protection of Poland. But
it was just this common guardianship of Poland, in addition
to the partition of certain provinces, which would have been most distasteful
to Catharine, and she did not deign to make any answer to the proposal. She
gathered from it, however, that Austria and Prussia still held together in
undiminished harmony, and that she could not succeed in making a separate
alliance with Berlin, if she directly repulsed
Austria, and did not establish a certain understanding
with the Court of Vienna. In Poland, indeed, she would not admit any Austrian
influence; in order, therefore, to divert the Emperor's attention from that
country, she mooted the Bavarian-Belgian Exchange in Vienna through the
agency of Rasumovski. We have seen how the imagination of Francis LI. was
inflamed by this idea, and that he immediately began to negotiate on the
question with Prussia, and how the two Powers came to the preliminary agreement, that the Emperor should receive Bavaria and the King a Polish
province. Count Cobenzl hereupon received instructions
to propose this plan of compensation in St. Petersburg, and at the same time to
open negotiations for a new alliance between the two
Imperial Courts. The Russians had scarcely expected that their measures would
work so rapidly, and Catharine did not hesitate a moment to make use of
360
PARTITION
OF ROLAND. PRELIMINARIES. [Book VI.
the favourable opportunity. She determined first of all
to make sure of Austria. On the 13th of July, a treaty of alliance was signed
by Cobenzl and the Russian Ministers, for mutual defence by an auxdiary corps
of 12,000 men; which assistance was to be given in all cases except when Austria was attacked from the side of Italy, or Russia by
China, Persia, or Tartary. In two special articles, Austria guaranteed the
Duchy of Oldenburg to the house of Hol-stein-Gottorp, and lastly bound herself
to join Russia in restoring the old Polish constitution. Austria's
desertion of Leopold's policy was thus officially declared, and the Minister Markoff assured the Ambassador that a compensation for the two
German Powers would be found according to their wish, although he said tbe
cession of a Polish province to Prussia was a
very hazardous step.
Tbe immediate effect of this transaction was felt in Poland. The
intelligence of the entrance of Russian troops, and their irresistible advance
on all sides, produced an indescribable confusion in Warsaw. It is a characteristic circumstance,
that although the raising of an army of 100,000 men had been ordered a year
before, and tbe Russian invasion bad been certainly impending
for six months, no one. from the very first, believed in the salvation of Poland by her own strength. Though Prussia had so often repeated
the declaration, that she was not bound to defend the new constitution,
Ignatius Potocki hastened to Berlin at the end of May to claim Prussian aid in
virtue of the treaty of 1790. The Abbe Piatoli started for Dresden for
the same purpose, and Prince Adam Czartoryski moved heaven and earth in Vienna.
All was in vain; whereupon King Stanislaus, resolved on a very remarkable
step. On the 22nd of June, he wrote to the Empress and appealed to her personal feelings in the name of their old friendship. "I
will speak," he said, "briefly and frankly, for I am speaking to you. Read what I say without prejudice, I will speak plainly. It is
important to you to have influence in Poland, and to
Cb.II.]
THE RUSSIANS ENTER POLAND & DEFEAT KOSCIUSKO. 361
keep the line of march open for your troops, whether against the Turks
or against Europe. It is important to us, to put an end to our endless
revolutions, and the constant interference of our neighbours. We need,
moreover, a stronger and better regulated government than Ave have
heretofore possessed. There are means of uniting all
these advantages. Give us your grandson, the Grand Duke Constantine, as our
King; give us likewise an eternal alliance and an advantageous
treaty of commerce' with Russia. I wdl say no more; you need no
instruction and no guidance." Eight months earlier, tins proposal might
have met all the Avishes
of the Russian Cabinet, and wovdd have handed over Poland to.
Catharine, and spared her the disagreeable cession of a province to Prussia. But she had now gone too far in her negotiations with the German
Powers. She saw in the letter of Stanislaus nothing more than an attempt to set
her at variance with her allies, and she harshly replied that the only thing
which could and avouM save Poland, Avas the
immediate assent of the King to the Confederation of Targowice. In a
circumstantial despatch, the Vice Chancellor Ostermann explained more fully to
the King, that no legitimate Polish government existed in Warsaw, and that
therefore no proposals of alliance or commercial treaties
could be received from that quarter; that Russia was not at Avar with
Poland, but in intimate union Avith the true Republic, i. e. the Confederation, against its domestic enemies.1
About the same time the Austrian Charge d'affaires handed in a declaration that
his Government had no reason to oppose the wishes of Russia. On the 17th of
July Kachowski crossed tbe Bug at Dubienka, and forced the Polish General
Kosciusko, after an heroic resistance, to retire from his
strong position to the other side of the river. While the Russian columns were
now advancing on the capital from all sides, Stanislaus received the
discouraging answer from St. Petersburg, heard
1 Smitt, Smvarow,
II. 168,
362
PARTITION
OF POLAND. PRELIMINARIES. [Book VI.
of the intimate understanding between Russia and Austria, and learned
from the Russian Ambassador that Catharine alone prevented the Prussians
from a hostile march into Poland. In this country itself, there was nothing but
feebleness, strife and confusion—no prospects of aid from any quarter;—the
King therefore submitted, and formally declared her adhesion to
the Confederation on the 24th.
By this act the overthrow of the new constitution was completed, and
the restoration of the old anarchical State proclaimed.
The patriots of 1791, Ignatius Potocki, Malacbowski, Kollontai, fled to Vienna or Dresden. The King sat deserted and humiliated in his
palace, now giving way to violent outbursts of sorrow, and now sunk in
gloomy brooding. He was altogether guiltless of the disasters of the last
contest; yet all the hatred of the conquered, all the disgrace of the
defeat, fed on him, because he had not strength of mind enough to flee with the
patriots as Potocki had advised him. He no longer possessed a shadow of power;
the conduct of affairs lay exclusively in the
hands of the Confederation and its chief, Felix
Potocki, who was regarded as Regent of the country. But he and his associates
were entirely at the beck of the State-Councillor Bidder, whom Catharine had
attached to the Confederation as her Rejtresentative. The light in which she regarded her relation to the so-called Republic, may be gathered
from the fact that Buhler took the draft of a new Polish constitution with him
from St. Petersburg. When the Confederation in
Warsaw adopted some measures which were displeasing to the Empress, and grasped too hastily at the dignities and Starostics
of their fallen opponents, Ostermann wrote to Buhler
on the 14th of August as follows: The Empress desires the welfare of the
nation, not that of a few individuals. She knows the true interests of Poland better than the members of the Confederation, and will
therefore lay down for them a rule of conduct. Experience has shown how liable
these gentlemen are to err, when left to their own devices, but the Empress
wishes to rest the
Cn.
II.] DRAFT OF ALLIANCE BETWEEN RUSSIA & PRUSSIA. 363
tranquility of Poland on a sure basis." 1 We
see that the relation between the two countries was no longer that of Suzerain
and Vassal; the will of Russia reigned supreme in Poland in
every matter, from the smallest to the greatest, and nothing but the name of
Poland distinguished it from the other provinces of Russia.
Meanwhde the negotiations with Prussia had made important progress. The draft of an alliance, which had beeu asked for by the King of Prussia, was despatched from St. Petersburg on
the 21st of June. It agreed in the main with the Austrian treaty, but a secret
article was added which guaranteed the constitution of 1788 for the Duchy of
Courland. This proposal ran entirely parallel with the protection afforded by Russia to the Confederation of Targowice in Poland.
The Duke of Courland, like the Polish King, had endeavoured in 1791 to obtain
an increase of his prerogatives; and here too there was an opposition party of the nobles which favoured the old anarchy, and had likewise formed a
close alliance with Russia. Russia therefore now proposed to the Court of
Berlin, that Prussia, which had formerly favoured the Duke, should abandon
Courland and its Prince to the Russian party. Catharine on her side, in
the note which accompanied the draft, made a considerable step in advance to
meet the Prussian plans of conquest. Ostermann repeatedly represented that the
German Powers must not aim at the forcible acquisition of French provinces; but in other respects, he said, the Empress was quite of
opinion that some compensation was due to them, which she woidd gladly
cooperate in procuring as soon as she had become more intimately acquainted
with their plans. The Prussian ministers considered that Catharine, in
proclaiming the in-violabdity of France, could only be thinking of Poland as
the source from which their common advantage was to arise; and from this moment
they regarded the realization of their
Smitt,
II. 489.
364
PARTITION OF POLAND.
PRELIMINARIES. [Book VI.
hopes as certain. They had only a few unimportant additions and alterations to make in the Russian draft, all of which
related to Poland. They demanded that Austria should be
mentioned as a fellow-adviser and guarantee of the future state of Poland; and
proposed an article, according to which no prince belonging to the three
neighbouring empires should -ever sit upon the Polish throne. With regard to
the compensation, they preferred
a written communication, because the meeting between the King and the Emperor
was about to take place at Mayence, and they hoped that a final understanding might be come to there. They explained their views,
however, to the Russian Ambassador by word of mouth; representing, that
as a province of France was not a suitable acquisition for Prussia, and as many
inconveniences might arise in that direction for Austria, the Bavarian-Belgian
Exchange appeared the best thing for the Emperor, and the seizure of a Polish district for Prussia. In this case Russia might take
possession of the Ukraine, so that the ever-fermenting
Poland might be confined by narrower frontiers, and France be left undiminished
according to the wish of Catharine. Count Goltz was directed
to use similar language in St. Petersburg; he was likewise commissioned as much
as possible to mitigate the anger of Catharine against Austria, with which
Prussia still hoped to come to a thoroughly good understanding, and in union
with which she desired to reduce
the sole rule of Russia in Poland to more tolerable proportions.
But the Russian Empress had already foreseen this turn in the affair,
and was not at ah inclined to sanction it. She had apparently lent a willing
ear to the wishes of the German
Powers, as long as the struggle in Poland continued, and a protest in Berlin or
Vienna might bring great danger to Russia. Now, however, at the end of July,
she saw Poland at her feet, and the more complete her triumph became, the more she disliked the idea of ceding a province to
Prussia. The treaty of alliance, with the Berlin additions,
Ch.
II.] CONTINUED DISCORD BETWEEN AUSTRIA & PRUSSIA. 365
was signed on the 7th of August, but for a considerable time Goltz
heard nothing about the compensation to Prussia, and was
at last told that the result of the conference at Mayence must.be
waited for. Half in joke, Ostermann let fall the observation that the manifesto
of the Duke of Brunswick disclaimed all ideas of
conquest; to which Goltz replied, that the declaration of that manifesto, that
the Powers did not seek to enrich themselves, by no
means excluded a fair compensation. Ostermann immediately yielded the point:
"You are right," he said, "but mutual explanations are necessary to a mutual understanding." (11
fdllaitmieuxs'expliquer pour s'entendre.")
Meanwhile the conference at Mayence took place which was followed
by the fatal catastrophe, the breach of German unity—the open discord between
Austria and Prussia. This unhappy turn of affairs gave a decided superiority to Russian diplomacy iu the East, as well as to the French
Revolution in the West. From this time forward, Goltz found all doors and aU
ears closed against him. Russia, he was told, was allied both with Austria and
Prussia, and could not come to terms with the one without the consent of the
other; that before Prussia made any proposal in St. Petersburg
she ought to come to an understanding with her German ally—with the Emperor of
Austria. Such a reconciliation was indeed heartdy desired in Berlin. Count
Haugwitz was sent to Vienna to discuss the points in dispute, but he was not able to advance a single
step. Austria adhered to the demand she had made at Mayence of tbe Franconian
Margraviates, and Prussia to her decided refusal. Thus the Autumn passed away,
and the campaign in Champagne ended without results; and we
have seen how the suspense increased in October, and the crisis came on. On
the one side, Austria expressed her wish, not to restore the Bourbons, but to
achieve the conquest of French border lands; on the other, Prussia sent a
categorical demand first to Russia, and then to Austria, for
compensation in Poland for the late campaign, and the promise of further
acquisitions
366
PARTITION
OP POLAND. PRELIMINARIES. [Book VI.
as a reward for the continuance of her warlike toils. Catharine was equally vexed by both demands; but she possessed no ready
means of crushing them both at the same time, as such an attempt woidd lead to
the union of the two Courts against Russia: she therefore adhered to the policy
of postponement, and^repeated her former answer, that the German Powers must first of all come to
an agreement with one another. The whole European question,
therefore, was centered in that discussion of the note of Merle, which
Spielmann and Haugwitz had begun in the Prussian head-quarters.
We shall be obliged to go into the particulars of this discussion, because the resolutions, nay, even the humours, of the
Emperor, which formed the subject of it, had a decisive weight during the whole
period of the Revolution. All the threads on whieh hung the fates of France,
Germany and Poland, are here united. We may therefore break off our account of
the Polish question for a moment, for the purpose
of enquiring into the state of the Austrian monarchy, and the changes it had
undergone since the death of Joseph II.1
Although the Emperor Leopold was a man of perfectly clear views,
and—with all his pliabdity—of decided action, yet his reign had been too short
to allow of his reconstituting in accordance with his own
views the State whose prosperity had received so rude a shock
from Joseph. Most of the latter Monarch's innovations were withdrawn, but the
old institutions were not aU restored, and, in many cases, more suitable
reforms were promised. Thus Hungary was appeased, Belgium subjected, and a new government, including representatives of the
different Orders, was established in Milan. Yet no firm footing was gained by
these means in the hereditary lands, any more than in Belgium. The
1 The greatest part of what follows is taken from the despatches of the Dutch Minister, van Haeften, and the English Ambassador in Vienna, Sir Alexander Stratton.
Ch.
II.]
POLICY
OF THE EMPEROR LEOPOLD.
367
effects of the violent measures of Joseph's policy were still
continually felt. Leopold endeavoured to decentralize the governing bodies
throughout the Empire, and to restore their former aristocratic form; but they
did not work well, business dragged on slowly, and Leopold was compelled to call them sharply to account for
indolence and disorder. Nay, he was even obliged to appoint two* inspectors
over the Court Chancery, and to compel them by severe measures to conduct their
affairs with punctuality. The Emperor endeavoured to maintain
friendly relations with the Church, without however consenting to restore it to
its former position. He placed the civil schools once
more under the superintendence of the Bishops, but he protected the mixed
marriages of the Hungarian Protestants, and refused to
restore the monasteries which had heen broken up by Joseph. It remained,
therefore, to be seen how firmly the government could rest on this most ancient
pillar of the Austrian State. The second prop, the army, felt the effects of this sudden change of system still more deeply. In the
reign of Joseph, the influence of Field Marshall Laudon had been counteracted on all points by the counsels of General Lascy, in consequence of
which a series of important changes, both personal and material, had been
made. Under Leopold, the school, or party, of Laudon regained their ascendancy.
They ridiculed Lascy's reforms in the commissariat department, and quoted a
saying of Frederick H., that the good Lascy required officials at the cost of a million florins, to prevent the waste of a thousand.
Leopold did not proceed with so much haste and severity as his predecessor, but
the necessity of new changes soon became
indisputable. In December 1791, therefore, a commission was appointed to examine the regulations of Joseph, which was nominaUy presided over
by Prince Colloredo, a zealous adherent of Lascy, but really controlled by the
energetic General de Vins, a decided Laudonian; so that after a short time
Colloredo retired in vexation, prophesying mischief. These differences quickly
3G8
PARTITION
OF POLAND. PRELIMINARIES. [Book VI.
made themselves felt among the officers of the whole army, and spread
through them to the provincial nobility. The lower classes were hardly better
satisfied; for while the noblesse joyfully welcomed the abolition of Joseph's
new system of taxation, loud complaints arose from the peasants,
who apprehended a return of their former excessive burdens. The provincial
Estates had been restored in all the possessions
of the crown, likewise to the satisfaction of the noblesse whose influence
predominated in them: but the peasants, roused by their
pecuniary sufferings, demanded in many quarters a share in the representation.
A deputation from Styria made itself especiaUy remarkable. They represented
that their class comprised three-fourths of the population, and furnished three-fourths of the recruits and taxes of the whole province;
that it was therefore uujust to make them entirely dependent on the remainiug
fourth, and that it would be but fair to give them some share at least in the
representation of the country'. This was a most unwelcome demonstration,
aud the more so because similar movements were reported from Caruiola and
Bohemia. The government did not like to meddle with the matter and yet could
not entirely pass it over. Leopold therefore sent the petition of the Styrians to Count Kollowrath, President of the Austrian
Court Chancery, with instructions that this body was not to discuss the matter,
but that each of the Councillors, with the greatest secrecy, should send in his
opinion to the Emperor in a
sealed letter. Among the opinions thus expressed Leopold was most pleased with
one which recommended that the peasants should not elect a representative, but
that instead of this the so-called Landcs-adroeat
(an imperial official in Vienna, whose business it
was to lay the complaints of the Emperor's subjects before
the central authorities) should be a member of the Diet.
AVell-founded doubts were, however, entertained whether the peasants would be
satisfied with this arrangement; and before any decision
was arrived at, other petitions poured in, one from the peasants
Cn.
II.]
LIFE
IN VIENNA UNDER LEOPOLD.
3G9
of Transylvania, praying for ecpial representation, and another from the Bohemian Estates, asking for the same privileges which the other provinces possessed. The
case was rendered worse by apprehensions of opposition in Hungary —by the
smouldering discontent of the Galician nobles, who were nearly breaking out
into armed revolt against Joseph—by continued differences with
the States of Brabant— and, lastly, by revolutionary intrigues in Vienna
itself, where Leopold's active police cpuckly discovered traces of French
envoys—traces which, as we have learned from Lebrun's despatches, were by no
means invented by the authorities in Vienna, and which excited the
greater apprehension, when taken in connexion with the violent threats of the
Gironde.
These cares, however, had but little effect on the external life of the
aristocratic and official world which had to bear and digest them as it could. Vienna was as splendid, jovial and seductive as ever. The
prudish severity of Maria Theresa had been completely thrown off, and the
capricious harshness of Joseph II. entirely forgotten; no one could have dreamt
what frightful catastrophes, what boundless exertions, awaited
the age and the monarchy. Leopold managed to compensate himself in
secret for the toils of government, by the most excpiisite
enjoyments of every kind; the Court eagerly followed his example, and the
ruling classes of the Empire were plunged in the depths
of sensuality. Intellectual life had long been at the lowest ebb in the
Austrian capital; the moral strength of the higher classes had suffered greatly
under Joseph's energetic despotism; and when his control was suddenly withdrawn, they fell into a state of complete collapse. It seemed as
if higher politics only existed to secure to each individual the pleasures of
the table—to the select circles, their balls and gamingtables—and
to the ladies, a never-ending round of triumphs and enjoyments. The
intrigues of the ante-chamber and the bed-chamber regained at Court, and in the
various ministerial departments, the decided
influence of which they had
370
PARTITION
OF POLAND. PRELIMINARIES. [Book VI.
been so long deprived. In tbe Hofburg, in tbe Kohl Markt, and in the
Prater, the most blissful contentment reigned, from which the Emperor alone,
perhaps, was startled in anxious hours, when he turned his
thoughts to the weakness of his empire —when he thought of Paris and St.
Petersburg.
When, therefore, Leopold's sudden death raised the young Emperor
Francis to the highest dignity in Christendom, the position of affairs was in
all respects a critical one, and by no means well adapted for trying a change of policy. But the young monarch had no comprehensive and
well-cou-sidered views either of the objects to be aimed at, or of the powers
which he possessed. He was an Italian by birth, and had lived to his sixteenth
year in Florence. His education was
defective, but he was early filled with the consciousness
that he should one day reign; so that the Emperor
Joseph, who with all his absolute tendencies bad a lively sense of duty, was
highly dissatisfied with the narrow selfishness of bis nephew. He found him destitute of knowledge, stubborn in his claims on
others, and incapable of self-control; and he therefore took the education of
the youth into his own hands. The general superintendence of his training was
entrusted, by a no means fortunate choice, to the High Steward, Count
Colloredo, a man of reserved and somewhat melancholy character, who concealed
beneath his gravity no very remarkable talents, but a certain watchful slyness.
His instruction in military science was undertaken )jy the
Adjutants Lamberti—a very insignificant and
indolent person—and Itollin, a man of aspiring ambition, who soon obtained a
decided influence over his pupil. The scientific education of the >Toung
Archduke was conducted by the Jesuit Diesbacb, of whom there is not much to say, and the erudite, somewhat timid, and extremely conceited
Professor Schloissnigg. The Archduke was not reported to be possessed of remarkable talents, but the opinion gradually obtained that he would one day restore the policy of Joseph, in contradistinction to that of his father Leopold.
Ch.
II.] CHARACTER OF THE EMPEROR FRANCIS
II.
371
And in fact he prepared to realize these expectations, in spite of all
obstacles, a few months after his accession. Not that he was impelled by any grand idea, or attracted by any clearly understood system;
for that he was far too ignorant of the condition and affairs of his Empire;
and while Joseph seldom arrived at a well founded decision, from excessive
haste, Francis was often prevented from gaining the most
superficial knowledge of the subject before him, by an indolent dislike of all study. He passed the greater part of his time in
harmless but fruitless amusements, in music and dramatic representations, in
collecting animals and cultivating flowers; nor were these
pursuits ennobled by any artistic or scientific interest, but merely served for
the amusement of a sluggish and unoccupied mind. The fact that he left all the
labour of government to his Ministers, by no means lessened his idea of his own importance and dignity; on the contrary, the sense of
his own weakness not only left the domineering features of his character
intact, but rather enhanced • them, by the universal
distrust with which he incessantly persecuted his associates, his servants, and his allies. It is easy to see that though there
was little room in such a soil for Joseph's liberal aims, his tendencies towards absolutism and foreign conquest were sure to be renewed. The
impetuous consciousness of power begets a splendid despotism; overweening
self-conceit and fear beget a stifling tyranny. Without any clear understanding
of the objects at which he aimed, Francis decidedly wished for obedience at
home and conquest abroad. He equally disliked the provincial governments, to which his father had restored their former power, and
Leopold's pliancy, and readiness to concede, in his foreign policy. But to come
forward in the open and noisy manner, in which Joseph to his own injury had
done, was not in Francis' nature, which in spite of his youth had
never been ardent, and whieh hid itself in the affectation of dry sincerity,
and found a real pleasure in playing a double game. We have seen that he came for-
2a2
372
PARTITION
OF POLAND. PRELIMINARIES. [Book VI.
ward at first with the same peaceful professions towards foreign
countries as his father, and concealed the first steps of his plans of conquest
behind a public embassy furnished with exactly opposite instructions. In the same way he began his internal administration, by
rejecting all secret denunciations, and soon afterwards
re-establishing Joseph's system of police in a still severer
form. In political matters he ttsed the most confidential language to Kaunitz, and confirmed Cobenzl in his dignities;
but he really kept them both at a distance, and entrusted the actual conduct of
affairs to his tutor Colloredo. The demands for a popular representation
were silenced in all the provinces, but on the other hand,
complaints of encroachments on their religious freedom were raised by tbe
Protestants in Hungary. Joseph H.'s system of- centralization
was completely restored; the Bohemian and Austrian Court-Chancery, the
Audit-office, the Hungarian Chamber of Finance, the Ecclesiastical .and
Educational Committees, were all abolished; and in their stead a General
Directory was appointed, for the transaction of all the internal affairs of the
German and Hungarian lands, and the financial business of the public treasury.1 Belgium
and Milan alone—but only for the moment — remained
exempt from its operations. It was the same system which had existed from 1749
to 17G0 under Maria Theresa, and again since 17S'2 under Joseph II. During both
periods it had served as the basis of an aggressive foreign
policy,
1 President, Count Kollowrath.
Chancellor, Count Rottenhan, who was commissioned to report personally to the
Emperor. Vice-presidents, Count Mailath and Degclmann. General Comptroller, Count Zinzendorf. His deputy, Count Strasoldo. Minister of Education, Baron Birkenstock. Two
Councillors each for Bohemia, Galicia, Moravia, Upper and Lower
Austria,
Central Austria, Fore Austria, and Hungary. Inerease of expenditure 20,000
florins. Count Chotek, late
President of the Chamber of Finance, is the only official
who retired without pension, because he violently opposed the scheme, as-he had
the new system of taxation under Joseph.
Ch.
II.]
SECRET
AIMS OF FRANCIS II,
373
by enabling tbe government to transact its business and to collect
money with greater rapidity; on both occasions it had been laid aside 011 the adoption of a more peaceful policy, because from the very
composition of the Austrian State, centralisation soon led
to an excessive accumulation, and a consequent delay, of business. A thorough
change of system for the fifth time in fifty years was certainly not
advantageous to the conduct of affairs or political morality, but it was on
this occasion also, as we know, in perfect accordance with the
secret warlike intentions of the Emperor.
The last thing to be looked for under such circumstances, was a clear
and consistent policy. The internal condition of the provinces was in no
respect consolidated; their governing
bodies were unfitted both by the character of their members, and their
regulations, for the ddigent transaction of business; and the pecuniary
resources of the country were in a state of deep and embarassing decline. It
was, therefore, little in accordance with the nature of his resources that the mind of the
Emperor—prompted more by an anxious jealousy than a bold ambition—was bent upon
rapid and one-sided aggrandizement. He entered on a very slippery and intricate
path, without any full understanding of the clangers which surrounded
him, without any consciousness of his own strength, without any regard to the
claims whieh were sure to be made by his allies. Nay, he had no clear idea of
the Teal and
ultimate object of his own wishes; he only desired to get
as much, as he could for himself, and to give to others as little as possible.
This was the only feeling in the heart of the German Emperor, in the midst of
the most terrible crisis which ever befell Europe! Thus was it ordained by the
Great Rider of all things. A Revolution which at every
step sank deeper in blood and crime, derived its historical, purifying and
judicial character, from the fact that in the convulsions it occasioned its
opponents thought oidy of their own selfish objects. While the furious storm with its dashing waves was undermining the protect
374
PARTITION
OF POLAND. PRELIMINARIES. [Book VI,
iiig dams, the warders were quarrelling about the fragments of the
wrecks which drifted towards them!
Prussia, as we have seen, had once more rejected
by the note of Merle the Austrian claim to Baireuth; and, on the other hand,
had almost doubled her own demand of an increase of territory in Poland.
Spielmann, being well acquainted with the Emperor's wishes,
was in despair at the gulf which separated them from the views of Prussia.
A little consideration convinced him, indeed, that in the face of the
increasing danger of a French war, the Emperor had no means of forcing Prussia
to make the Franconian cession; and that Belgium might in a short time
be deluged by the Revolution, which would render it impossible to exchange it
for Bavaria. He therefore quickly made up his mind to a considerable
modification of his previous course. He offered to give up his claims on Franconia, if Prussia would cease to make the Bavarian-Belgian
Exchange dependent on the free consent of the Elector, and agree to the
immediate occupation of Bavaria by a corps of 40,000 Austrians. He represented,
that the Elector after his dalliance with the French, deserved no better
fate; that the troops might be marched into his territory under the pretext of
reinforcing the Army of the Rhine; and that by a surprise of this kind all
dangerous opposition might be forestalled. We here see how a single passionate desire sufficed to cloud the judgment,
and stifle every moral consideration. How often had Frederick II. declared a
close alliance with Bavaria to be one of the first requisites of a sound
Prussian policy! And how consistently had he made this principle
the centre of all his operations during the first and last ten years of his
great career! And now, the mind of his successor was filled with the one desire
of acquiring a Polish province; and in his eagerness to gratify this, he forget
all other duties, and aU other laws: "Let them
take Bavaria," he said, "if I do but obtain Posen. The Empress will
not let them" (the Austrians),
"into Poland, and they must have some-
Cb.
II.] HAUGWITZ AND SPIELMANN AT
VIENNA.
375
thing; then let the occupation of Bavaria take
place simultaneously with that of Poland." In
order to conclude the matter as soon as possible, he determined to send
Haugwitz to Vienna with Spielmann, that the former might immediately close with
the Emperor, if the latter woidd direct his ambassador at St. Petersburg to support the demands of Prussia.
When the two Diplomatists arrived in Vienna, at the end of November,
the first impression made on Count Haugwitz was by no means unfavourable.
Official opinion respecting the war had undergoue a
sudden and thorough change. Hitherto the saloons had resounded with noisy abuse
of Brunswick's want of skdl, and eager longings for peace. Now, however, in
consequence of a few words which the Emperor had let fall, the aristocratic circles were filled with nothing but compassion for the victims
of unavoidable misfortune, and a resolution to take the
field in 1793 with redoubled forces. Those 25,000 men,
whose non-appearance had had such fatal consequences to the war in Champagne, marched at last from Galicia to Nuremberg, with the Rhine as
their ultimate destination. Summonses to come forward in defence of the Empire
were despatched to Dresden, Hanover and Munich—the last not in a
friendly, but in an all the more emphatic, tone.
Lastly, on receipt of the news from Jemappes, an order was issued to place the
whole army on a war footing; and it is singular, on the one side, that in spite
of the French war this had not been clone long before, and on the other, that
it was done now, in spite of the extreme scarcity of
money. In connection with these vigorous measures it seemed a matter of course
for Austria to ally herself as closely as possible with Prussia. Meanwhile
another path was opened which might lead to
peace. Just at this juncture, the above mentioned English
note respecting the eventual conditions of an understanding with France
arrived. From this it appeared that England was decidedly opposed to the
spoliation of Poland; and thought of setting on foot an armed mediation between France and Germany.
376
PARTITION
OF POLAND. PRELIMINARIES. [Book VI.
Whatever plan might be preferred, the victorious progress of Dumouriez
seemed to render all unnecessary delay extremely dangerons, and a rapid
decision desirable,
But the difficulty was, that the Emperor Francis would agree to no
peace with France without receiving some accession
to his own territory; and at~the same time refused the only condition under
which a successful war coidd be carried on. He had,
indeed, like Spielmann made up his mind to forego his claim on Anspach and
Bayrenth, and to content himself with exchanging Belgium for Bavaria. Unfortunately, however, Belgium had fallen completely into the hands of the French, and until it was recovered, it was impossible to talk
to the Elector of Bavaria of an exchange. The Emperor, therefore, apprehended
that while Prussia took immediate possession of Posen, he shoidd himself gain
nothing but an uncertain, and perhaps altogether delusive, hope;
and for this reason he refused to make any cession of land to Prussia without
some positive guarantee. Pie was in the worst possible humour, and dismissed
Haugwitz at the first audience after five minutes conversation. Negotiations were then carried on between the Ministers, both by word of
mouth and in writing, for eight days without any result; even the Russian
Ambassador, who several times joined in the discussion, was unable to move
Austria a single step. On the 5th of December the Vice-Chancellor
Cobenzl brought forward a definite proposal, which, however, met with the most
violent opposition on the part of Prussia. "The Emperor,"
wrote Cobenzl, "acknowledges the claims of Prussia, but a full
understanding with Russia in this affair is above all things
necessary: if therefore Prussia shall take possession
of her share of Poland before Austria has annexed Bavaria, the Emperor, who
will by no means consent to tare worse than Prussia, will likewise occupy an
ecpial portion in Poland." Haugwitz, who
was well aware that Catharine would on no account admit
the Austrians into Poland, could only see in this demand a source of endless
Ch. II.]
HAUGWITZ'S
APPARENT TRIUMPH.
377
difficulties. In his reply, therefore, he insisted that
Austria should plainly declare her intentions respecting the compensation of Prussia, -without any reference to her own desire of Polish
territory. To make matters worse, the news from Belgium became more and more
discouraging. Dumouriez had occupied Liege,
Aix-la-Chapelle, and the line of the Ruhr, and Clerfait already despaired of
holding the left bank of the Rhine. But Haugwitz adhered with immovable
calmness to his declaration, that Prussia woidd immediately make peace with France, unless the Emperor allowed him to occupy
Posen. The various phases of the question were restlessly
discussed in the State Chancery at Vienna. If they satisfied Prussia, it was
said, the King would continue in the field, and they might hope with his help to expel the French from Belgium. They would then once more
have an object of exchange; and though under present circumstances Prussia would not consent to coerce the Bavarian Elector, yet
the Court of Vienna might hope the best from the friendly disposition of Charles Theodore. This Prince had been ready to make
the exchange in 1785, why should he not be so now? But there was another point
to be considered. Mighty England had hitherto on
every occasion expressed her deep dislike of the plan of exchange; her opposition might under all
circumstances frustrate the execution of the project; and in spite of the
protest of Haugwitz, Cobenzl ordered his London ambassador to inform the British Ministers of the whole scheme of compensation. For the moment, indeed, they were obliged to come to terms without England; for it
became more and more absolutely essential to keep the Prussian army on the
Rhine. On the 19th of December, therefore, Sp>ielmann gave the decisive
answer to Haugwitz; that the Emperor consented to the Prussian
acquisition in Poland, and woidd instruct his ambassador
at St. Petersburg to advocate the claims of Prussia before Catharine. Haugwitz
was highly delighted; he discussed the particulars of the
question with Spielmann during
378
PARTITION
OF POLAND. PRELIMINARIES. [Book VI.
the following days, obtained sight of the new instructions about to be
forwarded to the Austrian ambassador in St. Petersburg, and hastened to inform
his Sovereign of the desired result. The news arrived at
head-quarters during the celebration of the Christmas festival and excited
universal satisfaction. "Haugwitz has managed the affair
excellently," cried Manstein, "and achieved the most encouraging result." The King, Bischoffswerder
and the others, agreed with him; Lucchesini, ever full of distrust against
Austria, alone clamped their triumph by a closer consideration of the Austrian
instructions. "The Emperor," he said, "in his note of the 5th,
still demanded a Polish province for himself, in the event of
the failure of the Bavarian exchange. Now the new
instructions make express reference to this very note; nay, it literally says,
that as Austria's compensation—shoidd the Bavarian plan be unsuccessful—could only be found in Poland, Francis begged the
Russian Empress to agree as soon as possible to a treaty for the partition of
Poland. According to this," continued the suspicious statesman,
"it is clear that the Emperor only gives up the actual
occupation of Poland, but not his Polish claims; and as these
last will be unconditionally rejected by Catharine, it is to be feared that she
will refuse her consent to the whole treaty."
The King had no answer to make to these observations. It. was evident,
that he still stood on very uncertain ground as regarded
Austria. Meanwhile better news arrived from St. Petersburg; Catharine declared
herself ready, in case of need, to conclude a treaty even without Austria. The
King therefore took no account of the difficulties raised by Lucchesini, and announced to the newly appointed Imperial
Commander-in-Chief, Prince Frederick Josiah of Saxe Co-burg, that he was now iu
a position to assist him in drawing up the plan for their joint
campaign.
Meanwhile the bitterest feelings prevailed in Vienna,
There was not a single Statesman in that city who did not regard
Ch. n.] FATAL
JEALOUSY BETWEEN THE GERMAN POWERS. 379
the new arrangements as wrested from Austria by the necessities of war. The Emperor was still of opinion that he had really
made no promise which could entitle Prussia to take possession of her new
acquisition before himself. On the contrary, he had the decided intention of
using every means in his power to deprive his importunate rival of the
slightest advantage. Cobenzl wrote in this strain to the Austrian ambassador at
St. Petersburg, and instructed him to urge Catharine to limit Prussia's share
of Poland to fair proportions, and to promote the rapid fidfdment of Austria's plan of exchange.1
Colloredo and Rollin were quite of the same opinion; none of them considered
the fatal consequences to the revolutionary war which must arise from such a
course.
These were the immediate results of the new alliance, into which the German Powers had entered with Russia. Iu appearance, the
number of the enemies of the French Revolution was increased; in reality
a selfishness and a confusion were spread throughout
Europe, which allowed the Jacobins on the one side, and the Czarina on the other, to carry out their plans unhindered. In
appearance, the two German Powers were now joining in a common struggle against
the French Republic, and for the extension of their own territory on the Rhine
and the Vistula; but in reality, they mutually regarded one another
with the bitterest dislike, suspicion and malice. The
germ of the subjugation of Germany by the arms of France sprang up in the same
moment, and in the same negociation, in which Austria agreed to the Second
Partition of Poland.
1
Ssolowjoff, Der Fall Polens, p.
311.
380
PARTITION
OF POLAND. THE TREATY. [Book VI.
CHAPTER III. PARTITION OF POLAND.
THE TREATY.
Miserable
condition of Poland.—Measures
taken by the patriots.— French
agents.—views of Catharine.—Invasion
of the Prussians.— Decision
consequent on events in prance.—Traatv
of partition of jan. 23d.—England's
displeasure at it apteased by the recognition of english laws of neutrality.
At the
end of 1792, Poland was governed by the military power of Catharine, and in
those districts which her arm did not reach, complete disorder reigned.1
Since King Stanislaus had given in his adhesion to the Confederation of
Targowice, the latter was regarded as the sovereign representative of the nation, and as such had appointed a supreme ruling Court, with the title of Generality, at Brzesc, under the
presidency of Felix Potocki. In addition to this a similar Committee was
established for Lithuania, which Bishop Kossakowski had formed
with the aid of his brother. These two men therefore, Kossakowski and Potocki,
represented aU that was left of Polish government. They did what every
reactionary power does under similar circumstances:
they abolished the hitherto existing laws and authorities, promised ample freedom and abundant blessings for the future,
and for the present bestowed all power and office on their own adherents. The governing bodies in the towns
1 For the following description we
have consulted (in addition to the published
accounts iu the Political Journal)
Oginski's Memoirs, Ferraiid's and Lelewel's Histories, and tbe M. S. despatches of Buchholtz
in Warsaw, and Hogguer in St. Petersburg.
Ch.
III.] DESPOTIC RULE OF THE "GENERALITY"- rfSf POLAND.
381
which dated from 1791 were dissolved; and those of their members who
belonged to the nobility, and who would have considered themselves degraded by
accepting a civic office, were deprived of their political rights: In every way-loodeship the adherents of the ruling party formed district committees, which
assumed all the functions of police and administration. The finances were
likewise organized afresh, and the Royal fiscus was separated from the
Lithuanian, in order to entrust each of them to a newly
appointed commission composed of men who could be
relied upon. In a similar manner all the existing courts of law were done away
with, and new tribunals formed from partisans of the Confederation. But as even
these means did not seem sufficient
to secure the power of the party, the Generality reserved to itself the
decision on appeals. If we add to this, that whoever wished to exercise any
political right, or official function, was obliged to
sign a note of unconditional recognition of the Confederation,
we shall have before us, in tolerable completeness, the measures by which a
minority —inconsiderable in talent, rights and numbers—took possession of every department of the government.
The real support of the ruling party was, we need hardly say, the
Russian army, which crushed every symptom of discontent
by armed force. The Polish regiments, still numbering
about 37,000 men, were dispersed throughout all parts of the kingdom, and
surrounded by a superior force of Russians;
a large portion of them too were dismissed without reward or pension. The
Russians placed the new levies in their own regiments as recruits, subjected
the officers to the strict surveillance of the police, and took
the arsenals throughout the whole kingdom into their own custody.
There was no possibility, therefore, of any further
resistance, and the defenceless land had to endure the
arbitrary will of its contpieror. In Warsaw the Polish garrison which guarded
the palace had to make way for a Russian force. The seat of the real
government, the Generality, was removed
to Grodno, al
382
PAlTITION
OF POLAND. THE TREATY. [Book VI
though the Confederation itself would rather have gone to Warsaw. An order on this head arrived from St. Petersburg
at the same time that the negotiations with Prussia produced a definite result;
and as the Russians would have bad the Generality as completely under military
supervision in Warsaw as in Grodno, tbe motive of
the Russian Court was evidently the desire to remove the Polish government as
far as possible from the influence of Prussia. Meanwhile the provinces, had to
provide for the maintenance of their foreign protectors: they had to furnish
the daily supply of provisions and forage; and in November
supplies for eight months, according to Russian tarifs. The inhabitants soon
began to suffer terribly from the laxity of Russian discipline, which allowed
the same licence to the brutality of the soldiers,
as if they were in an enemy's land. Amid these scenes of misery the Generality
sent an embassy of twelve magnates to St. Petersburg, to present to the
"immortal" Catharine, the thanks of their liberated
country. They begged for an alliance based on implicit trust and friendship, were fortunate enough to see the face of
the Empress, and received a gracious, but somewhat vague, assurance of her
continued protection.
Meanwhile these impotent rulers had hardly agreed with one another for
a single day. Incredible as it may seem. Felix Potocki bad
entered on his unholy task in good faith, and having once secured the
privileges of his Order, was really desirous of acting in a mild and
respectable manner. He cherished, perhaps, at times the ambitious hope of
raising himself to the unenviable throne of King
Stanislaus, and he certainly treated him with indecent severity. But in other
cases, notwithstanding his great vanity, he manifested neither a persecuting
nor a selfish spirit, and on this very account was soon in bitter feud with his principal colleagues. The Crown-General Branicki, a man
of equally empty character, was annoyed that Potocki alone was in every body's
mouth, and that even the army had received a new uniform on the
Cn.
III.] PREPARATIONS
FOR REVOLT IN POLAND.
383
pattern of Potocki's coat. Still more decided was the opposition of the Kossakowski's, who in Lithuania extorted money and
estates for themselves and their adherents in the most shameless manner; and
being supported by secret patrons in St. Petersburg
repelled the interference of Potocki and the Generality with
scorn. And thus all harmonious action gradually vanished
from the new Government, and its discord was greatly increased when Potocki
appointed a commission to deliberate on the constitution. Some
wished to retain a few fragments of the constitution of 1791, and to alleviate
the condition of the burghers and peasants. Others, fearing the loss of their
aristocratic power, or their position in the State, demanded with angry fanaticism the entire restoration of the old state of things. In
short, foreign despotism and domestic anarchy were
displayed in the most glaring colours.
It was natural that the most furious indignation should rage in the
hearts of the great mass of the people. The leaders of 1791
had met with a hospitable reception in Vienna and Dresden. The complaints of
the land were poured in upon them; and even if they had not themselves been
filled with a burning desire of liberation, the grief and anger of their countrymen would have roused them to action. The peasants, indeed,
sunk in slavery and barbarism, had no idea of the meaning of a Polish State,
and were without any spark of national feeling; but at the present moment they
too felt the miseries of war in the shape of hunger and
ill-treatment. In the towns, •''and especially in Warsaw, party fends were at
their greatest height: no patriot would seat himself at the-same table with a Targoivician,
who was made to feel the crashing weight of public contempt under the very eyes of the Russian garrison. The ladies, whose voice
has always had so much weight in Poland, turned their backs upon them, and
sometimes asked the Russian officers why they had marched to the aid of such canaille.
The Russians, conscious of their own ascendancy, only
laughed,
384
PARTITION
OP POLAND. THE TREATY. [Book VI.
and indemnified themselves by the silent advances which their influence
made amidst the excitement of the nation. There was a number of persons, accustomed from their youth to the intervention of the
Russians, who preferred submitting to these than to the hated dominion of the
Targowicians;-and we shall presently see, alas! how soon and how powerfully these sentiments contributed at that time
to the universal demoralization of Poland. The
anger of the rest of the nation was only increased by the perception of the
existence of such feelings among their countrymen. In the mood in which
they were, it needed no great persuasion to spread conspiracy
through every part of the land. In December there existed in every town
in the kingdom secret unions for the liberation of the country, which sprang up
only too independently of one another, and with too various interna]
organizations to allow of their being quickly united in a
common enterprise. On this very account they fell more easily under the
observation of the police, so that the Generality and the Russians joined in
taking every conceivable precaution, and despatched more
and more alarming reports to St. Petersburg. But
they did not succeed in making any actual discoveries. A Lithuanian nobleman,
named Jasinski, one of the most restless of the conspirators, managed all at
once, under the eyes of bis persecutors, to bring these various unions into close connexion. He published a licentious novel under the
title "Extracts from the works of the Chinese Philosopher Good."
Every body read the book, but only tfie initiated learned that it contained a key for their correspondence, and a model for their organization. By this means he succeeded in a very short time
in uniting the country in one great league, and at the same time in evading the
investigations of the police.1
In the spring of 1791 we saw the French Ambassador Deseorches engaged
in a
similar intrigue. The Polish
1 Lelewel, II. 173.
Ch. III.]
FRENCH
AGENTS IN POLAND.
385
and Russian governments, being informed of Lis machinations, had expelled him from the country immediately after the
appointment of the Generality; but one of his
secretaries De Bonneu was left behind, and effected communications between the
conspirators and Paris with no less zeal than tbe Ambassador himself. We know
the far-reaching plans of Lebrun respecting Eastern Europe, and his connexion with Austrian and Hungarian malcontents. Dumouriez too interested
himself witb all the ardour of his nature for the fate of Poland, and gave De
Bonneu the positive assurance that Poland was saved if the French continued to
be victorious. Russia felt the palpable residts of these
operations in December, when a sudden revolt excited by French agents broke out
among the Don Cossacks. It was immediately suppressed, and buried in the
deepest mystery; but when taken in connexion with a conspiracy of nobles, discovered a short time before in Moscow,1 it
probably contributed to incline Catharine to complete the outrage upon Poland.
Nor was the real state of things altogether unknown to the frontier
authorities of Prussia. The activity of the patriots
was still greater in Great Poland than elsewhere;
since according to the preliminary agreement with Prussia, these Palatinates
had remained free from Russian troops, and the Poles, therefore, were able to
carry on their operations almost unchecked. The burghers of Posen had already played a great part in the movements which had led
to the constitution of the 3rd of May. Their chief
Wibycki, a man of wealth, intellect and knowledge, had been intimately connected with Descorches, and still directed the conspiracy against the Russians and the Targowicians.2 In
consecpience of the reports on this subject winch reached Berlin, Count Goltz,
as early as December, proposed to the Court of St. Petersburg that all the
Polish regiments should be disarmed.
1 In September under Prince Trubetzkoi, and Count Lapucbin. — 2 Memorial of Lucchesini, April 7th,
1791.
386
PARTITION
OF POLAND. THE TREATY. [Book VI.
But Catharine could not make up her mind to a step whieh was in fact a
declaration of war against the very existence of the
Polish State. "It would be difficult for the Empress,'1 said
Ostermann to the Prussian ambassador, "to break the promise so solemnly
made to the Targowicians." Golz flew out, saying that Russia ought to have
thought of that before,
and that such scruples at the present moment were tantamount to disloyalty
towards his master, to whom Russia had so distinctly promised her aid in the
attainment of a compensation. Ostermann endeavoured to pacify him by saying
that he was in the right, that he (Ostermann) had only
expressed his personal opinion and not that of his Government, and that he had
no doubt of a satisfactory result as soon as a declaration arrived from Vienna
agreeable to their views. Personally the Russian Minister woidd have been glad to break off the whole negotiation: he and his
friends Bakunin and Woronzow, and the gifted foreign Minister Count Besborodko,
were extremely averse to relinquishing to the Germans a single
clod of Polish soil, which they had long been accustomed to regard as the property of Russia. Catharine seldom consulted these men on the question.
She entrusted the Polish affairs at that time chiefly to the young Suboff, the
twelfth of her acknowledged favourites, a thoroughly empty and wortldess man, who with little talent but a restless ambition, hoped to make
for himself a political career like that of Potemkin. Suboff, again, took the
advice of Count Markoff, an official who had risen to notice under Ostermann,
and who united to skill and activity an utter untrustworthiness
and an old Russian contempt for his fellow-creatures. It was chiefly from
jealousy of the Vice Chancellor that he advocated the scheme of partitioning
Poland.
Such was the position of affairs in St. Petersburg, when Rasumowski announced from Vienna the commencement of Haugwitz's negotiation.
He reported that the acquisition of Bavaria for Austria had been rendered
doubtful by Dnmou-
Ch.
III.] CATHERINE UNWILLING TO PARTITION
POLAND. 387
riez's victories in Belgium, in consequence of
which the Emperor opposed the claims of Prussia,
meditated the occupation of a Polish province, and
talked of invoking the intervention of England in this
important affair. This intelligence roused the Empress from her long-enduring indecision. We have her deliberations on the subject before
us, in the minute instructions which she caused to be
drawn up at that time for Count Sievers,1 her
newly appointed Ambassador to Warsaw. We clearly see in this document the
reluctance with which she gave up the system of
keeping Poland as a vassal State. With all the love of an owner for his property she would have defended Poland against the encroachments of the Germans, if this ungrateful country had not itself
repelled her powerful protection. "From the
beginning of our government," said she, "we have endeavoured to found
our relations to Poland on an enduring basis; but the Poles, instead of meeting
our advances with corresponding friendliness, have only manifested the
bitterest hatred; and thus it came to the first
Partition of 1772; our consent to which, as all the initiated know, was only
wrested from us by the force of circumstances." She added, that ever since
that time she had manifested the same desire to protect the Poles, and had always met with the same aversion; that after the revolution
of the 3rd of May she had summoned the Targowicians, and procured for them,
their friends and dependents, the dominion over Poland. But she said that she
had found even these untrustworthy, selfish, and divided among
themselves; that King Stanislaus was continually exciting
his people and army against Russia; that the Targowicians
complained, that immediately on the withdrawal of the Russian troops a general
revolution would break out; and that to crown all, the poison
of French doctrines was spreading through the land. It was clear, she
concluded, that under these circumstances no improvement was to be
1 Dec. 22. Given in Smitt, Suwarow, II. 522.
2 b 2
388
PARTITION
OP POLAND. THE TREATY. [Book VI.
hoped for; aud that she could only have in Poland a peaceful and harmless neighbour by reducing it to utter impotence.
We have here the fundamental principles of Catharine's Polish policy.
She wished for no partition as long as she saw any
possibility of ruling the whole country in a peaceful
manner. She did not lend an ear to the Prussian claims until that possibility
bad been utterly destroyed by the Poles themselves. And even then she hesitated
for months, waited and remained inactive, until
European events rendered all further evasion impossible. She touches on these
in her instructions, but in a far less direct and
candid maimer.
She expressed her fears lest the King of
Prussia should take possession of a
Polish province without her concurrence, or enter into an understanding with
the Polish patriots against Russia. She pointed out the danger that the King
might conclude a peace with France, and that then her natural ally, the Roman
Emperor, might fall into the greatest difficulties. In reality however resentment against Austria, which only
three quarters of a year ago had proposed to her the union of Poland with
Saxony, was the liveliest feeling in her heart: and what she
feared was, either the return of the Emj>eror to the same
policy, with the powerful aid of England, or the concert of the two German
Powers to effect a partition of Poland without Russian cooperation. To avert
these dangers, therefore, she resolved to close with Prussia as quickly as possible, This plan too she said had undeniable advantages. "By
adopting it, we agree to an act whose whole result is to liberate all Russian
lands and cities, peopled or founded by a cognate race, and confessing the same
faith with ourselves, from oppression; by uniting them with our
empire, we raise them to an equal pitch of glory and prosperity as all our
beloved subjects, we hope, enjoy." She sent orders to Count Ostermann to
commence negociatious with the Prussian Ambassador for a treaty of partition.
Cn.III.]
PRUSSIANS ENTER POLAND UNDER FALSE PRETEXTS. 389
On the 16th of December, accordingly, the Russian Minister announced to Count Golz that the long hesitation of the Emperor,
and the threatening protest of England, rendered
it necessary to lose no more time. He said that Catherine agreed to the
acquisition desired by Prussia, and its immediate seizure by the royal troops;
that she herself intended to incorporate a corresponding tract of country in
the Ukraine. Golz began to breathe freely when he heard the
long-wished for words. He was indeed somewhat terrified
by the tremendous enlargement of the Russian acquisition:
but Prussia was evidently not in a condition to make good any opposition, and
the Berlin cabinet by return of post ordered the Ambassador to
overlook these scruples, and to proceed to the discussion of the articles of
the treaty. The first-fruits of this agreement were seen in a Prussian
manifesto of the 6th of January, to the effect that the Jacobin intrigues in Poland, which would be doubly
dangerous shoidd the French war continue, compelled Prussia in consideration
for her own safety to occupy the frontier lands. This declaration has been
condemned, with rare unanimity, as a piece of clumsy
hypocrisy; and it is sufficiently
evident that the Warsaw clubs were not the primary
cause of the partition. But the facts which the manifesto
brought forward are not the less true,—viz. that general preparations were
going on for a war against Russia and the Targowicians,
and that too in league with France, which Prussia could under no circumstances
have allowed. This state of things was indeed partly owing to the unfortunate
diplomatic mistakes of Prussia herself in the preceding summer; but these could
no longer be made good, and fate had to run its course.
On the 14th of January Molleudorf crossed the. borders with five columns, which
entered simultaneously from Silesia, the Neumark, and
East Prussia, and cut off the district claimed by Prussia from Poland.
The excitement which this proceeding caused
throughout the whole of Europe was tremendous: a cry was raised from
390
PARTITION
OF POLAND. THE TREATY. [Book VI.
all quarters that a new Partition was on foot, and that an act of such injustice must be prevented at any cost. It was the English
government, above all, which gave the most energetic expression to this
feeling. Lord Whitworth in St. Petersburg, aud Murray at the Prussian
head-quarters launched forth into the loudest protests,
and the Cabinet of St. James became dady more zealous iu their endeavours to
preserve peace with France for themselves, and to restore it between Germany
and France. For it now appeared evident that the longer the
revolutionary war lasted, and the more widely it extended, the freer
scope would the Russians gain for their aggressive policy in Eastern Europe.
Pitt— whom an inveterate delusion has falsely represented as the real torch of
the European conflagration—left no stone unturned
at the very last moment to avert the danger from our
quarter of the globe. He sent repeated declarations in every direction, that
the French ought to be allowed to manage their own internal affairs, and that
the Republic ought to be acknowledged, as soon as it gave up all efforts on its part to revolutionize the neighbouring states and to
extend its frontiers. He even consented, in order to gain over Austria to his
views, to give up an old principle of English policy, that Belgium must always
be in the hands of a great military power as a bulwark against
France. He promised Austria his consent to the Bavarian-Belgian Exchange, if she woidd make peace with the French Republic through the
mediation of England, and then on her part support
the English protest against the partition of Poland. This attitude of
the London cabinet naturally excited lively apprehensions at St. Petersburg,
and a fresh feeling of irritation against the Emperor who had
first drawn the English into the cpiestion. In addition to this a great
dissatisfaction with Catharine began at this time to
shew itself in Sweden. Complaints arrived from Stockholm of the brutality of
the Russian ambassador, Stakelberg; there was a talk of collecting troops on the borders of Finland; in short it be-
Ch.
HI.] THE JACOBINS ARE CATHARINE'S BEST
ALLIES. 391
came known that the Swedish regent strongly inclined towards France. If we consider, lastly, that the French influence continuaUy gained ground in Constantinople, and that fresh reports were continually spread of Turkish armaments, it was impossible for Catharine to conceal from herself that many dangerous elements only needed an energetic leader to
combine them against Russia; and we may imagine bow deep the importance she would attach to the efforts of England to put an end to the French war.
Thus the interests of the different parties were so strangely and
unnaturally complicated, that though Catharine felt nothing but aversion and
disgust towards the Parisian regicides, yet
their bloody act and its political consequences gave exactly the turn to events
which she most desired. We have seen above that the execution of Louis XVI. ensured the victory of the Jacobins and their policy of conquest, and thereby made the breach between
England and France irremediable. The last obstacle iu Catharine's path was thus
removed. The blow which severed the head of Louis XVI. from his body, was at
the same time the death stroksfaf the national existence of Poland. The clouds
which had gathered on the Russian horizon round the
pacific plans of England were dispersed in a moment. By the certainty of a
naval war, the inaction of the Porte was secured. With regard to Sweden,
Ostermann now told Lord Whitworth, that if England would seriously interfere the people of Stockholm would soon be brought to
reason. Murray still grumbled and scolded when Poland was
talked of at Prussian head-quarters, but he no longer raised any formal
protest, but at the most declared that England would reimburse herself in the French colonies and islands—to
which Lucchesini naturaUy gave a joyful consent. In
short the Russo-Prussian policy gained free scope by the warlike measures of
the Jacobins against England.
And thus the negotiation between Ostermauu
and Golz on the particulars of the treaty of partition continued to be
392
PARTITION
OF POLAND. THE TREATY. [Book VI.
carried on in the deepest secresy. Prussia had carried her main point—the acquisition of a Polish province—very much against the wishes of
Russia; but in other respects Catharine assumed to herself the
decision in respect to all the detads of the treaty. Every reference which Golz
ventured to make to the disproportionate extent of the Russian share was met
with dogmatic pride. The whole affair was represented
as an act of self-defence, forced upon Catharine by the revolutionary
principles which had spread from Paris to Warsaw; and France was designated as
the real enemy which was to be opposed by the partition of
Poland. Russia accordingly promised to keep her forces, as long as the French
war lasted, on the present numerical footing; but she demanded of Prussia a
promise far more pregnant of consequences—not to enter into any separate peace with France before the complete suppression of the
Revolution. The Prussian Ministers submitted to this, imagining that Austria
too would not continue the war longer than was necessary; and they were
completely satisfied by a verbal assurance of Ostermann, that this
article was really a matter of indifference to the Russian government, and ha*
only been adopted to quiet Austria for the moment. With regard to the Emperor
himself and his claims, the two Powers promised
one another to consent to the Bavarian-Belgian Exchange, and, if called upon, to afford the Emperor their good services
and support as far as possible. Prussia, however, added a distinct declaration,
that by the word support, she only meant armed assistance for the reconcpiest of Belgium, and not compulsory measures against the Elector of
Bavaria. Tbe two Powers were to receive homage in their respective Polish
provinces before the 21st of April, and they gave a mutual guarantee of their
possession against all opponents. They agreed to observe the strictest
secrecy in respect to the whole purport of the treaty; and Russia more
especially made it a sine
qua non, that even the Court of Vienna should not be invited to accede to the
treaty, or be informed of its
Ch. iii.]
SHAMELESS
DUPLICITY OF RUSSIA.
393
existence, until after the exchange of ratifications, and consequently after the fait
accompli in Poland. The Prussian Ministers saw in this a final outbreak of
Russian anger against the policy of the Emperor Leopold, and
deplored beforehand the bitter feelings which such a proceeding must
necessarily excite in Vienna. They had, however, no means of resistance, since
Catharine made the conclusion of the whole treaty dependent on their acceptance of this one article. And thus the document, so
fatal in its consequences, was signed on the 23rd of January 1793.
It contained as we have seen more than one clause well calculated to
damp the joy which was felt in Berlin at the new acquisition. What they learned from other quarters respecting the sentiments of the
Russian government, by no means opened very splendid prospects to the Prussian
allies. While Ostermann was employed in drawing up the treaty of partition with
Golz, Suboff assured the Polish Count Oginsky that all reports of
a new partition were false, and that Catharine was only thinking how she might
strengthen Poland against the enemy in the West. Ostermann also hinted to
various members of the diplomatic corps, that Prussia positively demanded three or four Polish Palatinates ; that Catharine was strongly
opposed to such a transaction; but, beset as she was by numerous cares, she
might at last be obliged to yield to Prussian importunity. A distinct desire on the part of Russia was thus manifested
to throw all the odium and responsibility of the step on the shoulders of her
ally, and while appropriating to herself more than a double share, to represent
herself to the European Powers as a reluctant accomplice, and to the Poles
themselves as their constant protector against Prussian
greed. Even in the last days of January, the State Councillor Markoff told the
English Ambassador, that it was impossible to answer for the future, but that
for the present no partition would take place. Lord Whitworth, who had no proofs of the contrary to produce, was obliged to rest
satisfied.
394
PARTITION
OF POLAND. THE TREATY. [Book VI.
Such a system of bare denial could not of course be carried on long. No
very earnest resistance on the part of England was to be expected after the French declaration of war, and
Catharine immediately proceeded to take steps to assure herself of the warm
friendship of the British Cabinet. Effectual means of doing this were not
wanting. On occasion of the first Partition in 1772,
she had granted that country an extremely advantageous treaty of commerce: she
was now in a position to offer still more important concessions of a similar kind. Not only was the former treaty not renewed on
its expiration, but Catharine, in the year 1780, had
raised the most decided opposition to the whole maritime code of England, by
the celebrated act of armed neutrality, to which she had hitherto steadily
adhered. As the questions connected with it play an important part in the revolutionary war, it will be necessary to recall to our
minds its most important provisions.
As war by sea had hitherto always aimed, not only at injuring the
hostile State, but at destroying the commerce of the enemy, the question
naturally arose, what course was to be pursued with
respect to commercial intercourse between the enemy and other, neutral,
nations. The theoretical principle may, indeed, be
easdy deduced from the very idea of neutrality: he who acknowledges another
State as neutral, thereby foregoes all claim to stop its
commerce even with an enemy. And on the other hand, whoever declares himself
neutral, is careful not even indirectly to favour the warlike operations of
either party by his commercial transactions. But clear as these two propositions are, when taken generally, they often become very
doubtful in their application. In fact disputes have never
been wanting concerning the limitation of their meaning; since the neutral
States naturally desired the greatest possible freedom of intercourse, and the belligerents desired the greatest
possible extension of their repressive measures. There were three questions,
especially, which formed constant subjects of discussion. It
ch.
in.]
THE
RIGHT OF SEARCH.
395
was acknowledged that an enemy's property was fair booty, but that a
neutral ship was to be respected: but how if the former was found in the latter
nnder the protection of the neutral flag? It was agreed that no neutral might
supply either party with the materials of war, or contraband
goods: but how far, and to what goods, did this principle extend? It was
determined that no neutral could demand free access into a blockaded harbour,
any more than into a beleaguered fortress; but what was necessary to entitle a blockade to be regarded as really effectual? It was to the
interest of the great Naval Powers, who were usually involved in every war by
sea, and might hope to decide its issue—and since- the end of the 17th century
it had been especially the interest of England—to answer all these
cpiestions in favour of the belligerent Powers. A neutral vessel, they
maintained, must submit to search and the seizure of all hostile property found
upon it; contraband goods were not only arms, but materials for shipbiulding, and warlike implements; a blockade came into existence
immediately after it was declared. In fact England had succeeded in gradually
gaining from nearly all the European states, and especially from France, the
recognition by treaty of these principles.
Now it was these propositions against which Russia protested in 1780, by denying the right of search, by narrowing the definition of contraband goods, and by requiring for an
effectual blockade the actual closing of the blockaded place by an armed force. All the Baltic states, together with Austria, joined at that time
in this declaration; and though England protested against the Russian
statements, she thought it better during the troubles of the American war to
abstain from active measures. But now that she was on the threshhold of
a new naval contest, it was a vital question both for her warfare and her
commerce, whether Russia still adhered to the principles of the armed
neutrality or not. Catharine on her part felt at the time but little interest in the question. As the loud tone which she had
396
PARTITION
OF POLAND. THE TREATY. [Book VI.
assumed against the French Revolution might, at all events nominally,
involve her iu the war; as Prussia and Austria were already
engaged in it, and Holland would take up arms simultaneously with England, the
only neutral States which remained were Denmark and Sweden, the latter of which
had at this very time displeased her by a manifest leaning towards the French
republic. She did not, therefore,
hesitate a moment to take the decisive step in favour of England.
On the 6th of February Ostermann sent for Lord Whit-worth, and
communicated to him a long despatch containing instructions for Count Woronzow,
the Russian Ambassador at the English court, which was on
the point of being sent off to London. Its chief purport was, that Russia would
gladly enter into the league against France, and send auxdiary troops—that she
had reason for apprehensions on the side of Turkey and Sweden, and was taking every precaution against those two Powers;
that for her own part she gave lip all the privileges of the armed neutrality,
and left England to act in this respect as she thought fit.1
After such a concession, Ostermann could unhesitatingly decline
the English proposal of an armed mediation between France and Austria, which,
moreover, had been divested of all its value by the latest occurrences in
Paris. Fie' also promised soon afterwards, that Russia
woidd not only forbid her own subjects to trade with France, but would urge
a similar measure in Stockholm and Copenhagen. 2 This
whole scheme was completed about the middle of February—i. e.
before intelligence of the Freneh declaration of war against England
was known in St. Petersburg'—by an autograph letter of Catharine to
Woronzow, in whieh she empowered him to declare, that if England possessed the
means of hindering the partition of Poland, the
Empress would not be sorry, as she was being forced into that measure by the
1 Hogguer, Feb, G. — 2 Hogguer, Feb. 11th,
Ch.
III.] CATHARINE THROWS A SOP TO
ENGLAND. 397
King of Prussia; that in any case she would gladly enter into a treaty
of alliance and commerce with England, and awaited the proposals of the English
Ministry on this head.1
At this period General Dumouriez was eagerly pressing forward towards
the Dutch frontiers, and France was equipping new fleets in all her arsenals
for the struggle witli England: iu such a ptosition no English Minister could
reject the Russian offers for the pmrpose of
maintaining an impotent protest against the Polish partition. On the contrary, Pitt desired to transport a Russian corps by sea from Dantzic to
Flanders, and he would have sacrificed more precious things than Poland for the immediate renewal of the commercial treaty. His answer, therefore, was
completely affirmative, and offered the immediate conclusion of a formal
treaty of alliance. But in this case too Catharine adhered to her tactics of
reserve. She had as little intention of entrusting troops against
France to Pitt, as to the German Powers: she considered
England's silence about Poland was sufficiently paid for by Russia's
resignation of the maritime neutrality, and she would only grant an effectual
alliance agaiust France, if England would surrender Turkey
to the Russian arms. They therefore contented themselves, on the 25th of March,
with a preliminary treaty—in which they mutually promised friendship, good
offices, curtailment of intercourse with France, and promotion of English commerce—and the announcement of a new
negotiation concerning a treaty of alliance.
In this manner Poland lost all prospect of English intercession; in no direction did any obstacle appear to the projected partition. Let us see in what condition
the unhappy country now found itself.
1 Hogguer, Feb. 25tb.
398 PARTITION
OF POLAND. THE EXECUTION. [Book VI.
CHAPTER IV. PARTITION OF POLAND. THE
EXECUTION.
Excitement
in polano caused by the entrance of Prussian
troops.— Arrival of the Russian
ambassador, count sievers.—Anarchy in poland.—Military operations of the Russians.—Stupid insensibility of polish peasants.—German sympathies in great Poland.—Immorality of TnE nobles.— Wholesale bribery.—Russia intrigues against ptussia.—Occupation of the ceded provinces.—Merits and faults of prussian policy.
Whilst the
Powers at St. Petersburg were comiug to a decision in diplomatic silence,
Poland was being agitated by the first shock of the Prussian invasion. Intelligence of the coming event arrived during the last days of
the year 1792 from the Polish Ambassador in Berlin, aud fell like a thunderbolt upon the Generality at Grodno. Great was the terror and
excitement produced. But Catharine bad so thorongly
kneaded the Confederation, that its leaders hastened in a body to the Russian
commander Igelstrom, begging that he would help them, place himself at their
head, and lead them against those odious Prussians. Igelstrom, usually no
pliant man but proud and domineering in his character,
feared by all his subordinates and animated by a thorough contempt for the
Poles, entered on this occasiou rather deeply into their intrigues. He advised
them however to be cautions, since, considering the
alliance between Prussia aud Russia,
Molleudorf would certainly not have made his appearance without the knowledge
of the Empress. Potocki then flew into a rage, saying that he would attack the
Prussians alone; but he drew
upon himself such a sharp rebuke from
Ch.
IV.]
PRUSSIANS
ENTER POLAND.
399
Igelstrom, that he went home and fell ill.1
Immediately afterwards, the Prussian declaration of the 6th of January,
arrived, and the Generality was somewhat calmed by finding
in it nothing but their own sentiments of antipathy against the patriotic party
of the May Constitution. General Byszewski accordingly, who was
stationed in Great Poland with 5,000 Polish troops, received the nugatory
order, to defend his country, but to consider the Prnssians as
friends. But this state of calm did not last long. On the 26th of January, the
"Second General of the Crown," General
Rzewuski, returned from St. Petersburg—whither he had gone to present the
above-mentioned vote of thanks to Catharine—full of the flattering
promises of the Empress, and of indignation at the interference of the
Prussians. He had always been a hotheaded and unstable man, and in 1772 had so
violently opposed the first Partition, that Catharine sent him off to Siberia; he now raved with no less zeal for the deliverance of his
country by the high protection of the Russians. He soon succeeded in rousing
the Generality to action; protested that Catharine neither knew nor approved of
the proceedings of Prussia, and persuaded them to send off two
couriers, on the 28th, to St. Petersburg with urgent prayers for help, and
orders to Byszewski to hold himself in readiness for war. The storm was
redoubled on the following day when the news arrived of
Mollendorf's actual entrance into Poland, which had been
followed by a few cavalry skirmishes. The Generality in the midst of violent
declamations drew up a strong protest, and issued a manifesto to the people, which called on all the nobles to mount. At the
same time Rzewuski assigned a regiment of infantry and 26
guns from the Warsaw arsenal as a reinforcement for General Byszewski. But
Igelstrom immediately interposed with the greatest energy. He
blocked up the Posen road by two Russian battalions, took possession of the ar-
1 Buchholz to the King, Jan. 23d.
400
PARTITION
OF POLAND. THE EXECUTION. [Book VI.
serial with a strong party of Cossacks, and plainly gave the
Confederation to understand, that he would not allow a single man of the Polish army to march to Posen. In spite of all the assurances of Rzewuski it
was no longer possible for the understanding between the two Powers to remain
unknown at Grodno: Potocki thought of retiring to his estates in despair, and the Generality was on the point of final dissolution. At this juncture the new Russian Ambassador, Jacob von Sievers, arrived.
Catharine had especially chosen this man to carry out her system,
according to whieh she desired—in spite of her own aggrandizement at _their
expense—to shew herself to the Poles as their friend
and protectress. Her object was to attain this end by the mildest possible
means, but as far as layT in her power to circumscribe Prussia, and thereby at once to check a
disagreeable rival, and recommend herself to the
Poles as a trustworthy ally against the bated Germans.
In pursuance of this plan Igelstrom was selected to represent the overwhelming
power of Russia—and Sievers, the kindly feeling of the Empress towards the
Poles. The latter was a somewhat sickly, but
still very stately, old man, whose appearance promised great sincerity. Every
expression which fell from him bore the stamp of an extensive knowledge of
the world, and a long and active life. His manner afforded a decided contrast
to the usual bearing of the Russians at that period, being
full of friendliness and delicate tact; to which were joined an extraordinary
fatility in the despatch of business, and an unfading readiness of expression.1 Such
a man was well adapted to conciliate alike respect and affection, and to gain at the same time the confidence of the Poles and
the Prussian Ambassador, however diametrically they might differ in their
wishes. The very air of frankness, which he could so well assume, paved
1 AVord for word according to Buchbolz's description given to the King, Feb. 13th.
Ch.
IV.]
SIEVERS'
GENTLE VIOLENCE.
401
the way for him. He quickly excited the Generality at Grodno, and made
himself completely master of the weak-minded Potocki. He did not conceal from him, that in the miserably complicated state of
things, the Republic might perhaps have to make a sacrifice; but he then set
before him in so clear a light the beneficent favour of the Great Empress, both
towards Poland in general and Potocki in particular, that the latter
promised to keep his post and to do all he coidd to ensure a continuance of
such grace and favour. Sievers considered this a great gain, because Catharine wished at any rate to have her share of the country ceded by a
formal treaty; and if the Confederation had broken up, Poland would have
no orgau for the execution of such a contract. Having carried this point,
Sievers started for Warsaw—where he arrived on the 10th of February—and immediately entered into close communication
with Mollendorf and Buchholz. He exhorted the former to gentleness,1 aud
begged him not to insist on the disarming of the Polish troops, as there had
already been sufficient noise, and he hoped to induce Stanislaus to remove them
to Cracow. He confided to the Ambassador that Russia
intended to incorporate the Polish regiments, in her share of the country, with
her own army, as soon as ever she had taken possession; and he expressed his
surprise that Mollendorf had not already taken similar
measures. He then explained
the plan of future proceedings which had been drawn up at St. Petersburg. It
was to the effect that as soon as the treaty of partition of the 23rd of
January had been ratified, the two Powers shoidd take formal possession of
their new provinces. Meanwhile the Generality under
the presidency of the King, who on this account was to proceed to Grodno,
1
Characteristic enough is
the in the Ministerial instructions
to
request
of Igelstrom made on the Mollendorf (Dec. 30) to the effect
30th
of Jan. to Mollendorf, not to that the troops should be kept in
pay
the Polish contractors better than good discipline, if possible rather
bel-
he
himself was doing; and a passage ter than that of the Russians'.
II. 2 C
402
PARTITION OF POLAND. THE EXECUTION. [Book VI.
were to issue writs for the election of a Diet from whieh they hoped to
obtain a formal act of cession. In the severed provinces, however, no
elections were to be allowed, because their inhabitants would have already
about this time been compelled to do homage to their new lords.
"Moreover," he added, "the Enqjress does not wish to have too many people to listen to and to payr, but
to settle the matter as quickly as possible without useless formalities."
Buchholz could only express his entire agreement, as indeed in all respects he had nothing but what was nattering to report of
"the good Ambassador." Sievers manifested a desire to meet the
wishes of the Prussians in every way. He immediately extorted from the
Generality at Grodno the withdrawal of the decree by which the whole nation was
summoned to arms. He informed Buchholz, that the Poles were endeavouring to
strengthen themselves in Czenstochau,1 and
thereby led Mollendorf immediately to occupy theplace; in short the harmony
between them could not have been more perfect. "We continue," wrote
Buchholz on one occasion, "to pull at the same rope." "King
Stanislaus," he reported soon afterwards, "has tried to blacken my
character to Sievers, but the latter told me every thing,
and we are more intimate than ever."
Under such circumstances the Polish State fell more and more into decay. The army, driven to and fro in the land by Prussians and Russians,
rapidly melted away; the citizens refused to pay taxes to a government which
was no longer able to protect them against foreigners; all the public coffers
were as good as empty', and the King himself was no longer able
to pay the daily expenses of his court. His position— for which he had partly
to blame himself—was in the highest degree pitiable. As he knew only too well
that Poland had lost all hope of Prussian support on the 3rd of May, and
1 He received this intelligence from
the Polish Commandant of Warsaw, Ozarowski.
Ch.
IV.] CATHARINE'S TREATMENT OF
STANISLAUS. 403
of Austrian support on the 13th of July, he had submitted to
Catharine's will in order to induce her at least to guarantee the future inviolabdity of the Polish frontier. He had not yet
received from Sievers any adverse communication, but in his unhappy life he had
seen too much of politics to remain in doubt as to the issue. On the 1st of
March, he received a letter from his former
paramour which was little ealeulated to quiet his fears; all his past
misfortunes, she said, he had brought upon himself by the part he had taken on
the 3rd of May; she could not by any means grant him a personal interview, and advised him to trust entirely to the Ambassador; he must, she
said, be implieitly obedient, and he should soon learn the particulars of her
wishes. These last were soon enough manifested by a second
letter received on the 12th of March, in which Catharine, in cold and severe words, instructed him to proceed to Grodno,
and to place himself at the head of the Confederation.
The effect was increased by an enclosure directed to Felix Potocki, which
summoned the latter to St. Petersburg ; the Empress, it said, on his arrival there, would show him the interest she took
in the personal welfare of himself and his famdy. The object of this was, to
spare the unhappy Potocki, who had been indueed to go
farther than he wished, the reproaches of the approaching
Diet. The Confederation tried to deceive themselves with respect to the meaning
of this-measure, and commissioned their late chief to offer Catharine a close
alliance with Poland.1 But
Stanislaus perfectly understood the case. "The Empress," he
cried, "speaks of his person and his faimly, but never of his country;
Poland is lost, the Empress has sacrificed us to the King of Prussia." He
almost fed ill with terror and vexation, and obstinately refused to obey the
order he had received. He had long and violent interviews with Sievers, and
poured out the vials of his wrath on Prussia, which in
1 Vid. Moniteur, April 24, 1793.
2 C 2
404
PARTITION
OP POLAND. THE
EXECUTION. [Book VI.
1790 had excited him against Russia in order to betray him. "You
will see," he cried, "that you too will be betrayed; as soon as I am
gone Buchholz will march his regiments to this place under the pretext of some
mutiny of his own contriving." When however
Sievers took no notice of what he said, the King after brief consideration came
to the conclusion that he had done what he could,
and must submit to what he could not change. He was actually in want of money
for his journey, so that the Ambassadors were obliged
to advance it; whereupon on the 19th his departure was fixed for the 4th of
Aprd.
Meanwhile the ratified treaty of St. Petersburg, accompanied by a manifesto of the two courts to the Generality, arrived in
Warsaw on the 7th of March. The execution of the decisive act was near at
hand, and all the preparations for it were being actively
carried on. General Kret-schetnikow had occupied the Russian share with a large
army, and was preparing to wrest the important border fortress of Kaminieck, if necessary by force, from its patriotic
commandant Orlowski. And on behalf of Prussia General Raumer led a corps to
Dantzic, where the authorities refused with no little obstinacy to
deliver up the town. Igelstrom distributed his troops in
that part of the country which was nominally left to the
Republic, and above all collected a very imposing force in the
neighbourhood of Grodno, partly to prevent the dispersion of the Confederation,
and partly to overawe the Diet at a subsequent period. His garrisons, moreover, were scattered through all the chief towns of the districts, the
immediate object of which Buchholz explained to Mollendorf in the
following words: "General Igelstrom will carry on the
election of deputies to the Diet by means of Russian staff-officers and detachments of troops, who will drive out all those who are
uot favourable to the matter in hand, and only employ compliant persons; I
congratulate your Excellency that you have nothing to do
Ch. IV.]
SERFDOM
IN POLAND.
405
with this business, which requires special experience not to" _ be
gained in other countries."
In addition to these violent measures other worse ones were employed,
the responsibdity of which falls still more heavily on the conquered than on
the conquerors. It may seem harsh to expose the
weaknesses of a perishing nation, but historical justice demands that we should
not conceal the sins by which a people, once so powerful, drew down destruction
upon its own head. The melancholy spectacle of its fall would be more than we could bear, if we were forced to regard it as the work
of capricious fate, and not as the consequence of deep and heavy guilt. It wdl
be ne-nessary somewhat to enlarge on this point in order to bring clearly
before us the possibility of the events about to be related.
Poland had been labouring for centuries under the curse of serfdom.
Nine-tenths of its inhabitants were peasant bondmen, who were exposed without
any kind of protection from the law to the arbitrary will of their masters. The
old law still existed which valued each of these serfs—in case of murder
or manslaughter by a stranger—at ten marks, or according to the value of money
at that time about twelve shillings;1 but
the master disposed of the person and property of his serf at pleasure. At the end of the 17th century,
when the impulse towards personal freedom and social equality was every where
beginning to awake, the tyranny of the nobles in Poland was completely
established; it has been remarked, that about the middle of this century the services and dues exacted by the lords of the soil were immoderately increased. The period of compulsory service was raised to
four clays in the week, and the brutality of the personal relation between lord
and serf surpassed all bounds. "The noblemen," wrote a traveller
in the year 1781, "abuse
1 Vid. Stanislaus
Lescynsky (Oeuvres dtt Philos. bienf., III. 3) quoted and enlarged upon by
Lelewel, II. 294,
406
PARTITION
OF POLAND. THE EXECUTION. [Book VI.
every girl as they please, and drive away every
person who attempts to resist them, with a hundred blows."1
George Forster, who had for many years observed them from a near point, made
use, iu 1791, of the following terrible words concerning
them: "The Polish nobility alone in Europe have carried
ignorance and barbarism to such a pitch as almost to annihilate in their serfs the last spark of reason."2 In
fact the latter had sunk into a state of poverty and brutal insensibility unknown in the rest of our quarter of the
globe. In Great Poland travellers found them only a degree more wretched than
in the worst parts of Germany, but stdl far more tolerably off than in the
interior of the country. Here they dwelt in wooden huts plastered with clay;
containing a single room, in which men women and cattle
lived together; there was no kind of furniture except the great stove, which
formed the sleeping place of the whole family, the smoke of which found an
issue through the doors and chinks of the building.3
Their food and clothing corresponded
with their dwelling: mental training was of course not to be thought of, and
the mechanical skill peculiar to the Sclavonian race was not developed in the
wretched monotony of their existence. No one
endeavoured to produce any thing, because no one could acquire any
thing for himself or his children; the Lord's Kantschuli
drove them to their work, and behind his back they fell into listless
inactivity again. The only pleasure of both men and women was enjoyed in
the public house which every Seignior kept up, where,
on the Sunday, they forgot the miseries of their life in intoxicating drink, to
the sound of the fiddle. They
1 Bernouilli, IV. 129. — 2 Ansich-
ten vom Niederrhein, 1790,
I. 377._
3 An aceount of
Poland, Salzburg
1793 (dedicated to Prince Czartoriski) 1.1G0 ctseq. Malmesbury, Diary
1. II. No houses, but huts-, all
the family in one miserable room. The
head of it has a sort of mock bed: the rest lie on the floor, and the children
that have the advantage to be small enough creep into the
oven. The only comfort they seem to enjoy is a thorough plenty of fuel (1767).
Ch.
IV.] POLITICAL APATHY OF POLISH
SERFS.
407
had sunk so low, that they had lost every desire of a better condition, every yearning for a more human existence.1 A
case of insubordination among the peasants had been for a hundred years an
almost unheard of thing: in none of the many feuds by which the nobdity ruined
the Polish state, had any political excitement appeared
among the people.2 The same insensibdity prevailed even now when the existence of the
empire was at stake; how indeed coidd they acquire either patriotism or public
spirit? They knew nothing of the State and never asked who ruled them, since
every government only brought them compulsory labour,
ill-treatment, and the spirit-tap. It was needs perfectly indifferent to them
whether their masters obeyed the head of a Polish Republic, a Russian Empress,
or a German King: they might perhaps have desired the last,
if the intelligence had reached their huts, that their countrymen in West
Prussia and Galicia were ruled with severity indeed, but still like human
beings. When we consider this state of things, we can hardly continue to talk of the fall of the Polish
nation as a consequence of the Partitions. What did fall
to the ground in 1793, was the inhuman rule of a few noblemen over the Polish
people: the latter only changed masters, and regarded the alteration, which
even on the Russian side might bring them as much good as evil, with sluggish
indifference.
Of a third class in Poland there is nothing to be said. Besides Warsaw,
there were some free or royal towns, in which however trade made very little
progress, partly in consequence of bad administration—which, e. g. made no arrangements against fire, or for the promotion of cleanliness
and health—aud partly because it was only during the last
1 Forster to Lichtenberg, June 18th
1786. Ch. Lee (subsequently an American General) to Charlemont, Jan.
6. 1765. "Were I to call the common people brutes, I shonld injure the quadruped
creation." (From Hardy's Life of Charlemont in Mahon's Hist, of England, 1714—1783. VI. 55.) — 2 The only exceptions are the two
revolts of the Greek peasants instigated by Russia in 1768
and 1789.
408
PARTITION
OF POLAND. THE EXECUTION. [Book VI.
thirty years that a' tribunal existed in the country, which received
the complaints of a burgher against a nobleman. Most of the so-called towns,
however, were in a far worse position, because they were
built on the estates of noblemen, and almost as dependent on the
Seignior as the peasants themselves. A law passed in
1768, which deprived the Seigniors of the criminal jurisdiction on account of
its intolerable abuse, had granted them as a compensation
the right of arbitrarily raising the services and dues of the burghers. There
was, therefore, no legal protection, no corporative
independence, no other occupation than a sluggish and unprofitable agriculture.
The only exception to the melancholy rule was found in the districts of
Great Poland, the lands bordering on the provinces of North Germany— the very
country, in fact, whieh Prussia was now taking possession of. In this region,
as five centuries earlier in Brandenburg and Sdesia, German
civdization had paved the way for German conquest. A number of German artisans
and merchants, allured by a certain market and the absence of competition, bad
settled in the towns: in some of these there was scarcely a single Polish inhabitant in 1793, and the German language extended to nearly
seventy miles into the interior. Without any support from the State, without
any mitigation on the part of the Seigniors of their customary oppression, considerable linen and woollen manufactures flourished through German industry. All their interests, of
course, pointed towards Germany: trade looked for its channels towards the
Baltic harbours, and the sons of the burghers frequently studied at Frankfort
or Leipsie. Differences of religion also came into account. In spite of persecution a numerous protestant
nobility had maintained themselves in the neighbouring frontier. These were not
allowed indeed to take any part in the government, and met with nothing but
neglect from the State; but by means of order and economy they
attained on their little properties— which they managed themselves—to a degree
of prosperity
Cn.
IV.]
GERMAN
SETTLERS IN POLAND.
409
seldom known in Poland. These families Kalkreuth, Schlich-ting,
Seydlitz, Potworowski &c. were all connected by blood or marriage with the
Brandenburg and Silesian nobility, and had no more ardent wish than to form a
part of the well-ordered Prussian State.1
If we now turn our attention from this politically oppressed portion of the nation to the ruling class—the catholic nobility of Poland—we are immediately struck by the fact that
their number was continually on the decrease. It was calculated that at this period a general levy would bring together at the most 150,000 men.2 This
diminution in numbers indicates of itself an internal decline, and closer
observation immediately brings to light utter moral and material decay. Most of the estates were heavily
mortgaged, and were managed by farmers, who were in fact the mortgagees, and who endeavoured as speedily as possible to extract from the land the amount of their claim. It is evident that imder
such circumstances the property itself would not be spared, and that the peasants especially would be fleeced in every way. This
relation was so common that special forms of law were made to apply to it, and
these very often existed through several generations till the debt was liquidated. It was in fact rare for a great landowner to manage his
own estates; the majority, like the French nobdity at the same period,
preferred the court or town life, or travelling,
to their home duties, and entrusted the management of their estates—unless the
creditor had already taken them in hand—to some poorer
nobleman as tenant. The fundamental defect of this system, and
the natural consequence of the undeveloped manufactures of the country, was an
entire want of capital. Ready money was rare, the rate of interest high,3 and
there was no trace of a reasonable system
1 Buchholz's Memoire
uber Orosspolen, Feb.
1793. — 2 Lelewel's Hist,
de Pologne, II.
328. — 3 In 1812 it had risen to 78—80 p.
c. Vid. De
Pradt, Ambassade a Varsovie. In 1792 it was 7—8 p. c.
410
PARTITION
OF POLAND. THE EXECUTION. [Book VI.
of credit. The few bankers at Warsaw formed a real power which kept the
whole nobility in a state of dependence. The fact that a few of them suspended
payment in consequence of the Russian occupation in 1792, was lamented as the most disastrous of all the
consequences of the war.1 They
lacked, therefore, the material means for a comprehensive
and ameliorating management, which looks to the future. In its place they had
nothing but the untutored tod of the serfs, who were obliged to
cultivate the fields of their lord both by their own labour and that of their
horses, according to the national and traditional
custom, to the neglect of the land which was allotted to themselves. The
produce therefore which accrued to the serf, the lord, and
the commonwealth, was miserably small.
The Seigniors indeed, had sufficient means of indemnifying themselves for the deficiency, but this compensation was equally
destructive to themselves and the State. Their favorite motto was: bene
nati, bene possessionati—in other words, as the nobility had all the power of the State in
their hands, it was a matter of course that the State shoidd support the
nobility. There were two principal courses from
which this support was derived—the sale of offices, and the administration of State lands. The consequence of the former was, that every
office was regarded and used as a source of income;
by which the administration of justice, especially, was completely ruined, and delay, expense and corruption, spread through all the
courts from the highest to the lowest. The public domains formed a mass of
property valued at from 400 to 600 mdlion Polish florins (fl.=sixpence), and
were for the most part granted to needy or favoured noblemen as Starosties. The
Starost was bound to hand over to the
1 Oginski, II. 236. The facts and which he professes to have
seen
whieh
he himself brings forward re- at the festive
assemblies of the
fute
his own opinion of the large nobles, amount of ready
money in the country,
Ch. IV.]
THE
STAUOSTIES.
411
public treasury half or three-quarters of the net produce, according to
the term of possession. By this arrangement, the State directly gave away a
considerable part of its revenues, and suffered a stdl further
and still greater loss by the deterioration of the lands, which were not of
course cultivated with a view to the interests of the owner, hut every where so
miserably tilled, that the land of a Starost might be distinguished at the very first sight from an hereditary
estate. The fact that the patriots of 1791 had proceeded to confiscate the Starosties,
and created a new constitution for the towns, had done more than
anything else to envenom the nobles.
And thus the anarchy of the State, which was the offspring of the unbounded licence of the nobdity, avenged itself on its originators, by inflicting upon them selfish frivolity and careless extravagance. The tyranny they exercised over their
inferiors had a still more terrible effect on the nobles than their freedom
from all control from above. It is after all the surest and most righteous
punishment of despotism, that it enervates the despot himself by
means of his own insolence and evil passions. The prominent feature in the
natural character of the Poles, by the side of cunning
and courage, was a temperament of the liveliest ex-citabdity, which made them
equally sensible to good and bad impressions. In the
midst of all their corruption, the Poles retained a capacity for the most
burning enthusiasm; but they had nevertheless imbibed with eager thirst the
poison of a consuming immorality. As children they had grown up amidst hundreds of degraded wretches who were subject to every whim of their
master.1 In
the Jesuit schools, in which the generation of that period had still been
educated, they had learned mechanical exercises of devotion, an elegant
handwriting, barbarous latin, and nothing else. When they
1 Malmesbury's Diary,
I, 26. "Prince Czartoriski's personal
servants amounted to 375. The number in his country house is
infinitely greater,"
412
PARTITION
OF POLAND. THE EXECUTION. [Book VI.
entered into tbe stream of life and the world, they had for the most
part imbibed the frivolity of French radicalism, which afforded them
theoretical instruction in that love of pleasure and of self, in the practice
of which they had been so terribly schooled by their own government and
in their own homes. They still kept up their old reputation for unruly courage and inexhaustible cunning, and no nation possessed in an ecpial degree personal tact, skill in the use of language,
gallantry, and the rapid acquisition of superficial
knowledge, But nowhere did their education penetrate so deeply as to form the
character, bridle tbe passions, or regulate the moral conduct. A
well-ordered economy was as rare among individuals as in the public treasury;
disgusting uncleanliness existed side by side with princely magnificence;
splendid toilets were covered with vermin, and at the most sumptuous festivals
the use of poeket-handkerchiefs was an unknown luxury.1
Where the lower classes drank ardent spirits, the higher
drank Tokay; drinking was not a more favourite occupation than gambling, in
which both men and women engaged with most passionate phrensy. Their social intercourse was free from all formal trammels, without stiffness
or restraint: so that the foreigner-—especially the German
traveller—was at first highly charmed. But in this ease too, freedom
degenerated into unbridled licence, and the tone of aristocratic society showed
terrible marks of the influence of serfdom. In Poland as
everywhere else, slavery, which degrades human beings to
the level of the brute, destroys in the masters the very core of all
morality—the feeling of shame. The intercourse between the sexes was not
regulated by any wholesome forms, because the feelings of both parties were destitute of modesty and reserve. The girls married to become their own
mistresses, and nothing was easier or more customary than the divorce of the
marriage tie.2 One
might associate for years with a
lady
1 Forster to Therese Heyne, Jan. 24,
1785. — 2 Forster
to Therese Heyne, Jan. 22nd 1785.
Ch.
IV] FEARFUL CORRUPTION OF POLISH
NOBLES.
413
without knowing whether she was separated from her husband, or how many husbands she had had before the present one.1 We
may be allowed to ponrtray the darkest feature in this
picture in the words of the royal physician Lafon-taine. It is disagreeable to
speak of such things, but it is only by a knowledge of them that we can
understand the fall of the Polish Empire. He says: "Unter unsem KranJc-heitsfallen verh'dlt sich die Lustseuche gegen
die sonstigen Uebel tvie seeks zu zehn; unter liundert ReJcruten war en in
Warscliau voriges Jahr achtzig angestecJct, und haufig habe ich junge Madchen
von zwei, drei und mehreren Jaliren von angeborenen Leiden dieser Art
ergriffen gesehen; wer das Uebel niclit durch eigene Scliuld bekommt, der hat
es enhveder ererbt, oder dtirch die Amine erhalten, von tvelchen man unter
ztvanzig getviss fiinfzeJm mit diesem Uebel Behaftete rechnen Tcann."
Is it necessary to describe the various departments of a State ruled by
such men as these?—to reproduce the same spectacle of dissolution and decay in
the departments of law and finance, in civil and mditary administration,—to set
before the reader the ever-recurring demoralization,
violence and selfishness in actual examples? The ruling classes in Poland were full of zeal to fight for the Republic, and most of them were
ready to die for their country; but very few were willing to sacrifice their
indolence and inconstancy, their in* terests and enjoyments, to the public
weal. Can we wonder that the nobleman, broken in fortune, health and morals,
should alternately regard his powerful neighbours with narrow-minded contempt, and submit to them with selfish subserviency; that the burgher should look
on the German concpiest with pleasure, and the peasant regard even the
establishment of Russian dominion with indifference? Or is it strange that the
Seignior, who during his whole life had sold to the burghers his judicial sentences, and the Official,
Nachrichten
atts Polen, I.
100.
414
PARTITION OF POLAND. THE EXECUTION. [Book VI.
who had always regarded the State solely as a source of wealth, should now sell his vote to the agents of Eussia?
The reports of the statesmen entrusted with the execution of the second
partition of Poland have left not the slightest doubt that bribery played as
great a part in this transaction as violence.1
Sievers, who every where played the first part as a matter of course, chose
to take the lead even in these discreditable operations. Those with whom he had
first to deal were the leaders of the Confederation, who moreover had for years
received salaries from Eussia. After the departure of Potocki the most important person was General Kossakowski,
who though a paid tool in the service of Russia
was highly indignant when he heard of the participation of Prussia. He
confessed to Sievers that he had just intended to
make an inroad into East Prussia from the side of Lithuania, but he was quick
in taking a hint, and received his instructions for the future. Care was taken
at the same time that King Stanislaus should oidy have thoroughly initiated and
trustworthy rjersons about him; the word was passed
through all the electoral bodies, that submission to Catharine's arrangement
would bring the most splendid advantages. It is melancholy to add
that the effect produced was immense. "In the provincial Diet," wrote
Igelstrom, "the petty nobility turned the scale, and they carry on a
trade with their votes; they are bought at 10, 15 or at most 30 ducats."
Sievers sent word to St. Petersburg that in his opinion a Diet had never gone
cheaper; that in the whole of Lithuania the average price of a Deputy was
oidy 200 ducats, and that in Poland he should get forty of them for 2,000
ducats.2 It
is true that in this case the selfish spirit of the masses was seconded by more
than one political consideration. With many, it was hatred
of the Targowicians,
1 That this was the ease in the
first Partition also is proved by the official list of the persons bribed, in
Lelewel, II. 87, in which list one of the same names appears as in 1793. — 2 Blum's Denheiirdigkeiten
des Gra/en Sievers, III. 232. 623.
Ch. IV.]
POLISH
HATRED OF PRUSSIA.
415
which made them friendly to the Russians, as soon as the latter held
out a prospect of the overthrow of those traitors. As many more were influenced
hy the thought that they had been virtually Russian subjects for a
hundred years, and that resistance had only made their condition worse; it
seemed to them mere folly to refuse payment for an acknowledgment which they mnst have yielded to force. And lastly the
sentiments of the'King and Kossakowski—an innate dislike
for everything German—were far and wide diffused—and had constantly been
increased by the state of things in Great Poland above described, by the
difference of religion, and the undoubted superiority and patriotic leanings of the immigrants. With what wrath was the humbling fact observed, that more than one landowner enquired after the frontier of the
Prussian share—which had as yet remained a secret—in order to buy land beyond
it before the prices were raised by the proclamation
of the new rule!1
Under the influence of these feelings the Poles were ready to meet the Russians
half-way, in order to gain their aid in thrusting back the Prussians, if it
were but for an inch.
The honest Buchholz had no suspicion that Sievers was making as powerful a use of this last lever as of any other. The
following extracts from certain letters will place the position of affairs hefore us more clearly than any descriptiou could do.
"The King," wrote Buchholz on the 2nd of March, "informs me that the Minister von Hoym will send the
large sum required. " This intelligence has given the Ambassador great
pleasure and we are still pulling at the same oar." "We are
progressing" he said two months later "partly by gentle, and partly
by forcible, means; we have also made use of the money
allotted to us, and have made a common purse, which greatly furthers our
cause."
Sievers, on the other hand, reported to his ministers at
'
Buchholz to Mollendorf, April 2rd.
416
PARTITION OF POLAND. THE EXECUTION. [Book VI.
the beginning of April as follows: "In the instructions sent to me
yon have inserted a clause directing me to hinder the ao-o-randizement
of Prussia as much as possible. You have ordered General Igelstrom to pacify
men's minds, and to show every consideration towards the Prussians. I am in
need of larger funds for distribution, for Mollendorf has orders to proceed as
far as he can. He has received 100,000 Ducats from
his court, and has already distributed eighty thousand of them. I have only ten
thousand and want a great deal more."
Such relations need no criticism; they shows how clearly the cabinet of
St. Petersburg understood the vast importance of Posen to the
political independence of Prussia; and with what reluctance they made the
sacrifice of such a concession to their new system. A more far-seeing man than
Buchholz might even then have felt the insecurity of the ground which the Russian alliance afforded him; since, from the very first,
there was no lack of political and military dffferences. The frontier line
agreed upon for Prussia was drawn according to a defective map, and had
therefore been marked out at several 'points in a strategetically
unfavourable manner. It was the same on the side of the Russians, where they
had contented themselves by marking three quarters of the frontier by a straight line upon the map. But when it came to the actual
execution, the Russian Generals silently made the
necessary alterations, always of course at the expense of the Republic. General
Mollendorf was directed, in answer to his report, to follow this example; but
he every where met with opposition from the Russian commanders, who defended the interests of Poland against him, as their own. They allowed
him indeed to include a few districts near Czenstochau, Lenzyk and Wdlenberg
within his cordon;
but when he also claimed the town of Zakrozyn in the neighbourhood of "Warsaw, Igelstrom pointed to the letter of the
treaty; and Sievers, who iu this case, as with the Poles, assumed the air of a mediator, contented himself with holding
Ch.
IV.]
DISSECTION
OF POLAND.
417
out a vague prospect of the impending discussions
in the Diet, and thereby for the moment avoiding an open breach.
And thus had Russia step by step brought her task to a final solution.
We have seen how she occupied one position after another, incessantly carried
on her operations, and made uninterrupted progress with methodical
foresight. The stroke was never allowed to fall upon the victim untd resistance
was no longer possible. Thus Prussia, Austria, and England,
were successively won; and now at the last moment, before the final act, the
Polish riders were drawn over to the Russian side.
The Republic stood isolated between its oppressors, deprived of all support,
and given up by itself and the world. The moment of action had arrived. The
Polish Government had already announced the attitude which it intended henceforward to assume. According to the directions of the Ambassadors, it had secretly sent orders to the
provinces to submit; but in order to conceal this understanding
with Russia from Europe, it bargained for a certain show of force on the part of the victors. Thus, on the Prussian
side, the Chancellor Malachowski sent off the instructions
in question to the magistrates of Dantzic, as early as the beginning of March;[1]
whereupon Dantzic demanded of the Prussians that their own town garrison should
be left in the place, which was, of course, not granted; and when it
capitulated, on the 25th, General Raumer had to fire a few rounds before the
garrison withdrew from the works. On the same day a royal patent
was issued which proclaimed the seizure of the country between the former
boundary and a line from Czenstochau through Rava to Soldau,—as well as the two
towns of Dantzic and Thorn—in all 1016 German square miles (about 23,408 English square miles), with a million and a half of
inhabitants; at the same time a prospect of a formal act of cession by
the previous government was held out, but the new inhabitants were ordered to
do
II.
418
PARTITION OF POLAND. THE EXECUTION. [Book VI.
homage immediately. The proceedings were exactly similar on the Russian
side. In Kaminiek, Orlowski had hitherto bid defiance to every hostile summons,
until at last his own Government appointed a successor to him, with whom Kretschetnikow very quickly came to terms. The latter then
issued the Russian manifesto on the 7th of April, whieh in its language was
pretty nearly the same as the Prussian, but far exceeded it in its demands,
since it announced the incorporation of 4,000 German square miles
(18,666 English s. m.) with more than three million
inhabitants;—?', c. of all the Polish country east of a straight line from
Kaminiek and the Galician border to Polozk and Drissa. The importance of this acquisition will be seen, when we reflect that Poland
henceforth was only a little larger than this Russian share; that the Turks saw
all the Polish land which bordered on their territory pass into Russian hands;
and that Austria's dominions were now for the first time brought into immediate contact with Russia. The Russian flag floating from the rocky peaks and bastions of Kaminiek, the most important
military position in these regions,1
proclaimed to the South and West of Europe the unchecked advance of the
Sclavonian mditary power.
The ceremony of receiving homage from the new inhabitants passed over without difficulty or resistance, both in the Prussian
and Russian shares. It was calculated in Berlin,
with great satisfaction, that the newly actpiired province was larger than Silesia; that it would bring in a net income
of 4 or 5 million dollars, and increase the army by several regiments. The most
important advantage was unquestionably the military rounding
off of the Eastern frontier of the kingdom, which we may
remember had hitherto afforded not the slightest security for the defence
of the German territory. A glance at the map is sufficient to show us the main
features of the case. Whilst Silesia in the
1 Haeften enlarges on this snbjcet;
Desp. of March 18.
Ch.
IV.] PALLIATION OF PRUSSIA'S POLISH
POLICY.
419
South, and East Prussia in the North, projeet far towards the East, the
frontier of Brandenburg retreats between the two far towards the West, so that
Great Poland lies in the midst of all these, threatening
Konigsberg and Breslau in the rear, and pushing forward to within a few days'
march of Berlin. As long as Poland was powerful she pressed heavdy upon
Brandenbmg from this side—kept Silesia in a state of dependence, and constrained West Prussia to feudal serviee. Now she was weak and harmless; but
the Russian mditary forees had been domieded for ages on her soil, aud the
necessity for protecting the frontier of Brandenburg, and uniting Prussia with
Sdesia, had been more than ever felt during the Silesian war. The
court of Berlin, therefore, had every reason, in 1793, to rejoiee at the
attainment of this object; it was a conquest whieh was demanded by the most
vital interests of self-preservation, and was about equally important for North Germany as Dauphine for France.
Moreover, from the progress whieh the German element had already made in this
border district, and the eonfusion of Polish affairs, it was to be hoped that
the new government would rapidly strike root; the position of the monarchy therefore in the East might be regarded as settled on a
sure basis.
These aspirations, it is true, soon enough vanished in smoke; and it
has been a thousand times said that this failure was the necessary recompense
of the perfidy and falsehood, with whieh Prussia helped to
trample down the freedom of her own ally. We may be deceived by patriotic
feelings, but we cannot refer the subsequent catastrophes to this source,
however great the abhorrence we may feel for the aets of brutality whieh accompanied this event, and the disregard of existing treaties. We have
already shown that Poland had little reason, after the 3rd of May, to reckon on
the Prussian alliance of 1790. In international affairs we must always take
into account, not merely the letter, but in an equal degree the
ground and object, of a treaty. In the case before us the matter stood thus;
that Poland had ob-
2d2
420
PARTITION
OF POLAND. THE EXECUTION. [Book VI.
tained the treaty of 1790 in express opposition
to Russia and Austria; but that the patriotic party entered in 1791 into close
relations with Austria, and the Targowicians in 1792 had aUied themselves with
Russia; and that both, consequently, had vied with each other
in giving up all connexion with
Prussia. The patriots, as we have seen, entertained
no doubts on this point even in 1791; and Prussia never gave any assurances of
support to the Targowicians; we cannot, therefore, talk of the breach of an
effective treaty in the measures adopted by Prussian policy.
Thus much, indeed, lies beyond a doubt; that neither of the Polish
parties had been guilty of any active aggression against Prussia, when she made
up her mind to the partition. Prussia was iu every sense of the word the
aggressor against Poland, and that too without the shadow
of a legal pretext. But if ever a policy of conquest was rendered desirable,
nay absolutely essentia], by the circumstances of the times, it was in this
case. That which gave its fatal
character to this period, and completely unhinged the whole
system of Europe, was not the Revolution alone, nor the ambition of Russia to
rule the world alone, but the coincidence of the two, by which all existing
rights and titles of possession were called in cjnestion. It wdl be acknowledged
that in such crises, self preservation becomes the leading principle in every
individual: the real responsibility does not depend so much on the single acts
of the contest once begun, as on the question, who first kindled the
conflagration, and who endeavoured to prevent it from
breaking out. With the facts which now lie before us, it is not difficult to
apply this standard to the Polish question.
Prussia was the Power which since 1791, when the French war became
imminent, first began to speak of territorial acquisition and
compensation, and thereby lent to a Coalition,
whose mission was entirely one of defence and conservative disinterestedness,
tire character of aggressive selfishness, and envious discord. This guilt is
neither to be concealed nor defended. Just as clearly,
Ch.
IV.] GENERAL CAUSES OF THE POLISH PARTITION. 421
in the subsequent developement of the affair, are the faults of the
Court of Vienna brought to light, which simultaneously directed the cmnity of
Prussia against Poland, and tore asunder the new bond between the German
Powers; these faidts are—Leopold's plan of the Polish-Saxon Union, and Francis'
claims to the Franconian Margraviates. The immediate
consequence was a secret alienation between Austria and
Prussia, and the melancholy emulation with which they subsequently hurried into
the Russian aUiances of July and August. The whole matter was finally decided
in those negotiations which took place on French sod
in the course of September. When Prussia at that time offered a general
peace to the French Government, she virtuaUy renounced aU plans of
aggrandizement in Poland; since nothing was more certain, than that on the
conclusion of that peace, Austria, France and England, would have entered the lists to maintain the integrity of Poland. All Europe would have recurred
to the system of the Emperor Leopold; and in spite of Catharine's lust of
conquest—in spite of all the corruption of the Government of the Polish
nohdity—the protection of Europe woidd have prolonged the existence of the
Republic. But instead of this, France and Austria simultaneously
announced their offensive plans, which threatened our whole quarter of the
globe with the most violent convulsions; whereupon Prussia no
longer hesitated to give effect to her stipulations with
Russia. All these things worked together:—the deep corruption of the Polish
state—the urgent necessity for Prussia to look after her own safety—and the
general and impetuous advance of the other Powers. It is easy to point out the dark side in the resolutions come to in these perilous
times; it is a duty of humanity to feel the deepest compassion for the fate of
perishing Poland; but the question always remains, what better course was left
for Prussia, considering the attitude assumed by Austria,
Russia and France? Ought the King, perhaps, to have done, in 1793, what he did
two years afterwards, amidst
422
PARTITION OF POLAND. THE EXECUTION. [Book VI.
genera] disapprobation—withdraw himself,
from the storm which raged on all sides into a neutrality full of disquiet and contempt? Or ought he to have allied himself with the
Parisian assassins of September, -in open war against the rest of Germany, in
favour of the Polish slaveholders? Or ought he, lastly, to have promoted
the extension of Austria, to have thrown himself with
all his force upon the French, and meanwhde have allowed the Russian garrisons
to fix themselves as firmly in Posen and Gnesen, as in Grodno and Warsaw?
No, after the most careful consideration, we can
come to no other conclusion than this; that the resolution to appropriate a frontier province of Polaud, was decidedly the only one which,
under the circumstances, did not lead to evident disaster—the only one,
therefore, which was consistent with the duty of
the Prussian government. As the whole of European policy was, at the end of
1792, in a state of the most miserable complication, so this Polish branch of
that policy was not followed by favourable results alone; on the contrary, it led to many acts of violence and much animosity; and above all it was very imperfectly carried out. On this
head we have still a few remarks to make.
It was a matter of course that Prussia could acquire no Polish land for
herself, without allowing Russia to appropriate a corresponding share. But the more heavdy the mighty power of
Russia—which had been continually rising since the reign of Peter I.—pressed on
the frontiers of North Germany, the more cautious and deliberate did it behove
Prussia to be, in fixing the boundary by whieh the extent of the
intermediate State was to be diminished. This is self-evident; and the Court of
Berlin had, moreover, an excellent example before their eyes
in Frederick II., in the first Polish partition. On that
occasion not a syllabic was uttered, not a step was taken, without the most
accurate calculation, and the strictest regard to the whole object in
view. The advantage of every
acquisition at the expense of
Ch.
IV.]
PRUSSIA
DUPED BY RUSSIAN CRAFT.
423
Poland, was carefully weighed against the dangers of Russian aggrandizement; and the double object of weakening and yet
preserving Poland, though not openly avowed, was never for a moment lost sight
of. But there was no thought of such a view of the ease
in 1793. The Prussian Government grasped eagerly at Polish territory, delighted
at every fresh acquisition, and careless of future consequences. They seized
for themselves more than was recpiisite for the correction of their boundary line—a district of more than 90 English miles in breadth
beyond the present Province of Posen—and thereby deprived themselves of the
possibility of calling upon Russia to moderate her claims. ' But the Russian
boundary line, which was drawn with rude hand across the patient
map, was a sentence of death to Poland. Those who took so much to-day, would
certainly not be content with so little to-morrow; such an act of robbery
implied the annihilation—such a partition, the utter destruction—of Poland. In 1793, the King of Prussia—as wdl
be proved by documentary evidence—by no means entertained such a wish; the evil
was, that he did not act according to a weU-considered system, but allowed-
himself to be driven on from day to day, aimless and vacillating, by transient impulses and moods, which taken singly were all
reasonable enough. And thus he sanctioned the treaty of St. Petersburg—though he was by no means insensible to the dangers of the Russian
supremacy, and was avowedly on a footing of mutual
dislike with Catharine—without a thought of the necessary aggravation of the
difference between them which the fall of Poland must produce. As far as we can
see, it was one circumstance especially which caused him to overlook for the moment the danger of the course which he was taking—viz. the
Empress's designing profession of anti-revolutionary zeal. As Catharine
ostentatiously displayed her hatred of the Revolution by police orders, by
public prayers in the churches, and proclamations—in every way in short but that of sending auxiliary troops—she succeeded
424
PARTITION
OF POLAND. THE EXECUTION. [Book VI.
in inspiring in the King's mind, for a considerable time, a firm belief
in her unselfishness and loyalty.
This first mistake led, as usual, to others. The
district about the Middle Vistula, the Bug and the Narew, forms, according to
the geographical and political relations of Central
Europe, and the historical experience of centuries, one of those strong points
of attack, which in the hands of a powerful monarch
spread supremacy and dominion on every side. A similar vantage ground is formed
by the Alps and the Netherlands in the West of Europe, and by the plains of the
Lower Danube in the East. The fate of such districts
is-always the same; great nations struggle for their possession for
centuries, until the desire of peace, and the progress of civilization, lead to
their being entrusted to neutral or impotent riders under a
common guarantee. From this point of view, which is
the only one to which a careful examination of both German and
European interests can lead, the endeavour of the German Powers to circumscribe
Poland—which from Galicia had often fixed herself in Hungary and Bohemia, and from Great Poland had overwhelmed East and West Prussia—was perfectly justified. But the very same
sound policy should have prevented every step which opened the way to the
entire destruction of this intermediate State. From the
circumstances of the case, no other Power could profit by
the proceeding except Russia, the most powerful and aggressive of them all.
This has been proved by the whole course of events since 1793. In 1795 the King
of Prussia was compelled against his will to consent to the total destruction
of Poland. His successor had to give up the important line
of the Vistula and Narew— which he had originally kept to himself—to the
Russians in 1814. And since that period, the saying of Pozzo de Borgo has
proved true, that Russia concpiered these lands "to open to herself, in immediate contact with Europe, a new theatre for the display of her
power, her talents and her pride."
Cn.
IV.] EFFECTS OF DISCORD BETWEEN GERMAN POWERS. 425
Let us now imagine, in the place of Frederick Wdliam IL, a Prince who
really would have been a guide and leader of his people, and in all his
plans and actions have followed the principles of sonnd policy. Woidd such a
Prince have had the means of taking an energetic part in the Polish question,
and yet of putting the cnrb on the pretensions and encroachments of
Russia? In other words did the Russian hegemony in these regions spring from
natural and unalterable sources, or from the easily avoidable errors of German
policy?
The answer will be found in the history before us. The real root of the evil lay in the inveterate and mutually well-grounded
jealousy of the German Powers. As long as Prussia stood opposed to the Russian
policy without support from Austria, she had no choice between an open breach
and entire dependence. As the successes of Frederick the Great
resulted from a transient good understanding with Joseph in 1772, so the
pernicious tenor of the treaty of St. Petersburg arose from the renewal of
discord between Prnssia and Austria. As long as the Court of Berlin looked to St. Petersburg for support against the Emperor, and the Austrian
Government regarded a Russian alliance as a weapon against Prussia, every path
was open to the ambition of Russia, and a systematic, energetic, and at the
same time cautious, treatment of the Polish cpiestion with a view to
the general interests of Europe was simply impossible. In this respect, too,
Prussia had on several occasions, as we have, seen committed errors, which were
subsequently more than equalled by false steps on the Austrian side.
It is the developement of this relation which we have now to observe.
The report of the conclusion of the treaty of St. Petersburg did not reach
Vienna until the middle of March, as its ratification in Berlin was delayed by
the article respecting the war with France. Before we can
observe the effect which it produced in the Austrian capital, it will be
necessary to look at the position which Austria had in the meantime gained in
the French war.
426 RECOVERY OF BELGIUM BY THE AUSTRIANS. [Book VI,
CHAPTER V. RECOVERY OF BELGIUM BY THE AUSTRIANS.
AuSTRIA.'s
projected preparations against france. — frankfort conferences.—Plan of the campaign.—Dumouriez against Holland.— Weakness
of the prince of coburg.—Battles on the roer.—Relief of maestricht. — Flight of the French.
— Internal
condition of Belgium.—Union
with france.—Risings
of the peasants.—Dumouriez's
return.—He
breaks with the democrats.—Battle of neerwinden.— Dumouriez
gives up Belgium.
According to the agreement made in December—by which Austria and Russia engaged to
carry on offensive war on a grand scale against France, and the struggle
against the Revolution was changed into a war of
conquest for the advantage of Austria—there was the
most urgent necessity that the latter should enter
on the theatre of war as soon as possible, and with overwhelming forces. Aud
certainly the intentions of the Government in this respect were excellent. Coburg was to receive 69,000 men for the main struggle in Belgium; Hohenlohe was to command 38,000 in Luxemburg and Treves, and
Wurmser 42,000 on the Upper Rhine. These, together with 20,000 men in Italy and
50,000 serviceable men of the reserve at home, would have made up an army of
nearly 220,000 men—a number whieh would have been worthy of the
greatness of the object and the dignity of Austria.1 For
the present however these armaments proceeded very slowly. Above
all, money was wanted. The Government could not make up its mind to an extra-
1 These figures are to he found in
several despatches of Haeften; and they are confirmed by a letter of the
Emperor to the King of Prussia, which we shall presently quote.
Cn.
V.] AUSTRIAN PREPARATIONS AGAINST
FRANCE. 427
ordinary war-tax, but received instead, the
voluntary contributions of loyal subjects—gold
buckles, sdver hearts, purses and goblets filled with ducats—showing great individual patriotism, but producing an insignificant sum total. To this
was added the strife of parties among the military leaders,
which dady became more bitter. While all the Generals in command belonged to
the school of Laudon, Field Marshal Lascy possessed a decisive influence in the
military administration at Vienna, and showed very little zeal in assisting generals whom he disliked. When, therefore, at the beginning of February, the Prince of Coburg, attended by
the Colonels of his staff, Mack and Fischer, repaired to Frankfort to meet and
consult with the King of Prussia, the Duke of Brunswick, and Generals Manstein and Grawert, the forces enumerated above were by
no means in a state of readiness. Coburg estimated bis Belgian army at 55,000
men; it was resolved to increase these by 11,000 Russians whom Frederick of
Brunswick had led to Gueldres, and 13,000 Hanoverians in the pay of
the Maritime Powers— and to support the operations of this great body of men by
the 33,000 men whom Hohenlohe-Kirchberg was reported to have under his command.
A second main-army was to be gathered round the King on the Maine, consisting of 42,000 Prussians, 6000 Hessians, 3000 Darmstadter,
and 5000 Saxons; and all these were to be supported
by Wurmser, whose strength was estimated for" the present at 24,000 men.
War had been as good as declared by the Empire since the conclusion of the Imperial Diet of the 23rd
of November (though the formal and official declaration of war was not issued
till the 30th of April), and orders were given for calling out a Triplum—i. e.
an army of the Empire of 120,000 men.1 Meanwhile
these preparations were carried on in so slow and partial a manner, that not
even the contributions of money entered on the lists had been coUected, and no
more
1 The simplum
was 40,000.
428 RECOVERY OF BELGIUM BY THE
AUSTRIANS.
[Book VI.
than 17,000 soldiers of the Empire, at the most, were expected for this campaign,1
besides the above-mentioned divisions. The idea therefore of a
separate Army of the Empire was renounced from the very
first, and the contingents were sent off to Coburg or Brunswick as they
came in,
With respect to the immediate employment of these troops it was
resolved as follows. First and foremost Coburg was to relieve Maestricht, which
was threatened by the French, and to~ drive the enemy from tbe left bank of the Meuse. Brunswick was then to cross the Rhine, and besiege
Mayence; for which purpose Coburg—who designated the capture of this town as
the main object of the campaign—promised to send him 15,000 Austrians. On the
fad of Mayence, Coburg was to take measures for the recovery of
Belgium, and Wurmser to advance upon Landau, Brunswick upon Saar-louis, and
Beaulieu upon Thionville, simultaneously.2
Iu these feeble and tentative arrangements we recognize the wavering
mind of the Duke of Brunswick, and his aversion
to the whole war.3 From his habit of spending the same amount of time over important and
unimportant matters, and looking after every particular
himself, and thereby losing sight of the main object in view, he was completely
lost in the annoyances which attend on every coalition war,
and which, on this occasion, sprang in rich abundance from the military
preparations of the German Empire. He was again convinced, as in 1794, that
nothing but disgrace would result from the approaching campaign. Meanwhile the conferences were tolerably harmonious,
as the Prince of Coburg vied with the Duke in slowness and circumspection—was
equally convinced of the necessity of patiently waiting on the Meuse until
Mayence should be taken,—and was in no
l Vid. Hausser,
I. 528, for the details. — - The official minutes of this Conference are given
in Wagner's Geschichte des Preubsischen Feld-zuyn am llheiu 1793. —
3 This is not inconsistent with
Hausser's view (I. 575) that the Dnke was obliged to eonsent to some important alterations in his plan.
Ch.
V.] DUMOURIEZ'S PLANS AGAINST
HOLLAND. 429
hurry to act on the offensive before the arrival of his reserves.
What a different .degree of energy and activity was shown, at the same
time, on tbe side of the enemy! When Dumouriez
received orders to attack Holland, his force had been completely crippled by
the late uncertainty of affairs; the recruiting had beeu interrupted, the
treasury was exhausted, and the Commissariat in the same state of derangement as in November. The General hastened to take the
necessary measures. His present plan was to force his way from Antwerp through
North Brabant, seize the strongholds of the Lower Meuse, cross this river near
Dortrecht, and thenee to march upon Amsterdam with all possible
expedition. The success of the scheme depended entirely on a bold and unexpected coup
de main; the agitated state of Belgium, the ruined state of his own army, and
the approach of the Austrians, left him no choice. His
forces amounted in all to somewhat more than 100,000 men, of which about
10,000 were distributed in different garrisons, 11,000 occupied the province of
Namur under General Harville, and 19,000 under Valence covered the Ardennes
(Verviers, Stavelot and Mal-medy). From this point an army of
30,000 men under Dumouriez's own command lay extended
from Liege towards Aix la Chapelle and the Roer; while 16,000 under Miranda
watched the Lower Meuse from Maestricht to Roermonde. There remained,
therefore, about 17,000 men for the expedition against Amsterdam, and it was evident that everything depended on the rapidity of their movements.1 The
Dutch, who were still in a very imperfect state of preparation, had dispersed their small army along the extensive line of frontier; they were, however, taking active measures
1 All these figures are taken from
the muster-rolls of- the several corps in the Military Archives in Paris.
Dumouriez's estimates in his Memoiret are
invariably too low; the higher figures in Miranda's Correspondence give the
nominal strength, "on paper."
430 RECOVERY OP BELGIUM BY THE
AUSTRIANS. [Book VI.
to increase their force, while Dumouriez on his part had but little prospect of receiving any further reinforcement from France.
The Minister BeurnonviUe had indeed promised to do all in his power. He
sent off the greater part of the garrison of Paris to the army, and in general
cultivated the best possible understanding with the commanders;
which the latter, after the disorders of Pache's administration, acknowledged
with feelings of relief and gratitude: "You no longer say," wrote
Miranda, "as Hassenfratz once did, that generals are to be had by
millions; or, like Cambon, that soldiers are every
thing and generals nothing." The withdrawal of the garrison from Paris,
however, gave the Proletaries an opportunity for fresh revolts, but afforded
little aid against the Austrians. Everything depended, therefore, on the speed with which Dumouriez could push on, and reach Amsterdam before
the Germans brought aid from the East, or the English from the West. Dumouriez
now ordered Miranda to increase his corps to 30,000 by draughts from
Valence's army—to take Maestricht and Venlo as. speedily as
p>ossible, and then advance with all his force upon Nymwegen. If these
operations succeeded, he thought that he should have Holland entirely in his
power, and in his sanguine zeal he imagined himself at the successful termination of an enterprise which was only just
commenced. "As soon as I have effected the revolution in Amsterdam, I
shall march back by way of Utrecht, and in all probability, bring with me Dutch
auxiliary troops, to add to whose numerical strength Thouvenot shall meanwhile raise 25 battalions of Belgian infantry. If I
had more time, I woidd proceed in a more regular way, but we must fight like
desperate men—inspire astonishment and terror—conquer or die; it is, under
the present critical circumstances, the only way
of saving the Republic."
We see that he was in a similar position and mood, as he had been five
months earlier, when opposed to the Duke of Brunswick at Montmedy. On the latter occasion, he
Ch.
V.] ENGLISH GUARDS ARRIVE AT DORTRECHT.
431
wished to draw off to the left, and throw himself upon Belgium, to
excite astonishment and fear. He was now equally hopeless of being able to
resist the daily increasing Austrians, and he once more sought to save himself
by a brilliant diversion. But now his zeal was
quickened, and at the same time his position rendered doubly difficult, by the
unsatisfactory footing on which he stood with the Parisian parties. From France
he had nothing more to hope; on the contrary, he intended to employ his Batavian and Belgian troops, not merely against- the Austrians, but
more especially against the Jacobins.
On the 17th of February his troops crossed the Dutch frontier at
Bergen-op-zoom; and he pushed forward with all the impetuosity of his
character, increased threefold by desperation. On the
23rd Breda was invested, and surrendered on the fourth day—though it possessed a brave and adequate garrison—by its commandant, General Bylandt. Fort
Klundert fell at the same time after a brave resistance, and immediately afterwards, the weakly fortified Gertruiden-hurg. Early in
March, therefore, sufficient ground was won on the Hollands-Diep—the broad,
shadow, lake-lukc frith near the mouth of the Meuse—to enable him to make
arrangements for crossing. Whde vessels were being collected from all quarters for the transport of the
troops, Dumouriez quartered his regiments in hastily built straw huts close to
the shore, to be ready to start at any moment. Meanwhile the difficulties had
increased. The Dutch had got together more than a hundred armed
vessels, with which they filled the arm of the Meuse from the sea to Gorkum;
all the fortresses in their rear were now protected by
inundation, and just at the right moment a regiment of English Guards, 2,000
strong, appeared, to strengthen the garrison of
Dort-recht which was first exposed to attack. "Two months ago," wrote
Spiegel at that time, "we could have made no resistance, but now we are in
good condition, and look with
432
RECOVERY
OF BELGIUM BY THE AUSTRIANS. [Book VI.
confidence to the future," Such was the position of affairs when the storm broke from the German side.
General Miranda began to open bis trenches before Maestri cht on the 21st of February. He employed in this
service 12,000 men on the left bank of the Meuse, under his own command, and
5,000 on the right bank in Wyk under General Leveneur. As there was no time
for a regular siege, he tried to terrify the garrison by bombarding the town,
set fire to it in several quarters, but made no impression
either on the Commandant the Prince of Hessen-Phdips-thal or the citizens.
Meanwhile General Lamarliere occupied Roermonde, lower down the river, with a
nominal force of 7,000 men, but which had melted away by want, exposure and desertion, to 4,500; and
General Champmorin was pushed forward with 4,700 men to occupy Venlo, where
however Frederick of Brunswick-Oels got the start of him with 10,000 men, and
took up a position extremely awkward for the line of communication between Miranda and Dumouriez. Nor was the French line of
defence on the Liege frontier in a sounder state. Valence, who in Dumouriez's
stead commanded in all 36,000 men in that country, had his head-quarters in
Liege itself, and would have liked to keep) his troops together in the
hdly country between Liege, Herve and Verviers. But the Commissioners of the
Convention had compelled him—partly by Pache's orders, partly in
accordance11 with
their own desires—to revolutionize the old imperial city of Aix-la-Chapellc, and to extend his positions
beyond Aix, to the—in a military point of view— entirely unimportant river
Roer. In this way half his army was spread along a too extended line—Stengel in
Eschweiler, Dampierre in Aix-la-Chappelle, and Lanoue in Aldenhoven. With a view of affording it some sort of security, Lamarliere was obliged to send forward a few outposts from Roermonde over the Roer, to Wassenberg, Dal-beim, and
Arsbeek, where a few unimportant .skirmishes took place during the month of February. It is easy to perceive
Ch. V.]
COBURG
BEATS FRENCH ON THE ROER.
433
that this could only increase the too great dispersion of the French
forces. Dumouriez, however, only knew of 30,000 Austrians beyond the Roer, and
indulged the hope that his generals, with a nearly
double force, would easily keep the enemy back.
And in fact many weeks passed before the Prince of Coburg got into motion. The ground of his delay was always the
same—deficiency in numbers. Even at the last conference
he had to anounce that he had only 55,000, instead of 69,000 men, and now a new
deficit of equal amount appeared; since at the end of
February he had not more than 40,000 men under his colours. As General Wurmser,
too, had for the present only 14,000, instead of 24,000, there was a
recurrence of the same insufficiency of forces which had played so great a part
in the failure of the past year. The King of Prussia, who received intelligence
from the Emperor Francis in an autograph letter that there were 225,000 Austrians in the field, urged the Prince to commence the attack. The King himself—in spite of the by no means
despicable enjoyments of his Frankfort sojourn— burned with desire to wipe out
the disgrace of the previous autumn, and sent courier after courier urging the Prince to rescue Maestricht, and put an end to his
shameful inactivity.1 It
was with great reluctance that Coburg made up his mind to attack the superior
force of the enemy with his little army; he was decided at last by the
increasing distress of Maestricht, and on the 1st
of March he gave the longed-for order to attack.
In the early dawn, General Clerfait with several columns fell upon Aldenhoven, and somewhat later, Lieutenant Field-Marshal the Prince of Wiirtemberg, on Esch-weiler. The French were surprised at both points, and routed in spite of a
vigorous resistance. The victors pursued them with all speed, and
pushed forward without stop-
1 M. S. correspondence
between Manstein and Tauenzien.
434
RECOVERY OF BELGIUM BY THE AUSTRIANS.
[Book VI.
ping to Aix-la-Chapelle, where Danrpierre tried a street-fight; but the
Austrians, like the Hessians in Frankfort, were supported by the thoroughly
exasperated inhabitants, and dispersed the French so completely that General Stengel was driven far away to the South and did not
reach a French corps cl'armee until he came to Namur. The other divisions fled with a loss of 2,000
men towards Liege, from which place Valence sent
reinforcements to meet them, and for the present maintained the positions of
Herve and San-magne.1
But even these successes opened the way for the Prince of Coburg to
raise the siege of Maestricht. While the Prince of Wnrtemberg was following the French towards Liege, the Arch-Duke Charles hastened
westwards directly towards Maestricht. The march was executed with such
rapidity, that Miranda scarcely had time to remove the corps of General Levenenr from Wyk, and cause it to move up the stream and cross the Meuse by the bridge of Viset. He saw that his
own position was not tenable, and he first sent his siege-train with 4,000 men,
and soon afterwards the remainder of bis army—some 7,000 men—under Philip of
Chartres, back to Tongres; and then hastened himself to Liege to
talk over further measures with Valence. Thus Maestricht was rescued, the right
bank of the Meuse cleared of the enemy, and the first task of the Frankfort
conference accomplished in three clays. At Llerve the
zeal of the victors immediately relaxed, and only
feeble attempts were made against Liege which Valence easily repelled.
This time, however, events were destined to move more quickly than the
feeble leaders had dared to hope. The Archduke Charles could see from Maestricht the consternation
1 For tbe details eontained in this
letins of the Austrian army (from
and the following pages we have the Oesterr.
Milit. Zeitschri/t von 1813),
constantly consulted
not only the but also the
correspondence of the
Miimoires of
Dumouriez, the corres- Military Archives in Paris, pondence of Miranda, and the
bul-
Cn.
V.] DISORDERLY FLIGHT OF THE FRENCH.
435
and disorder of the enemy, and determined to continue the pursuit
without intermission. One of his columns had a skirmish, on the 4th,
with Leveneur's troops, beyond Viset and the Archduke himself appeared on the
same day with 11,000 men before Tongres, made three attacks upon it in quick
succession, and at the third gained full possession of the town. The fugitives dispersed, some towards the West to Saint Trond, the others
towards the South to Liege, where their intelligence spread universal terror.
The French already imagined Belgium overrun by the enemy, and themselves cut off and surrounded; they were
without any news of Lamarliere and Champmorin, and therefore came to the
resolution to withdraw all their corps from Herve, &c., to give up Liege,
and as speedily as possible to be in Saint Trond before the enemy. This plan
was carried out in breathless haste, and the sick, the magazines
and cannon, were left behind. In the course of the 5th, indeed, during their
march to Saint Trond, they had to repel several divisions
of the enemy, who from the side of Tongres were already harrassing the Freneh
line of retreat. The troops, already shaken by
their previous misfortunes, could not stand this restless haste; they saw that
the military chest and the heavy artdlery were being sent by the nearest road
to the French frontiers, and concluding that their danger was extreme they broke their ranks and fled. In
one confused and disorderly mass, which hourly melted away, they made for St.
Trond; Dumouriez maintained that more than 10,000 deserters ran as far as the
French borders. "Every road," wrote a Civil Commissioner to the Minister at War, on the 7th, "is covered with
fugitives, who mark their path by every kind of excess and devastation."
The campaign wonld probably have been already decided, had Coburg pressed on
with all his force beyond Liege; but the acquisition
of this city seemed so important, and there were so many political and
administrative matters to be arranged, that the Prince halted for several days,
and thus left the French generals
2 E 2
436
RECOVERY
OF BELGIUM BY THE AUSTRIANS. [Book VI.
time to recall Lamarliere and Champmorin, — who had hastened from
Roermonde by way of Diest to St. Trond,— and then, on the 8th, to draw up their
whole force, in a position protected by a canal, behind the town of Louvain.
The rear-guard alone remained at Bautersem, and still
held Tirlemont with 400 men.
The news of this catastrophe caused the greatest excitement in Belgium. Ever since the Thirty Government Commissioners had been let loose upon the country, there was not a
province which had not felt the effects of the decree
of the 15th of December. Everywhere the existing taxes were abolished at once,
and thereby the order of every community completely ruined; the
established Authorities were removed, and new elections ordered; pending which, all the property belonging to Royal persons, to the Towns,
the Church, or the Corporations, was confiscated. Cambon bad, from the very
first, declared the immediate object of these measures—to enrich the French
treasury by the wealth of Belgium. The ulterior object had been
unreservedly announced by Danton in the Convention on
the 31st of Jan. "As soon,' he said, "as the Belgian proletaries are
emancipated, there will be no further difficulty in incorporating Belgium with the French territory." The
decree therefore was issued on the same clay, ordering the primary Electors in
Belgium, not oidy to elect new Magistrates, but to give a vote respecting the
future constitution of their country; and threatening to treat them as enemies
unless their voices were given in favour of freedom and
ecpiality. As it was very well known in Paris, how much dislike and reluctance
had to be overcome before the desired result could be obtained, the Ministry instructed their Commissioners to keep a strict
watch over the assemblies of primary Electors, and
to test the validity of every election—in other words, to dictate their
commands with the aid of a French military force. Matters were carried on in
accordance with these directions in every town. "When the Authorities
in Namur
Ch. V.] THE FRENCH COMMISSIONERS IN BELGIUM.
437
were unwilling to hold any new elections, General d'Harville threatened
to have them all arrested, and thus forcibly brought about the formation of an
entirely democratic Council of Administration, which then
named the French Commissioner as its Procurenr-Syndic;
whereupon the confiscation of public property was
carried on without further difficulty. In Tournay the Magistracy thought of a
more prudent plan, and having full confidence in the
sentiments of the people, caused new representatives to be elected as quickly
as possible; who, in virtue of their definitive appointment,
had the right of withdrawing their province from the operation of the decree of
the 15th of December. But they had given the French credit for too much
respect for their own laws; for General Omoran prevented any election from
taking place by force, untd the Commissioner had confiscated
the public lands. Matters were carried on in the
same way through the whole of Belgium; and everywhere •there were impotent
protestations on the one side, and open rapacious violence on the other.
But this was by no means all. The Commissioners were exclusively
selected from the dregs of the Parisian club; some of them coidd scarcely
write their own names, and they were all destitute of any knowledge whatsoever
of administration, or of the country to which they were sent; but to make up
for this they were filled with the sentiments of the vilest Cordeliers. The lower their position in their own country, the more
intoxicated were they by the sense of unlimited power; their arrogance,
always brutal, sometimes amounted to aberration of mind. Wherever they came
they demanded to be received with the same solemnities
with which the Austrian Archdukes had formerly been honoured; sometimes they
quashed the orders of the Conventional Commissioners, and one of them
commanded Dumouriez to send off a reinforcement to some point on the line of
the Meuse without delay. The Belgians had reason to
complain of their rapacity. Whilst they
received from Paris 800 francs
438 RECOVERY
OF BELGIUM
BY THE AUSTRIANS. [Book VI.
a month, in addition to a daily sum for their personal and travelling expenses, they plundered all the Belgian treasuries without shame,
and took their stand,—wherever a claim was in cpiestion—on the ancient laws of
the land, to which they otherwise showed such fanatical hostility. They
likewise took care to gather round them all the elements of the Belgian people which were similar to themselves: "Ye poor," said
a proclamation published in Namur, "throw away all shame; the rich who are
the cause of your misery must be made to blush, the palace shall give way to
the cottage." Meanwhile the Parisian Jacobin
Club, being informed of the ill feeling which was raging in the country,
anounced in another proclamation to the Belgians; that
if they had the meanness to recall their tyrants, and to forget their liberation by the blood of Frenchmen, the brothers of
the fallen would rush upon them and sacrifice them to the manes
of the heroes! The Commissioners of the Convention, six in number,
among whom was Danton, publicly confirmed this proclamation on every occasion.1
Dumouriez, who in his heart was furious at this
stupid piece of brutality, prophesied a general revolt of the Belgians, as soon as ever the Germans shoidd show themselves on the
frontier. This was his chief reason for thinking the concpiest of Holland
indispensable to the maintenance of Belgium. But his
protest was not regarded; on the contrary, the last step was taken just
as he was marching against Holland, at the end of February, and Belgium was
compelled to beg for incorporation into the great Republic,
1 Borgnet (Hist,
des Beiges a la Jin du IS. sieele) has confirmed these statements by a
superabundance of Belgian documents. Nor is there any lack of French testimony
to the same effect in the secret correspondence.
On the 10th of March the Conventional
Commissioners themselves
reported to the Minister at War: "The ignorance and madness of the
Executive Commissioners are chiefly in fault." On the 19th, the Agent
Millon writes to the Minister Lebrun: "The indignation against the Civil
Commissioners and their thefts, is universal."
Ch.
V.] BELGIAN VOTE ON UNION WITH
FRANCE.
439
The Commissioners had already discussed the subject on the 3rd of
February, and had with one exception decided for the union, which they said must be brought to pass by every means of reason, philanthropy, and
revolutionary tactics, and lastly, in virtue of the rights of conquest. According to the favourite formula, however, the Belgian people were
first to vote on the question; and the commissioner Chaussard reported to the Ministry—pretty much as Sievers had
done to St. Petersburg—that as there were very few well-disposed voters, he
needed money, much money, to work upon the people, and that it might be
necessary to display the national power to prevent scandalous scenes in the
assemblies. Liege, where a very different spirit pre-vaded from that of the
rest of Belgium, and the majority was really in favour of a union with France,
had already sent a petition to Paris in accordance with the wish of the Ministry, on the 28th of January. The result in the rest of
Belgium was very different. In Mons, 150 Unionists drove ten times the number
of opponents from the assembly of the people by the aid of the French garrison,
and then freely and unanimously passed a resolution in favour of
incorporation with the French people. The citizens of Ghent, a few weeks
later, spared themselves a similar experience by not visiting the popular
assembly at all; in this case about a hundred proletaries and sixty criminals, under the presidency of a cobbler, in their capacity of the
sovereign people of Ghent, laid the city at the feet of the French Republic. A
similar scene was enacted under the presidency of the French Colonel Lavalette
in the Cathedral at Brussels; whereupon
the Sansculottes
celebrated the great day , by destroying several
"aristocratic" monuments. It is not necessary to describe the
proceedings which took place in the other provinces, since they all bear the
same stamp.
In the midst of these oppressive and violent proceedings
intelligence arrived of the rapid and complete defeats of the tyrants, of the
flight of the French troops from Ger
440 RECOVERY OF BELGIUM BY THE
AUSTRIANS. [Book VI.
many and the irruption of the Austrians, who in their uninterrupted progress had arrived within two days' march of Brussels.
The aspect of the country was immediately transformed.
The Jacobins now began to hide their property and to flee, the citizens
assembled for mutual protection, and the peasants rose without
further hesitation. The immediate cause of the rising was an order of the
Conventional Commissioners, to send off the gold and
silver church vessels of the sequestered corporations to France; an order which
was immediately extended by the inferior agents* to all
the churches in the country, and was carried out amidst the most violent
tumults. The patience of the nation was exhausted, and the country people,
especially, excited by their religious feelings, rose in a mass against this outrage. In Flanders several risings took place at the same
time, and in a few days 10,000 men were collected at Grammont; a sally of the
garrison at Ghent was repulsed, and a few French cannon taken. A similar
outbreak in Tournay was put clown with great difficulty, and a
tumultuous assembly in Antwerp was dispersed with bloody severity; and in order
to cool the people's fanaticism, the Commandants ordered their soldiers to
exercise in the churches. "The country," wrote Millon to the
Ministry, is in full ferment; there are riots in
every quarter; no convoy is safe on the roads, the thefts of the Commissioners
have filled the people with indignation." In Brussels, half
of whose garrison had marched out to strengthen the camp at Louvain, the Authorities ordered a general disarming of the people,
and threatened to set fire to the town at the first symptom of disorder. But an
Austrian proclamation was secretly and zealously spread about by the
inhabitants, which promised entire oblivion of former differences
and a recognition of the ancient privileges of the land.
All these tidings fell, like a succession of blows, on the head of
Dumouriez, who, as we have seen, was just on the point of passing the Hollands
Diep. At first he adhered to
Ch. V.]
DUMOURIEZ BREAKS WITH THE PARISIAN DEMOCRATS. 441
his plan, and wrote to Valence that he must hold the line of the Meuse
for fourteen days longer at any cost; whereupon
Miranda, curiously enough, sent word to him from St. Trond, on the 6th, that everything was in good order again, and that he
even hoped to be able to bring him 15,000 men to Holland. But the first
intelligence of the advance of the Austrians had caused very great uneasiness
in Paris. The Ministers invited Generals Custine, Servan and
Labourdounaye to a council, and quickly came to the resolution that Dumouriez
must return forthwith to Belgium. The latter obeyed, doubly embittered by all
these disturbances of his plans, convinced of the
impossibdity of any longer delay, and iu all respects
prepared for every extreme. His first care was to pacify Belgium by putting a
stop to the excesses of the Commissioners. Directly he arrived in Antwerp he
banished the Government Commissioner from the city, and forbade the Jacobin Club, with threats of nulitary force in case of disobedience, to
busy themselves any further about politics. He sent orders in all directions to
restore the sdver vessels to the Churches and even to bring them back again
from France. In Brussels he deposed the Commandant, an associate of
the Jacobins, arrested the Government Commissioner, and disarmed
the so-called army of Sansculottes.
He called upon all the Communes of the land to draw up their just
complaints, and on the l"2th of March, despatched a letter to the Convention, in which he unsparingly
revealed the late abuses. By each of these steps he irrevocably broke with the
Parisian Rulers. The Commissioners of the Convention told him
as much, and when a Brussels deputation begged for their church plate in accordance with Dumouriez's last
order, they angrily replied, that the General was not there to give orders, but
to receive them. Dumouriez needed not such expressions to tell him that he
stood opposed to implacable enemies. The men who were just erecting the bloody tribunal of the Revolution might make use of him
as long as he seemed necessary to
442
RECOVERY
OF BELGIUM BY THE AUSTRIANS. [Book VI.
oppose the Austrians, but his subsequent fate was irrevocably determined on. He had no intention of
patiently waiting for it; his first object was to make
himself master of the situation. His only way out of the difficulties which
beset him, was to drive the Austrians from the land by a rapid succession of
blows, to complete the conquest of Holland, and thereby attach the army indissolubly to his person, and then
to hold a bloody reckoning with the Parisians. Should fortune desert him at the
first step, one last means still remained.
He therefore hastened from Brussels to the
army. He had caused the fugitives to be collected from all quarters, drawn
together 4,000 men under General Neudly from the Ardennes, and 1,500 from the
garrison at Brussels, by which he had raised the number of his forces at
Louvain to 50,000 men; and now considered himself equal in
strength to the enemy.
On his arrival in Louvain his determination to fight was stronger than
ever—a determination which, even from a military point of view, seems much
better justified than is generally acknowledged. The army
threatened to fall to pieces at every touch; it had already at an earlier
period been greatly demoralized by a bad commissariat and the machinations of
the demagogues, and had suffered since its defeats by wholesale desertion. With
such troops he coidd only hope for success from bold
offensive operations, which might restore to his men some degree of
self-confidence; they were utterly incapable of an obstinate defence, and a
further retreat would have been followed by complete dissolution. Moreover the relative proportion of numbers was
for the moment much more favourable to the French, than it was likely to be at
a later period. For the Austrians had not even 50,000, as they supposed, but at
most 40,000 men at their disposal; that re-inforcements were on the way seemed certain, and at any rate there was no doubt at all
that Beaulieu and Hohenlohe were on their way from Treves
Ch.
V.] DUMOURIEZ ATTACKS THE
AUSTRIANS.
443
and Luxembourg towards Namur. In addition to this, it was announced, on the 8th, that 16,000 Hanoverans were approaching the
Belgian frontier, and on the 10th, that Brunswick-Oels had reached
Herzogenbusch with his Prussians. Lastly, 10,000 Dutch might
at any moment force their way across the rivers, and the already announced landing of an English corps might be immediately
expected to take place. On the other hand it is true that the Convention had
ordered a fresh levy of 300,000 men in February, but thus far the only residt
had been a number of ententes
in the Departments, and a civil war in La
Vendee; and as to the rabble which the Commissioners of the Convention had
drawn into Belgium from the border Departments—"rather trustworthy
politicians,!' as they themselves wrote, "than useful
soldiers"—Dumouriez was obliged to send them home as
speeddy as possible. It was therefore in the highest degree uncertain whether
the latter woidd receive any real accession of strength, whde
reinforcements for his opponents were at hand in no small numbers. His only
chance, therefore, was to take advantage of
Coburg's momentary weakness, to inflict 'a blow which woidd drive the
Prussians, Dutch and English, to a becoming distance.
On the 15th, the first Austrian divisions were seen in the direction of
Tongres; by a rapid attack they had captured the
weakly-garrisoned town of Tirlemont. Dumouriez had just altered the
battle-array of his army, and was employed in placing his divisions at greater
intervals, in order to oppose the possible intervention of
the Prussians from the North. In doing this he made the
bitter experience, that at the beginning of the battle at Tirlemont, several of
his generals to the right and left deserted their new posts and timidly
retreated upon the main army at Louvain. But he saw with satisfaction that the behaviour of his troops improved in a marked degree under his
firm conduct. All the more boldly, therefore, did he move forward, on the 16th,
with his whole force against the Austrians, attacked them
RECOVERY
OF BELGIUM BY THE AUSTRIANS. [Book VI.
before Tirlemont on the front and flank at the same time, and drove
them through that town and beyond the high banks of the little river Gette.
Both parties lost about 1,000 men in this engagement which lasted for eight hours; but this first advantage, after so many shameful
defeats, somewhat restored to the French their confidence in themselves and in their leader.
On the 17th Dumouriez reconnoitred the position of the enemy more
closely, and determined to bring the matter to a decision on
the following clay. The Austrian line extended behind the Gette from north to
south—from the high road which connects Tirlemont with Saint Trond and Tongres,
to the village of Raccourt. The Archduke Charles with the van of the army formed the extreme right wing, which rested on the high road;
then came the divisions of the Prince of Wiirtemberg and Colloredo; and next to
the latter, as left wing, lay the reserves under Clerfait between the villages
of Landen and Raccourt. They had occupied the villages which
lay in front cprite close to the river—first Oberwinden and Neerwinden on the
south, and then Neerhespen and Orsmael on both sides of the high road—but had
left the strongly-built country town of Lean,—half a league north of the high road pretty nearly in the line of their battle-array—unoccupied. Dumouriez calculated that the northern or right wing of this
position would be the stronger, since it occupied and covered the natural line
of retreat for the Austrians, the high road to Tongres. He determined,
therefore, to send General Miranda the leader of his left wing to occupy Lean
and to wrest Orsmael from the Austrians. Chartres, on the other hand, was to
make the main attack with the centre of the army against Neerwinden, and Valence with the right wing, against Oberwinden; and after taking
these villages they were gradually to wheel to the left, and constantly outflanking the enemy, to keep advancing till they too reached the high
road, and thereby drove back the Austrians from Tongres. In accordance with this plan, Dumouriez set
all
Ch. V.]
BATTLE
OP NEERWINDEN.
445
his columns in motion, almost at the same time, at 7 o'clock on the
morning of the 18th. The battle began on the high road, where Miranda by a vigorous charge drove the light troops of the Archduke out of
Orsmael, but soon received a check from the superior fire of the Austrian
artillery. Towards 8 o'clock General Champmorin occupied Leau by the side of
Miranda, and from this place sent forward a regiment of Chasseurs against the rear of the Archduke;1 at
the same time Valence from the opposite end of the line of battle came into the
engagement at Raccourt and Oberwinden, and pushed forward a column (Lamarche)
into the plain behind these villages as far as Landen; by
which means the intended out-flanking of the enemy was commenced on this side
also. Being thus hard pressed on many sides the Prince of Coburg ordered a
vigorous attack upon all these columns at once. Clerfait moved against Valence; the Prince of Wiirtemberg drew a portion of his corps from the
rear of the Archduke, in order to recover Leau from the French, and General
Benjowski brought the rest to reinforce the Archduke, who then without further
hesitation proceeded to attack Miranda. At the same moment the
battle was commenced in the centre also, between the
Duke of Chartres , and Count Colloredo, who disputed the possession of the
vdlage of Neerwinden with the greatest obstinacy. The contest continued undecided at this point until the evening; Neerwinden
having been taken and lost twice according to French reports, and once
according to the Austrian account; it remained at last in the hands of
Colloredo, who was not, however, able to drive the French beyond the Gette. Clerfait had great difficulty in maintaining his ground at Oberwinden and Raccourt; he had, as Dumouriez rightly foresaw, scarcely
8,000 men at his disposal; but he repidsed two charges of a superior number of
French infantry with the
1 Champinorin's report in the military archives of Paris, Arme'e da Nord, Supplement.
446
RECOVERY
OF BELGIUM
BY THE AUSTRIANS. [Book VI.
greatest steadiness, and held his position on the whole until the
afternoon. Whdst a bloody engagement was carried on
without decision in this way on the south and in the centre, the Archduke
Charles decided the fortune of the day a little after two o'clock. He
completely routed Miranda's columns by a splendid charge, and drove them over
the Gette; whole battalions of the national volunteers broke
their ranks and dispersed; the artillery-men deserted their guns and a crowd of
fugitives carried such confusion into Champmorin's columns,
that that General retreated as quickly as possible over the bridge of Helve,
The whole left wing of the French army was completely broken up.1
Coburg immediately brought up some of his own victorious regiments to
strengthen Clerfait and Colloredo, and Clerfait threw
the Nassau Cuirassiers upon the enemy with such violence,
that Valence placed himself in person in front of
his squadrons, succeeded in resisting the charge, but was obliged immediately
afterwards to leave the battle-field severely wounded.2
But this gallantry could no longer win back victory to the French side,
since after Miranda's flight the Archduke was able
to attack the other divisions of the enemy in the rear; nay he might even reach
Tirlemont before them and thereby intercept the road to Brussels. Dumouriez
therefore hastened on the same evening in person to the defeated corps, and led aU of it that seemed capable of being held together
back again to the Gette, highly delighted that the Austrians did not in the
meanwbde renew the attack on his centre. On the following morning he continued
his retreat with all his forces towards Louvain, without
suffering much annoyance from the Austrians; his hope of changing the fate, of
the whole campaign by a sudden coup was
over. The French had lost more than 5,000 in slain and prisoners, and thirty
1 Chainpinorin's report. — 2 At a
later period, after Dumouriez's fall, Miranda gave an essentially different
aeeount of this battle; but all the reports from the spot, whether French or
Austrian, agree in the above details.
Cn.
V.]
THE
FRENCH TURNED OUT OF BELGIUM.
447
guns on their left wing.1 Still more unfavorable, however, was the moral effect of this battle;
-since the lately healed panic of Aldenhoven and Aix-la-Chapelle was now
renewed in the fullest measure. By the evening of the 18th Miranda's corps alone had lost 4,000 deserters and a
despairing spirit soon spread through the rest of the forces. No one could
regard the battle itself as a defeat of the French, but as it compeUed them to
continue their retreat, it brought absolute annihilation upon the army. Dumouriez acknowledged that Belgium could no longer
be maintained. It is true that some of the French divisions fought three
battles near Tirlemont and Louvain, but they could no longer stop the march of
the Austrians, and the great mass of the army was completely
useless. The number of deserters increased in two days to 10,000; it was more
especially the Volunteers and the Rationales—about
three-quarters of the army—who having been most implicated in the machinations
of the Clubs, now spread tumidt and confusion in every direction, loudly
cursed the further defence of Belgium, and hastened towards the French frontier
in disorderly crowds. Dumouriez resolved to leave them to their own devices,
and to form a special corps of about 15,000 men from the troops of the line and the artillery, with which he in some degree covered the
further retreat.
1 Moniteur, April 12th. The French Allemand,
the Cuirassiers of Nassau,
have
lost at least from 5,000 to the free
corps of Griin-Laudon and
6,000—the
Austrians at most from O'Donnel have suffered
considerably. 3,000 to 5,000 ; the regiments Royal
448
CHANGE
OF MINISTRY IN AUSTRIA.
[Book VI.
CHAPTER VI. CHANGE OF MINISTRY IN AUSTRIA.
Parties
in the cabinet of Vienna.—Negotiation with England.—Spielmann threatens bavaria.—England wishes to enlarge Belgium.—
Dumouriez's catastrophe.—Conference at Antwerp.—CoburG's negotiation with france.—Change of ministry in Vienna
—Baron
thugut opposes the partition of poland. — prussia's successes against
custine.—Effect
of the proceedings in Vienna
upon Prussia.
While the
Austrian army was making its rapid and victorious progress through Belgium,
the Court of Vienna found itself in a position by no means agreeable to its
wishes. The satisfaction of recovering its former possessions was disturbed
by the uncertainty of its new plans of concpiest. The secret dissension in the
Ministry, moreover, between Colloredo, Cobenzl and Spielmann
continued, aud the Emperor ■—who
as usual troubled himself but little with business,
and after his slow and reserved fashion, seldom expressed his will
decidedly—manifested more clearly every day his secret dissatisfaction with the
position of affairs. Even Colloredo no longer enjoyed his full confidence; but the scientific preceptor of Francis, Schloissnigg,—■ insignificant as his vain and
unpractical character rendered him—obtained a very influential
voice in the Cabinet by his readiness on all occasions to flatter the
self-sufficiency and ambition of the Emperor. The Ministers
had a more than vexatious proof of his influence during this very Belgian
campaign. No sooner had the Prince of Coburg driven the French from Liege than
he put the Bishopric under imperial secpiestration, excluded the episcopal officials from the exercise of their functions, and
■ VI.] ENGLAND OPPOSES THE BAVARIAN EXCHANGE.
449
paid no attention to the orders of the Bishop himself. This conduct
excited no little surprise, and called forth lively opposition from all quarters; but no one was more astonished than the
Austrian Ministers, who, not having the slightest intention of pursuing such a
course, called the Prince to account for his arbitrary and
unwarrantable conduct; they were soon, however, obliged to
hold their tongues, when Coburg laid before them in his own justification an
order proceeding directly from the Cabinet. They contented themselves by a subsequent compromise of the matter, so that for the
present it had no further consequences; but of
course such a state of affairs was not well adapted to further the ends of
Austrian diplomacy.
The darling wish of the Emperor—the acquisition of Bavaria—was moreover surrounded with ever-increasing diffi-ficulties.
There was, as we have seen, a moment in January when England seemed
favourable to the plan, because it was her object to gain over Austria to the
English scheme for saving Poland, and making peace with France. But this whole
plan was only too soon rendered impossible by the ardent desire for war which prevailed in the Convention, and forthwith the old
disinclination to the Bavarian-Belgian Exchange once more showed itself in
London. At the very first conference which Count Stadion held with Lord
Gren-ville on this point in London, the latter
declared generally, that no proposals for compensation by the accpuisition or
exchange of lands, could expect to meet with any favour in England. On
the contrary, he said that it was the decided wish of his royal master that
projects of that kind—which necessarily exercised an
unfavourable influence on general questions—should for the present be
postponed, that they might not destroy the most essential condition of victory,
a general feeling of confidence among the Powers themselves.
1
1 Haeften to Spiegel.
450
CHANGE
OF MINISTRY IN AUSTRIA.
[Book VI.
This answer was the more disagreeable to the Court of Vienna the more
they felt the want of England's mighty influence to remove the German
obstacles to the execution of the plan. After Prussia had consented to
the exchange, on the condition that the House of Wittelsbach should give their
consent to it, almost everything depended on the resolutions
of the Court of Munich. The latter, however, carried
on for the time more intimate intercourse with Paris than with
Vienna, regarded the plan of exchange as an empty pretext, and had been thrown
into a state of violent agitation by the expressions uttered in Vienna about
the Imperial ban and sequestration. Bavaria therefore showed nothing but caution and suspicion, and put every conceivable obstacle in the way of the Imperial troops on their march
through the country to the Rhine. And thus the anger of the Austrian government
at such treasonable conduct to themselves and to the
Empire was increased tenfold, while the main subject in hand—the negotiation
of the exchange—was rendered more and more
difficult. Under these circumstances Spielmann, in spite of the dissuasion of
Prussia, continually recurred to the idea of employing force, by which means Bavaria at any rate might for the present be occupied by
a military force, as Saxony had been by Prussia in 1756. He regarded this plan
as the more justifiable because he thought he saw traces of
French influence in South Germany as well as
Bavaria, and expressed himself on this subject ■ with inconsiderate zeal. He alluded, in the first place, to Darmstadt,
whose Landgrave, however, managed to justify himself against the main
charge—the feeble opposition made against Custine in the
preceding autumn; but most pointedly to Wurtemberg, whose charge
d'affaires having asked how his Duke could obtain the favour of the Emperor,
received the plain answer—"By doing the very opposite of all that he had
hitherto done."1 Thus at' every step the
1 All this
is taken from Haeften's correspondence.
Ch. VI.] THE COALITION CRIPPLED BY MUTUAL JEALOUSY.
451
mutual irritation was increased and the plan of exchange was still
farther from realization in March than in the previous
December. It was in the former mouth that the
Elector, after long negotiation and much hesitation, distinctly refused to
deliver up Mannheim to the Imperial troops; a step which was regarded in Vienna
as a certain proof of a treacherous understanding with France; and had it "not been for their regard for the opinion of Prussia
and England, the Imperial cabinet would have immediately proceeded to put
Bavaria under sequestration. This state of affairs was well known at Prussian
head-quarters, and led the Prussian government to keep a strict watch on
the policy of the Emperor. No one at the Court of Berlin viewed the Austrian
intentions against Bavaria with any great favour; the most favourable wished at
all events to wait and see the course pursued by Austria in the Polish affair, and all were convinced of the necessity of not allowing
any act of violence on the part of Austria, or any swerving from the compact
made at St. Petersburg. And thus, before the beginning of the French campaign,
a feeling arose of the necessity of proceeding with the greatest
caution, and of not staking, for the advantage
of Austria, all those forces, which might perhaps be needed on the following day to meet the encroachments
of Austria on the Empire. "If Austria can re-conquer the
Netherlands" wrote Haugwitz on the 9th of
March, "all the better for the Emperor and for us; we wish it
sincerely and shall not desert his cause-but we must not forget that it is not
our business to lead the way." In these few words we have the key to the
whole course of the Coalition war; as long as
ground for such mistrust remained, the forces of Germany were condemned to impotence in the struggle with the Revolution.
At the same period Lord Grenville convinced himself that his system of
a disinterested struggle with the Revolution would not be
accepted at Vienna, and he therefore sought to substitute
some other plan of compensation for the dangerous Bavarian one. He declared himself ready to increase the
2 F 2
452
CHANGE
OF MINISTRY IN AUSTRIA.
[Book VI.
Austrian possessions in Belgium by a line of French fortresses, and in general to make France pay the expenses of the war.1 Such
an idea began to find favour in Vienna, when—in brilliant contrast to the South
German vexations— Coburg gathered laurels upon laurels in
Belgium, whose population greeted the donble eagle with
unbounded joy. Nay, even in Alsace under the tyranny of the Democrats, the
liberal burghers and the catholic peasants vied with one another in showing
German sympathies, and General Wurm-ser, who was
a native of Alsace, considered himself sure .of a rapid conquest of the couutry
by means of his understanding with the inhabitants.
Austria therefore, carried on a discussion of this system in London, but
without entirely giving up the Bavarian plan; the
final decision depended on the further course of events, which the Conrt of
Vienna now watched with increased eagerness.
Meanwhde matters took a very unexpected turn in Belgium. Dumouriez had
as little hope of driving the Austrians out of Belgium
again, as of gaining an earnest support from the Parisian rulers. His letter of
the 12th of March had been received by the French government with furious
excitemeut, which was only appeased for the moment by Danton's euergetic interference. Danton, who continually recurred to the plan of
drawing over the General to himself and the Centre, offered to go to Belgium,
and soon afterwards spoke with the Geueral in Lonvain on the 20th,2
where he urgently
1 This is first mentioned in a despatch of Sir M. Eden to Lord Gren-ville,
March the 2nd. We shall see that England adhered with unalterable firmness to
this plan in opposition to that of the Bavarian exchange. It is therefore the
very reverse of truth when Lord Stanhope (Life of Pitt II. 203), speaking of the taking of
Valenciennes by the Austrians, complains that the Emperor had
deserted
Pitt's
disinterested system. The occupation took place not in spite
but in consequence of the English project. — 2 Lacroix's report, Moniteur, 22nd February 1794. Dumouriez says
2nd of March, but on this day Danton was already on his way to Paris, and his
companion Lacroix was in Ghent with the other Commissioners.
Ch. VI.] BREACH BETWEEN DUMOURIEZ
& THE CONVENTION. 453
begged him to withdraw- his letter of March the 12th promising him, in case of compliance, the energetic support of all
parties. But Dumouriez was too firmly wedded to hi« plan respecting Belgium,
and had quarrelled with Danton on this very point; here, therefore, a concession on his part, was least of all to be expected.
Nor did he trust the promises
which were made to him. He knew that the very same men had offered the
command-in-chief to Lafayette six days after the 10th of August; he did not
give them credit for any greater honesty now than
at that time, and he indulged in the most violent
accusations against the Convention. AU that Danton could prevail upon him to
do, was to address a short petition to the Assembly to defer their resolution
respecting this letter of the 12th, until they
should receive further explanations. Danton returned hastily to Paris1 and
there fell into new difficulties.
We shall hereafter become better acquainted with his position there.
Having been shortly before intimately connected
with Robespierre, he had endeavoured at this time to enter into closer
relations with the Gironde, but had quarrelled with them, soon after his
return, respecting Dumouriez. For the Gironde still retained an irreconcilable
dislike to the General, and had just received from Miranda
very decided hints respecting his treacherous plans.2
Robespierre and Marat entirely agreed on this occasion with their deadly
enemies, and Danton found himself completely alone, nay almost compromised, on
account of his sympathy for Dumouriez.
It was now certain that the breach between the latter and the Convention was
irremediable.
Dumouriez on his part was incessantly driven on by the
1 According to the Moniteur
he chosen member of tbe Committee
of
saidin
the Conventi'on on the IstApril, Public Safety on the
25th, and made
that
he had arrived in Paris on Fri- great speeches in the Convention on
day
the 29th; but as, according to the 27th,
it is evident that we ought
Lacroix's
letter, he had started from to read above, Friday the 22nd. —
Ghent
to Paris on the 22nd, was 2 Miranda to Pethion, March 21st,
454
CHANGE
OF MINISTRY IN AUSTRIA.
[Book VI.
course of events. On the 23rd he made his first step towards a reconciliation with his late enemies; he spoke to the adjutant
of Coburg, Colonel Mack, concerning an exchange of prisoners, and came to an
agreement with him that no further great battles should be fought, that the
French should evacuate Brussels, and that further negotiations should then take place. On the 25th he received such unfavourable
intelligence from Namur, that he himself ordered the evacuation of the city,
and thus the last hope vanished of maintaining at any rate a portion of the
Belgian territory. He saw his conquest entirely lost, his reputation
destroyed, his army defeated upon French ground, and himself therefore helplessly exposed to his opponents. He was surprised at this time
by the arrival of three Commissioners from the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, who in a lengthy conference proposed to him to declare
himself for the Jacobins, and to supersede the Convention by the Jacobin Club.1 Was
this perhaps a last attempt of Danton to bind Dumouriez to his interests at any
cost?—all the other chiefs of the Club only thought of
persecuting the General to the death. However that may be, they came too late
for their object; it was in Tournay on the evening of the 26th, and Dumouriez
had already fixed the following day for his decisive conference with Mack. He was in the greatest state of excitement, expressed
himself with bitterness to the three Commissioners concerning the Convention
and the Club, and at last granted them a further interview for the next evening
after his return from Ath. Distracted
by the most contrary and violent passions, he had now at last irrevocably made
up his mind. He disclosed to the Austrian Colonel his intention of marching upon Paris, and putting an end to the rule of the Jacobins. He considered himself
secure of the good will of
'
Dumouriez to Beurnoville, Mareh the three Commissioners drawn up
29th
(Read out in the Convention on for the Convention, it would seem
the
2nd April). To the same effect as if
they only wished to make the
in
the Memoires. In the
protocol of General reveal his plans.
Ch.
VI.] DUMOURIEZ'S PLAN FOR RESTORING MONARCHY. 455
the troops of the line, and only asked of Coburg an armistice of fourteen days in which to complete the restoration of the
Monarchy. He had
thoroughly thought over the object he had in view and the mode of its
execution, and unfolded his plan in all its details.1 He himself Avas to
lead the van, which on its arrival in Paris was to form three divisions; the
first was to make itself master of the Convention, the second of the
Jacobin Club, and the third of the Temple; whereupon the army Avas to
proclaim the young Dauphin unter the title of Louis XVII. The latter Avas then
to govern with a Constitution formed on the English pattern; and Avith this vieAV the Nobdity Avere to receive back their estates and form an Upper Chamber, without,
however, any stipulation for the restoration of feudal
and seigniorial rights. A restoration of the Church to its
old possessions was, he said, impossible; but the prerogatives of the King,
though not unlimited, Avould at
any rate be greater than in 1791. The General thought it above all thing
essential that the Emigres should not show themselves at all, in
order that the nation might not be irritated by the spectacle of the and
en regime. He also thought that the interference of foreigners should be kept as
much as .possible out of sight, not merely out of respect to public opinion, but because he himself laid the greatest Aveight
upon the preservation of national independence. "If I had a hundred lives I Avould
stake them all to put an end to the atrocities of the Jacobins; and if I had a thousand I would sacrifice
them likewise to prevent any foreign power,
or any Emigre from giving laAVS
to my country." It was only
in case his own forces should prove insufficient for the march upon Paris, that
Coburg was to lend him military aid; in return for Avhich
he was to occupy LiUe and Valenciennes until the
conclusion of peace.
These overtures, at which Louis Philippe of Chartres was
i The
following is taken from a despatch of Tauenzien to the King of Prussia.
456
CHANGE
OF MINISTRY IN AUSTRIA.
[Book VI.
present, clearly proved that Dumouriez had no idea of elevating the house of Orleans; it is also self-evident that such a scheme
was excluded by the cooperation of the allies. Dumouriez told the three
Commissioners the whole truth, when he once more admitted
them to his presence late in the evening at Tournai; and treated the hint
thrown out concerning -Orleanistic intrigues as a silly calumny. In fact he was
in the mood of a man who has broken down all the bridges behind him, and has
gained firmness and security from the fixedness of his
resolution. He indulged in a lively description of the worthlessness of the Convention, of the robber government in Paris, and the fidelity of the
army, which, he said, would follow him like a troop of Mamelukes against the criminals of the capital. To their proposal that he should place
himself at the head of the Jacobins and consecpiently of the
Republic, he replied by the counsel that the Jacobins should compensate for
their past enormities by a revolt against the Convention,
and the liberation of the Royal family; and he
dismissed them with directions to let him know the
resolution of the Club within five days.
This frankness has been called inconceivable, and regarded as the cause
of his failure. But his plans had been well-known in the capital
for several clay; for as he had first of all to assure himself of the fidelity
of his troops, conspiracy or secrecy were impossible, and several democratic
officers had long ago sent information to Paris.1 If
the army remained true to him, the Convention,
in spite of their knowledge of his intentions, had simply
no means of opposing him; and nothing is more certain than that the troops of
the line, the only important part of the army, entirely shared at that time (on
the 28th) the feelings of their commander.
1 The names of these officers are
given. As early as the 21st the Conventional Commissioners in Lille
had discussed the question of arresting the General. Lacroix, I. c,
Ch.
VI.] DUMOURIEZ-S FATAL VACILLATION.
457
They had not been won but insulted by the anarchical laws of
Dubois-Crance; they surrounded their General with loud cries of approbation,
and when he spoke quite openly of his plans against Paris, and some of the
Volunteers threatened his person on that account on the
31st, all the regiments loudly manifested their indignation and devotion. What
then was the reason which prevented, him from immediately following up his threats with deeds?
He has himself given us this reason: it is the same
which successively destroyed Lafayette, Dumouriez and the Gironde. Bold and
skdfid as they were in works of destruction, they showed themselves
inexperienced and wavering when they tried to enter upon an opposite.course.
Dumouriez, who had never yet shrunk from any undertaking however
hazardous, or from the sacrifice of human life, now hesitated to disarm the
volunteers by means of the troops of the line. The latter
were quite ready for this enterprise; they despised the disorderly gangs who
had shown themselves such robbers in the open
country, and such cowards during the retreat; and considering the wild disorder
of the volunteers, there was no doubt that they had the necessary power. But
Dumouriez apprehended a frightful carnage from a collision of these two forces; whereas at any other time he woidd have considered
that such a struggle would irrevocably bind the troops to himself. He once
more, therefore, previously endeavoured to sound the public feeling at Paris,
and wrote on the 28th to Beurnonvdle about the moderation of the
Austrians,— who were ready to make peace if internal order were restored,—and called upon him to weigh these matters with the great
Committees of the Convention. But there was no longer a single person in Paris
who had either the courage or the inclination to
advocate his cause. His opponents, on the other hand, were men who recoiled
from no means however horrible; the murderous attack on
Dumouriez of the 31st had been instigated by the Committee of Public Safety
itself, and all the resources of violence, cunning
and seduc
458
CHANGE
OF MINISTRY IN AUSTRIA.
[Book VI.
tion, had been set in motion against him.1 His
position grew worse every hour. After he had retreated step by step before the
Austrians, he now stood upon French ground near St. Amand and Maidde. Here,
on the Northern frontier, everything had been done during the past year to
exclude from the hearts of the people every feeling but the love of country.
The great majority of them, it is true, were full of constitutional hatred against the Parisian democrats,2 but
the sole fact that Dumouriez was in treaty with the national enemy was
sufficient to ruin him in their opinion, and to place all resources at the
absolute disposal of the Conventional Commissioners. Every kind of
influence was brought to bear on the garrisons of Lille, Conde and
Valenciennes, and they declared decidedly for the Convention; these fortresses were lost to Dumouriez. In the army itself very awkward
symptoms of disaffection appeared, and some of the
Generals — e.g. Dampierre
— conducted themselves towards Dnmouriez as he had clone in August towards
Lafayette. The troops would have nothing to do with an English Constitution, but only with the French one of 1791, which the course of events had made the only possible rallying point of the
liberal friends of order at this period. It was above all, the constant secrecy
of Dumonriez's negotiations with the Austrians, which awakened an
ever-increasing and extending suspicion against him. And indeed, thongh
he might consider himself secured by Coburg's
promises against any ambitious views on the part of the Austrians, the troops,
who were likewise not inclined to betray their country, had every reason for
demanding a simdar guarantee. In this
1 The report of Fabre to the Condition (April 3rd) leaves no doubt on this point in the mind of any one
who chooses to see it. On the 14th Aug. 1793, live of those Volunteers were introduced to tbe Convention, loaded with praise for their murderous attack on the traitor, and presented with 6,000
francs. The protocols of the ministerial council contain detailed accounts of
subsequent attempts to murder Dumouriez. — 2 The documentary evidence will be given below.
Ch. VI.]
THE
TROOPS DESERT DUMOURIEZ.
459
state of universal uncertainty, instead of a favourable answer to
Dumouriez's letter of tbe 28th, intelligence was suddenly brought that the
Minister at War with four Conventional Commissioners had
arrived to summon the General to Paris, and in case of refusal to depose and
arrest him. They followed close upon their courier, and
the decisive moment came. Dumouriez had no choice. After a short conference the
Commissioners pronounced sentence of suspension against him; he caused
them to be arrested and delivered up to the Austrians. The troops immediately
greeted him with applause, but the giving up of the
Commissioners to the enemy —which was done out of regard to the Royal famdy,
for whose safety they were to serve as hostages — had a
bad effect. And this day was lost in correspondence with Coburg, with whom a conference was agreed upon for the 4th. The
regiments, particularly the artillery, became more refractory;
and the volunteers ran back to Valenciennes breathing vengeance against the traitor. Three of their battalions met the
General on his way to the Prince of Coburg, fired upon him, and chased him for
several leagues. Having narrowly escaped, he declared to the
Prince that nothing but the Constitution of 1791 would be
accepted, and that it was above all things necessary that Austria should make a
solemn declaration that she had no intention of making conquests in France. This Coburg promised, and we shall see from what
motives; but the time when it coidd have produced any effect was irrevocably past. After the skirmish above
mentioned, it was reported by some that he had been killed, and by others that
he had deserted to the Austrians. Whereupon the artillery left their camp at 5
o'clock in the morning, to march to the Commissioners of the Convention in
Valenciennes; their example was soon followed, and the defection became
general. It was of no avail that Dumouriez returned into the camp, now attended
by an Austrian escort. He had no other alternative than to escape
to the Austrians,
460
CHANGE
OF MINISTRY IN AUSTRIA.
[Book VI.
with a few faithful followers. He was followed during the next few days
by about 1,800 men.1
And thus this splendid meteor of the Revolution
was hopelessly extinguished. He was a man richly endowed by nature with
intellect, strength of will, and restless energy. Having grown up with all the
accomplishments and vices of the ancicn
regime,—in which he was trained to intrigue and love of
pleasure, and divested of all moral principle,—his ambition was developed to
gigantic proportions by the fiery breath of the Revolution, and we see him
rushing along untrodden and dizzy paths, often on the
very brink of crime, and with frivolous audacity
tampering with the fate of his country. Yet we cannot altogether condemn him;
nay, we often turn away with pleasure from the other chiefs of the Revolution
to contemplate his image. And thai, not merely because he bad no sympathy with the bloodthirsty assassins of September—which is no
small praise—-nor because he saved France at Valmy, and taught her to conquer
at Jemappes— for we know how greatly his efforts were aided by others, and by
singular good fortune. But although he was neither a Statesman
nor a General of the highest order, he had self-sacrificing courage and
inexhaustible energy;. and at these pure fountains the sterling worth of his
nature was refreshed and renewed, whatever dark and troubled waves might pass over it. He disdained to take part in the mob tyranny of Paris, but
he was not strong enough to seize the only alternative—the
establishment of a military dictatorship. He fell, and with him fell the last
remnant of the old French army. Three years were
needed to create the new arnry, which then fulfilled his predictions concerning
it.
For the present, therefore, it was all over with the march to Paris.
Nevertheless for a war in favour of Louis XVII.— for a war such as the Emperor
Leopold had contemplated
'
According to Tauenzien. Dampierre subsequently stated the number to the.
Convention at 6— 700.
Ch.
VI.] POSITION OF THE PRINCE
OF COBURG. 4G1
in bis last days—Dumouriez would have been no despicable ally. It would
even now have been worth while trying the effect
of the too long delayed declaration on the part of Austria, and to afford him
the necessary support to enable him to raise the banner of the Constitution in
France. But time pressed, and Coburg weighed the matter in the most painful state of doubt and indecision. His own views entirely coincided with those of Dumouriez. He did not belong to the
Generals of Joseph's school who indulged in far-reaching schemes of conquest;
he had already seen the bitter fruits of these in
the Turkish war, and now, iu the midst of his victorious course, he was full of
anxious cares about the future. He found himself upon hostde ground, far removed from all his resources, with about 32,000 men, and threatened on
all sides by a general national resistance. It is true that
re-inforcements were on their way from various quarters—10,000 Prussians, 6,000
Hessians, 7,000 English and 13,000 Hanoverians; but it was just as certain, on
the other side, that the French woidd take up arms with general enthusiasm, aud that far superior
masses of troops would be raised by the efforts of the revolutionists. Although he was by no means thoroughly informed as to the views of his
own Court, yet he knew how many antagonistic aims, and how many germs of inward strife, were coutained in the great Alliance. He was prepared to
enter on a new contest with pleasure, but the conviction of his reason only
tended towards the wish for an honourable conclusion of the unhappy war. His
mental horizon was not extensive, nor was he a man of creative ideas,
or easy versatility; he was not in any respect a man of great mind, but he had
sound sense and courage, and he was one of many whose reputation was at that
time undeservedly destroyed by the crooked policy of his Court.
We see that he regarded the revolutionary war in nearly the same light
as the Prussian Court, whose representative at his head-quarters, Count
Tauenzien, tberefore, enjoyed
462
CHANGE
OF MINISTRY IN AUSTRIA.
[Book VI.
his full confidence, and contributed not a little to confirm his
resolution. On the first intedigence of Dumouriez's plans, the King,
remembering Valmy, bad exhorted him to caution; subsequently, however, being
better informed than Coburg of the intentions of
Austria, he ordered his officials to remain completely passive. But Tauenzien,
acting on his knowledge of the secret wishes of the King, had eagerly urged the
Prince to issue the manifesto demanded by Dumouriez, to declare himself the ady
of the friends of order in France, and in the name of
his Emperor solemnly to reno\mce all ideas of conquest. And thus the Field
Marshall put the last stroke to this important act, which was published on the
5th of April. With a somewhat heavy heart he then started for Antwerp with Mack and Tauenzien, where a conference of
Anstrian, English and Dutch statesmen was assembled on the 7th to determine on
their fnture proceedings. On the part of England appeared the Duke of York,
Commander of the English auxiliaries, and Lord
Auckland, English ambassador at the Hague. Austria was represented by Count
Metternich, the Austrian Minister in Belgium, and Count Stahremberg the
Ambassador; Holland, by the hereditary Prince of Orange
and the Grand Pensionary van Spiegel; Count Keller,
the Prussian Ambassador at the Hague, was present as persona
muta. Coburg laid his aims and reasons before this assembly; once more was
the original object of the war—defence against the Revolution—pressed
upon the memory of the Austrian Government, and
was on this occasion recommended byT her
own commander-in-chief, by the most important of her late enemies, and by the well-known inclinations of her most powerful ally. But we already know the ideas which prevailed in Vienna; not
a syllable of doubt was heard, not a moment of
consideration was allowed in the Congress at Antwerp. On the contrary, a
general displeasure manifested itself at the close of Coburg's address, and it
was immediately resolved, almost without discussion, that
the altered circum-
Ch.
VI.]
THE
CONGRESS OF ANTWERP.
463
stances of the case demanded the issue of a new manifesto and the
recall of the former one. In the evening Couut Metternich brought forward the
draft of a plan, which was received with applause,
because it answered the object in view, and did not too openly compromise
Coburg. Mack made one more attempt to explain and justify the views of his
General, and he added that if the Powers desired a restoration
of order and monarchy in France, the support of Dumouriez was evidently the
best means of attaining that object; but if they aimed at a partition of France
they must of course set Dumouriez aside, and make up their minds to many a
campaign and many a siege. His words of course produced not the slightest effect. Every thing connected with Dumouriez's plan was
rejected, and Coburg had to listen to many cutting and bitter words, charging
him with having averted the utter ruin of the beaten French army by his
credulons negotiations. When this matter had been settled, the Conference
proceeded to consider, in a consultation which lasted many days, how
the misfortune was to be made good, and the war carried on with success. After
having counted up the contingents, they deliberated whether they should be formed into one large army; but this idea was given up because it was
uncertain to which of the Princes present—the Duke of York or the Prince of Coburg—the command-in-chief would fall. When they then came to deliberate
further on the plan of the campaigu and the disposition of the forces,
the Duke was first asked whether he could occupy the country between Ostend and
Menin, and thus form the right wing of the combined army. He immediately agreed
to this, emphatically declaring that his instructions would just enable him to do so. The limitation implied in these words was
more fully explained by Lord Auckland, who said that the Duke was empowered to
operate in common with the Imperial army only where sieges were concerned;
since it was the object of his Court to procure for Belgium a
defensive line of fortresses on the
464
CHANGE
OF MINISTRY IN AUSTRIA.
[Book VI.
frontier. "I will not conceal the fact," he added, "that
England too contemplates a very considerable compensation for herself." The Prince of Orange then threw out the remark, that if
all the world was looking for compensation, he hoped that Holland would not be
excluded, and that her ambassadors would be admitted to any Congress that might
take place.1
After this they exchanged some edifying information
respecting the sums of money which had been invested in England by
Dumouriez, Pethion and their associates, and had just been confiscated by the
Authorities; they then discussed a number of military details
and broke up the Conference.
On the 9th, Coburg published Metternich's declaration,
by which, "in consequence of the persistent stub-boruess of the
French," he withdrew his former manifesto, and proclaimed an unconditional
state of war, and consequently—in virtue of the recall of his previous summons of the 5th—a war of conquest
against France. The scheme which had been in preparation since September was
hereby publicly revealed in the face of all Europe; it was now proclaimed that the war no longer aimed at the restoration
of the French throne and the security of Europe, but the conquest of French provinces and the aggrandizement of the Powers. The
effect produced in France was great and general,
and in every respect favourable to the democratic rulers. They had constantly maintained that this was always the object of the Allies,
and now triumphantly asked whether they had not been fully justified in
denouncing the King and the Emigres, the Feuillants and Dumouriez, who had all
coquetted with the foreign robbers, as traitors to their country.
Henceforward, indeed, the Convention was stamped as the representative of the
national cause; all opposition to it became treason, and Dumouriez was morally
annihilated in the eyes of his countrymen.
At a time when nothing
Tauenzien's report to the King.
Ch. YL]
SELFISH
VIEWS OF THE COALITION.
465
was more important to the Allies than the support of the friends of
order in France, they made it impossible for any (lover
of his country to rise in alliance with them against the tyranny of the
Democrats. By changing the political object of the Coalition they destroyed
their most important political support in the coming struggle.
And this was done by a Coalition, none of
whose members had the slightest inclination to make sacrifices for the war, but
mutually tried to shift its burdens and exertions on to each others shoulders,
and in the depth of their hearts grudged one another the gain which might
accrue from the contest. It was done, moreover, in the
presence of a Revolution which had just made itself
master of all the. goods, the powers, and the persons, of a great nation, and
was on the point of filling the scene of action with innumerable armies. At the
Antwerp Conference they imagined that the more
eagerly the French lacerated one another in the revolutionary
turmoil, the more safely and comfortably the Allies might indulge in the
conquest of the border lands. They entirely overlooked the fact, that from a
military point of view there was but one means of victory—the immediate
foUowing up of the advantages gained for the moment; in other words, a rapid
march upon Paris, before the Convention had completed its mighty
armaments. It was in vain that Edmund Burke explained
the real nature of the case with all the force of his eloquence.1 Nay,
in some quarters a notion existed that the restoration of order in France ought
to be avoided, because the Powers could not decently deprive their friends the
Bourbons of their provinces and fortresses.
No one, after all, was more deeply impressed with the ruinous character
of such a system than the very man on whose shoulders the principal part in the
execution of it rested—the Prince of Coburg.
Full of grief and indignation
1 His correspondence of the year
1793 is full of this subject.
466
CHANGE OF MINISTRY IN AUSTRIA. [Book VI.
he returned from Antwerp to his head-quarters, so firmly fixed in his
convictions, that in spite of the vexations he
had lately suffered, he determined to make an attempt to open a negotiation
with the Convention itself. After the arrest of the Commissioners above refered
to, their colleagues had written to. him from Lille,
demanded their release, and loaded Dumouriez with abuse; whereupon Coburg, in a polite though unfavourable answer
attempted to defend this French General. On the 12th of April a
Lieutenant-Colonel Cherin appeared at his outposts, as bearer of several
documents; vis. a
confidential letter of tbe Commissioners— in which they upheld
their charges against Dumouriez, but in other respects expressed themselves so
moderately that the Convention subsequently took great offence at it—and
further, a public letter, which was filled with all the more republican bluster, to make up for the mildness of the private one. It talked of
Hannibal and the Romans, and the triumph of liberty, and threatened the despots
with 80,000 armed Parisians. Coburg received the Envoy in the presence of Colonel Mack, and began the conference
by expressing his regret that France should, by the employment of such
language, cut off every chance of peace. He then asked why the French would not
accept the Constitution of 1791, and thereby appease the enmity of Europe. They
had every reason, observed Mack, to seek a
reconciliation, since England had already agreed to a considerable extension of
territory on the part of Austria. After exchanging a few sharp remarks
concerning Dumouriez, Colonel Mack made another step in advance. As Coburg had just learned at Antwerp how little his own government was inclined
to peace, it seemed to him important to point out to the French another handle
to the affair. "The Prince," said Mack, "was sorry that he was
no longer permitted to speak as negotiator but
only as general, but he was sincerely desirous of peace, and if the French
Government were animated by the same sentiments, they would do well to address
themselves
Ch. VI.] COBURG AGAIN ATTEMPTS NEGOTIATION.
4G7
to the King of Prussia." "The
King," interposed Coburg, "is favourably disposed, very accessible,
and an upright man." "He has," added Mack, "at this moment,
a decisive influence." Cherin, having no
authority to consider overtures of this kind, endeavoured to break off tbe conference. Mack repeated: "remember that you have to open a
negotiation, and that you should first address yourselves to Prussia."
When Cherin took his leave, Mack once more endeavoured to add weight to his
representations. "Do not think of the Emigres,
whom the Emperor no longer tolerates in his army; make up your minds to treat
with Prussia, and to resign your conquests"—"Mayence,"
interrupted Coburg, "and the rest of the territory of the Empire—and then
there is hope of an armistice, from which a Congress
and straight forward negotiations may arise."1
These were the same conditions which Prussia had already laid down in
October 1792, the acceptance of which would now have beeu greeted by her with
double pleasure. Cherin, too, faithfully executed his
commission, but he naturally laboured under the false idea that the desire of
peace was chiefly to be sought on the side of Austria. The Convention then
passed a vote of censure on the Commissioners for having entered into any
correspondence with the enemy at all. But this warlike pride
was only a piece of bravado, calculated for the Parisian mob; for the present
rulers, deeply convinced of the danger of their position, took the words of the
Austrian General into serious consideration.2
Unhappily for Europe, however, the very corner stone
of Coburg's plan—the good understanding between Austria and Prussia, which was
equally necessary for the conduct of war or the conclusion of peace—was just at
this moment dashed to pieces. On the same day on which Coburg concluded his final agreement with
Dumouriez—the 27th of
1 Cherin's report in the papers of
the Committee of Public Safety. — 2 Con/. Conv. Nat., April 19, Report of
Dampierre's Adjutant.
2 g 2
468
CHANGE
OF MINISTRY IN AUSTRIA.
[Book VI.
March—the unhappy Polish business had brought on a change in Vienna,
which completely alienated the policy of Austria, both from Coburg's views and
the Prussian alliance.
On the 23rd, namely, the Treaty of St. Petersburg was made known in
Vienna by the Ambassadors of Russia and Prussia, and had roused a storm of
consternation, anger and jealousy among the Austrian Statesmen. "I shall
immediately report the matter to the Emperor," said Cobenzl,
"but I can say at once what his opinion will be; I know not what to think; it is so important a thing—so entirely apart
from all former negotiations—that I cannot yet master all its bearings."
When the Ambassador reminded him of the discussions which had taken place in
Mayence, in Merle, and in Vienna itself, he replied that there had indeed
been some talk on these occasions of Prussian accpusitions in Poland, but that
he had forgotten their extent, as no agreement had been come to; and that
what had then been proposed was mere child's jday when
compared to such an enormous accession of
territory. This alleged weakness of memory was evidently only a blind to
conceal the real seat of his vexation. It was not the extent of the Polish provinces which the two Powers destined for themselves that excited his
displeasure, for their intentions in this respect had been known to him
ever since the negotiations in December; what affected him so deeply
was the rapid realization of the Prussian gains, while those of Austria were
still uncertain and dependent on a thousand contingencies. It was the conclusion of so important a treaty
behind the back of the Austrian Government, which implied a decided victory of
Prussian influence in St. Petersburg. And lastly, it was the palp>able mark
of the defeat of the Austrian policy— the insignificance of the share
allotted to the Emperor, when compared with the rich booty of the two other
Powers. Francis II. could not pardon his Statesmen for being thus outwitted,
and as he could not directly punish his Ambassador
in Russia, and thereby entirely break with the latter's
Cn.
VI.] DISMISSAL OF COBENZL AND
SPIELMANN.
469
patroness, the Empress Catharine, his displeasure fell with the greater
force upon the Ministers themselves who had given the Ambassador his instructions, and had devised no expedient for warding off the evil.
This time Colloredo had no difficulty in unhorsing his rivals, Cobenzl and
Spielmann at once. It was quite after the manner of Francis II. that he
received them, on the 27th, with smding graciousness, and took leave of
them with greater friendliness than ever, and that on their return home from
the ELofburg they found their written conges.
He liberally provided them with pensions
and subordinate offices, but they were for ever excluded
from the conduct of affairs. On the recommendation of the still
influential Count Mercy they were succeeded by the Baron von Thugut, as Chief
of the Foreign office—the man to whom France owes her victory in the
Revolutionary war, and Austria her present position
in Europe.1
Thugut, like Spielmaun, was a man of low birth; the former being the
son of a skipper on the Danube, the latter of a shoemaker in Vienna. Having
attracted attention in early life by his extraordinary abdity, he was
recommended by his teachers, the Viennese Jesuits, to the
Ministry, and quickly rose in the diplomatic service, In every position he
manifested acuteness and courage, a talent for intrigue, and contempt for
danger. He always pursued his object with singleness of purpose, unchecked by fear, or love of pleasure, or. conscientious scruples. He had
been seen equally undaunted amidst a furious revolt of the people in the
streets
1 That the treaty of St. Petersburg was the cause of the change in tbe Ministry is positively stated
in the Eeports of the Prussian Ambassadors, and confirmed by Haeften
on the 18th of May. That Mercy decided the choice of the Emperor in favour of
Thugut we gather from the correspondence of Mercy's intimate friend.Lord Auckland(III. 235). Hormayr's account of the
intrigue of Colloredo and Madame de Poutet may thus be completed. On the other
hand, all that Hormayr says in the "Lebensbilder"
respecting Thu-gut's personal
qualities is confirmed by those despatches, and by subsequent events.
470
CHANGE
OP MINISTRY IN AUSTRIA.
[Book VI.
of Constantinople, and in a stormy night upon the Eosphorus. In Warsaw
he made his way by alternate pliancy and energy, and a tact which
was never at fault, between the venal Nobility, tbe powerless King, and the
overbearing insolence of the Russian Ambassador. And finally he saw the ancient
Court of Versailles in the last blaze of its splendour, and brought away with him the conviction, in regard to the Revolution, that a mob of scoundrels would not have overturned the throne, if the listless gentlemen of the ancicn
regime had not been too weak to fight in its defence. Reserved and imperturbable he retained his coolness, and therefore his superiority, under all circumstances. Frugal and sober he
appeared to be stdjject to no weaknesses, and to have scarcely any wants—his
regular supper consisted of a little fruit and a glass of water. Those who knew
him best were unable to find out anything which he respected. Though he
made great use of Crown and Church as means of obtaining
political power, he set no value on either religion or legitimacy; and
Catharine II., who knew him as well as he knew her, exclaimed on hearing of his appointment, that a Jacobin had become Minister,
who would soon come to an agreement with his brethren in Paris.1
She was right to this extent, that Thugut was never obstructed in his political schemes by any fixed political principles. The despotic germ which Nature had
implanted in his breast, had been reared to full maturity by the external
circumstances of his life. Among the Turks and Poles, as well as in the great
world at Paris, he had learnt to look on policy as a mixture of unprincipled intrigues, brutal violence, and venal selfishness. He
regarded human nature with cold and unmingled contempt, and was fidly convinced
that self-love was the only motive of men's actions. Pie himself, therefore, had no object but power, and knew no other means of attaining it than working on the fears of some,
1 Hogguer, Ap. 16th.
Ch.
VI.]
THE BARON
VON THUGUT.
471
and the self-interest of others—and he acknowledged no other standard
than success. By these sentiments he had recommended himself to the young Emperor, who sympathised with them at the
bottom of his heart, and the Austrian Court promised itself great results from
the vigorous and manly guidance which had succeeded to the administration of the sleepy Cobenzl, and the narrow-minded Spielmann.
Here too, indeed, they were to learn by experience that penetration,
courage and intrigue, can only receive political value from a connexion with
some great aim—that the worship of selfishness does not raise, but rather unnerves the able man. This worship had
long ago deprived Thugut of the love of labour, falsified bis judgments
respecting persons and events, and excited in him indifference or disgust for
all human affairs. At first his colleagues saw with satisfaction with how
much keener penetration than his predecessors he discharged the business of his
office—with what precision and energy he acted on every occasion—and what an accurate knowledge of men's views and feelings he displayed.1 But
this elasticity was soon relaxed; it was still observed, iudeed, that the new
Minister was skilfully and diligently employed in gaining exclusive influence
over the Emperor, but in other respects, now that he had attained his object,
his contempt for the world made him sluggish and undecided. He allowed the reports to accumulate, left applications unanswered, and every kind of business in arrear. He gave the
last finish to the avaricious character which Francis H. had given to his
policy, and was as little able as the Emperor himself
to choose between the objects of his desire. "He seems to me," said
Napoleon, four years afterwards, "to possess but little skill, to see but
little way before him, and to interfere in everything; he mixes him-
1 Haeften's
despatches during April and May are full of these sentiments.
472
CHANGE
OF MINISTRY IN AUSTRIA. [Book VI.
self up with the intrigues of all Europe, without following out any
kind of plan." 1
The first attention of the new Minister was directed to the
subject—the treatment or neglect of which had led to the fall of his
predecessors—of the Polish affair, and the cpies-tion
of compensations in general. Angry as he was with Prussia and Russia, he had
recourse first of all to the only friendly Power in
Europe, and sought to secure from it a sure support. One of the veterans of
diplomacy, Count Mercy, received directions, on the 29th of March, to repair to
London, and signify to the Government the adhesion of Austria to the English view of the general character and objects of the war—vis. that
no interference with the French Constitution was intended, but only resistance
to French encroachments; and he was directed to [u'Ojoose
a firm cooperation of the two Powers for these
objects. As a recompense for this concession he was first and foremost
to ask for England's consent to the Bavarian-Belgian Exchange. Austria, on her side, would do all in her power to carry out the wishes of
England by capturing a line of French fortresses.
Of these some were to be annexed to the new Belgian
State as a protection, while Austria—which, it was said, obtained a very
insufficient acquisition in Belgium—was only to receive in addition a few
places in Alsace. Thugut expressly observed in these instructions, that England's support in the matter of the
Belgian-Bavarian Exchange, was all the more urgently necessary, because, in
case of her refusing it, Austria would be compelled to seek a Polish province,
which might easily lead to infinite complications.
On the 4th of April, five clays after the drawing up of this document,
the Minister held his first conference with the Ambassadors of Prussia and
Russia respecting the treaty of St. Petersburg. It contained, as we know, the
promise of the two Powers—in case the Emperor would
guarantee
1 Corresp. inedite, VI. 4.
Ch.
VI.] AUSTRIA REJECTS TREATY OF ST.
PETERSBURG. 473
the Polish acquisitions—to assist him in the Bavarian Exchange. If we compare this stipulation with Mercy's instructions, the way to a general settlement of the affair seems clearly
pointed out. Austria should have agreed to the treaty of St. Petersburg, on
condition that some French border fortresses were thrown into the bargain in
addition to the Bavarian Exchange. If the two Courts agreed to
this, the object was attained, and the grand Alliance was firmly concluded; if
they declined it, Austria would have manifested her good wdl, and be relieved
from all responsibility for the evil consequences of the disagreement. But such a proceeding seemed to the Imperial Minister
too straight forward and simple to be wise. He may have thought that the
Bavarian Exchange woidd still be uncertain as long as the Courts of London and
Munich appeared adverse to it; and that he must
therefore revive all his claims in every quarter, and for the present refuse
all concessions. In his reply to the Eussian and Prussian Ambassadors,
therefore, he stated in direct contradiction to the instructions of Mercy, that
in the face of the entire want of consideration which had
been shown by the two Powers, the Emperor's honour imperatively called upon him to give up her Bavarian plan of exchange, and to demand in its stead a French border district, and a
Polish province; in other words, he entirely rejected the treaty of St.
Petersburg. Nor did he content himself with mere words, but immediately set to
work to throw real obstacles in the way of the Polish partition. The Austrian Charge
d'affaires in Warsaw, Du Cache, was instructed not to follow
King Stanislaus to Grodno, and, in general, to abstain from lending any support
to the measures of Eussia and Prussia. Whereupon Du Cache by no means contented
himself with such a passive attitude, but openly assured the Polish patriots
that they possessed the full favour of Francis H., who
was only prevented for the moment from lending them his active
assistance. This led to a violent scene between the Austrian Charge and General
474
CHANGE
OF MINISTRY IN AUSTRIA.
[Book VI.
Igelstrom, in which Du Cache somewhat softened the matter by a few
conciliatory remarks, without, however, subsequently denying his decided
hostility to the partitioning Powers.
In the midst of this general suspense and disagreement, the news of the
late warlike events in Belgium—the defection of Dumouriez, and the disordered
state of the French army—■
arrived in Vienna. Thugut cordially approved of the resolutions of the Antwerp Conference, and emphatically rejected the
disinterested system of the Prince of Coburg. He beheld with lively
satisfaction the defenceless state of the French, which seemed to place the
capture of the border fortresses beyond a doubt. He therefore sent for the
English Ambassador, Sir Morton Eden, enlarged to' him
on the state of Europe, and expressed the desire of the
Emperor to enter into a formal alliance with England. Sir Morton entered with
the greatest readiness on the consideration of so friendly a proposal; but he
clearly informed the Minister, that while England was willing to allow him to make the richest acquisitions
at the expense of France—the first line of border fortresses, as well as
Lorraine and Alsace—she would under no circumstances consent to the Bavarian
Exchange. Thugut showed himself very tractable on this point. If England, he said, woidd conclude a firm alliance with Austria,
the Emperor might be induced to insist no further on the Bavarian Exchange, although he could not bind himself never to take it up
again. He added a long account of the Russian encroachments
in Poland, and sounded the Cabinet in London to see whether it was inclined to
oppose the partition of Poland, and by what means. We
see how he endeavoured to gain the help of England
against the Northern Powers, by a provisional renunciation of Bavaria, and yet even here to reserve all his claims for the future.
If we look to the gist of all these tortuous declarations, it is
evident that the rupture of the grand Alliance against the Revolution was
commencing in all quarters. Prussia had from the first
made the acquisition of a Polish province the condition of her military aid.
The more firmly she had reckoned—since the negotiation in Vienna—on the consent
of Austria, the more completely did she consider herself released by Thugufs measures from all her Federal
obligations, in case of an aggressive war against France. But it is plain to
every one that, considering the relative forces of different States at that
time, the aid of Prussia was simply indispensable
to Austria, and that the possible good will of England would by no means compensate for the want of it. It is difficult,
therefore, to conceive a more mischievous contrast than the destruction of the
treaty with Prussia on the one hand, and the taking up the English plan of conquest on the other. There was evidently but one course open
for Austria. Whether she wished to save, or assist in conquering, Poland, peace must be made with France. And, vice
versa, the Polish partition must he consented to, if the plan of making acquisitions in France was followed out. But instead of this,
simultaneously to dissolve the alliance with Prussia—to quarrel with Catharine
and Frederick Wd-liam about Poland—to close every avenue to a peace with
France—and not even decidedly and sincerely to meet the wishes of
England, the sole remaining ally—is it possible to conceive a line of policy on
the part of Austria more calculated to bring her into a complicated and
dangerous position?
Let us now see under what circumstances this new turn of affairs became known at the Prussian head-quarters, and what effect
it produced there.
are
disclosed in order. England continually protests against the Bavarian Exchange,
promises to help in acquiring French border fortresses for Austria, and
complains of the vagueness of Austrian aims.
476
CHANGE
OF MINISTRY IN AUSTRIA,
Two days before the change of Ministers in Vienna, the King of Prussia,
according to his agreement with Coburg, had commenced operations against Custine. After a Prussian division had proceeded up the Rhine from
Coblentz, and an Austrian division had marched from Treves over the Hunds-ruck
to Baumholder, the main body of the Prussians crossed the Rhine at Bacharach,
on the 25th and 26 th, took the direction of the river Nahe, and
compelled Custine to retreat rapidly towards the South. No engagement was
fought on a grand scale, since Brunswick moved forward with his usual
circumspection. A battle which the Hereditary Prince of Hohenlohe fought at Waldalgesheim was sufficient to show the superiority of the German troops,
and to make Custine give up every thought of serious resistance. He now commanded all the troops in the Palatinate and Alsace, and was moreover
told to look for support to the Army of the Moselle,
then under the command of General Ligneville. The latter, however, after the
march of the Austrians into the Hundsriick, had withdrawn the outposts which he
had pushed forward towards the South, and Custine did
not fail to make the consequent exposure of his left flank his excuse in
Paris for retreating. But what weighed far more with him was the wretched
character of his troops which consisted of ill-provided regulars,
inexperienced national guards, and mutinous volunteers—who at every attack of the Prussians lost, not their courage, but
their order, and fled almost without a blow before the vigorous cavalry charges
of the enemy. The German columns, therefore, spread themselves over the
beautiful plains of the Palatinate, and were everywhere welcomed by the inhabitants as liberators and restorers. The retreat
of the French was conducted with such haste that a division of 8,000 men—which
was on its way from Mayence to Custine's
head-quarters—to the equal
surprise of themselves and the Prussians, fell in with the King and
Hohenlohe instead of their own General. The Hereditary Prince then attacked
them vigorously with a few hastily collected
battalions, and drove them back to Mayence. And when Wurmser
also,—who had been delayed by useless formalities, and misplaced distrust
against Prussia, on the part of Bavaria—at last approached with 14,000 men and
crossed the Bhine not far from Spires. Custine hastened to evacuate the Palatinate entirely, and to take up a position with about 10,000 men
behind the Lauter, in the lines of Weissenburg —that chain of fieldworks which
forms the Northern frontier of Alsace from the Vosges to the Rhine. The
internal demoralization of his forces was complete. On the march to Weissenburg, one regiment passed a vote
of want of confidence against its Colonel; and when
Custine blamed the ringleader, an ambitious captain, for exciting the soldiers,
the offender, with perfect impunity, cut him short by
saying that the Colonel was an aristocrat, but that he, the captain, had the
soul of a Brutus.1
Another captain went to Custine, and denounced him as a
traitor, presenting a pistol at his head with the words—"for thee or for
me." When Custine told him to
fire, he shot himself in the mouth.2
The first task of the Prussians after these events was the siege of
Mayence, which was surrounded on every side. By the driving back of those 8,000
Frenchmen, the garrison of this place had been raised to the extraordinary number of 22,000, so that in consideration of the great extent of
the place aud the outworks, the corps destined for the attack had to be
increased, not to 20,000, as had been intended, but to 33,000 men. This made
the King all the more urgent with the Prince of Coburg to send up the
15,000 meu from Belgium, which had been promised in Frankfort; but he was
immediately informed that Coburg could only dispose of 30,000 men, and
therefore could not spare a single soldier. He then demanded compensation from the military chest of the Empire for the Landgrave
of Hesse Cassel, who had once
more furnished 6000 men for the army; whereupon Coburg
brought forward proofs of the utter exhaustion of the fund in question. The
missing links in the chain of beleaguering forces round Mayence were
gradually supplied by various contingents. A few
Darmstadt and some Imperial battalions, and at last—in consequence of some very
strong representations—even Bavarian troops were sent,
though the Elector could with difficulty make up his mind to endanger his relations with France. "He ought to
see," said Lucchesini with sarcastic politeness, "that according to
our Gothic constitution a Prince of the Empire may
carry on war with his troops, and at the same time yet remain neutral with his
territories." All these circumstances naturally tended to
cool the .joyful enthusiasm of victory, with which the soil of Germany had been cleared of its invaders. But what was the surprise of the
generals, when they received intelligence of the Antwerp Conference, and of
England's plan, according to whieh the Emperor
was not to exchange Belgium for Bavaria, but to keep the former, and that too
with considerable additions! From all other quarters
they had hitherto heard that the Emperor zealously continued his exertions to
gain possession of Bavaria. The heir to the Bavarian dominions, Duke Maximilian of Deux-Ponts, had just come into the camp,
and was moving heaven and earth to prevent the exchange. Lord Elgin, too, who
was present at head-quarters as Plenipotentiary of England, remarked in a private audience the anxiety with which the Duke begged
him to implore the King of England, to protest, as Elector of Hanover, against the translation of the House of Wittelsbach to Brussels.1 His
conduct betrayed only too clearly the apprehension
of immediate violence. Taken in connection with the intelligence from Antwerp,
it awakened the suspicion afresh that Bavaria was to be suddenly inundated by
the Austrian reserves, whose lingering
in their own country, at a time when Coburg was so weak, was inexplicable, but became perfectly intelligible oh the above supposition. The Prince of
Nassan-Siegen,—who as an agent of Russia enjoyed
at this time the King's confidence in a very high degree, and in his noisy
rattling way divulged the secret thoughts of the rulers,—openly declared that
the occupation of Bavaria by the Austrians could never be allowed.
Under these circumstances the King of Prussia received from Vienna
the announcement of Thugut's declaration against the Treaty of St. Petersburg,
and soon afterwards Buchholtz's report of the hostile proceedings of the
Austrian Charge d'affaires in Warsaw. The impressiou made was as deep and
painful as possible. The King wrote to Tauenzieu, that His Imperial Majesty was
in a very bad humour in consequence of the advantages which
his old ally had gained. But the Prussian Ministry, in their reply to Vienna,
enquired upon which of the treaties Thugut grounded the charge of
want of consideration ? If Austria continued hostile in regard to the Polish
affair, the Prussian Cabinet felt itself entirely relieved from all
responsibilities which went beyond the February treaty, and the defence of the Empire—in other words, from their engagement to furnish more than a
contingent of 20,000 men. It was resolved, for the present, to continue the
siege of Mayence, as an important fortress of the German
Empire, but to make all further steps towards an attack
on France dependent on the conduct of the Emperor. The war of the Coalition was
in fact even then—only four weeks after its commencement — at an end. ' To
Poland the immediate consequence of Austria's protest
was, that the two partitioning Powers accelerated their proceedings. The
King, whose only thought now was to keep up his good understanding with Russia, sent orders to Mollendorf to do nothing in the question of boundaries without the approbation of
Catharine. The Empress was above all things intent
upon bringing her own affairs in Poland to a final settlement. Sievers,
therefore, was exhorted
to move forward at double speed,
and Easnmowski was directed in spite of all obstacles to press for the
Emperor's adhesion to the treaty of St. Petersburg.
At this moment, when the poison of German discord was destroying the
bands which had held the grand Alliance together, the French
Eevolution was breaking down the last dams which had checked its flow at home,
and creating that fearful dictatorship, which was destined, by an unexampled
union of the forces of the French nation, to overpower discordant and divided
Europe.
END
OF VOL. II.