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HISTORY OF GREECE
UNDER
OTHOMAN AND VENETIAN DOMINATION A.D. 1453-1821.
CHAPTER I. THE POLITICAL AND
MILITARY ORGANISATION OF THE OTHOMAN EMPIRE, BY WHICH THE GREEKS WERE RETAINED
IN SUBJECTION.—A.D. 1453-1684.
CHAPTER II THE NAVAL CONQUESTS OF THE OTHOMANS IN GREECE.—A.D. 1453-1684.
CHAPTER III. SOCIAL CONDITION OF
THE GREEKS UNTIL THE EXTINCTION OF THE TRIBUTE OF CHRISTIAN CHILDREN A.D. 1453-1676.
CHAPTER IV. HISTORY OP THE
VENETIAN DOMINATION IN GREECE.—A.D. 1684-1718.
CHAPTER V. THE CAUSES AND
EVENTS WHICH PREPARED THE GREEKS FOR INDEPENDENCE. A.D. 1718-1821.
CHRONOLOGY.
1397. Bayezid I.
establishes the timariot system in Thessaly.
1453. Mohammed II. repeoples Constantinople.
Re-establishes the
Orthodox Greek Church.
1454. Insurrection of Albanian population in
the Morea.
1456. Mohammed II.
defeated at Belgrade.
1458. Walls of Constantinople repaired, and
Castle of Seven Towers
1459. Servia annexed to the Othoman empire.
Amastris taken from the
Genoese.
1460. Mohammed II. conquers the Morea.
Athens annexed to the
Othoman empire.
1461. Conquest of empire of Trebizond.
1462. Mytilene annexed to Othoman empire.
1463. Argos occupied by Othoman troops.
War with Venice.
1466. Athens taken by Venetians, and abandoned.
1467. 17th January, death of Skanderbeg at
Alessio.
1469. Earthquake at Santa Maura, Cephalonia,
and Zante.
1470. Conquest of Negrepont.
1475. Kaffa and Tana
taken from the Genoese.
1477. Croia surrenders
to the Othomans.
1479. Peace between Mohammed II. and Venice.
Zante and Cephalonia
taken by Mohammed II. from Leonard Tocco, despot of Arta.
1480. Othoman army defeated at Rhodes.
1481. Death of Mohammed II.
1484. Venice restores
Cephalonia to Bayezid II., and pays a tribute of five hundred ducats annually
for Zante.
1489. Catherine Comara
cedes Cyprus to Venice.
1492. Jews expelled from
Spain by Ferdinand and Isabella.
1494. Andrew Paleologos,
son of Thomas, despot in the Peloponnesus, cedes his rights to it and to the
Byzantine empire to Charles VIII. of France, but that cession not being
accepted within the stipulated time, in 1498. He cedes his rights to Ferdinand
and Isabella of Spain.
1500. Bayezid II. takes Lepanto, Modon, Coron,
and Durazzo, from
1501. Mohammedans expelled from Spain if they
refuse to be baptised.
1502. Peace between Bayezid II. and Venice. The
republic cedes Santa
Maura to the Sultan, but
retains Cephalonia.
1509. Great earthquake at Constantinople.
1510. Walls of Constantinople repaired.
1512. Bogdan, Prince of
Moldavia, becomes tributary to Sultan Selim I.
1515. Great fire at Constantinople.
1516. Vallachia pays an annual tribute of six
hundred Christian children to the Sultan.
1522. Conquest of Rhodes
by Suleiman I.
1526. Vienna besieged.
1535. First public
treaty of alliance between the Othoman empire and the King of France.
Supremacy of the Othoman
navy in the Mediterranean.
1537. Defeat of the
Othomans at Corfu.
Barbarossa takes Paros,
Skyros, Patmos, and Stympalea.
1540. Treaty of peace
between Suleiman I. and Venice. The republic cedes Monemvasia and Nauplia to
the Sultan.
1563. Great inundation,
caused by rain, at Constantinople.
1565. Othoman expedition against Malta
defeated.
1566. Chios and Naxos annexed to the Othoman
empire.
Rebellion of the
Janissaries.
1570. Morescoes, descendants of Mohammedans in
Spain, driven to
1571. Conquest of Cyprus by Othomans.
15th of October, battle
of Lepanto.
1572. Tunis taken by Don Juan of Austria.
1573. Treaty of peacc between the Othoman
empire and Venice.
1574. Tunis retaken by the Othoman fleet.
1591. Thirty thousand
workmen employed to construct a canal at Nicomedia.
1593. First commercial
treaty between the Sultan and England.
1600. Rebellion of the
Janissaries.
1609. Final expulsion of
the Morescoes from Spain by Philip III.
1614. Maina compelled to
pay haratsh.
1622. Great rebellion of
Janissaries and Sipahis against Sultan Oth- man II.
1624. Cossacks plunder
the shores of the Bosphorus.
Piracy prevalent in the
Mediterranean.
1632. Great rebellion of
troops at Constantinople.
1642. Great earthquake
at Constantinople.
Corsairs and pirates
continue their ravages in the Archipelago. 1645. Othoman troops invade Crete.
1648. Earthquake at
Constantinople.
1650. New island rises
out of the sea at Santorin.
1653. Great earthquake
at Constantinople.
1656. Great insurrection
at Constantinople.
1C69. Conquest of Crete
completed by capitulation of Candia. Treaty of peace between the Othoman empire
and Venice.
Foundation of the
official power of the Phanariots by the rank conceded to Panayotaki of Chios,
dragoman of Aclimet Kueprily.
1670. Subjugation of
Maina. Forts of Zarnata, Porto Vitylo, and Passava, armed and garrisoned by
Turks.
1671 to 1684. Corsairs and pirates infest
the coasts and islands of
1672 and 1673. Maniates emigrate to Apulia
and Corsica.
1675. Disputes of the
Greeks and Catholics concerning the possession of the Holy Places at Jerusalem.
1683. Siege of Vienna by
Kara Mustapha.
1685. The Venetians
commence the conquest of the Morea. Morosini takes Coron.
1687. Athens taken by Morosini. Parthenon
ruined.
Plague in the Venetian
army.
Great fire at
Constantinople.
1688. Defeat of Morosini at Negrepont.
1690. Earthquake at
Constantinople.
1692. Fire at
Constantinople.
1699. Peace of
Carlovitz.
1711. Defeat of Peter the Great. Treaty of the
Pruth.
1712. Commencement of Phanariot domination in
Moldavia.
1715. Re-conquest of the Morea by Ali Cumurgi.
1716. Commencement of Phanariot domination in
Vallachia.
1718. Peace of Passarovitz.
1719. Great fire and earthquake at
Constantinople.
1720. Treaty of perpetual peace between Turkey
and Russia.
1736 to 1739. Marshal
Munich’s campaigns against the Crimea and Turkey.
1739. Treaty of Belgrade.
1740. Great fire at Constantinople.
1741. Fire at Constantinople.
1746. Fire at
Constantinople.
1751. Piracies on the
coast of Maina and in the Archipelago.
Tumult of Greeks at
Constantinople against the Patriarch and the Phanariots.
1754. Great earthquake at Constantinople.
1755. Great fire at Constantinople.
1761. First treaty
between Turkey and Prussia.
Persecution of Catholic
Armenians at Constantinople.
1764. Insurrection of
Greeks in Cyprus.
1766. Earthquake at Constantinople.
1767. Great fires at Constantinople and at
Pera.
1770. Great fire at
Constantinople.
Russian invasion of the
Morea.
Sphakiots compelled to
pay haratsh.
1774. Treaty of Kutchuk
Kainardji.
1787. War of Suliots
with Ali Pasha of Joanniiia.
Russian privateering in
the Archipelago.
1792. Treaty of Yassi.
1797. Ionian Islands
surrendered to France by the Treaty of Campo Formio.
Ali Pasha massacres the
Christian Albanians of Chimara.
1800. Russia cedes the
continental dependencies of the Ionian Islands, Parga, Previsa, &c., to
Turkey.
Establishment of the
Ionian republic.
1807. Russia cedes the
Ionian Islands to France by the treaty of Tilsit. 1815. Ionian republic placed
under the protection of Great Britain by the treaty of Vienna.
1819. Parga delivered to
Turkey by Great Britain.
1821. Commencement of
the Greek Revolution.
CHAPTEK I.
THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY ORGANISATION OF THE OTHOMAN EMPIRE, BY WHICH
THE GREEKS WERE RETAINED IN SUBJECTION. A.D. 1453-1684.
Measures
of the Othoman conquerors to consolidate their domination—Position of the
Greeks in the Othoman empire—Extent of the empire—Degradation of the Greek
population—Stability of the Othoman power—Its
institutions—Tribute-children—Ulema —First class of institutions : Those
derived from the Koran— Second class : Those derived from the Seljouk
empire—Third class : Those peculiar to the Othoman government — Kanun-nam£ of
Mohammed II.—Administrative
divisions—Defective administration of justice—Nizam Djedid of Mustapha
Kueprilij, a.d. 1691—Finances—Haratsh—Commercial
taxes—Land-tax—Depreciation of the currency—Project of exterminating the
Christian subjects of the Sultan—Improvement in the Othoman
administration—Murder authorised by an organic law of the empire—Othoman army—
Feudal militia—Janissaries—Regular cavalry—Sipahis—Tribute of Christian
children—Irregular troops—Christian troops and auxiliaries—Decline of the
administrative system—Venality— Wealth—Discipline long maintained in the army.
The conquest of Greece by Mohammed II. was felt to
be a boon by the greater part of the population. The government of the Greek
emperors of the family of Paleologos, of their relations the despots in the
Morea, and of the Frank princes, dukes, and signors, had for two centuries
rendered Greece the scene of
Saganos Pasha was left
as governor of the Morea and the duchy of Athens. Garrisons of the sultan's
regular troops were stationed in a few of the strongest fortresses under their
own officers; but the general defence of the country and the maintenance of
order among the inhabitants was intrusted to Saganos, who was invested with the
revenue necessary for the purpose. The arbitrary power of the pasha, and the
license of the regular garrisons, were restrained by the timariot system. The
feudal usages, which the earliest Othoman sultans had inherited with their
first possessions in the Seljouk empire, were introduced by Mohammed II. into
Greece, as the natural manner of retaining the rural population under his
domination. Large tracts of land in the richest plains having reverted to the
government as belonging to the confiscated estates of the princes and nobles,
a certain proportion of this property was divided into liferent fiefs, which
were conferred on veteran warriors who had merited rewards by distinguished
service. These fiefs were called timars, and consisted of a life-interest in
lands, of which the Greek and Albanian cultivators
sometimes remained in
possession of the exclusive right of cultivation within determined limits, and
under the obligation of paying a fixed revenue, and performing certain services
for the Mussulman landlord. The timariot was bound to serve the sultan on
horseback with a number of well-appointed followers, varying according to the
value of his fief. These men had no occupation, and no thought but to perfect
themselves in the use of their arms, and for a long period they formed the best
light cavalry in Europe. The timars were granted as military rewards, and they
never became hereditary while the system continued to exist in the Othoman
empire. The veteran soldiers who held these fiefs in Greece were bound to the
sultan by many ties. They looked forward to advancement to the larger estates
called ziamets, or to gaining the rank of sandjak beg, or commander of a
timariot troop of horse. This class, in Christian provinces, was consequently
firmly attached to the central authority of the Othoman sultan, and constituted
a check both on the ambitious projects and local despotism of powerful pashas,
and on the rebellious disposition of the Christian population. The rich rewards
granted by Mohammed II. to his followers drew numerous bands of Turkman and
Seljouk volunteers to his armies from Asia Minor, who came to Europe, well
mounted and armed, to seek their fortunes as warlike emigrants. The brilliant
conquests of that sultan enabled him to bestow rich lands on many of these
young volunteers, while their own valour gained for them abundant booty in
female slaves and agricultural serfs. These emigrants formed a considerable
portion of the population of Macedonia and Greece after its conquest, and they
were always ready to take the field against the Christians, both as a religious
duty and as a means of acquiring slaves, whom, according to their
qualifications, they might send to their own harems, to their farms, or to the
slave-market. The timariots of the Othoman empire, like the feudal nobility of
Europe, required a servile race to cultivate the land. Difference of religion
in Turkey created the distinction of rank which pride of birth perpetuated in
feudal Europe. But the system was in both cases equally artificial; and the
permanent laws of man’s social existence operate unceasingly to destroy every
distinctive privilege which separates one class of men as a caste from the rest
of the community, in violation of the immutable principles of equity. Heaven
tolerates temporary injustice committed by individual tyrants to the wildest
excesses of iniquity ; but history proves that Divine Providence has endowed
society with an irrepressible power of expansion, which gradually effaces every
permanent infraction of the principles of justice by human legislation. The
laws of Lycurgus expired before the Spartan state, and the corps of janissaries
possessed more vitality than the tribute of Christian children.
The Turkish feudal
system was first introduced into Thessaly by Bayezid I., about the year 1397,
when he sent Evrenos to invade the Peloponnesus. He invested so large a number
of Seljouk Turks with landed estates, both in Macedonia and Thessaly, that from
this period a powerful body of timariots was ever ready to assemble, at the
sultan’s orders, to invade the southern part of Greece.1 Murad II.
extended the system to Epirus and Acarnania, when he subdued the possessions of
Charles Tocco, the despot of Arta ; and Mohammed II. rendered all Greece
subject to the burden of maintaining his feudal cavalry. The governmental
division of Greece, and the burdens to which it was subjected, varied so much
at different times, that it is extremely difficult to ascertain the exact
amount of the timariots settled in Greece at the time of Sultan Mohammed’s
death. The number of fiefs was not less than about 300 ziamets and 1600 timars.1
Along with the timariot
system, Mohammed II. imposed the tribute of Christian children on Greece, as
it then existed in the other Christian provinces of his empire. A fifth of
their male children was exacted from the sultan’s Christian subjects, as a part
of that tribute which the Koran declared was the lawful price of toleration to
those who refused to embrace Islam.2
By these measures Greece
was entirely subjected to the Othoman domination, and the last traces of its
political institutions and legal administration, whether derived from the Roman
Caesars, the Byzantine empe-
1 The number is thus stated in various accounts :—
Ziamets. Timars.
The Sandjak of Morea, .
... ... Negrepont, .
... ... Thessaly, that is Paleopatra and Tricala,
... ... Epakto, .
... ... Karlili, that is
Acamania and Aetolia ... ... Joannina, .
267 1625
Estimating the force of the ziamets at 15 men, and of the timars at 2,
this would furnish 7250 cavalry.
When Crete was conquered, it was divided into 3 sanjaks.
Ziamets. Timars.
Candia, . ... 8 1400
Khanea, . . . . 5 800
Retymos, . . . . 4 350
17 2550
Rhodes, .... 5 71
Mitylene, .... 4 83
The islands and maritime districts subject to the jurisdiction of the
captain pasha, were obliged to maintain a number of galleys. See infra, chap.
ii.
3 Sale’s Koran, chap. ix., vol. i., p. 224. “ Fight
against those who forbid not what God and his prophet have forbidden, and who
profess not the true religion of those unto whom the Koran has been delivered,
until they pay tribute, and they be reduced low.”
109 342
12 188
60 344
13 287
11 119
62 345
A. D.
1453-1684.
6
OTHOMAN DOMINATION.
chap. i. rors, or
the Frank princes, from the code of Justinian, the Basilika of Leon, or the
assize of Jerusalem, were all swept away. Greece was partitioned among several
pashas and governors, all of whom were under the orders of the beglerbeg of
Roumelia, the sultan’s commander-in-chief in Europe. The islands and some
maritime districts were at a later period placed under the control of the
captain pasha. The Greeks, as a nation, disappear from history: no instances of
patriotic despair ennobled the records of their subjection. A dull uniformity
marks their conduct and their thoughts. Byzantine ceremony and orthodox
formality had already effaced the stronger traits of individual character, and
extinguished genius. Othoman oppression now made an effort to extirpate the
innate feelings of humanity. Parents gave their sons to be janissaries, and
their daughters to be odaliscs.
The history of the
Othoman government during the period when its yoke bore heaviest on the Greeks,
nevertheless deserves to be carefully studied, if it were only to institute a
comparison between the conduct of the Mussulmans, and the manner in which the
most powerful contemporary Christian states treated their subjects. Unless this
comparison be made, and the condition of the rayah in the sultan's dominions be
contrasted with that of the serf in the holy Eoman empire of the Germans, and
in the dominions of the kings of France and Spain, the absolute cruelty of the
Othoman domination would be greatly overrated. The mass of the Christian
population engaged in agricultural operations was allowed to enjoy a far
larger portion of the fruits of their labour, under the sultan’s government,
than under that of many Christian mon- archs. This fact explains the facility
with which the sultans of Constantinople held millions of Christian landed proprietors
and small farmers in submissive
POSITION OF THE GREEKS.
7
bondage to a
comparatively small number of Mohammedans in the European provinces of their
empire. Indeed, the conquest of the Greeks was completed before the Othoman
government had succeeded in subduing a considerable part of the Seljouk Turks
in Asia Minor, and for several centuries the Mussulman population in Asia
proved far more turbulent subjects to the sultans than the orthodox Christians
in Europe. Mohammed
II., and many
of his successors, were not only abler men than the Greek emperors who preceded
them on the throne of Byzantium, they were really better sovereigns than most
of the contemporary princes in the West. The Transylvanians and Hungarians long
preferred the government of the house of Othman to that of the house of
Hapsburg; the Greeks clung to their servitude under the infidel Turks, rather
than seek a deliverance which would entail submission to the Catholic
Venetians. It was therefore in no small degree by the apathy, if not by the
positive goodwill of the Christian population, that the supremacy of the
Sublime Porte was firmly established from the plains of Podolia to the banks of
the Don. So stable were the foundations of the Othoman power, even on its
northern frontier, that for three centuries the Black Sea was literally a
Turkish lake. The Russians first acquired a right to navigate freely over its
waters in the year 1774.1
After the conquest of
Constantinople, the Othomans became the most dangerous conquerors who have
acted a part in European history since the fall of the western Roman empire.
Their dominion, at the period of its greatest extension, stretched from Buda on
the Danube to Bussora on the Euphrates. On the north, their
1 By the ninth article of the treaty of Kainardji. By
the third article of the treaty of Belgrade in 1739, Russia was bound not to
build any ships of war, and not to maintain any fleet, even in the Sea of Asof.
See infra, chap. v.
8
OTHOMAN DOMINATION.
chap. i. frontiers
were guarded against the Poles by the fortress of Kamenietz, and against the
Russians by the walls of Asof; while to the south the rock of Aden secured
their authority over the southern coast of Arabia, invested them with power in
the Indian Ocean, and gave them the complete command of the Eed Sea. To the
east, the sultan ruled the shores of the Caspian, from the Kour to the Tenek;
and his dominions stretched westward along the southern coast of the Mediterranean,
where the farthest limits of the regency of Algiers, beyond Oran, meet the
frontiers of the empire of Morocco. It lies beyond the sphere of this work to
trace, even in a cursory manner, the various measures and the rapid steps by
which a small tribe of nameless Turkish nomades completed the conquest of the
Seljouk emirs or sultans in Asia Minor, of the Mamlouk sultans in Syria and
Egypt, of the fierce corsairs of northern Africa, expelled the Venetians from
Cyprus, Crete, and the Archipelago, and drove the Knights of St John of
Jerusalem from the Levant, to find a shelter at Malta. It was no vain boast of
the Othoman sultan, that he was the master of many kingdoms, the ruler of three
continents, and the lord of two seas.
For three centuries the
position of the Greek race was one of hopeless degradation. Its connection with
the old pagan Hellenes was repudiated by themselves, and forgotten by other
nations. The modern Greeks were prouder of having organised the ecclesiastical
establishment of the orthodox hierarchy than of an imaginary connection with an
extinct though cognate society, which had once occupied the highest rank in the
political and intellectual world, and created the literature of Europe. The
modern identification of the Christian Greeks with the pagan Hellenes is the
growth of the new series of ideas disseminated by the French Revolution. At the
time when ecclesiastical
DEGRADATION OF THE GREEKS.
9
orthodoxy exerted its
most powerful influence 011 the Greeks as a people, they were content to
perpetuate their national existence in the city of Constantinople, in a state
of moral debasement not very dissimilar from the position in which Juvenal
describes their ancestors at Rome.1 The primates and the clergy
acted as agents of Turkish tyranny with as much zeal as the artists and
rhetoricians of old had pandered for the passions of their Boman masters. On
the other hand, the slavery of the Greeks to the Othomans was not the result of
any inferiority in numerical force, material wealth, and scientific knowledge.
The truth is, that the successes of the Othoman Turks, like those of the
Romans, must be in great part attributed to their superiority in personal
courage, individual morality, systematic organisation, and national dignity.
The fact is dishonourable to Christian civilisation. After the conquest of
Constantinople, the Greeks sank, with wonderful rapidity, and without an
effort, into the most abject slavery. For three centuries their political
history is merged in the history of the Othoman empire. During this long
period, the national position, for evil and for good, was determined by the
aggregate of vice and virtue in the individuals who composed the nation.
Historians rarely allow due weight to the direct influence of individual
conduct in the mass of mankind on political history. At this period, however,
the national history of the Greeks is comprised in their individual biography.
The power and resources
of the Othoman empire, at the time when the Sultans of Constantinople were most
dreaded by the Western Christians, were principally
1 Ingenium velox, audacia perdita, sermo Promptiis et
Isseo promptior : ede quid ilium Esse putes ? quemvis hominem secuin attulit ad
nos; is quite as correct a description of the nobles of the Phanar who served
the Othoman administration, as it was of the Rhetor who flattered the senators
and pro6onsuls of imperial Rome.
10
OTHOMAN DOMINATION.
chap. i. derived
from the profound policy with which the Turkish government rendered its
Christian subjects the instruments of its designs. It gave to its subjects a
modicum of protection for life and property, and an amount of religious
toleration which induced the orthodox to perpetuate their numbers, to continue
their labours for amassing wealth, and to prefer the domination of the sultan
to that of any Christian potentate. In return, it exacted a tithe of the lives
as well as of the fortunes of its subj ects. Christian children were taken to
fill up the chasms which polygamy and war were constantly producing in
Mussulman society,, and Christian industry filled the sultan’s treasury with
the wealth which long secured success to the boldest projects of Othoman
ambition. No accidental concourse of events could have given permanence to a
dominion which maintained its authority with the same stern tyranny over the
Seljouk Turk, the Turkman, the Curd, the Arab, and the Moorish Mussulman, as
it did over the Greek, the Albanian, the Servian, the Bulgarian, the
Yallachian, and the Armenian Christian. An empire whose greatness has endured
for several centuries, must have been supported by some profound political
combinations, if not by some wise and just institutions. Accidental
accumulations of conquest, joined together by military force alone, like the empires
of Attila, Genghis Khan, and Timor, have never attained such stability.
The peculiar
institutions which characterise the Othoman empire were first introduced by
Orkhan. About the year 1329, Christian orphans, whose parents had been slain,
were collected together, and schools for educating young slaves in the serai
were formed. This was the commencement of a systematic education of Christian
children, and of the corps of janissaries. Murad I. gave both measures that
degree of systematic
STABILITY OF THE OTHOMAN POWER.
11
regularity, by which the
tribute of Christian children afforded a permanent supply of recruits to the
sultan’s army, and to the official administration. Hence, Murad, rather than
his father Orkhan, has been generally called the founder of the janissaries.1
The political institutions of the empire were extended and consolidated by
Mohammed II. After the conquest of the empires of Constantinople and Trebizond,
he published his Kanun-name, or legislative organisation of the Othoman empire.
In the reign of Suleiman I., called by the Mussulmans the Legislator, and by
the Christians the Magnificent, the Othoman power attained its meridian
splendour. The death of the Grand-Vizier, Achmet Kueprilij, in the year 1676,
during the reign of Mohammed IV., marks the epoch of its decline. Yet the decay
of its strength was not without glory. In the year 1715 it inflicted a mortal
wound on Venice, its ancient rival, by reconquering the Morea ; and at the
peace of Belgrade, in 1739, it frustrated the combined attacks of its most
powerful enemies, by obtaining terms which were dishonourable to Austria, and
not advantageous to Russia.2
A slight sketch of the
Othoman government at the end of the reign of Mohammed II. will be sufficient
to place the relation of the Greeks to the dominant race and to the central
administration in a clear light. This relation underwent very little change as
long as the original institutions of the empire remained unaltered. During
this period the records of the Greeks are of very little historical value ;
indeed, they are so destitute of authenticity on public affairs, that they can
only be trusted when they can be confronted with
1 Hadji
Khalfa fixes the establishment of the janissaries, and Saadeddin that of the
sipahis, in the year of the Hegira 730=a.d. 1329. Compare Hammer, Staatsverfassung und Staatsverwaltung
des Osmanischen Reichs, i. 52-56. Christian writers generally consider Murad I.
their founder, and even some Turkish.
a See note, page 7, and infra, chap. v.
12
OTHOMAN DOMINATION.
chap. i. the
annals of their masters. It is by the influence which the Othoman government
exercised on European politics that Greece finds a niche in the history of the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and it is by the influence the Greek
Church exercised on Moscovite civilisation that the national importance is
known.
The power of systematic
organisation, as distinct from the pedantry of uniform centralisation, was
never more conspicuous than in the energy of the Othoman administration. The
institutions of Orkhan infused into the Othoman tribe a degree of vigour which
enabled it to conquer both the Seljouk and the Greek empires; and this was done
by forming a central administration, and by organising a regular army in
immediate dependence on the person of the sultan. The administration of the
Othoman power became in this way a part of the sultan’s household, and the
Sublime Porte, which formed the emblem of the political existence of the
empire, was called into active operation, without any direct dependence on
Turkish nationality. The conquering race in the Othoman empire was never
allowed a share of political power in the sultan’s government, however great
the privileges might be which they were allowed to assume in comparison with
the conquered Christians.
The strength of the
Othoman empire during the most flourishing period of the sultan’s power,
reposed on the household troops he composed from the children of his Christian
subjects. A tribute of male children was collected from Christians in the
conquered provinces ; and it was apparently paid by the Greeks with as much
regularity, and with as little repining, as any of the fiscal burdens imposed
on them. These tribute-children form the great distinctive feature of the
Othoman administration, as compared with the preceding Turkish empire of the
Seljouks of Eoum or
ULEMA.
13
of Iconium.1
They were carefully educated as Mussulmans, and their connection with their
master the sultan, as household slaves, was always regarded in the East as
more close, and even more honourable to the individual, than the connection of
a subject to his sovereign, where the tie was not strengthened by a
relationship of family, or at least of tribe. We find the same social relation
between the slave and the master existing among the Jews at the earliest period
of their national history. No stranger could partake of the passover, but the
servant that was bought for money could eat thereof. The foreigner and the
hired servant were nevertheless excluded from the family festival.2
The tribute-children, consequently, supplied the Othoman emperors with an
official administration and a regular army, composed of household slaves, as
ready to attack the Seljouk and Arab sovereigns, though they were Mohammedans,
as the Greeks and the Servians, who were Christians.
We must not, however,
conclude that the power of the sultan, even when aided by this powerful instrument,
was entirely without constitutional restraint. The ministers of the Mohammedan
religion, as interpreters of the civil and ecclesiastical law, had a corporate
existence of an older date than the foundation of the Othoman power. This
corporation, called the Ulema, possessed political rights, recognised throughout
every class of Mohammedan society, independent of the sultan’s will. The power
of the sultan was long restrained by the laws and customs of which the Ulema
was the representative and the champion. But in the long struggle between
despotic and central authority and class privileges, supported only by local
1 The
caliphs of Bagdad and the sultans of Egypt had also guards composed of slaves,
and those of the sultans of Egypt were called Bahairiz.—Joinville, Histoire de
St Louys, p. 55, obser. 77, ed. Ducange. Pachymer., i. 116.
2 Exodus,
xii. 43.
14
OTHOMAN DOMINATION.
chap. i. interests
and prejudices, the victory at last remained with the sultan, and the Ulema no
longer exerts any very important restraint on the political action of the
Othoman government. Corruption, which is the inseparable attendant of despotic
power, gradually rendered the principal interpreters of the dogmas of Islam
the submissive instruments of the sultan s will, and the power of the Ulema
over public opinion was thus undermined.
The institutions of the
Othoman empire range themselves in three classes : 1. Those which were derived
from the text of the Koran, and which were common to all Mohammedan countries
from the times of the Arabian caliphs ; 2. Those civil and military arrangements
connected with property and local jurisdiction which prevailed among the
Seljouk Turks in Asia Minor ; 3. The peculiar institutions of the Othoman
empire which grew up out of the legislation of Orkhan and successive sultans.
The evils inflicted on
society by the absolute power over the lives and property of all Mohammedans,
except the members of the Ulema, with which the laws of Mahomet invest the
sultan, form the staple of the history of Islam. And when the arbitrary nature
of the administration of justice inherent in the constitution of the Ulema
becomes a concomitant of the despotic power of the sovereign, it is not surprising
that, in Mohammedan countries, there has always been as little security for the
property of individuals as there has been protection for political liberty. The
authority which the Ulema possesses of extracting rules of jurisprudence for
the decision of particular cases from the religious precepts of the Koran,
opens an unlimited field for judicial oppression and iniquitous corruption. The
acknowledged imperfection of the administration of justice prevents the law
from being
tizedh MiLsQvOfi
MOHAMMEDAN LAW.
15
regarded with due
respect; and hence arises that ready submission to a despotic executive which
characterises all Mohammedan countries, for the power of the sovereign is
considered the only effective check on the corruption of the Ulema. The
sentiments of justice in the hearts of the people are also weakened by the laws
of marriage, and the social relations which arise from the prevalence of
polygamy. The heads of families become invested with an arbitrary and despotic
power at variance with the innate feelings of equity, and the moral
responsibility which is the firmest basis of virtue in society is destroyed.
The primary institutions which prevail wherever Mahomet has been acknowledged
as the prophet of God, are, despotic power in the sovereign, an arbitrary
administration of civil law, and an immoral organisation of society. This is so
striking, that every student of Turkish history feels himself puzzled in his
attempts to solve the problem of ascertaining what were the good impulses of
the human heart, or the sagacious policy of a wise government, by which these
demoralising influences were counteracted, and the Othoman empire raised to the
high pitch of power and grandeur that it attained. In the following pages we
shall endeavour to mark how the characteristics of Mohammedanism affected the
relations of the Othoman administration with its Greek subjects.
The second class of
institutions which exerted a prominent influence on the Othoman government, consisted
of the civil and military usages and customs of the Seljouk population of Asia
Minor. The feudal institutions of the Seljouk empire continued to exist long
after the complete subjection of its provinces to the Othoman sultan ; and the
wars of the national or feudal militia of Asia Minor with the central
administration and the regular army at Constantinople, form an important
feature in the history of the Othoman empire.
16
OTHOMAN DOMINATION.
chap. i. The large
irregular military force which marched under the sultan's banner, along with
the regular army of janissaries and paid sipahis, even in the European wars,
consisted principally of Seljouk feudatories enrolled in Asia Minor. The
administration of the sultan’s dominions has always presented strange anomalies
in its numerous provinces, among the Mohammedan as well as among the Christian
population. As in the Roman and the British empires, various races of men, and
the followers of different creeds, lived intermingled in great numbers, and
were allowed to retain those peculiar laws and usages that were closely
interwoven with the thread of their social existence. This freedom from the
administrative pedantry of centralisation has saved the Othoman empire from the
crime of becoming the exterminator of the races it has subdued. The sultans
only interfered with the laws and customs of each conquered people in so far
as was necessary to insure their submission to the Sublime Porte, and render
their resources available to increase the wealth and power of the Othoman
empire. It was the policy of the sultan to maintain constantly an isolated
position, overlooking equally all the various nations in his empire, whether
they were Mohammedan or Christian. This policy produced, in some respects, as
direct an opposition between the Seljouk population of Asia Minor and the
Othoman officials of the central administration, as it did between the
dominant Mohammedans and the subject Christians in Europe. The sultan employed
the slaves of the Porte as the agents of the executive government. The imperial
officials, both civil and military, were consequently a distinct and separate
race of men from the great body of the Mohammedan population of the empire, and
this distinction was more galling to the proud Seljouk feuda-
ydsZtfd £ nOft
SELJOUK POPULATION. 17
tory in Asia than to the
recent Othoman landlord in Europe. The ties which connected the imperial
officials with the Mussulman population of the sultans dominions were few and
weak, while the bonds which united them to the sultan's person and government,
as children of his household and slaves of his Sublime Porte, were entwined
with all their feelings and hopes. No sentiments of patriotism united the
Seljouk Turk and the Syrian Arab to the Othoman government; while, on the other
hand, no kindred sympathies, and no sense of national responsibility,
restrained the rigour of the sultan's despotism, as exercised by the slaves of
the Porte. Mussulman bigotry, and the community of interest arising out of a
long career of conquest, inspired all the Mohammedan subjects of the sultan
with one object, whenever war was proclaimed against a‘Christian state. The
Seljouk feudatory and the Bedouin sheik were then as eager for plunder and the
capture of slaves as the regular army of janissaries. Even during the time of
peace, the Seljouks on the Asiatic coast were compelled to stifle their
aversion to the Othoman administration by the necessity of watching every
movement of the Christian population. But the persevering opposition of the
Seljouk population in the interior of Asia Minor to the government of the
sultan, fills many pages of Turkish history for two centuries after the
conquest of Constantinople ; and this opposition must be constantly borne in
mind by those who desire to understand the anomalies in the administration of
the Othoman empire, and in the social position of its Turkish inhabitants.1
Many relics of the former anomalies in the Othoman empire were visible at the
1 It would require a long explanatory dissertation to
cite the proofs, for the corruption introduced into the Othoman administration
before the end of the sixteenth centuiy had so mixed up the abuses in the
regular army with those in the feudal militia, that the causes of the
rebellions in Asia were very complicated, and their origin often appears to
have becii accidental, in spite of the deep-rooted discontent.
18
OTHOMAN DOMINATION.
chap.
i.
beginning of the present century, which have now disappeared. The late Sultan
Mahmoud II. swept away the last traces of the Seljouk feudal system, by exterminating
the Dere-beys, the ruins of whose castles still greet the traveller in many of
the most sequestered and picturesque valleys in the Asiatic provinces. Much of
the local vigour of the Mohammedan population was then extinguished; and how
far the force of the empire has been increased by centralising its energies in
the administrative establishments at Constantinople, is a problem which still
waits for its solution.
The third class of
Othoman institutions gave the empire its true historical character and
distinctive political constitution. They had their origin in the legislation of
Orkhan, and they grew under the fostering care of his successors, who
persevered in following the direction he had marked out to them, until the work
was completed by Mohammed II. the conqueror of the Greek race. Orkhan made the
household of the sovereign the basis of the government of the Othoman
dominions, as it had been of the imperial administration in the Roman empire.
He assigned to the organisation of the army and the civil and financial
administration an existence perfectly independent of the people. The great
political merit of Orkhan's institutions was, that they admitted of extension
and development as the bounds of the empire were enlarged and the exigencies
of the administration increased. Accordingly, we find Murad I. so far
extending his father’s regulations for recruiting the regular army from the
tribute of Christian children, as to have obtained from some Turkish historians
the honour of being called the founder of the corps of janissaries.1
At length, when Mohammed II. had completed the conquest of the Seljouk emirs,
as well as of the Greek
1 Annales Turoicl, a Joanne Leunclavlo latine translati, p. 248. Ed. Ven.
KANUN-NAM£ OE MOHAMMED II.
19
empires of
Constantinople ancl Trebizond, the Scla- vonian kingdoms of Servia and Bosnia,
the Frank ‘
O ?
principalities of
Athens, Euboea, and Mytilene, and the Albanian lordship of Skanderbeg, he
turned his attention to the civil government of his vast empire.
In all his plans for the
administration of his new conquests, he made the institutions which Orkhan had
bequeathed to the Othoman government the model of his legislation. His
Kanun-name, consequently, is a collection of administrative ordinances, not an
attempt to frame a code of civil laws. True to the spirit of Orkhan’s theory of
government, he constituted the sultan s palace the centre of political power,
and its sublime gate as the spot where his subjects must look for protection
and justice. To the world at large the Sublime Porte was the seat of the
sultan’s government, and only the sultan’s slaves could enter its precincts to
learn the sovereign’s wTill in his own presence.
Mohammed II. was one of
those great men whose personal conduct, from their superiority of talent and
firmness of purpose, modifies the course of public events, when it is granted
to them, as it was to him, to exercise their influence during a long and
successful reign.
Though he ascended the
throne at the age of twenty- one, his character was already formed by the education
he had received. An enemy who knew him personally, and had the most powerful
reasons to hate him, acknowledges that, with all the fire and energy of youth,
he possessed the sagacity and the prudence of old age.1 The palace
of the sultan, where the young princes of the race of Othman received their
education amidst the tribute-children who had been selected on account of
their superior talents and amiable dispositions, was for several generations
an excellent public school. No reigning family ever educated so
1 Phrantzes, 03. Ed. Conn.
20
OTHOMAN DOMINATION.
chap. i. many
great princes as the house of Othman. When the intellect was strong, and the
disposition naturally good, the character was developed at an early age by the
varied intercourse of the tribute-children and their instructors. In this
society the young sultan Mohammed, whom nature had endowed with rare mental
and physical advantages, learned the art of commanding himself, as well as others,
by his desire to secure the esteem and attachment of the youths who were the
companions of his amusements, and who were destined to become the generals of
his armies and the ministers of his cabinet. Mohammed II. made it the duty of
the sultan to preside in person over the whole government. For many years he
was the real prime- mini ster of the public administration, for he retained in
his own hands the supreme direction of all public business after the execution
of the grand-vizier Khalil, whom he had reason to suspect of treasonable
dealings with the Greeks. The succeeding grand-viziers only acted as
commanders-in-chief of the army and principal secretaries of state for the
general administration, not as vicegerents of the sultan’s power. From the time
of Murad I. to the taking of Constantinople, the usages and customs of the
Othoman tribe still exercised some influence over the public administration,
and the office of grand-vizier had been hereditary in the family of
Djenderelli. Khalil was the fourth of this family who filled the office, and
with him the political influence of the Othoman tribe expired. The project of
Khalil had been to create an acknowledged power in the hands of the
grand-vizier, as protector of the peaceable subjects of the empire, independent
of the military power and the military classes. His avarice, as much as his
ambition, induced him to use his hereditary authority to constitute himself
the leader of these views, and to endeavour to control the operations
t
MOHAMMED II.
21
of the army. His conduct
awakened the suspicion of Mohammed II., who detected his intrigues with the
Greeks; and forty days after the conquest of Constantinople, Kahlil was
beheaded at Adrianople. Several of the grand-viziers of Mohammed II. were men of
great ability. Like the sultan, they had been educated in the schools of the
imperial palace. The ablest of all was Mahmoud Pasha, whose father wTas
a Greek, and his mother an Albanian. He was a man
worthy to rank with
Mohammed II. and with Skan- l
The successors of
Mohammed II. pursued the line of policy he had traced out, and followed the
maxims of state laid down in the Kanun-name with energy and perseverance for
several generations. The sultans continued to be men both able and willing to
perform the onerous duties imposed on them. For two centuries and a-half—from
Othman to Suleiman the Legislator —the only sultan who was not a man of
pre-eminent military talent was Bayezid II.; yet he was nevertheless a prudent
and accomplished prince. All these sovereigns directed the government of their
empire. The council, composed of the great officers of state and of viziers of
the bench, was held in their presence.
The administrative
fabric of the government was divided by Mohammed II. into four branches : 1.
The Executive, the chief instruments of which were the pashas; 2. The Judicial,
embracing the ulema, under the control of the kadiaskers, but subsequently
presided over by the grand mufti; 3. The Financial, under the superintendence
of the defterdars; and, 4. The Civil department, under the direction of the
nisliandjees or imperial secretaries. The grand-vizier, who wTas the
chief of the pashas, exercised a supreme control over the whole government;
while the pashas, each in his
1 Hammer, Ilistoire de Vempire Othoman, iii. 168. Tr. Hellert.
A. D.
1453-1684.
22
OTHOMAN DOMINATION.
chap.
i.
own province, commanded the military forces, maintained the police, watched
over the public security, and enforced the regular payment of all taxes and
imposts. The kadiaskers, or grand judges of Asia and Europe, were, in the time
of Mohammed II., the administrative chiefs of the judicial and religious establishments
on the different sides of the Bosphorus. They named the cadis or inferior
judges. But in the reign of Suleiman the Great, the grand mufti was vested with
many of the functions previously exercised by the kadiaskers, who were rendered
subordinate to this great interpreter of the law. A supreme defterdar acted as
minister of finance, and directed that important branch of state business
which, in all long- established and extensive empires, ultimately becomes the
pivot of the whole administration. The sultan's private secretary was the chief
nishandjee, who performed the duty of principal secretary of state. His office
was to affix the toghra (toura) or imperial cipher to all public acts, and to
revise every document as it passed through the imperial cabinet.
Such was the general
scheme of the administration as it was arranged by Mohammed II.; and though it
was reformed and improved by Suleiman the Legislator, it remained in force
until the commencement of the present century. But when the indolence and incapacity
of the sultans left the irresponsible direction of public affairs in the hands
of their grand-viziers, those ministers exercised the despotic power of their
masters in the most arbitrary manner.
The administration of
justice and that of finance are the two most important branches of government
in civilised society, because they come hourly into contact with the feelings
and actions of every subject. The organisation of both these departments has
always been singularly defective in the Othoman empire. The
DEFECTIVE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.
23
manner in which justice
was dispensed to the subjects of the sultan—whether Mussulman or Christian—
whether in the tribunal of the cadi or the court of the bishop—was so radically
vicious as to render all decisions liable to the suspicion and imputation of
venality. The consequence was that corruption pervaded the whole frame of
society; there was an universal feeling of insecurity, and a conviction that
candour and publicity were both attended with individual danger. The want of
morality and self-reliance, which is made the reproach of the subjects of the Othoman
empire, and from which only a portion of the dominant race was exempt, can
easily be traced to this defect in their social position. In all historical
investigations we ought constantly to bear in mind the observation of Hume,
that all the vast apparatus of government has for its ultimate object the
distribution of justice.1 The executive power, and the assemblies
which form a portion of the legislative, ought both, in a well-constituted
state, to be subordinate to the law. The fashionable phrase of modern constitutions,
that every citizen is equal before the law, is a mockery of truth and common
sense in all states where there is one set of laws or regulations for the
government and its officials, and another for the mass of people as subjected
to that government. Until neither rank, nor official position, nor
administrative privileges can be pleaded as a ground of exceptional treatment
by the agents of the executive in matters of justice, there can be no true
civil liberty. The law must be placed above sovereigns and parliaments as well
as above ministers and generals.
No such principles of
government ever entered into the minds of the Othoman Turks. The Mohammedan
jurisprudence declares distinctly that there is a different
1 Hume’s Essays: On the Origin of Government.
24
OTHOMAN DOMINATION.
chap. r. civil law
for the believer in Islam and for the infidel. It pronounces that the Koran
confers privileges on the true believer from which all others are excluded. The
Mohammedan law, therefore, was founded on principles of partial, not of
universal application, and it has maintained a perpetual struggle with the
natural abhorrence of injustice which God has implanted in the human heart.
Even the Mussulman population of the Othoman empire was not insensible to the
instability of their legal position as a dominant race, where the mass of the
population was of a different religion. They always felt that their power in
Europe was based on maxims of law and policy which rendered its duration
uncertain. The Mohammedans in Europe always contemplated the probability of
their being one day expelled from countries where they appeared as foreign
colonists and temporary sojourners, and looked forward to a period when they
should be compelled to retreat into those Asiatic lands where the majority of
the inhabitants followed the faith of Mahomet. Hence resulted the nervous
anxiety displayed by the Mussulmans to convert the Christian population of the
sultan's dominions. The true believers considered that this was the only
manner by which it was possible to confer on the followers of a different
religion an equality of civil rights, and they felt that this equality could
alone give stability to their government. Several of the ablest statesmen in
the Othoman empire declared, that until the Mohammedan religion was embraced by
all the sultan's subjects, the government could neither be secure nor
equitable. They fully acknowledged the danger of treating the Christians under
their dominion with systematic injustice, and they endeavoured to palliate the
evil they could not eradicate. The necessity of protecting the Christians
against oppression was recognised by Mohammed II., and the patriarch
£
NIZAM-DJEDID OF 1G91.
25
of Constantinople was
appointed the agent for the 145^1D684
Greek nation
at the Sublime Porte for this purpose. ______________________ '
But the first
legislative enactments for the declared object of protecting the Christian
subjects of the sultan against official and Mussulman oppression, by investing
them with a guarantee in their own personal rights, were dated in the year
1691. These imperial ordinances were promulgated by the grand-vizier Mustapha
Kueprilij, called the Virtuous, and were termed the Nizam-djedid, or New
System. The governors of provinces, and all the pashas and other officials,
were commanded to treat the Christians with equity. They were strictly
prohibited from exacting any addition to the haratsh or capitation-tax, or to
any of the imposts as fixed by the laws of the empire, under the pretext of
local necessities. The intention of the Othoman government had always been to
leave the collection and administration of the funds destined for local purposes
in the hands of the inhabitants of the locality.
This attempt of Mustapha
the Virtuous to sanction the right of Christians to demand protection against
Mussulman injustice, under Mohammedan laws, produced very little practical
effect in ameliorating the lot of the Greeks.1 The Othoman
administration was about this period invaded by a degree of corruption, which
left all the sultan's subjects, both Mussulman and Christian, exposed to the
grossest injustice. It required many social changes in the East before any
progress could be made in the task of levelling the barriers which separated
the dominant religion from the faith of the subject people. The difference was
too great to be effaced by legislative enactments alone.
The imperfection of the
financial administration in the Othoman government assisted the vices of the
judicial system in accelerating the decline of the empire.
1 Hammer, Ilktoire de Vempire
Othoman, xii. 306, 322.
26
OTHOMAN DOMINATION.
chap. i. In all
countries, the manner in which the permanent revenues of the state are levied,
exerts an important effect on the national prosperity. A small amount of
taxation may be so collected as to check the accumulation of national wealth,
and hinder the people from adopting fixed habits of industry, while a large
amount may be imposed in such a way as to form a very slight check on the
national progress. The taxes in the Othoman empire were not so injurious from
their amount, as from the way in which they were imposed and collected. The
Mohammedans were exempt from many burdens which fell heavy on the Jews and
Christians; and as often happens with financial privileges, these exceptions
proved ultimately of no great advantage to the class they appeared to favour.
The great financial
distinction between the true believers and the infidel subjects of the sultan,
was the payment of the haratsh or capitation-tax. This tax was levied on the
whole male unbelieving population, with the exception of children under ten
years of age, old men, and priests of the different sects of Christians and
Jews. The maimed, the blind, and the paralytic were also exempted by Moslem
charity. This payment was imposed by the Koran on all who refused to embrace
the Mohammedan faith, as the alternative by which they might purchase peace.1
The Othomans found it established in the Seljouk empire, and, as they were
bound by their religious precepts, they extended it to every country they
conquered. In the reign of Suleiman the Legislator, this tax yielded a revenue
of seventeen millions of piastres, while the whole revenue of the empire only
amounted to twenty-seven millions, or about £6,000,000 sterling.2
1 Sale’s
Kwan, chap. 9, vol. i. 224, as cited above, page 5.
2 D’Ohsson, Tableau de Vempire
Othoman, vii. 237, 8vo. Hammer, Histoire, vi. 510.
COMMERCIAL TAXES. 27
The duty levied alike on
imports and exports a.d.
1 ill/’ i i n 1453-1684,
amounted to
two and a halt per cent when the goods ----------------------------------------
were the property of a
Mohammedan, but to five per cent when they belonged to a Christian or Jewish
subject of the Porte. This moderate duty enabled the commerce of the Othoman
empire to flourish greatly during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.1
Though the commercial duties levied on the infidels were double the amount of
those paid by the Mohammedans, they were in reality so moderate, that the
difference was easily compensated by closer commercial relations with foreign
merchants in distant countries, and by greater activity and economy. The
Christians, consequently, preserved the greater share of the trade of Turkey in
their hands. And as both Christians and Jews were excluded from war and politics,
they turned their whole attention to trade. The different members of the same
family dispersed themselves in various cities of the empire, in order that they
might collect cargoes for exportation with the greatest facility, and
personally superintend their distribution at the ports of consumption in the
most economical manner. In an age when guarantees for personal honesty were not
easily obtained beyond the circle of family ties, and extensive credit required
to be replaced by personal attendance, the Greeks made their family connections
a substitute for the privileges of corporations and guilds in the commercial
cities of western Europe. Another circumstance favoured the trade of the
non-Mussul-
1 Turkish merchants were numerous at Ancona, Venice,
and Ragusa. In the year 1522 the Venetian ambassadors to the Papal see
estimated the amount of business of single Turkish and Greek traders at 500,000
ducats annually, and it is said with emphasis, that there were always numerous
Turkish vessels at anchor in the port.—Ranke, History of the Popes, 97, 101.
The Turks had also a hostelry for themselves, and large warehouses (the
fondaco), at Venice.
—Marin., viii. 155. Mohammed II., in the treaty he concluded with Scan-
derbeg in 1461, inserted a clause in favour of Othoman traders. See the letter
of Mohammed to Scanderbeg ; Barletius, 192, and Reusner, Epist. Turcica:, i.
213: Ut mercatores et negotiatores nostri regnum tuum cum mercimoniis
suis ubique permeent atque percurrant.
28
OTHOMAN DOMINATION.
chap. i. man
population of the Othoman empire. Venality ' and rapacity have always been
prominent characteristics of the Othoman financial system. The Christian population
of the East had been disciplined to every species of financial extortion for
many ages by the Greek emperors. In fiscal measures the Othomans were the
pupils of the Byzantine system, and the officials of the Porte soon perceived
that the privilege of paying smaller duties placed the interests of the
Mussulman trader in opposition to the interests of the imperial fisc. The
custom-house officers were taught to favour that trade which brought the
largest returns to the imperial treasury, and to throw obstacles in the way of
commercial dealings which bore the character of individual privileges injurious
to the sultan’s revenue. The import and export duties formed one of the
principal branches of the sultan’s revenue, and we have already observed that
the nature of the Othoman government prevented the existence of much sympathy
between the great bulk of the Mohammedan landlords or cultivators of the soil
and the agents of the sultan’s administration. The policy of throwing
obstacles in the way of the commercial operations of the Turks gradually gained
strength, until the Mussulman landlord was content, in order to save time and
avoid collision with the government officials, to sell his produce to rayah
merchants, who in this way gained possession of the greater part of the trade
of the empire. At a later period, the privileges conceded by commercial treaties
to the subjects of foreign nations introduced a change in the commercial position
of the Christian subjects of the Porte, which was extremely injurious both to
the wealth and moral character of the Greek traders. From this period the
history of Othoman commerce becomes a record of privileges granted to
foreigners, and of fraudulent
LAND-TAX.
29
schemes adopted by the
rayalis to share in these privileges, or to elude their effect. The government
strove to indemnify itself for these frauds by unjust exactions, and the native
traders employed corruption and bribery as the most effectual protection
against the abuses of tyrannical authority. The letter of the law and the
legitimate duties served only as the text for an iniquitous commentary of
extortions and evasions.
The land-tax, however,
was the impost which bore heaviest on the industry of the whole agricultural
population of every religion and race. This tax consisted of a fixed
proportion of the annual produce, generally varying from a tenth to a third of
the whole crop. Almost all the countries which had fallen under the domination
of the Mohammedans had been in a declining state of society at the time of
their conquest. This was as much the case with Syria, Egypt, Persia, and
Northern Africa in the seventh century, as it was with the Greek empires of
Constantinople and Tre- bizond, and the principalities of Athens and the Morea,
in the fifteenth. In such a state of society, communications are becoming
daily more confined, and it is consequently more easy for the cultivator to pay
a determinate proportion of his crop than to make a fixed payment in money.
Thus, the worst possible system of taxation was introduced into the dominions
of the Mohammedan conquerors as a boon to their subjects, and was received with
satisfaction. All the land in the Othoman empire was subjected to this tax,
whether it was held by Mohammedans or infidels. The effect of this system of
taxation in repressing industry arises in great measure from the methods
adopted to guard against fraud on the part of the cultivator of the soil. He is
not allowed to commence the labours of the harvest until the tax-gatherer is on
the spot to watch his proceedings ; and he is compelled
30
OTHOMAN DOMINATION.
chap. i. to leave
the produce of his land exposed in the open air until the proportion which
falls to the share of the government is measured out and separated from the
heap. Where the soil is cultivated by a race of a different religion from the
landlord, it becomes the interest of the landlord to combine with the tax-
collector, or to become himself a farmer of the revenue, and then every act of
tyranny is perpetrated with impunity. Throughout the whole Othoman empire all
agricultural industry is paralysed for at least two months annually; the
cultivators of the soil being compelled to waste the greater portion of their
time in idleness, watching the grain on the threshing-floors, seeing it trodden
out by cattle, or else winnowing it in the summer breezes ; for immemorial
usage has prescribed these rude operations as the surest guarantees for
protecting the government against frauds on the part of the peasant. This
barbarous routine of labour is supposed to be an inevitable necessity of state,
and consequently all improvements in agriculture are rendered impracticable.
The evils inherent in the system of exacting the land-tax in the shape of a
determinate proportion of the annual crop, have produced a stationary condition
of the agricultural population wherever it has prevailed. It was one of the
great social evils of Europe during the middle ages, and at the present day it
forms the great barrier to improvement in the Othoman empire and the Greek
kingdom.1
Another evil arising
from this mode of levying the tax on the soil is, that it induces the
government to weaken the rights of property, and thus, in the hope of
increasing the annual revenue of the state,
1 The author of this work is practically acquainted
with the difficulty of making any agricultural improvements under this system.
He wasted much money and time before he fully perceived the impossibility of
one individual contending against general regulations and the habits they
produce. In a pecuniary point of view, he found cultivating the soil of Greece
even more unprofitable than writing its history.
l
LAND-TAX.
31
capital is excluded from
seeking a permanent investment in land. Even under the Roman empire, a similar
policy caused some degree of insecurity to the landed proprietor, whose arable
land was not sufficiently protected by the law, if it remained uncultivated.
For, by the Roman jurisprudence, the occupier who tilled the land belonging to
another person, if he maintained his occupation for a year, acquired a right of
occupancy, leaving the real proprietor only the power of regaining possession
of his land by an action at law. It is evident that this transference of
possession to the squatter who could obtain the undisturbed occupancy for a
single year, was an element of insecurity in all landed property. The laws of
Great Britain and of the United States of America are based on very different
principles from those of Rome. The rights of property are always considered too
sacred to be tampered with for fiscal purposes ; mere possession confers no
right to land. The Othoman legislation has adopted the policy of the Roman law,
and it considers the loss which might accrue to the state from the land
remaining uncultivated as a greater evil than the injury inflicted on society
by unsettling the rights of property. The Othoman law allowed any person to
cultivate arable land which was left uncultivated by its proprietor beyond the
usual term of fallow, even though the proprietor might desire, for his own
profit, to retain it for pasture. The possession of arable land could only be
retained by keeping it in constant cultivation, according to customary
routine. Capital, under such circumstances, could not be invested in land with
security or profit. A barrier was raised against agricultural improvements, and
the population engaged in cultivating the soil was condemned to remain in a
stationary condition.1
1 D’Ohsson, Tableau de I'empire
Othoman. Code Politique, v. 21. These
32 OTHOMAN
DOMINATION.
chap. i. Another
vice of the financial administration of the Othoman empire tended to annihilate
the wealth of its subjects. This was the depreciation of the metallic currency;
and it was so great, that it appears alone sufficient to explain the decline
which has taken place in the resources and population of the sultan's dominions
during the last two centuries. Whenever the amount of specie in the imperial
treasury was found inadequate to meet the demands on the government, it became
the practice of the sultan's ministers to supply the deficiency by adulterating
the coinage. Perhaps no administrative measures in the Othoman empire have
produced more poverty, or have more rapidly undermined the resources of the
people and the strength of the government, than this mode of defrauding the
sultan's subjects of their property. The Byzantine emperors had preserved their
coinage unaltered in its standard for seven centuries; and there can be no
doubt that this wise conduct contributed greatly to the stability of society
and to the duration of that empire. On the other hand, the Greek emperors of
the house of Paleologos appear to have been constantly tampering with the
coinage. But 110 government ever carried the depreciation of its coinage to
such a degree as the Othoman. The asper was long the unit of Turkish monetary
enumeration. Originally it was a silver coin, representing the miliaresion of
the Byzantine empire, and ten were equal in value to a gold sequin or byzant.
At the accession of Selim I., after an interval of only thirty-one years, the
size of the
principles have been acted on by the phanariot statesmen of the Greek
kingdom, as well as by the members of the sultan’s divan. Mavrocordatos, when
minister of finance during the Bavarian regency, issued a circular, in which he
says, “ that every spot where wild grass for the pasture of cattle grows is
national property,” and that the government of Greece, like that of the Sublime
Porte, recognises the principle that there can be no property in the soil,
except the exclusive right of cultivation vested in private individuals. This
will be found quoted in my pamphlet entitled, The Hellenic Kingdom and the
Greek Nation, published in 1836, page 64.
DEPRECIATION OF THE COINAGE.
33
asper, and the relative
value of silver to gold, were so
much
diminished that fifty-four of the new aspers were __________________
equal to a Venetian
sequin, which passed current for fifteen of the old aspers. The aspers of the
time of Mohammed II. may, however, be supposed to have lost a considerable
portion of their original weight by attrition. In the reign of Suleiman the
Legislator, the sequin passed current for sixty aspers but about the middle of
the sixteenth century that sultan issued a coinage so debased by alloy as to
raise the value of the sequin to ninety aspers. From that period the
deterioration of the Otlioman coinage proceeded with accelerated speed in each
successive reign. In the commercial treaty with England, concluded in the year
16 75, the value of the dollar was fixed at eighty aspers, but when the treaty
of Carlovitz was signed in the year 1699, German and Venetian dollars were
already valued at one hundred and twenty aspers. At the accession of the
present Sultan, the value of the Venetian sequin was about six thousand aspers.
The asper, however, has long been a mere nominal monetary division.2
The Greeks found the line
of separation which the Koran draws between the infidels and the true believers
much more galling than the other Christian subjects of the sultan. They could
not forget that they had been a dominant race when they were conquered by the
Mohammedans ; and even their pride could not conceal
1 Compare Ducas, 109 ; my
Byzantine History, vol. ii. p. 613, note 1 ; Leiui- clavius, Pand. Hist. Turc.,
404, ed. P.
2 Hammer,
Histoire, vii. 235, xii. 311. Hertslet’s Commercial Treaties, ii.
367. The asper is one-third of a para. The word gurush (piastre) was at
first given to the Spanish dollars. Turkish piastres were first coined in the
reign of Mustaplia III., and were equal in value to half a Spanish dollar, or
perhaps only to half a Venetian dollar, called Arslani, or Lion dollars, from
the Lion of St Mark on their reverse. The Othoman government often increased
the extent of its injustice by refusing to receive the base money it issued.
Frederick the Great of Prussia appeal's to have copied this policy when
he coined base money for the share he had received in the partition of Poland,
which he made a legal tender from a Prussian to a Pole, but which no Pole could
compel a Prussian to receive back.
C
34
OTHOMAN DOMINATION.
chap. i. the fact
that they were numerically superior to the Otliomans in all the European
provinces of the empire. The memory of lost power and former wealth was kept
alive by some knowledge of Hellenic literature, and an unbounded confidence in
their own merits as members of the only orthodox ecclesiastical hierarchy.
These feelings have always rendered the Greeks as unquiet subjects as their
inordinate selfishness has rendered them oppressive masters. The moral and
political condition of the Greek race, during two thousand years, proves that
neither classical knowledge nor ecclesiastical orthodoxy can supply the want
of those qualities necessary to infuse morality into a corrupted society. Their
system of education was evidently much inferior to that adopted by their
Turkish masters for the education of the Christian children collected by the
tribute, and compelled to embrace Mohammedanism. These apostates displayed a
degree of activity, intelligence, honesty, and self-respect, rarely found among
their brethren whose education remained under the superintendence of Greek
pedants and orthodox priests. Accordingly we find that many Greeks of high
talent and moral character were so sensible of the superiority of the
Mohammedans, that even when they escaped being drafted into the sultan’s
household as tribute- children, they voluntarily embraced the faith of Mahomet.
The moral superiority of Othoman society must be allowed to have had as much
weight in causing these conversions, which were numerous in the fifteenth
century, as the personal ambition of individuals.
The number of the
Christian subjects of the sultan in Europe filled the minds of various sultans
with alarm, and the desire of increasing the number of the true believers
became a measure of policy as well as of religion. The Koran, however, forbids
the forced conversion of adults who believe in the revelations of
f; Ly wilt*
PROJECTS OF EXTERMINATION.
35
Moses or of Jesus. The
divan sought in vain for plans , a.
i>.
n . , . i 0 . x
. 1453-loi
oi conversion
that promised any success m overcoming ------------------------
the national and
religious attachments of the Christians, whose persevering opposition to
Mohammedanism could not be concealed. At last the extermination of the whole
orthodox population was suggested as the only means of eradicating the canker
which was devouring the heart of the empire. The suggestions of political
necessity were allowed to silence every sentiment of humanity and sound policy.
The very basis of the Othoman power—the tribute of Christian children, and the
revenues paid by the parents of these children—would have been destroyed, to
assuage the cravings of religious fanaticism in the breast of an absolute
monarch.
Selim I., moved by
strong feelings of bigotry, was eager to compel all his subjects to adopt the
faith of orthodox Mussulmans. He commenced his project of putting an end to all
religious differences in his dominions, by exterminating heresy among the
Mohammedans. About forty thousand shiis or sectaries of Ali were massacred by
his orders in the year 1514.1 This monstrous act of barbarity was
surpassed in Christian Europe, more than half a century later, by the massacre
of St. Bartholomew’s Eve (22d August 1572). A despot who could murder heretics
in cold blood was not likely to have any compunction in exterminating those whom
he regarded as infidels. To complete his project for establishing unity of
faith in his empire, Selim at last issued orders to his grand vizier to
exterminate the whole Christian population of his dominions, and to destroy all
Christian churches. Orthodox and Catholics, Greeks and Armenians, were alike
condemned to deaths With
1 Hammer,
Ilistoire, iv. 175.
2 In
judging the conduct of the sultan, who was a man of singular ferocity, we must
recollect the spirit and the maxims of the times, even among Christians. That
humane and amiable sovereign, Isabella of Castille, signed the edict for the
expulsion of the Jews from her dominions in 1492, and in 1502
i
36 OTHOMAN DOMINATION.
• great difficulty the grand
vizier, Piri Pasha, and the mufti Djemali, succeeded in persuading Selim to
abandon his diabolical project.1 The Christians in the East were
fortunate in escaping the treatment which the Catholics of the West had
inflicted on the Albigenses. Time had improved the general condition of
society. A Mohammedan high-priest in the sixteenth century was more deeply
sensible of the feelings of humanity and true charity than the head of the
Latin Church in the thirteenth.
Nevertheless, the project of exterminating the Christians was revived at
subsequent periods. Sultan Ibrahim was anxious to carry it into effect in the
year 1646. The chief of the hierarchy again refused to sanction the cruelty. He
declared that the laws of Mahomet forbid the issue of such a fetva, for the
Koran prohibits the murder of men who have laid down their arms and consented
to pay tribute to the true believers. Although the grand mufti might have found
it impossible to convince the sultan of the injustice of his proposed measure,
he was able to demonstrate its impolicy. By referring to the registers of the
haratsh, he showed Ibrahim that a very large part of the revenues of the empire
were paid by the Christian population. In the capital alone their number
amounted to two hundred thousand, and throughout the whole empire they were the
most docile tax-payers.2
she, and her husband, Ferdinand of Aragon, expelled their Mohammedan subjects
from Spaiu, “ in order to drive God’s enemies from the land which He had
delivered into their hands.” Many exiles driven from Christendom by both these
persecutions, settled in the Othoman empire, where their descendants still
flourish. The severities meditated by the passion of individual tyrants in
Turkey fell short of the cruelties actually perpetrated by popes, inquisitors,
kings, and judges, in almost every Christian state. Mohammedan history offers
no parallel to the advice given by the Archbishop of Valentia to Philip III. of
Spain, so late as the year 1602. He recommended selling the children of the
Moriscos in Spain, as an act of mercy on their souls, and a holy measure for
bringing a large sum of money into the king’s treasury.—Watson’s Philip III.,
i. 415. Prescott’s Ferdinand and Isabella, Part Second, chap. 7.
1 Hammer,
Histoire, iv. 364.
2 Hammer, Histoire, xii. 306,
322. Staatsverfassung und Staatsrerwaltung,
IMPROVEMENT IN OTHOMAN ADMINISTRATION. 37
The progress of civilisation among the Turks, and the abhorrence of
injustice which is innate in the human heart, gradually induced some of the
most eminent Othoman statesmen to adopt measures for improving the position of
the sultan’s Christian subjects. We cannot doubt that they contributed by
their influence to accelerate the abolition of the tribute of Christian
children, even though we can trace its cessation directly to other political causes.
In the year 1691, the grand vizier, Mustapha Kueprilij, issued the regulations,
already mentioned under the name of the Nizam-Djedid, for securing to the
Christians legal protection against official oppression. Since that period the
Othoman government has made several attempts to reconcile the legislation of
the Koran with an equitable administration of justice to its subjects; but,
until very recently, these attempts proved ineffectual to protect the
Christians against the Mohammedans. The possibility of ultimately rendering
Christians and Mohammedans equal in the eye of the law, under an Othoman
sultan, admits of doubt, and the project is not viewed with much favour either
by Christians or Mohammedans. It is quite as violently repudiated by the Greeks
as by the Turks. As far as regards Arabs and Armenians, the possibility is
readily admitted; but both the Othomans and the Greeks aspire at being a
dominant race. As the Othoman government has grown more moderate in its
despotism, the Greek subjects of the sultan have risen in their demands. They
now assume that their orthodoxy is irreconcilable with Othoman domination ; and
they believe that it is the duty of all Christian powers to labour for their
deliverance from a yoke to which they submitted with
i. 331. Yet as late as the year
1722, the grand mufti declared that it was the duty of the orthodox to
exterminate heretics. To infidels he was more mild, but he said that, when
their lives were spared, they ought invariably to be reduced to slavery.—Hammer,
Histoire, xiv. 92.
A. D.
1453-1084.
38
OTHOMAN DOMINATION.
chap. i. unexampled
docility for four centuries. The rivalry of the Greeks and Othomans produces a
hatred which is much more deeply rooted than the mere aversion caused by the
religious differences of the other Christians and Mohammedans in the empire.
The victory, in the struggle between the Greeks and Othomans, can only be
gained by political wisdom and military power. The religious differences of the
other races may be separated from political interests by a wise and equitable
dispensation of justice to all the subjects of the sultan, without distinction
of rank, of race, or of faith, and by the adoption of a system of free communal
administration equalising financial burdens.
It must not be supposed that the institutions of the Othoman empire have
respected the principles of justice in regulating the rights of the
Mohammedans any more than in governing the Christians. The legality of murder,
when that crime has appeared necessary to secure the public tranquillity and
remove the chances of civil wars, has been established as an organic law.
Mohammed II., after citing in his Kanun-name the opinion of the Ulema that the
Koran authorises the murder of his brothers by the reigning sultan, adds this
injunction, “Let my children and grandchildren . be dealt with accordingly.”1 In a government where
inhumanity and immorality were so publicly proclaimed to be grounds of
legislation, it was natural that political expediency should become the only
practical rule of conduct. But in order to act energetically on maxims so
abhorrent to human feelings, it was also necessary for the government to create
its own instruments. This could only be effected by educating a body of
officials, and forming an army, whose members were completely separated from
the rest of the sultan's subjects. It was absolutely requisite for the sultan
to possess ministers
1 Hammer, Staatsverfam/ng und Staatsrencaltung, i.
98.
OTHOMAN ARMY.
39
and troops who were slaves of his Sublime Porte— men without family or
nation—men who had as few ties to connect them with the dominant Mohammedan as
with the subject Christian population of the empire. This desideratum was
supplied by the institution of the tribute-children. These little Christians
were reared to form the first regular troops of the Othoman sultans, and soon
grew into a standing army.
This foundation of the Othoman army was laid by Orkhan, whether from his
own impulse, or at the suggestion of his brother Aladdin, who acted as his prime-
minister, or in consequence of the advice of Kara Khalil, his most intimate
counsellor, is uncertain, and not of much historical importance. The
organisation of the tribute-children was improved, and the numbers of the
regular troops were increased by Murad I.; but even in the victorious reign of
Mohammed II. the Othoman regular army was small when compared with the armies
which the continental sovereigns of Europe consider it necessary to maintain at
the present day, even during periods of profound peace. The whole military
force of this sultan probably never exceeded seventy or eighty thousand
fighting-men, and of these the regular infantry or janissaries amounted only to
twelve thousand, and the regular cavalry to about ten thousand. The great numerical
difference between the forces of the Othoman sultans at this period, and of the
European sovereigns at present, must be in some degree attributed to the
financial moderation of the Othoman government during the early period of the
empire. It was this financial moderation, coming as a relief after the rapacity
of the Greek emperors, which made the Greeks hug their chains; and it forms a
strong contrast to the excessive financial burdens and constant interference
with individual liberty which characterises the system of administration in
modern
40
OTHOMAN DOMINATION.
chap. i. centralised
states. The Othoman government required its troops principally in warfare. Even
during the worst periods of Turkish tyranny, the Porte showed no disposition to
intermeddle with every act of the local administration, which is often
intrusted to its Christian subjects. The military forces of the empire
consisted of different troops, which owed their existence to a variety of
circumstances, and whose origin dates from very different times. It was the
admirable organisation of these troops, the great military talents of the
generals who commanded them, and the indefatigable superintendence of every
administrative detail by the sultans themselves, not the number of the troops,
which so long rendered the Othoman armies superior to the military forces of
contemporary Christian sovereigns. For a considerable time after the conquest
of Constantinople the sultan possessed the only regular army of any importance
in Europe.
The Greek race had been easily held in subjection by small bodies of men
even before their conquest by the Othomans. The Crusaders, who conquered the
Byzantine empire, and the Franks, the Venetians, and the Genoese, who ruled in
Greece, in Asia Minor, and in the islands of the Archipelago, were far inferior
in numbers to the subject Greeks. The Othomans were originally less numerous,
but the sultans connected the interests of all the Turks with the extension of
the empire, by conferring on them many of the privileges of a dominant race.
The first and greatest was common to all Mohammedans. They were reputed to be
born soldiers (askery), while non-Mohammedans were called merely burghers
(beledy), and were incapable of entering the army.1
The military force was divided into many bodies,
1 D’Ohsson, Tableau de I’Empire Othoman, Code religieux, vol. ii. p. 268,
folio edition.
r
FEUDAL SELJOUK MILITIA.
41
organised at various periods by different governments, ^ d.
and on opposite systems. But from the period of the ______________________
restoration of the power of the Othoman sultans by Mohammed I., after the
dominion of Timor’s successors in Asia Minor was overthrown, the troops of the
Othoman empire may be classed under the heads of regulars, or those
permanently receiving pay from the sultan, and irregulars, or those who were
bound only to temporary service in the field in time of war. The latter class,
as has been already observed, existed long before the foundation of the Othoman
government. It was composed of the proprietors of landed estates, who had owed
military service for their possessions, either to the Seljouk sultans of Roum
(or Iconium), or to the emirs who established themselves as sultans when that
empire declined, and who were ultimately conquered by the house of Othman. This
feudatory system had formed the earliest military organisation of Othman’s own
possessions, and its sphere was extended by his successors, who continued to
grant new fiefs in all the subsequent conquests of the Othoman armies.1
On the other hand, the aristocracy, which this system created, was
circumscribed in its authority, and deprived of the power of controlling the
sultan through a territorial or Seljouk influence, by the superior military
organisation of the slaves of the Porte. The tribute-children received, from
their civil and military education and organisation, an existence so completely
separated from the old feudal militia, that they formed a complete counterpoise
to the Seljouk nobility both in the cabinet and the camp. Thus, we find Sultan
Mohammed II. in command of an army consisting in part of Seljouk nobles and
Mohammedan gentlemen, like the armies of contemporary Christian monarchs in
western Europe, and in part of a regular force of infantry, cavalry,
1 Theso
fiefs were sipahiliks, timars, ziaraets, and begliks.
42
OTHOMAN DOMINATION.
chap. i. artillery, and
engineers, not unlike the invincible troops of ancient Rome, or the modern
armies of civilised nations. In this way the sultans were able to take the
field with a corps of janissaries, whose exploits have rivalled the deeds of
the Roman legions, and with a host of irregular cavalry of matchless
excellence, furnished by various tribes of Turks, Turkomans, and Kurds, far
superior to the Numidians and the Scythians.
The Janissaries formed the best portion of the regular infantry. They
were the first-fruits of the institution of the tribute-children. In the time
of the conqueror of Constantinople their number only amounted to twelve
thousand, but in the reign of Suleiman the Legislator it had already attained
forty thousand. The first blow which weakened the strength of this redoubtable
corps was struck at its constitution by its own members. When the Janissaries
rebelled, at the accession of Selim II. in 1566, they obtained the right of
enrolling their children as recruits to fill up vacancies in the corps.1
Originally they had not been allowed to marry, but this privilege had been soon
conceded as a favour to those who distinguished themselves by their services,
or who were stationed for a length of time in garrison. After their original
organisation underwent the change consequent on the introduction of hereditary
succession, the numbers of the corps rapidly increased. At the accession of
Mohammed III. in 1598, upwards of one hundred thousand janissaries were found
inscribed on the rolls.2 Until the reign of Murad III., a.d.
1574-95, the majority of the corps had consisted of tribute-children, supplied
by the Christian provinces of the empire.
1 Relationi
di Gioxan Francesco Morosini, quoted by Ranke in The Othoman Umpire, “Military
Forces,” p. 19, Kelly’s Tr.
2 D’Ohsson, Tableau de VEmpire
Othoman, vii. 333, 8vo edit.
OSOl
JANISSARIES.
43
The original constitution of these troops excluded all Mohammedan
citizens from the body. Its members were required to be slaves, reared as an
offering to the Prophet, and their education taught them to regard their
dedication to the propagation of the Mohammedan religion as their highest
privilege, while their strict discipline rendered them the best soldiers in the
world for more than two centuries. If we estimate the value of their education
by the strength of its influence on their minds throughout their lives, we are
compelled to concede to it the highest praise. Few men have ever fulfilled the
duties they were taught to perform in a more effectual manner. The Jesuits in
South America were not more successful missionaries of Christianity than the
janissaries were of Mohammedanism in Christian Europe. Fortunately it is the
nature of despotism to accelerate the corruption even of those institutions
which increase its power, and the janissaries suffered the fate of every body
whose privileges are at variance with the principles of justice, and those
great laws of human progress which impel the mass of mankind towards
improvement. After the year 1578, the number of janissaries' children entitled
to enter the corps became so great that the tribute- children were regarded by
the veterans with jealousy. On the other hand, the insubordination which the
corps often displayed, even under such warlike sultans as Selim I. and Suleiman
the Great, alarmed their more feeble successors, and caused them to adopt the
policy of weakening the military strength of a body that threatened to rule the
empire. The tribute-children were no longer placed in its ranks, nor was the
tribute itself exacted with the former strictness, for the Christian
population began to be regarded as more useful to the State as tax-payers than
as breeders of slaves. The Turkish population in Europe had now increased
44
OTHOMAN DOMINATION.
chap. i. sufficiently to
supply the Porte with all the recruits required for the army. The corps of
janissaries, after it became hereditary, soon transformed itself into a
military corporation, which admitted only the children of janissaries and born
Mussulmans into its ranks. As the pay and privileges of these men were considerable,
it became the habit of the sultan, the officers of the court, and the ministers
of the empire, to reward their followers by introducing them into some of the
odas or battalions of the janissaries. At last, during the reign of Mohammed
IV. (a.d. 1649-1687), the tribute of Christian children ceased to be exacted.
Indeed, for some time before the formal abolition of the tribute, a
comparatively small number of children had been torn from their families, and
these had been employed as household servants of the Sultan and of powerful
pashas.1 Nearly about the same time, the depreciation of the Turkish
money reduced the pay of the janissaries to such a pittance that it was insufficient
to maintain a family in the capital, and married janissaries were allowed to
eke out their means of subsistence by keeping shops and following trades. Their
places in the corps, therefore, generally devolved on men bred to their father
s occupation, and the celebrated army of tribute-children sank into a militia
of city traders, possessing only sufficient military organisation to render
them formidable to their own government and to the peaceful inhabitants of the
empire.2
The regular cavalry was also originally composed of tribute-children. In
the time of Mohammed II. it
1 Rycaut,
Present State of the Othoman Government, book iii. chap. 7. Ranke, Othoman
Empire, p. 20.
2 Compare
the various statements in D’Ohsson, Tableau de VEmpire Othoman, vii. 364, 8vo
edit.; Marsigli, Stato Militare, i. 87; Rycaut, Present State, book iii. chap.
6. Rycaut, speaking of the food and clothing of the janissaries in the latter
half of the seventeenth century, says, “ So their bellies are full and their
backs are warm, and in all points they are better provided than the tattered
infantry which are to be seen in most parts of Christendom."
CAVALRY.
45
was divided into three distinct bodies, and consisted
. , . . 1453-lo84.
of ten thousand men. The sipahis acquired the same ----------------------------------------
pre-eminence among the cavalry which the janissaries held among the
infantry, and their seditious conduct rendered them much sooner troublesome to
the government.1 The organisation and discipline of the regular
cavalry, indeed, was modified at an early period by the continual grants of
fiefs which were conceded to its members. From this circumstance, and from its
frequent seditions, the corps underwent many modifications, and ceased to be
recruited from the. tribute- children at an earlier period than the
janissaries. The spirit of Seljouk feudalism and of nomadic life always
exercised a powerful influence among the cavalry of the Othoman armies ; but it
is not necessary to enter into any details on this subject, as it produced no
very marked effect on the relations between the Sultan's government and his
Christian subjects.
During the most flourishing period of the Othoman empire the tribute of
Christian children supported the whole fabric of the sultan’s power, and formed
the distinguishing feature of the political and military administration of the
Sublime Porte. This singular tribute was first exacted from the Greek race.
Orkhan and Murad I. levied the tithe on the increase of the male population of
the Greeks they subdued, as an offering to the glory and edification of
Mohammedanism—just as the Anglican ecclesiastical establishment exacts the
tithe-pig from the Catholics of Ireland for the benefit of the Church of the
sovereign of the British empire. There is nothing more startling in the long
history of the debasement of the Greek nation, which it has been my melancholy
task to record, than
1 The term sipahi or spahi was subsequently given to
the lowest class of timariots, and in that sense it is generally used. It
originated in the practice of rewarding the regular sipahis with these fiefs.
46
OTHOMAN DOMINATION.
. the apathy with which the Greeks submitted to this inhuman imposition.
It seems to us wonderful to find a people, which even at the lowest ebb of
their political fortunes preserved no inconsiderable degree of literary
culture, displaying an utter indifference to the feelings of humanity, yet
clinging to local interests and selfish prejudices, both civil and religious,
with desperate energy. While their heads were hot with bigotry, their hearts
were cold to the sentiments of philanthropy, and almost without a struggle they
sank into the lowest depths of degradation to which a civilised race has ever
fallen. The Turkish race never made much progress in colonising Europe, even
though the provinces of the Greek empire were almost depopulated at the time
of the conquest. Had the Greeks, therefore, resisted the payment of a human
tribute with any degree of national vigour, they might have saved their
national honour from a stain which will remain as indelible as the glories of
ancient Greece are enduring. Some sentiments of humanity and an ordinary
degree of courage would have sufficed to prevent the Othoman Turks from
acquiring the military renown that surrounds the power of the sultans with a
halo of glory. Extermination ought to have been preferable to the dishonour of
breeding recruits to extend the sway of Mohammedanism. For two centuries the
Greek population, though completely under the guidance of the orthodox clergy,
continued to pay this tribute without much repining. Mohammed II. had so
completely secured the services of the higher clergy by restoring an orthodox
patriarch at Constantinople, that the hierarchy of the Greek church served as
an instrument of Othoman police.
The history of this tax is worthy of attention. The Mohammedan law
authorises, or rather commands, every Mussulman to educate all unbelieving
children
TIUBUTE-CIIILDHEN.
47
who may have legally fallen under his power as true believers, but it
strictly prohibits the forced conversion of any who have attained the age of
puberty.1 The Koran also gives one-fifth of the booty taken in war
to the sovereign. The Seljouk sultans had generally either sold their share of
the spoil, commuted it for a payment in money, or else filled their palaces
with concubines and pages, in virtue of this privilege. The project of
converting this claim into a means of strengthening the executive power was due
to Orkhan, and its organisation as the source of recruiting the regular army to
Murad I., as we have already mentioned. Several sovereigns had previously
formed armies of purchased slaves, in order to secure the command over a
military force more obedient and susceptible of stricter discipline than the
native militia of their dominions. In the sixth century, Tiberius II., Emperor
of the East, when he wished to restore the discipline of the Roman armies,
formed a corps of fifteen thousand heathen slaves, whom he purchased and drilled
to serve as the nucleus of a standing army unconnected with the feelings of the
people, and untainted with the license of the native soldiers. But this attempt
to introduce slavery as an element of military power in Christian society
failed. The system was adopted with more success by the caliphs of Bagdad and
the sultans of Cairo. The Turkish guards of the Abassids, and the Circassian
slaves of the Mamlouk kings, were the best troops among the Mohammedans for
several ages. It is true, they soon proved more dangerous to their sovereigns
than the national militia : nevertheless it was reserved for the Othoman
sultans to found an empire on the strength of a subject-population and the
1 “ If God had so willed it, every man who livetli on
the earth would have believed. Wouldst thou be so mad, 0 mortal, as to seek to
compel thy fellow- creatures to believe ? No; the soul believeth not unless by
the will of God.”
48
OTHOMAN DOMINATION.
chap. i. votaries of a
hostile religion. The plan required a constant supply of recruits of the early
age which admitted of compulsory conversion to Islam.
The tribute of Greek children being once established, officers of the
sultan visited the districts on which it was imposed, every fourth year, for
the purpose of collecting that proportion of the fifth of the male children
who had attained the requisite age. All the little Greeks of the village,
between the ages of six and nine, were mustered by the protogeros, or head man
of the place, in presence of the priest, and the healthiest, strongest, and
most intelligent of the number were torn from their parents, to be educated as
the slaves of the Porte.1 It is not for history to attempt a
description of the agony of fathers, nor to count the 'broken hearts of mothers
caused by this unparalleled tax. The children were carried to Constantinople,
where they were placed in four great colleges, to receive the training and
instruction necessary to fit them for the part they were afterwards to perform
in life. Those who were found least fitted for the public service were placed
in the families of Othoman landed proprietors in Bithy- nia ; those of inferior
capacity were employed as slaves in the serai, as gardeners and guards of the
outer courts of the palaces. But the greater number were trained and
disciplined as soldiers, and drafted into the corps of janissaries and sipahis
of the regular cavalry; while those who displayed the most ability, who
promised to become men of the pen as well as of the sword, were selected to
receive a better education, and destined for
1 The city of Constantinople was exempt from the
tribute; an exemption probably granted by the conqueror in order to facilitate
the assembly of a numerous Greek population within its walls, but which was
used by the Greeks as an argument to prove that the city had surrendered on
capitulation.—Hi$~ toria Patriarchica, p. 167, edit. Bonn ; Turco-Grcecia, p.
162. AVhen L’Isle Adam surrendered Rhodes to Suleiman in 1522, one of the
articles of the capitulation was, that the Greeks of Rhodes were not to be
compelled to supply tribute- childrento the Porte.—De Bello Rhodio,
Fontanus-Lonicerus, i. 425, 8vo ed.;— Xegociations de la France dans le Letant,
i. 92; Vertot, ii. 522.
zed bj- Hfli • : ?f;<
TRIBUTE-CHILD REN.
49
the highest offices in the administration.1 Never was a more
perfect instrument of despotism created by the hand of man. Affection and
interest alike bound the tribute- children to the personal service of the
sultan ; no ties of affection, and no prejudices of rank or of race, connected
them with the feudal landed interest, nor with the oppressed subjects of the
empire.2 They were as ready to strike down the proudest descendant
of the Seljouk emirs, or the Arab who boasted of his purity of blood, as they
were to go forth to plunder the Christian enemies of the sultan, and extend the
domain of Mohammedanism. The Turks formed a dominant race in the Othoman
empire, but the tribute-children were a dominant class even among the Turks.
Mankind has never witnessed a similar instance of such wise combinations
applied to such bad ends, and depraved by such systematic iniquity. It is,
however, manifestly a law of Providence, that immorality and injustice have a
direct effect in developing the principles of decay in political communities.
And history is the science of recording the facts which demonstrate how the
infinite wisdom of God has connected the decay and death of communities with
moral causes. Time can alone determine
1 Chalcocondylas says, p. 121, that the janissaries
had reached the number
of ten thousand in the reign of Murad II. His description of the
education of the Christian children by the Othomans, applies rather to those
carried off at the first conquest of a province, than to the children of the regular
tribute. For the impoi’tance attached to this institution see the various
collections relating to Turkish history in the sixteenth century—Lonicerus, i.
77, 217, 8vo edit.; Sansovino, fol. 33, 80 ; Knolles, A Brief Discourse of the
Greatness of the Turkish Empire, vol. ii. 982, sixth edition. The practice of
filling the highest offices from those who were educated as tribute-children,
secured them so long a preference, that Osman Pasha was not appointed grand
vizier in 1582, merely because he was a Turk by birth. It was argued that he
could not be so devoted to the sultan’s interest as if he had been a young
infidel saved from perdition.—Hammer, Histoire, vii. 125. Mahmoud Pasha, who
was twice grand vizier of Mohammed II., and a scholar and poet as well as a
warrior, was a child of tribute from Greece. Ali Pasha, the grand vizier of
Suleiman the Great, who is praised by Busbequius, was also a child of
tribute.—Hammer, IJistoire, vi. 147. In 1515 Selim I. imposed a tribute of six
hundred children on Nagul Bessaraba, prince of Vallachia.—Hammer, iv. 220, who
quotes Engel Geschichte der Wallachey, 98.
3 Knolles,
General History of the Turks, i. 207.
D
A. D.
1453-1684.
50
OTHOMAN DOMINATION.
chap. i. whether it is
possible so far to eradicate the seeds of immorality and injustice from
political institutions, as to secure a permanent duration to any earthly community.
But it is evident that it can only be attainable by an unceasing vigilance in
the path of reform, individual as well as national; no principle of conservatism
can produce this desirable condition of society. The temporal fortune of
individuals often escapes the consequences of iniquity, for the physical decay
of man is not directly connected with moral deterioration; vice, therefore,
appears to enjoy impunity in many cases, unaffected both by the sense of moral
responsibility, and by the fear of the judgment to come. But the deviations of
governments from moral laws inevitably bring retributive justice on the State.
The history of the Othoman empire affords a striking illustration of this
truth. In no case did injustice so directly confer strength and dominion, and
in none did it ever more evidently produce decline and ruin.
The irregular troops of the Othoman empire were composed chiefly of feudal
cavalry. This militia existed in the Seljouk empire before the ancestors of
Othman entered Asia Minor. Its constitution placed it more under the control of
the central authority, and caused it to be less influenced by class prejudices
and the interests of an armed nobility, than the feudal chivalry of the West.
Until the time of Suleiman the Legislator, the timars or cavalry fiefs were
granted only for life ; and it was rare for the son to obtain his father's
grant of land, which was usually conferred on some veteran as a reward for long
service in the field, or for distinguished valour and capacity. This militia
was divided into three classes, according to the extent of the fiefs. First in
rank were the Sandjak Begs, who were bound to bring into the field more than
twenty well-armed followers on horseback. But many of this
FEUDAL MILITIA.
51
class possessed sucli extensive fiefs that they mustered at times several
thousand horsemen. The second class was the Ziams, who were bound to take the
field with from four to nineteen mounted followers, and who may be compared to
the holders of knight’s fees in feudal Europe. The third class was called
Timariots, and might be bound to take the field alone, or with as many as three
followers. It is not necessary to notice the anomalies which were admitted into
the system. The right of hereditary succession was respected in many districts
where the great Seljouk nobles and Turkoman chiefs had voluntarily submitted to
the Othoman government; and several of these great chieftains, at the
commencement of the present century, could still boast of a princely authority,
which dated from an older period than the dynasty of Othman. But in the case of
the ordinary timariots, ziams, and sandjak begs, the classes remained always too
disconnected, and the right of hereditary succession never received the
universal acknowledgment necessary to admit of the formation of a territorial
aristocracy.
As long as the mass of Mussulman society in the Othoman empire was
pervaded by a military spirit, and new conquests annually brought an increase
of wealth, in the shape of captive slaves and grants of fiefs, the timariots
and begs rushed eagerly to war with well-appointed followers, in order to
secure a large share of the spoil. The harems were often filled with Russian,
Polish, and Austrian ladies, and a great part of Hungary was parcelled out in
fiefs. But when the conquests of the sultans were arrested, and many successive
campaigns were required to defend the territory already conquered, it often
happened that the holders of the smaller fiefs found their resources completely
exhausted. Some were compelled to eke out their contingents with grooms and
pipe-bearers, mounted on
52 OTHOMAN DOMINATION.
chap. i. baggage-mules ;
and others abandoned the army, sacrificed their fiefs, and became cultivators
of the soil to gain a livelihood. Before the time of Suleiman, a timariot who
joined the army with a single follower, brought into the field a companion
well-armed and mounted, who stood by his side in danger, and shared his booty
in success ; but before a century had elapsed, many of the ziams joined the
army with contingents, in which grooms, pipe-bearers, domestic servants, and
cooks were mustered to complete their masters’ following.1 Such militia
was inefficient in the time of war, and it continued to be a means of wasting
the resources of the country in time of peace ; for these men being privileged
to bear arms, would neither attend to agricultural pursuits, nor to any of the
duties of landed proprietors. The personal nature of the tenure by which they
held their estates prevented their devoting any portion of their annual
revenues to improvements promising a distant return. Hence we find a great part
of the land occupied by Othoman proprietors becoming from age to age less
productive, in each successive generation, the buildings becoming more dilapidated;
and gradually a visible decline in the numbers of the Mohammedan population of
the empire begins to be observed. At the present day the traveller in Asia
Minor is often struck by finding a long-deserted mosque in the vicinity of a
cemetery, adorned with numerous marble tombs, surrounded by a tract of country
where there is now no human habitation ; and many fallen bridges and ruined
caravanserais indicate the existence of a degree of activity and prosperity in
past times which has long ceased to exist in the Otho-
1 Rycaut, in the preface to his History of the Turks
from 1679, says,— “ Whilst I was in the camp with them, I found the timariots
very poor, so that they stole from each other their bridles, saddles, lances,
and other necessaries of war, and would excuse themselves by saying, that they
could not do otherwise in so long a war, of more than three years.”
tized by Microsoft
IRREGULAR TROOPS.
53
man empire. A just and inexorable law of society appears to have doomed
the Turkish race to extinction in Europe and Asia Minor, unless it resign its
privileges as a dominant people, and place itself on an equality with the other
races who inhabit the sultan's dominions.
The feudal institutions of the Othoman empire, as they departed much less
from the natural order of society than those of Western Europe, had a longer
duration when transplanted into the Greek provinces. Those of the Latin empire
of Romania disappeared in the third generation, but those of the Othoman empire
survived almost to our own times. The latest traces of the system were swept
away by the Sultan Mahmoud
II., when he destroyed the I)ere
beys, who were the last surviving element of Seljouk society.1 He
has often been accused of an erroneous policy in not endeavouring to
reinvigorate and restore the institutions of his Mohammedan subjects in Asia
Minor. Those, however, who are familiar with the changes which time has made
in the state of property in the East, know well that it would have been no less
futile than to attempt restoring the feudal system in France or Germany. The
military organisation of the Mohammedan landed proprietors had passed away as
irrevocably as that of our Christian knights and barons.
Besides the feudal militia, the armies of the sultan received a
considerable addition of irregular troops from the numerous bodies of soldiers
maintained by the pashas in their respective governments. Some remarkable
instances of the immense numbers of
1 Lord
Byron has an allusion to the feudal system of Turkey in the Bride of Abydvs,
but he has infused into it a Western train of thought: —
“ We Moslems reck not much of blood ;
But yet the line of Karasman,
Unchanged, unchangeable, hath stood First of the bold Timariot bands That
won and well can keep their lands.”
A. D.
1453-1684.
I
54
OTHOMAN DOMINATION.
chap. i. armed followers
maintained in tlie households of great officers of the empire during the reign
of Suleiman the Legislator, deserve notice as illustrations of the state of
society at the acme of the Othoman power. The defterdar Iskender Tchelebi, who
was put to death in the year 1535, had upwards of six thousand slaves,
consisting chiefly of captives torn from their parents at an early age, many of
whom were of Greek origin. These slaves were educated in his household in a
manner not very dissimilar to that adopted in the serai of the sultan for the
tribute-children. The greater part was in due time formed into bodies of
troops, and served in the Othoman armies ; many received a learned education,
and were trained to enter the political and financial departments of the administration.
The superiority of their education is proved by the fact, that when they passed
into the sultan's household after their master s execution, several rose to the
highest offices of the State, and no less than seven of these purchased slaves
of Iskender Tchelebi attained the rank of vizier. Mohammed Sokolli, the
celebrated grand vizier of Suleiman at the time of that great sultan's death,
was one of the number. The celebrated Barbarossa, who died in 1544, left two
thousand household slaves ; and the widow of Mohammed Sokolli possessed nine
hundred slaves, all of Christian parentage, in the year 1582.1
It would be difficult to enumerate all the anomalies that existed in the
military forces of the Othoman empire. They varied in different provinces, and
in the same province, from age to age.2 It is only
1 Hammer,
Histoire, v. 224, 388 ; vii. 157.
2 The
practical method of maintaining military efficiency and strict discipline,
without the martinet’s love of uniformity, gave a pleasing variety to the
punishments in the army. The janissaries received their bastinado on the
buttocks, as their feet were in constant requisition for the performance of
their service ; but the sipahis received their punishment on the soles of their
feet, for when lifted on their horses they could still keep their plaice in the
ranks.
CHRISTIAN TROOPS.
55
necessary here to notice those deviations from the general system which
influenced the Greek population. The Porte found it often advisable to adopt
different arrangements in Europe, where the majority of its subjects were
Christians, from those established in Asia Minor, where the Mohammedan
population was all-powerful. One remarkable deviation from the law which
reserved all military power as an exclusive privilege of the true believers is
to be found in the employment of Christian troops by various sultans. It was
commenced by Orkhan himself, when he laid the foundations of the Othoman power.
Motives of policy induced him to make every effort to secure the support of the
Greek mountaineers of Bithynia, whose military spirit is often vaunted by the
Byzantine historians, in order to oppose them to the Seljouk emirs in his
vicinity. Orkhan, consequently, formed a corps of Greeks, consisting of one
thousand cavalry and one thousand infantry.1 When his son, Murad I.,
however, had increased and improved the corps of janissaries, these Christian
troops were only employed in collecting the taxes and the tribute of Christian
children. Still, even at later periods, after it was recognised as a law of the
empire that Mohammedans alone should bear arms, the Christians continued to act
both as pioneers and as auxiliaries. Ibrahim, the grand vizier of Suleiman,
employed them as gendarmes for the protection of the unarmed rayahs against the
disorderly conduct of the Turkish irregulars ;2 and Christians were
generally admitted to form a portion of the contingents of Servia and Albania.
Indeed, down to the commencement of the Greek revolution, a Christian
gendarmerie was maintained by the Porte
1 Compare Pachymeres, i. 129,
and Hammer, Staatsveifassung und Staatsrer- waltung, i. 53.
2 D’Ohsson, Tableau de VEmpire
Othoman, vii. 385 ; Hammer, Histoire, vii. 356. Compare also Staatsver/assung, i. 171, and ii. 276.
CHAP. I.
56 OTHOMAN DOMINATION.
in the mountain districts of Macedonia, Epirus, and Greece ; and at the
present day, Albanian Christians are serving with the Othoman armies on the
banks of the Danube. Besides the troops furnished by the immediate subjects of
the sultan, large contingents of Christians from the tributary states have
borne an important part in the Othoman wars from the earliest periods of their
history. The defeat of Bayezid I. by Timor at Angora is generally attributed by
native historians to the flight of the Servian auxiliaries.1
The military strength of the Othoman empire began to decline from the
period when the sultans ceased to take the field at the head of their armies.
The absolute power necessary to imprint energy on every movement of its
complicated administration could not be safely intrusted to the grand vizier,
so that even the most effeminate of the sultans, who lived secluded in the
harem, and associated almost exclusively with women and eunuchs, frequently
controlled the acts of the divan, and rendered the arrangements of the
government subservient to the intrigues of the palace. Another evil followed
which soon produced incalculable demoralisation in the public service. When
the sultans ceased to hold constant communication with the military and civil
servants of the Porte, they lost the power of judging of their merits. Viziers
were enabled to advance their personal adherents over the heads of the ablest
administrators and bravest soldiers in the empire ; and favourites
1 By the
first treaty between the Othomans and the Servians in 1375 or 1376, Lazaros,
krall of Servia, engaged to furnish Murad I. with an auxiliary corps of one
thousand cavalry, besides paying one thousand lb. of silver annually as
tribute. The second treaty between Stephen of Servia and Bayezid I. was
concluded in 1389.—Ducas, 6 ; Hammer, Histoire, i. 295. The Servian auxiliary
corps was subsequently increased to two thousand men, when Bayezid was making
every effort to meet Timor. This number has been magnified into twenty
thousand, and doubtless the whole numbers of the armies of Timor and Bayezid
have been exaggerated in the same proportion. It is singular to find how
readily historians adopt fables in place of truth.
DECLINE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM. 57
reared in the palace could easily, by securing the favour of the sultan,
or the chief of the eunuchs, obtain the highest offices in the State, without
possessing any of the qualifications required for the performance of its
duties. The Othoman empire followed the usual steps of other despotisms in its
progress from corruption to decline ; and the selection of ignorant and
unsuitable ministers, generals, and admirals was facilitated by the fatalism of
the Mohammedans. The populace, who judged the grand viziers and highest
dignitaries of the empire rather by their individual temper and personal
conduct than by the policy of their administration, often showed
dissatisfaction at the measures of those grand viziers who had enjoyed the
highest reputation before entering on office. The apparent contradiction
between the behaviour of the ablest men in different circumstances and
positions, at last induced the people to infer that human intelligence alone
was insufficient to guide a sovereign in selecting fit ministers. The
religious element was always powerful in the Mohammedan population ; and it
became the feeling of the people that it was better to trust in God than in
man. It was a sincere confidence in that divine protection which had raised the
Othoman empire to its unexampled pitch of power and glory that gave currency to
the popular saying,— “AVhere God gives an employment, He bestows the qualities
it requires.”
There was one evil in the Othoman administration which could only be
restrained by the constant personal attention of the sultan. Venality was,
from an early period, the prevalent vice in the civil and judicial
administration of the empire. Yet, though the interest of the sovereign was
directly opposed to this inherent vice of the administration, avarice in-
A. D.
1453-1684.
58
OTHOMAN DOMINATION.
chap. i. duced many sultans
to become participators in its fruits, and the court became as deeply tainted
with the corruption as the government. The practice of the sovereign receiving
a present whenever he conferred an office, gradually introduced the system of
selling every office to the highest bidder. The venality of the Othoman
officials was great even before the taking of Constantinople. The avarice of
Khalil, the grand vizier of Mohammed II., is notorious, and it cost him his
life. Before one half of the reign of Mohammed II. had elapsed, the patriarchs
of Constantinople purchased their rank by paying a sum of money to the Porte.1
Khotshibeg, who wrote a work on the causes of the decline of the Othoman
empire, dates its decay from the time of Suleiman the Legislator, and
attributes it to the great increase of venality which then took place.2
Rustem, the grand vizier of Suleiman, dropped the veil which had concealed the
extent of this corruption in the general administration. He openly put up every
office for sale at a fixed price, and declared publicly that money was the
object most eagerly sought for by the Porte. To increase the public revenues of
the State, he farmed the taxes to Jews and Greeks. By his venality and
exactions Rustem accumulated a fortune of two hundred thousand gold ducats of
annual revenue.3 In a state of society where riches were all
powerful, his example was irresistible. The two other causes of decline
indicated by Khotshibeg are, the habit adopted by Suleiman of absenting
himself from the ordinary meetings of the divan, which were held four times
every week, and of naming his personal favourites to the highest offices in the
State,
1 Ilistoria
Patriarchica, “ Turco-Grsocia,” 124.
2 He wrote
during the reign of Murad IV., a.d. 1623-40.—Hammer, Histoire, vi. 281.
3 Hammer,
Histoire, vi. 284.
VENALITY.
59
without their having acquired the experience requisite for the
performance of their duty by a long and active career of service. The
nomination of Ibrahim, the grand falconer of Sultan Suleiman, to the office of
grand vizier, accelerated the decline of the administrative organisation.
After the reign of Suleiman, justice grew every day more venal. Judicial
offices were as openly sold as administrative; and, except when the army was engaged
in active service, all promotion, even in the military service, was obtained by
the payment of a bribe. The veteran janissaries languished, forgotten or
neglected, in the frontier garrisons of Buda and Bagdat; while the sons of shopkeepers
in the capital, and the followers of pashas, whose public duties had been confined
to police service—to maintaining order in the markets, to guarding the persons
of foreign ambassadors, or standing sentinel at the city gates—were allowed to
purchase the highest military commands. This corruption soon became incurable,
for it pervaded the whole body of the Othoman officials, who, as we have
already observed, formed a class of men too completely separated from the mass
of the population to be under the influence of its moral sympathies. The conviction
of the members of the government that they were not amenable to public opinion,
and owed no responsibility to the people, very naturally led to the exactions
and oppressions which render Turkish history a continual record of revolts and
rebellions. There was no hope of punishing the iniquities of a pasha, except
by the arbitrary action of the Sultan’s power. It was necessary to slay the
accused, for to obtain his condemnation by any tribunal which could take cognisance
of his crimes was almost hopeless. The suffering people had little hope of
redress, if compelled to bring their complaints before the divan, for every
60
OTHOMAN DOMINATION.
chap. i. member of that
body felt that he was himself liable to be exposed to similar accusations. The
condition of the sultan’s Christian subjects bore a strong resemblance, in
this point, to that of the Roman provincials in the time of the republic, who
had no great chance of redress when they sought for justice against the
tyrannical and oppressive conduct of a proconsul, as their complaints required
to be laid before a senate in which proconsuls possessed an overwhelming
influence. Yet, we must not condemn the Othoman empire in the time of Suleiman
without comparing the state of its administration with that of contemporary
Christian governments. The sale of offices was then very general in Europe,
and we find it adopted by the papal court, towards the end of the sixteenth
century, as a regular method of recruiting the finances. The abuse was carried
quite as far by the pope as by the sultan.1 It was the inherent
defects in the judicial administration of the Mohammedans which rendered the
venality of public employments more injurious to the State at Constantinople
than at Rome. This abuse, however, had no inconsiderable effect in producing
the degraded social condition of the papal dominions existing at the present
day.
In the reign of Suleiman the Great, the wealth of the Othoman empire far
exceeded that of any other European state. The annual income of the sultan was
generally estimated at 12,000,000 ducats, while the revenues of Charles V.,
from all his wide-extended dominions, never exceeded 6,000,000 ; yet the Netherlands
and the richest parts of Italy were included in the Spanish empire.2
At that period many parts of
1 Ranke,
History of the Popes in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries, Kelly’s Tr.,
102, 118.
2 Hammer, Ilistoire, vi. 510;
Ranke, Spanish Empire, chap. 4. Our Henry VII., a. d. 1509, left a treasure of
£1,800,000. — Hallam, Constitutional History, i. 12. Hume, chap. xxxvii., says
the revenues of England in the time of Mary were about £300,000. Hallam, Middle
Ages, i. 265, gives an esti-
DECLINE OF THE MILITARY POWER. 61
Asia Minor, Macedonia, and Thrace, which are now ^a.d.^
almost deserted, were cultivated by an active population. _____________ '
Venice drew large supplies of wheat from the Othoman dominions, and
during the greater part of the two centuries which followed the conquest of
Constantinople, both the Othoman and the Greek population of the empire
increased considerably. It was not until the middle of the seventeenth century
that the incessant extortions of the pashas, who became partners with the
farmers of taxes in their pashalics, encroached so far on the accumulated
capital of the preceding period as to diminish the resources, and, ultimately,
the numbers of the population.1
As the power of the Othoman empire reposed on its military strength, the
internal decay of the government produced little change on its position, with
reference to the Christian states of Europe, until the number and discipline
of its troops were sensibly diminished.
It was long before this happened. In the moral conduct of the soldiers
and in the public police of the army, a Turkish camp, until a late period,
displayed a marked superiority over the military forces of contemporary
Christian sovereigns. This superiority was one of the most efficient causes of
the long career of victory of
mate of the forces of the European powers in 1454, and of their revenues
in 1415, which prove how little authentic information on these subjects can be
extracted even from contemporary historians.
1 It would be impossible to give a complete account
of the financial resources and monetary condition of society in the Othoman
empire, without more accurate information than we possess, concerning the
quantity of the precious metals which was annually put in circulation from the
produce of the mines in the sultan’s dominions during the latter half of the
fifteenth and the early part of the sixteenth centuries. The sum must have been
considerable, with reference to prices, at that period. In Europe, very
productive mines were worked in Macedonia, Servia, and Bosnia; and in Asia,
those of Bakyr Kuresi, near Ineboli, had yielded large revenues to the emirs of
Sinope, and those of Gumiish Khaneli to the emperors of Trebizond, while
various productive silver mines were worked in the mountains which extend from
Angora to Tokat, separating the ancient Galatia from Paphlagonia and Pontus.
Besides this, several very rich mines of copper and lead afforded large
returns, and these metals were often exported in considerable quantities to
Western Europe, as well as to Syria, Egypt, and Northern Africa.
62
OTHOMAN DOMINATION.
chap. i. the Othoman armies.
Before the sultan’s armies entered on a campaign, the regular troops,
janissaries, sipahis, and artillerymen, received a part of their pay in
advance, that they might jmrchase the necessaries required before taking the
field. During the campaign they were paid with regularity, and the strictest
discipline was maintained on the march, in order to insure the establishment
of markets at every halt and the attendance of numerous suttlers in the camp.
Of their superiority in military science we have also many testimonies.1
We possess two remarkable testimonies in favour of the order and
discipline which prevailed at the headquarters of Othoman armies by Christian
writers, well acquainted with the Turkish troops, and neither of them
favourably disposed towards the Othoman government. There is an interval of
two centuries between the periods at which they wrote, and both were eyewitnesses
of the facts they describe. The first was the Greek Chalcocondylas, who lived
in the middle of the fifteenth century; the other was the Englishman Bycaut,
who resided in Turkey in the latter half of the seventeenth. Chalcocondylas, in
describing the invasion of the Morea by Sultan Murad II., in the year 1445,
praises the discipline of the Othoman army as incomparably superior to that of
contemporary Christian powers. He mentions that it secured ample supplies in
the camp-markets by paying regularly and liberally for provisions, and by this
means relieved the commanders from the necessity of detaching large bodies of
men to forage. The historian says that he
1 Negotiations de la France dans
le Levant, i. 566, 567. “ Les Turcs, ayant, par merveilleuse liabilete et
expertise, paracheve leurs fortifications non loin du camp.” And “ Le Marquis
du Guast visitant Nice et regardant les ouvrages des Turcs, s’emerveilloit
tellement de leur artifice k drdcir remparts, qu’il con- fessoit que nos gens
luy sembloit de beaucoup inferieurs en telles choses aupres des barbares.” This was in 1543, when the Sultan Suleiman sent troops to Marseilles to
defend France against her invaders.
V
DISCIPLINE LONG MAINTAINED. G3
liacl never heard of armies in which such order was preserved. Though the
suttlers were accompanied by immense trains of mules, laden with provisions and
stores of every kind, there was no confusion. A spot was assigned for their
tents, and the soldiers always found a well-stocked market in the vicinity of
the camp.1 It is true these suttlers derived as large a part of
their profits from the slave-trade as from the sale of supplies to the troops
and the purchase of the rest of their booty. Accordingly, when the number of
captives made in war decreased, and the slave-trade became less profitable in
the Othoman camps, the difficulty of supplying the troops was considerably increased.
Still, the viziers regarded it as the first of their military duties to see
that their soldiers were well supplied, and that discipline was strictly
enforced.
Sir Paul Bycaut, who resided in the Othoman empire for eighteen years,
seven of which he passed at Constantinople as secretary of the English
ambassador, and eleven at Smyrna as consul, describes the army of the Grand
Vizier, which he visited at Belgrade in the year 1665, in the following words: “In
the Turkish camp no brawls, quarrels, or clamours are heard; no abuses are
committed on the people by the march of the army ; all is bought and paid for
with money as by travellers that are guests at an inn. There are no complaints
of mothers of the rape of their virgin daughters, no violences or robberies
offered to the inhabitants ; all which order tends to the success of their
armies, and to the enlargement of their empire/’ 2
While this system of military discipline was enforced as a means of increasing
the efficiency of the regular
1 Chalcocondylas,
p. 182, edit. Par. Medieval Greece, p. 294.
2 The
Present State of the Othoman Empire, by Sir P. Rycaut, book iii. ch. xi. See also Thevenot, J., Relation d’un Voyage fait au
Levant, {Voyages), ed. Amst., i. 225 : “ Coinme ils paient fort exactement ce
qu’ils prennent, et ne font aucun desordre, ni ne volent par la campagne, on
apporte tout au camp comme & un marchg ordinaire.”
A. D.
1453-1684.
64 OTHOMAN DOMINATION. -
chap. i. army, the peaceful
provinces of the empire were exposed to be plundered by pashas and their
households when travelling to their governments, almost as if they were
inhabited by a hostile population. Every great officer had a right to demand
lodging and provisions at the charge of the districts through which he passed
on the public service. This right became a source of incredible exactions, as
the venality of the imperial officials increased with constant impunity. We may
form some faint idea of the extent to which the oppression of the sultan's
officers was carried by calling to mind the extortions exercised under the
authority of the royal prerogative of purveyance in feudal England, after it
was acknowledged to be the country in which the best protection for individual
property had been established. We find, even as late as the reign of James I.,
the English parliament declaring, that though the king's prerogative of
purveyance had been regulated by not less than thirty-six statutes, still the
royal purveyors imprisoned men for refusing to surrender their property, lived
at free quarters, and felled wood without the owner’s consent.1 The
abuses which originated in the right of every petty officer in Turkey to claim
lodging and provisions, at the expense of the town or village at which he might
find it convenient to halt, became at last so great a burden to the agricultural
population near some of the principal roads, that the villagers abandoned their
dwellings, and emigrated to the most secluded valleys in the mountains.2
But long after the immediate vicinity of most of the great highways had
been depopulated by the exactions
1 Hallam’s
Constitutional History of England, i. 223. The tyrannical abuse of the
prerogative of purveyance, though restrained by Magna Charta, was not abolished
until the reign of Charles II.; 12 Car. II., c. 24.
2 Several
examples of the abuses caused by the license of official travellers will be
found in Voyage en Turquie et en Perse, parM. Otter, in 1734, vol. i. pp. 47,
54, 68. Yet Otter praises the good order and excellent police which then
existed at Constantinople, a city of 800,000 inhabitants.—Page 9.
L-y 1'
OTHOMAN ARMY IN 1715. 65
of pashas and tax-gatherers, discipline continued to be strictly enforced
at the headquarters of the armies of the Othoman empire. As late as the year
1715, when the grand vizier (Ali Kumurgee) conquered the Morea from the
Venetians, the exactitude with which the Turkish cavalry paid for the fodder,
which was brought to the camp from a distance and sold at a high price, excited
the wonder of Monsieur Brue, the French interpreter of the embassy at
Constantinople, who accompanied the expedition.1 But after that
period even the discipline of the Othoman armies in the field declined with
great rapidity.
From the preceding sketch of the military establishments of the Othoman
empire, it is evident that the conquests of the sultans were the result of a
wise organisation, and of a system of education and discipline which formed a
superior class of men as soldiers and officers, much more than from any
overwhelming superiority of numbers. The vices of mankind were taken into
requisition in order to recruit the army and give it additional strength. The
lives and property of the Christians were valued chiefly in the proportion in
which they contributed to increase the numbers of the sultan’s troops, and to
fill the coffers of his treasury.
Such were the most prominent features of the government to which the
Greeks were subjected for several centuries. Yet, with all the vices of the
sultans’ administration, it may be doubted whether any contemporary Christian
government would have treated an alien and heretical race, which it had
conquered, with less severity and injustice.
1 Journal de la Campagne que le grand vizier Ali Pasha a faite en 1715
pour la Conquite de la Morie, original MS. in the Author’s possession,
purchased at a sale of Oriental MSS. in Paris in 1843. M. Brue, a relation of Voltaire, is mentioned in the History of Charles
XII., livre v. Some notices concerning him will be found in the Nouvelle Revue
Encyclopedique, Fevrier 1847, Didot; Journal inedit de Galland. The fact cited
in the text is noted by M. Brue as a justification of the high price at which
barley for his horses is charged in his accounts.
CHAPTER II.
THE NAVAL CONQUESTS OF THE OTHOMANS IN GREECE.
A.D. 1453-1684.
Decline
of the Greek population during this period—Effects of the Othoman
conquest—Extent of country inhabited bt the Greek race which remained under the
domination of the Latin Christians
AFTER THE CONQUEST — CONQUEST OF MyTILENE—VENETIAN
WAR, A.D.
1463-1479—Conquest of the dominions of
Leonardo di Tocco— Venetian war, a.d. 1499-1502—Conquest of Rhodes—Invasion of the Morea by Andrea Doria—Venetian
war, a.d. 1537-1540—Conquest of
Chios—Extinction of the duchy of Naxos—Conquest of Cyprus—Battle of Lepanto,
a.d. 1571—State of the Greek
population, a.d. 1573-1644—Maritime
warfare, and piracies in the Grecian seas — Knights of Malta — Knights of St Stefano, and navy of Tuscany—Exploits of the Othoman
navy—Depopulation of the coasts of Greece by the maritime expeditions of the
Christian powers — Ravages of the Cossacks in the Black Sea—War of Candia, a.d. 1645-1669 — Subjugation of Maina — Apostacy of
Christians.
During the period which
elapsed from the conquest of Constantinople to the conquest of the Morea by the
Venetians, towards the end of the seventeenth century, the Greek nation
declined both in civilisation and numbers. The Hellenic race had never fallen
so low in the social scale at any previous period of its history. It may
possibly have incurred greater danger of extermination in its native regions,
during the dark age which followed the Sclavonian colonisation of the
Peloponnesus at the end of the sixth century ; but at that time, though the
valleys of the Sperchius and the Eurotas, and the plains of Thebes, Sparta, and
Olympia, were occupied by Sclavonian
t
EFFECTS OF OTHOMAN CONQUEST.
67
invaders, the principal cities of Greece, the islands in the Grecian
seas, and a large part of western Asia, were still densely inhabited by a
numerous and wealthy Greek population, whose commercial activity, municipal
administration, and legal civilisation, joined to the advantages resulting
from the accumulation of capital, during a long series of ages, in roads,
bridges, aqueducts, ports, quays, cisterns, fortresses, public granaries, and
private warehouses, enabled Leo the Isaurian to restore the Roman empire in its
Byzantine form, and reorganise a state which for four centuries was the most
civilised portion of the world. The Greek empire of Constantinople, recovered
from the Crusaders, became, it is true, such a scene of anarchy that the
Othoman conquest brought relief to the Greek people ; but in giving peace and
tranquillity to Greece, the Othoman government gradually rendered it a desert,
and the rude cultivators of the soil, whether of Hellenic or Albanian blood,
erased from its surface almost every monument of earlier and better times.1
Even the relief from the evils of war was rather apparent than real. The
continent was generally tranquil, but the sea was always insecure, and the
repeated interruptions of commerce cut off the inland producer from every
market, and put an end to production. The Othoman government also extended its
domination very slowly over the Greek islands; and it was not until the power
of the empire had shown signs of decline that the supremacy of the Porte was
completely established in the Archipelago by the conquest of Candia. But my
duty as historian of the Greeks, and the space within which I must confine my
work, compel me to renounce the hope of rendering my pages attractive by
recounting the martial deeds of the victors, and paying honour to the
desperate valour of the
1 “ Ubi solitudinem faciunt, pacem
adpellant.”—Tacitu.s, Agricolce Vita.
68 NAVAL CONQUESTS OF THE
OTHOMANS.
chap. ii. vanquished, in
the naval wars of the Turks and the Western nations. I must leave this theme to
the historians of the Othoman empire, and of the Christian States who opposed
its progress. While they describe the courage of the tribute-children in the
field, their
patience in the trenches, and their daring in the new sphere of fighting
on the deck of the galley, I must turn from the strange fate of these Greek
children, who left the homes of their fathers with blooming faces, to consider
the results of their victories and defeats on the fortunes of their parental
race and ancestral religion. It is not even my privilege to dwell on the
gallant deeds of the Christian chivalry that bathed every shore of Greece in
blood, warring to arrest the progress of Moslem conquest. The exploits of the
proud Knights of St John, and of the prouder nobles of Venice, who made the
sieges of Bhodes, Famagosta, and Candia, rivals in fame to those of Plataea,
Syracuse, and Carthage, do not fall within the scope of my pages. In the
glories of the Latin Christians the Greeks had no share, and with the Catholics
they had no sympathies. In Greece, the domination of the Papists had been more
galling, if not more oppressive, than that of the Mohammedans. The prominent
feature in the history of the Greek people, during the period which elapsed
from the conquest of the Morea by Mohammed II. in 1460, to its conquest by the
Venetians in 1686, is the misery inflicted on the inhabitants of every coast
accessible to the corsairs, whether Mohammedans or Christians, who swarmed in
the Levant. The unparalleled rapacity of these pirates devastated the maritime
districts to such a degree that, even at the present day, many depopulated
plains and ruined castles on the coasts of the Archipelago still indicate the
fear which was long felt of dwelling near the sea.
Most of the Christian princes in the East became
■r
POSSESSIONS OF CATHOLIC POWERS. G9
tributary to Mohammed II. on hearing of the conquest 14^-®-g4
of Constantinople. The Genoese of Galata, the despot _____________________ ’
of Servia, the Greek despots in the Peloponnesus, the emperor of
Trebizond, the republics of Venice and Eagusa, the duke of Naxos, and the
signors of Mytilene and Chios, all solicited his alliance and purchased his
favour. His subsequent campaigns soon united all the territory governed by
orthodox princes to the Othoman empire ; but even after he had completed his
continental conquests, no inconsiderable portion of the territory occupied by
the Greek race still continued subject to Catholic powers. Venice retained
possession of the fortresses of Argos, Nauplia, Thermisi, Monemvasia, Coron,
and Modon, in the Peloponnesus, and of the great islands of Euboea, Corfu, and
Crete, to which Cyprus was soon added. The dukes of Naxos and several signors
held various islands of the Archipelago, which they governed as petty sovereigns.
Leu- cadia, Cephalonia, Ithaca, and Zante, were ruled by Leonardo di Tocco, who
assumed the vain title of Despot of Arta, Duke of Leucadia, and Count of Cephalonia.1
Genoa, after the loss of her commercial stations in the Black Sea, continued to
exercise considerable influence in the Archipelago as sovereign of Chios, which
was held by a Genoese joint-stock company, and as protector of the signors of
Mytilene. The Knights of St John possessed Rhodes, Kos, and several smaller
islands, as well as the fortress of Bodroun or Halicarnassus. Cyprus was still
governed by the house of Lusignan, with the proud title of Kings of Cyprus,
Jerusalem, and Armenia ; but the republic of Venice was already preparing to
receive their inheritance, while various European monarclis have the folly to
assume the empty title at the present day. It is strange to see how slowly
common sense mounts to
1 Buchon, Recherches Non relies, i. 322.
70 NAVAL CONQUESTS OF THE
OTHOMANS.
• the heads of princes. This
disjointed condition of the Greek nation explains the utter absence of all
national political action, or even feeling, among the Greeks during the three
following centuries.
The conquests of Mohammed II. diminished the numbers of the Greeks, and
degraded their condition as orthodox Christians. Several generations of peace,
and a degree of security and tranquillity, which Greece never obtained, would
have been necessary in order to restore the accessories of material
civilisation on private property, as well as to replace the bridges, aqueducts,
and ports which had fallen to ruin under the disgraceful administration of the
Greek emperors. But, for the greater part of Greece, this period of security
and improvement never came; and at the present day, the greater part of the
Greek kingdom is unable to maintain a larger population than in the fifteenth
century. The translocations of the inhabitants of many places by Mohammed II.,
which I have mentioned in my preceding volumes, caused a great destruction of
property and an immense loss of life.1 The same system was continued
in the succeeding conquests of the Othomans, and the inhabitants of every city
or island which Mohammed II. annexed to his dominions during his long and
active reign, were treated with as great severity as the people of the Morea,
and expatriated in considerable numbers.
The signor of Mytilene was the first of the Catholic princes whom
Mohammed II. conquered. The Genoese family of Gattilusio had possessed the rich
and fertile island of Lesbos for more than a century ; and at this period the
islands of Lemnos, Thasos, Imbros, and Samothrace were governed by them, and
they possessed an interest in the profitable alum-works of
1 Byzantine
History, ii. 646, 651. Medieval Greece and Trebizond, 314, 493. '
CONQUEST OF MYTILENE, A.D. 1462.
71
Phocsea, and in part of the territory of Ainos.1 These
dominions were gradually annexed to the Othoman empire. New Phocsea was
conquered in 145G, and great part of its Greek population reduced to slavery,
so that the place never recovered its commercial importance. Ainos suffered
the same fate. In the following year, Lemnos, Imbros, Samothrace, and Thasos
were finally annexed to Mohammed’s dominions. The best and wealthiest part of
their inhabitants were removed to Constantinople, the youngest and healthiest
individuals were sold as slaves, and only the poorest of the Greek peasantry
remained to cultivate the soil. No person who had the means of establishing
himself in the capital as a useful citizen, or the strength and beauty requisite
to insure a ready sale in the slave- market, escaped deportation, unless he was
fortunate enough to conceal himself in the mountains until the departure of the
Othoman fleet.2
In the year 1462, Mohammed put an end to the government of the signors of
Lesbos. He had good reason to complain of the shelter which the excellent ports
in their dominions afforded to the Catalan, Italian, and Sicilian pirates who
infested the entrance of the Dardanelles. These adventurers made a profitable
business, not only by the capture of Turkish ships, but likewise by surprising
Turks on shore, whom, if wealthy, they ransomed for money, and if poor they
sold as slaves to labour at the oar in European ships. The signor of Mytilene
had probably no power to suppress this piracy, even had he possessed the wish.
The sultan resolved to effect it. The last signor of Mytilene
1 Francis
Gattilusio married Maria, sister of the Emperor John V. (Paleo- logos), and
received Lesbos as a reward for his services against Cantacuzenos in
1355.—Byzantine Greece, ii. 573. For a list of the signors of Mytilene, see
Appendix, ii. 413.
2 Compare
Ducas, 333, 335, edit. Bonn.; and Chalcocondylas, 250, edit. Par. lQppu>peuoL
Ka\ ano Trjs Aeatov oi re TapaKwwrjaioi ctt\
Xrjreiav Kara Bakarrau.—Chalcocondylas, 277, edit. Par.
72 NAVAL CONQUESTS OF THE
OTHOMANS.
• was Nicolas Gattilusio. He
had slain his elder brother Dominicus to gain possession of the government, yet
he hardly made a show of resisting Mohammed ; and, after surrendering his
capital, endeavoured to gain the favour of his conqueror by embracing Islam.
Sultan Mohammed, who despised his cowardice, and knew that his conversion was
produced by the hope of enjoying a life of luxurious ease, rewarded him with
the bow-string, and confiscated his property. The conquest of Mytilene brought
ruin on the Greek inhabitants of the island, though they had been eager and
active in transferring their allegiance from the Catholics to the Mohammedans.
One third were sold into slavery in order to raise money to reward the Othoman
troops; one third were transported to Constantinople ; and the remaining
third, consisting of the lowest order of the townsmen and the poorest class of
cultivators, were left to till the soil, and collect the abundant harvests of
the vineyards and olive-groves.1 From this time the inhabitants of
Mytilene have been proverbially one of the most degenerate communities among
the modern Greeks. Their malice and falsehood are linked in a rhyming proverb,
with the aversion generally entertained for the inhabitants of Athens and
Thebes, where a large proportion of the population, consisting of Albanians,
lived in a state of separation from Greek sympathies.2
During the war between Sultan Mohammed and Venice, which lasted from
1463tol479, the hostile fleets ravaged many of the wealthiest parts of Greece.
The galleys of the King of Naples, of the Pope, and of the Catalan cities,
cruised in the Archipelago under the
i Ducas (Italian translation),
512, edit. Bonn. Chalcocondylas, 280, edit. Par.
2 ’Adrjvaioi kcu QtjGcuoi Kai KdKoi
MiTvXrjvaioi,
*AXXa Xeyovv to fipabv
Kt’aXXa Kafivovv to to\v.
DEPOPULATION OF GREECE.
73
pretence of assisting the Christians, but they plundered the property of
the Greek subjects of the Porte on the coasts of Europe and Asia, whenever they
found any booty undefended. In the year 1463, a Greek priest betrayed Argos to
the Mohammedans; and in the war which followed, the Venetian possessions in
Greece were ravaged by the Othomans, and the Greek subjects of the republic
carried off into slavery in such number as to depopulate the districts round
Nauplia, Modon, and Lepanto.1 The unfortunate campaign of 1463 deprived
the Venetians of all chance of conquering the Morea. Their attempt to take
Corinth was unsuccessful, and they were unable to defend the fortifications
they had constructed across the isthmus. The Othoman troops defeated the
Venetians, and either put to the sword, or made slaves of, all the Greeks and
Albanians in the Morea whom they had induced to take up arms.2
While the Othoman army depopulated the Venetian possessions on the
continent, the ships of the republic plundered the coasts of the sultan’s
dominions. The miserable inhabit ants of Lemnos, Ain os, and Phocsea, were
robbed of all the Turks had left them. Passagio, a great mercantile depot of
neutral trade, situated on the continent opposite Chios, afforded the Venetian
fleet a rich booty in 1472, but the loss fell chiefly on the Genoese.3
The Othoman galleys, manned by Jews, Greeks, and Turks, were generally far
inferior to the Venetians in naval efficiency.4 These desultory
operations impoverished the Greek cities, and diminished
1 Chalcocondylas,
294, edit. Par.
2 Chalcocondylas,
298, edit. Par. The Albanian chief, Peter the Lame, a leader in the great
revolt against the Greeks in 1454, -was one of the partisans of Venice. See
Medieval Greece and Trebizond, 300.
3 Cepione
ddle cose fatte da Pietro Mocenxco, p. 4—a rare work, the knowledge of which I
owe to Zinkeisen, Geschickte des Osmanischen Reiches, ii. 403. See also Brunet, Manuel du Libraire, “ Cepio.”
4 Muratori, Rerum Jtalicarum
Scriptores, tom. xxii. Marino Sanuto, p.
1170.
74 NAVAL CONQUESTS OF THE
OTHOMANS.
• the numbers of the Greek
population, but they were unable to arrest the progress of the Othomans. The
great event of this war was the conquest of Euboea. In the year 1470, the
well-fortified city of Negropont was taken from the Venetians after a valiant
defence. The Greek inhabitants were in great part reduced to slavery, and many villages
in the island were plundered and burned.1 This loss was poorly
revenged by a Venetian fleet, which laid waste the Greek suburb of the city of
Attalia, and destroyed Smyrna, a town then almost entirely inhabited by Greeks.
Indeed, during this war, the orthodox Christians, whether living in the Othoman
empire or the Venetian possessions, were the principal sufferers. The naval
expeditions of the Venetians plundered the open towns and defenceless villages
on the coast; and the Othoman armies which invaded the Venetian territory
sought chiefly to carry off as many slaves as possible in order to enrich the
soldiers. Etolia and Locris were ravaged by Suleiman Pasha during his
expedition against Lepanto in 1477.2 In the following year the
Othoman fleet plundered the possessions of the Knights of Rhodes, and carried
off many Greek slaves from Kalymnos, Leros, and Nisyros. The peace which Sultan
Mohammed concluded with Venice in 1479, relieved only a part of the Greek
nation from plunder and devastation.
Almost immediately after signing the peace with Venice, Mohammed II.
extended his conquests in Greece by seizing the territories of Leonardo di
Tocco. The possessions of this little sovereign originated in a grant made to
one of his ancestors, in 1353, by Robert
II., prince of Tarentum, and
titular Latin emperor of Romania, and extended themselves over the rich dis-
1 Lonicerus,
Chronicarum Turcicarum Epitome. De Negroponti captione, tom. i. 339, 8vo edit.
2 Phrantzes, 452, edit. Bonn.
CONQUEST OF LEUCADIA, ETC., A.D. 1479. 75
trict of Arta, and the provinces of Acarnania and Eto- a. d.
lia, as well as the islands of Leucadia, Cephalonia, and !__________________ *
Zante. Charles di Tocco, despot of Arta, duke of Leucadia, and count of
Cephalonia, died at Joannina in 1430, and was succeeded by his nephew, Charles
II.
In the following year the troops of Sultan Murad II., under Sinan Pasha,
took possession of Joannina, and in 1449 the remainder of the continental
dominions of Charles were annexed to the Othoman empire. Acarnania and part of
Etolia, which was then called the country of Arta, received from the Turks the
name of Karlili, or the country of Charles. Leonardo, who succeeded his father
Charles II. in 1452, now saw the islands of Leucadia, Cephalonia, and Zante
occupied by the Othoman troops, and retired to Naples.1 As usual,
the Greek inhabitants were carried away to repeople Constantinople, but it is
said that many of the Ionians experienced a harder fate than had fallen to the
lot of the other Greeks. They were compelled to intermarry with negroes, in
order to breed mulatto slaves for the Serai.2 The misery of the
population of the Ionian Islands was increased by the enterprises of Antonio di
Tocco, the younger brother of Leonardo, who collected a small force, and, with
the assistance of a few Catalan corsairs, succeeded in recovering Cephalonia
and Zante. But as he could only maintain his mercenaries by piracy, the injury
he inflicted on commerce induced the Venetians to expel Antonio and his
Catalans from their conquests. They restored Cephalonia to the sultan, and
were allowed to retain possession of Zante, for which they paid an annual
tribute to the Porte (a.d. 1482).3
1 Buchon, Nouxelle? Recherches,
i. 307. Plirantzes, 156.
2 Discorso
di Theodoro Spadugino Cctntacusino dell’ origine de Principi Turchi, fol. 171,
in Uevum. Sansovino, edit. 1600.
3 Muratori,
Rerum Ital. Scrip., tom. xxiii. Nataqiero Storia Venetiana,
1180.
76 NAVAL CONQUESTS OF THE OTHOMANS.
chap. ii. In the year 1480,
the army of Mohammed II. besieged Ehodes unsuccessfully, but it ravaged a
great part of the island, and carried away many Greek families into slavery.
In the year 1499, a new war broke out between the Sultan Bayezid II. and
the Venetians, which lasted to 1502. Lepanto, Modon, Navarin, and Coron were
conquered by the Othoman armies. Modon was taken by storm in the presence of
the sultan, and all the inhabitants were slain ; but Bayezid repeopled the
city by compelling every town or large village in the Morea to send five
families to settle in the place. On the other hand, the Venetians took
possession of Cephalonia, which they found so depopulated that they were enabled
to grant lands to the Greek families who fled from Lepanto and the places
conquered by the Turks in the Morea.1 During this war the Greek
population in the neighbourhood of Argos and Nauplia was entirely
exterminated, and the country was repeopled by the Albanian colonists, whose
descendants occupy it to the present day. Megara, which still continued to be a
populous Greek city, also received a blow from which it never recovered. The
Othoman government had made it one of their principal magazines of grain and
stores. Everything was plundered by the Venetian fleet, and the place laid in
ruins. The Greek inhabitants of Megara gradually decreased in number from that
time, and their place was filled by poor Albanian peasants. Venetian, Catalan,
and Turkish corsairs cruised in all the seas of Greece, carrying off the defenceless
inhabitants to sell them as slaves ; some, in
1 Prescott,
in his History of Ferdinand and Isabella, part second, chap. x., gives a
highly-coloured account of the storming of the insignificant fort of St George
in Cephalonia by Gonsalvo de Cordova, the Great Captain, and Pesaro, the
Venetian admiral; and he says the arms of Bayezid filched one place after
another from the republic (a.d. 1500.)
Gonsalvo was one of the first great generals in Western Europe. The Othomans
had already possessed several who were at least his equals in military science
and strategic combinations.
VENETIAN WAR, A.D.
1499-1502.
77
their eagerness for booty, paid very little attention to inquire who was
sovereign of the country, if plunder could be carried off with impunity. The
Venetian government excited the activity of its mercenary troops by granting
them two-thirds of all the booty they collected, and by establishing regular
sales by auction of the captives brought into the camp, paying the soldiers
three ducats a-head for each prisoner.1 We must also remember that
slaves have always borne a much higher value in Mohammedan than in Christian
countries. It was therefore often a principal object of the campaign in the
expeditions of the Othomans during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, to
obtain a large supply of slaves. Those terrible incursions into Styria,
Carniola, and Carinthia, and into Italy, as far as the banks of the Isonzo and
Tagliamento, were often made merely to gratify the troops with a rich booty in
slaves, not with the intention of making any permanent conquests.2
The profits of the slave-trade must not be overlooked in examining the objects
and results of Othoman expeditions, nor in estimating the causes of the misery
and depopulation in Greece. Suleiman the Great, in the letter he wrote to the
Grand-master of the Knights of Ehodes announcing the capture of Belgrade,
boasts of the number of slaves he had made in his expedition into Hungary.3
The number of Mohammedans retained in slavery by the Knights of Rhodes was also
one of the principal reasons urged by the Othomans for expelling them from the
Levant.4 Before the alliance between the Othoman empire and the King
of France
1 Chalcocondylas, 277, edit.
Par. Cepione, Cose fatte da P. Mocenigo, 17.
2 There is
a tract on the expedition to the Isonzo in 1478, in the collection of
Lonicerus, i. 339, 8vo edit. In 1499 the Turks reached the Tagliamento,
destroyed one hundred towns and villages, and carried off six thousand slaves. Bembo, Della Istoria Veneziana.
3 Lonicerus,
i. 353. De hello Rhodio, J. Fontano, autore. Negotiations de la France dans le Levant, i: 90.
4 Lonicerus,
i. 354-5.
A. D.
1453-1684.
78 NAVAL CONQUESTS OF THE OTHOMANS.
• was formed, the Turkish
corsairs extended their slave- hunting cruises even to the French coasts.1
The dominion of the Knights of Ehodes affords an example of the different
aspects under which historical facts may be viewed by different classes and
nations. The nobles, the clergy, and even the people, in western Europe,
willingly conceded wealth, honours, and privileges to noble blood; and the
knights of Rhodes were long admired by their contemporaries as the flower of
Western chivalry, and supported as the firmest champions of Christianity, and
the surest barrier of Europe against Moslem conquest. But by the Greeks generally,
and particularly by their own subjects, they were felt to be proud, bigoted,
and rapacious tyrants, whose yoke bore heavier on their Christian brethren,
whom they pretended to defend against the Mohammedans, than the yoke of those
very Mohammedans. Even Yertot, the historian and panegyrist of the order, owns
that the Turks treated their Greek subjects more mildly than the Latin knights.2
To the Othomans they appeared as a band of lawless plunderers, who paid tribute
to the sultan or plundered his subjects when it suited their interests; while
the toleration with which they treated their subjects of the smaller islands,
who fitted out galleys for ravaging the Turkish coasts, made them popular with
the Greek pirates.3
To us, who look back at the dominion of the Knights through the mist of
past years, dim records, and picturesque monuments, the order of St John of
the Hospital seems deserving of its power and fame. In an age when valour was
the best quality in men, the Knights
1 Negotiations de la France dans
le Levant, i. cxxxii.
2 Vertot, Histoire des
Chevaliers Hospitaliers de St Jean de Jerusalem appellez depuis les Chevaliers
de Rhodes, et aujourd'hui les Chevaliers de Malte, tom.
ii. 458.
3 Vertot,
ii. 459.
KNIGHTS OF RHODES.
70
were the bravest among the brave. Few who read the history of the siege
of Rhodes in 1480 will fail to form an imaginary portrait of the Grand-master,
D’Aubusson, in his simple armour, with the red cross on his breast and the red
cardinal's-hat on his head.1 Nor will the story of the fall of
Rhodes in 1522 give him a less vivid picture of his less fortunate successor,
LTsle Adam, whether repulsing the janissaries from the ruined walls, or
presenting himself before the great Suleiman after receiving an honourable
capitulation. The traveller who has visited the ruins of the great hall where
the Knights assembled with LTsle Adam for the last time, and then wandered
through the long succession of uninhabited chambers where the pashas dwelt who
succeeded the grand-masters, cannot refrain from looking towards the future
after lamenting over the past. Is the splendid island of Rhodes never again
destined to nourish an active and prosperous population ?
“ Can tyrants but by tyrants conquered be,
And freedom find no champion '? ”
The splendid ruins of Rhodes have been the admiration of the traveller
in different ages. Mr Thomas Hope records the impressions the solitary palace
of the Grand-masters and the deserted street of the Knights produced on him, in
Anastasius. Walter Vinisauf tells us of the profound astonishment with which
Richard Cceur-de-Lion and the English army viewed the splendid remains of
mightier works of art before the Knights had laid the foundations of their
fortifications and their palaces. In 1191,
1 Pinkerton, Essay on Medals, ii. 110, mentions a
medal of John Kendal, who was Turcopilier of the Order of St John at the siege
of Rhodes in 1480, as the first English medal. It is in the collection of the
Duke of Devonshire, and is engraved in the Ducatus Leodiensis of Thoresby. It
is very large, like many of the Italian medals of the time, and was probably
executed in Italy, and not in England. I know nothing of it but from Pinkerton.
A. D.
1453-1684.
80 NAVAL CONQUESTS OF THE OTHOMANS.
chap. ii. Yinisauf saw
fallen towers and wonderful buildings of admirable architecture, which had
encumbered the ground from the time the Saracens sold the fallen Colossus to
the Jews as old bronze. He saw ancient palaces and temples, which had
subsequently been converted into monasteries, and though recently inhabited by
crowds of monks, were then again deserted. Mr Charles Newton, and the writer of
these pages, saw the castle of the Grand-masters and the palace of the Pashas,
which had been built out of the ruins seen by Yinisauf, falling again to ruins.
In 1191, everything attested the existence of an immense population at some
earlier period; in 1853, the well-constructed fortress and the untenanted
palace, into which these ruins had been converted, appeared as if it had been
suddenly deserted, or depopulated by the plague.1
The Knights of St John of Jerusalem robbed the Greek empire of the island
of Rhodes by a successful piratical expedition in 1310, and made it the
capital of an independent state, comprising the neighbouring islands of Kos,
Nisyros, Telos or Episkopia, Chalke, Syme, Kalymnos, Leros, and Castelorizo, as
well as the fortress of Bodroun (Halicarnassus), and some smaller forts on the
Asiatic continent. The
1 Anastasius;
or, The Memoirs of a Greek, i. 293, ed. of 1819. Chronicles of the Crusaders,
179, Bohn. David Chytrceus, in his Epistola Hodceporicon Naviga- tionis ex
CoTipoli in Syriam, etc., in the year 1581, gives the following short notice of
Rhodes, and no better description of its actual appearance could be conveyed in
fewer words : “ Rhodum civitatem (uti mihi quidem videtur) totius Orientis
pulcerrimam pervenirnus. Nam quemadmodum ab equitibus Hierosolymitanis extructa est ita hodie
videtur integra, nulla ex parte vastata. Nulli tamen Christianorum in civitate vel habitare vel per noctem
commorari absque venia licet.”—Lonicerus, Turc. Chron., ii. 198. I visited the
palace of the Grand-masters with Mr Newton, then Consul in Rhodes, on the 31st
May, at an early hour, when the morning sun threw strong shadows on the
picturesque line of mountains, which once formed part of the continental
dominions of the Rhodian republic.
The decline of Rhodes has been rapid. In the eighteenth century it contained
eighty thousand inhabitants. During the latter part of the Greek revolution it
was governed by Mehemet Sukiur, the renegade brother of Petro Mavromichali, bey
of Maina. His administration was cruel and oppressive, and the population then
fell to about twenty thousand. The population is now estimated at thirty-five
thousand.
CONQUEST OF RHODES.
81
Order maintained its position as one of the institutions and bulwarks of
Catholic Europe for two hundred and twelve years, partly by its valour, partly
by its prudence, and partly by the weakness and worthlessness of the Greek emperors
of Constantinople, and the other princes in the Levant, before the Othoman
sultans had consolidated their power. The sultans regarded Rhodes as a portion
of the Greek empire they had conquered, and they were only restrained from
attacking it by the danger of the enterprise. But the memory of the
unsuccessful siege of 1480 was at last effaced by the piracies of the Knights
and the danger of allowing the popes to possess an advanced post in the centre
of the Othoman empire. The trifling results produced by the incessant
invitations of the popes to the princes and people of Europe to take up arms
against the Turks, by their promise of indulgences to all who would join these
crusades, and by the leagues they formed, are apt to make us undervalue the effect
of these exertions on contemporaries. Even the most powerful sultans were often
alarmed by these papal demonstrations ; for it was long before the Mohammedans
could believe that the Christian princes paid only lip-service to the caliph of
Rome, except when their political interests rendered his alliance necessary.
The profession of the Knights, as sworn enemies of Islam, and the
piratical spirit of the age, both among Christians and Mohammedans, made the
existence of the Order a serious interruption to the communications between
Constantinople and the recent conquests of Sultan Selim I. in Syria and Egypt.
The exploits of the Order were the cause of repeated complaints on the part of
the Turkish merchants ; and even the inhabitants of Asia Minor and Syria were
exposed to incessant plundering visits from the Greek subjects of the Knights.
Several of the smaller
82 NAVAL CONQUESTS OF THE
OTHOMANS.
chap. ii. islands belonging
to the Order were inhabited by a population remarkable for naval skill; and as
the general system of commercial exclusion prevented these Greeks from sending
their vessels to trade in the principal ports of the Mediterranean, they had no
resource but to carry on piracy. Their proficiency in the construction of small
vessels of war, and their activity in employing them, were highly estimated by
their sovereigns the Knights. An open war was carried on by the Turkish and
Christian corsairs for some time before Suleiman summoned the Grand-master to
surrender Ehodes. The Order held a brother of Curtogli, the Othoman admiral,
prisoner in Ehodes, and Curtogli attempted to capture the Grand-master, L/Isle
Adam, on his passage from France after his election. There can be no doubt that
the Sultan Suleiman was urged to the conquest of Ehodes by every rule of sound
policy.1
The Knights made a gallant defence against the Othoman army, commanded by
Suleiman the Great in person, and L’Isle Adam obtained an honourable
capitulation. The Greek inhabitants of the dominions of the Order were exempted
from the degrading tribute of furnishing children to recruit the ranks of the
janissaries. Nevertheless, the certainty which the wealthy citizens
entertained that their lives and fortunes would be at the mercy of tyrannical
and rapacious pashas, induced a thousand Greek families to abandon Ehodes, and
seek safety in the Venetian island of Crete.2
The Morea enjoyed a period of tranquillity after the Venetian peace in
1502, and the interior of the penin- s]Ja was beginning to recover some degree
of prosperity, when a Spanish expedition, under Andrea Doria, again
1 For
Suleiman’s summons to the Grand-master, see CJironique du Bdtard de Bourbon;
Vertot, ii. 636. The date, at page 622, is given erroneously, 1485 for 1522.
See, for the complaints of piracy, Negotiations de la France dans le Levant, i.
90, 95 ; Vertot, i. 498, ii. 427, 459. For the capitulation, Negotiations, i.
94.
2 Negotiations de la France dans
le Levant, i. 94. Lettre de Villiers de Lisle Adam, Vertot, ii. 528.
doria’s EXPEDITION, A.D. 1532.
83
threw the country into a state of confusion in 1532. The great Genoese
admiral took Patras and Coron ; and the garrison he established in Coron
invaded the Morea, occupied Kalamata and Misithra, and induced many Greeks to
take up arms against the sultan. But in the following year the Spaniards were
expelled from Coron, and the Greeks were treated with great severity by the
victorious Othomans.1
A new war broke out between the sultan and Venice in the year 1537, and
the Othoman army laid siege to Corfu. The enterprise failed ; but, before
abandoning the undertaking, the Turkish troops plundered and wasted the Greek
villages in the island for eighteen days with fire and sword, burned the
churches, and carried off many thousands of the inhabitants as slaves.2
After this repulse, the indefatigable admiral of the Othoman fleet, Haireddin
or Barbarossa, made a series of plundering attacks on the islands of the
Archipelago still in the possession of the Latins. iEgina, then a flourishing
island under Venetian domination, was ruined ; the city was stormed, though the
garrison defended it with desperate valour ; the houses were burned to the
ground, all the males capable of bearing arms were massacred, and about six
thousand young women and children were carried off into slavery. The island was
so completely devastated that for some years it remained deserted, nor has it
to the present time recovered from the blow it then received. A French
admiral, who was sent to the Levant in consequence of the alliance between
France and the Othoman empire, passed iEgina shortly after the departure of the
Turks, and found it without inhabitants.3 It is probable that the
first colonists who returned to cultivate the soil
1 Negotiations dela France dans
le Levant, i. 235. Hammer, v. 236.
2 Lonicerus,
ii. 155. Criapi Kpistola.
8 Journal de la croisiere du, Baron de Saint Blancard, Negotiations de la
France, i. 372.
A. D.
1453-1684.
84 NAVAL CONQUESTS OF THE OTHOMANS.
chap. ii. were Albanian
peasants, whose descendants still occupy the southern part of the island,
unless the present Albanian population consist of a new colony, which dates its
settlement from the Turkish conquest in 1715. An immense number of Greek slaves
were also carried off by the Turks from Zante, Cerigo, and the islands of the
Archipelago. Nearly all the islands of the iEgean, which had fallen into the
hands of Venetian signors, in consequence of grants to individual nobles after
the partition of the Byzantine empire in 1204, were now subjected to the sultan
by Barbarossa. The Duke of Naxos was compelled to pay an annual tribute of six
thousand ducats ; but his submission did not save his Greek subjects from being
plundered. Skyros, Ios, and Patmos had been subject to the Pisani; Stympalia to
the Quirini; Paros and Antiparos to the Yenieri; Zia (Keos) and My cone had
been granted as the dowry of a daughter of one of the dukes of Naxos ; Andros
was held by Coursin di Sommariva. All these islands were plundered and rendered
tributary to the Porte in the years 1537 and 1538. The coast of Crete, the most
valuable possession of Yenice, was plundered, and Tinos, the principal seat of
the power of the republic in the Archipelago, was compelled to pay a tribute of
five thousand ducats. The Othoman flag was never displayed in so dominant a
position over the whole surface of the Mediterranean as at this period.
Barbarossa cruised victorious in the waters of Marseilles, and threatened
Venice in the Adriatic. He plundered twenty-five of the Greek islands, reduced
eighty towns to ashes, and carried off thirty thousand Greeks alone into
slavery.1
By the treaty of peace concluded in 1540, the Venetians lost all their
fortresses in the Morea ; and as the Turks were now in possession of the whole
peninsula,
1 Ilistoirc Nout ell e des anciens Dues et antres Souterains de VArchipel,
293, 350, 352. Paruta, Historia Venetiana, ii.
36.
PAPAL POLICY.
85
the Greeks might at last hope to enjoy some tranquillity under the sole
dominion of the sultan. The power and influence of the Venetians on the Greek
continent seemed to be completely destroyed by their cession of the
fortresses of Monemvasia and Nauplia, yet, after a lapse of one hundred and
fifty years, they were again enabled to conquer the Morea. The sultan also
retained the islands of iEgina, Skyros, Paros, Antiparos, Ios, Stympalia, and
Patmos, at the peace of 1540.
The policy and conduct of the popes tended greatly to nourish the
suspicions of the Othoman government concerning the fidelity of its Christian
subjects. The popes considered it their duty, and often found it for their
interest, to make a great noise in Europe, preaching crusades against the
infidels ; and their endeavours to form leagues of the Christian princes, for
the purpose of attacking the Othoman empire, naturally alarmed the sultan.
Papal agents were repeatedly sent to the East, with instructions to excite the
Greeks to revolt; and though these emissaries of Rome did little real business
beyond purchasing ancient manuscripts and engraved gems, the apparent energy
of the Court of Rome caused the Othoman government to treat the Greeks with
greater severity, and to watch all their actions with distrust.1
The success of his attack on Rhodes induced Sulie- man to make an attempt
to expel the Knights of St John from Malta, which had been granted to them by
the King of Spain. That attack was signally defeated, and to revenge the loss
sustained by the Othoman arms before Malta in 1565, the sultan ordered his
fleet to take possession of Chios in the following year.
Chios was then held by a commercial trading company of Genoese, called
the Maona of the Justiniani.
1 An Englishman will find ample proofs of the
rhetorical activity of the popes in Rymer’s Fcedera. See the letters of Leo X.
to Henry VIII.
86 NAVAL CONQUESTS OF THE
OTHOMANS.
chap. n. This company had
already acknowledged the suzerainty of the sultan, and paid tribute to the
Porte. The island had been conquered from the Greek empire by the Genoese
admiral, Simon Vignoso, in the same piratical way that the Knights of St John
had seized Rhodes; but the Greek inhabitants, on submitting to the Genoese, had
concluded a convention with their conquerors, by which they retained greater
security for their liberty than their countrymen enjoyed in the other parts of
Greece subject to the Latins, a.d. 1346.1 The Genoese domination in
the island of Chios was so different from the feudal government established in
the other conquests of the western Christians in Greece, that it merits
particular attention. It is the first example we find recorded in history of
the territorial administration of a mercantile company of shareholders in a
distant country exercising all the duties of a sovereign. The origin of the
company may be considered as accidental. The public treasury of the republic of
Genoa was so exhausted in the year 1346, that the funds for fitting out the
twenty-nine galleys which composed the fleet of Simon Vignoso were raised by
private citizens, who subscribed the money in shares. The republic engaged to secure
these citizens against all loss, and pledged a portion of the annual revenues
1 The notice of the conquest of Chios in my Byzantine
History, ii. 566, requires correction. The conquerors of Chios were neither
discontented nobles nor exiles, as Cantacuzenos states. The treaty which
Cantacuzenos concluded with Genoa in May 1352, left the affairs of Chios to be
settled by an arrangement between the Greek emperor and the Maona. Now, the
great defeat of the Genoese, which induced them to confer the sovereign power
on John Visconti, archbishop of Milan, took place in 1353. The administrators
of Chios, after that event, as they did not recognise the authority of
Visconti, may have been regarded as exiles or rebels until 1356, when the
independence of the republic was restored, and Boccanegra elected Doge. See
Sauli, Della colonia dei Genovesi in Galata, ii. 220; and the documents
published by Pagano, Delle imprese e dominio dei Genovesi nella Grecia, anno
1346, Nos. 2 and 3, pp. 261, 262. Besides these works there is a well-written
history of Chios by Dr Vlastos, who prints a golden bull of the Emperor John
V., recognising the rights of the Maona of the Justiniani in 1362 : Xiana
tJtoi 'laropia rrjs Ntjo-ov x^ov> wo tov sarpov. A. M.
BXacrrou, 'EpfiovnoXei. 1840 (Syra), vol. ii.
>
MAONA OF CHIOS.
87
of the State to pay the interest 011 their advances. Each a. d.
subscriber had paid down 400 Genoese livres ; twenty- 1_______________ :'
six galleys had been equipped by the commons and three by the nobles. The
expenses of each galley amounted to 7000 livres, so that the capital of the
whole expedition amounted to 203,000 livres. After the conquest of Chios,
Yignoso, in virtue of the full powers with which he was invested, established a
committee of the subscribers, who administered the government of Chios, and
collected the revenues under the sovereignty of the republic of Genoa. The
whole of the contributors to the expedition had formed themselves into a
joint-stock company, according to the established usage at Genoa ; and this
society, or maona, now assumed the name of the Maona of Scio. The republic
being unable to repay the advances of the subscribers, a convention was
concluded between the State and the Maona, by which the shareholders were
recognised as the lawful proprietors and administrators of Chios, according to
the terms of the capitulation of the Greek population with Yignoso, for a term
of twenty years, during which the republic reserved the right of resuming the
grant of the island, on paying the capital of 203,000 livres due to the Maona.
The republic of Genoa was never able to pay off the debt, so that the
arrangements which had been adopted to secure the allegiance of the island to
Genoa, while investing the Maona with full power to administer its revenues for
the profit of the shareholders, became permanent. The greater part of the
shares passed into the hands of the family, or, more correctly speaking, the
firm of Jus- tiniani, and the joint-stock company of Scio was generally called
the Maona of the Justiniani.
Chios was governed according to the laws of Genoa, and the Podesta, who
exercised the supreme civil and criminal jurisdiction, as well as the
Castellano, who was
88 NAVAL CONQUESTS OF THE
OTHOMANS.
chap. ii. the military
governor of the fortress, were officers of the republic, though elected, under
certain restrictions, by the shareholders. The manner of collecting the
revenue, that of electing the persons who conducted and controlled the
administration, and that of dividing the profits among the shareholders, were
regulated by conventions with the republic, and by statutes of the Maona. In
the earliest constitution of the Maona, it received the right of coining money
after the type of the republic of Genoa.1 The local administration
of this joint-stock company, though it excluded the Greeks from the financial
and political government of their native country, and displayed all the
religious bigotry of the age, was for a long period the least oppressive
government in the Levant, It was less rapacious, and it afforded better
securities for the lives and properties of its Greek subjects than they had
experienced under the emperors of the house of Paleologos ; and it was milder
than the governments of the Knights of Rhodes and of the Sultan.
The Maona of the Justiniani enjoyed a monopoly of certain articles of
produce in the island, and shared with the other citizens of Genoa the monopoly
of the foreign trade ; but agriculture flourished under the intelligent
arrangements they made, and the fair price they paid to secure abundant
supplies of the exportable produce of the island. Several articles then in
great demand were either produced only in Chios, or else the produce of Chios
was so superior in quality as to com-
1 No gold coins of the Maona of Chios have been
found, I believe, though the Justiniani boasted of possessing the right of
coining gold ducats, of which they doubtless availed themselves, as the
privilege waa very highly valued.—Vincens, Histoire de la Republique de Ghies,
ii. 216. At first the money coined at Chios bore the figure of the doge, and
the inscription Dux Januensium Conradus Rex. See Primo trattato fra il comune di Genova e i
partecipi della Maona di Scio, a.d.
1347; Pagano, p. 281. Coins of the Justiniani, which I purchased at Chios, both silver and
copper of different periods, have on one side Ciritas Chii, and on the reverse
Conradus Rex. The Emperor Conrad (a.d. 1138-1152) not having received the imperial crown at a solemn coronation,
was only called Bex Roma norum. He first granted to Genoa the right of coining
money.
CONQUEST OF CHIOS; A.D. 1566.
89
mancl a higher market-price. The mastic, the fruit, a.d.
the wine, and the silk of this favoured island, were the 1__________________ ’
sources of wealth to the Greek inhabitants, who lived in ease and abundance,
though deprived of liberty.
This Genoese joint-stock company had governed Chios for 220 years, when
Piali Pasha annexed it to the Othoman empire in 1566. The sultan had a good
pretext for putting an end to the government of the Justiniani, for the island
served as a place of refuge for fugitive slaves, and of refreshment for
Christian corsairs. Before the Maona had become tributary to Sultan Mohammed
II., a magistrate had been regularly appointed to protect and conceal fugitive
slaves, and it was said that at one period the number annually assisted in
escaping from bondage amounted to one thousand. After the conquest of
Constantinople, however, they were compelled to conciliate the Othoman
government by refusing open protection to fugitive slaves, as well as by paying
tribute to the sultan.1 No notice was given to them by Sultan
Suleiman when he determined to abolish the administration of the Justiniani. He
treated the company as his vassals; but as he feared they might obtain some
support from the Spaniards and the Knights of Malta if they were aware of his
intention, he ordered his Captain Pasha to surprise the place. Piali entered
the port with his galleys, landed his troops, and took possession of the
capital without encountering any resistance. The principal Genoese families
were seized, and sent to Constantinople as hostages, where some of their children
were placed in the Serai. Several are said to have suffered martyrdom because
they refused to embrace the Mohammedan faith, and many leading Genoese
1 Pagano, 136, from Giustiniani, Scio Sacra. Blastos (Chiaka in modern Greek), vol. ii. p. 61. In 1453, the annual
tribute of Chios was fixed at six thousand ducats, but in 1456 it was raised to
ten thousand.—Ducas, 177, 190, edit. Par.
/
90 NAVAL CONQUESTS OF THE OTHOMANS.
chap. ii. were banished to
Kaffa, from whence they were released at the intercession of a Justiniani who
acted as envoy of France to Snltan Selim II. in 1569.
Thus ended the domination of a mercantile company in the Levant, which
offers some points of resemblance to the English East India Company—a
mercantile society that received authority to exercise the functions of
territorial government only in the year 1624, but which has founded one of the
greatest empires in the world’s history. The dominions of the Maona of Chios
extended at one time over the islands of Samos, Patmos, Ikaria, Psara, and
Tenedos, and for a short time over Old and New Phocaea, on the Asiatic continent.
Even after the Turks had taken the place of the Justiniani in the
administration of public affairs, they continued to follow the Genoese system ;
and the island was long better governed than any other part of Greece. The
Greeks were allowed to regulate the affairs of their own community; and though
the city appeared dead, and the Genoese palaces, having fallen to the share of
the Othoman conquerors, presented a dilapidated aspect, and the stillness of
Turkish apathy replaced the activity of Genoese love of gain, still the villages
prospered, and agriculture continued to flourish.1
Chios could not, however, entirely escape from the desolating effects of
the maritime wars that ruined the islands and coasts of Greece. An expedition
of the grand-duke of Tuscany, Ferdinand I., visited the Archipelago, in the
year 1595, under the pretence of a crusade against the Mohammedans, but in
reality to
1 Compare a
letter of Paleologos in Reusner, Epistolce Turcicce, ii. 142, with the
llodoeporicum of David Chytrams; Lonicems, Turcic. Chron., ii. 198. The
description of the island in 1581 is not inapplicable even in its present state
of ruin : “ Chium quam Zio (Scio) vocant, vidimus. Chius insula h, Genuensibus
diu habitata, et nuiltis superbis aedificiis et hortis amoenis ornata, atque
abun- dantia fructuum vinique et gummi, quod mastiche dicitur, bonitate multum
celeb rata, hodie pne reliquis provinciis Turcica) tyrannidi subjectis
(propterea, quod depositis armis sponte in Turcarum devenerit potestatem),
tolerabilem liabet servitutem.”
CHIOS, 1566-1694.
91
collect plunder and slaves. This fleet made an attack on Chios, but was
repulsed by the Turkish garrison of the strong citadel, built by the
Justiniani, which commanded both the town and the port. This ill- planned and
worse-conducted attack caused the Otlio- man government to treat the Latin
inhabitants of Chios with such severity that the greater part of those who
escaped death and utter ruin quitted the island for ever.1
About a century later, the Venetians, flushed with their success in
conquering the Morea, sent an expedition to Chios, which conquered the island
without difficulty, in 1694. They could, however, only retain possession of it
for about a year. The Venetian fleet was defeated by the Othomans in a severe
engagement off* the Spal- madores, and the admiral, losing heart, embarked the
garrison of Chios, and abandoned the island with great precipitancy. Though the
Greeks had given the Othoman government proofs of their aversion to the Venetian
domination by acting as spies for the Porte, they did not escape severe
oppression when the Othoman power was re-established. The Catholic families who
had escaped the confiscations of 1595 were only sixty, and they fled with the
Venetians. The Greeks were therefore compelled to satisfy the cupidity of the
Turks, who had expected to enrich themselves by the sack of the city. To save
the island from being plundered, they were compelled to pay a forced
contribution of four hundred and seventy purses (about £47,000). The island,
nevertheless, continued in a prosperous condition until the Greek revolution.2
The year 1566 also witnessed the extinction of the
1 Hammer, Ilistoire, vii. 363.
Dapper, Description des Isles de I'Archipel., 224.
2 Hammer,
xii. 377. Blastus, ii. 110. When the citadel of Chios capitulated to the Venetians
in 1694, six thousand Turkish inhabitants quitted the town. In 1853 I found
only about nine hundred in the capital, and not two thousand in the island.
92 NAVAL CONQUESTS OF THE
OTHOMANS.
chap. ii. Catholic dukedom of Naxos. The Greek
inhabitants, who were anxious to place themselves under the Othoman
government, in the hope of being allowed to farm the revenues of their island,
succeeded in persuading Sultan Selim II. to dethrone their duke, John VI.1
But instead of intrusting the local administration to the Greek primates, the
sultan granted the island in farm to a Portuguese Jew, Don Juan Miquez, who
sent a Spanish Catholic, Francis Coronello, to govern the Greeks and collect
the taxes. Miquez was a favourite of Sultan Selim, for whom he procured
supplies of the choicest wines ; and on one occasion, when sharing in their
liberal consumption, he was promised by his imperial protector a gift of the
kingdom of Cyprus, on account of the excellency of its vintage. The proud
title, which so many European monarchs now render themselves ridiculous by
assuming, was then adopted with more reason by this Jewish adventurer, who
publicly assumed the armorial bearings of a Christian kingdom, and began to
form projects for the restoration of a Jewish monarchy, and for replacing the
Greek population of Cyprus by founding Jewish colonies in the island.2
The next great
misfortune which fell on the Greek nation was the conquest of the rich and
fertile island of Cyprus. In the year 1570, Selim II. sent a powerful fleet and
army to take possession of the island, which belonged to the Venetians. With
the candour often displayed by the Othomans in their lust of con-
1 In my
Medieval Greece and Trebizond, the last duke of Naxos is called James IV., as
in the Histoire des anciens Dues, and the genealogies I have seen; but Ross has
published a document which proves his name was John VI.— Reisen auf der
Griechischen inseln, i. 25. When Naxos fell under the Othoman domination, the
tenth of the yintage alone yielded a revenue of fifteen thousand crowns to Don
Miquez.—Hammer, vi. 385. After the death of Miquez and of Sommariva, a.d. 1579, the revenues of the islands
of Naxos, Paros, and Andros were farmed by Suleiman Tzaoush for forty thousand
dollars annually.—Hammer, vii. 59.
2 Negotiations de la France dans
le Levant, iii. 88.
CONQUEST OF CYPRUS.
93
quest, the sultan
summoned the republic to surrender
Cyprus,
merely because he was determined to possess ________________
it at any expense of
blood and treasure.
The kings of Cyprus, of
the house of Lusignan, had been compelled to pay tribute to the Mamlouk sultans
of Egypt, and this tribute had been transferred to the Porte when Selim I.
conquered Egypt in 1517. The Venetians were then masters of the island, and the
annual tribute amounted to eight thousand ducats, so that the sultan pretended
that he was the lawful suzerain. The republic had acquired possession of the
kingdom of Cyprus in 1489, by ail act of cession from Catherine Cornaro, a
Venetian lady, widow of James
II., the last monarch of the house of Lusignan, who
became queen of Cyprus at the death of her husband.
The fair face of the
queen is familiar to thousands who know nothing of her political history. If,
indeed, the portrait of a Catherine Cornaro by Titian, in the Man- frini Palace
at Venice, be really an authentic likeness of the last queen of Cyprus, the
painter’s hand has conferred on the lady a fame which neither her crown, her
beauty, her virtue, nor the romantic changes of her life, could give. Venice is
said to have received from Cyprus an annual revenue of five hundred thousand
ducats, but the queen was satisfied with an income of eight thousand ducats,
and a secure residence in the town of Asolo, in the Trevisano, where she was
treated with regal honours.1
The Othoman expedition
landed at Salines without meeting with any opposition, for the naval power of
Venice proved unequal to encounter the Othoman fleet.2 The skill and
valour of Barbarossa, Dragut,
1 Reinhard, Geschichte des
Konigreichs Cypren, ii. 97.
2 Hammer says
the Turks landed at Limasol (Amathus) ; but the fleet, it seems, really
proceeded to Salines, as a more convenient port. The date given in the French
translation is erroneous; the landing took place on the 1st July.
— vi. 400.
94 NAVAL CONQUESTS OF THE
OTHOMANS.
chap. n. and Piali, had given the Turks a naval
superiority in the Mediterranean over every Christian state, and their names
were as famous as those of Dandolo, Pisani, and Doria. The Greeks of Cyprus
were so oppressed by the Venetian government, that they were eager for a change
of masters, and not disinclined to welcome the Othomans. In the month of
September 1570, Nikosia, the capital of the island, was taken after a gallant
defence; and Famagosta, the only fortress which remained in the hands of the
Venetians, was almost immediately invested. The siege of Famagosta is famous in
Turkish and Venetian history. The attack was conducted with the extraordinary
labour and indomitable courage which then distinguished the siege operations of
the Othoman armies. Their trenches and their batteries were of a size and
number never before witnessed by Christian troops. The defence of the Venetian
garrison was long and obstinate, but the place was compelled to surrender on
the 1st of August 1571.
This period marks the extreme height of Othoman pride, insolence, and
cruelty. The scenes which followed the capitulation of Famagosta stain the
annals of the Othoman empire with indelible infamy. The garrison was embarked
according to the stipulations in the treaty, when Bragadino, who had so bravely
defended the place, deemed it his duty to wait on Mustapha Pasha to arrange his
own departure. Mustapha Pasha was of a mean, envious, and revengeful
disposition, and he basely resolved to deprive the Venetian leaders of the
honours they had merited by their gallant conduct. Bragadino, and the officers
who accompanied him to the vizier's tent, were treacherously seized. The
greater part were instantly murdered, but the governor was reserved
MURDER OF BRAGADINO. 95
for a lingering deatli
by the most excruciating tortures. The sufferings of the noble Venetian during
ten days of agony are too horrible to be described in detail. Mustapha Pasha
gave a national and religious solemnity to his own infamy, by ordering
Bragadino 'to be publicly flayed alive on Friday, the day set apart by the
Mohammedans for their public prayers to God. The Venetian bore his tortures
with singular firmness, and the skin was cut from the upper half of his body
before he expired.1 Three hundred Venetians were massacred at the
same time ; every article of the capitulation was violated, and even the troops
on shipboard were compelled to disembark, and were reduced to slavery.2
Undoubtedly, the Turks have laid up a long arrear of hatred and vengeance on
the part of the Christians. The Greek population of Cyprus had generally joined
the Turks, in the expectation of enjoying milder treatment under the sultan
than under the republic. They soon found themselves utterly disappointed in the
hopes which their orthodox prejudices had led them to cherish. For about a
century they were governed by pashas, whose rapacity so depopulated and
impoverished the island that the pashalik was at last suppressed, and the
fiscal administration was committed to a mutzelim. In the year 1719, Cyrus
yielded the sultan only one hundred and twenty-five thousand ducats annually,
1 The skin
of Mareo Antonio Bragadino, stuffed with straw, was exposed for some years in
the bagnio of Constantinople, where the Christian prisoners and slaves were
eonfined; but twenty-five years after his death, it was purchased from the
eapitan pasha by his relations, and deposited in the ehureh of Sts. John and
Paul at Veniee, where the monument and inscription they placed may still be
seen.
2 Hammer,
vi. 416, mentions some contemporary aets of cruelty and treachery quite as
infamotis, on the part of Christians; viz., the massacre of St Bartholomew's,
and the desolation of Novgorod by Ivan the Terrible. The age was one of blood,
and the religious murders over all Europe attest the indifference of the
Christians to the feelings of humanity. The cruelty of the Venetians to the
Turks was sometimes as horrible as that of the Turks to the Venetians.— Hammer,
vii. 193.
A. D.
1453-1684.
96 NAVAL CONQUESTS OF THE OTHOMANS.
chap. ii. though a century and a half earlier, when
the precious metals were of much higher value, it yielded the Venetians five
hundred thousand ducats. In 1764 the extortions of the administration caused a
rebellion of the Greeks, which, as usual, only increased their sufferings.
Since the hour of its conquest by the Turks, every succeeding generation has
witnessed the diminution of the Greek inhabitants of Cyprus and their
increasing misery, so that they are at present, in spite of the admirable
situation of the island and the richness of its soil, the most wretched portion
of the Greek nation.1
The celebrated naval
battle of Lepanto was fought shortly after the taking of Famagosta, which the
allies ought to have saved. The political importance of this victory has been
greatly exaggerated in Christian Europe. It has been assumed that from this
defeat the decline of the Othoman power ought to be dated. Like the victory of
Charles Martel over the Saracens at Tours, it has served to gratify Christian
vanity ; and it has been declared by ignorant historians to have been the cause
of many events with which it had no connection. Had the demoralisation of the
sultans court, and the corruption of the Othoman central administration, not
made as rapid progress as the military and naval organisation of the Christian
powers, they would probably have found no reason to boast of the results of
their victory at Lepanto. It is true that the Othoman navy lost more than two
hundred vessels in this memorable defeat; but this loss was so rapidly repaired
by the activity of the government, and the resources of the arsenals and
dockyards of the Othoman empire were then so great, that, in the month of June
1572, the capitan pasha put to sea
1 Mariti, Voyage dans Pisle de Chypre, 19.
t* oj f/c. l son
BATTLE OF LEPANTO, 1571. 97
with a new fleet of two
hundred and fifty galleys, boldly engaged the Venetians and their allies, who
had assembled a still greater force off Cape Matapan, and arrested their
further progress in a career of victory by sea. There was no blockade of the
Dardanelles. The Turks encountered the combined Christian fleets half-way
between Constantinople and Venice. Well might the grand vizier, Mohammed
Sokolli, say to the Venetian baillo, Barbaro, “ In destroying our fleet you
have only shorn our beard ; it will grow again : but in conquering Cyprus we
have cut off one of your arms.” The indecisive naval engagements which
followed the victory of Lepanto in 1572, taught Venice that she had little to
hope by continuing the war ; and the practical result of the great victory at
Lepanto was, that it enabled the Venetians to purchase peace early in 1573, by
paying the sultan three hundred thousand ducats, and promising the Porte an
annual tribute of fifteen hundred ducats for the island of Zante. This peace
has been called disgraceful to the republic ; but when it is remembered that
Venice was dependent for her political importance in Europe, and even for her
ordinary supplies of grain, on her trade with the Levant, and when we compare
the military weakness and commercial exhaustion of a single city with the
immense power and resources of the extensive empire of the sultan, we must
acknowledge that peace was necessary to save the republic from ruin.1
1 Hammer, vi. 435. Since the publication of Von
Hammer’s History of the Othoman Empire, new and valuable documents relating to
the battle of Lepanto have been printed, particularly Documentos sobre la
armada de la liga y batalla de Lepanto sacados del archito di Simancas, por D.
Juan Sans y Bam tell, in the third volume of a collection of documents relating
to the history of Spain, published by Don Martin Fernandez Navarrete at Madrid
in 1843, and several letters relating to the subject in Negotiations de la
France dans le Levant, tom. iii. p. 184. See also llistoria del combate natal
de Lepanto, by Don Caye- tano Rosell, Madrid, 1853, in which the principal
documents of the archives of Simanca are reprinted.
G
A. I).
1453-1684.
98 NAVAL CONQUESTS OF THE OTHOMANS.
chap. ii. It is interesting to observe the part which the Greeks acted in
the battle of Lepanto. Their number in the hostile fleets far exceeded that of
the combatants of any of the nations engaged, yet they exerted no influence on
the fate of the battle, nor did their mental degradation allow them to use its
result as a means of bettering their condition. The effect of mere numbers is
always insignificant where individual virtue and national energy are wanting.
The Greeks were at this time considered the best seamen in the Levant. Above
twenty-five thousand were either working at the oar or acting as sailors on
board the Othoman fleet, and hardly less than five thousand were serving in the
Venetian squadron, where we find three galleys commanded by Greeks who had
joined the papal church—Eudomeniani and Calergi of Crete, and Condocolli of
Corfu. Yet these thirty thousand men, of whom many were excellent seamen,
exerted no more influence over the conduct of the warriors who decided the
contest, than the oars at which the greater part of the Greeks laboured. Their
presence is a mere statistical fact, of no more importance in a military point
of view than the number of the oars, sails, and masts in the respective ships.
Nevertheless, it was in part to the naval skill of the Greeks that the Othoman
government was indebted for the facility with which it replaced the fleet lost
at Lepanto. Every house in Constantinople and Rhodes, as those cities were
exempt from the tribute of Christian children, was compelled to furnish a
recruit for the fleet, and every Greek island and seaport furnished a galley,
or its contingent for equipping one; so that the losses of the Turkish navy
were easily restored at the expense of the Greeks. While the presence of thirty
thousand Greeks in a single battle was so unimportant, the
CONQUEST OF TUNIS, A.D. 1574?.
99
single city of Venice,
whose whole population capable 145A3-1®*84
of bearing
arms did not exceed that number, con-
trolled the lives and
fortunes of a large portion of the Greek race for many generations, and
transfused Venetian feelings and prejudices into the minds of many millions of
the Greek race.
The peace with Venice
enabled the Turks to reestablish their naval supremacy in the Mediterranean.
In the month of May 1574,
the capitan pasha, Kilidj- Ali, left Constantinople with a fleet of two hundred
and ninety-eight sail, carrying an army of twenty thousand men, of which seven
thousand were janissaries. The Spanish fleet was unable to oppose this force;
and Tunis, which Don John of Austria had conquered, was recovered without much
difficulty, though the Goletta made a gallant defence. Tunis now became an
Othoman dependency, and, with Algiers and Tripoli, formed an advanced guard of
the empire against the Christian powers, which they tormented with their
piracies until the present century.
Such were the immediate
results of the much-vaunted battle of Lepanto.1
During the seventy-four
years which elapsed between the battle of Lepanto and the war of Candia, the
Greek nation disappears almost entirely from history. Some insignificant
movements in Maina, caused by the influence of the Christian corsairs, who obtained
permission to conceal their vessels in the ports near Cape Matapan by sharing
their booty with the Greek mountaineers, were the only signs of life, and they
were easily suppressed by the capitan pasha.2 In Crete, the Venetian
colonists, who settled in the island after the suppression of the general
insurrection
1 Hammer, vi. 438 ; Negotiations de la France dam le Levant, iii. 504. This important event is hardly noticed in the correspondence of the
French diplomatists.
a Hammer, viii. 205.
100 NAVAL CONQUESTS OF THE OTHOMANS.
chap. ii. of the Greek inhabitants in 1363, had
retained the population in complete subjection. Several partial insurrections
occurred, but they were generally excited by Greek nobles and primates, who
attempted to retain the taxes, levied from the cultivators of the soil, in
their own hands, and not with any design to enlarge the liberties of the Greek
people, and lighten the burden of the Venetian government by improving the
administration of justice. The terrific cruelty with which the Venetian senate
suppressed the last of these attempts, at the beginning of the sixteenth
century, affords a picture of the condition of no inconsiderable portion of the
Greek nation for several centuries. The sway of the Maona of Chios was the
mildest foreign domination to which the Greeks were subjected; that of the
Venetian republic was the most severe; the Othoman government was less moderate
than the mercantile company, and less tyrannical than the aristocratic
senate. The principles of the Venetian administration are summed up by Fra
Paolo Sarpi in these words : “ If the gentlemen (nobles) of these colonies do
tyrannise over the villages of their dominion, the best way is not to seem to
see it, that there may be no kindness between them and their subjects; but if
they offend in anything else, 'twill be well to chastise them severely, that
they may not brag of any privileges more than others/'1
Mr Pashley, in his
valuable Travels in Crete, has published the following account of the
proceedings of the Venetians, from a manuscript he copied at Venice :2
“ At the beginning of the sixteenth century, the Greeks of Selino, Sfakia, and
Rhiza, including some villages situated almost in the plain of Khania, united
together, and refused to obey the representative of Venice. Their leaders were
George Gadhanole of Krustogherako, the
1 Pashley, Travels in Crete, ii. 298. 2 Pashley, Travels in Crete, ii.
150.
1 3
VENETIAN DOMINATION.
101
Pateropuli of Sfakia,
and some other families of the Archontopuli, as they are called (Greek
primates). Gad- hanole was elected Rettore of these provinces. Duties and taxes
were now paid, not to the Venetians, but to these Greek authorities. At length
the Greek rettore suddenly presented himself at the country-house of Francesco
Molini, a Venetian noble, in the neighbourhood of Khania, and asked his
daughter in marriage for Petro, the most beautiful and bravest of all
O 7
his sons, and in whose
favour the rettore declared his intention of resigning his office on the
celebration of
o o
the marriage. The
alliance was agreed on ; the rettore gave his son a massive gold ring, and the
betrothal took place. The youth kissed his future bride, and placed the ring
011 her finger. The wedding was to be solemnised the next Sunday week at the
Venetian’s country-house, a few miles out of Khania. Molini was merely to
send for a notary and a few friends, and Gadhanole, with his son, was to be
accompanied by a train not exceeding five hundred men. The Greeks left the
country-house of the Venetian without suspecting treachery. On the following
morning, Molini hastened to the governor of Khania, and obtained his promise
of co-operation in exacting such signal satisfaction for the indignity of
having been compelled to promise his daughter in marriage to a Greek, as might
serve both for an example and a warning to posterity. In order, however, to prevent
any suspicion of his good faith, Molini despatched tailors to his country-house
to prepare new dresses for the wedding, and also sent presents of fine cloth to
his son-in-law elect. During the next few days the governor of Khania assembled
about a hundred and fifty horsemen and seventeen hundred foot-soldiers within
the city.
“ On the day before the
wedding, Molini returned to his house at Alikiano, with fifty friends to be
pre-
102 NAVAL CONQUESTS OF THE OTHOMANS.
. sent at the marriage. He gave orders for roasting one hundred sheep and
oxen, and for making all due preparations to celebrate the nuptials with
becoming splendour. The Greek rettore arrived, accompanied by about three
hundred and fifty men and one hundred women, on Sunday morning, and was
delighted at all he witnessed. He was received by Molini with every mark of
kindness and affection. After the marriage ceremony, the day was spent in
festivity and rejoicing. The Greeks ate and drank, and danced and sang. The
Venetians plied their guests with wine, and the intoxication affected by them
really overcame the unfortunate and too confiding Greeks. Some time after
sunset, a rocket thrown up at Khania gave notice of the approach of the troops.
The Greeks, overpowered by wine and sleep, were dispersed about the place. As
soon as the military arrived, most of the destined victims were at once bound
hand and foot, but were suffered to sleep on until sunrise. At daybreak,
Molini, and the public representative of the most serene republic, hung the Greek
rettore, the unfortunate bridegroom, and one of his younger brothers. Of the
family of the Musuri three were shot and the rest hanged. Of the Kondi sixteen
were present; eight were hung by the Venetians, and the other eight sent to the
galleys in chains. The rest of the prisoners were divided into four parties,
not with the intention of mitigating the penalty, for an equally merciless fate
awaited them all. The Venetians hung the first division at the gate of Khania
; the second at Krusto- gherako, which village, the birthplace of Gadhanole,
was razed to the ground ; the third division was hung at the castle of
Apokorona; and the fourth on the mountains between Laki and Theriso, above
Meskla, to which village Gadhanole had removed from Krusto- glierako after he
became rettore.”
VENETIAN DOMINATION.
103
The senate at Venice not only approved of these cruelties, but sent a
proveditore with full authority to extirpate the seditious Greeks. Villages
were burned and sacked ; twelve Greek primates were hanged; pregnant women were
murdered in the crudest manner ; many families were reduced to slavery; and
pardon was only granted to the proscribed on condition that they brought to
Khania the head of a father, brother, cousin, or nephew who had rebelled. Such were
the cruelties by which the Venetians retained possession of Crete for four
centuries and a-half. Yet while they oppressed the Greeks with almost intolerable
tyranny, strange to say, the internal order they maintained allowed the country
to become more populous and flourishing than under the more apathetic and
disorderly administration of the Othomans. Under the Venetian government, the
Greek population was estimated at two hundred thousand, and under the Othoman
it never exceeded one hundred and thirty thousand. On the other hand, it is
probable that the Mohammedan population was greater than the Venetian, for it
is said at one time to have equalled the Greek in number.1
A principal feature in the history of the Greek nation, during the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, is the evils it endured from the
prevalence of piracy in the Levant. A number of Christian and Mohamme-
1 The
Venetians are supposed to have found more than half a million of Greek
inhabitants in Crete. A few examples may suffice to prove that any estimation
of the population at different periods must be very vague. Daru publishes an
account which gives 40,000 as the number of the inhabitants of the towns, and
120,000 as that of those of the country, in 1571; and another, which makes the
population of the island 207,798, about 3577.—Ilistoire de la Repnblique de
Venise, vi. 251. Pashley gives us a detailed account of the population some
years earlier as 271,489.—Travels in Crete, ii. 286. A few years after the
Mohammedan conquest it was estimated at only 80,000. Mr Pashley says the
population was stated at 260,000, or 270,000, in 1821, nearly equally divided
between the two religions. It fell to less than 100,000 during the
revolutionary war of Greece, but is said at present to have attained 160,000,
of whom 50,000 are Mussulmans.
A. D.
1453-1684.
104* NAVAL CONQUESTS OF
THE OTHOMANS.
chap. ii. dan galleys, under various flags, carried on a species of
private warfare and rapine over the whole surface of the Mediterranean. The
coasts of Spain, France, Italy, Corsica, Sardinia, and Sicily, suffered
severely from the plundering and slave-hunting expeditions of the. corsairs
from the ports of Morocco, Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli, but the coasts of
Greece suffered still more severely from the Christian pirates, who
acknowledged no allegiance to any government. The power and exploits of the
corsairs during this period exercised an important influence on the commercial
relations of southern Europe ; they often circumscribed the extent and determined
the channel of trade in the East, quite as directly as the political treaties
and commercial conventions of the Christian powers with the Othoman Porte. Not
only were the Greek inhabitants of the coasts and islands plundered by these
corsairs, but their trade by sea was completely annihilated. The jealousy of
the Othoman government rarely permitted a Greek to fit out an armed vessel for
trade ; and yet merchants willingly paid double freight to ship their goods on
board an armed ship. On the other hand, the protective policy and commercial
envy of the Christian powers would have exposed any armed vessel, manned with
Greeks, to confiscation in almost every European port beyond Turkey and the
Adriatic, unless it were sure of the immediate protection of the sultan. The
Othoman fleet only put to sea in great force for some definite expedition, and
rarely remained out a long cruise to protect the trade of the sultan’s
subjects. The insecurity of the Greek seas became at last so great that the
coasting trade was in general carried on in small boats, which expected to
escape the pirates by creeping along the coasts and sailing by night. But when
the corsairs found no vessels to plunder, they indemnified themselves by
plundering
ft
PIRACY.
105
the villages near the coast, and carrying off the inhabitants, whom they
sold as slaves, or compelled to labour at the oar. The frequency of these
expeditions at last drove the Greeks from the small towns and villages close to
the sea, and compelled their inhabitants to establish their dwellings in sites
of difficult access, to which it required some time to ascend from the nearest
point of debarkation on the coast. The principal object sought for in the new
locality was to gain time to escape from the pirates in case of their landing,
so that the families and property of the inhabitants might be transported to a
considerable distance in the interior, and the advance and retreat of the
plunderers harassed by occupying strong positions on their line of march. Even
to the present day, the continent and islands of Greece, when seen from the
coast, still present the desolate aspect impressed on them by the corsairs of
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The records of the ravages of these
Christian plunderers are traced as visibly on the shores of Greece, as the
annals of the fiscal oppression of the Othoman government are stamped on the
depopulated towns and abandoned villages of the interior. Many medieval ruins
of castles, towns, and parish churches still overlook the sea, which bear marks
of their having preserved their inmates until the sixteenth century. The author
of this work, in his various cruises in the waters of Greece, has often climbed
to these desolate sites, and passed many hours speculating on the period of
their decline, and the cause and the day of their final desertion.
Even in the capital of the Othoman empire the Greek population lived in
continual danger of their lives and property. Murad III., while playing at the
djereed, fell from his horse in an apoplectic fit. The result is described by
Knolles in his quaint translation of Leunclavius: “ The sultan, falling from
106 NAVAL CONQUESTS OF THE OTHOMANS.
his horse, was taken up for dead, insomuch that the janissaries,
supposing him to have been indeed dead, after their wonted manner, fell to
spoiling of the Christians and Jews, and were proceeding to further outrages,
had not their aga, to restrain their insolence, to the terror of the rest,
hanged up one of them taken in the manner, and certain others in the habit of
janissaries/'1 Every political event was used as a pretext for
plundering the Greeks; and indeed the Christian subjects of the Porte generally
were treated with extraordinary severity at this period. The Mohammedans
displayed an increase of bigotry, and became more tyrannical, on perceiving
that the Christian states of western Europe had acquired strength to resist
the progress of their conquests. Murad III. really desired to convert all the
churches in his empire into mosques ; and in 1595, when the news of the sack of
Patras reached Constantinople, the extermination of the Christians was
discussed in the divan, but the result was confined to the publication of an
order for the expulsion of all unmarried Greeks from Constantinople within
three days.2
During the time between the conquest of Cyprus and the invasion of Crete,
the maritime hostilities of the Knights of Malta, who were indefatigable
corsairs, constantly excited the anger of the sultan's court and of the Turkish
population against the Christians, while their expeditions inflicted great
losses and severe sufferings on the Greek population. It would be tedious to
notice the various acts of systematic devastation recorded by travellers and
historians during this Augustan age of piracy. The deeds of the corsairs in
the Levant, and of the Uscoques in the Adriatic, almost
1 A.D.
1584. Compare Knolles, The Turkish History, i. 689, and Leuncla- vius, Sup p.
Annal. Turcic., 381, edit. Pax*.
2 Hammer,
viii. 134, 317.
PIRACIES.
107
rivalled tlie exploits
of the buccaneers in the West Indies.1 A few leading examples will
suffice to show how the rapacity and cruelty of the corsairs affected the
position of the Greeks as Othoman subjects. The lawless conduct of the captains
of ships, and the general insecurity of navigation, are proved by a memorable
act of piracy, committed by a Venetian noble in command of a squadron, on some
Othoman vessels during a time of peace.
In the year 1584, the
widow of Ramadan Pasha, late Dey of Tripoli in Barbary, embarked with her
family and slaves in a vessel for Constantinople. The property she carried with
her was valued at eight hundred thousand ducats, and, for security against
pirates, she was attended by two armed galleys. Stress of weather drove these
ships into the entrance of the Adriatic, where a Venetian squadron, under Petro
Emo, was stationed to protect the trading vessels under the flag of the
republic. Emo pretended to mistake the Turkish galleys for pirates. He attacked
them with a superior force, and captured them after a desperate resistance. He
then committed the most infamous cruelties, in order to appropriate the rich
booty, and compromise his crew so far as to insure their silence. Two hundred
and fifty Turks who had survived the engagement were murdered. The son of
Ramadan was stabbed in his mother s arms. The female slaves were ravished,
cruelly mutilated, and thrown into the sea. A beautiful girl, who declared she
was a Venetian, a Cornara, and a Christian, vainly implored the brother of Emo
to spare her honour. She solemnly declared that she had been enslaved while a
child in Cyprus, but young Emo proved deaf to her prayers. She
1 Hallam,
Middle Ages, ii. 254, alludes to the plundering propensities of navigators in
preceding ages. He says that one might quote almost half the instruments in
Rymer in proof of the prevalence of piracy.
108
NAVAL CONQUESTS OF THE OTHOMANS.
chap. ii. received the same treatment as the rest, and
her body was thrown into the sea. One of the Turks, however, escaped with his
life, and at last found his way to Constantinople, where his story soon raised
a general cry for vengeance. The Persian war, in which Murad III. w'as engaged,
saved Venice from an immediate attack, and the republic gained time to appease
the Porte by denying, explaining, apologising, and bribing. The truth, however,
could not be concealed. Emo was brought to justice and beheaded. The captured
galleys were repaired and sent to Constantinople, manned by Turks delivered
from slavery, in the place of those who had been slain. Four hundred Christian
slaves were also delivered to the Porte, as it was said Ramadan had possessed
that number at Tripoli, though it was evident no such number had been embarked
in the captured ships. But of these slaves the greater number was divided among
the Othoman ministers, as an additional bribe to prevent war, and only a small
part was given to the widow and to the heirs of Ramadan.1
The cruelty of the
Knights of Malta was not so infamous as that of the Venetians, for their
warfare was open and systematic; but the losses they inflicted on the Turkish
merchants, and the continual captures they made of wealthy Osmanlees on their
way to perform the pilgrimage to Mecca, caused incessant complaints to the
sultan. The Porte was repeatedly urged to attack Malta, and destroy that nest
of corsairs; but the memory of the losses sustained during the siege of 1565
rendered the pashas, the janissaries, and the Othoman navy averse to renew the
enterprise.2
The Knights of Malta not
only carried on war with the Barbary corsairs and Othoman galleys, but they
searched every corner of the land, and lurked under
1 Leunclavius, Supp. Annal.
Turcic. 382, edit. Par.
2 Knolles,
Turkish History, i. 710.
KNIGHTS OF MALTA.
109
every cliff in the Greek islands, on the watch to cap- 145^-^'84
ture Turkish merchant vessels. The story of many a ---------------------------------------- '
hard-fought battle with the Barbaresques and the Othomans may be found
in the annals of the Order; but very few allusions are made to the daily plunder
of merchant ships, and the plundering and kidnapping exploits on the coasts of
Greece, from which the Christian subjects of the sultan suffered more than the
Mussulmans. Many Greeks were annually carried off to labour at the oar in
Christian galleys ; and from the want of rowers, though they were not called
slaves, they were guarded as carefully, and compelled to labour as constantly,
as if they had been infidels or criminals.
The habitual proceedings of the naval forces of the Order were so near
akin to piracy, that the Grandmaster was repeatedly involved in disputes with
the Christians at peace with Turkey, by the manner in which the Knights
commanding the Maltese cruisers openly violated every principle of neutrality.
Even the naval forces of Venice were insufficient to protect the ships and
possessions of the republic. A few examples will be sufficient to prove the
general insecurity of property ; for where there was danger to Venetians,
there must have been certain ruin to Greeks. In the year 1575, the Knights
seized a Venetian ship with a rich cargo belonging to Jewish merchants. The
republic, however, insisted that the perpetual warfare which the Knights made
it their vocation to wage against the Mohammedans, did not entitle them to
plunder Jews under Venetian protection. The Grand-master confiscated the
captured merchandise in spite of the reclamation of the Venetian senate, on
the ground that the Jews were not subjects of the republic. The senate
immediately sequestrated all the property of the Order in the Venetian
dominions, and thus forced the Grand-
110 NAVAL CONQUESTS OF THE OTHOMANS.
. master in the end to
make restitution to the Jews.1 But the Knights continued to
interpret their belligerent rights according to their own code ; and in 1583
the Venetians seized two galleys of the Order, to compel the Grand-master to
restore the property of Venetian merchants taken in a Turkish merchant ship. At
this time the Turkish merchants still carried on a considerable trade with
Italy in their own ships. The extortions of the pashas and provincial governors
in the Othoman empire had not yet exterminated the race of wrealthy
Mussulman traders, nor had the supremacy of the Christian corsairs yet excluded
the Othoman flag from commercial operations.2 We find the senate
compelled to sequestrate the property of the Order as late as the year 1641, in
order to force the Grand-master to make restitution for acts of piracy
committed by the Knights.3
Similar disputes
occurred with the King of Spain and the republic of Lucca in 1638, in
consequence of acts of piracy committed by French knights on Spanish and
Sicilian ships, France being then at war with Spain.4
While the corsairs of
Malta were plundering the Turks and Greeks, those of the Barbary coast were equally
active in capturing the Christians. Several of the European powers, however,
finding that they were unable to protect their subjects by force, submitted to
purchase security for their trade by paying an annual tribute to the African
corsairs. Nevertheless, we find that the merchants of France, England, and
1 Vertot,
iv. 110.
2 Ranke,
History of the Popes in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries, 97, 101, 110,
alludes to the extent and importance of the Turkish trade, and the number of
Turkish merchants at Ancona, in the sixteenth century.—Vertot, iv. 123.
3 Vertot,
iv. 152. 4 Vertot, iv.
144, 148.
HATRED OF LATINS AND GREEKS.
Ill
Holland were frequently
severe sufferers from these corsairs.1
The conduct of Christian corsairs on the coasts of Greece increased the
hatred which had long prevailed between the Latins and the Greeks, in
consequence of the oppression reciprocally suffered from each party when in
power. In Negrepont, Mytilene, Chios Cyprus, and many smaller islands, the
Latins had long treated the orthodox Greeks as serfs, and persecuted them as
heretics. At this time the Greeks were revenging themselves for former
cruelties by equal tyranny. The Othoman government, naturally placing more
confidence in the submissive and orthodox Greeks than in the discontented and
catholic Latins, favoured the claim of the orthodox to the guardianship of the
Holy Sepulchre at Jerusalem. During the sixteenth century this caused many disputes,
and created a permanent irritation at the papal court. The priestly soldiers of
Malta were invited by the Pope to take an active interest in this question, and
the Grand-master, to mark the zeal of the Order, joined his holiness in
advising the Christian powers not to spare the heretical Greeks whenever they
could be made prisoners. Eeligious hatred was considered as good a ground of
hostility as political interest, and the orthodox were consequently chained to
the oar in Catholic galleys with as little compunction as Mohammedans.2
Continual plundering expeditions against the Grecian coasts kept alive the
mutual animosities. In 1620 the Knights made a most successful foray in the
Morea. They took Castel Tornese, where they found an immense quantity of
military stores laid up by the Othomans, which they carried
1 Hammer, ix. 29, 30, 234, 2S1.
Rycaut, 21.
2 Vertot, iv. 145.
112
NAVAL CONQUESTS OF THE OTHOMANS.
• off or destroyed, and retired with a rich
booty in slaves.1
The spirit of chivalry
had perhaps expired in Europe before Cervantes bestowed on it an immortality of
ridicule in the person of Don Quixote. But chivalry continued a thriving
trade at most European courts after the spirit had fled, and an idle mimicry of
chivalric mummery is still perpetuated by princes to decorate courtiers and
chamberlains with stars and ribbons. In the year 1560, Cosmo de’ Medici, duke
of Florence and Sienna, instituted a new order of chivalry on the model of the
Knights of Malta, for the express object of combating the Turks, and called
them the Knights of St Stefano.2 The new Order was marked by the
characteristics of the age. There was as much of the ©
spirit of piracy as of
the impulse of chivalry in its institutions. These knights were to seek
adventures and glory in the Levant; but they were especially instructed not to
overlook plunder and profit while at sea. The pretext of the duke in
establishing the Order was to supply the means of defending the coast of
Tuscany against Mohammedan corsairs, and he hoped to give a new direction to
the valour of the restless nobles of Italy, by mingling the love of foreign
enterprise with their personal feuds and party politics. None but nobles were
admitted as knights, and only those who were wealthy or distinguished in arms.
The Order was endowed with considerable ecclesiastical revenues by Pius IV.,
and with large funds by the Duke of Florence, who reserved the office of
grand-master to himself and his successors. Several
1 Vertot,
iv. 132.
2 Compare
the different dates given by L’ Art de verifier les Dates, v. 295, quarto
edit.; Spondanus, anno 1562, No. 5, 39; and Napier, Florentine History, v. 225.
L'Art de verifier les Dates makes a sad mistake in the name of the pope who
confirmed the order in 1562. It was Pius IV., and not Paul IV., who died in
1559.
KNIGHTS OF ST STEFANO.
113
families were also
allowed to found hereditary command eries in the Order by granting it large
estates. The ancient city of Pisa was the seat of this new Order of St
Stefano—a fit residence for the revivors of ancient pageantry. The papal bull
of confirmation by Pius IV. was dated on the Gth July 1562. Historians have
carefully informed us what dress the Knights wore, and they are so eloquent and
so minute in their description that future times are likely to know more of the
deeds of the tailors of the Order than of the exploits of the Knights. Several
popes conferred additional privileges on the Order, and Benedict XIV. granted
them the right of audience without leaving their swords in the papal
antechamber, a privilege which is enjoyed by other Orders and by foreign diplomatic
agents at Rome, whose tongues certainly were more likely to offend his holiness
than their swords.
The Knights of St
Stefano maintained a well-appointed squadron of galleys under their own flag,
which, when united with the Florentine ships of war, formed a small fleet. The
Duke of Florence was quite as much the master of the one as of the other ; but
the Knights of St Stefano could commit acts of piracy without involving him in
such direct responsibility as would have resulted from the commission of
similar acts by ships under the Florentine flag. The right of private warfare
had ceased, but there were still independent sovereigns in Europe who possessed
neither the wealth nor the power of the Knights of St Stefano.1
The importance of gaining
the goodwill of the Greeks in the struggle between the Christian powers and the
Othoman government was felt by the Floren-
1 At the
death of Cosmo, the united fleet of Florence and of the Order of St Stefano
consisted of sixteen galleys.—Napier, Florentine History, v. 253.
114 NAVAL CONQUESTS OF THE OTHOMANS.
chap. ii. tines. Cosmo I. attempted to secure some
influence in the Archipelago by establishing a Greek colony in the island of
Giglio, and another at Florence, hoping that these colonists would be able to
rouse their countrymen in the Greek islands to join the sultan's enemies.
Religious bigotry destroyed the duke's plans, and even rendered his political
project injurious to the commerce of his subjects. The council of Florence had
forbidden the free exercise of all religious opinions not in strict conformity
with its decisions, so that only those Greeks who acknowledged the papal
supremacy could be allowed to form a civil and religious community. The
orthodox, consequently, soon discovered that they enjoyed more civil and
religious liberty under the government of the sultan than at Florence. The
commercial jealousy of the people in Italy at this period likewise aided the
religious bigotry of the papal court, in preventing the Greeks from forming any
national friendship with the Italians.
The plundering
expeditions of the Knights of St Stefano respected neither Greek nor Turkish
property where booty was to be obtained ; but the Florentine government soon
discovered that the piratical gains of the Order were insufficient to indemnify
the State for the exclusion of its industrious citizens from all participation
in the honest trade with the Othoman empire. Duke Francesco I. therefore sought
to conclude a commercial treaty with the Porte in 1577, and thereby offered
the Greeks an opportunity of establishing commercial houses at Leghorn under
the protection of an Othoman consul. During his negotiations with the sultan,
he attempted to deny all responsibility for the conduct of the Knights of St
Stefano, but the Porte insisted that he should disarm the galleys of the Order,
and engage that it should grant no assistance to the Pope and the King of
Spain. The
FLORENTINE NAVAL EXPLOITS.
115
duke would not accept
these conditions. This attempt a. 1d.
• i -i • • i > 145d-lo84.
to enjoy the
profits of legitimate trade m the sultans ----------------------------------------
dominions under one
flag, while plundering his subjects under another, having failed, the Medici
and the Knights of St Stefano continued their attacks on the Othoman empire,
and their piratical expeditions against the Greek islands, with redoubled
activity.
In the year 1594 they
had a force of three thousand two hundred men serving in the Levant. The
unsuccessful attack they made on Chios in the following year has been already
mentioned.1 Some years later, the united squadrons brought the
richest prizes that they ever made into the port of Leghorn, consisting of the
fleet from Alexandria, which was conveying the tribute of Egypt to
Constantinople. Two galleons, seven galleys, seven hundred prisoners, and two
millions of ducats, was announced as the official value of the booty; but much
additional profit was made by ransoming wealthy prisoners.2 At the
beginning of the seventeenth century, the galleys of the Duke of Florence were
accounted the best in the Mediterranean, and they carried on war both against
the Turks and the Barbary corsairs with the greatest activity.3
The spirit of private
warfare, or the love of piracy, was so widely spread in Christian Europe, that
we find even the English merchant-ships frequently coming into collision with
the Turks wherever they met, whether in the Red Sea or the Mediterranean, and
both parties appear to have generally acted in a way more likely to cause than
to prevent such collisions.4
1 See pp. 90-91,
and Napier, Florentine History, v. 295, 365, 377.
2 Hammer,
viii. 169, places this capture in 1606 ; Napier, v. 388, in 1608.
s Knolles, Turkish History, ii. 825, 886. Voyage de Levant, par le Sieur des Hayes en l’annee
1621,— “ L’ignorance dcs ministres Turcs est si grand, qu’il y en a plusieurs
qui cstiment le Due de Florence ou le Grand Maitre de Malte plus puissants qui
le lloi d’Espagne, parceqne les deux premiers leurs font plus de mal.”—Page
2S4.
4 See the
account of Sir Henry Middleton’s voyage, and the proceedings of
116 NAVAL CONQUESTS OF THE OTHOMANS.
chap. ii. Enough has been said to give some idea of the various causes
which combined to spread devastation over the coasts of Greece, and produce a
sensible diminution in the numbers of the Greek race. The poorer and more
exposed districts were often entirely depopulated. At the time of the Othoman
conquest, the Greeks of the small towns and thickly-peopled rural districts
were accustomed to live with more of the conveniences of civilisation, and to
enjoy more of the necessaries, and even of the luxuries of life, than the
inhabitants of other countries. When, therefore, their barns were destroyed,
their wine-presses broken in pieces, their olive-groves burned down, and their
silk carried off by the corsairs, they were unable to bear the privations which
these losses entailed. The people first crowded into the large cities, and then
gradually melted away—a process of depopulation which can now be seen going on
under the influence of fiscal oppression, and of the total want of an
equitable administration of justice, in almost every province of the Othoman
empire. But, unfortunately for Hellenic pride, Greece itself, under a native
government, appears to be making as little progress in wealth and industry as
some provinces of Turkey, and many of its most favoured cities are in a worse
condition than they were in the sixteenth century. Livadea, which then furnished
sail-cloth for the Othoman navy, is now desti-
other English ships on the coast of Arabia. For an engagement in the Mediterranean,
see Hammer, ix. 234, 281, and Rycaut, continuation of Knolles, 21. According to
Mariana, the good knight Diego de Paredes, whom the Spaniards considered a
worthy rival of the Chevalier Bayard, when he lost the estates conferred on
him in the kingdom of Naples by the Great Captain, Gonsalvo de Cordova, in
consequence of the Treaty of Blois, a.d. 1505, “ endeavoured to repair his fortunes by driving the trade of a
corsair in the Levant.”—Prescott, Ferdinand and Isabella, part ii. chap. xix.
The general feeling with which piracy was viewed by the Christian powers
is exemplified by the fact that Turkish corsairs were allowed to sell the booty
they had plundered from Christian vessels, in the port of Civita Vecchia. Ranke
observes, “ This was the issue of the labours of the chief pastor of Christendom
for the protection of commerce.”—History of the Popes, Kelly’s Tr., 265.
f
EXTENT OF PIRACY.
117
tute of all industry. It
grows at present little cotton, and less flax, and it suffers, perhaps, more
from brigands than it ever did under the Turks.1
Though the Venetians and
Turks were at peace from 1573 to 1644, and both powers kept up a very
considerable naval force for the express purpose of suppressing piracy, the Greeks
never suffered more from pirates than during this period. Indeed, the fleets
which were placed to protect them were often their worst oppressors. When there
was a want of hands in either fleet, the Greeks were carried off from their
homes to labour at the oar. The Venetians made slaves of them because they were
heretics, and the Othomans because they were infidels. The African corsairs set
the power of the sultan at defiance, and the pirates of Dalmatia despised the
authority of the republic, which could not prevent the ships of Segna from plundering
even in the Adriatic. The great extent of the Othoman coasts, and the immense
amount of Venetian property always afloat in commercial undertakings, held out
too many inducements to corsairs to pursue their trade of pillage, for it to be
an easy task to exterminate them. The corsairs of Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli,
and of Catalonia, Malta, Sicily, Genoa, Tuscany, and Dalmatia—all plundered
Greece indiscriminately. The capitan pasha only made a vain parade of the
Othoman fleets, in his annual cruise to collect the tribute of the cities and
islands of the iEgean Sea. The increasing venality of the Othoman governors,
and the deep-seated corruption of the civil administration, rendered the
permanent naval force, which the sand- jak beys of the islands were bound to
maintain by
1 Hammer, Staatsxerfasmng und Staatsvencaltung des Osmanischen Iieichs,
ii. 284. Linen was supplied by Livadea, and a quantity of
cotton sail-cloth, by Athens, in 1608.—Hammer, ii. 289. Little of either could
these cities now furnish to the diminished naval force of King Otho.
A. D.
1453-1684.
118 NAVAL CONQUESTS OF THE OTHOMANS.
chap. ii. their tenures, utterly inefficient.1 The governments
of Western Europe in alliance with the Porte, and the peaceable Greek subjects
of the sultan, were far more alarmed at the annual parade of fifty galleys,
under the capitan pasha, than the corsairs. Kings knew the immense power which
the Othoman navy could concentrate for any definite object, and the invasion
of Cyprus proved that even a treaty was no sure guarantee against a sudden
attack. But the corsairs were well aware of the defects of the Othoman galleys,
and the inexperience of their crews in naval operations, when compelled to act
separately. Though the Porte could repair the losses of the battle of Lepanto
with unrivalled vigour and celerity, it could never give adequate protection
to the coasts of Greece.
Historians have generally adopted the opinion that the Othoman navy has
always been the weakest and worst organised branch of the public service in
Turkey. The losses of several great battles, at various epochs, are cited as
proofs of want of naval power and skill, instead of being viewed as evidence of
the valour and discipline of fleets which could bravely prolong a desperate
contest. The vaunting declamations of Venetian and Greek writers have even
misled some historians so far as to lead them to describe the Othoman navy as
characterised by cowardice as well as incapacity. This decision is, however,
completely at variance with the facts recorded by history. Though the Turks
were never a maritime people, they can boast of as long
1 The beys of Rhodes, of Milos and Santorin, of
Chios, Cyprus, the Morea, Lepanto, Santa Maura, Negrepont, Mytilene, Andros and
Syra, Naxos and Paros, and Lemnos, were bound to furnish a number of galleys,
according to the extent of their revenues ; Rhodes furnishing four, Chios six,
and Cyprus seven, while the Morea only furnished three. The number, however, varied
at different periods.—See Voyage de Levant, par le Sieur des Hayes, page 214,
before the year 1645. When Spon travelled (a.d.
1675), Naxos, Andros, Mytilene, and Samos
maintained each a galley, Chios maintained two, while Mycone united with
Seriphos to maintain one.—Spon, i. 149. See also the number of timariot lands
in several islands and districts belonging to the jurisdiction of the capitan
pasha above, at page 5.
OTHOMAN NAVY.
119
a period of
uninterrupted naval conquests as any of 14^3-^84
tlie Western
nations. They had no sooner conquered ______________________
the Greeks on the sea*
coast of Asia Minor, than they found it necessary to form a naval force in
order to preserve their conquests, and, like the Romans, they made energy and
courage supply the want of maritime experience and naval skill. Before the end
of the eleventh century the Seljouk Turks were powerful in the Archipelago, and
in the thirteenth century their fleets began to dispute the command of the
iEgean and of the Black Sea with the Greek emperors of Constantinople and
Trebizond.1
The Othoman navy,
however, was not regularly organised until after the taking of Constantinople,
though Sultan Mohammed II. had formed a considerable naval force, and created
an admiral to attack the Greek capital by sea. That admiral was Suleiman Balta
Ogli, and the creek in which he constructed the Othoman ships, situated above
the European castle on the Bosphorus, still commemorates the event by retaining
the name of Balta Liman. The first great naval enterprise which established the
supremacy of the Othoman fleet in the Levant was the conquest of Negrepont, in
spite of all the efforts of the Venetian navy to save it, a.d. 1475. The
present chapter records the long series of conquests which followed that brilliant
exploit. The glory of Haireddin (Barbarossa), who, in 1538, with only one
hundred and twenty-two galleys, defeated the combined fleet of the Christian
powers under the great Andrea Doria, consisting of one hundred and sixty-two
galleys and many smaller vessels, far surpasses that of Don Juan of Austria,
who, with a superior force, gained the well-contested battle of Lepanto. The
fleet of Barbarossa was long terrible in the Italian seas, and the Turks were
ready to dispute
1 See
Byzantine Empire, ii. 112, 532. Medieval Greece and Trebizond, 415.
120 NAVAL CONQUESTS OF THE OTHOMANS.
chap. ii. the mastery of the Grecian waters with
Don Juan the year after his victory. The siege of Malta and the battle of
Lepanto reflect no disgrace on the Othoman navy. These reverses were more than
compensated by the conquest of Cyprus, of Tunis, and of Crete. Indeed, history
offers no example of greater vigour than was displayed by the Othoman
government in restoring its fleet after every great disaster. The defeats of
the Othoman navy have been as glorious to the Othoman administration as the
victories. Nearly a century after the disastrous fight of Lepanto, the Othoman
navy sustained another great defeat. This happened at the entrance of the
Dardanelles, during the war of Candia, in 1656, when the Venetian admiral,
Mocenigo, destroyed the fleet of Kenaan the capitan pasha. Seventy Turkish
ships were then taken or sunk; but the spirit of the Othoman administration
again rose superior to the disaster. The activity of the government, the
courage of the naval officers, and the resources of the sultan’s empire, soon
repaired the losses sustained, and this defeat, like that of Lepanto,
ultimately only increased the wonder and alarm of the Christian powers.
The battle of the Dardanelles is also remarkable for having awakened the
patriotism of a private individual, who, in labouring to rouse the enthusiasm
of his countrymen, has left an imperishable monument of the glory of the
Turkish navy. Hadji Khalfa was a clerk in the admiralty at Constantinople, when
the great loss sustained by the fleet induced him to write a history of the
naval exploits of the Othomans, as an incentive to every patriotic Mussulman to
step forward and repair the disaster. He had to remind his countrymen of a long
career of conquest. Hadji Khalfa died shortly after publishing his work, before
he witnessed the re-establishment of the naval supremacy of the Othoman fleets
in the Levant, for which he was
j
OTHOMAN NAVY.
121
labouring; but liis literary exertions may claim some share in animating
the Turkish army and navy to bear with patience the incredible toils that
render the siege of Candia the most memorable of modern sieges, and to display
the indomitable courage that conquered the valour of Morosini, and defeated the
naval science of the Venetians. The conquest of Crete was the last, the most
important, and the most glorious naval conquest of the Othomans ; and Hadji
Khalfa's glory, in contributing to that conquest, is nobler and purer than
that of the warriors who are honoured for their exploits as mere instruments of
their own and their sovereign's ambition.1
The Othomans were never a maritime people ; they had no love of naval
enterprise, and their fleets were formed only because political necessity imposed
upon them the duty of maintaining a naval force. The majority of the crews,
when they gained their greatest victories, were Christian rayahs, who had no
disposition to encounter danger. The Othoman officers and war-
O
riors were, consequently, obliged to watch the manoeuvres of their own
sailors, who sought to avoid bringing their ships to close quarters, as well
as to combat their enemies. Yet, under these disadvantages, the naval policy of
the Othoman government, and the obstinate courage of the Othoman officers,
secured to the sultans a supremacy in the Mediterranean for three centuries.2
1 Hammer, Staatsverfassung und
Staatsverioaltung des Osmanischen Reiclis, ii. 347.
2 Thevenot,
Voyage au Levant, ii. chap. xciv., describes the state of the Mediterranean in
1659. Spon, Voyage d’ltalie, de
Dalmatie, de Grece, et du Levant, vol. i. 12, edit. Amst., 12mo, 1679, gives an account of the activity of the Turkish
corsairs in the western part of the Mediterranean in 1674. The Dey of Algiers
seized M. Vaillant, the celebrated numismatist, and other Frenchmen, to compel
the King of France to restore eight Turks who were kept in slavery, though
Turkey was at peace with France. When Vaillant was on his way back to France,
he was again in danger of being captured by a corsair of Sale, and it was then
that the numismatist swallowed twenty gold medals. The frequency of corsairs is
again testified at page 90. Mr Vernon, who left Italy with Spon and Wheler, and
whose letter from Smyrna, dated in January 1676, is the first account of Athens
under the Turks by an Englishman, was
A. D.
1453-1684.
122 NAVAL CONQUESTS OF THE OTHOMANS.
chap. ii. The Othoman navy was organised to fight battles and to effect
conquests, but the single ships of which it was composed were not fitted out in
a way calculated to pursue corsairs and defend the extensive coasts of Greece.
The consequence was that the Greeks were exposed to be plundered incessantly. A
few of the calamities which fell on this unfortunate people may be noticed on
account of their importance ; but it must not be forgotten that the Knights of
Malta, the Knights of St Stephen, and the Tuscan navy, carried on similar
robberies every day in single ships. In the year 1595 a Spanish fleet plundered
the Morea, and laid Patras in ashes. The Greeks were the principal sufferers by
this attack; but the Porte being persuaded that the successes of the Spaniards
had been caused by collusion on the part of the rayahs, the project of a
general massacre of the Christian population of the Othoman empire was
seriously discussed in the divan. The treatment of the Greeks by the government
of Turkey, however, proved less tyrannical than that of the Moors and Jews by
the court of Spain, and the project of extermination ended in the sultan merely
ordering all unmarried Greeks to quit Constantinople.1 In the same
year a Florentine squadron made the attack on Chios which has already been
noticed. Though unsuccessful as a military operation, it caused great suffering
to the unarmed Greeks.
In 1601 the Spaniards
and their allies ravaged Maina, where they surprised Passava; and they sub-
also plundered of all his property, including his papers, by Greek
pirates in the Archipelago. He was put on shore at Milo in a state of
destitution, whence he continued his voyage in an English ship. He had been
once before taken by Tunisian corsairs, and kept as a slave. After escaping
these Mohammedan and Christian pirates, he was murdered on his way from
Trebizond to Persia. Compare his letter in Hay’s collection of curious voyages
and travels, ii. 29; Spon, Voyage, i. 117 ; and the French translation of
Wheler, vol. ii. 381, 522, 547.
1 Hammer, Histoire de VEmpire Othoman, vii. 317.
GREECE RAVAGED. 123
sequently plundered the
island of Cos.1 In 1G03 the Knights of Malta again sacked Patras,
and in
O O ;
the following year they
plundered many defenceless villages in Cos.2 But in the year 1609
they sustained a great naval defeat from the Othomans, though they succeeded in
ravaging the coast of Karamania. In the following year, a fleet, consisting of
Maltese, Sicilian, and Spanish galleys, entered the port of Cos, plundered the
town, and carried off a number of the inhabitants as prisoners, who, when not
ransomed, were compelled to work as slaves at the oar. The Florentine squadron
made an unsuccessful attempt to plunder the coast of Negrepont; and the
combined fleet failed in its attack on Albania, where the Turks, having
discovered that a Greek bishop served them as a spy, flayed the unfortunate
culprit alive.3 About this time the Christians were treated with
unusual severity in the Othoman empire, for the religious bigotry of the
Mussulmans was roused to seek every means of revenging the tyrannical treatment
which had been inflicted on the Mohammedans in Spain at their expulsion in
1609.4 In 1611 the galleys of Malta made an unsuccessful attempt to
plunder the country round Navarin ; but they succeeded in effecting a landing
at Kenchries, sacking the town of Corinth, and securing five hundred prisoners.5
In 1612 the Florentine galleys executed an enterprise which had been attempted
in vain both
1 Hammer,
viii. 17. 2 Vertot, iv.
128.
3 Knolles,
Turkish History, ii. 898, 903, 904. Hammer, viii. 170.
4 The
cruelty of the Turks to the Greeks was far surpassed by that of the
Spaniards to the Moors, as the records of the Inquisition testify. There
is a singular provision, which shows, however, that selfishness could get the
better even of Christian bigotry. When the Moors were expelled from Spain, the
barons of Valentia were allowed to retain six Mohammedan families in every
hundred, to teach the Catholics how to manage the sugar-manufactories erected
by the industry of the Mussulmans, to make a proper distribution of the water
in the canals and aqueducts of irrigation necessary to fructify the soil, and
to direct the manner in which the rice was to be preserved in the granaries constructed
by the Moors.—Watson’s Philip III., i. 441.
5 Knolles, ii. 906. Vertot, iv.
129.
A.
D.
1453-1684.
124 NAVAL CONQUESTS OF THE OTHOMANS.
chap. ii. by the Spaniards and the Knights of
Malta. They stormed the citadel of Cos or Lango, and carried off from the
island one thousand two hundred prisoners. They captured many Turkish
merchantmen, and ravaged the coasts of Greece from the island of Leucadia to
the island of Cyprus.1 In the year 1613, the Greek city of Sinope
was surprised by the Cossacks, a new race of pirates, who from this time began
to lay waste the shores of the Black Sea, and whose devastations fell almost
exclusively on the Greeks, who composed the commercial and trading population
of these coasts.2 The losses sustained by the Turkish navy in 1612
and 1613 were considerable. Even the Cossacks had captured two galleys richly
laden with government money. To replace the lost ships without draining the
treasury, the sultan ordered the Greeks to build and equip twenty galleys, and
the Armenians nine; so that the more the Christian subjects of the Porte were
plundered by the Christian navies of Western Europe, the more they were oppressed
by the sultan’s government.3
1 Knolles,
ii. 908, 917. Hammer, viii. 202. At this time the value of slaves was
considerable, for it was the fashion in the south of Europe to have captive
Turks or Moors, and frequently Greeks, in a foreign dress, as domestics. Sir
Francis Cottington writes from Spain, in 1610, that the slaves were suspected
of committing many murders. He adds, “ and not unlikely, for that few did here
serve themselves with other than captive Turks and Moors; and so the multitude
of them was very great.”—Watson’s Philip III., ii. 385.
2 Hammer,
viii. 206.
3 The
ravages of the Cossacks are mentioned by Knolles, ii. 921, and Rycaut, History
of the Turkish Empire from 1623 to 1677, p. 4. Hammer, ix. 162 ; x. 342.
Spon describes the ravages of the Christian corsairs in the vicinity of
Athens. In the year 1676 they plundered the village of Khasia, at the entrance
of the defile of Phyle.—ii. 75, 101, 208, 213. Megara paid two hundred and
fifty bushels of wheat to the corsair Creveliers as an annual tribute.—ii. 220.
Wheler also gives several instances of the extent to which the corsairs carried
their devastations on the mainland. The exploits of three famous corsairs,
Fleuri, Creveliers, and a Greek named Kapsi, are mentioned in Histoire Notelle
des Anciens Dues de I’Archipel, 306, 324. A MS. in the library of the Arsenal
at Paris, entitled “ Estat de la Marine Othomane, par de la Croix, augments des
divers voyages, combats, et rencontres des galeres dupuis l’an 1679, No. 682,”
would probably furnish some interesting information concerning the extent to
which piracy was carried at this time. See also Rycaut, Present State of the
Greek Church, 337, 356.
L.
BLACK SEA.
125
Sultan Mohammed II.
closed the Black Sea to every Christian power. After capturing in succession
all the towns possessed by the Genoese in Asia Minor and the Crimea, and
destroying their commercial establishments, in the year 1475 he occupied Caffa
(Theu- dosia) and Tana (Asof), the great depots of their eastern trade, and
expelled them from the Black Sea. From this time the western Christians were
prohibited from passing out of the Bosphorus, and during the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries no Christian flag was allowed to navigate the Euxine. All
knowledge of its shores was lost, its cities lay beyond the sphere of trade,
and the countries once frequented by Genoese and Venetian merchants became as
much a region of mystery as they had been before Jason made his voyage in
search of the golden fleece. But the seamen of Genoa still repeated vague tales
of the wealth once gained by navigating its stormy waters, and the merchants
cherished traditions of the riches of Caffa and the splendour of Trebizond.
The commercial system of
the Othoman government has generally allowed importation to be freely carried
on at fixed duties, but it has prohibited the exportation of the necessaries of
life without a special license, and it has subjected most other articles of
export to restrictions and monopolies. Under this system, trade soon
languished when foreign competition was excluded. The cities on the shores of
the Black Sea, which had been rich and populous until the time of their conquest
by the Othomans, declined and fell into ruins. The sites of many were deserted.
Cherson itself ceased to exist. The plains, which had furnished Athens with
grain, were uncultivated, and thinly peopled by nomades. Extensive provinces
became utterly desolate, and at last received a new race of inhabitants,
composed of exiles from Poland and
126 NAVAL CONQUESTS OF THE OTHOMANS.
chap. ii. fugitive slaves from Russia, who formed
several independent communities under the name of Cossacks. The Cossacks who
inhabited the banks of the Dnieper, being orthodox Christians, waged a constant
warfare with the Turks and Tartars, and, like the Russians, who had inhabited
these provinces before the invasion of the Mongols, often sought plunder and
slaves by making piratical expeditions with small vessels in the Black Sea.
In 1624 the Cossacks
entered the Bosphorus with a fleet of one hundred and fifty small galleys,
carrying each about forty men. They plundered Buyukdere, Yenikeni, and Stenia,
setting fire to the buildings in order to distract the attention of the Turks,
and prevent their being immediately pursued, and by this manoeuvre they
succeeded in escaping with their booty. Next year they plundered the environs
of Trebizond. In 1630 they pillaged the coasts of Thrace, landing at Kili,
Meidia, Sizeboli, Varna, and Baltshik, and collecting a rich booty and many
slaves. In 1639 they fought a naval battle with the Othoman fleet off the
Crimea. In 1654 they plundered the European coast near Baltshik, and the
Asiatic coast in the neighbourhood of Eregli; nor did these ravages of the
Cossacks cease, until the final conquest of Crete and the peace with Venice
enabled the Porte to send a large division of the Othoman fleet into the Black
Sea, to blockade the mouths of the rivers from which the Cossack boats issued
on their plundering expeditions.
In 1614, Maina, which,
from its rock-coast and precipitous mountains, was regarded as less exposed to
the inroads of foreign invaders than the rest of Greece, was visited by the
capitan pasha, who took strong measures to prevent a repetition of such attacks
as the Spaniards had made in 1601. The success of
GREECE RAVAGED.
127
the invaders had been
facilitated by several Greeks, both among the clergy and the laity ; and to prevent
the recurrence of similar acts of treason, the capitan pasha placed garrisons
in the forts, and made arrangements for the regular payment of the tribute to
the Porte, which from this period was collected with great regularity. In 1619
a Florentine squadron ravaged the islands of the Archipelago ; and in 1620 the
Knights of Malta plundered the coast of the Morea and captured Castel Tornese,
of which they destroyed a part of the works. In addition to these external
miseries, the sufferings of the Greek population were increased in 1622 by the
fiscal oppression of the Porte, caused by the successful revolt of the spahis.
These troops obtained from the sultan's government an order which gave them the
right of collecting the liaratch as a security for their regular payment. This
right they farmed out in districts by public auction in the mosque of Mohammed
II. at Constantinople. As the spahis in every province believed that it was
their interest to support the exactions of the farmers of the haratch from this
time, the measure tended directly to accelerate the impoverishment and
depopulation of Greece.1
The war which cost the
republic of Venice the island of Crete, owed its origin to the incessant
irritation caused by the Western corsairs in the Archipelago. Some strong
measures adopted by the Venetians to suppress the piracies committed by Turkish
and Barbary corsairs in the Adriatic, created much dissatisfaction on the part
of the Othoman government, which looked chiefly to the Mohammedan corsairs as a
protection against the Christian corsairs in the Levant, and considered it the
duty of the Venetians to suppress the piracies of these Christians. The Porte
at last resolved to seek a profit-
1 Hammer, viii. 205, 260, 316. Vertot, iv. 132. Spon, Voyage, i. 122.
A. D.
1453-1684.
128 NAVAL CONQUESTS OF THE OTHOMANS.
• able revenge, and a pretext soon presented
itself. In 1644 some Maltese galleys made a prize which offended the personal
feelings of the reigning sultan, Ibrahim. Some quarrels in the Serai had
induced the Kislaraga to undertake the pilgrimage to Mecca. He sailed from
Constantinople with three galleys, in which he had embarked his immense wealth.
Among his slaves was the nurse of the eldest son of Ibrahim, the future Sultan
Mohammed IV. The Knights of Malta were duly informed of his departure by their
spies. They attacked and captured the galleys, after a desperate combat, in
which the Kislaraga and most of the Turks of rank on board were slain. Three
hundred and fifty men, and thirty women, several of whom were young and
beautiful, were, however, secured as slaves. Among these was the young nurse
with her child, whom the Knights of Malta pretended was a son of Sultan
Ibrahim. The Maltese carried their prizes into the secluded port of Kalismene,
on the southern coast of Crete, in order to refit.
When the news of this
capture reached Constantinople the sultan w^as strongly urged to avenge the
insult; and as he feared to attack Malta, he resolved to make the Venetians
responsible for the shelter which Crete had afforded to the corsairs. The Porte
affected to consider Venice as a tributary State, which was bound to keep the
Archipelago free from Christian corsairs, in return for the great commercial
privileges it enjoyed in the Othoman empire. Immediate preparations were made
for attacking Crete, but the project w7as concealed from the
Venetian senate, under the pretence of directing the expedition against Malta.
The Venetians, however, had good reason for concluding that their possessions
offered a more inviting lure to the ambition of the Othomans than the fortress
of Malta, and that Crete would be invaded in the same
WAR IN CANDIA, 1645.
129
treacherous manner as
Cyprus; but the republic resolved to make every sacrifice to avoid war. Though
the sultan remained at peace with the republic, several circumstances occurred
which convinced the senate that hostilities could not be avoided. A Venetian
ship, laden with stores for Candia, was attacked by some Turkish corsairs. One
of the Turkish ships was sunk, but the others which escaped spread the report
as far as Constantinople, that they had been assailed by the Venetians.1
Yet, as the sultan still refrained from declaring war, the republic hoped that
its explanations, both with regard to the impossibility of preventing the
entrance of the Maltese into the desert port in Crete, and the proofs that the
transport had only acted in self-defence, w^ere satisfactory to the Porte. The
republic flattered itself that the storm preparing at Constantinople would
really burst on Malta.
The Othoman expedition,
after assembling its forces at Chios and Carystos, and embarking additional
troops at the port of Thermisi, in Argolis, collected its whole force at
Navarin. It was not until it sailed from that port that the real object of
attack was announced to
1 The
Othoman government was never more insolent to the Christians than at this time.
Rycaut, 59, mentions an anecdote which proves that the oppressive conduct of
the government to Christian traders at Constantinople rivalled the rapacity of
the corsairs at sea.—P. 58. In 1649, thirteen English ships were forced to
transport troops and ammunition to Crete.—P. 83. In 1662, eleven Englishmen
were taken by the Turks and reduced to slavery. They were part of the crew of
the “ Ann,” an English frigate, whose captain landed sixty men to cut wood in
the Morea. The ambassador, who could not reclaim them, as they were taken
plundering and burning the forests, ransomed them for one thousand four hundred
dollars.—P. 129. Justice seemed to have been as little respected by the
Christians as by the Turks, in the East, at this time; though on one occasion
the mufti observed, that the English always persisted in what they said, even
at the peril of their lives; which he considered a proof of their obstinacy,
and of the rudeness of their nature.—Hammer, x. 268. Though the king of France
affected to be the stanchest friend of the sultan in Christendom, and his
representative at Constantinople claimed to be treated with peculiar honours,
the French now fared no better than others. In 1658, M. de la Haye, the French
ambassador, sent his son to confer with the grand vizier Mohammed Kueprily, who
was then at Adrianople. The grand vizier, offended at the behaviour of the
envoy, ordered his servants to administer the bastinado to young De la Haye,
which was done with great severity. The ambassador himself was subsequently
imprisoned, and Louis XIV. was forced to digest the insult.—Hammer, xi. 45.
I
A. D.
1453-1684.
130 NAVAL CONQUESTS OF THE OTHOMANS.
chap. ii. the captains of the ships. The announcement
was received with enthusiasm, for the disastrous siege of Malta in 1565 made
the bravest Turks fearful of attacking that distant fortress. In the month of
June 1645, the Othoman army landed before Canea, which capitulated on the 17th
of August. This treacherous commencement of the war authorised the Christian powers
to dispense with all the formalities of international law in lending assistance
to the Venetians during the celebrated war of Candia, which lasted nearly
twenty-five years. During this long struggle the Venetians generally
maintained the superiority at sea, but they were unable to prevent the Othoman
navy, whenever it exerted its full force, from throwing in supplies of fresh
troops and ample stores, by which the Othoman army- was enabled to command the
whole island, and kept Candia, and the other fortresses in the hands of the
republic, either blockaded or besieged. The Greeks generally favoured the
Turks, who encouraged them to cultivate their lands by purchasing the produce
at a liberal price, for the use of the army. Indeed, the communications of the
invading army with the Othoman empire were so often interrupted for many
months, that, without the supplies it derived from the Greek cultivators, it
would have been impossible to have maintained a footing in Crete. The fact that
the Othoman troops found the means of persisting in the undertaking until
success at last rewarded their perseverance, is of itself a strong testimony
in favour of the excellent discipline of the Othoman armies in the field, which
forms a strange contrast with the venality and rapacity of the civil and
judicial administration at Constantinople. The Venetians in vain endeavoured
to compel the Turks to abandon the siege of Candia, by landing troops on
different parts of the island and destroying the harvests of the Greek inhabitants.
No
WAll OF CANDIA.
131
important result was produced by the partial devasta- 14rA3-1®-84
tion of small
districts by bodies of men who dared not ___________________ ’
venture to remain long
on shore, or to march to any great distance from their ships. The spirit of pillage
displayed, both by the officers and men, generally rendered the enterprises of
the Venetians ineffectual as military operations.1 The squadrons of
the republic often ravaged the coasts of the Othoman empire, and on one
occasion they carried off about five thousand slaves from the coast of the
Morea, between Patras and Coron.2 In the'year 1656, after Mocenigo’s
great victory at the Dardanelles, they took possession of the islands of
Tenedos and Lemnos, but they were driven from these conquests by the Othoman
fleet in the following year.
At the end of the year
1666, the grand vizier,
Achmet Kueprily, one of the greatest ministers of the Othoman empire,
took the command of the siege of Candia. The whole naval force of Venice, and
numerous bands of French and Italian volunteers, attempted to force the grand
vizier to raise the siege ; but the skill of the Italian engineers, the valour
of the French nobles, and the determined perseverance of Morosini, were vain
against the strict discipline and steady valour of the Othoman troops. The
works of the besiegers were pushed forward by the labours of a numerous body
of Greek pioneers, and the fire of the powerful batteries at last rendered the
place untenable.
At this crisis Morosini proved himself a daring statesman and a sincere
patriot. When he found that he must surrender the city, he resolved to make his
capitulation the means of purchasing peace for the republic.
1 Dam, Jlistoire de Venise, iv.
603. Hammer, xi. 103.
2 It was on
hearing of these ravages of the Venetians, that sultan Ibrahim is said to have
proposed exterminating the Christians (see above, page 36); but his rage was
probably chiefly directed against the Catholics in Turkey, as friends and spies
of the Venetians, not against his own orthodox subjects, who displayed a
preference to the Othoman domination at this period.—Hammer, x. 111.
132
NAVAL CONQUESTS OF THE OTHOMANS.
chap. ii. The step was a bold one, for though the
senate was convinced of the necessity of concluding a treaty as soon as possible,
the extreme jealousy of the Venetian government made it dangerous for Morosini
to venture on concluding a treatywithout express authority. Morosini, however,
seeing the peril to which his country would be exposed, if the favourable
moment which now presented itself for concluding a peace was lost, assumed all
the responsibility of the act, and signed the treaty. Its conditions were
ratified by the senate, but the patriotic general was accused of high treason
on his return to
o O
Venice. He was honourably
acquitted, but remained for many years unemployed. On the 27th September 1669,
Achmet Kueprily received the keys of Candia, and the republic of Venice
resigned all right to the island of Crete, but retained possession of the three
insular fortresses of Karabusa, Suda, and Spinalonga, with their valuable
ports. No fortress is said to have cost so much blood and treasure, both to the
besiegers and the defenders, as Candia; yet the Greeks, in whose territory it
was situated, and who could have furnished an army from the inhabitants of
Crete sufficiently numerous to have decided the issue of the contest, were the
people on the shores of the Mediterranean who took least part in this memorable
war. So utterly destitute of all national feeling was the Hellenic race at this
period.1
The position of Maina
has given that district a degree of importance in the modern history of Greece
incommensurate with the numbers of the inhabitants, and with the influence it
has exercised on the Greek nation. Pedants have termed the Maniats descendants
1 During the war of Candia, several of the islands of
the Archipelago were compelled to pay their taxes twice over; for as the
Venetians generally commanded the sea, they levied payment by force, while
policy induced the inhabitants to remit the usual amount of tribute to the
Porte.—Relation de VIsle de Sant-Erini, par le Pere Richard, 29, 376,
SUBJUGATION OF MAINA.
133
of the ancient Spartans, though the Spartan race was extinct before the
Roman conquest; and history points clearly to the alternative, that they must
be either descended from the Helots, who became freemen after the extinction of
the Spartans, or from the Periaikoi, who disappear as a separate class in the
great body of Roman provincials. To an older genealogy they can have no
pretensions. The population of the twenty- four Laconian towns, which received
the confirmation of their municipal charters from Augustus as Eleuthero-
Lacones, consisted of burghers, who, as a privileged caste, would become
extinct when the towns they inhabited became depopulated; nor did it ever
include the majority of the rural labourers, from whom the Maniats must be
descended. We learn from Pausanias, that about a century and a half after these
towns received their charters, six had already ceased to exist; of the eighteen
whose names he records, only eight are situated within the limits of Maina.1
It is said that Maina never submitted to a foreign conqueror. Though the
assertion is repeated by many writers of authority, it is a vulgar error. It
might, perhaps, be said with greater truth, that order and justice never
reigned in Maina; but foreign force has more than once established the
supremacy of strangers since the extinction of the Roman domination. It is
impossible not to feel some admiration for a small population which shows
itself always ready to make some sacrifices to defend its independence against
foreigners. Our sympathy leads us to overlook the evils of the state of anarchy
which makes every man a warrior, and we fondly admit, on the scantiest proof,
that the patriotic cause which we approve has met with the success it merited.
A disposition to eulogise every armed resistance to power has also caused the
misap-
1 Tausanias, iii. 21, 6.
A. D.
1453-1684.
134 NAVAL CONQUESTS OF THE OTHOMANS.
chap. ii. plication of a good deal of rhetoric by
continental writers, who have made Maina the medium for parading a love of
liberty, which shunned exhaling itself in domestic patriotism. The fact is,
that Maina has submitted to the domination of the Eomans, the Byzantine
emperors, the Sclavonians, the Franks, the Venetians, and the Othoman sultans,
but it has never been a servile, and rarely an obedient province.
The geographical
configuration of the mountain range, which forms the great promontory called
Maina, renders it of difficult access by land as well as by sea, and it has
successfully repulsed many invaders, and obtained favourable treatment from
every conqueror. Its population being dependent for many of the necessaries of
life on foreign commerce, is easily compelled to submit to reasonable terms of
capitulation when attacked by an enemy powerful enough to occupy its ports and
blockade its coasts, and prudent enough not to attempt any expedition into the
interior of the country, as was seen by the ease with which the capitan pasha
compelled it to pay the haratsh in 1614.
Another prevalent error
concerning Maina is, that it is a poor, arid, and desert country. This is very
far from being the case with its two northern divisions. In the year 1843,
Maina was more densely peopled and more productive than Attica, excluding
Athens from the calculation, as being the capital of the Greek kingdom, and the
seat of a centralised system of administration. Maina is divided by nature
into three divisions, western, eastern, and southern. The district lying to
the west of the great ridge of Tay- getus overlooks the plain of Messenia, and
possesses two ports, from which its commercial business is carried on, Armyros
and Vitylos.1 It exports a con-
1 The
produce of Western or *E£oo Main] is described, Merabi, AaSi nepicro-ov,
KOI TrpiVO
KOKKO KajAVei.
MAINA.
135
siderable quantity of silk, oil, valonia, and red dye, and imports grain
and iron. The wealth of this district in the thirteenth century is mentioned by
Pachymeres, and is recorded in a poem written towards the end of the
eighteenth.1 The eastern district, of which Marathonisi is the
principal port, is nearly as populous and as productive as the western. Its
exports consist of valonia and silk ; but, formerly, it exported a considerable
quantity of cotton.2 The southern district, on the contrary, is a
promontory of barren rocks, terminating in Cape Matapan. It commences at
Tzimova, and is called by the northern Maniats, as well as by the other Greeks,
on account of the manners of its inhabitants, Kakavoulia, the land of bad
designs. The furious winds which generally prevail arrest vegetation ; yet,
wherever there is a ravine with a little soil, it is laboriously cultivated by
the women, and the population is considerable. AVlieaten bread is rarely seen,
and the common food is a black cake made of lupins. The poem already mentioned
sarcastically notices its products, as consisting of quails and the fruit of
the cactus. Beans and barley are luxuries.3 Its inhabitants have
been for ages more celebrated for their piracies than for their independence.
The Byzantine emperors and the western crusaders appear to have found that the
only manner by which they could restrain the piracy of the southern Maniats was
by destroying all the towns on the coasts. Of
1 Pachymeres,
i. 52. I have quoted the passage in Medieval Greece and Trebizond, p. 231. The
poem was found by Colonel Leake, and some part of it, with a translation of the
remainder, is published by him in his Travels in the Morea, vol. i. p. 332. The
whole poem is printed in Das Griechische Volk, by Maurer, vol. iii. p. 1. He is
wrong, however, in supposing that the date is the time of Tzanet Koutouphari,
who was named Bey of Maina by Hassan Ghazi. The Tzanet of the poem was
Gligoraki, who held the office of Bey for ten years, from 17S5 to 1795, when he
w;is deposed for favouring French influence.
2 The
produce of Eastern or Kara) ~Mavr) is thus described,—'Ottov @a[i(3dia TTtpia'O'bv Ka\
@e\avldi Kapvei.
3 ’OpriKia; ko.\ (frpayKoavm f) npdiTrjs tovs
Ivrpada, ,
'Kapnov, kovkk'ui povaxa kat ^epoicpfci Kapvei.
A. D.
1453-1684.
136 NAVAL CONQUESTS OF THE OTHOMANS.
ciiap. ii. these
towns, and of the cisterns which supplied them with water, considerable remains
still exist. After the destruction of their towns, the people became even more
dependent on piracy for their subsistence than they had been previously. Their
poverty, their strange usages, their patience under privations, their thefts, their
bloody feuds, and the daring courage displayed in their acts of piracy,
rendered the Kakavouliots the wonder and the terror of the other Greeks. The
vices of their character and the peculiarities of their country were thus
attributed to all the Maniats.1
The celebrity of Maina,
and the independence it had assumed during the war of Candia, which secured to
it the protection of the Venetian fleet, induced Achmet Kueprily to take
measures for its complete subjection. He knew that as long as the pirates of Maina
remained unpunished, and the ports of Maina afforded shelter to Venetian and
Maltese cruisers, the commerce of Crete would be insecure and the conquest
imperfect. Accordingly, in the year 1670, while Achmet was reposing at Chios
after his victory, he sent Kuesy Ali Pasha with a strong naval and military
force to re-establish the sultan's supremacy in Maina. The piratical vessels of
Port Quaglio and of Tzim- ova were pursued into their places of refuge, and
captured or burned; but the Othoman force made no attempt to attack the
Kakavouliots in their fastnesses. On the other hand, the inhabitants of the
northern part of Maina, being dependent on foreign commerce, were easily
compelled to submit. Ali Pasha occupied the ports of Armyros, Vitylos, and Marathonisi
with his fleet, and landed troops, who succeeded in occupying the fortresses
of Zarnata, Kielapha, and Passava.
1 Avtol Ttjv Mavrjv rrjv Xomrjv, ttjv KdKovofxcnt£ovv, Kai onov ndyovv
rovofia avrrjs to ^oyar'i^ovv.
\
SUBJUGATION OF MAINA, 1G70. 137
By this means he
obtained complete command over the communications of the Maniats with the sea.
The forts were repaired, armed with artillery, and strongly garrisoned. No
expedition of Turkish troops was attempted into the interior, but Ali executed
the orders of Achmet Kueprily with ability as well as energy; he formed
alliances with several of the leading chief©
tains who were engaged
in feuds with their neighbours, and by supplying them with arms and ammunition,
and refusing to employ Mussulman troops in their broils, he rendered himself
arbiter of their disputes. He then showed them that it was in his power to ruin
and even to starve them, unless they consented to submit to his orders and pay
haratsh to the sultan. The amount which they agreed to pay for haratsh was only
fifteen purses, at that time rather more than £1500 sterling ; but whether
haratsh tickets were distributed by the chieftains among the rural population,
either in 1614 or at this time, seems not to be accurately known. By some it is
asserted to have been the case; by others it is denied. The regular
custom-duties were exacted on the exports of Maina by the Turkish authorities
at Armyros, Zarnata, Yitylos, Kielapha, Marathonisi, and Passava, but they were
generally farmed to Maniat chieftains; while, to repress permanently the
piracies on the coast, Othoman galleys were stationed at Tzimova and Port
Quaglio. By these measures Achmet Kueprily gave a degree of security to the
commerce of the Levant which it had not enjoyed for many years ; and his fame
as a statesman in Christendom soon rivalled the military glory he had gained as
the conqueror of Candia. The Othoman garrisons diminished the influence of the
chieftains, and deprived many of those who had long lived by feuds and piracy
of their means of livelihood ; but, at the same time, property was not
A. D.
1453-1684.
138 NAVAL CONQUESTS OF THE OTHOMANS.
rendered more secure, nor industry more profitable. The Maniats,
consequently, became eager to quit their country, and as soon as it was known
that they would meet a good reception from the Neapolitan viceroys, a
considerable emigration took place to Apulia.1 About the same time
another colony of Maniats emigrated to Corsica.2
A considerable decrease took place in the numbers of the Greek race
during the seventeenth century, and a still greater decline is observable in
the material wealth and moral condition of the people. Communications by sea
and land became more difficult for the Greeks, who were reduced to live in a
more secluded, poorer, and ruder manner. In the mean time, the numbers of the
Turkish landed proprietors and militia increased, and janissaries were
permanently formed into corporations in the principal towns. Thus, the relative
importance of the Greek to the Turkish population was diminished on the
continent, and in the islands misery and the ravages of the corsairs were
thinning the numbers of the inhabitants. It was during this century that many
fresh colonies of Albanians took possession of the Hellenic soil.3
The Greeks were never so much depressed and despised,
1 Spoil, i. 123. Gend-Schreiben
aus dem lager vor Modon vom 19/29 Julii 16S6, welches von ein und andern
denckwiirdigen Sachen selbiger gegenden und angrantzenden See-kusten handelt,
page 10. A small German tract, printed in 1686, written by a
volunteer in the Saxon contingent of the Venetian army.
2 It was on
the 3d October 1673, that an emigration of seven hundred and fifty persons took
place from Vitylos. These families, after passing the winter at Genoa, were
settled by the Senate on lands granted to them by the Republic at Paomio in
Corsica. The greater part of these colonists are said to have been expelled
from the island on account of their attachment to Genoa, in the year 1730, when
the Corsicans rebelled, but a few families remained at Ajaccio when France took
possession of Corsica.—Villemain, Esscti historique sur Vitat des Greet, 123.
3 The
majority of the peasantry of the island of Ios was of the Albanian race in the
early part of the seventeenth century. If any of their descendants remain at
present, they have forgotten their language, and laid aside their peculiar
customs. The present inhabitants appear to be entirely Greek.— Relation de Vide
de Sant-Erini, par le Pere Richard, 337. The Albanians were settled in Ios by
Mark Crispo, brother of John III., Duke of Naxos, a.d.
1438- 1451.—Jlistoire nouvelle des anciens Dues de
VArchipel, 214.
APOSTASY OF CHRISTIANS.
139
and never was the number of renegades so consider- a.d.
able among the middle and lower orders of society. _____________________ ‘
Immediately after the conquest of the Greek empire, the higher orders had
shown much greater readiness to forsake their religion than the mass of the
nation. We find several pashas of the name of Paleologos among the renegades, and
the learned George Amiroutzes of Trebizond abandoned the orthodox faith in his
declining years, not to mention innumerable examples of less eminent persons.
The Greeks at that time were not exposed to any very serious sufferings on
account of their religion. They were, indeed, treated with greater toleration
by their Mohammedan than by their Catholic masters, and they suffered less
fiscal oppression from the sultans than they had previously suffered from their
native emperors. Until the end of the sixteenth century the Othoman government
was remarkable for the religious toleration it displayed.
The Jews, when expelled from Spain, were charitably received in Turkey.
The orthodox who were denied the exercise of their religious forms in Italy,
and the heretics who were driven into exile by the tyranny of the inquisition,
found that toleration in the Othoman dominions which was denied in every
Christian land.
The religious bigotry of the Mussulmans was always strong; but their
spirit of persecution was now animated by the injustice and intolerance of the
Christians—by the expulsion of their co-religionaries from Spain—and by the
refusal of every Christian power with whom they held intercourse to allow the
public exercise of the Mohammedan worship, and the erection of mosques in
Christian cities. Still, it was not from direct oppression that the number of
the Greek renegades was increased towards the middle of the seventeenth
century. Those who quitted the orthodox faith were led to take that step by a
140 NAVAL CONQUESTS OF THE OTHOMANS.
chap. it. feeling of despair at their despised position in society, and
by a desire to bear arms and mix in active life. The spirit of the age was
military, and violence was one of its characteristics. The Greeks could only
defend their families against the insolence of the Turks and the rapacity of
the Frank corsairs by changing their religion ; when galled by acts of
injustice, and eager for revenge, they often flew to the most violent and most
effectual remedy their imagination could suggest, and embraced Mohammedanism.
David Chytraeus, who witnessed the public rejoicings at the circumcision
of Mohammed, the son of Murad
III. (a.d. 1582), tells us that he
then witnessed the miserable spectacle of a great number of Greeks embracing
the Mohammedan faith. On this occasion about one hundred Christians, Greeks,
Albanians, and Bulgarians, daily abjured the Christian religion during the
whole period of the celebration, which lasted forty days.1 Cases of
apostasy are even found among the highest dignitaries of the orthodox church,
and in 1661 an ex-metropolitan of Rhodes had the honour of being the first
Mussulman who was condemned to death by a fetva of the mufti.2 The
preponderant influence of the tribute children and of renegades in the
administration of the Othoman empire, and the great inducement held out to
apostasy, is proved by the fact, that the greater number of the grand viziers
before the middle of the seventeenth century were either renegades or the
children of Christians, Greeks, Albanians, and Sclavonians. Of the forty-eight
grand viziers who succeeded to the office after the conquest of Constantinople,
twelve only were native Turks.3 A
1 Compare
Chytrceus, Hodoeporicon, in Lonicerus, ii. 202, 8vo, and Hammer, vii. 151.
2 Hammer,
xi. 117. 3 Hammer, viii.
421.
APOSTASY OF CHRISTIANS.
141
large portion of the Greek population in Euboea and Crete embraced the
Mohammedan religion, and about the end of the seventeenth century it is
supposed that at least a million of the Mussulmans in Europe were descended
from Christian parents, who had abjured their religion.
CHAPTER III.
SOCIAL CONDITION OF THE GREEKS UNTIL THE EXTINCTION OF THE TRIBUTE OF
CHRISTIAN CHILDREN. A.D. 1453-1676.
The
cultivators op the soil become the true representatives of the Greek nation
during three centuries—Decline in the numbers and civilisation of the Greek
race during this period—A certain degree of improvement takes place in the
material wealth op the town population—Animosity between the Greeks and Catholics—
Toleration displayed by Mohammed II.— Contrast between the
MORAL CONDITION OF THE
GREEKS AND TURKS AT THIS PERIOD—INFLUENCE or Monachism
on Greek society—Position of the Greek Church at the time of the Othoman
Conquest—Re-establishment op an Orthodox Patriarch at Constantinople by
Mohammed II.—Simo-
NIACAL ELECTIONS OF THE
PATRIARCHS—STORY OF A TRICK BY WHICH THE
Greeks
pretend that the Patriarch Jeremiah saved the churches in Constantinople—The
Greek laity abstained from appealing to Othoman courts of justice more steadily
than the clergy—Increase of ecclesiastical corruption in the Orthodox
Church—General good conduct of the secular clergy in the rural parishes preserved
the profound reverence of the Greek people for their National Church—Political
and social position of the Greek laity—Effect of the immigration of the Spanish
Jews into the Levant on the position of the Greek population in the towns—
Order prevalent in the cities of the Othoman empire—Extinction
OF THE TRIBUTE OF
CHRISTIAN CHILDREN.
The moral change in the people, produced by the submission
of Greece to the Turks, was effected with unexampled rapidity, for a single
generation extinguished all the boasted intelligence of the Hellenic race, and
effaced every sentiment of patriotism and moral dignity in the higher orders of
society. The people resigned themselves to passive slavery, but the nobles and
dignified clergy became active as well as servile sycophants. The
1 b Mere soft
RURAL POPULATION.
143
sack of Constantinople, and the depopulation of Trebizond, destroyed the
power of the aristocracy, and drove the learned into exile. This, though a
calamity to the courtiers and pedants, who had consumed a large portion of the
fiscal burdens imposed on the people, was a great national benefit, since it
swept away a class of men who had formed an insuperable barrier to the moral
improvement of a degraded nation, and to the political reform of a corrupt
administration. The destruction of the influence of the higher classes
relieved the people from the trammels of innumerable privileges and monopolies.
The first effect of the extinction of the Byzantine aristocracy, and the
flight of the literary men, was to constitute the provincial landowners and the
peasant cultivators of the soil the real representatives of the nation. The
agricultural classes formed at this period the majority of the Greeks, and,
though ignorant and bigoted, they were far superior to the aristocracy they
replaced in usefulness and honesty. The inhabitants of each rural district, and
often of each valley in the mountains, lived in a state of isolation, connected
with the world beyond its limits only by the payment of taxes to the sultan’s
government, and of ecclesiastical dues to the orthodox church. They were
profoundly ignorant of all the political events which were passing beyond their
own horizon. Their religion alone awakened some general ideas in their minds,
but the priesthood, to whom they owed these ideas, possessed only such elements
of knowledge as were accordant with a corrupt ecclesiastical system. The
intellectual cultivation of the Greeks was consequently restricted for nearly
two centuries to a very slight acquaintance with the national literature, from
which they imbibed little more than a vague persuasion of their own superiority
over the rest of mankind, as being Romans and
A. D.
1453-1670.
144 SOCIAL CONDITION OF THE GREEKS.
(
chap. hi. Christians—the true representatives of the ancient conquerors
of the world, and the only followers of the pure orthodox faith.1
This ignorance of the world at large restricted the feelings of the Greeks to a
few local and hereditary prejudices. Their thoughts were divided between the
strict observance of ecclesiastical formalities and the eager pursuit of their
individual interests. Superstition and bigotry became the most prominent
national characteristics of the rural population during the following
centuries.
As soon as the great translocations of the inhabitants of various parts
of Greece, effected by order of Mohammed II., had been completed, and the
Othoman administration regularly established, the condition of the rural
population was found to be much more tolerable under the government of the
sultan and his pashas than it had been under the Greek emperor and his despots.
The agricultural classes were harassed by fewer exactions of forced labour,
extraordinary contributions were rarely levied, and proved a trifling burden
when compared with the endless feudal obliga-
1 'Pco/xaioi Ka\ Xpia-riavoi Until the revival of
learning among the Greeks, towards the end of the last century, when they
caught the enthusiasm for libei’ty awakened by the success of the American
Revolution, they had been proud of the name of Romans. The appellation
Hellenes, was given only to the pagans of ancient Greece. Even at present,
although the Greeks have imbibed their political civilisation from the French
school of the Revolution, they still arrogate exclusive orthodoxy to their
Church, and the people restrict the appellation of Christians solely to the
Eastern Church. Before the commencement of the present century, no modern
Greek would have boasted of any ancestral connection with the pagan Hellenes,
any more than he would yet think of pretending to a Pelasgic, Dorian, Ionian,
or Achaian pedigree.
The Greeks now overlook the fact, that where there have been no
genealogies there can be no purity of blood. Of all people it might be thought
that the Greeks would be the least disposed to talk much of their ancestors, as
they must ascend through immediate progenitors who have been slaves and sycophants
for two thousand years, before they reach the last rays of liberty.
Verily, the blood of Aristides, if it still flow in living veins, has
flowed through polluted channels. Tacitus tells us that the race of the old
Athenian citizens was extinct in his day, and that Athens was then, as it is at
present, peopled by an assemblage of men of different races. The native
Athenians are only one-third of the whole population, and of these native Athenians
more than one-third are of the Albanian race, who still use their own language
in the streets of the capital of the Greek kingdom.—Tac., Ann. ii. c. 55.
id A crosost
RURAL POPULATION.
U5
tions of the Frank, or the oppressive extortions of the Byzantine
sovereignty. The material advantages enjoyed by the bulk of the Greek
population at the commencement of the Othoman domination appear quickly to
have reconciled the people to their Mussulman masters, and even the tithe of
their male children was not considered too high a price for this increased
security. A single child of each family was sent out into the darkness of
Mohammedanism, as a scape offering to preserve the flesh-pots of a Christian
generation. The tameness and silence with which the Greek rural population
submitted to this cruel exaction for two centuries, is the strongest proof of
the ignorance and demoralisation of the Hellenic race.
The conquest of Greece by the Turks diminished the extent of country
peopled by the Greeks. Large bodies of the population were removed to
Constantinople and other cities of the sultan’s dominions, to replace the
ravages of war. The losses arising from these forced emigrations would, in all
probability, have been soon replaced by the natural increase of the surviving
Greek peasantry, had the state of the country allowed the cultivators of the
soil to improve their condition. But this was the case only to a limited
extent. The introduction of the feudal or timariot system created a Turkish
military aristocracy in the rich agricultural districts in Greece; and no
condition of society has proved more adverse to the increase of population, or
to an amelioration of the condition of the people, than that in which a
hereditary militia of proprietors has formed the predominant class. On the
other hand, the Greek landowners, who had been in easy circumstances before
the conquest, were no longer able to obtain slaves for the cultivation of their
estates, nor to retain their former serfs by force, and they conse-
146 SOCIAL CONDITION OF THE GREEKS.
chap. hi. quently soon descended to the rank of peasant proprietors, and
were compelled to till their lands with their own labour. Their rights of
pasturage, their property in fruit-bearing trees of the forest like the Yalonia
oak, and in wild dye-woods, their profits from limekilns and charcoal, were all
confiscated as invasions of the fisc, or transferred to Turkish feudatories,
who received grants of estates in their vicinity. The burdens of the Greek
villagers and peasant proprietors were lightened, but the change exterminated
the old Greek aristocracy. This was certainly no loss to the nation, for never
did a meaner or more unprincipled set of men exist, as we find them portrayed
in the life-like sketch of the archonts of the Morea, by Cantacuzenos, unless,
indeed, they be compared with the official aristocracy created by the Othoman
administration, and called Phana- riots, from the filthy quarter of the Phanar
in Constantinople where they dwelt and carried on their intrigues.
Even the peasant proprietors in many districts did not long enjoy the
relief from oppression which cheered them during the early period of the
Othoman domination. The devastations of war, the incursions of corsairs, the
exactions of the Othoman officials, and the diminution of consumption, caused
by the increased difficulties of transport, entailed the destruction of olive
groves, orchards, and vineyards. The Mussulman drank no wine, but he loved to
sit by a public fountain under a broad platane tree. A portion of the water
which the Greeks had reserved for their gardens, was turned into the court of
the mosque, and wasted on the roadside in numerous fountains. A little care,
and a slight increase of expenditure, would have enabled the spring to supply
the gardens and the fountains; but few things have succeeded that required the
smallest degree of constant care on the part of the Turks, and nothing
ALBANIANS Ttf GREECE.
has yet prospered that demanded unity of purpose between Othomans and
Greeks.
The Othoman conquest soon effected a considerable change in the extent of
country occupied by the Greek race, and in which the Greek language -was until
then predominant. Several extensive tracts in Thrace, Macedonia, and Thessaly
were now occupied by pastoral tribes from Asia Minor, called Yuruks, or were
granted as military fiefs to the Seljouk Turks, who had taken service under the
early Othoman sultans, and received the name of Koniarides or Iconians.1
These two classes are probably the only portion of the Mussulman population in
European Turkey which is not descended from Christian renegades or from
tribute-chil- dren. The Greeks ceased to form a native element in the
population of Bulgaria, Servia, and Bosnia, where the place they had occupied
in the urban population was filled by the Othoman Turks. Even within the limits
of Greece and the Peloponnesus the Greek rural population abandoned the
districts ravaged and denuded by war to the Albanian race, which extended its
settlements, and became the sole inhabitants of many sites celebrated in
ancient history. The Greek language was banished from its classic haunts. The
names of Olympia, Delphi, and Nemea, were unknown on the spot where all the
Greeks had assembled. Albanian peasants cultivated the fields of Marathon and
Platea, drove their ploughshares over the roomy streets of the Homeric Mycenae,
and fed their flocks on Helicon and Parnassus. The whole surface of Boeotia,
Attica, Megaris, Corinthia, and Argolis, a considerable part of Laconia,
several districts in Messenia, and a portion of Arcadia, Elis, and Achaia, were
colonised by Albanians, whose descendants preserve their peculiar language and
manners, their simple social habits, and their rude
1 Leake,
Travels in Northern Greece, iii. 171.
A. D.
1453-1676.
148 SOCIAL CONDITION OF THE GREEKS.
system of agriculture,
to the present day.1 In these districts the Turks dwelt as a
territorial aristocracy, while the Greeks only survived in the towns as artisans
and shopkeepers. The colonisation of so large a portion of the eastern shores
of Greece by an alien race, in an inferior grade of civilisation, was one of
the causes which tended to diminish the influence of the Greek race during the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.
The energetic government
of Mohammed II. revived the commerce of his Greek subjects. The concessions
which the Italian republics had extorted from the rapacity and weakness of the
Byzantine and Greek emperors, were abolished ; and the Othoman domination
restored to the Greeks a share in the commerce of the Levant. Unfortunately the
fiscal corruption of the sultan's government soon favoured the commerce of
foreigners more than that of natives. Political advantages and large presents
obtained relaxations of duties for the subjects of foreign states, which
individual native merchants could not purchase, and the commerce of the Levant
was again transferred to the western nations, and the whole coasting trade was
destroyed by pirates. The Venetians and Genoese laboured indefatigably to
secure to themselves commercial monopolies in the Othoman empire, and to render
the reciprocity of trade, which they were compelled to grant to the subjects of
the sultan, an empty privilege.2 The authority of the
1 The words
of Byron—
“ Their place of birth alone is mute To sounds which echo farther west
Than their sires’ islands of the blest”— are more literally true than most of
his readers suppose. I have visited hundreds of villages in Greece, and there
are some at this moment in Attica, in spite of kingdom, constitution, and
university, in which many of the women and children under ten years of age
understand very few words of Greek.
2 Even the
republic of Ragusa complained to the sultan, as its protector, of the
strictness of the Venetian protective system in 1484, which threatened to put
an end to the trade of Ragusa. The Venetians declared the existence of their
state depended on the maintenance of their prohibitive system.—Nava- giero,
<Storia Italiana. Muratori, Scrip. Her. Ital., xxiii. 1191. See some of the
orders of the senate on this subject in Marin, vii. 326, 347.
COMMERCE.
149
Othoman government,
nevertheless, enabled the Greeks
O 7 7 ■
to raise their commerce
from the depressed condition into which it had fallen under the Greek emperors.
Many restrictions on the coasting trade with the Frank and Venetian possessions
were removed, and the material interests of the boatmen and petty merchants of
Greece were undoubtedly benefited by the conquest, though their advantages were
not so apparent as those of the cultivators of the soil and of the regular
clergy. Sultan Mohammed II. brought so great an alleviation of the sufferings
of the people, by putting an end to the domestic feuds of the nobles, the civil
wars of the despots, and the fiscal oppression of the emperors, that we must
not wonder that he was regarded as a benefactor by the majority of the Greeks,
in spite of the declamations of orators and historians. The tame submission of
Greece to the dominion of its earliest Mussulman conquerors is at least easily
explained. Thus we find that the material condition of the lower orders in
Greece was considerably improved at the time when the higher orders were
exterminated or degraded. Unfortunately, the causes which enabled the people to
better their condition physically, produced a moral and social debasement of
the whole Hellenic race. The diminished population lived with little labour in
plenteous ease. Olives, oil, fruit, wine, and silk were abundant. The plains
were so easily cultivated as to furnish large supplies of wheat, of which a
part was annually exported. Venice was dependent on the Othoman empire for the
greater part of the grain it consumed during the fifteenth and sixteenth
centuries ; and the liberty of exporting wheat to France from Cyprus, the
Morea, Negrepont, and Albania, was a favour which the diplomatic agents of the
King of France often solicited from the Porte.1
1 Guicciardini,
Istoria d'Italia, 1. vi. p. 320. Wine, oil, soap,
cheese, salt,
150 SOCIAL CONDITION OF THE GREEKS.
chap. hi. The Greeks failed to secure to themselves
any permanent advantages from the various favourable circumstances in which
they were placed by the revival of their commerce, and the increased demand for
the produce of their soil. As had been the case for centuries, their national
character was in disaccord with their position. Partly from the jealous and
envious disposition that prevents their uniting together for a common object,
or acting in concord for any length of time, and partly from the suspicion with
which any popular action was regarded by the clergy, the Phana- riots, and the
Othoman government, the Greeks could neither form great mercantile associations,
permanent and influential banking companies, nor well-organised rural
municipalities. To carry on a secure and profitable commerce by sea it was
necessary to possess large and well-armed vessels, for the freight of goods was
thereby reduced one half. Now, it was only by singular favour and constant
bribes to Turkish pashas that a Greek vessel could obtain a license to carry
arms, or when armed, escape being treated as a pirate, in consequence of the
jealousy of rival merchants in every port of the Mediterranean.
The long contests
between the Greek clergy and the court of Rome, which had prevailed from the
recognition of the papal supremacy by Michael VIII. (Paleo- logos), were only
terminated by the death of the last Constantine, who died in communion with the
Pope.
morocco leather, dyeing materials, fruit, flax, cotton, silk, and
valonia, were imported into Italy, as well as grain.—Marin, Sturia del
commercio de Venezi- cini, vii. 188, 203. Wheat into France.—Negotiations dans
le Levant, iii. 902. Cattle and grain were exported from the Morea and
lloumelia to Sicily and Marseilles, at the end of the seventeenth
century.—Spon, Voyage d’ltalie, de Dalmatie, de Grece et du Levant, fait es
annees 1675 et 1676, ii. 5,7,19. Currants were imported into England in large
quantities at the beginning of the seventeenth century. English ships visited
both Zante and Cephalonia; and at the latter island they paid export duties to
the republic of Venice for currants alone, to the amount of forty thousand scudi
annually.— Voyage de Levant, par le
Sieur des-Hayes, en l’annee 1621, p. 452, 468.
■ft
RELIGIOUS RIVALRIES.
151
The religious bigotry of
the orthodox clergy, which had reached the highest pitch of frenzy during the
last years of the Greek empire, was calmed by the calamities which attended
the sack of Constantinople,—for the orthodox viewed this great catastrophe as a
divine judgment on the imperial heretic. The Greek priesthood, in the long
struggle it carried on with the imperial government and the papal power, had
succeeded in persuading the people that orthodoxy in doctrine, and the strict
observance of ecclesiastical forms, were the true symbols of Greek nationality.
The Greeks warmly espoused these opinions, and loudly expressed their thoughts with
all their usual volubility and confidence. The orthodox enthusiasm was
undoubtedly both national and sincere, yet never did such a loud and general
expression of public opinion produce so little moral effect. History has
transmitted the name of no orthodox hero to posterity honoured with the respect
and blessings even of the Greeks themselves. The real heroes of Eastern
nationality at the time of the conquest of Greece were the Catholic emperor Constantine
and the Albanian prince Scanderbeg, and both were members of the papal, not of
the orthodox church.
Mohammedan princes have
generally been more tolerant to their unbelieving subjects than Christian
rulers, the commands of the Koran having been more implicitly obeyed than the
precepts of the Gospel. Mohammed II. granted the fullest toleration to the
Greeks which the Koran allows to unbelievers, and motives of policy induced him
to add some particular favours to the general toleration he conceded to all his
Christian subjects. With that consummate prudence which he displayed on all
great occasions during his unfeeling and violent career, he made the religious
prejudices and bigoted feelings of the orthodox instruments for the
furtherance of his objects, and fetters
152
SOCIAL CONDITION OF THE GREEKS.
chap. hi. for binding the people. He not only
tolerated the political and social influence of the Greek clergy, but even
added to it. In displaying this spirit of toleration, however, his object was
not to favour the Christians, it was to render the orthodox clergy a useful
instrument of police for securing the tranquillity of his recent conquests. It
depended on Mohammed II., after the taking of Constantinople, to render the
Greeks an expatriated race like the Jews, for their military weakness,
political incompetency, and moral degradation, had rendered them powerless to
resist their conqueror. Four rival nations, each equal to the Greeks in
number, were competing for his favour, and could have filled up any void
created by forcible translocations of the Hellenic race. Had Mohammed II.
treated Greece as Ferdinand and Isabella treated Granada, Turks, Sclavonians,
Yallachians, and Albanians would have instantly occupied the country. But the
conqueror chose a nobler and a wiser course. He felt the fullest confidence
that his mental superiority would enable him to direct the minds of the Greeks,
and to master their intellects as easily and effectually as he had conquered
their persons, and without fear he gave them a new centre of nationality by
restoring the orthodox patriarchate of Constantinople. He united all the
dissevered members of the orthodox church under a central authority, over which
he exercised a direct control as its real head. The boon thus voluntarily
conferred on the Greek nation enlisted the prejudices and bigotry of the
people in the cause of the sultan’s government. He was accepted as the temporal
head of the orthodox church, because he was regarded as its protector against
Catholicism. By this insidious gift the sultan purchased the subservience of
the Greeks, and for the two succeeding centuries his suc-
/
MUSSULMAN TOLERATION.
153
cessors were the
acknowledged defenders of the orthodox against the pretensions of the popes.
It must be owned that
the contrast between Mussulman toleration and papal intolerance was too
glaring not to extort some sentiments of gratitude towards the sultan, even
from the hard character and utter selfishness of the Greek people. While the
pope and the Christian princes in Western Europe were fierce in their persecution
of heresy, and eager to extend the cruelties of the inquisition, the sultans of
Turkey and Egypt were mild in their treatment of unbelievers, and tolerant in
the exercise of their undoubted authority as absolute sovereigns. Not only was
the Christian treated with more humanity in Mussulman countries than the
Mohammedans were treated in Christian lands; even the orthodox Greek met with
more toleration from Mussulmans than from Catholics : and the knowledge
? O
of this difference
formed one strong reason for the preference with which the Greeks clung to the
government of the Othoman sultans in their wars with the Christian powers for
more than two centuries.
Of one sad fact history
leaves no doubt : The fabric of Greek society, private as well as public, was
utterly corrupt. Vice was more universal among the Greeks than among the Turks.
The venality of Greek officials, and the cowardice of Greek armies, had allowed
the Othoman tribe to found an empire by conquests from the Greeks. The ease and
rapidity with which the Greek nation was subdued, and the tameness with which
the people bore the yoke imposed on them, prove that the moral degradation of
the masses contributed as much to the national calamities as the worthlessness
of the aristocracy and the clergy, or as the corruption of the imperial
government. The moral inferiority of the Greek race at this period is forcibly
intruded on
A. D.
1453-1676.
154 SOCIAL CONDITION OF THE GREEKS.
chap. hi. the attention of the reader of Othoman
history. The orthodox Mussulman was remarkable for his strict observance of the
moral obligations of the Mohammedan law ; but the orthodox Christian neglected
the great moral precepts of his religion, and was only attentive to the
distinctive ceremonies and peculiar formalities of his own church. A strong
sense of duty directed and controlled the conduct of the Mussulman in the
everyday actions of life ; while among the Greeks a sense of duty seems to have
failed entirely, and there appears to have been an utter want of those deep
mental convictions necessary to produce moral rectitude. Yet, among the
Othomans, we find that the strict observance of all the outward formalities of
their law was united with a profound devotion to its moral and religious
ordinances. This remarkable circumstance must have originated in the wise
system of education which enabled the Othoman Turk to emerge as a superior
being from the corrupted populations of the Seljouk and Greek empires. Among
the Greeks the regular performance of church ceremonies, and the fulfilment of
some vain penance, became an apology for neglecting the weightiest obligations
of Christ’s moral law. In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, Islam breathed
faith into the hearts of its votaries, while orthodoxy deadened the moral
feelings of the soul, by using idolatrous forms as a substitute for faith. This
spiritual elevation of Mohammedans long continued to form a marked contrast
with the degraded moral condition of the orthodox Christians. No period of
Greek history offers us so sad an example of the perversity with which man can
stray from the guidance of truth, and set up the ordinances of man’s
imagination above the laws of God.
The nature of
Mohammedanism gives it a political advantage over Christianity, which must not
be over-
MOHAMMEDAN AND CHRISTIAN FORMALITIES. 155
looked in examining the
relations between the Othomans and the Greeks. The outward forms of Islam are
an inherent portion of its doctrines ; they are tests of religion, not of
orthodoxy; and the public manner in which they are hourly exhibited unite all
Mussulmans together as one people, while by these very forms a strong line of
separation is drawn between them and the rest of mankind. Thus all Mohammedans
living in constant intercourse with Christians feel and act as if they composed
one nation. The Arab, the Mongol, and the Turk, find that their common religion
effaces their national differences.
Christianity presents a
very different aspect. The religious divisions of Christians form as strong contrasts
as their national distinctions. The Catholic and Orthodox Greeks are as
completely separated as the Greeks and Armenians. The Orthodox and the Catholics,
the Armenians, the Nestorians, and the Jacobites, are as much separated by the
articles of their faith as by the diversity of their nations. Those beyond the
pale of Christianity could hardly believe that Christianity was really one
religion, so marked were the distinctions among Christians, and so violent the
animosity which the rival churches entertained to one another. In the
individual, the contrast was as great as in the mass. The Mohammedan generally
obeyed the commands of his prophet to the letter; while the Christian assumed
the wildest license in interpreting the word of God. The pope taught publicly
that the doctrines of Christ were not of universal application, and assumed the
power of authorising Christian princes to violate the promises they made to
infidels even after they had sworn on the Gospel that they would keep their
word.1 This moral laxity among Christians,
A. D.
1453-1676.
1 Two
examples were notorious in the East. Pope Eugenius IV. excited Ladislas, king
of Hungary, to break his treaty with Sultan Murad II. ; an act
156 SOCIAL CONDITION OF THE GREEKS.
chap. hi. and want of an all-pervading religious
faith, was the principal cause of the apostasies so prevalent in the fifteenth
and sixteenth centuries. The Othoman army and administration were filled with
Christian renegades, while hardly an example could be found of a Mohammedan
forsaking his religion.
The fermenting leaven of
self-destruction, which exists in all corporate bodies placed beyond the direct
control of public opinion, had so corrupted the Greek clergy in the fifteenth
century, that the cause of Christianity suffered by the conduct of its
priesthood. Ke- ligion was the predominant feature of society ; but the
religion of the Greeks was far removed from the purity of the apostolic
precepts, and from the mild doctrines of Christianity. The characteristics of
modern Greek religion were then austerity and superstition, two qualities
impressed on it by monastic influence. The dignified clergy, who had long
exercised considerable authority in civil affairs, could only be chosen from
among the monks. This prerogative extended the authority of monacliism, by
making the monastery a path to wealth and power as well as to heaven. Men of
rank sent their children into the monastery as a means of securing them a high
social position. History affords innumerable examples of the facility with
which single classes of society can falsify the opinions of a nation,—so that
there is nothing surprising in the power and corruption of monachism in
Greece. Ambition introduced the spirit of intrigue among the monks, and a wish
to conceal the vices of the clergy spread religious hypocrisy through the whole
of faithlessness which cavised his defeat and death at Varna, a.d. 1444, Pope Pius II., on the same
pretext, that an oath to the enemies of the Christian religion was not binding,
persuaded Scanderbeg to violate the treaty he had just concluded with Mohammed
II. in 1461.—Pray, Ann. Hung., ii. part 3, 17. Bonfinius, dec. iii. lib. 6.
Raynaldi, Ann. Eccles., ix. 430, edit. Mansi. Barletius, Vita Scanderbeg, 198.
1 ii, Off
MONASTIC CORRUPTION.
157
frame of Greek society,
and silenced many of tlie truths which speak most plainly to the human
understanding. Under monastic influence, it became the highest virtue in a
Greek to repudiate many of his duties to his country and his fellow-creatures,
in order to secure a reputation of sanctity as a monk. Some rose to power as
courtiers, others as demagogues. The most worthless monk was allowed
privileges denied to the best citizen. The prevailing hypocrisy, it is true,
could not conceal the truth from all. The common sense of the people ventured
at times to question the pretension that the monk was always a better man on
account of his monastic garb ; but it was nevertheless generally believed that
the profession of monacliism was a valid reason for exemption from punishment
in this world, and a sure mitigation of divine wrath in the world to come. The
homage rendered to the monastic order was consequently very great, and the
monastery became a retreat for the intriguing priest as well as for the pious
enthusiast.
The fermentation of
monastic society in the East had passed into a principle of corruption before
the fifteenth century. The Greek Church had declined with the Byzantine Empire.
No examples were any longer to be found of that zealous abnegation of humanity
which elevated men for life on the tops of columns, or perched them in the
branches of trees. Even the active charity which reflects some rays of glory on
the darkest periods of Byzantine history, was almost extinct. The Stylites and
Dendrites of earlier times ; the hospitals of Constantinople, and the names of
the saints who have been admitted into the Greek calendar for deeds of true
Christian charity, form part of the social records of mankind in the East. But
in the fifteenth century the moral and physical weakness of the Greek race
rendered it incapable of emulating the stern suffer-
J 58
SOCIAL CONDITION OF THE GREEKS.
chap. hi. ings, or of feeling tlie tender
sympathies, of Byzantine society. Ecclesiastical learning declined, hypocrisy
increased, and bigotry became aggressive. The monasteries no longer supported
hospitals and poor-houses, nor did the monks any longer study as physicians,
and serve as attendants on the sick. Those who could not advance in the career
of ecclesiastical preferment, turned their attention to money-making. They frequented
the public marts as dealers in pictures, ancient and modern, profane and sacred
; but as picture- dealing alone was not sufficient to enrich them, many became
cattle-dealers and wool-merchants. Those who restricted their attention to
cultivating and extending the religious influence of their order, dealt only in
sacred images—the gilded pictures which had been the abomination of the
Iconoclasts—and excited the people to purchase them at an exorbitant price, by
forged visions and pretended miracles. Eustathios, Archbishop of Thessalonica
in the twelfth century, a man of virtue and a scholar, whose commentaries on
Homer and Dionysius Periegetes are still studied by the learned, declares, that
even in his time the monks had begun to sell the ancient manuscripts in the
libraries of the monasteries.1 The ignorance and vices of the monks
were long the subject of animadversion ; but in this matter, as in many others,
Greek society proved incompetent to reform its own abuses. The destructive
energy of a foreign conqueror was necessary to sweep away abuses, and open a
field for improvement.2
Many of the social vices
of the Greeks under the domination of the Othomans, must be traced back to
1 Eustathii
Opuscula, edit. Tafel, De emendando vita monachica, 229, 230, 249.
2 Nicetas, Isaac et Alex., s.
iii. p. 358, edit. Par., passes a severe censure on
“the accursed monks” about the person of the Emperor Isaac. Mazaris alludes to
the licentiousness of the nuns and the hypocrisy of the monks. — Boissonade,
Anecdota Gr&ca, iii. 128, 129.
’f
MONASTIC CORRUPTION.
159
the corrupt monastic
influence predominant in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. The monks
taught the people that avarice and extortion might be atoned for by
prostrations and fasting. Intolerance became a national characteristic. The
hatred of foreigners, which Strabo cites as a mark of utter barbarism, grew to
be the prominent feature of Greek nationality.1
The complete separation
effected by monachism in the social standing of the regular and secular clergy—
between the bishop and the parish priest—exercised a corrupting influence on
the whole clergy. The monks and the dignified clergy became intriguers at
Turkish divans, flatterers of Othoman officials, and systematic spies on the
conduct of the parish priests, and on the patriotic sentiments of the laity.
They served for three centuries as the most efficient agents of the Othoman
government, in repressing the national aspirations for independence among the
Greeks.
The only administrative
authority which was not entirely annihilated by the Othoman conquest, was that
of the church. The modern Greeks boast that their church, having survived the
loss of their independence, was the means of preserving their nationality
during three centuries of servitude. This must be admitted only to a very
limited extent. The Greek clergy, doubtless, by becoming the agents of the
sultan’s government, secured a legal position in the Othoman empire to the
orthodox Christians ; but the primary cause of the persevering endurance of the
Hellenic race was in its own obstinate nationality, not in the ecclesiastical
organisation which was capable of being
* Strabo, lib. xviii. p. 802. The Greeks were never hospitable to aliens
in race and language. In the middle ages they were regarded as extremely inhospitable.—Luitprand,
Legatio ad jVicephorum Phocam, p. 371, edit. Bonn.
“ In omni Griecia veritatem dico, non
mentior, non reperi hospitales episco- pos.” See also Sajwulf’s Travels; Bohn, Early Travels in Palestine, 34. “ The
Greeks are not hospitable.”
A. D.
1453-1676.
160
SOCIAL CONDITION OF THE GREEKS.
chap. hi. converted into an instrument of Othoman
oppression. The virtues of the rural population, and not the power of the church,
preserved the nation. The church of the East was orthodox, not Greek.
The Greek church
received from Mohammed II. an organisation which rendered it subservient to his
will; but the Greek clergy were the active agents in their own degradation. In
judging the relations between the conquered and the conquerors, we must not
allow our detestation of tyranny to nourish in our minds a feeling of sympathy
for the servility of parasites. No class of men can Ions; remain undeserving of
the social
O O
position it occupies ;
even the misfortunes of nations are generally the direct consequence of their
own vices, social or political.
One great temporal
characteristic of Christianity is, that it connected mankind by higher and more
universal ties than those of nationality. It taught men of every race and
language that religion ought to bind them together by ties which no political
prejudices ought to have strength to sever, and thus revealed how the progress
of human civilisation is practically connected with the observance of the
divine precepts of Christ. The Greeks have never admitted this truth into their
minds. On the contrary, they have laboured strenuously to corrupt Christianity
by the infusion of a national spirit. Their church is a great effort to make Christianity
a Greek institution ; and when the pure principles of religion were found to be
at variance with ecclesiastical restrictions, the Greeks made ecclesiastical
orthodoxy, not Christian piety, the essence of their national church. They
resuscitated the spirit of Paganism under a new form. At a very early period
the Greeks had placed the Gospel in a subordinate position to councils of the
church, by making them the
TO Soft
ORTHODOX PATRIARCHATE RESTORED. 161
lawgivers of Christians,
instead of restricting them to their true sphere as interpreters of the Gospel.
Mohammed II. understood
perfectly the character of his subjects. He spoke their language, and knew
their thoughts. After the conquest of Constantinople, he availed himself of the
hoary bigotry and infantine vanity of Hellenic dotage to use the Greek Church
as a means of enslaving the nation. The orthodox clergy had separated
themselves from the imperial government before the taking of Constantinople,
and Mohammed II. availed himself of the hostile feeling with which the
orthodox regarded the last unfortunate emperor, to attach that powerful party
to his government. The last patriarch during the Greek empire had retired to
Eome in the year 1451, where he died eight years later.1 The sultan
found the Greek Church in such a state of disorganisation from its disputes
with the Emperor Constantine and the flight of the patriarch, as to admit of
his reconstituting its hierarchy, without violence, according to his own political
views. The orthodox party was restored to power, and Mohammed II. selected its
leader, George Scholarios, who assumed the monastic name of Gen- nadios, to
fill the office of patriarch, and act as minister of public instruction and
ecclesiastical affairs for the Sublime Porte. Gennadios was respected by his
countrymen for his learning and morality ; but his public conduct testifies
that he had more than an ordinary share of the narrow-minded bigotry which
perverted the judgment of his contemporaries.
When the unfortunate
Emperor Constantine XI. confirmed the union of the Greek and Latin Churches in
the year 1452, Gennadios exerted all his influence to pre-
1 Phrantzes, 217, edit. Bonn. Crusius, Turco-Grcecia,
5. Cuper, de Patri- archis Constantino191.
162
SOCIAL CONDITION OF THE GREEKS.
chap. hi. vent the orthodox from assisting the
schismatic emperor in the defence of Constantinople. His bigotry so completely
extinguished his patriotic feelings that he predicted the destruction of the
Greek empire as a punishment which Heaven would inflict on the people, to mark
God’s reprobation of Constantine’s fall from orthodoxy. Sultan Mohammed, who
spoke Greek fluently, and who was perfectly acquainted with the influence the
different parties in the church possessed over the people, treated the most
popular of the clergy with marked favour.1 He saw the advantage he
would derive from using them as his agents in reconciling the laity to the
Othoman domination. With that profound political skill which enabled him to use
men as the instruments of his ends, he selected the bigoted Gen- nadios as the
new orthodox patriarch, as an instrument to obtain for himself, though a
Mohammedan prince, the ancient personal position of the Byzantine sovereigns
as protector of the orthodox church, and master of the Greek hierarchy. His
policy was completely successful. The sultans never involved themselves in
ecclesiastical disputes. The contempt which the Mussulmans then entertained
for all Christians saved them from this folly; to them the Orthodox and the Catholic
were equally distant from the light of truth. Theological differences and
church government only interested them as questions of public order and police,
and personal preferences were only determined by pecuniary payments. Hence the
Greek Church was for a long period left at liberty to arrange its own internal
affairs ; its vices and its virtues were the spontaneous efforts of its own
members ; its religious action was
1 Phrantzes,
93, 95. The History of the Patriarchs of Constantinople says— ’H|eupfi ra
‘Poo/uaiVca jcuAXa #cai Xeirrorara, ko.1 7as rdt-eis twv ‘Pco/xaiW—aya-
7-T)<re ttoAAo to yevos rtov xpianavZov Ka\ eftXeTre Kakws.— Turco-Grcecia,
107, 120, edit. Crusii.
ORGANISATION OF PATRIARCHATE.
163
rarely interfered with,
so that it must bear the blame if morality and faith did not prosper within its
bosom.
It is generally said
that, in virtue of the privileges conceded by Mohammed II. to the Greek Church,
the Patriarch of Constantinople is elected by an assembly composed of Greek
bishops who happen to be officially resident at the seat of the patriarchate,
joined to a certain number of the neighbouring clergy, under the presidency of
the metropolitan of Heraclea.1 But the truth is, that the Patriarch
of Constantinople is appointed by the sultan pretty much in the same way as the
Archbishop of Canterbury is appointed by the sovereign of England. Mohammed
II., after naming Gennadios patriarch, wished him to be instituted in his
ecclesiastical dignity according to the ancient ceremonial of the church, in
order to secure his election from producing new dissensions among a disturbed
clergy. The great object of the sultan was to re-establish the patriarchate in
such a manner as to give it the greatest influence over the minds of the whole
body of the orthodox clergy and laity. The patriarch Gennadios, and the bishops
who survived the taking of Constantinople, were supported by the Othoman
government in their exertions to restore the whole fabric of the Eastern
Churchy in outward form as well as in religious doctrine, to its condition
before the Council of Florence in 1439. The synods and councils of the Greek
Church, since the taking of Constantinople, have been tolerated by the Sublime
Porte only so far as they facilitated administrative measures, without
conferring any independent influence on the Greek clergy. The rescript of the
sultan has always been necessary to authorise a bishop to exercise his
ecclesiastical functions in the see to which he has been elected.2
The
1 Lequien,
Oriens Christiatius, i. 146.
2 Waddington,
Greek Church, 54, says the words of the barat of the sultan
A. D.
1453-1676.
164 SOCIAL CONDITION OF THE GREEKS.
chap. hi. Mohammedan sovereign, as master of the
orthodox church, retained in his own hands the unlimited power of deposing both
patriarchs and bishops as often as it appeared necessary to his government. The
absolute power of condemning every Greek ecclesiastic, whether patriarch, monk,
or parish priest, to exile or death, was a prerogative of the sultan which was never
doubted.
Mohammed II.,
nevertheless, invested the patriarch with privileges which gave him great civil
as well as ecclesiastical power over his countrymen. He was authorised by the
usages of the church to summon synods and decide ecclesiastical differences ;
and by the concessions of the sultan, to hold courts of law for the decision of
civil cases, with permission to enforce his sentences by decrees of
excommunication, a punishment which few Greeks had courage to encounter. A
virtuous and patriotic clergy might have rendered these privileges a source of
national improvement, an incitement to good conduct, and an encouragement to
true religion, for Mohammed and his successors would willingly have employed
Christians, on whose morality they could depend, as a counterpoise to the
military power of the Seljouk feudatories and the independent authority of the
Ulema.
The demoralisation of
the clergy and laity was so great at the time of the Othoman conquest, that it
would have required some time, and patient perseverance on the part of
virtuous and able patriarchs, to restore morality to some degree of influence
as an element of orthodox society. Gennadios had not even the purity of
character necessary to stem the current of evil, and despairing of his own
success in any project for the benefit of the church, he resigned the
patriarchate towards the end of the year 1458, and
were, “ I command you to go and reside as bishop at (Athens) according to
the ancient custom, and to the vain ceremonies of the inhabitants.”
loros**
STATE OP THE GREEK CLERGY.
165
retired to a monastery
of St John the Precursor, on Mont Menikion, near Serres. Gennadios, and the
three patriarchs who followed him in succession, entered on their office
without making any present or paying any tribute or purchase-money to the Porte
; but their government of the church was disturbed by internal dissensions and
intrigues among the clergy and laity. The third patriarch, Joasaph, a man of a
tranquil disposition, was driven frantic by the incessant quarrels around him,
in which he could not avoid taking some part. Despair and disgust at last so
far overpowered his reason, that he attempted to put an end to his life by
throwing himself into a well. He was fortunately taken out alive, and the Greeks
were spared the scandal of hearing that their patriarch had voluntarily plunged
into the pains of hell to escape the torment of ruling the orthodox church on
earth.1
After the conquest of
Trebizond, the Greek clergy and nobles formed themselves into two great
parties, the Constantinopolitans and the Trapezuntines, who contended for
supremacy at the patriarchate as the green and blue factions had striven in the
hippodromes of the Byzantine empire. The exiles of Trebizond spared no
efforts to place a member of their party at the head of the orthodox church.
They knew that much valuable patronage in the church would be placed at their
disposal, and, spurred on by interest, they allowed neither a sense of justice
nor a feeling of patriotism to arrest their intrigues. To gratify their
ambition, they suggested to the sultan a new source of revenue, drawn from the
demoralisation of the clergy and the degradation of their nation. The fourth
patriarch who was appointed without simony was Markos, a Constantinopolitan.
The dissen-
A. D.
1453-1676.
1 Crusius,
TJistoria Patriarchica, 121.
166 SOCIAL CONDITION OF THE GREEKS.
chap. hi. sions which had driven Joasaph frantic
increased under Markos, and the Trapezuntine party brought forward various
charges against him. At last they supported their petition for his deposition
by offering to pay into the sultan’s treasury a thousand ducats on the election
of their own candidate. Mohammed II. is said by a Greek historian to have
smiled at the intensity of the envy displayed by the Greeks, which rendered
their customs, their laws, and even their religion, powerless to restrain their
intrigues.1 He accepted the purchase- money, and allowed the Greeks
to introduce that black stain of simony into their hierarchy which soon spread
over their whole ecclesiastical establishment. From this time simony, which is
the worst of ecclesiastical heresies, became a part of the constitution of the
orthodox church.2
Simeon of Trebizond, who
gained the patriarchal throne by this act of simony, lost it by female influence.
The ladies of the sultan’s harem began already to traffic in promotions. But it
would answer no good purpose to pursue the history of these corruptions into
greater detail. The bribe paid to the Porte at each election was soon increased,
and when it became evident to all that the patriarchate could be obtained by
money, an additional impulse was given to the spirit of intrigue and calumny,
which has always been too active in Greek society. The vainglory of the Greeks,
even more than their success, roused the ambition of the
1 Turco-Grcecia.
Ilistoria Patriarchica, 125.
2 It
appears that this heresy prevails in King Otho’s administration. I find a
letter in the Greek newspaper Athena, No. 2332, 28th October 1855, from the Bishop
of Andros and Keos, Metrophanes, in which that prelate declares that common
report attributed the recent election of some ignorant (ava\(f)a€rj- tovs rivds) bishops to simony, and that
a senator, whom he names, offered to procure his own election at the same time
for the sum of one thousand dollars— a price he subsequently reduced to five
hundred. When the worthy Metrophanes refused, the Greek senator exclaimed, “
You know nothing of the world; you will never be a bishop unless you pay.”
PATRIARCHS OF CONSTANTINOPLE.
167
Servians, who succeeded
in placing a Servian monk, named Eaphael, on the patriarchal throne of Constantinople
as eighth in succession under Othoman domination. His nomination was purchased
by an engagement to render the church liable to an annual tribute of two
thousand ducats.
The account the Greeks
give of the Patriarch Raphael presents their church in a very contemptible
light. They say that he was a confirmed drunkard, and frequently appeared at
the most solemn services of religion in such a condition as to be unable to
stand without support. He was also so ignorant of the Greek language as to be
compelled to use an interpreter in his communications with the Greek clergy who
had elected him. His love of wine was a just ground for his deposition ; his
ignorance of Greek ought to have prevented his election.1
Maximos, who succeeded
Raphael, had a slit nose. His face had been thus disfigured for defending the
cause of Markos against the Trapezuntine party. Mohammed II. died during the
patriarchate of Maximos, a.d. 1481. The tenth patriarch was Niphon, metropolitan
of Thessalonica, whose father was an Albanian primate of the Morea, but whose
mother was a Greek. He was highly esteemed by his contemporaries for his
eloquence, but his moral conduct was not irreproachable, as appears from an
anecdote which proves that he was guilty of perjury. Simeon of Trebizond died
without leaving any heir to his wealth, which was very great. Niphon suborned
false witnesses, in order to appropriate the fortune of Simeon to the use of
the patriarchate. The perjury was discovered by the Turks, and Niphon was
deposed.2
1 Ilistoria
Patriarchica, 129, 130.
2 The
Church of the Holy Apostles at Thessalonica, near the Varder gate, which
retains its name though it has been converted into a mosque, appears, from the
inscription over the door, and the monograms on the columns of the
A. D.
1453-1676.
168 SOCIAL CONDITION OF THE GREEKS.
chap. hi. The misconduct of the clergy daily
degraded the position of the church, and stimulated the avarice of the Turks by
augmenting the offers of purchase- money for ecclesiastical offices. In this
public prostitution of religion, the clergy endeavoured to persuade the people
that patriotic feeling, more than personal interest, was the principal motive
of their intrigues and crimes, and the bigotry of the people prevented their
scrutinising very severely any conduct likely to prove advantageous to the
church.
The credulity of the
Greeks enabled the clergy to circulate strange tales to increase their
popularity. We find a curious instance of the ignorance and credulity of the
people, and of their readiness to confound right and wrong for the glory of
their church, recorded in the history of the patriarchs. Though a fable, it
deserves notice as affording a reflection of the national mind.
During the reign of
Suleiman the Lawgiver, while Loufti Pasha, the historian, was grand vizier
(a.d. 1539-1541), the attention of the divan was called to the circumstance
that it was the duty of the sultan, as caliph of Islam, to destroy all the
places of worship possessed by infidels in every town taken by storm.1
As Constantinople had been so conquered by Mohammed II., it was consequently
the duty of Suleiman to shut up all the Greek churches in the city, or to
convert them into mosques. A fetva to
portico, to have been constructed by a patriarch of Constantinople named
Niphon. The church appears older than the time of this Niphon, and he could
hardly have obtained permission to erect a building so considerable, for Baye-
zid II. expressed great anger at seeing a church which Joachim, the successor
of Niphon II., covered with new tiles.—Hist. Patriarch., 128. It must therefore
date from the patriarchate of Niphon I., a.d.
1313.
1 Turco-Grcecia, 156. This story cannot be reconciled
with chronology. The grand vizier is called Toulphi, and the date is placed in
1537. It is to be hoped that the report of Loufti having beaten his wife, who
was the sultan’s sister, current some years after at Constantinople, was not
more correct than this story.—See Negotiations de la France dans le Levant, i.
496.
O'
STORY OF THE PATRIARCH JEREMIAH. 169
tliis effect was
delivered by the mufti, and the sultan issued an ordinance to carry it into
effect. The Patriarch Jeremiah was smitten with terror on hearing the news. He
immediately mounted his mule and hastened to seek an audience of Loufti Pasha,
who had always treated him with kindness. The grand vizier and the patriarch
held a secret conference, in which they concerted a scheme for evading the
execution of the sultan's orders.
A meeting of the divan
was held shortly after, for the purpose of communicating the ordinance to the
patriarch and the Greek priests. Jeremiah appeared before the ministers of the
Porte, and stated with confidence that Constantinople did not fall within the
provisions of the ordinance, not having been taken by storm by the Mussulmans.
He declared that a capitulation had been concluded between the Emperor
Constantine and Sultan Mohammed before the gates were opened. Well might the
members of the divan wonder, cast up their eyes to heaven, and caress their
beards at this strange information; but as they had all received large presents
from the patriarch before the meeting, they waited in silence to see what turn
matters would take. The grand vizier declared that, as the business now assumed
a new character, it would be better to discuss it in a grand divan on the
following day.
The report that all the
Christian churches in Constantinople were to be destroyed excited general
interest, and, long before the meeting of the divan, crowds of Turks, Greeks,
Armenians, Catholics, and Jews were assembled to hear the result.1
The whole open space from the gate of the Serai to the court of St Sophia's
1 Suleiman the Magnificent does not appear to have
been tolerant in his disposition, for in his letter to Francis I., a.d. 1528, he boasts that the
Christians who live under his protection are allowed to repair the doors and
windows of their places of worship.—Negociations de la France, i. 131.
A. D.
1453-1676.
170 SOCIAL CONDITION OF THE GREEKS.
chap. hi. was filled with people. The patriarch
waited long without before he was summoned to enter the divan. When he was at
last admitted, he made his prostrations to the viziers with becoming
reverence, and then stood erect to speak boldly for his Church. The archonts of
the Greek nation crowded behind him. All admired the dignity of his aspect. His
white beard descended on his breast, and the sweat fell in large drops from his
forehead, for the Greek historian, with national exaggeration and irreverence,
suggests that he emulated the passion of Christ, of whose orthodox church he
was the representative on earth. A long pause intervened, according to the
supercilious and grave etiquette of the Othomans. The grand vizier at length
spoke, “ Patriarch of the Greeks, the sultan has issued an ordinance to enforce
the execution of our law which prohibits the existence of any place of public
worship for infidels in the walled cities we have conquered with the sword.
This city was taken by storm by the great Sultan Mohammed
II., therefore let your priests remove all their
property from the churches they now occupy, and deliver up the keys to our
officers.” To this summons the patriarch replied in a distinct voice, “ 0 grand
vizier, I cannot answer for what happened in other cities of the sultan’s
empire, but with regard to this city of Constantinople, I can solemnly affirm
that the Emperor Constantine, with the nobles and people, surrendered it
voluntarily to Sultan Mohammed.” The grand vizier cautioned the patriarch
against asserting anything which he could not prove by the testimony of
witnesses, and asked if he was prepared to prove his assertion by the evidence
of Mussulmans. The patriarch replied in the affirmative, and the affair was
adjourned for twenty days.
The Greeks wrere
greatly alarmed, and men of every
STORY OF THE PATRIARCH JEREMIAH.
171
rank offered to furnish
the patriarch with large sums of money, in order to enable him to bribe the
members of the divan to save their churches. The patriarch had already
concerted his plan. He sent an agent to Adrianople to find two aged Mussulmans,
who, as was doubtless well known to the grand vizier, were willing to testify
to anything the patriarch might desire, on being well paid. The witnesses were
found and conducted to Constantinople, where the patriarch welcomed them on
their arrival, embraced them, and took care that they should be well lodged,
clothed, and fed. After they had rested from the fatigues of their journey,
they were conducted to the grand vizier, who spoke kindly to them, and assured
them that they might give evidence in favour of the patriarch of the Greeks
without fear.
The day appointed for
the final determination of the cause having arrived, the patriarch presented
himself before the divan. The grand vizier inquired if he was now prepared to
adduce the testimony of Mussulman witnesses. The patriarch replied that his
witnesses were waiting to be examined. Two aged Turks were then led into the
divan. Their beards were white as the purest snow, red circles surrounded their
eyes, in which the tears gathered incessantly; their hands and their feet moved
tremulously. The viziers were amazed, for no one remembered to have seen men so
advanced in years. They stood together before the assembly like two brothers
whom death had forgotten.
In reply to the
questions of the grand vizier, they told their names, and said that eighty-four
years had elapsed since the conquest of Constantinople. Both declared that they
were then eighteen years old, and that they had now attained the age of one
hundred and two. They then narrated the events of the conquest of
Constantinople in the following manner :—
A. D.
1453-1676.
172 SOCIAL CONDITION OF THE GREEKS.
chap. ni. After the siege had been formed by land and
sea, and breaches were made in the city walls, the Emperor of the Greeks,
seeing that there was no possibility of resisting the assault, sent a
deputation to the great sultan to ask for terms of capitulation. The sultan
granted him the following conditions, a copy of which he signed, and read aloud
to the army :—
“ I, Sultan Mohammed,
pardon the Emperor Constantine and his nobles. I grant their petition that
they may live in peace under my protection, and retain their slaves and
property. I declare that the people of the city of Constantinople shall be free
from illegal exactions, and that their children shall not be taken to be
enrolled among my janissaries. The present charter shall be binding on me and
my successors for ever ”1 The deputation delivered this charter to
the emperor, who came out of the city and presented the keys to the sultan,
who, on receiving them, kissed Constantine, and made him sit down on his right
hand. For three days the two princes rejoiced together. The emperor then
conducted the sultan into the city of Constantinople, and resigned his empire.
The members of the
divan, after listening to this account of the conquest from the old men who
were present, drew up a report, and Sultan Suleiman, on reading this report,
ordered that the Christians should retain possession of their churches, and
that no man should molest their patriarch or their priests. Such is the modern
myth by which Romaic vanity glorified
1 This may
be admitted as a proof that the tribute of Christian children had not been
regularly enforced in Constantinople. The anxiety of Mohammed II. to repeople
his new capital was doubtless the real cause of the exemption. At a later
period the Christian families were compelled to furnish a rower for the
imperial fleet from each house. The story of the Patriarch Jeremiah seems to
have originated in a threat of Sultan Suleiman, that he would destroy all the
Christian churches in his dominions, as a reprisal for the ravages committed by
the Spanish garrison of Coron in 1533. See the report of Hieronymus, the ambassador of Ferdinand, king of the
Romans.—Gevay, UrTcunden und Acten- stiicke zur geschichte der rerhaltnisse
zicischen Ostreick, (Jngarn und der Pforte im 16ten und 17 ten Jahrhunderte, p.
5.
IGNORANCE AND VANITY OF THE GREEKS. 173
its own talents, and
satirised tlie ignorance and corruption of the Turks.
The great Suleiman,
called by Christians the Magnificent, and by the Othomans the Legislator, is
represented as an ignorant barbarian, and his learned grand vizier, Loufti,
the historian of the Othoman empire, as a corrupted tool of a Greek patriarch.
But the strangest feature of the fable is, the candid simplicity with which the
falsehoods and frauds of the patriarch are held up to the admiration of
Christians. The fruits of simony in the church are displayed in the moral
obtuseness of the people. The ignorance of the inventor of the tale is less
astonishing, for even the wealthiest Greeks at this time penetrated with
difficulty into Othoman society. The ecclesiastical historian was ignorant of
the name of the person who had been grand vizier eighty-four years after the
taking of Constantinople; it is not wonderful, therefore, that he had never
heard of the learning of Loufti Pasha. He probably knew that Loufti was an Albanian
by birth, and the Albanians were proverbially an unlettered race ; he could
not, therefore, suspect that Loufti had employed the years he lived as an exile
at Demotika in writing a history of the Othoman empire, which is still
preserved.1 A comparison of the flourishing state of Turkish
literature with the degraded state of knowledge among the Greeks during the
three centuries which followed the Othoman conquest, offers a singular anomaly
when contrasted with the constant assumption of mental superiority on the part
of the ignorant Greeks over their more accomplished masters. The estimation in
which Turkish literature was held in Western Europe, was not very different from
its appreciation by the Greeks, until Yon Hammer, in his History of the
Othoman Empire, furnished us with accurate
1 Hammer, Histoirc, v. 304, 533.
A. D.
1453-1676.
174 SOCIAL CONDITION OF THE GREEKS.
chap. hi. information concerning the many learned
men who flourished at Constantinople. From him Christian Europe heard, for the
first time, that several distinguished statesmen had employed some portion of
their time amidst the toils of an active and glorious public life, in the
cultivation of literature and in the labours of historical composition ; and
that the literary productions of several sultans are still known, even to the
present degenerate race of Othomans. For some time the Turks were really
entitled to take as high rank in Europe in literature as in politics and war.
But the Greeks have always viewed the history of other races through a mist of
prejudices, which has distorted the objects they contemplated.
The Greek clergy, and
those who believe that the nation owes its preservation to the church, have
boasted that the priesthood persuaded the people to repudiate the judicial
administration of the Othoman government, and to refer their differences to
the decision of their patriarchs and bishops. This, however, is hardly a
correct view of Greek society. Under the Othoman domination, the great mass of
the Greek nation was engaged in agricultural pursuits, and lived scattered in
small villages, removed from immediate contact with Turkish courts of law.
Fortunately for them, the communal system, by which they elected their village
magistrates or head men, was not disturbed by the Othoman conquest; on the
contrary, the Turks allowed these village chiefs more liberty of action than
they had enjoyed under the centralising and aristocratic spirit of the Greek
Empire. The head men of the village, aided by the parish priest, decided all
ordinary judicial cases relating to rights of possession, in a court held
before the church, in which the most respected among the inhabitants formed a
kind of jury. 'The cases which required a reference to another tribunal were
GREEKS REPUDIATE TURKISH TRIBUNALS. 175
usually those relating
to questions of succession, which, a. d.
by the
privileges granted to the Greek Church, were ______________________ '
placed under the
jurisdiction of the bishop. The usages of the people had more to do with the
repudiation of Othoman courts of law than either the conduct or the example of
the clergy. The bishop was too distant, and too decidedly an instrument of the
Othoman government, to secure the implicit confidence of the people where
religion was not directly concerned, while the general ignorance of the secular
clergy prevented their acquiring any judicial authority. The fact, however, is
incontestable, that the Greek laity displayed a steady determination to avoid,
as much as lay in their power, every reference to Turkish tribunals. This
determination arose, in part, from the defective administration of justice
established in the Othoman empire, and the notorious corruption of the judges.
Indeed, the Mussulmans themselves entertained the greatest aversion to seek
redress from their own tribunals, and the dislike manifested by the Turkish
population to litigation, often spoken of as a national virtue, was nothing
more than a dread of being plundered by their judges. This corruption of the
Turkish tribunals being generally acknowledged, it was regarded as one of the
worst crimes of which a Greek could be guilty, to appeal to a Mohammedan judge
if a Christian bishop could be made arbitrator of his difference. The bishops,
however, never assumed more judicial power than they had received from the
re-establishment of the church by Mohammed II.
Their gains, as
instruments of the sultans power, induced them to recognise him as possessing
the power of the sword in civil and criminal justice, and, to justify their
obedience, and even servility, they cited our Saviour's words, “My kingdom is
not of this world/’
176 SOCIAL CONDITION OF THE GREEKS.
chap. in. We have seen with
what eagerness the Greek clergy constituted the sultan the judge of their
patriarch's fitness for his sacred office. They displayed the same readiness to
appeal to the Turkish law tribunals, when by so doing they could increase their
ecclesiastical revenues. The conduct of the Patriarch Jeremiah affords a
memorable example. The Archbishop of Achrida claimed the bishopric of Berrhoea,
as one of the sees dependent on his jurisdiction as Patriarch of Bulgaria; but
the Patriarch of Constantinople considered this bishop as a suffragan of the
metropolitan of Thessalonica, and within the patriarchate of Constantinople.
To decide the question, Jeremiah applied to the mufti for a fetva, declaring
that after a lapse of one hundred years’ uninterrupted possession, it was
unlawful to revive a claim to property. With this fetva the patriarch
presented himself before the divan ; and having proved that the church of
Constantinople, and not that of Bulgaria, had exercised jurisdiction in the
bishopric of Berrhoea for more than a century, his rights were fully
recognised. The production of the fetva had, however, been supported by a
considerable bribe, according to the established procedure of Turkish justice,
and Jeremiah burdened the church with an annual tribute of four thousand one
hundred ducats.1 Under the Patriarch Dionysius, who succeeded
Jeremiah, the election present, or bakshish, to the Porte was also increased
to three thousand ducats. The contemporary ecclesiastical history of the
Greeks is filled with complaints of the simoniacal practices of the clergy, and
the Turks displayed their increased contempt for the Greek priesthood by
ordering them to take down the cross which had until this time crowned the dome
of the belfry at the patriarchate.2
The traffic in
ecclesiastical preferment went on in-
1 Historia Patriarchica, 164. 2 Ibid., 167, 168.
INCREASE OF SIMONY.
177
creasing. The
patriarchs, having purchased their own place, disposed of the vacant bishoprics
in the orthodox church to the highest bidder; they added to the dues they
exacted from their clergy, and augmented the debts of the church. To such a
degree had these corruptions proceeded, that in the interval between 1670 and
1678, the Patriarch of Constantinople was changed six times, and the
purchase-money of a new candidate was raised to the sum of twenty-five thousand
dollars. The annual tribute had then reached six thousand ducats, and the debts
of the patriarchate amounted to three hundred and fifty thousand dollars, two
dollars being nearly equal to one ducat.1
The general corruption
and intriguing spirit of the higher clergy at Constantinople are exemplified in
a singular measure which was adopted by the members of the synod, to guard
against treachery on the part of any single individual of the body. The
patriarchal seal was divided into four parts, the custody of which was
intrusted to four metropolitans, but these four parts could only be used when
united by a key of which the patriarch retained possession, and who consequently
alone possessed the power of affixing it to a public document.2 By
this contrivance no patriarchal writing could be legalised without the
concurrence of the four prelates. The same want of confidence was shown in
every rank of Greek society, at least among the urban population. The common
people declared that they considered it a blessing to give hospitality to a
parish priest, but that it was a curse to be obliged to receive a monk into
their houses. The secular clergy in Greece must always be married before they
enter on their parochial functions ; the monks, who
1 Compare llycaxit, Present
State of the Greek Church, 98, 107 ; and De la Croix, Etat present des nations
et iglises Grecque, Armenienne, et jlaronite en Turquic, 109.
2 Thiersch, De Vetat actuel de
la Grece, ii. 1S1.
M
A. D.
1453-1676.
178 SOCIAL CONDITION OF THE GREEKS.
chap. hi. wandered about the country, or who dwelt in the cities, were
either men of doubtful character, or men deeply engaged in political and
ecclesiastical intrigues, either for themselves or as agents for others.
From what has been said,
it is evident that, both as a political and ecclesiastical institution, the
Greek Church offered a feeble resistance to the Othoman Government. It had been
unsuccessful in opposing the progress of Mohammedanism with the Arabs in the
seventh and eighth centuries, and with the Seljouk Turks in the eleventh and
twelfth, and it proved very ineffectual as a barrier to its progress in Europe
under the Othomans in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.
The weakness of the
Greek Church as a moral agent arose in part from the defective constitution of
Greek society. The governing class in the ecclesiastical establishment was
selected from the aristocratic element, and no more selfish and degraded class
of men has ever held power than the archonts of modern Greece and the
Phanariots of Constantinople. Under the Greek emperors and the Othoman sultans
we find them equally ready to sacrifice the interests of their nation and the
good of posterity to the gratification of their own avarice and ambition. The Greek
hierarchy only shared the character of the class from which it was selected.
The division of the
orthodox clergy into regular and secular increased the worldly-minded
tendencies of the priesthood. It rendered the regular clergy avaricious and
intriguing ; it reduced the secular clergy to so low a rank in society that
they were obliged to gain money by labour. The bishops possessed considerable
revenues, and a jurisdiction in civil affairs ; the monasteries possessed
large landed estates ; and the whole patronage of the establishment was vested
in the hands of the patriarch and the bishops, who were selected
GREEK CLERGY.
179
from the monastic class.
The monasteries served as a. d.
places of
retreat and shelter for the members of the ______________________ '
aristocracy who sought
to escape Turkish oppression, or who aspired at ecclesiastical promotion. The
wealth of the monasteries rendered the lives of these noble monks easy, and
they devoted their leisure to political intrigues, to which the quasi-elective
forms and open simony of ecclesiastical nominations opened an extensive field.
The result was, that though for three centuries the Greek monks were placed in
not unfavourable circumstances for the cultivation of Hellenic literature and
Christian theology, they forsook these studies entirely, and were more active
as Othoman agents than as Greek priests.
The prudent policy of
the Othomans to a certain extent conciliated the feelings of the orthodox. They
treated the higher clergy with far more respect than was shown to them by the
Latins. The sultan conceded some marks of honour, and considerable power and
wealth, to the higher Greek clergy ; while, on the contrary, the Venetians and
Genoese, in their possessions in Greece, excluded the Greek clergy both from
honour and power. The consequence was, that the theological bigotry of the
people was inflamed by the galled feelings of the higher clergy : hatred to
the Latins was inculcated as the first of orthodox virtues.
The spirit of bigotry
nourished by the higher clergy drew a strong line of separation between the
Eastern and Western Christians, and tended greatly to impede the progress of
political civilisation among the orthodox.
Yet so servile was the
priesthood in pursuing its personal advantages, that many members of the Greek
Church were found who pretended to countenance both Catholic and Protestant
interpretations of the doctrines of the church, when the influence of the
French, the Dutch, or the English ambassador at Constantinople
1
180 SOCIAL CONDITION OF THE GREEKS.
chap. in. appeared most likely to advance their intrigues. Most of the
disputes in the Greek Church, which during the seventeenth century induced the
Catholics and the Protestants in turn to hope for the establishment of a close
union with the orthodox church, must be attributed to feelings of political
interest, not to conformity of doctrine. Cyril Lucar doubtless held some theological
opinions tending to Calvinism, and Cyril of Berrlioea, his successor, inclined
to admissions that savoured of Catholicism ; but public opinion, both among the
clergy and the people of Greece, remained unshaken in its devotion to the
national and orthodox church, and bigoted in its hostility to every other. The
historian of the Greek Church cannot, therefore, appeal to the contests among
the Greek ecclesiastics in the seventeenth century with any confidence, as indicating
a wish in either party to modify the theological doctrines, or reform the
simoniacal practices, of their church.1
The obligations which
the modern Greeks really owe to their church, as an instrument in the
preservation of the national existence during the fifteenth and sixteenth
centuries, have been greatly magnified by the wish of the people to invest the
only prominent national institution they possessed with all imaginary power and
virtue. We have seen how little the regular clergy did to resist Othoman
supremacy and the moral power of Mohammedanism. Still there can be no doubt
that the secular clergy supplied some of the moral strength which enabled the
Greeks so successfully to resist the Othoman power. It is true the parish
priests were a class of men destitute of learning, and possessing no great
personal authority; but as
1 For an account of these contests from the English
point of view, see Wad- dington, Condition of the Greek Church, 78, &c. For
a dispassionate summary of facts, Kimmel, Monument a Fidei Eccl. Orthod.
proleg., s. 4, &c.
PAROCHIAL CLERGY.
181
the agricultural classes
in the villages formed the heart of the nation, the parish priests had an
influence on the fate of Greece quite incommensurate with their social rank.
The reverence of the peasantry for their church was increased by the feeling
that their own misfortunes were shared by the secular clergy. They believed
that every doctrine of their church was of divine institution, and they adhered
to all its ceremonies and fasts as affording visible symbols of their faith.
As with the Mohammedans, forms became the strongest bond of religion. In the
mean time, the secular clergy, without seeking the mighty charge, and without
being suited worthily to fulfil the mission, became by the nature of things the
real representatives of the Greek Church, and the national ministers of
religion. To their conduct we must surely attribute the confidence which the
agricultural population retained in the promises of the Gospel, and their firm
persistence in a persecuted faith. The grace of God operated by human means to
preserve Christianity under the domination of the Othomans.
The situation of the
secular clergy in large towns was neither so respectable nor so influential as
in the agricultural districts. They were men of no more education than those in
the country, and of much less virtue ; so much so, indeed, that we find the
ignorance and low condition of the secular clergy in the towns of the Othoman
empire, which excited the contempt of travellers, too generally taken as the
indication of their rank and position in the rural districts. But in the
agricultural villages they were the equals of the leading men among the laity,
while in the towns they belonged to the lower orders. In the agricultural
districts they escaped the influence of that corruption which demoralised the
higher clergy; but in the towns they displayed the vices of their own low grade
of
A. D.
1453-1676.
182
SOCIAL CONDITION OF THE GREEKS.
. society, which were
more disgusting to others, and more generally offensive, than the polished
wickedness of their superiors. Spon tells us that three instances of apostasy
occurred among the secular clergy of Corinth in the year 1675.1 All
general descriptions of society must be liable to many exceptions, and never
were anomalies more numerous than in Greece. There was probably no town in
which several virtuous members of the secular clergy did not reside, and few
rural districts in which the name of a virtuous bishop was not respected. Every
city had its respected ar- chont; every province its much - feared brigand or
loathed apostate.
The parochial clergy of
Greece lived and died in the same social circle in which they were born and
bred. Their education in the country was the same as that of the better class
of the village proprietors around them, of whom they were the companions and
spiritual guides. As a body, they were taught by their position to feel the
necessity of securing the respect of- their parishioners, and on the whole they
succeeded. Their ignorance and rusticity, not their immorality and avarice, are
made the themes of reproach by travellers, who echoed the opinions of the inhabitants
of towns and of the higher orders of the clergy. The parochial clergy could
form no ambitious projects which required them to flatter Othoman officials,
and hence they held little intercourse with the Turks; while the most active
members of the monastic order were eager to cultivate Mussulman society, and to
study the Turkish language, as a means for advancing their preferment in the
church. Not unnaturally, therefore, we find the secu
1 Spon, ii. 231. Apostasy, however, was as common
among the monks as among the secular clergy. A curious example of the spirit of
toleration and respect for public decency among the Turks, is mentioned in a
Venetian report, dated 1679. A renegade monk, or kalogeros, was beheaded for
cursing the religion of Christ in the divan.—Hammer, xii. 45.
GREEK LAITY".
183
lar clergy as superior
to the regular in patriotism as they were inferior in learning ; and this
superiority gave them no inconsiderable moral influence in defending the
orthodox church against the attacks of Mohammedanism. Their simple lives, and
the purity of their moral conduct, united them in harmony with the laity, in
whose fortunes they were directly interested, and in whose feelings they
participated. In the lowliness of their social position they emulated the
worldly rank of their divine Master ; and the history of the Greek people
attests that their humble efforts strengthened the great body of the people to
persist in their devotion to the Christian faith unto the end.1
But, after all, the
national existence of the Greek race depended ultimately on the character and
fortitude of the people themselves, which could only be partially strengthened
by the influence of the clergy. Interest or ambition may be powerful enough to
induce a single class of men, a church, a nobility, a corporation, or any
privileged body, to assume an artificial character, but a whole people cannot
conceal its national vices, nor imitate virtues which it does not possess. No
nation can boast of greater firmness of purpose, or stricter devotion to its
church, than the Greek. Yet Greek society was divided into so many branches,
living under the influence of such different social circumstances, that during
the fifteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth centuries it offers a great variety of
aspects. Orthodox Greeks differed from Catholic Greeks ; the subjects of the
sultan were unlike the subjects of the Venetian republic; there was a marked
contrast between the urban and rural population, and between the regular and
secular clergy, even in the different provinces of the Othoman empire. In no
other race of
1 The parochial clergy in the Greek Church must many
a virgin before ordination, but cannot marry a second time.
184 SOCIAL CONDITION OF THE GREEKS.
chap. hi. men did so little sympathy exist between the different portions
of the nation as among the various orders of the Greeks at this period, yet
none more vigorously repudiated all foreign influence.
The nation was divided
into two great divisions, whose character is more distinct, and whose
separation is much more complete in the East, than among the Germanic and
Anglo-Saxon races ; namely, the urban population, and the cultivators of the
soil. These two classes have perpetuated their existence for ages in different
stages of civilisation, and their increase and decrease have been determined by
different political circumstances and social laws. The cultivators of the soil
formed, as I have said before, the great majority, and, in fact, really
constituted the Greek nation during the period embraced in this chapter. Among
the rural population alone some sentiments of manly vigour and true patriotism
still survived. The citizens had adopted the philanthropic selfishness of the
archonts, regular clergy, and Jewish colonists, with whom they lived, and with
whom they struggled for preferment in the Othoman service. The agricultural
population, therefore, the despised and ignorant peasantry, were the only class
to which the patriot could look forward as likely at any future period to
afford materials for recovering the national independence. The extinction of
this class, which was often a possible contingency, would have reduced the
Greeks in Constantinople, Athens, and Sparta, to the same condition as the Jews
in Palestine, and the Copts in Cairo.
The urban population was
again subdivided into two sections, which had almost as few feelings and
interests in common as if they had belonged to different nations. These were
the aristocracy, which grew up as officials and servants of the Othoman government,
and the industrious . classes, whether
CONDITION OF SOCIETY.
185
merchants, shopkeepers,
artisans, or day-labourers. But this latter class, having no organ among the
clergy, and being unable to give expression to its feelings, was compelled to
accept the leading of the official aristocracy and the dignified clergy, and to
treat its worst oppressors as national leaders. Thus we see that the monastic
and parochial clergy, the officials in the Turkish service, the industrious
classes in the towns, and the agricultural population, formed five distinct
bodies in the Greek nation, acting under the guidance of different, and often
of adverse, circumstances and interests. These heterogeneous elements
prevented the Greeks from coalescing into one body, and offering an united
national resistance to the Othoman domination. Socially, as well as geographically,
the Hellenic race did not form one compact body.
A correct estimate of
the condition of the people can only be obtained by observing how the
individuals in each class passed through life; how far they were enabled to
better their fortunes ; or how they sank gradually in the social scale under
the weight of Othoman oppression. The authority and importance of the higher
clergy, and the restricted sphere of action of the parish priests, have been
already noticed. The patriarch and the bishops purchased their dignities, and
repaid themselves by selling ecclesiastical rank and privileges ; the priests
purchased holy orders, and sold licenses to marry. The laity paid for
marriages, divorces, baptisms, pardons, and dispensations of many kinds, to
their bishops. The extent to which patriarchs and bishops interfered in family
disputes and questions of property, is proved by contemporary documents.1
A. D.
1453-1676.
1 Several letters in the Tureo- Grcecia of Crusius.
186
SOCIAL CONDITION OF THE GREEKS.
chap. hi. The trade of the Greeks had been ruined by the fiscal
oppressions of the Greek emperors; and, before the conquest of Constantinople,
the commerce of Greece had been transferred to the Italian states. Under the
firm government of Mohammed II. a wider sphere was opened for the commercial
activity of his Greek subjects. They not only received protection within the
extensive bounds of the Othoman empire, but foreign states were compelled to
admit them into ports, under the sultan’s flag, from which they had been
excluded in the time of the Greek emperors. During the early part of the
sixteenth century the port of Ancona was crowded with vessels under the Othoman
flag, loading and unloading their cargoes ; and the exchange was filled with
Greek and Turkish merchants, some of whose houses were said, by their rivals
the Venetians, to do business to the amount of
500,000 ducats annually. In the year 1549, about two
hundred Greek families were settled as traders in Ancona, where they were
allowed to have their own church.1 Barcelona also carried on a
considerable trade in the produce of the Levant with Eagusa, Ehodes, and Cairo.
The long wars of Spain with the Othoman empire prevented all direct trade, but
it was the fiscal measures of Philip II., and not the extension of Spanish
commerce with America, which at last ruined the trade of Catalonia with the
Levant. Greek merchants travelled to Asof, Moscow, and Antwerp, where their
gains were very great. They wore the dress and assumed the manners of Turks ;
for they found that in western Europe they were more respected in the character
of Othoman subjects than as schismatic Greeks. The middle classes in the towns
were also at this period superior in industry to
1 Ranke,
History of the Popes, 97, Kelly’s Tr., wlio quotes Saracini, Notizie historiche
della citta d’Ancona, Roma, 1675, p. 362.
■f
COMMERCIAL CLASS.
187
the same classes in many
parts of western Europe. Various manufactured articles were for two centuries
generally imported from the sultan’s dominions into other countries,
particularly camlets, a strong stuff composed of silk and mohair called
grogram, rich brocaded silks, embroidered scarfs, Turkey carpets, leather, and
yarn; besides Angora wool, cotton wool, and raw silk, flax, and hemp, in
addition to the usual produce exported from the Levant, southern Italy, and
Sicily, at the present day. Before the middle of the seventeenth century the
people of Manchester had already turned their attention to the cotton manufacture,
and the material they used was purchased in London from the merchants who
imported it from Cyprus and other parts of Turkey.1 Livadea and
Athens, as has been already mentioned, supplied sailcloth for the Othoman
navy. English ships already visited the Morea and Missolonghi to load currants,
and often brought back rich scarfs, sashes of variegated silk and gold tissue,
and Turkey leather of the brightest dyes, which were manufactured in different
towns in Greece, particularly at Patras, Gastouni, and Lepanto.2
Soon after the taking of
Constantinople, the ancient aristocracy of Greece was exterminated. The young
children were forcibly torn from their parents and educated as Mohammedans ;
many adults voluntarily embraced Islam. Mohammed II. systematically put to
death all men whom he supposed possessed sufficient power or influence to
disturb his government. Manuel, the last male scion of the imperial family of
Paleologos, embraced Mohammedanism. But the protection which the sultan
granted to the lower classes,
1 The
Merchants' Map of Commerce, by Lewes Roberts, fol., London, 1638, quoted in
Craik, History of British Commerce, ii. 49.
2 See
above, page 149, note.
A. D.
1453-1676.
V
188 SOCIAL CONDITION OF THE GREEKS.
chap. hi. soon enabled a number of individual Greeks to acquire ~ wealth
by commerce as well as by acting in the capacity of agents for provincial
pashas, and of farmers of the revenue. Several of these men claimed a descent
from females of the great Byzantine families, and, according to a common
practice among the Greeks, assumed any surname they pleased. One of the best
known of this class is Michael Cantacuzenos, who was famous for his wealth and
pride in the latter half of the sixteenth century. His rapacity is celebrated
in modern Greek history, and his magnificence and misfortunes in modem Greek
poetry.1
Michael Cantacuzenos had
accumulated great wealth by successful mercantile speculations. To increase his
riches and gratify his ambition he became a farmer of the revenue, and, as
such, he was remarkable for his rapacity, and the inexorable severity with
which he collected the taxes due by the Christians. His corruption and
exactions obtained him the name of Sheitan- oghli, or Devil's Child, and the
execration of the whole Greek people. His influence with Mohammed Sokolli, the
celebrated grand vizier of Selim II. and Murad
III., enabled him to mix in every political intrigue
by which he could gain money. He had carried on some of his projects with the
concurrence of the Patriarch Metrophanes, but having afterwards quarrelled with
the patriarch, he accused Metrophanes of revealing state secrets to the
ambassadors of the Emperor of Germany, Busbeck and Wys, who had purchased many
valuable ancient manuscripts from the clergy. Metrophanes was deposed, and then
demanded from Cantacuzenos the repayment of 16,000 ducats which he had received
as a bribe to purchase his support. As
1 Letter of Zygomalas, Turco-Grcecia, 91. Ranke and
Hammer consider the song on the death of Kyritsos Michaele, in Fauriel, Chants
Populaires de la Grice Moderne, i. 212, as written on the death of Michael
Cantacuzenos. It is a rude and simple composition, without even plaintive
gi-ace.
MICHAEL CANTACUZENOS.
189
the grand vizier
Mohammed Sokolli, and the viziers Pial6 and Aclimet, shared in the extortions
of Canta- cuzenos, the patriarch could obtain no redress. The wealth of
Cantacuzenos became at last so enormous that he was able to build and present
to the sultan several galleys after the battle of Lepanto.
Cantacuzenos, like every
Greek, had a mortal enemy among his own countrymen ; his name was Paleologos;
and these two Turkish tax-gatherers revived the feuds of the houses whose names
they had assumed. Cantacuzenos amassed his wealth with all the rapacity which
has been the standing reproach of Greek officials in the Othoman empire. But he
lavished it with an ostentation of aristocratic pride which increased the envy
of his rivals. When he rode through the streets of Constantinople on his mule,
he was preceded by six running footmen, and followed by a train of slaves. When
the influence of Mohammed Sokolli declined, it was easy for the intrigues of
Paleologos to inspire Sultan Murad III. with a desire to appropriate the wealth
of Cantacuzenos—wealth extorted from the sultan’s subjects, and therefore
considered by the sultan as of right belonging to the imperial treasury. A
political accusation was soon found, and Cantacuzenos was ordered to be
strangled for intriguino; in
o o o
Moldavia. On the 3d of
March 1578 he was hung in the gateway of a splendid palace he possessed at
Anchialos, on the construction of which he had expended twenty thousand
ducats.1
At this period the
wealth of the Greek merchants, bankers, and farmers of the revenue, and the
luxury and lavish expenditure of their wives and daughters, excited the wonder
of European ambassadors and noble travellers who visited the East.
During the whole of the'
seventeenth century there 1 Hammer, vii. 60. Turco-Grcecia, 43, 211,
224, 274, 497.
A. D.
1453-1676.
190
SOCIAL CONDITION OF THE GREEKS.
chap. hi. was a constant destruction of the accumulated investments of
the capital, employed in preceding ages on works of public utility and private
advantage, over the whole surface of the Othoman empire inhabited by the Greek
race. The neglect of the Porte, the extortions of pashas and primates, the
ravages of corsairs, and the plundering of brigands, compelled the Greek merchant
and landowner to restrict his operations, and with each successive generation
to sink lower-in the social scale. Accordingly, during this period the Greek
race disappeared from several districts, and abandoned the cultivation of the
soil exclusively to Albanian peasants of a hardier frame and ruder habits of
life. Into such a state of disorder had the Turkish administration fallen, that
when Sultan Mohammed
IV. led his army to Belgrade in 1683, before
sending his grand vizier to besiege Vienna, it was regarded as a favour by the
inhabitants of the villages on his line of march through Thrace, to be allowed
to burn their houses, and conceal themselves and their property in the
mountains, in order to escape the exactions of the feudal militia of Asia, who
were now little better than brigands.1
The arrival of the
Spanish Jews in the Othoman empire at a period of great political depression in
the whole Christian population, was particularly injurious to the Greeks. The
Jews expelled from Granada settled in the towns of Turkey about the time that a
large number of Turkish military colonists settled in Europe ; and the sudden
increase of the Mussulman warriors and landlords required a corresponding addition
to the class of artisans and traders. The Greek population of the towns had,
however, suffered so severely in the fifteenth century from famines' and
plagues, as well as from the incessant slave-forays
1 Hammer, xii. 81.
SPANISH JEWS IN THE LEVANT.
191
of the Seljouk and
Othoman Turks, that Mohammed II. was often compelled to have recourse to the
rural population of Greece to repeople the towns he conquered. At the same
time, the conquests of Mohammed II. enriched the Othomans, and augmented the
demand for all articles of luxury and civilisation. This demand, suddenly
created by a rapid career of conquest, was as suddenly supplied by the bigotry
of Ferdinand and Isabella of Spain, who drove the Jews and Moors of their
dominions into exile. In the latter part of the fifteenth century, Jewish
colonists settled in great numbers in most of the large commercial cities of
Turkey, where they immediately occupied various branches of industry formerly
exclusively exercised by Greek artisans. Their arrival filled a void in
society, and their superior dexterity in many branches of industry enabled them
to resist successfully the rivalry of the Greek emigrants, who quitted the
country to seek their fortunes in the commercial cities. For more than a
century after their arrival in the Othoman empire, the Jews occupied a much
higher social position than they have subsequently maintained. They were the
principal physicians as well as merchants and bankers of the Turks. Throughout
the greater part of the empire the best medical practitioners were Jews. They wTere
the first to open regular shops in the streets of towns throughout the East
for the sale of articles of common use, distinct from the magazines and
workshops of the fabricant.1
Before the end of the fifteenth
century, from
30,000 to 40,000 Jewrs were settled at
Constantinople, from 15,000 to 20,000 at Thessalonica, and great numbers at
every seaport in Turkey. They were
1 Belon, Observations de
plusieures singularitis en Grecc, Asie, &c. 3me livre, p. 182, edit. 1555. Prescott, Ferdinand and Isabella, 263.
A. D.
1453-1676.
192 SOCIAL CONDITION OF THE GREEKS.
chap. hi. eager to display their gratitude to the Othomans, and the
inhuman cruelties they had suffered from the Inquisition made them irreconcilable
enemies of the Christians. It was natural, therefore, for them to employ all
the influence they gained in the Othoman empire, by their services and
industry, to inspire the Mussulmans with the hatred they felt; and when the
Mohammedans in Spain were likewise persecuted and driven into exile, these
efforts were attended with signal success. Thus the punishment of the bigotry
and injustice of the Catholic Christians in Spain fell with greatest severity
on the Orthodox Christians in the Turkish dominions.
There was always a
marked contrast in the character and conduct of the Turkish and Greek population,
even living in the same towns, moving in the same rank of life, and speaking,
as was the case in some places both in Asia and Europe, the same language. The
Turks, though they were more courageous, cruel, and bloodthirsty than the
Greeks when roused to war, were in general far more orderly in conduct, and
more obedient to established social laws. The Greeks, though servile and
submissive when in the presence of power, were fraudulent and insolent whenever
there seemed a chance of their misconduct escaping punishment. With such a
disposition, fear alone could secure order ; and it is surprising how well the
Othoman government preserved tranquillity in its extensive dominions, and
established a greater degree of security for property among the middle classes,
than generally prevailed in European states during the fifteenth and sixteenth
centuries. This end was obtained by a regular police, and by the prompt execution
of a rude species of justice in cases of flagrant abuses and crimes. In the
populous cities of the Othoman empire, and particularly in Constantinople,
which contained more inhabitants
MORALITY OF THE MUSSULMANS.
193
than any three Christian
capitals, the order reigning in the midst of social corruption, caused by
extreme wealth, the conflux of many different nations, and the bigotry of
several hostile religions, excited the wonder and admiration of every observant
stranger. Perfect self-reliance, imperturbable equanimity, superiority to the
vicissitudes of fortunes, and a calm temper, supplied among the Othomans the
want of laws which were notoriously defective, and the faults of tribunals
which were infamously venal.1 Knolles says, “ you seldom see a
murder or a theft committed by any Turk/'2 European gentlemen
accustomed to the barbarous custom of wearing swords on all occasions, were
surprised to see Turks of the highest rank, distinguished for their valour and
military exploits, walking about, even in provincial towns, unarmed, secure in
the power of public order, and the protection of the executive authority in
the State.3
The darkest night of
ignorance covered Greece in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and it was
then almost as much forgotten in Christendom as it was neglected by the Othoman
government. The Greeks had their whole attention absorbed by the evils of the
passing hour; they were forced to think day and night how they could best save
their children from the collectors of that living tribute, their own persons
from being enslaved by the pirates who never quitted their coasts, and their
means of subsistence from being consumed by the exactions of
1 “ Et mirum est inter barbaros
in tanta tantce urbis colluvie nullas cedes audiri, vim injustam non ferri, jus
cuivis dici. Ideo Constantinopolin Sulta- nus refugium totius orbis scribit:
quod omnes miseri, ibi tutissime lateant; quodque omnibus (tam infimis quam
summis tarn Christianis quam infid elibus) justicia administretur.”—T'urco-Grcccia,
487.
2 Knolles,
Turkish History, adds, “if any foul act be committed, it is most commonly done
by Grecians but Spon, with more discrimination, observes, that the Arabs in
Asia, and the Albanians in Europe, were the chief brigands.—Vol. i. p. 244.
3 Spon, L
161.
N
A. D.
1453-1676.
194 SOCIAL CONDITION OF THE GREEKS.
f- pashas, an Othoman
official who appeared to be in perpetual motion in the sultan's dominions.
Ancestral records were forgotten, and no hope urged them to look forward to an
earthly future. A few orthodox prejudices and local superstitions became the
whole mental patrimony of the Hellenic race. The Othoman government not only
neglected to protect its Greek subjects from the corsairs, it even aided in
making their devastations more ruinous, by compelling the remnant of the
population in the depopulated and wasted districts to pay the same amount of
taxation which had been assessed on it in prosperous times. At last poverty,
depopulation, and insecurity of property, seemed to threaten the Greeks with
utter ruin.
At this crisis of the
national fate, the sultan’s government lightened the sufferings of the Greeks
by ceasing to enforce its worst act of oppression. The tribute of Christian
children fell into desuetude in consequence of the decline in the numbers of
the Christian population engaged in agriculture throughout the Othoman empire,
which began to be felt as an evil by the Porte. A considerable portion of the
Greek population in Asia Minor, and of the Sclavonian and Albanian in Europe,
had embraced Mohammedanism to escape this tribute. The example began to be
followed by the Greeks in Europe, and a considerable number of the Cretans
apostatised soon after the conquest of their island. The sultan found no difficulty
in recruiting his armies from the increased Mussulman population of his empire.1
The corps of janissaries had long ceased to admit tribute-children into its
ranks. The permission
1 For the extent of the conversions to Mohammedanism
among the Christians and Jews, see Rycaut, Present State of the Greek Church,
22; and Milman, History of the Jews, in The Family lAbrary, iii. 394. Rycaut
perceived that this increase of the Mussulman population acted as one of the
causes of the abolition of the tribute.
TRIBUTE OF CHILDREN ABOLISHED.
1.95
which its members had
received as early as the year 1578 of enrolling their children as recruits in
the corps, had ultimately transformed the finest body of regular troops in the
world into a hereditary local militia of citizens. About the time this change
was going on, the numerous renegades who were constantly entering the sultan's
service filled the Othoman armies with good soldiers, and saved the government
the expense of rearing and disciplining tribute- children.
About the same time the
fiscal oppression of the Porte fell so heavy on the landed proprietors and
peasants, that the tribute of the healthiest children became an insupportable
burden. The peasant sought refuge in the towns ; the Turkish aga found his estate
depopulated and uncultivated ; the timariot could no longer take the field with
the armies of the sultan, attended by well-armed followers, as his father had
done. The agricultural population of the Othoman empire, Mussulman and
Christian, consequently united in opposing the collection of the tribute, and
the Porte, feeling no urgent necessity to enforce its collection, gradually
ceased to exact it.
For two centuries at
least the Greek population had been diminishing in number, and the Turkish had
been rapidly increasing. This change in their relative numbers was the
principal cause of the abolition of this singular institution, wThich
long formed the chief support of the sultan's personal authority, and the
basis of the military superiority of the Othoman empire. It fell into disuse
about the middle of the seventeenth century, not long after the conquest of
Crete. The last recorded example of its exaction was in the last year of the
administration of the grand vizier Achmet Kueprily, a.d. 1676.1
1 Hammer, xi. 444. The French translator Hellort
would lead us to infer,
A. D.
1453-1676.
196 SOCIAL CONDITION OF THE GREEKS.
chap. hi. Thus the Greeks were relieved from the severest act of tyranny
under which any nation had ever groaned for so long a time ; but the relief was
produced by the force of circumstances and by the neglect of their masters,
without a struggle on their part to rend their chains. History furnishes no
example of a nation falling from so high a state of civilisation, and perpetuating
its existence in such degradation. As long as the Greeks furnished a tithe of
their children to augment the strength of their oppressors, their condition
was one of hopeless misery. That burden removed, the nation soon began to feel
the possibility of improving its condition, and to look forward with hope into
the future.
by a passage at page 389, that the tribute was abolished in 1672, but at
page 397 we find that a levy of two thousand children was made in 1674. The
levy in 1676 was of three thousand children. Hammer nevertheless mentions
another levy of one thousand Christian children in the reign of Achmet III. (a.d. 1703) which he calls the last
attempt to enforce this species of tribute, already fallen into disuse for more
than half a century.—Vol. xiii. 136, 373. Rycaxit, Present State of the Greek
Church, p. 22, writing in 1678, speaks of this tribute as having long fallen
into disuse.
I
VENETIAN DOMINATION IN GREECE. A.D. 1684-1718.
Behaviour
of the Othoman government to the representatives op the Christian powers at the
Sublime Porte—Venetian Republic declares war with the Porte—Morosini
Captain-General op the republic—Campaign in Greece, 1684—German mercenaries in
the service of Venice—Campaign of 1685—of 1686—of 1687—Siege of Athens and
destruction of the Parthenon—Campaign of 1688— Siege of Negrepont—Venetian
deserters—Peace of Carlovitz— Venetian administration in the Morea—Population,
revenues, and commerce—Civil government and condition op the people—Mani-
ates—State op property and administration of justice—Ecclesiastical
ADMINISTRATION — CATHOLIC CLERGY—RELATIONS OF THE PORTE
with the European Powers
when war was renewed with Venice in 1715—Conquest of the Morea by the grand
vizier Ali Cumurgi— Following events of the war—Peace of Passarovitz.
The ambassadors of the Christian powers were never
treated with greater contempt at the Sublime Porte than after the conquest of
Candia. The sultan’s government complained, and not without reason, that no
treaty of peace with a Christian monarch afforded any guarantee for its
faithful observance. While the ambassador of France boasted that his sovereign
had been the first and firmest ally of the sultan, French corsairs levied
ransom-money from the towns in Greece, and made slaves of the Mohammedan
subjects of the sultan who fell into their hands.1 Frenchmen, too,
as Knights of Malta, were active in carrying on an inces-
1 Petis de la Croix, Etat
general de VEmpire Othoman, ii. 270. Ilhtolre des anciens Dues de I'Arckipel,
p. 314.
198
VENETIAN DOMINATION.
chap. iv. sant warfare against the Othoman flag over the whole surface of
the Mediterranean. Matters were not very different with the other Christian
powers; nor was peace better observed by land than by sea. On the frontiers of
Poland, Hungary, and Dalmatia, bands of organised troops called Cossacks,
Haiduks, and Morlachs, carried on regular forays into the Othoman territory. In
vain the sultan’s ministers required the Emperor of Germany, the King of
Poland, and the Republic of Venice, to put a stop to these invasions; their
complaints were made the subject of interminable discussions, in which the
Christian governments displayed their weakness and bad faith by attempting to
repudiate all responsibility for acts of hostility committed by troops
assembled within their frontiers, on the ground that they were the acts of
lawless brigands ; or else they excused them by asserting that the acts of
brigandage committed by the Christians were in revenge for similar deeds of
Othoman subjects. If the assertion was true, it appears that the Porte paid
more attention to the sufferings of the plundered Mussulmans than the
Christian governments paid to the complaints of their subjects. Indeed, the
feelings of the Othomans were so much excited by the incessant hostilities to
which they were exposed, that the sultan was compelled to demand explanations
from all his Christian neighbours. The Othoman ministers assumed a menacing
tone in their intercourse with Christian ambassadors; and then they very soon
discovered that the diplomatic agents of their most formidable enemies were
disposed to submit to a great deal of insolence rather than commence an open
war.
The house of Austria had
caused such widespread discontent in Hungary, by its fiscal exactions and bigoted
treatment of the Protestants, that it feared to
TREATMENT OF FRENCH AMBASSADORS. 199
engage in a war which
might end in the total loss of that kingdom. More than one-half of Hungary was
already annexed to the Othoman empire ; and it seemed not improbable that the
inhabitants of the remainder might prefer Turkish toleration to German tyranny.
The republic of Venice
was so intent on preserving its commercial relations with the Levant, as a
means of recruiting its finances after the great expenditure caused by the war
of Candia, that it bore many insults on the part of the Porte with patience,
and rarely uttered a complaint, except when some act of the sultan's officers
seemed likely to circumscribe the trade and diminish the gains of its subjects.
The deportment of the
ambassadors of the Christian powers at Constantinople did not increase the
consideration in which they were held. Unwise exhibitions of presumption and
petulance by some French ambassadors were not supported with proper firmness.
Many scandalous scenes occurred. The son of M. de la Haye, the French
ambassador, was bastinaded by the Turks, and his father imprisoned. Louis XIV.
sent M. Blondel as envoy-extraordinary to demand satisfaction for the insult ;
but this envoy could not gain admittance to Sultan Mohammed IV., and returned
to France without delivering his sovereign's letter. Some time after, the
younger de la Haye, who had received the bastinade, became himself ambassador,
and conducted himself in such a manner at his first meeting with the grand
vizier, that he was pushed off the stool on which he wras seated,
and beaten by the grand vizier’s attendants.1 The Marquis of
Nointel, who was sent to Constantinople in 1670 to repair the imprudences of
his predecessors, distinguished himself
1 Hammer, Histoire de VEmpire Othoman, xi. 45, 229.
a. D. 1634-1718.
200
VENETIAN DOMINATION.
chap. iv. rather by ostentation and petulance than by prudent and dignified conduct.1 He had far
more violent disputes with the grand vizier Kara Mustapha concerning the
position of his seat in the audience-chamber, than concerning the trade of
French subjects or the political interests of France. The lavish expenditure by
which he maintained his pretensions involved him in debt, and made him descend
to meanness. He borrowed money from Constantinopolitan Jews, and compelled the
French merchants of Pera, by ail unwarranted exercise of his authority, to
supply him with funds. These private proceedings formed a shameful contrast
with his public displays, and did not tend to increase the respect of the Turks
for the agents of the greatest monarchs of Christendom.2
The eagerness with which
the ambassadors of the Christian powers intrigued and bribed, in order to
overreach one another at the Porte, the importance they attached to sitting in
an arm-chair in public, and the tricks they made use of to obtain exclusive
privileges, each for his own nation, led the Turks to conclude that the
Christian character was a very despicable compound of childish folly and extreme
selfishness.3 The Othoman ministers acted on this persuasion, and
treated the representatives of the Christian powers at Constantinople with the
insolence of contempt, while the commerce of the merchants in the empire was
considered as a fair object for constant exactions.
These circumstances were
already operating to produce a great collision between the sultan and his
Christian neighbours, when Achmet Kueprily, who had
1 Hammer, xi. 341. Compare a
letter of Nointel, in Laborde’s Athenes aux XV., XVI., et XVII. Si^cles, i.
137.
2 Laborde, Athdnes aux XV.,
XVI., et XVII. SiZcles, i. 140.
3 Nointel
endeavoured to insert an article in the treaty with France, by which the Porte
engaged not to admit vessels of several of the European powers to trade in the Othoman
empire, unless under the French flag.—Hammer, xi. 344.
y
DEATH OF ACHMET KUEPRILY.
201
been grand vizier for
fifteen years, died, at the early age of forty-one, a.d. 1676, leaving the
Othoman empire at the greatest extent it attained.1 Achmet was as
remarkable for his honourable conduct as for his great talents. He was a lover
of justice, and a hater of presents, which he knew were one of the great
sources of corruption in Turkey. Kara Mustapha succeeded this great man as
grand vizier. He was distinguished by his excessive cupidity and insolence, as
Achmet had been by his extraordinary disinterestedness and prudence. The rapid
degradation of the Othoman character, and the decline of the empire, dates from
his accession to office. The negotiations of the Porte with foreign governments
were employed by Kara Mustapha as a means of gratifying his avarice and
extorting money, without any reference to the principles of justice. His
presumption was as unbounded as his avarice was sordid. At the first audience
he gave to the French ambassador, one of those scandalous scenes happened which
we have seen acted in the present day with more tragical effect by a Russian
prince. Menschikoff was in no danger of being treated like M. de Nointel, who
was turned out of the room by the shoulders, the tshaous shouting as he pushed
him along, “ March off, infidel! ” 2
A few examples of the
exactions of Kara Mustapha require to be cited, to give a faithful portrait of
the state of the Othoman administration. He demanded from the republic of
Ragusa the payment of a sum of three hundred purses, or one hundred and fifty
thousand dollars, on account of an additional amount of customs which he
pretended that Othoman subjects had paid in the port of Ragusa during the war
of Candia, when they were excluded from trading in the
1 He added
Candia, Xeuliausel in Hungary, and Kaminiec in Poland, to the empire.
2 “
Haid<5 kalk ghiaour.”—Hammer, xii. 8.
A. D.
1684-1718.
202
VENETIAN DOMINATION.
chap. iv. Adriatic. Kagusa was under Othoman protection,
' and paid an annual tribute to the Porte. Even this the envoys of Ragusa
represented that they were unable to pay, as their city had been almost
entirely destroyed by an earthquake in 1666. They were thrown into prison, and
threatened with torture ; but, after a year s imprisonment, the matter was
compounded by the republic paying one hundred and twenty purses or sixty
thousand dollars.1
The Dutch ambassador
Collier was compelled to pay a large sum to prevent the trade of Holland from
being interrupted.2
The Venetian bailo,
Cuirana, having smuggled some valuable merchandise into his residence in order
to defraud the Porte of the legal duty, was obliged to compound for his
misconduct by paying the grand vizier thirty thousand dollars.3 On
the arrival of a new bailo, Morosini, new disputes occurred, in consequence of
some Christian slaves making their escape on board the Venetian galleys in the
port. These disputes were again arranged by paying the sum of fifty thousand
dollars, which was distributed among the grand vizier and the principal agents
of his party. Again, when the news reached Constantinople that a number of
Turks had been slain in a foray on the Dalmatian frontier, the bailo of Venice
was imprisoned in the Seven Towers, and not released until the republic paid
the sum of two hundred thousand dollars as indemnity.4
1 Rycaut,
History, iii. 4. Hammer, xii. 38.
2 Fifty
purses to the grand vizier, ten to his kihaya, three to the reis effendi, aud
eight to the aga of the custom-house. Not six thousand purses for an audience,
as the French translation of Hammer says. Compare Rycaut, iii. 12, with Hammer,
xii. 40.
3 Even the
Greek government has been compelled to send circulars to the foreign ministers
at King Otho’s court, complaining of the frauds committed by diplomatic agents;
and frauds on the part of the royal household have been detected. So dangerous
are diplomatic and monarchical privileges where honour is the only guarantee
for honesty.
4 Rycaut,
iii. 10. Hammer, xii. 38.
TREATMENT OF THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR. 203
The Genoese resident,
Spinola, was accused of making a trade of circulating forged coin, and he was
compelled to pay the Porte five thousand dollars before he could obtain the
permission to embark for Genoa. On a previous occasion he had paid a large sum
for having established a manufactory of brandy, and a cellar for the sale of
wine, in his residence.1
The position of the
French ambassadors seat, at his audience with the grand vizier, was a question
of State between the Court of France and the Sublime Porte. Kara Mustapha
persisted in denying to M. de Guille- ragues the privilege of sitting on the
soffra; and the French, by submitting to this indignity, could not escape the
exactions of the Othoman government. Eight ships, belonging to the corsairs of
Tripoli in Africa, having been pursued by a French squadron under Admiral
Duquesne, sought refuge in the port of Scio, where they were fired on by the
French, whose shot did considerable damage to the town, and killed several
Mussulmans. The grand vizier, who availed himself of every opportunity to fill
his coffers, demanded an indemnity of three hundred and fifty thousand crowns
from the French ambassador for this wanton act of hostility, and threatened to
send him to the Seven Towers. After a few days’ detention in arrest, M. de
Guilleragues signed an agreement to pay' a present to the Porte, and was
released. A good deal of bargaining was required to fix the amount of the
present, and the manner in which it was to be presented to the Porte. At
length the secretary of embassy and the dragoman presented themselves with
articles valued at sixty thousand dollars ; a curtain was suddenly drawn up,
and the representatives of France found themselves in the presence of the
sultan, who was seated on an elevated throne. The imperial
1 Rycaut, iii. 11. Hammer, xii. 18.
i
I
A. D.
1684-1718.
204
VENETIAN DOMINATION.
chap. iv. uslier then proclaimed, “ Behold the agents
sent by the King of France to make satisfaction for the misconduct of his ships
at Scio,” and the different articles were mentioned, with the value attached to
each.1
The English ambassador
was exposed to more severe pecuniary exactions than the French. The Turkey Company
was accused of having imported an immense sum of Venetian lion-dollars, of base
alloy, into Aleppo. Though the accusation appears to have been false, the
Turkey merchants preferred paying the grand vizier a bribe of seventeen
thousand dollars rather than engage in a contest which must have entailed
great loss, and, from the notorious venality of the Othoman administration, no
decision would have established their innocence, unless their commercial
character in their general dealings had refuted the accusation.
Another device of Kara
Mustapha to extort money from the English was singularly mean, but completely
successful, on account of that very meanness which none could have suspected.
Sir John Finch, the ambassador, was requested to send the capitulations, as
the treaties are called, to be examined at the Porte. He complied, and was then
informed that a new treaty was necessary, which always required a number of
presents. The ambassador protested that he was satisfied with the existing
capitulations, and asked for their restoration in vain. Kara Mustapha ordered
every obstruction to be thrown in the way of English trade, and the losses to
which the merchants were exposed were so great that they furnished the
ambassador with twenty-five thousand dollars to bribe the grand vizier to
restore the capitulations. A new ambassador, Lord Chandos, was specially
instructed to complain of this exaction, and, to avoid exposure, Kara Mustapha
1 Rycaut says they were valued at ten times their
real cost.—iii 8. Hammer, xii. 5i.
VENICE DECLARES WAR.
205
deemed it prudent to
restore the money; but other grounds were discovered for compelling the English
merchants to leave the greater part of the sum in his hands.1
The avarice and
injustice of Kara Mustapha were so generally feared, that Suleiman Pasha, who
became grand vizier, and perished when Mohammed IV. was dethroned, observed,
“In this man's time the true believers cannot expect better usage than the
infidels.”
The tameness with which
the European powers had submitted to the insolence and extortions of the grand
vizier increased his pride. When their subjects complained, he replied, “ Do
you not breathe the sultan's air, and will you pay nothing for the privilege
?" At length he made the affairs of Hungary a pretext for commencing war
with Austria. His presumption led him to believe that he would find no
difficulty in adding Vienna to the sultan’s dominions, and, with all his
incapacity, he would probably have succeeded, from the greater incapacity of
the German emperor, had the house of Austria not been saved by the Poles. The
first campaign was signalised by the memorable siege of Vienna, the victory of
John Sobieski, and the death of Kara Mustapha, who was strangled as a
punishment for his bad success, a.d. 1683.
When the republic of
Venice saw that the army of the grand vizier had been completely destroyed by
the disastrous campaign of 1683, the senate began to think that an immediate
war with the sultan would be the best policy. The sacrifices Venice had made to
preserve peace, both of money and dignity, were always met by fresh displays
of insolence and new exactions on the part of the Othoman government, so that
sooner or later the republic felt that it would be compelled to defend itself
by arms. It seemed, therefore, more pru-
1 Rycaut,
iii. 8.
A. D.
1684-1718.
206
VENETIAN DOMINATION.
chap. iv. dent to seize the
present moment for weakening the resources of its enemy, by attacking him in
the south while all his best troops were employed on his northern frontier,
than to wait supinely until he found leisure to choose his own time for
commencing hostilities with Venice, as he had done with Austria. The Pope
joined the Emperor of Germany and the King of Poland, in urging the republic to
form an alliance for prosecuting the war against the Mohammedans in concert. Many
allusions wTere made to the glorious victory of Lepanto
—allusions which must have suggested to Venetian statesmen the trifling results
of that great battle, and convinced them that in the war they were about to
undertake, their only hope of success ought to be placed in the extent of their
own resources. An offensive and defensive treaty, with promises of mutual aid,
was concluded between the republic, the Emperor of Germany, and the King of
Poland, under the guarantee of Pope Innocent XI., and war was declared against
the Othoman empire.1 In the month of July 1684, Capello, the
Venetian resident at Constantinople, presented himself at the Porte, and
communicated the declaration of war to the kaimakam, the grand vizier being at
Adrianople with the sultan. As soon as he had executed his commission, he
disguised himself as a sailor, and escaped 011 board a French ship.
The war wThich
now commenced was the most successful the republic ever carried on against the
Othoman empire, yet it affords signal evidence that both the machine of
government and the energy of the people had suffered greater deterioration
among the Venetians than even among the Othomans. The glory Venice acquired by
the war, and the conquests she gained, must be ascribed entirely to one great
man, whose influence remedied many of the defects in the
1 Rycaut, iii. 136, gives the articles of the treaty.
FRANCESCO MOROSINI.
207
Venetian administration,
and whose character supplied its wants. Francesco Morosini, who had been
elevated to the dignity of Knight and Procurator of Saint Mark for his valour
in the war of Candia, was subsequently accused of having betrayed his country's
interests when he concluded the peace which surrendered to the sultan an
untenable fortress. He was honourably acquitted, but during fifteen years of
peace his former services were depreciated, and he lived retired as one of the
common herd of princely nobles in Venice. When, however, it was again necessary
to think of meeting the Othomans in battle, all men remembered the bloody
contests of the former war, and the indomitable courage of Morosini. The
dignified behaviour of the patriotic general at last received its reward.
Francesco Morosini, now sixty-six years of age, was intrusted with the chief
command of the forces of the republic as captain-general.
Morosini occupies so
conspicuous a place in the history of Greece as well as Venice, that his
private character deserves to be noticed in order that his public career may
be better understood. Though he was wealthy and noble, he had passed the best
years of his youth and manhood at sea. From his twentieth to his forty- third
year he had been constantly in active service on board the Venetian fleet,
where he had gained great honour by his enterprise and daring. His mind was
firm and equable ; his perseverance was not inferior to his courage, yet he was
neither rash nor obstinate; his constitution was vigorous and healthy ; his
personal appearance was dignified and his countenance cheerful ; his manner
bold, and somewhat haughty; his language frank and rough, or grave and
courteous, according to the rank of his associates ; his naval and military
skill of a high order, and improved by long experience in the Othoman wars. His
career proves
A. D.
1684-1718.
208
VENETIAN DOMINATION.
chap. iv. that he possessed considerable knowledge of
administrative and warlike science, but his campaigns seem also to indicate
that he was not endowed with the highest strategical prescience. The military
and naval operations under his direction were not sufficiently combined, nor
were his campaigns marked by that unity of purpose which attains a definite
object by regular progress. We must, however, always bear in mind that the
armies he commanded were comparatively small, that his power over the best
part of his land forces was limited by conventions, that he could not act
without consulting a council of war, and that his plans were controlled by a
jealous senate. It need not, therefore, excite our wonder if his mind turned
habitually from the contemplation of enlarged views to the attainment of
immediate advantages. The impatience of successful results is one of the evils
of controlling distant military operations by numerous assemblies, whether
aristocratical or democratical. Party objections and ignorant criticism have so
much scope for their activity, that generals under such control must secure
every trifling success, even though the insignificant victory entails the
sacrifice of some greater results, which steady perseverance, patient progress,
and long delay, could alone have gained.
The naval forces of
Venice, at the commencement of the war, consisted of a well-appointed fleet of
ten galleasses, thirty ships of the line, and thirty galleys, besides a number
of smaller vessels. The army, on the other hand, was in a neglected condition ;
the regular troops amounted to about eight thousand, and they were by no means
in good order or well disciplined. The provincial militia, though numerous, and
sometimes well armed, could hardly be made available for foreign service. The
revenues of the republic did not greatly exceed two millions of sequins. With
these
CAMPAIGN OF 1681.
20.9
limited resources Venice
engaged in a contest with the a. n
o o
Othoman empire.
It was of the greatest
importance to Venice to follow up the declaration of war by some great success,
before the Othoman government had time to reinforce its garrisons in Dalmatia
and Greece. In both these countries military operations were carried on with
activity, but those which relate to Greece alone require to be noticed in this
work. It was by conquests in Greece that the Venetians expected to acquire such
an increase of revenue as would indemnify the republic for the expenditure of
the war. This consideration, and not the ambition of becoming the conqueror of
Sparta and Athens, induced Morosini to recommend Greece as the chief field of
military operations. He opened the campaign of 1684 by laying siege to Santa
Maura. The attack was pushed with vigour, and the place surrendered in sixteen
days (6th August). This conquest was of primary importance for the prosecution
of hostilities against the Morea, and for the security of Venetian commerce,
Santa Maura being one of the principal places of refuge for the Barbary
corsairs who infested the entrance of the Adriatic. As Prevesa might have
performed the same office, Morosini followed up his first success by besieging
that place, which fell into his hands on the 29 th of September. A plundering
expedition into Acar- nania, the destruction of five Turkish villages, and the
capture of a few slaves, occupied the fleet and army during the interval
between the capture of Santa Maura and the attack on Prevesa.1 At
this early period of the war, disease began to make great havoc in the ranks of
the Venetians, and it seems to have increased in intensity in every succeeding
campaign.
1 Coronelli, Description Gecxjraphique et JUstorique de la Morce reconquhe
paries Venetieus; Paris, 16S7 ; folio, pp. 07-70.
1684-1718.
210
VENETIAN DOMINATION.
chap. iv. Count Strasoldo, the general of the land
forces, was one of its victims.
In order to prosecute
hostilities with vigour, the senate found that it w^as necessary to augment the
army by the addition of foreign troops already organised in battalions, and experienced
in military duties. The Pope, the Grand-duke of Tuscany, and the Order of
Malta, had promised to send some veteran auxiliaries, but the chief dependence
of the republic could only be on its own troops. Veteran mercenaries were
sought in Germany. The alliance with the Emperor enabled the Venetian
government to conclude military conventions with several of the German princes,
who were in the habit of hiring their troops to foreign states. Many of the
German princes had taken up the trade formerly exercised by the Italian
condottieri, in order to maintain larger military establishments than the
revenues of their dominions could have otherwise supported, and give
themselves thereby additional political importance. The war in Candia had
proved that the brilliant military services of the noble volunteers of France,
in spite of all the noise made about them, were of little real value in a long
campaign. The professional soldiers of Germany proved more efficient troops,
and during the present war they displayed not only steady courage on the field
of battle, but also great patience in the camp when disease was destroying
their strength and thinning their ranks. Conventions for the supply of entire
regiments completely equipped and disciplined under the command of experienced
officers, were concluded with the princes of Brunswick and Saxony, each of whom
bound himself to furnish the republic with two thousand four hundred men.1
The treaty with the Duke of Bruns-
1 Gratiani,
Eistoriarum Venetarum, libri xxiv., vol. ii. 321. Hist or ia della Veneta Guerra in Levante contro
VImpero Otlomano di A. Locatelli, i. 112. Ales-
CAMPAIGN OF 1685.
211
wick, afterwards Elector
of Hanover, was concluded in December 1684, and the Hanoverian troops, after
marching through Germany in winter, reached Venice in April, and joined
Morosini at Dragomestre in June 1685.1 Their number, including
officers and camp- followers, amounted to 2542 men. Though valuable troops,
they were not easy to rule, complaining constantly of the treatment they
received from the Venetian government and the captain-general, and quarrelling
frequently among themselves.2
The great object of
Morosini was to conquer the Morea. He considered that it would be as easily conquered,
and more easily defended, than Candia, as it lay nearer the resources of
Venice. Some of the chiefs of Maina had promised to join the Venetians, and
rouse the rest of the Greek population to arms, if Morosini would appear in
Greece with a formidable force. These chiefs induced Morosini to hope that he
should be able to take possession of Misithra and Leondari without difficulty,
and, by commanding the centre of the Morea, interrupt the communications of the
Turks with the sea-coast. The maritime fortresses could then have offered very
little resistance to the Venetians, who already commanded the sea. The Maniate
chiefs boasted of what they had no means of performing. The grand vizier
Aclimet Kueprily had reduced Maina to a state of complete subjection, and the
Othoman garrisons in the three fortresses of Zarnata, Kielapha, and Passava,
had so completely
sandro Locatelli was secretary to Morosini from June 1684 until he returned
to Venice in 1689. His work was printed at Cologne, after his death, in two
volumes, folio, 1705.
1 Schwenke,
Geschichte der HannoterUchen Truppen in Grieckenland, 16S5- 1689, gives the
treaty with the Duke of Brunswick, father of George I. of England, p. 182.
2 Schwenke,
42, 126, 155, 170. On one occasion they complained that they were unfairly
treated in the division of the spoil, because they received no black slaves,
like the Venetian captains.—Pfister, Zicei Feldzilgc aus dem Kriege ton Morea
am ende des 17 Jahrhunderts, 1687, 16S8. Kassel, 1845, p. 122, note 3.
a. n.
1684-1718.
212
VENETIAN DOMINATION.
chap. iv. established the authority of the sultan in
the country, that the mountaineers were too much intimidated to think of taking
up arms.1 Ismael Pasha had also taken precautions to preserve
tranquillity by marching additional troops into Maina, and compelling the principal
families to give hostages for their good conduct. When Morosini arrived at
Sapienza he met a deputation of Maniates, who besought him not to approach
their coast as they were entirely at the mercy of the Turks, since the people
would not venture to take up arms until they saw the Venetians in possession of
some important fortress in their vicinity, where the republic would be able to
maintain a powerful garrison and fleet to protect the movements of their
friends. Morosini, who had with him about eight thousand troops, immediately
commenced the siege of Coron.2 The pasha of the Morea hastened to
its relief with a considerable force, but was defeated, and Coron was taken,
and its defenders massacred, after a vigorous defence, on the 11th August.
As soon as Morosini had
repaired the fortifications of Coron, and put the place in a condition to
receive a garrison sufficient to repel any attack of the Turks, he crossed over
the gulf to Maina. The object of the Venetians was to encourage the Maniates to
take up arms and to gain possession of Kalamata, before which the capitan-pasha
had formed an intrenched camp with an army of six thousand infantry and two
thousand spahis. Morosini was well acquainted with the country. Twenty-six years
had elapsed since he had
1 Hammer,
xi. 337, 374. Locatelli, i. 101, 128.
2 The Venetian army consisted of Venetians,
Sclavonians, and Hanoverians; the auxiliaries of Maltese, Florentine, and Papal
troops.
Venetians,
Sclavonians,
Hanoverians,
3000 Maltese, . 1000 Florentines, 2400 Papal troops,
1000
300
400
6400
1700
BATTLE OF KALAMATA.
213
taken and destroyed
Kalamata, carrying off fourteen pieces of cannon from the castle, condemning
the inhabitants to work as slaves at the oar in his galleys, and burning all
the houses in the town.1 He now summoned the place to surrender,
under the penalty of being treated like Coron if it resisted. The capitan-
pasha rejected the summons with disdain. In the mean time the Venetians
rendered themselves masters of Zarnata, which was only five miles distant from
Chi tries, where the fleet lay at anchor. The Othoman governor of Zarnata had
referred to the capitan-pasha for orders, but Morosini intercepted the orders
to defend the place to the last extremity, and persuaded the aga to surrender
on the 10th September. Six hundred Turks, with their arms and baggage, were
landed near Kalamata, but the aga retired to Venice, where his treachery or
cowardice was rewarded with a pension. The Venetian army, increased by the arrival
of three thousand three hundred Saxons, was now placed under the command of
General Degenfeld, and ordered to attack the capitan-pasha. A council of war
was held, and its members agreed with Degenfeld in thinking that the position
of the Turkish camp was too strong to be assailed. When, however, it was proposed
to sign a written declaration to this effect, in order to transmit it to the
captain-general Morosini, the Hanoverian prince, Maximilian William, declared
that Morosini having given express orders to attack the Turks, in his opinion
the best thing they could do would be to obey them without losing time.2
This observation of the young prince changed the resolution
1 Gratiani,
F. Mauroceni gesta, 71;
2 Scliwenke,
47. The prince was the third son of the Duke of Brunswick. He was then nineteen
years old. He was a giddy youth, and got into disgrace at his father’s court by
ridiculing the rouged figure of the Countess of Platen, his father’s mistress.
He made the whole circle of envious beauties partake in his amusement, by
squirting pea water, instead of rose water, in their faces, which left sad
traces of artificial adorning on the painted visage of the countess.
A. D.
1684-1718.
214
VENETIAN DOMINATION.
chap. iv. of Degenfeld, who appears to have intended
to set up his own authority as a control 011 that of the captain- general,
either from personal jealousy, or a desire to prolong the war ; for he was a
man of courage, and when he resolved to advance, he conducted the operations
of the army with promptitude. The Turks were completely defeated, and both
their camp and the town of Kalamata taken. The castle of Kalamata, being found
incapable of defence, was again destroyed, as it had been in 1659, but the
inhabitants on this occasion remained in possession of their property under
Venetian protection. The Othoman garrisons in the forts of Kielapha, near the
harbour of Vitylo, and of Passava, near Marathonisi, now capitulated, and
evacuated Maina. In the first the Venetians found fifty-eight pieces of artillery,
including some small guns mounted on the curtains. Passava was destroyed as of
110 use to the Venetians, who kept possession of Marathonisi; but they placed
garrisons in Zarnata and Kielapha, in order to watch the Maniates, and to
secure the command of the ports of Armyro and Vitylo, from which the greater
part of the produce of the Zygos was exported. The Venetians placed as little
reliance in the unsteady disposition of the Maniate chiefs as the Turks, and
employed nearly the same means for preserving their ascendancy in the country.
The army of the republic was put into winter-quarters at Zante, Santa Maura,
and Corfu, in the month of October, but disease continued to thin the ranks of
the Germans.1
The campaign of 1686 was
opened by the Otho-
1 The
Hanoverians passed the winter at Zante, and they had some reason to complain of
neglect on the part of the Venetian government. They had great difficulty in
procuring firewood to cook their victuals; the barrels of rice were sometimes
half-filled with spoiled macaroni, and everything rose in price on their
arrival. From April 1685 to January 1686 they lost 256 in battle, and 736 died
in hospital.—Schwenke, 57.
CAPTURE OF NAVARIN AND MODON.
215
mans in the month of
April. They penetrated into Maina and besieged Kielapha, but were compelled to
abandon the enterprise on the approach of a Venetian fleet under Venieri. The
republic had now secured the services of an able general to direct the
operations of its army in Greece. Otho Koenigsmark, field- marshal in the
Swedish service, was appointed commander-in-chief of the land forces under the
orders of the captain-general.1 The Hanoverian troops had been
increased to upwards of three thousand men, but the whole army did not exceed
eleven thousand, and it was assembled so slowly that the campaign did not
commence until June. The troops were landed at Old Navarin (Pylos), which,
being dependent for its supply of water on an aqueduct, immediately
capitulated. The garrison consisted chiefly of negroes, who were conveyed to
Alexandria. New Navarin, which had been constructed by the Othoman government
in 1572, the year after the battle of Lepanto, to defend the entrance of the
magnificent harbour, in which the largest fleet may ride at anchor, was next
attacked. The seraskier of the Morea attempted in vain to relieve it, and
Sefer Pasha was compelled to sign a capitulation, binding himself to surrender
the place in four days. The explosion of a powder magazine on the night he
signed this capitulation, by which he and many of the principal Turks perished,
induced the survivors immediately to admit the Venetians into the fortress.2
Three thousand souls, of whom one thousand
1 This
Count Otho Koenigsmark was the uncle of Philip, the lover of Sophia Dorothea,
the wife of George I.; and his sister, Maria Aurora, was the mistress of
Frederick Augustus I., Elector of Saxony and King of Poland, and mother of
Marshal de Saxe.
2 It was
supposed that Sefer Pasha blew up the magazine, where he had invited many of
the principal Turks to assemble, in order to revenge himself on them for having
compelled him to capitulate. This report, however, is not mentioned in the
letter of a Saxon volunteer, entitled “ Griindlicher und
A. D.
1684-1718.
VENETIAN DOMINATION.
ciiap. tv. five hundred were soldiers, were conveyed
to Tripoli. The army then besieged Modon, encamping among the luxuriant gardens
in its vicinity. The place was well fortified, provided with ample supplies of
provisions and ammunition, with an excellent artillery of one hundred guns, and
defended by a garrison of one thousand men ; but it capitulated, after a feeble
defence, on the 10th of July, and the inhabitants, four thousand in number,
were transported to the regency of Tripoli. Considerable booty was found in
Modon, but Morosini was accused of allowing the Italians to purchase the
property of the emigrants at their own terms. Of four hundred black slaves
taken in the town, the Hanoverians complained that they only received seven
men and three women for their share, and they said that all their booty
consisted of some copper, which was sold for forty sequins.
The Hanoverians were at
this time much dissatisfied with the Venetian service, in which they gained
less plunder than they expected ; and Morosini was extremely unpopular among
them. His courage was admired, for they recounted that on one occasion, when it
was expected that Modon was about to surrender, the captain-general visited
the advanced battery with a train of magnificently-dressed Venetian nobles.
The Turks, however, suddenly broke off the negotiations, and opened their fire
on this battery: the consequence was, that all the fine-dressed nobles ran to
hide themselves under cover, leaving Morosini standing alone. Complaints were
made of his severity, and the Germans declared that they would not remain in
the Venetian service unless the article of the convention, which placed the
administration of justice
genauer Bericht aller merckwiirdigen Sachen welch e
bey Belager und Eroberung der Vestungen in Morea, Navarino, und Modon taglich
vorgelauffen. Gedruckt im Jahr, 1686.”
,t t' ze r y H ict o&oft
CAPTURE OF NAUPLIA.
217
and the power of
punishment in the hands of an officer named by their duke, was strictly
observed. Morosini, they asserted, sometimes ordered the highest Venetian
officers to be put in irons and flogged, without the sentence of a
court-martial.1 If this be true, there can be no doubt that the
captain-general found it necessary to employ these strong measures to put an
end to fraud and peculation. The complaints of the Germans were not always
reasonable. The officers were discontented at the frequent change of place in
this campaign, which compelled them to sell the horses and camp-equipage they
had picked up at an inadequate price, as they were not allowed space to
transport it on board the Venetian ships. The red uniform of the Hanoverians,
though it was greatly feared by the enemy in battle, was too conspicuous to
allow the soldiers to make much booty, and, to their great regret, prevented
them from catching buffaloes, which were numerous in the Morea.2
Nauplia was the next
object of attack. On the 30th July, Count Koenigsmark landed at Port Tolon. The
rock Palamedes, being then without fortifications, was immediately occupied by
the Venetians. But though the town was commanded by this position, it was so
well provisioned and strongly fortified, that it was found impossible to make
any progress with the siege until the seraskier, who had posted himself at
Argos with four thousand cavalry and three thousand infantry, was driven from
the vicinity of the place. This was effected after a sharp engagement, in
which, from want of horses, the Hanoverian artillery- officers employed Greeks
to drag their guns.3 The Turkish cavalry was well mounted, bold, and
active,
1 Schwenke, 88. 2
Schwenke, 105.
3 Lieut. Heerman says, “ Als
icli jiingst mit den Stiiken avanciren sollen, liabe ich mich erst nach meinen
menschlichen Pferden, den Griechen umselien und sie zusammen suclien
inussen.”—Schwenke, 104.
A. D.
1684-1718.
218
VENETIAN DOMINATION.
chap. iv. and covered the retreat to Corinth. The
batteries on the Palamedes soon set the houses of the town on fire, but the
place continued to make a brave defence, as the seraskier was expected to
return with fresh reinforcements. The Venetian army, which was encamped in the
low ground between Tyrinthus and Nauplia, suffered from an autumnal fever
called the plague. The Hanoverians could only muster one thousand five hundred
and fifty men under arms, and they had one thousand two hundred sick and
wounded. The seraskier now thought that the time had arrived for assailing the
Venetian army with every prospect of success. He advanced from Corinth, and
made a desperate attack on their camp on the 29th of August, which was not
repulsed until Morosini landed a body of two thousand men from the fleet, who
opened their fire on the flank of the Turks. Koenigsmark distinguished himself
by his skill and courage in this battle, which ended in the total defeat of the
Othoman army. Nauplia, being now deprived of all hope of relief, capitulated on
the 3d of September, and seven thousand persons, including one thousand two
hundred men of the garrison, were landed at Tenedos. The Sclavonians in the
Venetian service distinguished themselves greatly before Nauplia. Disease
continued to make destructive ravages among the Germans. Their complaints were
loud, and their disputes with Morosini unusually violent, who wished to put
them into winter-quarters at Nauplia. Morosini had also reason to complain, for
the German officers disputed among themselves, intrigued against one another,
and increased the service of the soldiers by carrying an excessive number of
private servants on the regimental muster-rolls.1
The campaign of 1687 is
memorable in the history
1 Sehwenke, 120, 126.
L /■ ft
BATTLE OF PATRAS.
219
of Europe for the destruction of the Parthenon of Athens, the most
wonderful combination of architecture and sculpture, and perhaps the most
perfect work of art, winch has yet been executed. Germany again sent new troops
to reinforce the army of the republic. The Saxons returned home at the end of
the last campaign ; but conventions having been concluded with the Landgraf of
Hesse and the Duke of Wtirtemberg, the strength of the German contingent in the
Venetian service was not diminished.1 The Hanoverian battalions also
received an addition of one thousand two hundred men, but these new recruits
were not veteran soldiers like those who had arrived in the preceding years.
All Germany was at this time filled with recruiting parties for the Austrian
armies in Hungary, and in anticipation of war with Louis XIV. The officers of
Brunswick had even accepted French deserters into the ranks, in order to
complete their companies. On the march to Venice forty of these French recruits
went off with their arms on one occasion, and the whole loss from desertion
exceeded two hundred men.
The Turks had prepared for resisting the further progress of the
Venetians by forming a camp near Patras, in wiiich ten thousand men were
strongly intrenched under the command of Mehemet Pasha. The delay which took
place in the arrival of the troops from Germany, and the fear of placing the
army in too close communication with the fleet, in which the plague had
appeared, prevented the captain- general from opening the campaign before the
end of July. The troops were landed to the west of Patras, and the fleet passed
through the Dardanelles of Le-
1 Ztcei Feldziirje aus dem Krlege ton Morea in den Jahren 1687 und 1688,
besonders als beitrag zur Ilessischen Kriegs-geschichte. Von F. Pfister,
kurhessis- chem artilleri-capitain. Kassel, 1845.
A. D.
1684-1718.
x
220
VENETIAN DOMINATION.
chap. iv. panto during the night of the 22d July. Koenigsmark saw the
necessity of defeating the Turkish army before commencing the siege of Patras,
and though the position of Mehemet Pasha was strong and well chosen, he
succeeded in marching round it, in assailing its weakest point, and carrying it
after a well-contested battle. Patras, the two castles commanding the entrance
of the gulf of Corinth, and the town of Lepanto, were immediately evacuated by
the Turks with the greatest precipitation.
These successes excited great enthusiasm at Venice, where the delay in
opening the campaign had caused some anxiety. Morosini, who had been raised to
the rank of hereditary knight after the taking of Nauplia, now received the
title of “ the Peloponnesian.” His portrait was placed in the hall of the Great
Council, an honour never granted before to any Venetian during his lifetime.1
Koenigsmark, who was supposed to want money more than empty honour, was
presented with six thousand ducats in a gold basin. The Prince of Hanover
received a jewelled sword valued at four thousand ducats, and other officers
were rewarded with gold-hilted swords or gold chains. The liberality of the
republic was more than royal. Koenigsmark’s pay was raised to twenty-four
thousand ducats annually.
Castel Tornese, Salona, and Corinth were abandoned by the Turks, who fled
in confusion to Thebes and Negrepont. Those in the Morea who could not escape
out of the peninsula, retired to Misithra and Monemvasia, the only cities of
which they retained possession. The retreat of the Turks was marked by
1 Morosini
was authorised to transmit his hereditary knighthood to his nephew, as he had
no son. The only families who possessed this honour were those of Contarini and
Querini.—Daru, iv. 645. In England the title of baronet has become a
ministerial reward for rich landlords who can render services to the men in
office having the disposal of court favour.
SIEGE OF ATHENS, 1687.
221
the same acts of barbarity, both on their part ancl on a. d. that of the
Greeks, which have been renewed on a I6S4'1718- greater
scale in our own times. The Turks destroyed all the Greek villages on their
line of march, and carried off many Christians as slaves. They frequently
massacred even their own Christian slaves, when unable to take them away. The
Greeks, on the other hand, waylaid and murdered every Mohammedan, man, woman,
or child, whom they could surprise or capture.
The Venetians occupied Corinth on the 7th August, where they were joined
by one thousand Hessians. On the 12th of August the captain-general commenced
fortifying the isthmus, carrying his works along the ruins of the wall
constructed by Justinian and repaired by Manuel II. This was certainly a
useless waste of labour.
Morosini now proposed to attack Negrepont, as it was the key of
continental Greece, and its capture would have rendered the republic master of
the whole country south of Thermopylae. His plan was opposed by the generals of
the land forces, who all agreed in thinking that the season was too far
advanced for an operation of such magnitude; and after much deliberation, it
was determined to attack Athens, where it was thought that the army would find
good winter- quarters.
The passage of the fleet round the Morea was very slow, for the lion of
St Mark rarely made use of his wings; but on the 21st of September the
Venetians entered the Piraeus, and Koenigsmark encamped the same evening in the
olive grove near the sacred way to Eleusis. The army consisted of nearly ten
thousand men, including eight hundred and seventy cavalry.
The town of Athens was immediately occupied, and the siege of the
Acropolis commenced. The attack was
222
VENETIAN DOMINATION.
chap. iv. directed against
the Propylaea, before which the Turks had constructed strong batteries. The
Parthenon, and the temple of Minerva Palias, wTith its
beautiful adjoining porticoes, were then nearly perfect, as far as regarded
their external architecture. Even the sculpture retained much of its
inimitable excellence.1 Two batteries were erected, one at the foot
of the Museum, and the other near the Pnyx. Mortars were planted under the
cover of the Areopagus, but their fire proving uncertain, two more were placed
under cover of the buildings of the town, near the north-east corner of the
rock, which threw their shells at a high angle, with a low charge, into the
Acropolis.2
In the mean time the
Othoman troops descended into the plain from Thebes and Negrepont; and
Koenigsmark, as had been the case at the siege of Coron, Navarin, and Nauplia,
was compelled to divide his army to meet them. On the 25th of September a
Venetian bomb blew up a small powder-magazine in the Propylaea, and on the
following evening another fell in the Parthenon, where the Turks had deposited
all their most valuable effects, with a considerable quantity of powder and
inflammable materials. A terrific explosion took place ; the centre columns of
the peristyle, the walls of the cella, and the immense architraves and cornices
they supported, were scattered around the remains of the temple. Much of the unrivalled
sculpture was defaced, and a part utterly detroyed. The materials heaped up in
the building also took fire, and, mounting high over the Acropolis,
1 The
little temple of Wingless Victory had been removed to make room for a Turkish
battery before the siege. The materials found when the Greek government
commenced clearing away the rubbish of modem constructions, enabled Ross,
Schaubert, and Hansen partially to restore the building, which Pittaki, with
the assistance of a contribution from Colonel Leake, has completed as far as
possible. Compare Ross, Die Acropolis ton Athen, with La- borde, Athenes aux
XV. XVI. et XVII. Siecles, ii. 116.
2 See the
plan of the Acropolis, by the Venetian captain of engineers, Ver- neda.—Laborde,
ii. 182.
<gr,zei uy iv t JSQtt
SIEGE OF ATHENS, 1687.
223
announced the calamity
to tlie besiegers, and scatlied many of the statues which still remained in
their original positions. Though two hundred persons perished by this
explosion, the Turks persisted in defending the place until they saw the
seraskier defeated in his attempt to relieve them on the 28th September. They
then capitulated on being allowed to embark with their families for Smyrna in
vessels hired at their own expense.1 On the 4th of October, two
thousand five hundred persons of all ages, including five hundred men of the
garrison, moved down to embark at the Pirseus. Morosini complains in his
official report to the republic that all his precautions could not prevent some
acts of rapacity on the part of his mercenaries. About thirty Turks remained,
and received baptism. Count Tomeo Pompei was the name of the Venetian
commandant appointed to the Acropolis.
Athens was now a
Venetian possession. The German troops remained in the town. One of the
mosques near the bazaar was converted into a Lutheran church, and this first
Protestant place of worship in Greece was opened on the 19th of October 1687,
by the regimental chaplain Beithman.2 Another mosque in the lower
part of the town, towards the temple of Theseus, was given to the Catholics,
who possessed also a monastery at the eastern end of the town, containing the
choragic monument of Lysicrates. The time of service of the three Hanoverian
regiments first enrolled had now expired, and on the 26th of December 1687
they sailed from the Piraeus. In the three campaigns in which the red uniform
had
1 These vessels were, an English pink, three Ragusan
petraks, and two French tartans. —Morosini’s despatch, given by Laborde, ii.
159. The negroes were kept as prisoners, and divided among the troops in the
usual way.—Loca-
telli, ii. 7. Pfister, 92, 94.
3 Schwenke, 156. Pfister, 104.
A. D.
1684-1718-
1
224 VENETIAN DOMINATION.
chap. iv. taken so distinguished a part, it had lost eighty-eight
officers and two thousand nine hundred men ; yet, from the recruits they had
received, their number still amounted to one thousand four hundred.1
A short time convinced the Venetian leaders that it would be impossible
to retain possession of Athens.
The plague, which was making great ravages in the Morea, showed itself in
the army. The seraskier kept two thousand cavalry at Thebes, and, by a
judicious employment of his force, retained all Attica, with the exception of
the plain of Athens, under his orders. To secure their communications between
the city and the Piraeus, the Venetians found it necessary to fortify the road
with three redoubts. The departure of the Hanoverians also weakened the army,
and in a council of war held on the 31st of December, it was resolved to
evacuate Athens at the end of the winter, in order to concentrate all the
troops for an attack on Negrepont. Lines were thrown across the isthmus of
Munychia, to cover the evacuation and protect the naval camp, which could be
distinctly traced until they were effaced by the construction of the new town
of the Piraeus. It was also debated whether the walls of the Acropolis were to
be destroyed ; and perhaps their preservation, and that of the antiquities they
enclose, is to be ascribed to the circumstance that the whole attention of the
army was occupied by the increased duties imposed upon it by the sanatory
measures requisite to prevent the ravages of the plague, and the difficulties
created by the emigration of the Greek population of Athens. Between four and
five thousand Athenians were compelled to abandon their native city, and seek
new homes in the Morea. Some were established at Vivares and Port Tolon, on the
coast of Argolis, as colonists; the poorest were settled at Corinth, and
1 Schwenke,
156.
7e> jboft
i
DESTRUCTION AND REMOVAL OF ANTIQUITIES. 225
others were dispersed at
Egina, Tinos, and Nauplia. About five hundred Albanians, chiefly collected
among the peasantry of Corinth and Attica, were formed into a corps by the
Venetians, but no Greeks could be induced to enter the army.1
The last act of Morosini
at Athens was to carry away some monuments of ancient sculpture as trophies of
his victory. An attempt was made to remove the statue of Neptune and the
Chariot of Victory, which adorned the western pediment of the Parthenon, but,
in consequcncc of an oversight of the workmen employed, and perhaps partly in
consequence of a flaw or crack in the marble, caused by the terrible explosion
and the fire, which destroyed a considerable part of the building, the whole
mass of marble was precipitated to the ground, and so shivered to pieces by
the fall that the fragments were not deemed worthy of transport. This
misfortune to art occurred on the 19th of March 1688. Instead of these
magnificent figures from the hand of Phidias, Morosini was obliged to content
himself with four lions, which still adorn the entrance of the arsenal at
Venice. One of these, taken from the head of the port of the Piraeus, is
remarkable for its colossal size, its severe style, and two long inscriptions,
in undecipherable characters, winding over its shoulders.2 The
complete evacuation of Attica was at length effected. Six hundred and sixty-two
families quitted their native city, and on the 9 th of April the Venetians
sailed out of the Piraeus to Poros.
These records of the
ruin of so much that interests the whole civilised world, awaken our curiosity
to
1 Fanelli,
Atene Attica, 311. The greater part of the Athenians were then, as at the
breaking out of the Greek revolution, small landed proprietors, shopkeepers,
and petty dealers in exports and imports. Ranke, Die Venetianer in Morea,
mentions the concessions granted to the emigrants, 437, 443.
2 Laborde, AtlUnes aux XV. XVI.
et XVII. SiMes, ii. 243. Some antiquaries consider these
inscriptions Runic, others Pelasgic.
P
A. D.
1684-1718.
226
VENETIAN DOMINATION.
chap. iv. know something of the character and feelings of the modern
Athenians, Greeks, and Albanians, who then dwelt under the shadow of the
Acropolis. Neither Morosini nor his German auxiliaries, though they joined in
lamenting the destruction of the ancient marbles, seemed to think the modern
Greeks deserving of much attention, merely because they pretended to represent
the countrymen of Pericles, and still spoke Greek. Venetian statesmen perceived
the same degeneracy in their national character, as German philolo- gians
discovered in their spoken language. The Greek population, from its unwarlike
disposition, was only an object of humanity ; the Albanian peasantry, though a
hardier and more courageous race, was not sufficiently numerous in the
immediate vicinity of the city to be of much military importance. Yet, to a
Hessian officer, Athens appeared a large and populous town, with its ten
thousand inhabitants, and the Athenians were found to be a respectable and
well-disposed people.1 They were, however, too completely destitute
of moral energy to act any part in the public events of which their city was
the theatre. They had no voice to give utterance to their feelings, though
Europe would have listened with attention to their words. Perhaps they had no
feelings deserving of utterance. Greece was thus the scene of important events,
in which every nation in Europe acted a more prominent part than the Greeks.
Even my countrymen, from the misty hills of Caledonia, are named among the
officers who joined the Hanoverians in 1686 as volunteers.2
Morosini was elected Doge of Venice on the death of Justiniani, and he
was invested with the insignia of his ducal rank at Poros. The senate made the
greatest exertions to increase the army in the Levant, and
1 Laborde, ii. 358. Pfister,
105.
2 Schwenke, 64 : “ Siebenzehn an
der Zahl meisters Schotten, Schweden und Franzosen.”
SIEGE OF NEGIIEPONT, 1688.
227
enable the doge to
perform some exploit worthy of the prince of the republic. New troops were
recruited in Germany, but they arrived slowly, and it was not until the 8th of
July 1688 that the Venetian expedition sailed from Poros to besiege Negrepont.
The land forces amounted to upwards of thirteen thousand men, the crews of the
fleet to about ten thousand.1 The garrison of Negrepont consisted of
six thousand men, and the place was strongly fortified on every side. Its
communications with the continent were secured by a fortified bridge over the
Euripus, and covered by the strong fort Karababa. On the land face, in the
island, the fortifications were strengthened by a deep and broad ditch. A
strong outwork, affording space for an intrenched camp, occupied by four
thousand five hundred janissaries, crowned an eminence which protected the
suburbs. Koenigsmark was of opinion that the attack ought to begin from the
land side, by investing Karababa and the bridge, and thus cutting off the
communications with the Othoman army at Thebes; but the doge considered that it
would be easier to attack the place from the island, and his opinion prevailed.
On the other hand, his proposal to make an immediate attempt to storm the
eminence on which the janissaries were intrenched, was rejected, and the advice
of Koenigsmark, to proceed against it by regular approaches in order to spare
men, was adopted. In both cases the decision proved unfortunate. A month was
lost in the attack on the outwork, and after a succession of bloody skirmishes
it was at last taken by storm on the 30th of August. Thirty pieces of cannon
and five mortars fell into the hands of the besiegers, who were then enabled
to push their approaches up to the ditch of the citadel. But, as the communications
between the garrison and the army of the
1 Schwenke, 163, gives the list of the Venetian
forces.
V
228 VENETIAN DOMINATION.
chap. iv. seraskier
remained open, reinforcements and supplies were continually introduced into the
place, and the sick and wounded were withdrawn. In the mean time the Venetian
army was encamped near a pestilential marsh, wThich spread
disease through its ranks. Thousands of soldiers perished, and almost all the
higher officers were unable to do duty. Count Koenigsmark died on the 15th of
September, and before the end of the month a majority of the land forces was
incapable of service. The progress of the siege was very slow. At length, on
the 12th of October, Morosini resolved to make a desperate attempt to storm the
place. Even with all the assistance that could be drawn from the fleet, only
eight thousand men could be mustered under arms. This number was clearly
inadequate to attack a strong fortress garrisoned by six thousand men. The
Turkish garrison, having been strengthened by fresh reinforcements, was still
as numerous, and far more confident, than at the commencement of the siege.
After a desperate fight, the assault was completely defeated, with a loss of
one thousand men.1 All hope of taking Negrepont was now abandoned,
and it only remained for Morosini to save the relics of the expedition. The
re-embarkment of the land forces was covered by Prince Maximilian of Hanover,
and effected without loss. On the 21st of October the army was landed at
Thermisi in Argolis, by no means a healthy spot, and from thence the German
troops, whose period of service had expired, were embarked for Venice. The
remaining battalions of the Hanoverians and Hessians quitted Greece on the 5th
of November 168 8.2
Before returning to
Venice, Morosini was desirous of rendering his title to the proud epithet of
the Peloponnesian indisputable by the conquest of Monem-
1 Pfister, 186. 2
Schwenke, 177. Pfister, 195.
VENETIAN DESERTERS.
229
vasia, tlie only
fortress of which the Othomans still retained possession in the peninsula. He made
an unsuccessful attack on it in 1689 ; and almost immediately after its
failure, the state of his health compelled him to resign the command of the
fleet. His successor, Cornaro, gained possession of Monemvasia in the
following year ; but the place yielded to famine, and not to the arms of the
republic.
The possession of the
fortresses of Lepanto and Corinth gave the Venetians the command of the whole
northern shore of the gulf, and the greater part of northern Greece submitted
to their authority, the Turks only retaining garrisons at Zeitouni, Talanti,
Livadea, and Thebes, and in the mountain-passes which connect the valley of the
Sperchius with the Boeotian plains, in order to secure the communications
between Thessaly and Negrepont by land. But a considerable part of continental
Greece was left without either Turkish or Venetian troops, and the Greek population
not venturing to take up arms to defend their property, the country was exposed
to be pillaged by marauders from both sides. Several districts were occupied by
bands of deserters from the Dalmatian and Albanian troops in the service of
Venice. Bossina, the leader of one of these bands, established his headquarters
permanently at Karpenisi, where his authority was recognised by the primates of
the surrounding country, who paid him regular contributions, for which he
defended them against the plundering expeditions of the Mohammedan arnauts and
Christian armatoli. Bossina assumed the title of General of the Venetian
deserters. In vain Morosini endeavoured to suppress desertion and punish the
deserters, by offering a reward of ten zecliins for every deserter brought back
to a Venetian port. The Albanians and armatoli, who posted themselves in the
mountain-passes, arrested a
A. D.
1684-1718.
VENETIAN DOMINATION.
chap. iv. few, and delivered them up to be punished ; but the evil
continued, in consequence of the irregularity with which the republic paid the
troops enrolled in its own possessions on the Adriatic. The success of Bossina
induced another corps, under Elia Damianovich, to occupy Lidoriki and the
surrounding district ; and to such a state of anarchy was Greece reduced, that
the peaceable cultivators of the soil found these foreign deserters more
humane and effectual protectors than either the Othoman or Venetian
governments, and far less cruel and rapacious than the native Greek armatoli,
who were a species of Christian gendarmerie in the service of the Porte. The
Greek primates furnished the leaders of the deserters with monthly pay and subsistence
for their followers, and the deserters defended the country against the
armatoli and the foragers from the hostile armies, and maintained better
discipline than was observed by either party.1
The Othoman government
finding that the disorders in Greece were every day becoming greater, and that
the number of districts which failed to pay taxes was constantly increasing,
became seriously alarmed at the defection of the Christian population, and laid
aside its usual haughtiness in order to make use of the services of its Greek
subjects in opposing the progress of the Venetians. Liberaki Yerakari, one of
the Maniate chiefs who had embraced the Othoman party when Kueprily compelled
Maina to pay haratsh, and who had assisted the Turks in establishing their
permanent garrisons at Zarnata, Kielapha, and Passava, was subsequently
imprisoned at Constantinople for his acts of piracy. He was now liberated,
invested with the title of Bey of Maina, and sent to the army of the seraskier
1 Locatelli,
JJistoria della Veneta Guerra in Lerante contro VImpcro Otto- mano, ii. 11,
156, 172.
VENETIAN DESERTERS.
231
at Thebes, where he
appeared, at the end of the year 1688, with about three hundred followers. He
was instructed to persuade the Greeks who had submitted to the Venetians, to
return to their allegiance under the sultan ; and he addressed a letter to the
primates of Athens to invite the Athenians who had fled to Sala- mis and Egina
to return to their native city, promising them pardon for the past, and protection
against illegal exactions in future. Many availed themselves of the offer when
they found it was confirmed by the seraskier. Liberaki also opened secret
communications with partisans in Maina, in order to raise a rebellion against
the Venetians ; and he entered into negotiations with the deserters at
Karpenisi and Lidoriki, in order to persuade them to join the Turks. These
negotiations were unsuccessful, and he was defeated in an attempt to gain
possession of Salona by force.1
In the year 1690 the Othoman
armies, having received reinforcements, drove the deserters from the districts
they occupied, and recovered possession of all the open country north of the
Dardanelles of Lepanto and the Isthmus of Corinth, but they were defeated in an
attack on the fortress of Lepanto. The property of the unfortunate Greek
peasantry continued still to be exposed to devastation by both the hostile
armies, and by bands of armed men who were strong enough to plunder on their
own account. Two examples may be cited to show the miserable condition of the
population in continental Greece. In the year 1792, a party of Moreot
Albanians made an incursion as far as Livadea, which they plundered, carrying
off many slaves, seven hundred oxen, and four thousand sheep. Again, in the
year 1694, another party of the Greek and Albanian militia in the Venetian
possessions in-
A. D.
1684-1718.
1 Locatelli, ii. 152, 220.
232
VENETIAN DOMINATION.
citap. iv. vacled
continental Greece, and plundered Patradjik and many of tlie neighbouring villages.1
These campaigns
reflected no glory on Venice. Valona was taken, but an attack on Canea was defeated.
The old doge believed that he could again bring back victory to the arms of
Venice by taking the command in person, and in 1693 he returned to Greece. He
was now seventy-five years old, an age at which it is difficult to infuse
enthusiasm into the hearts of lukewarm followers, so that fortune probably
treated him kindly by conducting him to the tomb at Nauplia on the 16th January
1694. Francesco Morosini was the last great man who has acted a part in the
public affairs of Greece ; his exploits have not yet been eclipsed by those of
any subsequent hero.
The new captain-general,
Zeno, attacked Chios. The imprudence of assailing tlie Turks close to the coast
of Asia Minor, and near the centre of their resources, was pointed out to him
in vain. Zeno was a party leader and a braggart. Chios was taken without
difficulty, but the Othoman government displayed all the energy which it has so
frequently put forth on the arrival of great misfortunes. It did everything in
its power to render its fleet superior to that of Venice, by constructing a
number of line-of-battle ships, for it had observed that its line-of-battle
ships were better able to contend with the Venetians on equal terms than its
galleys. After some severe fighting, Zeno lost heart, fled, abandoned his
conquest, and was deservedly imprisoned on his return to Venice.2
About the same time the
Othoman government made a bold attempt to regain possession of the Morea. A
Turkish army assembled at Thebes, traversed the
1 In 1689
several Othoman galleys entered the Saronic gulf, and carried off three hundred
and fifty Greeks as slaves from the island of Salamis.—Locatelli, ii. 204.
2 Gratiani,
ii. 590, 626, 631, and page 91 of this volume.
PEACE OF G'ARLOVITZ, 1699.
233
Isthmus of Corinth
without opposition, and encamped in the plain of Argos; and Liberaki, who accompanied
the Turks, availed himself of his secret correspondence with many discontented
Greeks to plunder the interior of the peninsula. The capitan-pasha,
Mezzomorto, sailed from the Dardanelles to assist the invading army. The German
corps of auxiliaries in the Venetian service was concentrated at Nauplia, and,
when joined with a body of Venetians and Scla- vonians, formed a small army,
which was placed under the command of General Steinau, who attacked and
defeated the seraskier before the arrival of the Othoman fleet. The Turks were
driven back to Thebes, and Liberaki was bribed to enter the service of Venice.
Molino encountered the capitan-pasha off Scio, and two naval engagements were
fought, in which, however, the Venetians gained no advantage over the Turks. It
was now evident that the Othoman government was recovering its energy and strength,
and peace was becoming necessary to enable Venice to retain the possession of
her recent conquests.1
Peace, after long
negotiations, was concluded at Carlovitz, in January 1699, between the Emperor
of Germany, the King of Poland, the Republic of Venice, and the Sultan. Venice
retained possession of the places it had conquered in Dalmatia, of Santa Maura,
of the Peloponnesus,v and of Egina ; and it was relieved from the
tribute it had formerly paid to the Sublime Porte for the possession of Zante. Prevesa,
the northern castle at the entrance of the Gulf of Lepanto, and the city of
Lepanto, were restored to the sultan after the destruction of their
fortifications. The republic must have felt that, in spite of all the valour
and
1 The Maniate Liberaki soon recommenced his
intrigues, hoping to force Venice to recognise him as Bey of Maina; but the
jealous republic, having secured his secretary as a spy on his proceedings,
immediately an-ested him, and sent him a prisoner to Brescia, a.d. 1697.—Locatelli, Continuazione, i.
29.
A. D.
1684-1718.
234
VENETIAN DOMINATION.
chap. iv. ability of Morosini, and the great expense
it had incurred in bringing German mercenaries to Greece to fight in its
cause, still the conquests it had gained were due more to the victories of
Prince Eugene on the Danube than to its own power and exertions.1
When the Venetians
conquered the Morea, they found it ruined and depopulated by the war. The Turks
had distrusted the Greeks from the commencement of hostilities, and they had
taken every precaution in their power to deprive their Christian subjects of
the means of combining together and assisting the enemy. The Greeks were
disarmed ; the granaries were emptied, and their contents transported into the
fortresses; the cattle were driven into the districts commanded by Turkish
garrisons or troops in the field. When the Turks were at last compelled to
abandon the country, they carried off everything of value belonging to the
Christians which they could transport, in order to indemnify themselves for
what they were compelled to leave behind. The youth of both sexes were seized
when they were likely to prove valuable slaves, and the property of the Greeks
was destroyed on the line of retreat. The richest plains of the Morea, having
been in turn the scene of military operations, were left almost uncultivated.
Famine followed war, and the plague came as an attendant on famine, carrying
distress and ruin into districts which neither war nor famine had visited. The
roads were neglected, the bridges broken down, the towns in ruins, commerce
annihilated, the administration of justice in abeyance, and the whole peninsula
filled with bands of armed
1 The treaty signed at Carlovitz between the Republic
and the Porte, is given by Rycaut, iii. 597; but Hammer, xiii. 35, mentions
that, when the Venetian ambassador Sorano visited Constantinople to obtain its
confirmation, he concluded an additional and more explicit treaty, embodying
seventeen clauses contained in the preceding treaties between the Republic and
the Porte, besides the fifteen which constituted the original treaty of
Carlovitz.
VENETIAN MODERATION.
235
brigands, who seized
what they wanted wherever they could find it. With these robbers the pastoral
population in the mountains often formed alliances, in order to share in the
plunder of the agricultural population of the plains.1
The Venetians found
that, in order to render their conquest of any permanent utility, it would be
necessary to establish a military superiority over the whole country, in order
to restore that feeling of security without which there can be no prospect of
agricultural and commercial prosperity, even in the most fertile regions. The
Venetian government performed its duties both with goodwill and ability. It
possessed men experienced in dealing with Greeks ; and the loss of Crete had
taught them a lesson of tolerance and moderation. Their recent government of
Tinos had been mild and judicious ; and that island, which is still the most
industrious and flourishing portion of the Greek kingdom, owes its superiority
to the Venetian government. Still there were many difficulties in the way of
establishing order in the Morea which did not exist in the islands, and these
difficulties must be candidly weighed before we venture to pronounce that
Venice acted either injudiciously or tyrannically during the period it ruled
the Morea.
Many circumstances
prevented the Venetian government from intrusting the Greeks with any considerable
share in the local administration. They did not, however, so completely falsify
the communal system, and render it a mere organ of the central administration,
as has been done recently by the
1 Those who
witnessed the extent that brigandage attained in liberated Greece in the year
1835, during the German domination of Count Armansperg, and in the years
1854-5, under the constitutional monarchy of King Otho, with Mavrocordatos as
his prime-minister, can alone form any correct idea of the lawless state of
society through which the peaceful agricultural population has perpetuated its
laborious and suffering existence. In the present year (1S55), acts of torture
have been committed never exceeded by Turkish tyrants.
A. D.
1684-1718.
236
VENETIAN DOMINATION.
chap. iv. Bavarians and by Greek ministers under a
constitutional government. The Venetians were compelled to guard against the
influence of the Otlioman Porte, which continued to be great in the Morea, both
over the Greek primates, who had property or connections in the Turkish provinces,
and over the Greek clergy. The power of the Patriarch of Constantinople was an
especial object of disquietude, as he was a powerful instrument in the hands
of the Othoman government to create opposition to Venice. The complete
alienation in religious and national feeling between the Greeks and the
Catholics rendered it impossible for the Venetians to attempt amalgamating the
native population of Greece with the republic, by conferring on the Greeks the
privileges of citizens of Venice. The French of Louisiana, and the Spaniards of
Florida, though staunch Catholics, have become good citizens of the United
States ; but no concessions have hitherto induced the Greeks to become useful
members of a foreign state. They can be industrious in moneymaking like the
Jews, but even when they accept the boon of foreign citizenship as a means of
increasing their gains, their idea of Greek patriotism induces them to be more
eager in their opposition to that foreign nationality which protects them, than
active in striving to develop those virtues which would secure respect to
themselves, and prosperity to their native country. To judge the Venetian
government fairly, it must be compared with the British government in the
Ionian Islands, and with the Bavarian domination in Greece, and surely it will
not suffer by the comparison.
"When the Venetians
found leisure to devote their attention to the civil government of the Morea,
the native population had sunk, through the ravages of war and pestilence, to
about one hundred thousand souls, although, before the commencement of
hostilities,
POPULATION.
237
the Christians alone,
including Greeks and Albanians, were estimated at two hundred and fifty
thousand, and the Turks at fifty thousand ; an estimate which does not appear
to be far removed from the truth.1 Morosini established a
provisional civil administration, which restored order, and, with the cessation
of the plague, the increased security of property enabled the Morea to recover
so rapidly from its misfortunes, that, in the year 1701, the native population,
Greek and Albanian, had already reached two hundred thousand. Morosini
introduced the municipal system of the continental possessions of Venice into
the towns he conquered. The rights he thereby conferred 011 the Greeks, and
the improvement which took place in their condition, soon produced a
considerable emigration from Northern Greece, where the Turks were slower in
re-establishing order. Thousands of families, with their baggage and cattle,
were conveyed by the Venetians from the northern coast of the Gulf of Corinth
into the Morea, and the emigration became so great as to induce the Porte to
order the pashas and provincial governors everywhere to treat the Greeks with
greater consideration and justice than they had previously received from the
Othoman authorities. Thus one of the most valuable results of Morosini’s
conquests was, that it compelled the Turks to make an effort to gain the
goodwill, or at least to alleviate the discontent, of their Christian subjects.2
Another feature which marked a considerable change in Turkish society was the
return of many families of Maliomme-
1 The best authority on the
administration of the Venetians is the work of llanke, entitled Die Venetiancr
in Morea, published in llistorlsch-Politische Zeitschrift. Berlin, 1835, 2
Band, 3 Heft.
Cornaro, the first general proveditor, gives only 86,460 souls as the
result of the first census; yet the men capable of bearing arms were
20,123.—Ranke, 436.
2 See some
of the concessions to the Christians, mentioned by Hammer, xiii. 65. For the
emigration, see Rycaut, iii. 271.
A. D.
1684-1718.
238
VENETIAN DOMINATION.
chap. iv. dan agriculturists to Christianity, which
their ancestors had forsaken in order to escape from persecution and fiscal
oppression.1 The liberality of the Venetians at this time is shown
by the fact that they allowed these converts to join the Greek Church. At any
earlier period they would have considered themselves bound, as a Catholic
power, to force the converts to embrace Catholicism, or else to remain
Mohammedans.
The revenues derived by
Venice from the Morea were considerable. They consisted of one-tenth of all the
agricultural produce, besides taxes on wine, spirits, oil, and tobacco, and a
monopoly of salt. It is needless to dwell on the impediment which the payment
of tenths offers to any improvement in agriculture, though this tax is not to
be regarded as too heavy in amount in a civilised country, if it could be
faithfully administered, and employed in such a manner as to secure the
establishment of able and independent courts of justice, and a proper attention
to all necessary public improvements ; still the manner in which it must
unavoidably be collected renders it always an oppressive mode of obtaining a
revenue. The Venetians, in order to avoid constant disputes between the fiscal
officers of the government and the people, found it necessary to farm the
tenths. The consequence was, that the farmers always contrived to live at the
expense of the people in the district they farmed, and, by uniting the trade of
money-lenders and dealers in agricultural produce with their occupation as
farmers of the revenue, they employed the great powers they received as
collectors of taxes to enforce payment of their private debts, so that they
both oppressed and cheated the people in many ways. In order to relieve the
Greeks from these abuses on the part of their own archonts, wTho
were the
1 The Venetian accounts mention 1317 families of
Mohammedan peasants who embraced Christianity. See Rycaut, iii. 270, 272.
REVENUE.
239
usual farmers, the
Venetian government endeavoured to facilitate the farming of the revenues by
the communes themselves for terms of not less than five years, and the plan
was attended with considerable success.
The salt monopoly was
the cause of great oppression, and still greater inconvenience, though the
price was only two solidi a pound (about a halfpenny). The expense of transport
and loss of time in procuring salt from distant magazines were serious and just
grounds of complaint against the system ; for in many places where the peasant
could easily have procured salt gratis on the sea-sliore within a few miles of
his residence or his slieepfolds, he was compelled to take a day’s journey
with his mules in order to purchase a stone of salt at some distant depot of
the monopoly.
The Venetian government
gained possession of extensive domains in the Morea ; but it had sufficient
experience in territorial administration to know that the State is the worst
possible landed proprietor, and that the land belonging to government is
generally the portion least profitable to the public treasury. The patronage of
the powerful, the neglect and dishonesty of officials, and the avidity of
farmers, all contribute to the mal-administration of property placed in such
exceptional circumstances as government lands.1
The revenues of the
Morea are stated by Grimani, the general proveditor from 1698 to 1701, at
605,460 reals : but his estimate was apparently too high ; and Emo, who
administered the province from 1705 to 1708, found the actual receipts only
amounted to about 400,000 reals. By wise measures and liberal concessions he
increased the receipts to 461,548. The good effect of a mild administration became
still more visible during the government of Loredano (1708 to
1 The evil effects, both politically and financially,
are strongly exemplified at present in the Greek kingdom.
240
VENETIAN DOMINATION.
chap. iv. 1711), as the revenues rose to more than
half a million of reals.1
The regular expenses of
the Venetian government amounted to only 280,000 reals, so that a surplus of
220,000 was annually paid over into the treasury of the fleet. Though it was
necessary to maintain a considerable naval force in the Grecian seas to
protect the country against the incursions of corsairs, and to enforce the
commercial laws and restrictions of the republic, still there can be no doubt
that the revenues of the Morea under the Venetian domination were amply
sufficient to pay all the expenditure both of its internal administration and
of its military and naval establishments in time of peace.
The commerce of the
Greeks was almost annihilated when the Venetians commenced the war. The Ionian
sea and the Archipelago were so crowded with pirates, that even Greek
fishing-boats could hardly venture to creep out of a harbour, lest the men
should be carried off to labour at the oar in some French, Maltese, or Barbary
corsair. These pirates had established many regular stations in the Levant. The
Christians compelled several Greek towns on the continent and in the islands
of the Archipelago to pay them a regular tribute, in order to secure their
lands and fishing-boats from being plundered; while the Mohammedans had formed
establishments in the Othoman fortresses in "Western Greece and Albania
for the sale of the plunder and slaves they collected in their cruises between
the Barbary coast and the Adriatic.
The only foreign trade
that existed in the Morea at the time of its conquest was that between Messenia
and Barbary, and between Monemvasia and Alexan-
1 Ranke, 455. The Venetian real was, I believe, then
valued at twenty- pence, English money.
COMMERCE.
241
dria.1 It was
very insignificant. A few boats were also employed in transporting the produce
of the Morea to the Ionian Islands, from whence it was conveyed to Venice in
armed vessels. The Venetian conquest quickly restored some activity to the
trade of the native Greeks. The demand for good wine was soon so much increased
by the number of foreigners established in the Morea, that it was for a time
necessary to import the better qualities from France, Italy, and the islands of
the Archipelago. But the Moreotes, as soon as they were assured that their
labour would be well rewarded, made such improvements in the preparation of
their own wines as to share in the profits of this trade, and supplant the
foreign importers, who were soon compelled to confine their dealings to the
finest qualities, which were only consumed in small quantities.
The trade of the Morea
was prevented from receiving all the extension of which it was capable by the
severity of the restrictive commercial policy enforced by the Venetians. The
possessions of the republic were regarded as valuable to the State in the
proportion in which they contributed to increase the trade and fiscal receipts
of the city of Venice. Instead, therefore, of allowing the inhabitants of the
Morea to
7 o #
trade directly with the
nations who might desire to consume Greek produce, and of raising a revenue by
export duties, the Venetians compelled their subjects to send every article of
value they exported to Venice, which, by this system of restriction, was
rendered the sole emporium of the trade between Western Europe and the Venetian
possessions in the Levant. The
1 Prinokokki,
a red dye, from au insect collected on the holly-leaved oak, which is used for
dyeing the fez or red skull-cap, and valonia, for tanning and dyeing, with
silk, oil, and fruit, were the chief articles in this trade.
Q
A. D.
1684-1718.
242
VENETIAN DOMINATION.
chap. iv. rigour with, which this system was enforced
injured the inhabitants of the Morea by lowering the price of every article of
export, and it prevented the French, English, and Dutch merchants from
purchasing many articles which they had previously procured there, while,
instead of seeking them at Venice, they generally succeeded in procuring them
in provinces of the Othoman empire. The trade in oil, silk, turkey leather, and
fruit, suffered particularly from this monopoly in favour of Venice.
The Venetians at first
established seven fiscal boards in the Morea, of which Patras, Castel Tornese,
Modon, Coron, Kielapha, Monemvasia, and Maina were the seats ; but these were
afterwards reduced to four, corresponding to the four provinces into which the
peninsula was divided for the facility of the civil administration. These
were, Komania, w7ith Nauplia or Napoli di Eomania for its capital;
Laconia or Zaccunia, of which Monemvasia was the capital; Messenia with
Navarin, and Achaia with Patras, as their chief towns. Each of these provinces
had its Proveditor, in whose hands the superior civil and military authority
was placed; its Kettore, or chief judge; and its Camerlingo, or intendant of
finance. The whole Morea was governed by a general proveditor. As soon as
Morosini had conquered any town, he established in it a Conseglio, or municipal
council, in imitation of the communal system adopted in the Venetian provinces
of the terra firma. This council was invested with the power of choosing the
magistrates and local officials, who were selected from the Greek inhabitants
of the place devoted to the interests of Venice, and on them considerable
privileges were conferred.1 The council itself was generally
composed of Venetians, or Venetian subjects. The general practice of Europe,
the prejudices
1 Locatelli, i. 197.
y
CIVIL ADMINISTRATION.
243
of the age, and the
peculiar position of the Venetians in their foreign dependencies, rendered it
impossible for the republic to avoid employing privileges and monopolies as a
means of attaching partisans and creating a revenue. But no care or prudence on
the part of the general proveditors, who appear to have governed, on the whole,
both ably and honestly, could prevent these privileges and monopolies from
nourishing intrigues and financial abuses. All endeavours to
O O
extirpate these evils
proved vain : as soon as one abuse was discovered, and a remedy applied, it was
found that it was replaced by some new corruption, equally injurious to the
State and to society, equally profitable to officials, and equally oppressive
to some class of the native population. The system of privileges and
exemptions has sometimes proved a powerful instrument of State policy, where
the great object has been to hold the mass of the people in subjection, by
making their own jealousies supply the place of a large military force ; but it
has invariably served as a premium for official dishonesty and political immorality.
One of the evils of the
system may be noticed as an example of its effects. The burgesses of towns were
exempted from the burden of quartering troops, which fell heavily on the
inhabitants of the country. The better class of Greek proprietors, who resided
on their property, or who inhabited the rural districts as traders in
agricultural produce, soon contrived to corrupt the lower Venetian officials,
and place themselves on the roll of burgesses in the nearest town. They then
succeeded in gaining an exemption from quartering soldiers in the house they
inhabited, as being the country residence of a burgess. This abuse made the
burden fall heavier on the poor peasantry, who having no persons of knowledge,
wealth, and influence to defend
2te
VENETIAN DOMINATION.
chap. iv. their interests, became the victims of great
oppression on the part of the Venetian military. The soldiers were only
entitled by law to receive rations of barley bread and cheese ; but they
exacted dinners of roast meat, wheaten cakes, and wine. The assessment
authorised by the Venetian government was light, for the annual maintenance of
one soldier was charged on eighteen families ; but laws are powerless where the
government is both weak and corrupt. At the present day, a greater abuse is
universal in the kingdom of Greece, and Kang Otho and his ministers seem to be
powerless to restrain it. The gendarmes of King Otho are only entitled to
quarters, and not to rations ; but they extort from the poor peasantry of
liberated Greece far more abundant supplies of provisions, and exercise greater
exactions, than the Venetian soldiers ever did. They take turkeys and lambs
where their predecessors, the Venetians and Turks, were satisfied with fowls
and bread; and when they have feasted and slept, they compel the peasant to
take his horse from the threshing-floor and to quit the plough, in order that
they may ride at their ease from one station to another, though they invariably
report that they have marched the distance. This is no trifling hindrance to
the progress of agriculture in liberated Greece, or it would not be noticed in
this place. It is one of those abuses which warranted the Earl of Carlisle in
describing the present government of Greece as “ the most inefficient, corrupt,
and, above all, contemptible, with which a nation was ever cursed/'1
Not a day passes in seedtime or harvest that many poor Greek and Albanian
peasants are not compelled to leave their work to follow their oppressors. The
writer of these pages has witnessed this systematic extortion perpetuated for
twenty years without any effort having been made by
1 A Diary in Turkish and Greek Waters, 208.
MOREOTE CHARACTER.
245
king, ministers, or
chambers to extirpate it, though all are aware of the severe burden it imposes
on the poorest and most industrious class of the population. The contrast
between the conduct of the Venetian provedi- tors and of a constitutional king,
with native ministers, is not favourable to either German or Greek political
honesty and intelligence. The Venetian governors laboured incessantly to
repress the abuse; the nomarchs of King Otlio do much to perpetuate it.
At first sight, it would
seem that the Venetian senate possessed absolute power to govern the possessions
of the republic in Greece,—for there existed no nobility, no established system
of laws, and no organised corporations in the Morea. But this was not really
the case. The traditional maxims of Italian statesmen, the privileges of the
nobles of Venice in the dependent territories of the republic, and the
financial principles then deemed conducive to political power, on the one hand,
joined to the restless disposition of the Greeks, who often fancied that a
wider career would be obtained for their activity and ambition by the
restoration of the Othoman domination, to the want of truth and conscience
engendered by their servile condition, and to the violence of their orthodox
prejudices, on the other hand, presented, on many subjects, barriers to
improvement which the Venetians had not strength to destroy. The Greek
character seems less adapted for political order than for individual progress.
Envy and suspicion have always been marked characteristics of Hellenic society
; and more Greek states have been ruined and subjected to foreign conquest at
every period of history by the operation of internal vices than by the force of
hostile nations. The inhabitants of the Peloponnesus, from some causes which it
is difficult to detect, but which appear to have operated in the most
dissimilar condi-
A. D.
1684-1718.
246
VENETIAN DOMINATION.
chap. iv. tions of civilisation, and in times and
circumstances widely different, are considered by their countrymen as the most
envious and suspicious of all the Greeks. The Venetian general proveditors, who
were extremely anxious to improve the condition of the country, complained
that, though they found the inhabitants active and intelligent, they found them
also false from excessive suspicion, and obstinate from aversion to foreigners.
It was deemed a patriotic duty to persist in native habits, even when these
habits had originated in the oppression of the Othoman domination. They were so
suspicious and envious that the middle classes wasted the greater part of their
time in watching the conduct of their neighbours, and in taking measures of
precaution against imaginary schemes of supposed intriguers. The consequence
was, that all the Greeks lived together in a state of feverish excitement,
wasting great energies to no purpose. They laboured with their whole attention
directed towards a distant point from which they expected an enemy to issue, as
the husbandman who sows a field on the verge of a tribe of nomades. The higher
classes of Greeks were rapacious, avaricious, and idle. They despised all
agricultural and manual industry, and looked for wealth to saving rather than
to industry. Their contempt for the agricultural classes was shown by their
calling all who were engaged in the cultivation of the soil Albanians, and all
who were occupied in pastoral pursuits Vallachians. These two classes, the
cultivators of the soil and the shepherds, were unquestionably the most
industrious and honest portion of the population of Greece at this period,
which may be in part attributed to the circumstance that they had been less
exposed to the demoralising influence of a bad political government, and of a
worse social system. One feature in the Moreote population of every
MANIATES.
247
rank made a strong
impression on the Venetians. This was, the insuperable aversion they manifested
to military service. No young men ever appeared desirous of seeking to advance
their fortunes by arms. The aversion they displayed to war contrasted strangely
with their unquenchable thirst for civil strife. The Maniates were the only
part of the population of the Morea attached to a military life. The most noted
bands of robbers in the peninsula were generally composed of Albanians from
northern Greece.
It has been already
mentioned that, after the conquest of Crete, the Othoman government had reduced
Maina to complete submission, and compelled the inhabitants to pay the haratsh
like the other Greeks. The assertion that this tax was never paid by Maina,
though extremely erroneous, since it had been levied by the Othomans in the
sixteenth century, was now revived, and has often been repeated since. After
the Othoman government had established regular garrisons in the fortresses of
Zarnata, Kielapha, and Passava, in 1670, the Maniates paid the hated imposition
of the haratsh, which was considered as the severest mark of Othoman servitude,
until they were relieved from it by the victories of the Venetians.
When the Maniates joined
Morosini they concluded an alliance with Venice, which conferred on them many
privileges, and authorised them to establish an independent local
administration throughout their mountains. The most important privilege they
obtained was exemption from paying a tenth of their agricultural produce to
the State. This tax was commuted for a fixed tribute, called by the Maniates mahtu.
It was during the Venetian domination in the Morea that the Maniates first
succeeded in constituting themselves into a really independent people, but the
use they made of their independence did not tend to improve
a. r>.
1684-1718.
248
VENETIAN DOMINATION.
chap. iv. the condition of the mass of the population.
Maina became the scene of innumerable family feuds, and petty civil wars; and
the defeated party generally endeavoured to gain a livelihood by plundering the
Venetian provinces of Messenia and Laconia, or by exercising piracy. The
Maniates displayed great courage and extraordinary perseverance in their feuds,
though they sought rather to waylay and assassinate their enemies than to meet
them in open fight. The northern and central parts of Maina were, however,
valuable to Venice, which retained a monopoly of their trade, for they then
exported a considerable quantity of valonia, red dye, galls, cotton, and oil.
The population was estimated at more than twenty-five thousand souls.
The first object of the
Venetians, after they had established their domination in the Morea, was to
give security to property. They endeavoured to persuade the Greeks that they
would respect every existing right of private property, and that they would
even consider the possession of property under a clear title as entitling the
possessor to claim a preference as a purchaser. The Venetians found the country
in a state somewhat similar to that in which the Bavarians undertook its
organisation in 1833 ; but the general proveditors of the republic were far
abler and honester administrators than the regents selected by King Louis :
the Venetians had studied the wants of the Greeks in the experience of
practical life, while the Bavarians were mere chamber statesmen, whose knowledge
of the Levant was confined to diplomatic arrangements, state papers,
ministerial bureaus, and police-offices.
The Venetian government,
in order to turn the attention of the Greeks from intrigues and lawsuits to
profitable employment, immediately recognised all the possessors of land, whose
right of occupancy was established under a legal title, as absolute
proprietors, in so
■t
STATE OF PROPERTY.
249
far as the State was
concerned. To the peasants who had cultivated property claimed by the Othoman
government the boon was very great, as their payments to the fisc were
diminished one-half. The primates and ecclesiastics, it is true, frequently
contrived to appropriate to themselves property that had belonged to private
Turks and to the Othoman government; but the Venetians wisely overlooked some
fraudulent gains on the part of individuals, in consideration of the great
benefits which the measure conferred on the many small cultivators of the soil,
who were thereby rendered the undisputed proprietors of the lands their
families had long occupied.
Immense tracts of land
still remained uncultivated, of which the property was vested in the State by
the fortune of war. When this property was capable of being immediately
rendered productive by some outlay of capital, as in the case of mills,
cisterns, warehouses, and building-sites, it was conceded to tenants on leases
for ten years, with the obligations of making the necessary outlay, and of
paying one-tenth of the annual produce. But irrigable lands, gardens, and
meadows, in the vicinity of towns, were let for a rent of one- third of their
produce, as was customary in private leases. Pasture lands, olive groves, and
vineyards, were usually let for a money rent. When peace was concluded with
Turkey in 1699, and the domination of the Venetians was definitively recognised
by the sultan, the Greeks began to consider their lot as subjects of Venice
permanently fixed. The republic made use of this opportunity of giving
additional security to its power, by endeavouring to gain the goodwill of the
native population of the Morea. All temporary rights of property in the domains
of the State were declared permanent. Thus all lessees became proprietors on
paying their previous rent as a perpetual duty. A com-
A. D.
1684-1718.
250
VENETIAN DOMINATION.
chap. iv. plete survey of the peninsula and a census of the population
were then completed.
Until the conclusion of
peace the Morea had been infested by bands of robbers; numerous exiles from the
Othoman provinces, who were too lazy or too proud to work, and deserters from
the army, wandered about, and when they were not employed as gendarmes, local
guards, or policemen, exercised the trade of brigands.1 The
republican administration of Venice proved more successful in establishing
order and security for life and property in the commencement of the eighteenth
century, than the monarchical centralisation introduced by the Bavarians in the
present day. The Venetians intrusted the municipalities they established with
some real power ; the ministers of King Otho have maintained the demarchies,
created by the Bavarian regency, in a state of servile dependence on the Minister
of the Interior. The Venetian municipalities were authorised to form a local
militia, in order to guard their property; and they were encouraged to undertake
the responsibility of making good any losses sustained within their limits by
robbery. Even the jealous republic intrusted them with the right of bearing
arms. Sagredo, the last general proveditor who ruled the Morea in time of
peace, reported the country to be so tranquil that few crimes were committed
which required to be punished with death.2 This, we must remember,
was said at a time when death was the punishment universally applied to many
minor offences. It forms a sad contrast with the condition of Greece in the
year 1855.3
1 Grimani,
as quoted by Ranke, says, “rare volte fu fermato un ladro che non fosse
meidano.” At present the brigands in Greece are recruited principally by
deserters from the irregular troops, by the persons allowed to escape from the
prisons, and by those pardoned by King Otho.
2 Ranke,
473.
3 A long
list of villages plundered by the brigands might be made from the Greek
newspapers.
GREEK CHARACTER.
251
The administration of justice
in civil affairs, though a.d. very much superior to what it had been under the 1684'1718,
Othomans, was still very defective. The tribunals were presided over by young
Italian nobili, whose long residence at Padua had not always enabled them to
acquire more knowledge of law that a short sojourn at Venice taught them to
forget; for they generally displayed great aptitude in learning the vices and
corruption of that luxurious city. Their ignorance was a constant subject of
complaint. The clerks of court, who possessed more knowledge, were notorious
for venality and dishonesty, and the advocates, who were Ionians, were prompt
agents in pointing out to the young judges how they could enrich themselves by
selling judicial sentences. Wealthy suitors easily gained their causes, but the
poor were exposed to delay in every process, and could find no protection from
the law against acts of injustice committed by the Greek primates. The weakness
or mildness of the Venetian civil administration increased the sufferings of
the peasantry, as it relieved oppressors from the fear of punishment. The
feeling of impunity among the unprincipled Greek archonts and merchants, soon
led them to gratify their avarice and revenge by iniquitous lawsuits, which
they usually succeeded in gaining by bribing false witnesses. The Venetians saw
these evils gradually increase, but they were unable to suppress the false
testimony which was habitually given in the courts of law. Their legislation
was ineffectual to restrain the demoralisation of Greek society, nourished by
the bad example of their own judges. The same want of truth and honesty, which
contributed so powerfully for many centuries to maintain the Greeks in a
servile position as a nation, baffled the partial efforts of the Venetians to
improve their condition. Time alone can show whether the establishment of the
national
252
VENETIAN DOMINATION.
chap. iv. independence will efface from the Greek
character these vices. The general proveditor, Emo, describes the Moreotes in
1708 very much as the Emperor Cantacuzenos had described them in the middle of
the fourteenth century. The Venetian says they were a race addicted to
wrangling, unwearied in chicanery, and inexorable in revenge, who seemed to
take delight in nourishing the bitterest quarrels with all their neighbours.
The imperial historian mentioned the mutual hatred which the archonts of the
Morea cherished to the hour of death, and the feuds which they regularly
transmitted, as a death-bed legacy or an inalienable inheritance, to their
children and heirs.1
Keligious liberty was
not a principle of government recognised by any European state in the
seventeenth century; the difference of faith consequently formed an
insurmountable obstacle to an equitable administration of public affairs in
all European governments. The spirit of the Italians was peculiarly opposed to
toleration. Indeed, so deeply was intolerance a part of Christian civilisation
at this time, that even a sense of the wrong which they had suffered for conscience
sake in the Old AVorld, did not restrain the exiles, who sought for religious
liberty in America, from persecuting those who differed from them in their new
homes. The Venetians were then remarkable for liberality, but, as sincere
Catholics, they could not become the sovereigns of the orthodox Greeks without
awakening strong feelings of opposition to their government, even though their
conduct was marked by unusual prudence and toleration, and though they had
long acted as protectors of the orthodox against papal influence at Constantinople.2
The vicinity of the
sultan's dominions, the great
1 Ranke, 470. Cantacuzenos, 751,
edit. Par.
2 Hammer, Histoire de VEmpire
Othoman, ix. 31.
ECCLESIASTICAL ADMINISTRATION. 253
power of* the Patriarch
of Constantinople over the Greek clergy, and the general feeling which induced
all the bigoted of the orthodox church to regard the sultan as their
protector, created a sense of insecurity on the part of the senate of Venice,
which made it avoid, with the greatest care, giving its Greek subjects any just
cause of dissatisfaction. It knew well that no act of the republic could
deprive the Greek clergy of their civil influence any more than of their
ecclesiastical authority.
The Venetians,
nevertheless, considered it their right as conquerors, and their duty as
Catholics, to restore to the papal clergy all the mosques which had been
Christian churches at the time of the Othoman conquest. In most cases, where
the building was one of importance, it had been erected by the Frank princes.
The Venetians naturally restored the Catholic Church to the full enjoyment of
its authority oyer the Catholics in Greece, but they did not permit the Pope
to assume any supremacy over the Greek Church. The Catholic Church in the Morea
was divided into four bishoprics, under the superintendence of the archbishop
of Corinth. Many priests and monks flocked to the Morea from Italy and the
islands of the Archipelago.
The Greek Church
retained all the property and privileges it had possessed under the sultans,
and was not required to make any concessions of ecclesiastical superiority to
its Romish rival. The power of the Patriarch of Constantinople, however, both
as being a foreigner at the head of an opposition church in a hostile State,
and as lie was a political agent in the hands of the Othoman government, caused
great anxiety at Venice. The Patriarch named the bishops in the Morea; his
influence was, consequently, allpowerful with the clergy, who looked to his
favour and protection for ecclesiastical advancement: and the
A. D.
1684-1718.
254 VENETIAN DOMINATION.
chap. iv. power of the clergy over the great body of the people was
exorbitant. The Patriarch of Constantinople named also the abbots of many
monasteries. One-half of the annual offerings made by the priests, and by each
family in every diocese, was paid over by the bishop to the exarch of the
Morea, who received these sums on account of the Patriarch. A portion of the
revenues of the monasteries was also remitted to Constantinople by their
abbots.1 The bulls of
the Patriarch possessed as much authority in the Morea as in any part of the
Othoman empire, for his excommunications were feared by all the orthodox laity
as well as clergy, and his patronage was powerful to advance the temporal
interests of his partisans. The Venetians, who had deprived papal bulls of
authority in their dominions until they received the sanction of the civil
government, desired to exercise the same control over the bulls of the
Patriarch of Constantinople. The measures adopted marked the prudence of the
senate, and were carried into execution by the general prove- ditors with great
moderation. No acknowledged exarch of the Patriarch was allowed to reside in
the Morea, and the publication of patriarchal bulls by the clergy was
prohibited ; while, in order to curtail the influence which the distribution of
immense patronage conferred on the Patriarch, the Greek communes were invited
to select their own bishops, and an attempt was
1 Ranke gives the following ecclesiastical statistics
from Grimani: “ The metropolitan archbishop, who exercised the superintendence
over the whole peninsula, then resided at Trepolitza. There were four other
archbishops without suffragans. There were twelve suffragan bishops, and sixteen
titular bishops without sees; thirteen hundred and sixty-seven monks in one
hundred and fifty-eight monasteries; ninety-four of these were monasteries
having the right of electing their own abbots; in fourteen the nomination of
the abbot was a right of patronage, and twenty-six abbots were named by the
Patriarch; twenty-four of these monasteries also were only metochi, or
dependencies of other greater monasteries. Besides these, there were one
hundred and fifty-one churches possessing landed property.— (Page 479).
Morosini had endeavoured to gain the Greek clergy by his liberality during the
war. He assigned pensions to the bishops of Larissa, Thebes, Negrepont, Athens,
and Salona, who all fled to the Venetians for protection in 1688.—Locatelli,
ii. 156.
ECCLESIASTICAL ADMINISTRATION.
255
made to abolish the
payment of the dues which were remitted to Constantinople. The Venetian
authorities were well aware that the Archbishop of Patras acted secretly as
exarch for the Patriarch, and that the bishops and abbots, in order to secure
the goodwill of the Patriarch and synod at Constantinople, continued to make
considerable remittances of money to the patriarchal treasury ; but they were
satisfied to put an end to the public payment of these dues, without forcing
the Patriarch to assail their political authority in defence of his revenue.
By this conduct the influence of the Patriarch in the Morea was considerably
diminished, without producing any direct collision between the Greek Church and
the civil power.
Simony was too deeply
engrafted on the orthodox church to admit of its being extirpated by external
influence. The bishops sold the office of priest, and the communes, when they
became invested with ecclesiastical patronage, followed the established usage
of the church, and endeavoured to turn ecclesiastical elections into a means of
increasing the communal revenues. They bargained with their nominee for a share
of the ordinary ecclesiastical dues and church offerings. Thus the clerical
office was rendered universally an object of bargain and sale.1 The
provedi- tors could not venture to interfere. They required the assistance of
the Greek clergy to aid in maintaining public order, and found it politic to
wink at abuses which often rendered the priesthood anxious to secure the
support of the government. Thus the same policy of employing the Greek Church
as an instrument of police, to watch over the people and to support the power
of a foreign domination, was adopted by the Venetians at Nauplia as it had been
established by the Othomans at Constantinople. The
1 Ranke, 481.
A. I).
1684-1718.
256
VENETIAN DOMINATION.
chap. iv. vices of the Greek ecclesiastical system
made the priesthood the most efficient agents for riveting the chains of their
country. The success of the Venetian policy was proved when the Patriarch sent
a letter to the primates of Misithra, enjoining the community to solicit the
nomination of a new bishop from Constantinople, instead of the one chosen
under the authority of the Venetian government. The community of Misithra left
the letter unanswered, and the bishop it had chosen remained in office.1
The presence of the
Catholic clergy in the Morea, though it caused some exacerbation on the part of
the orthodox Greeks, was nevertheless productive of permanent good. The
Catholics first drew the attention of the Moreotes to the improvement of the
system of education then prevalent, and extended a desire for instruction more
widely among the people. They also taught the Greeks that active charity, and a
constant exercise of benevolence, are prominent duties in the office of a
Christian parish-priest. The superior moral character, the greater learning,
and more disinterested behaviour, in pecuniary affairs, of the Catholic priesthood
at this time, formed so strong a contrast with the meanness, ignorance, and
rapacity of a large portion of the orthodox, that even the Greeks treated them
personally with respect. The influence of the Catholic was greatly increased by
the knowledge of medicine which several possessed, by their readiness to attend
the sick, and by their liberality in furnishing medicines from dispensaries
established at the expense of the church. Many schools were founded in the provincial
towns, and several colleges were established, in which the education was so
much superior to that bestowed on the pupils in any Greek schools then existing
in the Morea, that many of the orthodox sent their
1 Ranke, 483.
CATHOLIC CLERGY.
257
children to be educated
in these establishments. The 16^-J^ig
college of
Tripolitza was particularly remarkable for ______________________ ‘
its excellence, and for
the concourse of orthodox Greeks who attended it. Tins declaration of public
opinion in favour of morality and education produced a sensible effect on the
Greek clergy. They began to exert themselves to gain a degree of personal
esteem, which they saw was attained by their Catholic rivals, and a considerable
improvement was soon visible in the general conduct of the Greek priesthood.
The torrent of social demoralisation which had been rolling onward and gaining
additional force as time advanced, under the Othoman domination, was now
arrested.
The first productive
seeds of social improvement were sown in the minds of the Greeks by their Venetian
masters during the short period of their domination in the Morea. The hope, as
well as the desire of bettering their condition, became then a national feeling,
which gained strength with each succeeding generation, until it ripened into a
desire for national independence. The obligations of the Greeks to the
Venetian government and to the Catholic clergy may not be very great, but it
would be an oversight in the history of the Greek nation to omit recording
these obligations. The young Greeks of the Morea, who grew to manhood under
the protection of the republic, were neither so ignorant, so servile, nor so
timid as their fathers who had lived under the Turkish yoke. It is true that
the Venetian government failed in making any great social improvements in
Greece, or in gaining the goodwill and gratitude of the people ; but what
foreign government has ever succeeded better ? And, on the whole, the Venetian
administration will not lose by a comparison with that of the Greeks
themselves, since the complete establishment of their national in-
R
258
VENETIAN DOMINATION.
chap. iv. dependence in 1843, when the Bavarians were
finally expelled from the government.
Prudence induced the
Venetian senate to maintain a strict neutrality during the great European war
of the Spanish succession. To avoid being involved in the general hostilities,
it overlooked more than one open infraction of its territory by the
belligerents ; and, as often happens with those who fear to make a single
enemy, it soon remained without a single friend. Its policy was presumed to be
dictated by the official selfishness of the ruling class, whose members were
more anxious to preserve their large salaries and sinecures than to support
the influence and dignity of the republic. Rather than encounter the slightest
risk of diminishing their own incomes, they allowed Venice to be despised as a
spiritless state. The consequence was, that when the Treaties of Utrecht and
Rastadt re-established peace in "Western Europe, Venice remained without
an ally. France, whose success in placing a Bourbon on the Spanish throne had
given her a predominating influence in the Mediterranean, was the ancient ally
of the Othoman Porte, and was now supposed to be especially envious of the
great extension which Venetian commerce had gained by a long neutrality. The
French government, seeing no hope of their merchants recovering the share they
had formerly enjoyed of the Levant trade, as long as the possession of the
Morea enabled the Venetians to enforce their system of monopoly, was suspected
of urging the Porte to commence hostilities with the republic.
In the mean time Russia
had taken its place as a first-rate power in the international system of the
European states, and already threatened to destroy the power, if not the
existence, of the Othoman empire. The statesmen of Venice were too traditional
in their policy, and too conservative in their views, to appre-
POWER OF RUSSIA.
259
ciate the full value of
an alliance w^ith the Czar Peter at this crisis. The moment was one when all
thoughts of neutrality ought to have been laid aside, unless Venice was
convinced that she possessed singly the strength necessary to defend the Morea
against the whole force of the Othoman empire. A considerable similarity may be
traced between the internal condition of the Othoman empire and the state of
its relations with Russia at the commencement of the war with Peter the Great
in 1710, and at the invasion of the Turkish dominions by the Emperor Nicholas
in 1853. The Russian empire was strong in the feeling of progressive
improvement and increasing power. Peter was elated by his victory over Charles
XII., the military hero of the age. The Othoman empire showed visible signs of
decline and weakness. The defects in the financial administration and in the
dispensation of justice became every day more apparent, as the necessity for
order and security of property were more generally felt in consequence of the
progress of social civilisation. The military organisation which had given
power to the sultan’s government was ruined : the janissaries, instead of
being, as formerly, the best infantry in Europe, were little better than a
local militia of armed burghers ; the institution of the tribute-children,
which had long been the firmest support of the Othoman empire, no longer
supplied the sultan’s army with a regular influx of enthusiastic neophytes and
well-disciplined soldiers ; the timariot system was weakened by the poverty and
depopulation of the provinces, and the luxurious manner of living of the large
landed proprietors. War was no longer the normal condition of Othoman society.
The difficulty of recruiting the armies of the sultan was felt to be
augmenting. An inferior class of men was received into the army ; and it was
generally believed that the
a. n. 1684-1718.
260
VENETIAN DOMINATION.
chap. iv. Mussulman population was everywhere
decreasing in number. On the other hand, it was said that the Christians were
rapidly increasing, and there were many proofs that the Greek population was
acquiring a new degree of importance. Wherever it could place itself in
security, whether under the protection of Venice or of Russia, it began to
exhibit signs of mental and commercial activity.
Sultan Achmet III. was
despised by Peter the Great as a weak prince ; and the Othoman ministers were
considered both worthless and venal. The Czar was persuaded that a single
campaign would enable the Muscovite army which had gained the battle of Pul-
towa to sweep from the field any force the Sultan could assemble to oppose it.
Russian agents had visited every part of European Turkey, in order to instigate
the Christians to revolt. The Greeks were reminded of ancient prophecies said
to have been found in the tomb of Constantine the Great, which declared that
the time had arrived when the Byzantine empire was to be restored by the
Russians. The Sclavonians were flattered with the assurance that they were destined
to become the dominant race in a new eastern empire, as the sovereignty of
Constantinople was about to pass into the hands of the Czar of Russia, who was
the head of the Sclavonian race, and the emperor selected by Heaven to rule all
the orthodox nations of the earth. In short, Peter had good reason to believe
in 1710 what Nicholas said in 1853, “that the affairs of Turkey were in a very
disorganised condition ; that the country itself seemed falling to pieces ; and
that he had to deal with a sick man—a man seriously ill, whose constitution
afforded little hope of recovery/'1 To increase the internal fever
which threatened the
1 Parliamentary
Papers, 1854. Secret correspondence of the Emperor of Russia with the British
government, No. 1, dated 11th January 1853.
'J
TREATY OF THE PRUTII, 1711.
2G1
existence of Turkey,
Peter augmented the exacerbation by constructing several forts on its
frontiers. Repeated infractions of the Othoman territory by his subjects were
left unredressed; and the hospodar of Moldavia, Demetrius Cantemir, was gained
over to betray the interests of his sovereign the sultan. Peter apparently
expected that he would succeed in his encroachments without the sultan daring
to resist. He was surprised when a declaration of war anticipated the progress
of his clandestine schemes. It found him, however, fully prepared for carrying
out his plans by arms.
Peter led the Russian
army forward in person to invade the Othoman empire; but his expectation of
being welcomed by a general rising of the Christian population in Moldavia and
Vallachia was disappointed. The presence of a numerous Turkish army soon
showed him that he was not likely to find it a very easy task to plant the
cross over the dome of St Sophia. The campaign of 1711 confounded all Peters
hopes, and astonished Europe. The Christians remained everywhere quiet: in
every province of the Othoman empire the Mohammedans flew to arms, and
displayed their old warlike energy. Peter the Great advanced incautiously, and
was surrounded by the Tartars of the Crimea, and by the army of the grand
vizier. Cut off from all hope of escape, and despairing of being able to force
his way through the Othoman army, the Emperor of Russia preferred signing a
disgraceful peace to encountering the risk of being compelled to enter
Constantinople as a prisoner, instead of marching through its gates as a
conqueror. By this treaty Russia was bound to demolish the fortifications which
Peter had recently constructed at Kamiensk, Samara, and Taganrog; to yield Asof
to the sultan, and to abandon all his artillery to the grand vizier as a trophy
A. D.
1684-1718.
262
VENETIAN DOMINATION.
ciiap. iv. of victory. The Czar also bound himself not to meddle in the
affairs of the Cossacks, nor to send ambassadors to reside permanently at
Constantinople. This humiliating treaty was signed in July 1711, on the banks
of the Pruth.
The credit of the Othoman
arms was restored by this unexpected display of strength. The Christian
subjects of the Porte were reconciled to their allegiance by the increased
profits of an extended trade in the Sea of Asof, the Black Sea, and the Levant,
and by somewhat milder treatment on the part of their masters. The sultan
subsequently renewed his treaty of peace with Poland ; and at last, by the
treaty of Adrianople in 1714, finally regulated his disputes with Russia
concerning the execution of the treaty of the Pruth, and arranged the frontiers
of the two empires. At the same time the Porte prosecuted its warlike preparations
both by land and sea with unusual vigour. The object of these preparations was
generally supposed to be the reconquest of the Morea ; yet Venice alone would
not believe in the danger which threatened her power; and when war was declared
by the Othoman government, the republic was unprepared to meet the enemy. The
military and naval forces of Venice were far too weak to offer a successful, or
even a prolonged resistance, to a serious attack on the part of the Turks. The
Venetians had supposed that the object of the sultan's preparations was to
conquer Malta ; and if the republic had displayed the same energy and determination
as the Order, it might perhaps have saved the Morea. For as soon as the grand
master, Raimond Perellos, was informed of the extent of the naval armament
fitting out at Constantinople, he summoned all the knights in Europe to the
defence of the island, provisioned the fortress for a long siege, and
strengthened the fortifications in every possible way. The Porte
OTHOMAN ARMY.
263
declared war with Venice
in the month of December 1714, making use of some disputes concerning the
conduct of Venetian cruisers to Turkish ships, and of the protection granted to
bands of insurgents on the Dalmatian frontier by the Venetian authorities, as a
pretext for an appeal to arms.
The grand vizier who
took the command of the army destined to invade the Morea was Ali Cumurgi, the
son of a charcoal-maker in the village of Soeloes, on the southern bank of the
Lake of Nicoea. He had been received as a child into the serai, and educated as
an imperial page. The favour of Sultan Mustapha had raised him to the rank of
chamberlain, and Sultan Achmet III. treated him with even greater favour than
his brother. At an early age he was appointed Selic- tar aga, and his counsels
exercised considerable influence on the sultan’s conduct, even before he
became a minister of the Porte. His first public office was that of grand
vizier ; but when placed at the head of the government, though he was destitute
of experience of the world, he displayed considerable talents as a statesman,
and great energy as a general.1
The Othoman army
assembled at Adrianople in spring, and after the cavalry had remained some time
at Serres and Saloniki, in order to feed the horses on green barley in the
plains, according to the invariable usage of the East, the grand vizier marched
southward, and reviewed his army at Thebes on the 9 th June 1715.2
According to the returns made to the grand vizier, the troops then assembled
amounted to 22,844 cavalry, and 72,520 infantry ; and if this estimate be
1 Hammer,
in Iris Othoman History, always calls the grand vizier Damad Ali. Keumur means
charcoal.
2 The army
crossed the river Vardar at a fine bridge recently constructed by Mohammed
Pasha at his own expense. Mohammed
had been kiaya of the Sultana Validhe, and was then kaimakam at
Constantinople.—MS. Journal de la Campagne que le Grand Vizier Ali Pacha a
faite en 1715, pour la ConquUe de la Mortc.
A. D.
1684-1718.
264
VENETIAN DOMINATION.
r. reduced one
quarter, which is not too great a reduction for so large a body of men,
consisting of many irregular bands under almost independent officers, the army of
Ah Cumurgi still exceeded 70,000 men.
The fleet had already
sailed from Constantinople under the capitan-paslia, Djanum Khodja, and the
grand vizier received the news that it had conquered Tinos before he quitted
Thebes. This island, of which the Venetians had retained the sovereignty for
five centuries, and which had repeatedly foiled the attacks of powerful Othoman
fleets, was now surrendered by the proveditor, Balbi, without striking a blow.
From Thebes one division
of the army was sent forward to the isthmus, with orders to proceed along the
southern coast of the Gulf of Corinth, and besiege the Castle of the Morea, at
the Straits of Lepanto. The Asiatic troops were employed in the mean time in
rendering the road over Mounts Cithseron and Geran- ion suitable for the
transport of the artillery and baggage which accompanied the main body of the
grand army.
The Venetians had
employed themselves, during the period which followed the peace of Carlovitz,
in strengthening the fortifications of Nauplia, Modon, and the fort at the
Straits of Lepanto, called the Castle of the Morea. These places were made the
central establishments of the military power of the Venetians in the Morea :
their fortifications were improved by additional works on a modern system of
defence, and by deep ditches. The Hill of Palamedi, which commanded Nauplia,
had been crowned by a well-planned series of works, consisting of three closed
forts and four detached batteries, amply supplied with water from large
cisterns constructed in the rock. The most elevated of the three forts
commanded the whole defences, and was furnished with bomb-proof buildings.
SIEGE OF CORINTH.
2G5
Corinth and Monemvasia
were considered impregnable from their natural position. It was the plan of the
senate to confine all preparations for defending the Morea to these five
fortresses, which were well furnished with artillery, ammunition, military
stores, and provisions. All the other fortified places in the peninsula were
ordered to be dismantled. But fortresses are of little use without strong
garrisons ; for insufficient garrisons and bad troops really facilitate the
progress of an enemy. The whole military force of Venice in the Morea when the
war broke out only amounted to eight thousand men, and the Venetian fleet in
the Levant, under the captain-general Delfino, consisted of only forty-two
ships, large and small, some galleys with oars, a few galleasses, and some
galliots carrying mortars. The captain-general counted much on the attachment
which he supposed the Greek population felt for the Venetian government, and
believed that the Greek militia would display great valour in the field, and
impede the advance of the Othoman army by hanging on its flanks and rear.1
Against these forces the grand vizier advanced with seventy thousand men, and
the capitan-pasha with a fleet of sixty ships, besides galleys and galleasses.
On the 25th of June,
1715, Ali Cumurgi passed the wall across the Isthmus of Corinth, which was far
too extensive for the Venetians to think of defending, and, advancing through
the lines they had constructed to connect Corinth and Lechaeum, leaving the
fort on the sea-shore on his right, and the city 011 his left, he encamped
near the Gulf of Corinth. On the 28th the trenches were opened against the
outer wall guarding
1 In a letter from Delfino to Bono, the proveditor of
Nauplia, intercepted by the grand vizier, the captain-general cautions Bono
against allowing the Greeks to expose themselves too much from their great
zeal. So completely had the hypocrisy of the archonts and priests, and the
vaunting of the irregular Greek soldiers, deceived the Venetians.—MS. Journal
of Brue, 10.
A. D.
1684-1718.
266
VENETIAN DOMINATION.
. the ascent from the
town to the Acrocorinth, and the proveditor, Jacomo Minoto, was summoned to surrender
the place.1 The summons was rejected, and Sari Achmet Pasha (by
whose advice, in the following year, the grand vizier lost the battle of
Peterwardein and his life) was ordered to press forward the siege. The Venetian
garrison consisted of four hundred soldiers, assisted by two hundred armed
Greeks ; but the place was crowded with Greek families, who had retired with
all their most valuable property to seek security within its walls. These
non-combatants were all eager for a capitulation, believing that they would be
able to save their property by a speedy surrender of the fortress, though they
knew it was impregnable if well defended. The Turks directed their attack from
a hill to the south. Their batteries were too distant to produce much effect,
but they protected the advance of the janissaries, who contrived to effect a
lodgment under the walls ; and it was resolved to attempt storming the outer
gate, when Minoto hoisted a flag of
i Lord Byron’s Siege of Corinth having given a classic interest to the
events of this siege in English literature, I subjoin the summons sent by the
grand vizier, and the answer.
“ I, who am the first minister and generalissimo of the most powerful
emperor of the universe, and the most high among the monarchs of the earth,
inform you, who are the Venetian commandant in the fortress of Corinth, that if
you surrender the fortress, which from old time belongs to our most powerful
emperor, the inhabitants shall be treated in the same manner as we treat all
the true and faithful subjects of the empire; that they shall enjoy in perfect
liberty all their possessions and property ; nor shall their wives and children
be ill used. And with regard to you, the Venetian commandant, you and all your
garrison shall be treated according to the articles to be stipulated on surrendering
the fortress. But if, in consequence of an ill-timed obstinacy, you resist the
invincible arms of our most powerful emperor, know, that with the assistance
of God, we will take your fortress, and put every man within it to the edge of
the sword, and we will make slaves of the women and children, and you shall be
responsible to Heaven for the blood and slavery which will ensue, the crime
being in no way to be attributed to us.” The seal of the grand vizier was
affixed to this document. The reply was in these words : “ To you who are the
minister of the Othoman Porte, know that we, and all the troops and inhabitants
of the fortress of Corinth, are determined to defend it; therefore your menaces
are useless, for we are prepared to resist all your attacks, and, with
confidence in the assistance of God, we will preserve this fortress to the most
serene Republic. God is with us. (Signed) Giacomo
Minoto, Proveditore Generale.”
PILLAGE OF CORINTH.
2G7
truce. The Reis Effendi
was sent into the place to settle the terms of surrender, and a capitulation
was concluded, by which the grand vizier engaged to transport the Venetian
garrison in safety to Corfu.
On the morning of the 3d
August, while preparations were going forward to convey the garrison to the
Othoman ships at Kenchrees, on the Gulf of Egina, the janissaries, who were
enraged at being deprived of the immense booty supposed to be accumulated in
the fortress, contrived to escalade an unguarded part of the wall, and
commenced plundering the houses. About noon a great smoke was seen from the
Othoman camp to rise over the Acrocorinth, and a loud explosion announced that
from some unknown cause a powder magazine had blown up. The grand vizier was
soon informed that the janissaries had forced their way into the place, and
broken the capitulation. The cause of the explosion was never known. The Turks
accused the Venetians of setting fire to the powder, and commenced a massacre
of the garrison. The troops, who were hurried up to the Acrocorinth, by order
of the grand vizier, in order to arrest the disorder, could only save the lives
of a part of the Venetians, and conduct them to a place of safety in the camp.
The janissaries made slaves of the Greeks, men, women, and children ; nor did
the grand vizier venture to put a stop to these captives being sold publicly in
his army. It was reported by the prisoners that Minoto had perished in the
confusion; but it was afterwards known that a soldier of the Asiatic troops had
taken him prisoner, and concealed him in order to profit by his ransom. He
was secretly conveyed to Smyrna, where he was released by the Dutch consul, who
advanced his ransom money.1 Bembo, the second in command, and
1 Hammer, xiii. 270. MS. Journal of Brue, p. 16,
marginal note. M. Brue mentions the following circumstance in his Joxirnal:—
A. D.
1684-1718.
2G8 VENETIAN DOMINATION.
chap. iv. about one hundred and eighty Venetian soldiers, with a few
women, were saved, and sent on board the vessels at Kenchrees, from whence they
were conveyed to Corfu, according to the terms of the capitulation. The grand
vizier, though he feared to attempt depriving his troops of their plunder in
the camp, sent orders to all commandants of ports, and captains of defiles in
the mountains, to secure and send back any Venetians who had been clandestinely
enslaved; but he took no measures to deliver the Greek captives, whose sale in
the camp was legalised by regular certificates issued by the proper officers.
The mutinous conduct of his troops chafed the pride of Ali Cumurgi, who,
in order to make a display of his power, calculated at least to make
individuals tremble, ordered Suleiman Pasha of Selefke (Seleucia in Cilicia) to
be beheaded, as a punishment for his delay in bringing up his troops to
headquarters. This pasha prayed in vain that he might be strangled privately in
his tent, instead of being publicly executed before the whole army.
As soon as the capture of Corinth was known in the Morea, the Greeks
crowded to the Othoman camp, and gave the grand vizier the strongest assurances
of their attachment to the Othoman government, and of their eagerness to see
the Venetians expelled from the peninsula. Ali promised them protection, and
issued orders that they were to be treated as subjects of the
“ June 29. Five janissaries brought to the grand vizier the head of a man
with a long beard. They said they had fallen in with seven soldiers who had
made a sortie from the fortress, and that they had killed one, and carried off
his head. The others had escaped into the place. The grand vizier gave two
hundred and fifty crowns to the janissary who said he had killed the bearded
soldier, and divided two hundred and fifty more among the other four.
“ July 4. The prisoners informed us that Minoto ordered a Greek who wore
a long beard to be beheaded, and his head to be thrown from the walls, because
a petition from the Greeks in the Acrocorinth to the grand vizier had been
found in his possession, which he was suspected of endeavouring to deliver.
This we supposed was the head which the janissaries had carried to the grand
vizier.”
t
SIEGE OF NAUPLIA. 2G9
sultan, and on no account to be molested in tlieir persons nor injured
in tlieir property. These orders were obeyed, for the grand vizier had enforced
the strictest discipline in his army during its march, and effectually
protected the property of the rayalis in all the districts through which he had
passed. This conduct had secured to his numerous army regular supplies of provisions
and forage ; the peasants had brought their produce in abundance to the regular
markets which were established in his camp according to the system of earlier
times, when liberal payment for provisions filled the Othoman camps with
plenty, and excited the astonishment of Christian Europe.1 The
Moreote peasantry welcomed the grand vizier whose cavalry paid for their
barley, as they considered this conduct a proof that he would be a better
master than the Venetians, who allowed their mercenaries to extort wine and
meat gratis. Selfishness generally makes men shortsighted. Either from
carelessness or from an excess of weakness, and a fear of causing
dissatisfaction among the rural population, the Venetian authorities neglected
to destroy the supplies in the country between Corinth and Nauplia. The army of
the grand vizier found the houses filled with provisions, the threshing-floors
covered with grain, and the pastures
1 Compare page 62 of this volume with Chalcocondylas,
182. I was so fortunate as to purchase the original journal of Monsieur Brue,
interpreter of the French embassy at Constantinople, who accompanied the
expedition of Ali Cumurgi by order of the ambassador, at a sale of Oriental
MSS. at Paris, in 1843. Monsieur Brue was a relation of Voltaire, and is
mentioned in the Ilistoire de Charles XII., livre v. For further notices of
him, see Hammer, xiii. 41; and Journal inedit de Galland, in the second number
of Nourdle Revue Encydopedique, published by Didot, Paris, 1847, Fevrier.
Monsieur Brue, in the account of his expenses, has the following note to
explain the high price paid for the barley of his horses : “ However exorbitant
the price of barley may appear as I pass it in the account, it is nevertheless
a fact that the Turkish officers often paid a higher price, for I obtained my
supply through M. Mavrocordatos, the first dragoman of the Porte, for the same
price at which it was furnished to him in the camp.” Another notice of a
distribution of barley by the grand vizier, to facilitate the advance of the
army, also confirms the testimony we find in favour of the strict discipline
enforced by Ali Cumui'gi in this campaign.
A. D.
1684-1718.
270
VENETIAN DOMINATION.
chap. iv. stocked with
cattle.1 It met with
no obstacle in its advance, and on the 11th of July, Ali Cumurgi encamped in
the plain between Tyrinthus and Nauplia. On the 14th the janissaries, by a
daring attack, effected a lodgment in the covered way of a tenaille on
Palamedi, but suffered great loss in an obstinate and rash attempt to storm the
tenaille itself. On the 15th the Othoman fleet arrived, and on the following
day seventeen heavy guns and some large mortars were landed, and placed in the
batteries prepared to receive them. Little impression, however, had been made
either on the fortifications of the town or on the works of Palamedi, when, on
the 20th of July, a mine was sprung against the tenaille where the former
assault had been repulsed, and the janissaries, rushing forward over the ruins,
carried the work by storm. The Venetians in the works behind were seized with
a panic, and the whole of the Palamedi was abandoned in the most cowardly
manner, for the forts were in a state to have made a long defence, and to have
secured an honourable capitulation, even after the loss of the tenaille. The
janissaries followed so close on the steps of the flying garrison as to enter
the town of Nauplia by the gallery which descends from the Palamedi, without
encountering any opposition. The troops in the plain, seeing the confusion on
the ramparts, and a Turkish standard in the town, plunged into the muddy ditch
and escaladed the walls in the most exposed position. The proveditor Bono no
sooner heard that his troops had retreated from the Palamedi than he hoisted a white
flag; but the janissaries were already in the place,
1 Dana, iv. 684, says, Delfino se determina h, faire ravager tout le pays
et
bruler les moissons, pour oter a l’ennemi les moyens
d’y subsister. But Brue,
MS. Journal, 20, contradicts this saying expressly,
“ Le pain et la viande dtoient
tres rares aussi bien que l’orge pour les chevaux;
et si les Venetiens avaient
eu la precaution de bruler tous les grains de la
campagne de Corinthe, d’Argos, et de Nauplie, au lieu de les laisser comme ils
avoient fait, on eu bien de la peine
& faire subsister la cavalrie.
CAPTURE OF NAUPLIA.
271
and the Othoman troops had commenced pillaging the city before the grand
vizier was aware that it was taken. It is said that twenty-five thousand
persons were either slain or reduced to slavery. About a thousand Venetian
soldiers were brought to the grand vizier, who paid their ransom to their
captors, and then ordered them to be beheaded before his tent. Balbi, who
commanded the insular fort called the Burdge, immediately surrendered, and
eight thousand sequins were found in his possession. When Nauplia fell, the
garrison consisted of nearly two thousand regular troops, amply provided with
every means of defence.1
Nauplia was at this time a well-built town, as well as a strong fortress.
Its fortifications were excellent; its public and private buildings large and
solid structures ; its population numerous and wealthy. Its feeble defence
afforded strong proof of the incapacity and worthlessness both of the civil and
military authorities of the Venetian republic. But, on the other hand, the
grand vizier and the Othoman generals are not entitled to attribute the
conquest of the place either to their valour or military skill. The whole merit
of the rapid success is due to the courage, or rather temerity of the
janissaries, who, by a succession of rash attacks, and a gallant defence of
every step of
1 The military stores found in Nauplia consisted of
96 brass guns, some very large, 55 iron and 10 large brass mortal’s, 6 iron and
18 smaller brass mortars, and 4 iron mortars for stones, 15 field-pieces, 1664
cwts. of lead, 34,697 cannonballs, 12,115 bombs, 2930 iron hand-grenades, 2320
glass grenades, and 20,000 cwts. of powder. Many of the glass grenades of
different colours were found in Nauplia when it was taken by the Greeks in
1822. I knew a Philhellene who used one as an ink-bottle.
The Greeks attribute the fall of Nauplia to the treachery of a French
officer in the service of Venice, the Colonel Lasala; but there seems no reason
to adopt their version of the causes which led to the Turks entering the place
with facility. See a letter of Antonio Zara, one of the chief officers of the
garrison, dated from the bagno of Constantinople, 15th March 1716, in which it
appears that Lasala succeeded to the charge of the works on the death of
Cardosi, and that he quarrelled with Colonel Stade, and was put under arrest by
the proveditor Bono. — Hammer, xiii. 376. 2vficpopa <a\ ai^/noAcoo-ia
Mtupe'ooy riXoXoyj^elcra napa Mdvdov ’Icodvvav tov
’icoawiVcoi'.
A. D.
1684-1718.
272
VENETIAN DOMINATION.
chap. iv. ground they
acquired, though maintained with severe loss, gained possession of the
Palamedi, the key of the fortress, in nine days. Ali Cumurgi, who did not pretend
to possess any knowledge of military affairs, remained in the camp during the
whole siege, and never once visited the trenches of the janissaries on Mount
Palamedi. Sari Pasha, who commanded there, no more expected to see the place
fall, by the explosion of a single mine, than the proveditor Bono.
From Nauplia the grand
vizier marched through the Morea by Akladhokampo, Tripolitza, Veligosti, the
Lakos of Messenia and Nisi, from whence, proceeding towards Navarin, but
leaving that place on his right, he encamped before Modon on the 11th of
August.1 Coron and Navarin had been abandoned by the Venetians, who
had withdrawn the garrisons to Modon, into which the greater part of the
Venetian property in both towns had been conveyed, though some articles of
great value had been transported to the Ionian Islands and to Venice. The
fortifications of Modon had been improved by the Venetians, but they were still
commanded by a rising ground in the vicinity. The grand vizier, who wished to
save the valuable property in the town from pillage, summoned the governor to
surrender, declaring that, if he refused the terms offered, he should not be
admitted to any capitulation, but must surrender at discretion. This summons
was rejected ; for, as the captain-general Delfino was anchored at Sapienza
with a fleet of fifty sail, the garrison felt sure of support. The Turks opened
the trenches, and the capitan-pasha arrived with the Othoman fleet. Delfino
then declined the engagement offered, lest, as he himself says, disasters by
sea should
1 It is
interesting to find Veligosti and the Lakos of Messenia mentioned as stations
in the itinerary of the grand vizier. The site of Veligosti is now deserted,
and its feudal celebrity forgotten.—Medieval Greece and Trebizond, 214.
CAPTURE OF MODON.
273
accompany defeat on
shore, and Venice should find 16gA1-J^lg
that her only
fleet had been sacrificed in vain.1 The _____________________
garrison of Modon,
seeing that it was abandoned to its fate by the captain-general, after a feeble
defence offered to capitulate. Sari Achmet, the beglerbey of Roumely, wished to
save the place, bat the grand vizier refused all terms ; and the janissaries,
availing themselves of the truce, approached the walls, and found an entrance
into the town, which they immediately commenced plundering. The greater part
of the inhabitants were reduced to slavery, but the wealthiest had employed the
preceding night in conveying their money and jewels on board the ships in the
port, and the capitan-pasha allowed many of them, with the soldiers of the garrison,
to escape on board the Othoman fleet. All the males in the place would probably
have been put to the sword, and their heads heaped up before the tent of the
grand vizier, to obtain the usual head-money, had his kihaya not declared that,
the place having surrendered at discretion, the law of the Prophet forbade the
massacre of the inhabitants, and, therefore, the grand vizier was not authorised
to pay any head-money under such circumstances.
The troops grumbled at
what they called the avarice of the kihaya, for they knew the liberality of the
grand vizier too well to attribute the decision to his love of money ; so they
made the most they could by the sale and ransom of their prisoners whose lives
were spared.2 The Venetian general Pasta was protected and well
treated by the capitan-pasha, who, when a slave at Venice, where he had passed
seven years in
1 Ranke,
495.
2 Brae, in
his Journal (MS., page 41), directly contradicts the account of
Hammer, xiii. 27 4, that on this occasion the grand vizier paid thirty
imperial dollars for every Christian who was brought to him, in order to have
the
pleasure of seeing them beheaded before his tent.
S
274
VENETIAN DOMINATION.
chap. iv. the galleys, had been treated with kindness by his present
captive.1
The Castle of the Morea
at the straits of Lepanto surrendered to Kara Mustapha, the pasha of Diarbekr,
who had been despatched from Argos to invest it, after only three days of open
trenches. The Venetian troops, six hundred in number, were transported to
Cephalonia, but the Sclavonians and Greeks of the garrison were reduced to
slavery. The janissaries, however, violated the capitulation, and detained
many of the Italian soldiers until they were ransomed by the pasha. Kielapha
and Zarnata, though well prepared for defence, surrendered on the first
summons.
From Modon the grand
vizier marched by Leondari and Misithra to Elos, where he awaited the capitulation
of Monemvasia, which took place on the 7th of September. This impregnable
insular rock was supplied with provisions for more than two years ; but the
Greek inhabitants who possessed property in the Morea were eager to exchange
the mild domination of
o o
the Venetian republic
for the stern yoke of the Othoman sultan—as at the present day we see the
inhabitants of the Ionian Islands ready to transfer their allegiance from
Great Britain to Russia.
The grand vizier, having
completed the conquest of the Morea, returned to Adrianople, where Sultan
Achmet III. then resided. Before the end of the year the Venetians abandoned
Santa Maura and Cerigo ; Suda and Spinalonga were taken by the capitan-pasha.
The surviving Turkish
exiles who had been driven from the Morea by the Venetians were now re-established
in possession of their landed property, and many of those Mussulmans who had
embraced Christianity to preserve their estates were condemned to
1 Hammer, xiii. 274.
WAR WITH AUSTRIA.
275
death, though they had
always continued to wear a. d.
white
turbans, and affected to retain as much attach- ______________________ ’
ment to Mohammedanism as
the Venetian and the Greek people would tolerate. This system of compliance in
religious matters at the dictation of the civil power was borrowed from the
Greeks, and most of these compliant Mussulmans were of Greek descent; but the
votaries of Islam had no sympathy with those measures of dishonourable
conformity which, under the name of economical arrangements, make so prominent
a figure in the history of religious opinion in the Byzantine church.1
The Emperor of Germany
was alarmed at the facility with which the Othoman army had conquered the
Morea, and he feared that the sultan would follow up this victory by an attempt
to re-establish the Othoman power in Hungary, where the tyrannical government
of the house of Austria had, as usual, filled the country w^ith discontent. The
court of Vienna, alive to its true interests, did not show the same supineness
as the Venetian senate. It had an able minister, as well as an experienced
general, in Prince Eugene of Savoy. An offensive and defensive alliance was concluded
with the republic, and the Porte was invited to re-establish peace on the basis
of the treaty of Car- lovitz. To this demand the natural reply was an immediate
declaration of war ; but the divan was anxious to avoid hostilities, and the
grand vizier had some difficulty in getting war declared. He however took the
command of the army destined to invade Hungary ; and on the 5th of August 1716,
the battle of Carlovitz or Peterwardein was fought. The Othoman army was
completely defeated by Prince Eugene, and Ali Cumurgi was among the slain.
Another
1 History of tlie Byzantine Empire, i. 148. N’eauder,
History of the Christian Religion and Church, by Professor Torrey, iii. 541.
276
VENETIAN DOMINATION.
chap. iv. Othoman army, under Kara Mustapha Pasha, in conjunction with
the fleet under the capitan-pasha Djanum Khodja, had besieged Corfu about the
same time. That fortress was valiantly defended by Count Schulemburg, whom
Prince Eugene had recommended the republic of Venice to appoint general of its
troops, with the rank of field-marshal.1 The
energetic defence of Schulemburg, and the news of the defeat at Carlovitz,
forced the Turks to raise the siege of Corfu on the 19th of August. The events
of that siege belong to the history of Venice, and have very little connection
with that of the Greek nation. The siege of Corfu was the last glorious
military exploit in the annals of the republic, and it was achieved by a German
mercenary soldier. The defeat of the Othoman expedition enabled the Venetians
to regain possession of Santa Maura.
The following year was
distinguished by the siege and capture of Belgrade, which surrendered to Prince
Eugene on the 18th of August. The operations of the Venetians were confined to
the conquest of Butrinto, Previsa, and Vonitza, and to several indecisive naval
engagements in the Archipelago.
The victories of Prince
Eugene disposed the sultan to peace, which was concluded, after long
conferences, at Passarovitz, on the 21st of July 1718. Venice was compelled to
cede the Morea, Tinos, Egina, Suda, and Spinalonga to the sultan; but the
republic retained possession of the places it had conquered in Dalmatia, as
well as Santa Maura, Butrinto, Previsa, and Vonitza, and it received back
Cerigo. Austria acquired the fortresses of Temesvar, Belgrade, and Semendra.
1 The Duchess of Kendal, mistress of George I., was
the sister of Schulemburg.
VENETIAN ADMINISTRATION.
277
The facility with which
the Othoman arms had conquered Greece, and the feeble resistance which Venice
offered to an invading army, after the care with which the administration of
the Morea had been organised during a period of eighteen years, affords an
instructive lesson in the history of the government of foreign dependencies.
There is no sure basis of the subjection of any foreign nation, unless there be
a decided superiority of military power on the part of the rulers; and no
scientific administrative combinations can secure good government and an
equitable dispensation of justice, unless private individuals are courageous,
honest, deeply imbued with a love of truth and with self-respect. No moderation
and no political art alone will ever reconcile a subject people to foreign
domination, unless the sovereign authority connect its power with the
existence of popular municipal institutions. Indeed, no government can properly
fulfil its duties, nor rightly aid the progress of social civilisation, which
does not leave the population of each village, town, and district to exercise
an active share in the administration of its local affairs, in the direction
of its local improvements, and in the control of its local finances, absolutely
independent of the central government, and responsible only to the public
opinion of the country and to the law of the land. The fear which the Venetians
entertained of the Greek population of the Morea induced them to centralise all
power, and the corruption of the Venetian nobles made that centralisation the
cause of general discontent. It was the venality, rapacity, and cowardice of
the ruling classes and of the wealthy native archonts, far more than the
defects of the government, that destroyed the power of the republic in Greece.
Venice, like all
governments which persist in a tra-
278
VENETIAN DOMINATION.
chap. iv. ditional system of administration during a
long period of tranquillity, stood greatly in need of administrative reforms at
the commencement of the eighteenth century. Her system of commercial
restrictions and monopolies was so hostile to the interests of every Christian
power engaged in the trade of the Levant, as to prevent any State in the
Mediterranean from becoming her friend and ally. All foreign governments
regarded her with jealousy, and she was utterly destitute of all generous or
progressive social impulses from within. The government offices were regarded
as provisions for younger sons of the nobles. The military career was abandoned
to the provincial militia or to foreign mercenaries, for it entailed years of
service in distant garrisons, and offered slow promotion. Long service alone
could bring rank ; and if wealth came, it came when age had deprived its possessor
of those passions which, at Venice, rendered wealth valuable for their
gratification. On the other hand, the civil and judicial service admitted of
rapid promotion through favour and intrigue, while means could also be found
of making them conducive to the accumulation of illicit gains. The universal
practice of corruption, bribery, and peculation had dulled the force of
conscience, and all sense of honour appeared to be wanting in the civil
government during the eighteenth century. The young nobles who had it in their
power to share in a contract, or to sell a judicial sentence of importance,
might hope to return to Venice with wealth to enjoy those pleasures which
rendered her inhabitants notoriously the most luxurious, debauched, and idle
population in Europe. In a State where suspicion was the characteristic of the
government, dissipation the necessary occupation of society, and where the
feelings of the people were systemati-
VENETIAN ADMINISTRATION.
cally suppressed, it is
not surprising that selfishness and cowardice marked the conduct both of the
government and of individuals, nor that the republic of Venice was unable to
resist the forces of the Othoman empire.
A. D. 1684-1718.
CHAPTER V.
THE CAUSES AND EVENTS WHICH PREPARED THE GREEKS FOR INDEPENDENCE. A.D.
1718-1821.
Improvement in the condition of the Greeks during
the eighteenth century—Condition of Chios—Comparison of Chios with Tinos and
Naxos—Religious contests of the Catholics and Orthodox in the Othoman
empire—Character and influence of the Phanariots, or Greek officials in the
service of the Sultan—Treaty of Belgrade, a.d. 1739—War between Turkey and Russia
concluded by the peace of Kainardje, a.d. 1768-1774—Operations of the Russians in the Morea—Naval
operations and battle of Tchesme—Defeat of the Russians at Lemnos—Hassan Ghazi
exterminates the Albanian troops in the Morea—Establishes the authority of the
Capitan- Pasha in Maina—War between Turkey and Russia, a.d. 1787-1792— Insurrection of the Suliots, an Albanian
tribe in Epirus—Lambros Katsones and piracy in the Grecian seas—Ionian Islands
subject to the French Republic, to the Russians, and to the English— Change in
the social position of the Greeks at the commencement of the nineteenth
century—Influence of the Phanariots and of commerce on national
consolidation—Improvement of the modern Greek language a powerful instrument in
advancing national centralisation—Change in the nature of the Sultan’s power,
and decline of the Othoman empire—Conclusion.
After the treaty of Passarovitz, the material and
political position of the Greek nation began to exhibit many signs of
improvement. The cultivators of the soil obtained everywhere the rank of
freemen, and emancipated themselves from the peculiar condition, partaking of
slavery and serfage, which they had occupied until the complete extinction of
the tribute of Christian children. About the same time the increas-
t
CONDITION OF THE GREEKS.
281
ing importance of money
as tlie representative of the a. d.
1718-1821
value of all
services, as well as of every kind of pro- _____________________ ’
duce, introduced the
system of commuting the personal labour of the rayah, whether it was due to the
timariot or to the government, for the payment of a determinate portion of the
produce of the land, or for a fixed sum of money. The agricultural population
of Greece, in consequence of these changes, became, in the greatest part of the
country, the legal as well as the real proprietors of the soil ; and even
where the Christians remained as labourers of the lands belonging to Mohammedan
landlords, instead of working a fixed number of days on the land of the aga,
they now hired the land, and paid rent, in determinate proportions of produce
and money, according to agreement. The pashas, also, instead of compelling the
people, as formerly, to supply the materials for public works, and to labour in
person at their construction, now exacted payment of a sum of money, and
employed a contractor to execute the work. As the demoralisation of the Othoman
government increased, this manner of collecting and paying money became a means
of enriching officials and impoverishing the people, while the public works of
all kinds throughout the Othoman empire were allowed to fall into ruins.
Mussulman landlords also began to find so great a difficulty in obtaining
slaves, that slave-labour could no longer be profitably employed in
agriculture. Before the end of the seventeenth century, predial slavery had
disappeared in the European provinces of the Othoman empire south of the
Danube. The Greek peasant was everywhere a free labourer, and began to feel the
moral sentiments of a freeman. No power could now have enforced the collection
of a tribute of Greek children. The lowest class of the Greek population had
ascended so far in civilisation, that, by enforcing such a tax, the Othoman
282 PROGRESS TOWARDS INDEPENDENCE.
chap. v. government would have passed a sentence of
apostasy, exile, or extermination on the Greeks. The Greek peasant who remained
true to his religion would either have ceased to perpetuate his race, or he
would have escaped from his native land, and the soil of Hellas would have no
longer been identified with the Greek race, any more than the soil of Palestine
is with the race of Israel. To preserve their national existence, the Greeks
would have been compelled to become a people of exiles like the Jews.
The decline of the
military system and the corruption of the civil administration in the Othoman
empire, fortunately coincided with the improvement in the condition of the Greek
agricultural population. The conquest of the Morea by the Venetians, and the increasing
power of the Christian states whose territories bordered on Turkey, forced the
Othoman government to conciliate the goodwill of the rayahs, and the sultan’s
ministers began to recognise the necessity of granting the Christians a public
guarantee for the security of their personal liberty, and for the protection
of their property. But the practical concessions of the Porte were tardily
granted, and were generally obtained by the force of accidental circumstances
and of social changes, rather than by the progress of political intelligence
and a sense of justice. They were, consequently, too restricted in their
operation to remove many galling marks of subjection, or allay the national
opposition which increased communications with western and northern Europe
were spreading among the sultan’s Christian subjects. The opinion that the
power of the sultan possessed a divine sanction, because he was the protector
of the orthodox church, though taught by the Greek clergy, was no longer
implicitly admitted by the people. The English Eevolution of 1688 caused the
people over all Europe to discuss their
ft
CONDITION OF CHIOS.
283
rights. Other claims to
political authority were recog- a. d. nised as more valid than the legitimacy
of princes, and 17181821 apostolical succession was no longer held
to be an indispensable requisite in a teacher of Christianity.
The doctrine of the
supremacy of parliament invested the people with the right to make its own
laws, while the principles of religious liberty flowing from Protestantism
emancipated the human mind from ecclesiastical intolerance. In estimating the
effect produced on the Greeks by the new doctrines which began to ferment in
European society at the commencement of the eighteenth century, we must
remember that they were placed in contact with those who had suffered most from
feudal oppression and religious bigotry, and who were most inclined to question
the authority of existing institutions.
The good intentions of
the Porte towards its orthodox subjects were displayed in several measures
tending to improve their material condition. The inhabitants of the Morea
were exempt from the land-tax for two years after the conquest of that
province; and as soon as peace was established, the Porte invited colonists to
settle on the lands which still remained uncultivated, by exempting the
settlers from taxation for three years.
The island of Chios had
always retained the social superiority which it possessed under the prudent administration
of the mercantile company of the Jus- tiniani. Until the peace of Passarovitz,
its inhabitants had preserved their old system of collecting their land- tax by
the local authorities, and had annually remitted to the Othoman government a
fixed amount of tribute.
But, after the peace,
the grand vizier Ibrahim modified this system, and subjected the island to most
of the ordinary fiscal arrangements adopted with regard to the other Greek
islands. In 1727 the haratsh was
284
PROGRESS TOWARDS INDEPENDENCE.
chap. v. extended to the twenty-one villages engaged in the cultivation
of mastic, and three thousand and thirty-six additional tickets were added to
the capitation-tax of Chios.1 Still the inhabitants were the portion
of the Greek people which suffered the fewest evils from the Othoman domination
during the eighteenth century. The causes of their happiness and prosperity
during a long period, while the rest of their countrymen were poor and
discontented, deserve to be examined with attention. The first fact to be
observed is, that they were more honest and industrious than the other Greeks.
It was their moral and social superiority which enabled them to secure to
themselves the enjoyment of the fruits of their industry. Their island, it is
true, possesses some remarkable physical advantages. Almost every article it
produces is of superior quality, and when exported, obtained the highest price
then paid for such commodities in foreign markets. In the town of Chios, and in
the rich plain to the south, many remains of well-built houses may still be
seen, which bear on their ruined walls dates proving that they were constructed
during the eighteenth century, yet they rival in size and solidity the massive
structures of the Genoese domination, which were also destroyed in the
memorable sack of Chios in 1822. The mastic, the almonds, the lemons, the
preserved citrons, the conserve of roses, and the orange-flower water of Chios,
were highly esteemed by the luxurious in every province of the East. The
manufactures of silk and cotton, though so considerable as to be exported in
large quantities, were all worked in private families. Embroidery of every kind
was executed on scarfs and handkerchiefs by the same hands which had already
dyed them of the richest colours.
The superior moral
character of the Chiots was
1 Hammer, Histoire de VEmpire Othoman, xiv. 6, 33.
CONDITION OF CHIOS.
285
acknowledged throughout
the Levant. They were a. d.
• . . 1718-1821
alike
destitute of the insolence and rapacity of the ____________________ '
Phanariots, and of the
meanness and fraudulency of the trading Greeks of the continent. The marked
difference which existed between them and the rest of their countrymen was
observed by every traveller and foreign merchant. It was generally attributed
to the great privileges they were supposed to possess. This explanation was
suggested by the other Greeks, as an excuse for their own vices and dishonesty,
and it was adopted by strangers without sufficient examination.
It was said that
Suleiman the Great, or rather his son Selim II., after the island had been
subjected to the Othoman administration by Piala Pasha in 1566, had granted a
charter to the Chiots, by which their previous local usages were confirmed.
But this does not appear to have been the case. The supposed charter was
nothing more than the toleration of the fiscal system of the Justiniani,
obtained by the payment of an augmented tribute.1 The true
explanation of the moral superiority of the Chiots must be sought in their
family education. The boasted privileges which they enjoyed from the time of
Selim II., and which were so much envied by the other Greeks, were the
permission to repair their churches, the right to carry the cross in procession
through the town, and to perform many ecclesiastical ceremonies publicly,
besides the highly- valued privilege, retained by the wealthy, of riding horses
and wearing spurs. Their other privileges were the continuation of the fiscal
arrangements established by the Justiniani, and the election of the magistrates
who conducted the local administration. Sultan Selim II. may have confirmed the
existing system when he abolished the authority of the Justiniani, and his suc-
1 The
Justiniani had been tributary to the sultans, who were recognised as the
suzerains of Chios from the time of Mohammed II.
286 PROGRESS TOWARDS INDEPENDENCE.
chap. v. cessors appear to have frequently issued
ordinances, on their accession to the throne, enumerating and guaranteeing these
concessions. The oldest of these charters, which was preserved in the archives
of the municipality of Chios previous to the Greek Revolution, was that of
Suleiman II., the son of Ibrahim, who ascended the Othoman throne in 1687, and
his name gave rise to the opinion that the privileges of Chios dated from the
time of Suleiman the Great.1
The civil advantages
conceded to the Chiots applied rather to the city than to the agricultural
population of the island : they were chiefly fiscal; and similar concessions
were enjoyed by other Greek communities in the islands of the Archipelago, and
on the continent of Europe, sometimes even in a higher degree. The following
were the most important : The commutation of all taxes for a fixed sum of
money, paid to the Othoman authorities by Greek magistrates, who partitioned
the quota of each family and collected the amount. The right of electing these
magistrates by universal suffrage, and of electing in the same way native
judges to decide all commercial questions. The municipal government of Chios
consisted of five primates, of wThom three were chosen by the
Orthodox, and two by the Catholics ; the commercial tribunal consisted of four
judges, three of whom were Orthodox and one was a Catholic. But perhaps the
practical usage most conducive towards perpetuating the mutual good faith of
the Chiots, was the existence of notaries-public, whose acts were written in
Greek, and were received as official documents by the Othoman government.2 The
morality of the Chiots was not a consequence of
1 Vlastos,
XiaKa, ii. 84. Suleiman the Great, or the Legislator, is sometimes called
Suleiman II. by historians, who include Suleiman, the son of Bayezid I., in the
list of Othoman sultans.
2 For details relating to the municipal
administration of Chios, see Vlastos, Xia*a, ii. 152, 180.
TINOS AND NAXOS.
287
these privileges ; on
the contrary, it was that morality which gave them their value. Other Greek
communities enjoyed equal immunities. The Greeks of Constantinople, Rhodes,
and many islands of the Archipelago, were never subjected to the tribute of
Christian children ; and the inhabitants of Tinos and Naxos were governed by
their own laws and usages, like those of Chios, with the additional advantage
of not having a body of Mussulman proprietors resident in their islands.
The condition of the
people in Tinos and Naxos may be instructively compared with that of the
Chiots. In the three islands a part of the inhabitants had joined the Catholic
Church, and they had all three been long under Catholic domination. In Tinos,
as in Chios, the Catholics were as remarkable for their industry and honesty as
the Orthodox, but in Naxos they were distinguished by their idleness. Though
the island of Tinos was destitute of a good port, and far removed from any
advantageous market for its produce, and though its inhabitants had been long
cut off from many branches of trade with their immediate neighbours by the
commercial monopoly of the Venetians, still they were industrious and
contented. The soil of Tinos is not fertile, and the population was so great
that many young persons of both sexes quitted the island annually to lighten
the expenses of their family, and gain a small capital for themselves by a few
years’ of domestic service at Constantinople, Smyrna, and Saloniki, where their
probity insured them liberal wages and kind treatment in the families of
wealthy Christians. At home and abroad the Tiniots were remarkable for their
good conduct, frugality, and industry.
Naxos offered a complete
contrast to Tinos. Though it enjoyed all the advantages of a municipal government,
the influence of a small number of privileged
A. D.
1718-1821.
288
PROGRESS TOWARDS INDEPENDENCE.
chap. v. landed
proprietors, remains of tlie ducal aristocracy, rendered the local
administration a scene of intrigue and dissension. The Catholic nobles were
proud and luxurious; the Greek primates malicious and rapacious ; the people
of both churches lazy, superstitious, and false. This rich island only
contained about two- thirds of the population of the smaller and more barren
surface of Tinos ; and it paid little more than half the amount of taxation to
the Othoman government. The superiority of the Tiniots, like that of the
Chiots, was evidently caused by the moral education they received in their
earliest youth. The superiority was equally remarkable in the Catholic and the
Orthodox population, when compared w'ith the general mass of the Greek race.1
Chios did not possess
all the advantages of Tinos and Naxos, for it contained an Othoman fortress
with its garrison, and a considerable Turkish population. The prosperity of
Chios, under Othoman domination, must consequently be considered as entirely
due to the excellent education the inhabitants received for many generations in
the bosoms of their families, and not to any extraordinary fiscal privileges
and immunities the island enjoyed, nor to any peculiar favour with which it was
supposed to be treated by the sultans. Had the Chiots displayed the same spirit
of envy and dissension, and followed the same course of selfish intrigues as
the greater part of the Greeks, their peculiar privileges would only have
become an additional incitement to dispute, and would have entailed greater
misery on them than the direct operation of Turkish oppression. It was by union
in their municipality, and good faith in their private dealings, that the
Chiots rendered their
1 For some information concerning the state of Tinos
and Naxos at the end of the eighteenth century, see Olivier, Voyage dans
VEmpire Othoman, VEgypte, et la Perse, ii. 149, 163.
BIGOTRY OF THE CHIOTS.
289
ancient usages a
blessing to their island, and their fiscal system an advantage to the people,
instead of converting them into a means of gratifying the ambition of the wealthy
archonts, and of enriching a few primates, as was the case in most other Greek
communities. Among the Chiots industry was honoured, and the honest and active
citizen, whose personal exertions had gained him the respect of his fellow-
countrymen, was selected to conduct the municipal affairs and to fill the local
magistracies. Idleness was so universally despised that in Chios alone, of all
the Greek cities, there was no class of young archonts who considered it
ignoble to be usefully employed, and who spent their time in soliciting from
the Turks the post of tax-collectors, or in intriguing to be named primates by
the influence of a pasha, in order to obtain the means of enriching themselves
by acting as the instruments of fiscal extortion. The superior morality of the
Chiots in all the relations of life, their truth and honesty, rendered their
island for several centuries the most flourishing and the happiest portion of
Greece, alike under the Othoman as under the Genoese domination.
But the Chiots cannot be
expected to have been free from the social errors of the age in which they
lived. Keligious sincerity was then too closely united with bigotry for
orthodox Greeks to have learned that toleration was a Christian virtue. In
religious bigotry neither the Orthodox nor the Catholics of Chios yielded to
other Greeks, and their mutual animosity was repeatedly shown in violent and
unjust proceedings towards one another. But the fact that this bigotry was
cherished and aggravated by foreign interference must not be overlooked. The
Greek clergy were continually alarmed by the attempts of the French ambassador
at Constantinople to extend the authority of the
T
A. D
1718-1821.
290
PROGRESS TOWARDS INDEPENDENCE.
chap. v. Catholics, and to
obtain for them a superiority over the Greeks. In the year 1719, the
intervention of Count Virmont obtained for the Catholics the restoration of the
privileges which they had lost, after the expulsion of the Venetians in 1695.
Sultan Achmet III. issued a firman, recognising the rights of the Catholics to
participate in the privileges granted to all the inhabitants of the island by
the firman of Suleiman II., and reinstating them in the possession of the
church of St Nicholas.1 This concession was undoubtedly an act
of justice; but as it was conceded to the influence of a foreign power, whose
object was to obtain indirect authority in the Othoman empire, through the
instrumentality of the Catholics, and not to secure toleration for religious
opinions, to which it was more decidedly hostile than the Greeks themselves, it
was natural for the orthodox to fear an invasion of their rights as a
consequence of the success of the Catholics. The religious pretensions of the
Papal Church, and the ambitious projects of the King of France, warned the
orthodox to prepare for defending themselves against political aggression. In
1724, the French ambassador obtained permission from the Porte to build a new
chapel in the consulate at Chios; and under his protection the Catholic
missionaries displayed a degree of activity which alarmed the bigotry of the
Greeks, and roused their opposition. To counteract the eloquence of the
missionaries and the political influence of France, the Greeks in 1728
succeeded in persuading the Othoman government to defend orthodoxy by
prohibiting proselytism.2
The restless activity of
the French ambassadors at Constantinople sought to extend the influence of
France by circumscribing the rights of the Greek Church at Jerusalem. The
custody of the Sepulchre of
1 Hammer, Histoire, xiv. 23.
2 Ibid., xiv. 109, 200.
INTRIGUES OF FRANCE.
291
Christ, and of the other
holy places in and round Jerusalem, has been long a subject of dispute between
the Catholics and the Orthodox ; and from the time that both have been admitted
to a share of this custody, by the toleration of their Mussulman conquerors,
these two sects, instead of exercising their respective privileges in a
Christian spirit, have made the toleration of the Othomans a ground for
intrigues to encroach on each other’s rights. The aggression of the Catholics,
being protected by France, was more open and daring than that of the Orthodox,
until the Greeks obtained the protection of Kussia. At the period of which we
are treating, the proceedings of France concerning the Holy Places naturally
created a feeling of fierce hostility against the Catholics among the Greeks,
even more than among the other orthodox nations, and a contest of intrigue was
commenced at the Porte, which tended greatly to lower the Christians in the
opinion of the Mussulmans. Several French ambassadors, in order to obtain the
credit of establishing a permanent influence over a portion of the population
of the Levant, induced the Porte to grant concessions to the Catholics, w'hich
were, however, subsequently either neglected, or were again abrogated by other
concessions to the orthodox. The court of France displayed little delicacy, and
no sense of justice, in these intrigues. Constantinople, Jerusalem, Chios,
Crete, Cyprus, and the islands of the Archipelago, were made the scenes of
public tumults as well as of incessant discord.1 At
1 D’Ohsson, Tableau G6n6ral de VEmpire Othoman, v. 115, edit. Svo. Hammer, xiii. 184, corrected by page 228, mentions the banishment
of the Armenian patriarch to Chios, for opposing the influence of France, and
asserts that he was kidnapped by order of the French ambassador, and carried to
the isle of St Marguerite, near Antibes, where he died. But it appears that
this patriarch, whose name was Avedik, was not in reality taken to St
Marguerite, but was secretly transported from Marseilles to the abbey of Mont
St Michel, where he was intrusted to the safe keeping and zealous teaching of
the monks, in whose custody he remained completely secluded from the world for three
years. He was then removed to the Bastille. The terror of imprisonment for life
in that
A. 1).
1718-1821.
292 PROGRESS TOWARDS INDEPENDENCE.
chap. v. last, after the great diplomatic success which the Othoman
government obtained over Austria and Russia, by the treaty of Belgrade, the
sultan, to mark his satisfaction with the conduct of the Marquis of Yille-
neuve, the French ambassador who acted as mediator during the negotiations,
inserted articles in the French capitulations, on their renewal in the
following year, which were supposed to authorise the Catholics to take
possession of several of the Holy Places previously in the custody of the
Greeks. These concessions, whatever they were, appear never to have been
carried into execution, and the Greeks were subsequently confirmed in their
previous rights by more than one firman.
It is needless to
observe that religious zeal was not the cause of the activity of French
diplomacy, and it is evident that pecuniary interest, as well as ecclesiastical
authority, urged the orthodox to maintain rights which were extremely
profitable to the church. The orthodox, however, sincerely believed that the
most sacred ties of religion bound them to resist what they deemed to be unjust
attacks on their church by the Catholics. The rashness and levity with which
French diplomacy has attempted to make the superstitions and bigotry, inherent
in the question relating to the custody of the Holy Places, a criterion of
political influence in the Othoman empire at one time, and the utter neglect,
and even contempt, with which the subject has
celebrated place overcame his fortitude, and he declared himself a
convert to Catholicism, yet he was detained in France until his death. The
complaints of the sultan against this outrage on the law of nations caused the
French ambassador at Constantinople to deny the transaction, and he even
attempted to persuade the Porte that the Spaniards were the man-stealers who
had kidnapped the unfortunate Avedik. At last, to avoid a rupture with Turkey,
Louis XIV. formally announced that Avedik was dead, though he was still
languishing in a French prison. His death was universally believed to have
taken place long before it actually occurred. See a communication to the “
Athenaeum Fran- jais,” 5th January 1856, by G. Depping.
On the subject of these disputes concerning the Holy Places, compare Hammer,
ix. 283, 406; x. 67, 113; xi. 425; xii. 305, 461, 542.
t
PHANARIOTS. 293
been treated at another,
have been shown in our own time. After treating the subject with scorn for a
considerable time, in the year 1850 France thought fit again to open the
question. The history of the negotiations which ensued is not more edifying
than the record of earlier and equally futile pretensions ; but on this occasion
Russia, availing herself of the proceedings of France, mingled in the dispute
as protector of the orthodox. New complications were introduced into the
discussion concerning the relations between the Porte and its orthodox
subjects, and the Emperor Nicholas deeming the moment favourable for a new
encroachment on Turkey, Europe has been plunged into a bloody war.1
The ecclesiastical privileges which Mohammed II. granted to the Greek
Church, and to the Patriarch as the chief of the Greek nation, enabled the
laity gradually to acquire a recognised position in the public administration
of the Othoman empire. The importance of ruling their Greek subjects with
justice as well as firmness, was felt by the most powerful sultans, and by the
ablest grand viziers; while the complicated fiscal relations of a numerous
population widely dispersed, and possessing a monopoly of many necessary
branches of industry, induced the Porte to employ Greeks as useful subordinate
instruments in the fiscal administration. Soon after the conquest, Greek
archonts and
1 A report of the English consul at Jerusalem, to the
Secretary of the Foreign Department, dated 27th October 1852, shows how far
diplomatic intrigue can lose sight of true dignity, and to what degree France
must have degraded the Christian character in the opinion of the Mussulmans. “
After the Corban Bairam festivals were over, and ceremonial visits fully
exchanged, the commissioner, Afif Bey, with a suite of the local effendis, met
the three patriarchs, Greek, Latin, and Armenian, in the Church of the
Resurrection, just in front of the Holy Sepulchre itself, and under the great
dome; there they were regaled with sherbets, confectionary, and pipes, at the
expense of the three convents, who vied with each other in making luxurious
display on the occasion. M. Botta, the French consul, was the only consular
person present.”—Correspondence respecting the Rights and Privileges of the
Latin and Greek Churches in Turkey, presented to Parliament 1854, (part i. page
45).
A. D.
1718-1821.
294
PROGRESS TOWARDS INDEPENDENCE.
. primates were employed
by the Turks as collectors of the land-tax, and as custom-house officers. At
length, during the seventeenth century, the increased importance of the
diplomatic relations of the Porte with the Christian powers opened a new
political career to the Greeks, and gave rise to the formation of a class of
officials in the Othoman service called Phanariots, from their making the
quarter of Constantinople around the Patriarchate, called the Phanar, their
place of residence. The higher clergy and wealthy Greek primates had long dwelt
in this quarter, in order to enjoy security under protection of the immunities
granted to the Patriarch. The wealthiest and most influential Greeks generally
acted as fiscal-agents of the church, as well as tax-gatherers for the Porte.1
Before the
administration of the celebrated grand vizier Achmet Kueprily, the Greek
officials employed as secretaries in the Othoman service were ranked as little
better than literary menials. But after the conquest of Candia, Achmet
conferred on his secretary, the Chiot Panayotaki, an official rank in the
Othoman administration, by creating for him the post of Dragoman of the Porte.
Panayotaki’s devotion to the grand vizier, and his fidelity to the interests of
the sultan, enabled him to render his place one of great political influence.
The Porte subsequently created a second officer of a similar nature, attached
to the capitan- pasha, called the Dragoman of the Fleet, who soon exercised
direct influence over the Greeks employed in the naval service, and in the
islands and continental districts where the taxes were collected by the
capitan- pasha. The existence of these two offices laid the foundation of the
power of the Phanariots in the Othoman empire.
1 Zallony, Essni sur les Fanarioies, 157, (note
concerning the Patriarchal Treasury).
INFLUENCE OF PHANARIOTS. 295
The successor of
Panayotaki was Alexander Mavro- cordatos, also a Chiot. He distinguished
himself by his able conduct during the conferences preceding the treaty of
Carlovitz, and thereby added much to the influence of his office.1
These two Chiots gained the confidence of the grand viziers they served by
displaying more truth and honesty than the Othoman ministers had ever found
in the false and intriguing Greek
o o
officials, who were
educated under the immediate influence of the patriarchate in the Phanar. The
moral superiority, imbibed from the family education of Chios, did more to gain
a political position for the Greeks in the Othoman administration than the
learning of the Byzantine archonts, and the privileges of the orthodox clergy.
The servility and meanness of the Constantinopolitans could not gain the
authority readily conceded to the truth and fidelity of the Chiots.
The office of Dragoman
of the Fleet became the first step towards obtaining the highest offices
granted to Christians. His duty was to act as secretary to the capitan-pasha,
and to see that the tribute of the Greek islands was regularly paid. His
favour, and the extent of his political influence, depended on his activity and
ability in obtaining large presents and illegitimate profits for the
capitan-pasha, and in enforcing the regular payments due to the imperial
treasury. His
1 Alexander Mavrocordatos was the son of a
silk-merchant of Chios, who married the daughter of Skarlatos, a man who had
made an immense fortune as purveyor of beef for the sultan’s palace and the
public markets. Mavrocordatos studied medicine in Italy, and wrote a treatise
in Latin 011 the circulation of the blood, which has been much praised, as well
as several works in Greek. He was a proficient in the Greek, Latin, Italian,
French, Sclavonian, Turkish, Persian, and Arabic languages. Before his
appointment as Dragoman of the Porte, he exercised the charge of grand
logothetes or treasurer of the patriarchate of Constantinople.—Vlastos, XiaKd,
ii. 93. The families of Mavrocordatos, Kalliinakis, Ipsilantis, and Ivaradjas,
which received the title of Prince from holding the office of Voivode in
Vallachiaor Moldavia, are all descended from doctors in medicine. The
protection of Turks of rank, whom they had served professionally, opened for
them an entrance into the political career.—Hammer, llistoire, xvi. 188.
Zallony, 239, gives the origin of several Phanariot families, I know not on
what authority.
A. D.
1718-1821.
206
PROGRESS TOWARDS INDEPENDENCE.
own interest, and even
his personal security, made him the oppressor of the Christians, whom he might
secretly wish to protect. Unless he accumulated money for himself, he could
never hope to purchase the dignity of Voivode of Vallachia or Moldavia, where
he could feel a greater degree of security. His power as agent of the
capitan-paslia was almost absolute. His accusation was alone sufficient to
send any Greek to the galleys without trial. Such power has never been possessed
by a slave without being abused.
The extension of the
power of Greek officials in the Othoman administration was attended with both
good and bad consequences to the nation. The desire of literary instruction
became more general, the sphere of Greek ideas was enlarged, and the bigotry
cherished by the exclusive power of the higher clergy was diminished. But, on
the other hand, the great profits gained by the illegal exercise of the power
intrusted to the higher Greek officials increased the corruption of the class,
and made the name of Phanariot, or Greek, in the Turkish service, a byword for
the basest servility, corruption, and rapacity. A numerous body of Greeks,
belonging to the higher classes, became interested in supporting the Othoman
domination, since, by acting as the instruments of Turkish oppression, they
could five luxuriously and accumulate wealth.
In the year 1716 a new
career of wealth, influence, and power was opened to the Phanariots. The Porte,
in order to strengthen its authority in Vallachia, when it was about to
commence war with Austria, determined to subject the native population to the
domination of Greek officials, who were found to be servile instruments of
Turkish tyranny. Nicolas Mavrocor- datos, the eldest son of Alexander, was
appointed the first Phanariot voivode of Vallachia. He had already filled the
office of voivode of Moldavia, to which he
INFLUENCE OF THE P1IANARIOTS.
297
liad been appointed in
1710. The government of Phanariot voivodes, or fiscal-agents of the Porte, in
these two principalities, dates from this period. Like the Phanariot influence
in the Othoman administration at Constantinople, it was founded by a Chiot
family. Three sons of Alexander Mavrocordatos, Nicolas, Constantine, and John,
held the offices of dragoman of the Porte, of voivode of Moldavia, and of
voivode of Val- lachia, at different times. The Greeks gained neither honour
nor permanent national advantage by their power in the Transdanubian provinces.
Their administration was more corrupt and oppressive than that of the Turks in
the adjoining pashaliks. The Phana- riots, intent only on accumulating money,
and enjoying their power, rendered the native inhabitants of the
Principalities the most wretched portion of the sultan’s subjects. No other
Christian race in the Othoman dominions was exposed to so long a period of
unmitigated extortion and cruelty as the Romanian population in these unfortunate
provinces. It is the sad duty of history to record that the Othoman Turks were
better masters to the various races they conquered, than the Phanariot Greeks
to the fellow-Christians committed to their care and protection. A detailed examination
of the vices of the Greek administration in Vallachia and Moldavia does not lie
within the sphere of this work ; but it would form an important object of
inquiry in any complete history of the political condition of the Greek race.1
Our space compels us to notice only the general influence of the Phanariot
class on the national character.
A considerable portion
of the Greek population was drawn within the corrupting influence of official
employments under the Turks. In this career, fraud and
1 See the liat of the Phanariot voivodes of Vallachia
and Moldavia, in Appendix, III.
A. D.
1718-1821.
298 PROGRESS TOWARDS INDEPENDENCE.
chap. v. violence were
short paths to wealth, and wealth generally secured impunity for crime. The
four great Phanariot offices were those of Dragoman of the Fleet,
O 7
Dragoman of the Porte,
Voivode of Moldavia, and Voivode of Vallachia. Each of these officers was surrounded
by a crowd of minor officials, who looked to him for protection and promotion.
They had the disposal of many offices which insured large profits. They could
appoint their dependents collectors of taxes, farmers of public revenues,
fisheries, and saltworks, and secure to them the profits of many local
monopolies and government contracts. To such an extent had the corruption
nourished by this system proceeded, that, in the earliest years of the
nineteenth century, the sums extorted by Phanariot officials from the Greek
population illegally, were supposed to equal the whole haratsh due from the
inhabitants of Greece. The profits of this iniquitous service invited the
Greeks, from the most distant provinces, to enter the households of the
leading Phanariots, who became virtually princes of the nation; for even their
domestics might look forward to attaining the very highest honours which were
conferred on Christians. In a government where purchased slaves were habitually
elevated to the rank of grand vizier and capitan-pasha, a Greek pipe- bearer,
or household doctor, might, without presumption, aspire to become Bey of
Vallachia. The Phanariot instruments of the Othoman administration extended
their influence over all Greece, and connected the interests of a numerous
class with their own, which was identified with the Turkish domination.
Political feelings, hostile to Greek independence, and to all sympathy with the
Christian powers of Europe, were thus created in a numerous class of civilians
at the time when the ecclesiastical authority, which had previously propagated
these dispositions, began to decline.
INFLUENCE OF THE PIIANARIOTS.
299
This Greek official
aristocracy, accidentally formed by the Turks, was quite as anti-national in
its selfish policy, as the ecclesiastical hierarchy established by Mohammed
II., to consolidate his authority over the orthodox. While the Greeks continued
to be dependent on the patriarchate in all matters relating to their
ecclesiastical and religious rights, everything connected with the civil and
fiscal administration was of necessity addressed either to the Dragoman of the
Porte, or to the Dragoman of the Fleet: the first acting as a
o o
general secretary of
state, and the second being more especially charged with the business of the
navy and the Greek islanders.
Though the influence of
the Phanariots is acknowledged to have exercised a demoralising effect on the
character of the Greek nation, some persons have considered that the nation
was fully indemnified for this evil by the impulse which it gave to education.
They appear strangely to undervalue morality, and extravagantly to
over-estimate the advantages of knowledge. Some degree of literary instruction
was necessary to enable the dependents of a great Phanariot official to attain
many offices in his gift. The desire of learning was consequently greatly
extended among the people, but, unfortunately, the very object for which it was
sought prevented its producing any moral improvement on the national
character. Fortunately for the Greeks, other cotemporary causes tended also to
disseminate education from a purer source, and by revealing to the people
some idea of the vicious nature of the society by which they were governed,
whether Christian or Mohammedan, awakened a conviction that, until the national
independence was established, no permanent improvement could be effected in the
moral condition of the people.
The misfortunes which
attended the wars of Sultan
A. D.
1718-1821.
300 PROGRESS TOWARDS INDEPENDENCE.
chap. v. Achmet III. against Austria and Persia, and
the additional weight of taxation caused by the disorder that pervaded every
branch of the administration during his reign, produced at last an insurrection
of the janissaries and populace of Constantinople. The great successes over
Eussia and Venice, which had marked the early years of Achmet’s reign, were forgotten,
and in the year 1730 he was compelled to cede the throne to his nephew, Mahmoud
I. This revolution modified in some degree the government of the empire. The
influence of the officers of the sultan’s household on the public
administration became more direct, and was more openly exercised. The power of
the grand vizier was controlled by the authority of the Kislar-aga (chief of
the black eunuchs). The decisions of experienced statesmen, and the guidance
of traditional maxims of policy which moderated the action of arbitrary power,
were set aside by the rash ignorance of slaves, wThose secluded
position deprived them of patriotic feelings, and whose nature and occupation
rendered them insensible even to the ordinary sympathies of mankind. This chancre
was not disadvantageous to
O O
the Christian subjects of the sultan. The Phanariots and the clergy found
it easier to purchase the support of a menial in the Serai than to gain the
esteem of a pasha.
In the year 1739 the
successes of the grand vizier against Austria enabled the Porte to conclude the
treaty of Belgrade, which restored that frontier fortress to the sultan.1
A treaty concluded wTith Russia at the same time obliged the Empress
Anne to restore Chozim, and destroy the fortifications of Asof. These treaties,
concluded under the mediation of France, were followed
1 See the
opinion of Marshal Munich on this treaty, so dishonourable to Austria, in his
letter to Prince Lobkovitz.—Memoires Ilistoriques, Politiques, et Mil it (tires
sur la Pussie, par le General de Manstein, ii. 32, and before, page 7, note,
and page 11, note 2.
T
INTRIGUES OF RUSSIA.
301
by fiscal arrangements in Vallachia, established by Constantine
Mavrocordatos, which greatly increased the influence of the Phanariots in
Vallachia and Moldavia, added to the number of Greek officials in these provinces,
and prepared the way for the corrupt influence of Russian diplomacy on the
Greek population.1 From this period the court of St Petersburg began
to make use of Greek agents for thwarting the Othoman
© O
administration, and undermining the sultanas power, in every province of
his empire inhabited by the orthodox.
As early as the reign of Peter the Great, the statesmen of Kussia had
endeavoured to employ the religious prejudices of the Greeks, and their
devotion to the ecclesiastical establishment of the orthodox church, as a
means of creating a political attachment to the Czar. The disastrous campaign
of Peter on the Pruth checked for a time the extension of Russian influence ; but
the government of the empresses Anne and Elizabeth employed agents in various
parts of European Turkey to prepare the Christians for taking up arms, should
the court of St Petersburg consider it advisable to carry into execution the
plan of attack on the Othoman empire, which Marshal Munich had recommended
before the conclusion of the treaty of Belgrade, and to which he subsequently
directed the attention of the Empress Catherine II.2
The vanity and ambition of Catherine II., the hope of conquering Constantinople,
and the wish to gratify
1 Some of
the measures of Constantine Mavrocordatos were beneficial to the people, but
their advantages were neutralised by the rapacity of the Greek officials and
tax-gatherers, with whom he filled the province.—Vogalnitchan, Jlistoire de la
Valachie et de la Moldacie, 390; Memolres 11 istoriques et Gio- graphiques sur
la Valachie, par Gendral B. (Baur), 43.
2 Helladius,
Status prcesens Eccle&iat Graicce Epistola dedicatoria, 4. Rulhiere,
Jlistoire de VAnarchie de Pologne, (Euvres, i. 158, edition of 1S19.
Before the peace of Belgrade, Munich aspired at being appointed hospodar
of Moldavia, bymeansof the influenceof the Empress Anne.—M6moires 11
istoriques, Politiques, et Militaircs sur la liussie, par le General de Maustein,
tom. ii. 96.
A. D.
1718-1821.
302
PROGRESS TOWARDS INDEPENDENCE.
chap. v. her lover Gregory Orloff, who expected to
gain a principality for himself in ancient Hellas, all operated in conjunction
with the hostile relations with Turkey, caused by the invasion of Poland, to
revive the projects of Russia in favour of a Greek insurrection. Agents were
employed to examine the resources of the country, and to prepare the Greeks for
acting in subserviency to the policy of the court of St Petersburg. Unfortunately
for Greece, the intrigues of Catherine II., and the wild enthusiasm of a few
adventurers, involved the nation in a course of conduct which has too often
diverted it from the steady pursuit of its own advancement. The extension of
the local privileges of the people, the development of a system of moral as
well as literary education, and the improvement of manufactures and commerce,
were neglected to pursue schemes of visionary sovereignty, which were to be
attained by the conquests and to depend 011 the generosity of Russia. Much
capital was diverted from profitable employment, many active citizens were
turned away from occupations of honest industry, the attention of the
provincial Greeks was distracted from the local spheres of action in which they
were beginning to control the power of the Othoman administration, and an
artificial national ambition was fostered with objects so vague, that it could
only act as subservient to the more definite plans of Russian policy.
The intrigues of Russia,
which have inflicted many misfortunes on the Greeks, were actively commenced in
1764. Chandler, who visited Greece in 1767, heard the people frequently talk of
their approaching deliverance from the Othoman domination through the
assistance they were to receive from Russia.
In order to support an
insurrection of the Greeks, and render a successful revolution of the orthodox
subjects of the sultan subservient to her project of
RUSSIAN INTRIGUES.
303
transferring their
allegiance to herself, Catherine II. sent a large naval forcc to the
Mediterranean. Her agents prepared the maritime population to take up arms when
this fleet should appear in the Levant. The inhabitants of Montenegro, a
Sclavonian tribe to the north of Albania, did not wait even for this support.
A Greek captain of artillery in the Russian service, named Papasoglou, was
sent by Gregory Orloff to establish relations with Maina in 17GG.1
One of his agents, named Stephen, a young monk wtLlo was employed
to aid the intrigues of Russia, soon acted a conspicuous part in Montenegro,
where he obtained extraordinary influence by his eloquence and enthusiastic
demeanour, and contrived that a vague and mysterious report should be spread,
which designated him as Peter III., the murdered husband of Catherine II. In
consequence of his exhortations and promises, the Montenegrins took up arms
against the Turks in 1767, but before any support arrived from Russia, they
were assailed by the forces of all the neighbouring pashas, and the
insurrection was suppressed. The monk Stephen, laying aside his imperial
pretensions, succeeded in making his escape on board a Russian ship, which
arrived too late to assist the insurrection.
The visit of Papasoglou
to Maina had been' productive of mutual promises only, for the Maniates had
little to gain by taking up arms, unless Russia would pay them, or assist them
to plunder the rest of the Morea. At Kalamata he had more success. He there
drew into his plans Benaki, the richest Greek in the Morea, an influential
kodgia basha or primate, who was habitually consulted by the pasha, and
generally respected by the Mohammedans. Benaki also possessed con-
1 The Greek name of Papasoglou was Gregorios
Papadopoulos. He is also known by his Maniate synonym, Papapoulo. For the
events in Montenegro, and the extent of the Russian intrigues in the Levant at
this time, see Rulhiere, vol. iii. pp. 294, 358.
A. D.
1718-1821.
304? PROGRESS TOWARDS
INDEPENDENCE.
chap. v. siderable
influence in Maina, from being one of the largest purchasers and exporters of
its produce. Moved by ambitious hopes, and ignorant of the combinations of
course, and the relative military power of nations, his patriotism made him the
dupe of his vanity. He persuaded himself that a primate of Messenia was a man
of importance in the scale of nations. Through his influence several Greek
primates were induced to form a conspiracy to aid the projects of Eussia, and
they were persuaded to sign, and place in the hands of Papasoglou, an
engagement that, as soon as the Russian forces appeared in the Morea, they
would call to arms one hundred thousand Greeks. The value of this engagement
was magnified by Papasoglou in his communications to the cabinet of St
Petersburg, and the preparations for supporting the insurrection in Greece were
actively pursued. Alexis Orloff, his brother Feodor, and Tamara, a young
officer from the Ukraine, who had increased the Philhellenic enthusiasm he had
imbibed with a classical education by a tour in Greece, were sent to Italy to
direct the conspiracy, and prepare for the arrival of the Russian forces.
Maruzzi, a Greek banker of Venice, was made a marquis, and intrusted with the
monetary transactions in the Adriatic and Greece. The hopes of Catherine II.
rose so high in 1768, that even Voltaire contemplated the probability of
Constantinople soon becoming the capital of the Russian empire.1
The Porte was aware of
the rebellious disposition of its Greek subjects ; nor was it entirely ignorant
of the intrigues of Russia, though it obtained no knowledge of the conspiracy
of Benaki. With its usual carelessness it neglected to take any precautions,
induced partly by its contempt for the cowardice of the Greeks,
1 Rulhiere, iii. 334. Voltaire, Correspondance atec VTmperatrice de
JRussie, 15th Nov. 1768.
AUSTRIAN MINISTER INSULTED.
305
and partly from a
conviction that it was impossible for Russia to send any force from the Baltic
into the Mediterranean. The senate of Venice understood the danger better ;
and when the presence of the Orloffs withdrew the veil from the Russian
schemes, the republic deemed it necessary to recommend them to select some
other place of residence in order to secure its neutrality. It was only the
ignorant insolence which characterised the intercourse of the Othoman
government with the Christian powers, which prevented it obtaining proofs of
the complicity of Russian agents in exciting the Greeks to rebellion at the
very time when the court of St Petersburg was giving the sultan the strongest
assurances of its wish to maintain peace. When the Russian armies, therefore,
openly violated in Poland the engagements contracted by the treaty of the
Pruth, engagements which had been renewed by that of Belgrade, it was natural
for the sultan to prefer open war to the continuance of a peace which Russia
employed to make conquests in Poland, and in preparations for causing
insurrections in Turkey. The sultan declared war with Russia to defend the
integrity of Poland; but the Christian population of his dominions felt that
the real object of the war would be to preserve the integrity of the Othoman
empire.
The commencement of this
war affords an example of the imprudence with which European diplomatists
compromised their official character, and the political interests of nations
intrusted to their care, in order to indulge the prurient curiosity which is a
common vice of their profession. The sandjak-sherif, or sacred standard of
Mahomet, was unfolded at Constantinople on the 27th of March 176.9.1
When this banner is
A. D.
1718-1821.
1 D’Olissen, Tableau de VEmpire Othoman, i. 261, fol. edit. U
306 PROGRESS TOWARDS INDEPENDENCE.
ciiap. v. displayed the
Mussulmans deem it unholy for a Christian to gaze on it; but the Austrian
internuncio, Bro- gnard, thinking that his impertinent curiosity would be protected
by his diplomatic character, resolved to insult the prejudices of the people by
making it a boast that he had seen this sacred banner of Islam. To effect his
object, he placed himself, accompanied by his wife, four daughters, his
secretaries, and interpreters, in a house which overlooked the line of the procession
as it passed to the Top-Kapoussi, by which the Othomans had stormed
Constantinople. From this position the party was driven by the Imam of the
quarter ; but the German diplomatist, with more obstinacy than judgment,
established himself in the house of an Armenian in the neighbourhood, hoping to
obtain a view of the procession by concealing himself in a barber’s shop. The
Turks were, however, determined to prevent any Christian from seeing the
sandjak- sherif, unless when opposed to them in battle ; they watched,
therefore, the proceedings of the Germans, and when the cry arose that the holy
standard approached, their enthusiasm was inflamed with indignation.
Superstition led many to fear that the Christians might use enchantments which
would cause the defeat of the Othoman armies, and the bigotry of all persuaded
them that it was a duty to punish the insolence and malice of the Austrian
infidels. The tumult was commenced by the Turkish women, who had assembled in
great numbers to see the procession pass. The populace of the quarter needed
little excitement. The doors of the barber s shop were burst open, the minister
and his secretaries severely beaten, the veils and scarfs were torn from the
necks of his wife and daughters, and the party, after being robbed of their
jewels and gold lace, were only allowed to escape with torn clothes. All the
shops belonging to Christians in
RUSSIANS IN MAINA.
307
the same street were
broken open and plundered.1 The a. d.
• • 1718-1891
Othoman
police had some difficulty in saving the in- _____________________ T
quisitive diplomatist
from death, and his wife and children from being turned into the street without
clothes. The foolish Austrian wrote to his court that one hundred and fifty
innocent persons were killed, and one thousand wounded, in consequence of his
misconduct; but his misplaced vanity is said to have exaggerated the results of
his imprudence.2
The first division of
the Russian fleet under Spirit- off, a brave officer, but without much naval
experience, arrived in the Mediterranean towards the end of 1 769, and passed
the winter at Port Mahon refitting and embarking stores and provisions. The
Turks were alarmed, the Greeks emboldened, at this new crisis of the war. Early
in 1770 one squadron of the fleet visited Leghorn, to embark the sailors
collected by the Orloffs and their agents ; while another, under the command of
Feodor Orloff, having been refused entrance into the port of Malta, sailed on
to Greece.
This division,
consisting of three ships of the line and two frigates, with five hundred
troops on board, anchored at Port Vitylo in Maina. The Maniates, who expected
to see ten thousand Russians open the campaign, were disconcerted on seeing
the small corps which was disembarked in their country to commence an invasion
of the Othoman empire. The defective armament of the large ships, the want of
small vessels and of all means of transport, the neglect to bring a supply of
field artillery and ammunition proper for the wants of a Greek army,
discouraged the Maniates so much that they displayed a decided aversion to take
up arms. Rut a sum of money judiciously distributed among the chiefs, the hopes
of obtaining plunder in the rich plains of Messenia and Laconia, the
distribution of
1 Hammer, Ilistoire, xvL 203. 2 Ibid.
308 PROGRESS TOWARDS INDEPENDENCE.
ciiap. v. arms and ammunition to volunteers, the confidence that they
could defend their mountains against the Turks whatever might happen, and the
assurance that Alexis Orloff would soon arrive with a powerful fleet and
numerous army, at last induced the Maniates to join the Russians, on condition
that Feodor, following the example of Morosini, should immediately lay siege to
Coron, which was not prepared to offer a long resistance.
The first acts of the
Russians in Greece were injudicious, and awakened feelings of distrust in the
breasts of the people. Feodor Orloff would only subsidise and arm those who
swore allegiance to the Empress of Russia, and engaged to become subjects of
Catherine II. The Greeks, who had aspired at forming an independent state, now
perceived that even a successful insurrection would only make them the slaves
of the Czarina, instead of the rayahs of the sultan ; and they knew that materially
they would be no great gainers by the change. The wTar, therefore,
became one for vengeance, not for liberty, and the Greeks of the Morea at this
time did not feel the Othoman yoke so oppressive as to cause a national
movement. Many, however, joined the Russians; it sufficed that they were
Christians warring against their Mussulman masters. In Crete the Sphakiots
flew to arms, and sent a body of men to Maina. Some recruits also joined Feodor
from the Ionian Islands, but his army remained insignificant in number in spite
of all his exertions and promises. The unarmed Moreots were overwhelmed with
terror when they compared the force of the Russians with that which they knew
the Turks were preparing to pour into the peninsula. Benaki crept secretly to
the Russian camp, and, when he had seen the force on which he was to rely for
expelling the Turks from the Morea, returned to Kalamata in
ft
OPERATIONS IN THE MOREA. 309
despair, and attempted
to conceal the part lie had taken in the conspiracy, at least until the arrival
of the main body of the fleet.
The Russians had counted
on the assistance of armies of Greeks, but they found some difficulty in
collecting three thousand men. These Greek troops were divided into two
legions. The command of the eastern or Spartan legion was conferred 011
Antonios Psaros, a young supercargo of Mykone, who showed some military
aptitude.1 He marched to Passava, which he found deserted, plundered
the Mussulman district of Bardunia, and took possession of Misithra, where the
Maniates massacred numbers of the Turkish population, and plundered a part of
the town, without respecting the houses of the Christians. Psaros succeeded
with difficulty in establishing order; he protected the Mussulmans, and formed
a senate of Sparta, composed of the bishop and the primates, which acted as a
governing commission. The legion was increased by enrolling three thousand
Moreot recruits, to whom he promised regular pay, and among whom he attempted
to introduce regular discipline. A chosen body was clad in Russian uniforms,
which had been brought for the purpose of making the Turks believe that a
considerable Russian force had already arrived in the Morea.
The western or Messenian
legion, under the command of Prince Dolgoruki, marched into Kalamata without
opposition, and ravaged the property of the Turks in the plain of Messenia. All
the Mohamme-
1 Antonios
Ps<aros was one of the proprietors of a vessel from Mykone which visited
Taganrok before the war broke out, and who was drawn to St Petersburg by the
general encouragement given to adventurers from Greece. Eton says he was a
livery servant, but Orloff soon took him under his protection, and he probably
only wore a lively while attached to Orloff’s household. In the memorial of the
Greek deputies to Catherine II. in 1790, he is called a man sprung from the
dregs of the people, and abhorred by the whole Greek nation. Calumny, however,
has always been too prevalent in Greece for us to attach much importance to
such phrases.—Eton, Survey of the Turkish Empire, 359.
a. n. 1718-1821.
310 PROGRESS TOWARDS INDEPENDENCE.
chap. v. dans who fell into the hands of the Greeks were put to death,
and Dolgoruki advanced to the town of Arkadia, which was surrendered by the
Turks, and made the headquarters of this legion.
In the mean time Feodor
Orloff, with his four hundred Russian troops and a motley army of Maniates,
Sphakiots, lonians, Montenegrins, and Sclavonians, besieged Coron. The
operations of the Russians offer a discreditable contrast with the exploits of
the Venetians ; but Russia had no Morosini. The batteries raised by Feodor
were ill-constructed and inefficient. The fleet was anchored too far off to aid
the attack, and the Othoman garrison, though consisting of only four hundred
men, soon perceived that they could watch the proceedings of their besiegers
and wait for succours without alarm. Two months were wasted in futile
operations. Dissensions broke out between the Russians and the Greeks. Feodor
accused Mavromichalis, the leading Maniat chief, who had entered into the pay
of Russia, of want of courage ; Mavromichalis replied, by ridiculing the
pretensions of Feodor as a general, and exposing his ignorance of the art of
war. Alexis Orloff arrived towards the end of April, and finding that his
brother had made no progress in the siege, deemed it advisable to abandon this
first enterprise of the Russians in Greece, and concentrate his forces at
Navarin, which had capitulated to a Russian force under General Hannibal.1
The war, so far, had
only been remarkable for the incapacity with which the Russian officers had
acted. Bands of armed Greeks from the Venetian islands had landed in the Morea,
where their conduct had been that of robbers, not soldiers. Defenceless Turks
had been murdered, villages had been plundered, but
1 General
Hannibal was a mulatto ; his father was a negro slave of Peter the Great.
PROCEEDINGS OF ALEXIS ORLOFF.
311
no battle had been
fought. The first success obtained by the Greeks alone was at Missolonghi, and
it was not stained by any act of cruelty. A report reached the inhabitants that
Coron had capitulated to the Russians. They immediately flew to arms, and the
primates ordered the few Turks who resided in the place to retire to Patras.
They then took possession of the small insular town of Anatolikon, and sent a
deputation to Feodor Orloff, to place themselves under the protection of
Russia, and request assistance. Feodor neglected their solicitations. In the
mean time a band of Dulcigniot corsairs, hastening to the assistance of Patras,
and observing the defenceless condition of Missolonghi, attacked the place,
massacred a part of the inhabitants after a desperate resistance, regained
possession of both Missolonghi and Anatolikon, and entered Patras in triumph.
The greater part of the Missolonghiots had embarked their families in small
vessels, with which they escaped to the Venetian islands.
The operations of Alexis
Orloff were planned on a more extensive scale than those of Feodor, but they
were not carried into execution with greater vigour. He published a
proclamation, calling upon the Greeks to take up arms in defence of their
liberty and religion, yet he treated those only as friends who would swear
allegiance to Russia ; and he showed so much indifference to truth in his
conduct, and so little humanity to his allies in performing his duty as a
general, as to gain few friends.1 Prince Dolgoruki was ordered to
besiege Modon, Psaros to march 011 Tripolitza, and a third corps was pushed
forward from Messenia by Leondari, to join Psaros in the great Arcadian plain.
The junction being effected, Psaros found himself at the head of an army of
fifteen thou-
A. I).
1718-1821.
1 Rulhiere, iii. 402.
312
PROGRESS TOWARDS INDEPENDENCE.
chat.
v.
sand men, and a single battle was expected to give the Russians possession of
the centre of the Morea.
The Othoman government
had been more active than the Russian generals, and the measures adopted for
defending the Morea were better concerted than those for its conquest. The
native Mussulmans were ordered to retreat on Tripolitza, where they formed,
when united, a strong body of cavalry, which commanded all the communications.
The vizier of the Morea was Mehemet Emin, who had been deprived of the office
of grand vizier for advising Sultan Mustapha to avoid war with Russia.1
He was now eager to prove that his wisdom in counsel did not diminish his
energy in action; but as he was not a soldier, he could only direct the plan of
operations, the execution of which he was compelled to intrust to others. He
established his headquarters at Nauplia, in order to facilitate the
transmission of military stores to the interior of his province, and to hasten
the arrival of succours, particularly of a powerful body of Albanians, which
was rapidly advancing towards the isthmus of Corinth, and for which he took
care to prepare provisions at every station of their march, that they might
reach Tripolitza without delay. On the western coast the corsairs of the
Adriatic were ordered to transport troops from Albania direct to Patras, and
then to cruise off the Ionian Islands to prevent the Russians receiving supplies
from the Greeks under the Venetian flag. The tardy proceedings of the Orloffs
allowed the vizier to complete all his arrangements before he was attacked. The
vanguard of the Albanians, six thousand strong, entered Tripolitza about the
time Psaros concentrated the Russo-Greek army to attack the place. He had lost
much time in transporting across the mountains a few pieces of artillery, and
the ammunition required to
1 Hammer calls him Mouhsinzade.
BATTLE OF TPJPOLITZA.
313
breach the feeble wall
round Tripolitza. The whole force under his command was said to amount to
fifteen thousand men; but it was dispersed over much ground, from the
difficulty of supplying it with provisions. The greater part consisted of
half-armed peasantry, and the only force on which any reliance could be placed
in battle was a corps of four hundred Russians, and about four thousand Greek
irregulars and half-disciplined recruits. The Albanians, supported by the
native cavalry of the province, attacked his army as soon as it encamped. The
Greeks offered little resistance : the greater part fled when they saw the
Albanians rushing forward in spite of the first volley of musketry. The
Russians alone defended themselves valiantly, and perished almost to a man in
their ranks. Three thousand Greeks were slain in the pursuit, and the day after
the battle the metropolitan of Tripolitza and several bishops, who had entered
into correspondence with the Russians, were hanged by order of the pasha.
Another corps of
Albanians advanced from the Isthmus of Corinth along the southern shore of the
Gulf of Corinth, to relieve Patras from the attacks of the Ionian Greeks who
had besieged it; but the enemy had been dispersed by the Dulcigniots before
their arrival. Fresh reinforcements soon joined the main body at Tripolitza,
which then advanced in two divisions. One descended into the plain of Laconia,
retook Misithra, and drove Psaros and the relics of his army beyond Gythion
into the fastnesses of Taygetus. The other marched into the plain of Messenia,
drove the Maniates back into their mountains, defeated the Russians before
Modon, and captured all their siege artillery and stores. The successes of the
Albanians were marked by the greatest cruelty: the country was ravaged, the
people massacred without mercy, often
A. D.
1718-1821.
314
PROGRESS TOWARDS INDEPENDENCE.
ciiap. v. merely to find a pretext for carrying
off the young women and children to be sold as slaves. The pasha of the Morea
endeavoured in vain to arrest these atrocities. He proclaimed an amnesty ;
and, as far as his power extended, his humanity restored order and confidence
; but over the greater part of the peninsula the Albanian irregular bands
remained for some years masters and tyrants of the province.
Towards the end of May
another Eussian squadron, under Admiral Elphinstone, an excellent naval
officer, but a man of a violent character, arrived at Port Vitylo, where he landed
six hundred troops to support Psaros. The news of the appearance of a Turkish
fleet in the Archipelago, carrying supplies to Nauplia, made Elphinstone put to
sea immediately, in order to thwart the operations of the Othoman squadron that
might enter the Gulf of Nauplia, or engage any ships separated from the main
body of the capitan-pasha's fleet. He despatched a courier to Alexis Orloff, as
high admiral, informing him of liis movements, and requesting his support.
Orloff, despairing of any success by land after the recent disasters of his
troops, abandoned Navarin with precipitation, and, embarking only Papasoglou,
Benaki, and the bishops of Coron, Modon, and Kalamata, with a few primates of
wealth, sailed away to join Elphinstone, leaving all the other Greeks who had
taken up arms for the cause of Russia, and sworn allegiance to the Empress
Catherine II., to escape as they might be able to procure the means from
others. In vain the Greeks, and their friends among the Russian officers of
rank, urged Orloff to allow a small garrison to retain possession of Navarin
until the issue of the expected naval engagement should be known. They pointed
out that the island of Sphak- teria was covered with refugees, that more than
ten thousand Greeks of all ages were assembled round the
NAVAL OPERATIONS.
315
walls of Navarin, that
the fortress was strong enough to resist the attack of the Albanians for some
months, and that the command of the port would enable the Greeks to distract
the attention of the Turks, and keep up a mountain warfare, by furnishing
supplies of provisions and ammunition to armed bands on every inaccessible
mountain near the coast. Alexis Orloff was deaf to entreaties and advice.
The Othoman fleet
destined to meet the Russians was placed under the command of Hosameddin, the
grandson of Djanum Pasha, a man destitute of courage as well as of naval
knowledge.1 On quitting the Dardanelles, he sailed with ten
line-of-battle ships to land reinforcements and stores at Nauplia. The vanguard
of this squadron was led by Hassan the Algerine, and it encountered the
squadron of Elphinstone at the entrance of the Gulf of Argolis.2
After some desultory fighting, which enabled the capitan-pasha to enter the
gulf without loss, the whole Othoman fleet anchored under the cannon of
Nauplia. Elphinstone was anxious to attack them in this position, but the
Russian captains refused to engage in so desperate an enterprise before
effecting a junction with Alexis Orloff, who w^as commander-in-chief.
Elphinstone, therefore, returned to seek Orloff; but meeting four
line-of-battle ships and
1 Hammer,
Histoire de VEmpire Othoman, xvi. 244, French translation, sa}rs
that the post of capitan-pasha was conferred on Hosameddin on the 26th April
1770; and at page 254 he mentions that he was dismissed after the battle of
Tchesme, when Djaffir was appointed his successor. But in the biographical
sketch of Hassan in his Staatsverfassung and Staatsverivaltang des Osmanischen
Reichs, ii. 355, he follows the common error of calling the capitan-pasha who
commanded at Tchesmc, Djaffir.
2 Hassan,
called commonly Djesairli or the Algerine, until he received the title of
Ghazi, or the Victorious, is said by Hammer (Staatsrerwaltung, ii. 350) to have
been the son of a Christian of Rhodosto, or from the neighbourhood of the
Dardanelles. By Rulhiere (iii. 417) he i3 said to have been born in Persia, and
sold as a slave to an inhabitant of Rhodosto. He served when young at Algiers,
where he acquired rank and wealth. The vicissitudes of his eventful life are
recounted with many variations, and they warn me against the danger of implicit
confidencc in facts even as recorded bjT contemporary historians. .
A. D.
1718-1821.
316
PROGRESS TOWARDS INDEPENDENCE.
chap. v. a frigate under Spiritoff, it was determined
to pursue the capitan-pasha, who had also quitted the Gulf of Argolis. Feodor
Orloff persuaded Spiritoff to allow Elphinstone to retain the command of the
united squadrons. The capitan-pasha was overtaken in the channel of Hydra; but
the Russian captains paid so little attention to the admiral’s signals, that
the Othoman fleet had no difficulty in avoiding an engagement.
On the 23d of June 1770,
Alexis Orloff and Admiral Greig joined Elphinstone, and Spiritoff was ordered
to act as admiral of the fleet under Orloff. The capitan- pasha had selected
the Bay of Tchesme, in the Channel of Chios, as the position in which to await
the attack of the Russians. His fleet consisted of fourteen sail of the line
and several frigates, and was anchored in the form of a crescent, with one horn
defended by rocks and shallows, and the other by the mainland. The
capitan-pasha, and perhaps most of his captains, wTere too ignorant
of naval tactics to perceive the great disadvantage of rendering his superior
force stationary, and exposing its parts to be overwhelmed by a smaller
movable force. Hassan the Algerine, the ablest officer in the Othoman fleet,
who acted as flag-captain of the capitan-pasha’s ship, endeavoured in vain to
point out the disadvantages of the position. His representations succeeded
only in convincing Hosamed- din that it would be safer for himself to land and
issue his commands from a place of perfect security. He therefore went on
shore, under the pretext of completing a battery, and remained there, leaving
each captain to defend his own ship. The Russian fleet consisted of ten
line-of-battle ships and five frigates; but one of the large ships had only her
main-deck guns on board, and was therefore called a frigate. The battle was
fought on the 7th of July 1770. Spiritoff
BATTLE OF TCHESME.
317
led the vanguard; Alexis
Orloff, in Greig s ship, occupied the centre ; and Elphinstone, in consequence
of the jealousy of Orloff, was placed in the rear. About noon the engagement
commenced. Spiritoff bore down on the ship bearing the capitan-pasha’s flag,
which Hassan commanded ; but as he was exposed to the fire of several ships
during his advance, he lost*nearly one hundred men, killed and wounded, before
he could open his own fire. His losses were replaced by boats from the other
ships. When he was within musket- shot of his enemy he poured his first
broadside into the hull of the capitan-pasha, which was promptly returned. The
firing of both ships was kept up with vigour, and the loss in both was great.
At last a ball from a very large gun carried away the rudder of Spiritoffs
ship, and rendered it unmanageable. As he neglected dropping his anchor, he
drifted close to his enemy, and the Turks immediately rushed, sword in hand, on
his deck. To repulse this attack of the Turkish boarders, the Russians made use
of hand-grenades, threw combustibles into the enemy’s ship, and sent a party
of marines to board it from the yards. The decks of both ships became the scene
of pitched battles, and fresh combatants hastened from the other ships to aid
both parties. Hassan, seeing that the riflemen in the tops of the Russian were
thinning his men, ordered the sails, which the Russians had left hanging
loosely from the yards, to be set on fire. In a moment the whole rigging was in
flames, and before the Turks could cut their cable, their own ship took fire.
Spiritoff, Feodor Orloff, and the officers, abandoned their ship when the
blazing yards fell on the deck, but Hassan suspended the combat to get all his
boats afloat and save his crew. The two ships soon separated; but both being
driven into the line of the Othoman fleet, the Turkish captains cut their
cables,
A. D.
1718-1821.
318 PROGRESS TOWARDS INDEPENDENCE.
chap. v. and the
line-of-battle ships cro wded one after another into the narrow harbour of
Tchesme, where their position rendered them defenceless. The blazing ships blew
up. The gallant Hassan plunged into the sea, and, though severely wounded,
succeeded in swimming until he was taken up by one of his boats. His first care
was to send a message to the capitan-paslia, recommending him to sieze the
moment for ordering the fleet out to sea before the Russians could attack it in
its defenceless position, where its guns were useless. Hosamed- din was such a
coward that he feared to embark himself, and he dared not send the fleet to
sea while the capitan-pasha remained 011 shore. He pretended to think that the
batteries of Tchesme could protect his fleet.
The Russian admirals
immediately held a council of war, to decide on the manner in which they should
attack the Turkish ships. It was resolved to burn them before they could change
their position. Three fireships were prepared without loss of time, and,
shortly after midnight, everything being ready, several Russian line-of-battle
ships stood in towards the port, and opened a heavy cannonade; under the cover
of which the three polaccas fitted out as fireships were steered into the midst
of the Turkish fleet. Two of the fireships were commanded by English officers, Dugdale
and Mackenzie ; the third was under the command of a Russian. The crews
consisted chiefly of Greek and Sclavonian sailors. Dugdale, who led the way,
was deserted by his crew, but he carried his ship alongside the enemy, fired
the train himself, and then jumped into the sea and swam to the boat of one of
the other ships. Mackenzie and the Russian were well supported, and the attack
was completely successful. The three fireships drove into the midst of the
enemy's fleet, and the whole harbour was soon enveloped in
RUSSIAN OPERATIONS.
319
flames. The Turkish
line-of-battle ships blew up, one after another; and when the fire ceased, one
only remained afloat. This was captured, and Alexis Orloff conferred the
command of it on Dugdale, as a reward for his distinguished valour. Tchesme was
abandoned by the Turks and occupied by the Russians. The fugitives spread the
news of the destruction of the fleet in every direction ; and the Russians were
expected to make their appearance before Constantinople. At Smyrna the
Mussulmans, seized with frenzy, murdered all the Greeks they met in the
streets. At Constantinople the foreign ministers were in danger; and perhaps
the plague, which raged at the time with extraordinary violence, alone
moderated the fury of the populace.
After the destruction of
the Othoman fleet, Elphin- stone urged Alexis Orloff to sail immediately to the
Dardanelles, force the entrance, and either dictate terms of peace at
Constantinople, or lay the capital of the Othoman empire in ashes. Orloff was
incapable and selfish. He feared that Elphinstone would reap all the glory of
an exploit which he felt that he could not himself direct; and, as a plausible
reason for rejecting so great an enterprise, he declared that his instructions
directed him to support the Greeks, but did not warrant his venturing to treat
for peace, consequently he did not feel himself authorised to risk the
destruction of the fleet of the empress merely to have a chance of setting fire
to Constantinople. Ten days were wasted in vain debates. The projects of attacking
Chios and Smyrna were rejected; and at last it was determined to occupy Lemnos,
as a station from which it would be easy to maintain a strict blockade of the
Dardanelles. The castle of Lemnos offered an unexpected resistance, and three
months were consumed in fruitless endeavours to take it. In the mean time the
A. I).
1718-1821.
320
PROGRESS TOWARDS INDEPENDENCE.
chap. v. Russian fleet was
weakened by the recall of the English officers, who held commissions in their
own navy ; and the dilatory proceedings of Orloff gave the Turks time to
assemble fresh forces. Baron de Tott was employed to fortify the Dardanelles,
and Hassan, as soon as he recovered from his wounds, was appointed capitan-bey,
and intrusted with full power to collect a force to relieve Lemnos. Hassan
assembled four thousand chosen troops at the Dardanelles, which he embarked in
twenty-three small vessels. This force, escorted by two line-of-battle ships,
effected its landing on the east side of Lemnos on the 9th of October, and
stormed the Russian camp sword in hand. The Russians escaped to their ships
with the loss of all their artillery, military stores, and provisions. A naval
engagement took place a few days later, in which Hassan manoeuvred so well as
to keep the sea without any loss ; and Alexis Orloff, finding that his vessels
had need of repairs, sailed to Paros, leaving Hassan the highest personal
honours of the campaign of 1770, in spite of the catastrophe of Tchesme.1
The Russian fleet
remained in the Levant until peace was concluded in 1774, but it performed
nothing worthy of notice. The harbour of Naussa in Paros was its naval station;
and the scale of the buildings constructed by the Russians induced the Greeks
to believe that the empress had determined to retain permanent possession of
the island. Batteries were erected to defend the port, extensive warehouses
were built to contain naval stores, and the village of Naussa became a populous
city ; but the place was unhealthy, and the crews of the ships suffered
severely from fever.
1 Hammer, Histoire, xvi. 256. Baron de Tott, Memoires sur les Tttrcs et
les Tartares, ii. 247, 284, edit. Amst. De Tott
must be read with caution. Vanity and a spirit of exaggeration often make him
misrepresent details. He pretends that Hassan, who had fitted out
line-of-battle ships, directed considerable works in the arsenal of
Constantinople, and had visited the dockyards of Barcelona and Naples, did not
know how to mount a heavy gun.
7,
voltaire’s opinions.
321
After the conclusion of
the first campaign, Alexis Orloff hastened to St Petersburg to enjoy his
triumph as the victor of Tchesme. Elphinstone soon followed, disgusted with the
inactive service to which he was condemned; and the Russian navy ceased to
display any activity.
The war in the Levant
was now neglected by Catherine II., whose attention was absorbed by the proj
ect for partitioning Poland. Voltaire, who watched the changes in the
sentiments of the empress, with prompt servility altered the tone of his
correspondence concerning Greece. He began to defame the Greeks, in whose
favour he had previously affected great enthusiasm. Perceiving that Catherine
was no longer eager to support their cause, he now spoke of them as unworthy of
freedom, which, he says, they might have gained had they possessed courage to
support the enterprises of the Russians. The French philosopher, in the
fervour of his adulation, declared that he no longer desired to read Sophocles,
Homer, and Demosthenes. Voltaire expected the Greeks would fight like heroes to
become serfs of .a Russian favourite.1
The Greeks, who had been
cajoled and bribed to rebel, were abandoned to their fate as soon as their services
were useless to Russian interests. The Sphakiots of Crete were attacked by the
Turks, pursued into their mountains, and compelled to pay the haratsh, like the
Christians in the plain. The Albanians who had entered the Morea established
themselves permanently in companies throughout the peninsula, and collected the
taxes on their own account, besides extorting large
1 He adds: “Je detesterais
jusqu’d la religion Grecque, si votre majeste imperiale n’etait pas a la tete
de cette Eglise.”—Correspondance atec Vlmpera- trice de Rume, No. 107, 6 Mars
1772. Certainly no Phanariot ever addressed Sultan
Mustaplia in baser language.
X
A. D.
1718-1821.
322 PROGRESS TOWARDS INDEPENDENCE.
chap. y. sums by cruel exactions, under the pretence
of obtain* ing arrears of pay due to them by the Porte.
The successes of the Russian
armies on the Danube forced Sultan Abdul-hamid, shortly after his accession to
the throne, to sign the peace of Kainardji, on the 21st July 1774. This
memorable treaty humbled the pride of the sultan, broke the strength of the
Othoman empire, and established the moral influence of Russia over the whole
Christian population in Turkey, which henceforth regarded the sovereign of
Russia as the legal protector, if not as the legitimate emperor, of the
orthodox. Yet in this treaty the Greeks of the Morea and the islands were
sacrificed by Russia. The Porte, indeed, engaged by the seventh article to protect
the orthodox Greek church ; but Russia allowed the sultan to interpret the
article as he pleased, until she deemed it for her interest, many years after,
to make this engagement a pretext for claiming a right to watch over its
fulfilment, in order to paralyse the government of Turkey, and extend her own
dominion. Though the seventeenth article contained the promise of an amnesty to
the rebel • Greeks, the court of St Petersburg, even when it restored the
islands of the Archipelago to the sultan, never gave itself any concern about
the execution of this article. It is strange that the Greeks, who were saved
from oppression and mildly treated by the Venetians, should always have hated
and calumniated the republic, while, though they have been frequently deceived
and despised by the Russians, they manifest the warmest devotion to the Czars.
The bigotry of Orthodoxy is more powerful than the feeling of patriotism, and
effectually stifles all gratitude to Catholics. Enthusiastic orthodoxy, a warm
love of liberty, and an eager desire of vengeance, rendered them the ready
dupes of Russian policy; and though they were severely punished on this
occasion,
ALBANIANS IN THE MOREA.
323
they have ever since
been ready to serve the interests of Russia and sacrifice those of Greece, from
the same motives, with similar blindness. The peace with Russia could not make
the Turks forget the cruelty with which their countrymen had been massacred in
the Morea ; and for several years the Greeks w^ere everywhere subjected to
constant supervision and increased oppression. The cruelties of the Albanians
were tolerated even after their rapacity became so great that many Turks as wTell
as Greeks were ruined by their exactions, and compelled to abandon their
property, and escape to other parts of the empire.
Policy at last induced
Sultan Abdul-hamid to protect the industry and commerce of his Greek subjects,
and to order that they should be treated with humanity. The reiterated
complaints of the disorders perpetrated by the Albanians in the Morea, both by
Mussulmans and Christians, at length determined him to restore tranquillity to
that valuable province. Hassan, whose victory over the Russians at Lemnos had
gained him the title of Ghazi (the Victorious), had been raised to the rank of
capitan-pasha. In the year 1779 he was ordered to reduce the Albanians to
obedience, and reestablish order in the Morea. With his usual promptitude in
action, he landed a considerable force at Nauplia, and marched with a body of
four thousand chosen infantry, and the cavalry collected by the neighbouring
pashas, to attack the Albanians, who had concentrated a large part of their
troops at Tripolitza. The Albanians, confident in their numbers and valour,
marched out to engage the little army of the capitan-pasha in the plain, and
were completely defeated by the steady valour of the infantry, and by the fire
of the artillery. After this victory Hassan hunted down the dispersed bands of
the Albanians over the whole peninsula, and exterminated them without mercy.
The heads of the
A. D.
1718-1821.
324 PROGRESS TOWARDS INDEPENDENCE.
chap. v. chieftains were
sent to Constantinople, and exposed ' before the gate of the Serai, while a
pyramid was formed of those of the soldiers under the walls of Tripolitza, the
remains of which were seen by travellers at the end of the last century.1 Hassan
remained in the Morea for a few months, uniting the rank of pasha of the
province with his office of capi tan-pasha. His administration restored order
and re-established justice in such a degree, that most of the fugitives returned
from Roumelia, Asia Minor, and the Ionian Islands, and the greater part of the
deserted lands were again cultivated. Mavroyeni, a Greek of Mykone, who was
dragoman of the fleet, enjoyed the confidence of Hassan, and employed the
influence he possessed to improve the position of the Greeks.
The Maniates, who feared
the Albanians more than the Turks, had deputed Zanet Koutouphari, one of their
chiefs, to wait on Hassan at Rhodes in 1777 to solicit an amnesty for the part
they had taken in the Russian war, to assure the capitan-pasha of their devotion
to the sultan’s government, and to claim his protection. Hassan, having
received the sanction of the Porte for separating Maina from the sandjak of the
Morea, and placing it under the jurisdiction of the capitan-pasha, now
organised the administration, and arranged the payment of its taxes, on the
same plan as the other districts under his command. Zanet, as chief primate,
was invested with the authority of governor and the title of bey.2
The bey was charged with the duty of collecting the tribute ; and to facilitate
the operation, where topographical difficulties and the feuds of hostile tribes
rendered the task dangerous,
1 Pouqueville, Histoire de la
Regeneration de la Grece, i. 52.
2 Pouqueville,
Voyage de la Grece, v. 559, edit. 1827, gives the firman of investiture ; see
note 1 at page 135, which corrects a common error of confounding Zanet
Koutouphari and Zanet Gligoraki, beys of Maina.
SJ ' 'lK M
i't
IMPROVEMENT IN GREECE.
32 5
lie obtained a monopoly
of the export of oil, silk, and valonia, which wTas easily enforced
at the few points from which produce could be exported. In 1780 Hassan visited
Maina with the Othoman fleet. He landed a body of Turkish troops, and arrested
some of the chiefs who had plundered in Messenia or committed acts of piracy.
Murzinos, who had distinguished himself both as a Kussian partisan and a
pirate, was taken after a vigorous defence, and hung in his Russian uniform
from the main-yard of Hassan's ship.1 Hassan then compelled the
Maniates to compound for the arrears of tribute due to the Porte, and to give
hostages for their fulfilment of the obligations into which he forced them to
enter.
The favour which
Mavroyeni enjoyed, and the influence of the Phanariots on the general policy
of the Porte towards the rayahs, alleviated the oppression of the Othoman
administration in Greece. The people enjoyed greater security for their lives
and property, new paths were opened to them of acquiring wealth, and their
commercial intercourse with the Western nations became more frequent.
Education, also, became more general, and less exclusively ecclesiastic. In
the Morea particularly the government of Sultan Abdul-hamid was so much milder
than that of his predecessors as to be ascribed by the Greeks to the influence
of his favourite sultana, whom they imagined to be the daughter of a Moreote
priest; but the fact is, that the same improvement in the manner of treating
the Christian subjects of the Porte is observable in the other provinces of the
empire.2 Had the Greeks been fortunate enough, at this period, to
have passed a generation in the tranquil enjoyment of the commercial,
political, and moral advantages which they began to
1 Pcmqueville,
Voyage, v. 588.
2 llizo
Neroulos, Jlistoire de VInsurrection Grdcque, 93.
A. D.
1718-1821.
326 PROGRESS TOWARDS INDEPENDENCE.
chap. v. enjoy in the year 1780, it is probable they
would have succeeded in giving their local institutions such a development as
would have placed a large part of the communal and provincial administration in
their own hands, and served ultimately as the basis for the establishment of a
Greek government on sound principles of civil liberty, which, while it secured
the national independence of the Greeks where they form the majority of the
population, might have enabled the different Christian races in the Othoman
empire to combine in forming a powerful federal state.
The influence of Russia
unfortunately withdrew the attention of the Greeks from local improvements to
schemes of conquest. The court of St Petersburg did not wish to see the Greeks
in a condition to gain their independence by their own unassisted efforts. As
discontented subjects of the sultan, they were useful instruments of
Catherine's policy ; but, in possession of local privileges which, as in
Chios, would enable them to improve their own condition, they might become
useful subjects of the sultan, and ultimately the recognised heirs of the
Othoman empire. At all events, they would be interested in opposing the progress
of Russian despotism, and perhaps capable of making both the czarina and the
sultan treat them with justice. The leading statesmen of Russia attacked
Turkey from motives of selfish ambition, and the Greeks again aided them from
avarice and bigotry. Potemkin revived the projects of Marshal Munich ; and the
Greeks were urged to rebel merely to distract the attention of the Othoman
government from the northern provinces of the empire, and facilitate the
schemes of Catherine II. to extend her dominions on the shores of the Black
Sea. The measures adopted by Potemkin with regard to Greece were not, however,
so entirely selfish as those of Orloff. Men of talent
INTRIGUES OF RUSSIA.
327
were invited to Russia,
employed, trusted, and promoted. A military school was formed, in which many
young Greeks received their education. The pupils were selected from the
principal families in Greece by the Russian consuls in the Levant ; the
expenses of their voyage to Russia, and of their maintenance in the
establishment, were defrayed by the empress ; and when their education was
finished, they were employed in the army or navy, or as dragomans and consuls
in Turkey. If want of talent or health rendered it advisable to send a pupil
home, he was assured of Russian protection, and taught to consider himself a
subject of Russia. The patronage of Potemkin drew considerable numbers of
Greeks to Russia, where most of those who conducted themselves with prudence
gained wealth, and some obtained high rank.
In 1783 Catherine II.
renewed her encroachments on the Othoman empire by assuming the absolute sovereignty
of the Crimea. About the same time she obtained a treaty of commerce from the
Porte, by which the Greeks of the Archipelago were allowed to make use of the
Russian flag.1 The project of conquering Constantinople became
again the ordinary subject of conversation at court; the Grand-duke Constantine
was taught to speak Greek ; and Catherine II. seems to have expected that she
would be able to place the Byzantine crown on his head, and thus gain for
Russia a legitimate title to bear the double-headed eagle of Rome on its
escutcheon. The proceedings of Russia forced Sultan Abdul-hamid to declare war
in August 1787, which he commenced according to the established usage of the
Othoman empire by sending the Russian minister to the Seven Towers. The military
operations of the Turks were
1 This treaty, dated 10th June 1783, enlarged the
privileges conceded by that of 1779.
A. D.
1718-1821.
328 PROGRESS TOWARDS INDEPENDENCE.
chap. v. most disastrous. The fleet under Hassan Ghazi
liav- ing entered the Liman at the mouths of the Bug and Dnieper, was defeated
by the Russians with the loss of five line-of-battle ships, three frigates, and
many smaller vessels. Hassan’s proud title of Ghazi was forfeited, but he lost
neither his courage nor his energy; and when he collected the remains of the
powerful fleet with which he had left Constantinople at Sinope, the greatness
of his misfortune tended to increase his influence over the minds of his
countrymen, and did not diminish his favour with Abdul-hamid. When Selim III.
mounted the throne, his disgrace seemed inevitable, but the new sultan raised
him to the post of grand vizier, and intrusted him with the command of the army
on the Danube. Before the opening of the campaign of 1790 death closed his long
and brilliant career at Shumla.
As soon as war was
declared, the agents of Russia scattered manifestoes in all parts of Greece,
inviting the Christians to take up arms, and co-operate with the armies of the
empress in expelling the Turks from Europe.1 Phrases concerning
ancient liberty and national independence could not, however, entirely efface
the memory of OrlofFs flight from Navarin. Catherine also was persuaded that
the unwarlike Greeks of the Morea and the islands of the Archipelago could
render no effectual assistance to her cause. Her agents were now instructed to
rouse the warlike Albanian tribes in Epirus to attack their Mussulman
neighbours. Their intrigues were successful with the Suliots, a Christian tribe
which had always retained its arms, and preserved a degree of
semi-independence, like the Scla- vonians of Montenegro and the Greeks of Maina
and
1 Eton, Survey of the Turkish Empire, 354. See the
memorial of some selfelected Greek deputies, who rendered homage to the
Grand-duke Constantine, as representatives of the Greek nation.
jrt
SULIOTS.
329
Sphakia. Instigated by
the Bussian emissaries, the Albanians of Suli quitted their barren and almost
inaccessible mountains, and invaded the plains, carrying off the cattle, and
plundering the farms of the Mussulman landlords and of the Christian rayahs
who lived peaceably in the plains under Turkish domination. They defeated the
attempts of Ali Pasha of Joannina to invade their mountains ; but as it was
soon evident to the court of St Petersburg that their power was insufficient
to produce any diversion of importance, they were abandoned by Russia, and left
to carry on the war they had commenced by their own unassisted exertions. The
Empress Catherine II. had great reason to be dissatisfied with the results of
her policy in Greece. She deceived the people of the country to serve her own
political views ; her Greek agents cheated her to serve their private
interests. They embezzled large sums of money, and transmitted to her
ministers exaggerated accounts of victories achieved by bands of Suliots, and
absurd projects for future campaigns. Convinced at last that there was no hope
of extending the insurrection, either by the forays of the Christian Albanians,
or by the intrigues of her Greek emissaries, Catherine ceased to nourish the
war in the Levant. The Suliots, abandoned to their fate, were compelled to
conclude a truce with Ali Pasha, which their activity and valour enabled them
to do on favourable terms.
The naval operations of
this war in the Grecian seas were every way dishonourable to Russia. Catherine
II. had fitted out a fleet at Cronstadt, under Admiral Greig, which was
destined to act in the Archipelago, but a declaration of war against Russia by
the King of Sweden prevented its sailing out of the Baltic ; and the maritime
warfare in the Levant was confined to assisting adventurers to fit out
privateers under the
A. I).
1718-1821.
330 PROGRESS TOWARDS INDEPENDENCE.
chap. v. Russian flag. Lambros Katzones, a Greek, who
received the rank of major in the service of the empress, partly by the aid of
Russia, but principally by the subscriptions of Greek merchants, fitted out an
armament of twelve small vessels at Trieste. Lambros possessed more enthusiasm
and valour than warlike and naval skill. He imprudently engaged an Algerine
squadron, cruising off the coast of the Morea, and after a gallant but
ineffectual fight, the greater part of the Greek ships were sunk, and Lambros
escaped with difficulty in the vessel he commanded, (May 1790.)
The system of privateering
to which Russia lent her flag was carried on with great energy, and the crews
engaged in it were collected from every European nation. The cruisers being
virtually released from all control, and being often manned by those who had
long acted as pirates in the Levant, perpetrated acts of cruelty never
exceeded. The unprotected and industrious Greek population of the islands and
sea- coasts of the Othoman empire never suffered greater misery from the
slave-dealing pirates, than were now inflicted on them by pretended friends
under the orthodox banner of Russia. The Greeks, who were themselves the
principal agents in the sufferings of their peaceable countrymen at this time,
were so ashamed of the part they acted that they would willingly have buried
every record of this privateering in oblivion ; but justice demands truth. Few
records of the most horrible deeds of blood which have been enacted in Greece
have been preserved ; for the voice of the suffering citizens and peasants has
never found an echo among the infatuated literati, who laud every privateering
man as a Themistocles, and every Suliot, Maniat, or Klepht, as a Leonidas
looking about the mountains to find a new Thermopylae. Among the few authentic
records of the Russian cruisers is the journal of an
CRUELTIES OF THE PRIVATEERS.
331
English sailor ; and
when the author of this History- first visited Greece in 1823, it was his
fortune to meet with more than one individual whose testimony confirmed the
fearful narrative of that criminal.
In December 1788,
William Davidson, a young seaman from the north of England, sailed from
Leghorn in a privateer, under the Kussian flag, mounting twenty- two guns, and
carrying two hundred and fifteen men. This vessel returned to Leghorn in August
1789, and during a cruise of only eight months, it captured upwards of forty
vessels, and killed about fifteen hundred men, some of whom were slain in
battle, but far the greater part were murdered in cold blood on the deck of the
privateer by order of the captain, after they had surrendered prisoners of war.
Several Greek islands were plundered, the defenceless town of Castel Eosso was
taken, all the Turks in the place were murdered, though they offered no
resistance, and half the houses were wantonly burned. The plunder collected
from the Greek inhabitants was very considerable, and even the churches were
robbed of their gold and silver ornaments, images, and candlesticks. On some
occasions the privateers spared Greek ships under the Turkish flag when they were
the property of Greek merchants, but the cruelty with v/hich they treated even
their countrymen, at other times, can only be correctly described by the
murderers. The circumstances attending the capture of a Turkish galley with
eighty- five men on board are thus narrated. The prisoners were all confined
for one night in the hold. Many of them must have been Christians compelled to
work at the oars. In the morning they were brought on deck one by one, and “
their heads were cut off as ducks' heads are cut off at home,” says the
narrator, “ and then we threw them overboard." This was the first time the
whole crew were obliged to take their turn in
A. D.
1718-1821.
3.32
PROGRESS TOWARDS INDEPENDENCE.
chap. v. murdering the
prisoners, and the English at first refused; but when the captain told them
they were cowards, and that he could not believe they were really Englishmen,
they did the same as the rest, and afterwards were even worse than the others,
for they were always first when such work was going on. Yet even these
privateers were not the worst robbers in the Grecian seas. On the coast of
Maina vessels found shelter which openly carried on piracy, and these pirates
treated even the Eussian flag with 110 more respect than the Othoman, if they
supposed it covered a rich prize. The privateer in which Davidson served fell
in with a large ship to the west of Cerigo. It was pursued, and did not refuse
to fight, for “ to our misfortune/' as Davidson says, it proved to be a
celebrated pirate with thirty-two guns and three hundred and seventy-eight men.
A severe engagement took place, which lasted more than four hours, and when the
pirate struck to the superior order and discipline, and the heavier weight of
metal of the privateer, it was found that he had lost fifty-four men killed and
forty- three wounded. The success of the victor was in part attributed to the
confusion which wTas caused on board the pirate by the
variety of nations composing the crew. The wounded were immediately put to
death. Next morning the prisoners wrere examined, and when they
confessed that, like their captors, they were in the habit of killing the crews
and sinking the ships they took, the captain of the Greco-Kussian privateer,
forgetful of his own conduct, told them they should all die by the cruellest
death. He was as brutal as his word ; for next day he murdered them in so
horrible a manner, that it is necessary to record the fact in the words of the
eye-witness. His diary says : “ August 5th.—We got whips on the mainstay, and
made one leg fast to the whip, and the other to a
LAMBROS KATZONES.
333
ring-bolt in the deck,
and so quartered them, and hove them overboard.”1 The lure which
enticed the crews of the privateers to act these scenes of horror was the
immense booty they obtained. Each of the English sailors received, as his share
of prize-money after the eight months’ cruise, the sum of nine hundred and
fifty dollars, or nearly £200 sterling.
The infamous cruelties
and open piracies committed under the Eussian flag at last induced the court of
St Petersburg to refuse all further countenance to the
O ^
privateers. Lambros, who
had succeeded in obtaining assistance from the Greeks at Trieste to fit out a
few vessels, was nevertheless allowed to carry the Eussian flag until the end
of the war ; but when peace was concluded, he also was compelled to strike it.
Though disavowed by the empress, he continued his attacks on the Turks. Peace
having turned adrift a number of daring seamen who joined him, he conceived
the project of holding the sea as an independent cruiser against the Turks.
Unfortunately he soon found it necessary to act the pirate in order to procure
the means of maintaining his force, and vengeance quickly followed his
piracies. He made Port Quaglio in Maina his naval station; and having secured
the assistance of the Kakovouliats, the poorest and most desperate portion of
the population of Maina, he plundered the flag of every nation off Cape Mata-
pan. Emboldened by a few months’ impunity, he had the audacity to attack two
French ships near Nauplia, which were burned by him in May 1792. As soon as the
French ambassador at Constantinople heard of this outrage, lie sent information
to a French squadron then cruising in the Levant, which immediately joined the
fleet of Hussein, the capitan-pasha, and sailed in pur-
1 Davidson’s
narrative, in a History of Shipwrecks, edited by Cyrus Redding, second series,
page 204.
A. D.
1718-1821.
334 PROGRESS TOWARDS INDEPENDENCE.
chap. v. suit of Lambros. The Greek piratical squadron
consisted of eleven vessels. It was found anchored at Port Quaglio, under the
protection of batteries, which Lambros had supposed would be sufficient to keep
the Turkish fleet at a distance. On the 19 th of June, he was attacked by the
Othoman fleet, assisted by the French frigate La Modeste. The batteries in
which Lambros had trusted were soon destroyed, and the pirate ships, abandoned
by their crews, were all captured by the Turks, and conducted in triumph to
Constantinople. Lambros escaped into the mountains, and reached the Ionian
Islands.
Austria had joined
Russia in the war against Turkey, with the expectation of sharing in the spoils
of the Othoman empire. The Emperor Joseph commenced the war unjustly ; his
brother Leopold terminated it disgracefully. He concluded a separate peace at
Sistova in 1791, which, like that of Belgrade, was calculated to destroy the
influence of Austria in the East. Russia was more successful. Her arms were
crowned with victory, but the treaty she concluded with the sultan at Yassi in
1792 only extended the frontier of the empire to the banks of the Dniester. The
partition of Poland arrested the fall of the Othoman empire.
The French Revolution
now began to exert a direct influence on the people of every nation in Europe,
and to modify the position and the policy of every government. France invited
every nation to declare itself free and independent. These revolutionary
principles found an echo in the breast of every Greek ; but the different
classes composing the Greek nation were not yet united by common feelings which
could produce simultaneous action. The restless presumption and envious
disposition of the instructed few, and of the city population, gave the Greeks
no warrant that they
INFLUENCE OF FRANCE.
335
could succeed in
emulating the French, whose despotic a. d.
unity
magnified the power of their desperate valour. _____________________ 1
Rhiga of Velestinos was
one of the warmest partisans of the new revolutionary ideas. His patriotic
songs and his personal energy have made his name dear to his countrymen. His
enthusiasm deluded him into the belief that he could direct the counsels of
other nations and guide the events of his time, so as to bend France into an
instrument for framing Hellenic republics, and gratifying the dreams of ambitious
pedants. This presumption, and the confined sphere of his political vision,
made his schemes degenerate into mere conspiracies. The plots of Rhiga were
betrayed to the Austrian police by one of his own countrymen, and the Austrian
government delivered him up to the Turks, who put him to death at Belgrade in
1797.1
The treaty of Campo
Formio in 1797 placed the Ionian Islands and their dependencies on the continent2
under the dominion of France, and the Greeks became the ready instruments of
French policy, as they had formerly been of Russian. Venice had protected her
possessions in Epirus by forming alliances with the various tribes of Christian
Albanians who had preserved their independence; and the republic had
systematically supported these tribes, and particularly the Chimariots and
Suliots, against the neighbouring pashas. The French adopted a different policy
; they sought the alliance of Ali Pasha of Joannina, because he possessed a
numerous army of hardy irregular troops, from which they hoped to derive some
assistance in their schemes of conquest. They allowed him, there-
1 The
traitor was Demetrios Oikonomos Kozanites. AoKifxtov 'IcrropiKov mpl rrjs
(friKiKrjs ‘Eraiplas xmo I. $i\r]fJL0V0S, p. 92.
2 The
possessions of Venice on the continent were Butrinto, Gomenitza,
Parga, Previsa, and Vonitza.
336 PROGRESS TOWARDS INDEPENDENCE.
chap. v. fore, to consolidate his power by destroying
the local independence of the dispersed and disunited tribes of armed
Christians who had long successfully resisted the Othoman power. Ali, availing
himself of these views, obtained permission from the general commanding at
Corfu to send troops by sea to Chimara, to reduce to obedience the inhabitants,
whom he called rebel subjects of the Porte. The district, of which
Novitza-Bouba and Aghio-Vasili were the principal villages, contained six
thousand Christians, who enjoyed the same degree of partial independence as
the Suliots. The young men were in the habit of entering the military service
of Venice and Naples, and when they had saved a small sum of money, they
returned to their native mountains and married. Their privileges had been
protected by Venice at Constantinople. France allowed them to be exterminated
by Ali Pasha, whose troops landed in the bay of Lukovo, surprised the
population during the Easter festivals, and massacred most of those able to
bear arms.1
In 1798 the treacherous
invasion of Egypt by Napoleon Buonaparte caused the sultan to declare war
against the French republic. Ali Pasha availed himself of the opportunity to
gain possession of the dependencies of the Ionian Islands on the continent.
The French garrison at Previsa was defeated. Vonitza, Gomenitza, and Butrinto
surrendered, and Parga alone, of all the ancient Venetian possessions on the
continent, repulsed the forces of the pasha, and retained its local immunities.
Even before the declaration of war the sultan obtained proof that the French
government had sent emissaries into Roumelia, the Morea, and the islands of the
Archipelago, to distribute publications inviting
1 Heppeftos 5I(rropla
tov SouXiov /cat rrjs Hapyas, p. 1.—Emerson, Modern
Greece, ii.
436.
PARGA.
337
the inhabitants to revolt.1 Russia, as well as Turkey, a. n.
became alarmed lest the fanaticism of liberty should ______________________ ’
overpower the bigotry of orthodoxy. A common fear of French influence in
Greece united those apparently irreconcilable enemies, the czar and the sultan,
in a close alliance. The first object was to expel the French from the Ionian
Islands. In 179.9 a combined Russian and Othoman force took possession of
Corfu, and by a convention between the court of St Petersburg and the Porte in
1800, the Ionian Islands were constituted a republic, while, as if to make the
mockery of liberty more complete, this nominally independent republic was
prepared to undergo the fate of Poland, by being- placed under the joint
protection of the two most despotic sovereigns in Europe.
By the same convention all the Venetian possessions on the continent were
ceded to the Porte. It was stipulated that their Christian inhabitants were to
enjoy every religious and judicial privilege possessed by the Christians of
Vallachia and Moldavia ; a vague stipulation, which was calculated chiefly to
authorise Russian interference and to extend Russian influence, but which
proved of no avail as a protection to the inhabitants of Previsa.2
The Emperor of Russia, though the avowed champion of the orthodox, was thus the
last Christian sovereign who voluntarily placed an orthodox population under
Othoman domination. As the sultan was already, by the success of Ali Pasha, in
possession of all the territory ceded by the convention, except Parga, Ali
Pasha expected to gain possession of that place. But neither Russia nor the
Porte wished to see that strong position fall into his hands. The
1 Rizo N6roulos, Histoire, 171. Alison's Europe, vol.
iv. p. 188, People’s Edit., where an extract from the Turkish manifesto is
given.
a This convention is dated 21st March 1800. The Stli
article ccdes the continental possessions of Venicc to the sultan.
Y
338 PROGRESS TOWARDS INDEPENDENCE.
chap. v. people of Parga
were encouraged to resist his attacks, while the combined fleet refused to
blockade them, as they proclaimed their devotion to the sultan. Parga, from
these circumstances, was allowed to retain its municipal independence, though
it was regarded as henceforth forming a part of the Othoman empire. Russia did
not take any trouble to exact the observance of the article in the convention
which reserved their religious liberties to the inhabitants of the other
Venetian possessions.
By the treaty of Tilsit
in 1807, Russia ceded the Ionian republic to France, and though England conquered
the other islands, the French retained possession of Corfu until the peace of
1814. In 1815 the Ionian republic was revived, and placed under the protection
of the sovereign of Great Britain. The convention of 1800, relating to the
continental possessions of Venice, including Parga, was regarded as part of the
public law of Europe, for the jealousy of Russia and Austria feared to leave
England in possession of a fortress which might serve as a key to Epirus and
Greece.
When the French garrison
of Corfu found that it would be necessary to deliver up Parga to the English,
they resolved to prevent it falling into their hands by ceding it to Ali Pasha.
But an English force from Zante arrived in time to occupy it before the arrival
of Ali’s troops. The sultan, however, called on the British government to
execute the Russian convention of 1800, and after much negotiation it was at
last resolved in 1819 to deliver up Parga to the Turks. As the hated Ali
would, however, become master of the place, the inhabitants declared they would
rather emigrate than become subjects of the sultan. They asked to be
indemnified for the full value of all the property they abandoned ; and, by the
persevering exertions of the English authorities, the Porte paid to them the
sum
y
IONIAN ISLANDS.
339
of .£150,000, which was
divided among them according to the valuation of their property. There is no
doubt that the pecuniary indemnity was most liberal, but many of the poorer
classes, possessing no property, received no indemnity, and all who emigrated
were loud in their complaints of English policy, which had condemned them to
become exiles. In vain they enjoyed protection and the liberty of complaint in
the Ionian Islands ; every tongue in Europe was loud in reproaching England for
consenting to fulfil the convention of 1800, and compelling the inhabitants of
Parga to forsake the tombs of their ancestors, and change their municipal
existence and ancestral name, for the rights and the name of citizens of the
Ionian ©
republic.1
Perhaps public opinion is not unjust when it blames the acts of a free
government for violations of the principles of abstract justice, which it would
praise as wise and politic measures if they were adopted by a despotic prince.
Men habitually arraign the free before the tribunal of equity ; slaves and
despots they judge by the exigencies of expediency and policy. Truth and
justice ought always to penetrate to the hearts of freemen, but they are not
expected to find an echo in the breast of princes and statesmen. The severe
criticism of English policy is the eulogy of English liberty. The conduct of
the English government in the Ionian Islands has, however, neither been wise
nor liberal: though it has administered justice with equity, and protected
industry and commerce, it long opposed the liberty of the press. The chief
ground of its unpopularity nevertheless is, that it has checked the movements
of those who desired to cause an insurrection of the Greeks in Turkey. This
duty
1 The
enemies of England endeavour to make her conduct appear more odious, by
representing Parga as a free republic, which it never was.—Foscolo, Delle
fortune e delle ccssioni di Varya.
A. D.
1718-1821.
340 PROGRESS TOWARDS INDEPENDENCE.
chap. v. has rendered it unpopular with every party in
Eastern Europe. The Ionians themselves cared little for trade, but they were zealous
partisans of Eussian policy and of orthodox bigotry. But the inhabitants of the
Ionian Islands have no good reason to complain, for if the English government
has not performed its duty, the nobles and the people of the Ionian Islands
have completely neglected theirs. They have not availed themselves of the
liberty they have so long enjoyed for improving their moral condition, and for
attaining a moral and intellectual superiority over the other Greeks who were
subject to the sultan. All foreign domination appears to have exerted a baneful
influence on Greek morality. It has always found them ready to become servile
instruments and secret traitors. In the Ionian Islands the moral condition of
the people, when they passed under the protection of the sovereign of Great
Britain, was much worse than that of the Greeks under the Turkish domination.
Their communal institutions were only administrative facilities modelled by a
foreign central authority. When the islands were first occupied by the French,
assassination was the commonest crime, and it was a popular saying that there
was a murder for every day in the year.1
A great improvement took
place in the material condition of the Greek nation after the peace of Yassi.
Great social changes were exerting their operation on the Othoman government as
well as on the Greek people. The sultan was impelled, by the necessity of
self-defence, even more than by the desire all sovereigns feel to centralise
power in their own hands, to destroy the ancient fabric of the Othoman state
institutions, which time and individual corruption had already undermined. The
cruel use the pashas had made of the absolute power delegated to them ; the
1 Holland’s Travels, p. 23.
STATE OF GREECE.
341
rapacity of tlie fiscal
agents of government ; the venal- a. d.
ity of the
Ulema ; the selfishness of the timariots, and _____________________ 1
*
the anarchical insolence
of the janissaries, had rendered these classes equally hateful to the sultan
and to the people, and marked them out for destruction. The Othoman sultans had
to attempt the double task of saving their empire from dismemberment, and of
destroying the institutions which had formed the barriers against
dismemberment. The reminiscence of ancient glory, which the Greeks believed
their nation had immemorially enjoyed, either as Hellenes or Romans, was never
entirely lost, and they now caught some of the enthusiasm in favour of liberty,
independence, and the rights of man, propagated over Europe by the French
Revolution. The project of regaining their political independence was no longer
circumscribed to a few thoughtful and aspiring men ; it became the very object
of existence to numbers engaged in the pursuits of active life, in every rank
of society. The social position of the mass of the Greek population explains
the facility with which it was influenced by the revolutionary ideas of the
French. The Othoman government, though in some respects the most tyrannical in
Europe, was in others the most tolerant. It fettered the body, but it left the
mind free. The lower orders of its Christian subjects were in general possessed
of more intellectual cultivation than the corresponding ranks of society in
other parts of Europe. The Greeks particularly were no longer industrial slaves
or agricultural serfs ; their labour was both more free and more valuable, and
their civil rights were as great as those of the same class, even in France,
before the Revolution. The Othoman government corrupted the higher classes of
the Greeks more than it oppressed the lower. The cruelty and injustice of the
Turks were irregularly exercised, and were more galling than
342 PROGRESS TOWARDS INDEPENDENCE.
chap. v. oppressive. Towards the end of tlie
eighteenth cen- tuiy the burden of the Othoman domination was so much lightened
that the Greeks became an improving nation. They possessed a numerous body of
small peasant-proprietors of land, whom circumstances often enabled to better
their condition ; and in the towns an industrious population of labourers and
traders was supported and protected by a body of wealthy merchants often
enjoying foreign protection. A numerous maritime population of Christians,
partly consisting of Greeks, and partly of Albanians, also tended to give the
Greeks a considerable degree of personal independence. The Turkish peasant and
trader suffered quite as much from fiscal exactions as the Greek, and the
political obstacles to his rise in the social scale were generally greater. Few
native Turks of the provinces ever acquired as much influence over the public
administration as was systematically and permanently exercised by the
Phanariots. The local authorities of the Mussulman population in the rural
districts rarely possessed the same power of defending the people from
injustice as, and they certainly possessed fewer rights and privileges than,
the Greek communities. It is not, therefore, surprising that the Greeks were
superior in social and political civilisation to the Turks. The fact was generally
perceived, and a Greek revolution was consequently regarded as an event which
must occur at no very distant date, both by the Christian and Mussulman
population of the Othoman empire, at the commencement of the nineteenth
century. In the ordinary course of human affairs it was inevitable.
But unless some closer
bonds had united the dispersed members of the Greek nation than those by which
they had hitherto been connected, it may be questioned whether the
revolutionary movement could have proved successful. Some spiritual tie was re-
>oft
GREEK COMMERCE.
343
quired to infuse a
common feeling of national enthusiasm more powerful than the formal ceremonial
of the orthodox church, or the ecclesiastical influence of the clergy, which
had too long been an instrument of Othoman domination, and which seemed more
inclined to transfer the allegiance of the people from the sultan to the czar,
than to aid a struggle for liberty. The future prospects of a Greek Church in
an independent State did not offer an inviting field for clerical ambition,
compared with the magnificent vista opened to episcopal imaginations by an
orthodox hierarchy under Russian domination. Various causes, however, tended to
centralise those feelings of nationality which the church neglected to
cultivate. We have already mentioned that the corrupting influence of the
Phanariot system tended to this object. The hope of attaining the high rank to
which the Chiot Mavrocordatos, and the Mykoniot Mavroyeni, had risen, drew
aspirants for political employment to Constantinople from every corner of the
empire where Greek was spoken. The direct dependence of a considerable portion
of Greece on the capitan-pasha united a large population by common interests
and ideas in administrative affairs. It is true that the centralisation thus
formed tended to corrupt the higher classes as much as to unite the people; but
the influence of the Phanariots was not more demoralising than that of the
patriarchate, while the separation effected between the political and ecclesiastical
classes caused collisions of interest and personal disputes, which awakened
the attention and enlightened the minds of the many. The Greeks were thus
taught to perceive that their interests as a nation were not always identical
with the policy of the clergy of the orthodox church.
The extension of Greek
commerce tended also to develop the feelings of national union. The active
A. D.
1718-1821.
PROGRESS TOWARDS INDEPENDENCE.
chap.
v.
trade which the Greeks and Albanians carried on over the whole surface of the
Mediterranean, nourished a healthier spirit of political centralisation than
the allurements of Phanariot protection, and the profits of office in the
service of the sultan. This influence of Greek commerce dates from the
conclusion-of the commercial treaties between Eussia and the Porte in 1779 and
1783, which enabled the orthodox subjects of the sultan to obtain the
protection of the Eussian flag. Even before the conclusion of the first of
these treaties, ten Greek vessels, laden with wine from the islands of the
Archipelago, had entered the Eussian ports in the sea of Asof in one year. The
treaty of Yassi enabled Eussia to increase still further the number of her protected
subjects in Turkey, and even to secure to Greek subjects of the sultan the
fullest protection for their property under the Eussian flag.1
Fortunately for the
commerce of the Greeks, the Othoman government was enabled to maintain its
neutrality during the greater part of the wars in which the French Eevolution
involved the powers of Europe. Greek merchants visited ports in the
Mediterranean closed against every flag but that of the sultan, and the profits
of their commerce were immense. The manufacturers of Adrianople, and of the
mountain village of Ambelaki on Mount Ossa, sent cotton fabrics, dyed with the
rich colour called Turkey red, at that time even to England.2 The
Greeks of the island of Psara, and of the town of Galaxidhi in the Cor-
1 Rizo
Neroulos, Histoire, 125. Castera, Histoire de Catherine II., ii. 210.
2 At the
end of the last century there were twenty-four dyeing establishments at
Ambelaki, and the population amounted to four thousand persons. For a time the
inhabitants, capitalists and workmen, formed a general stock company, with
several subordinate branches, but the family education of Chios was wanting,
and the selfishness which is a prominent characteristic of the modern Greek,
induced many who had more money or more skill to separate their interests from
the rest. Dissensions and intrigues arose even in this mountain-village
society, and the mutual envy of the Greeks themselves ruined this once
flourishing spot.—Beaujour, Tableau du Commerce de la Grece, i. 274.
GREEK COMMERCE.
345
inthian Gulf, and the
Albanians of the islands of Hydra and Petzas, carried on an extensive commerce
in their own ships. Many of the sailors were part proprietors both of the ship
and cargo, and united the occupations of capitalists and sailors. All shared in
the profits of the voyage. Their extensive commercial enterprises exercised a
direct influence on the great body of the Greek population, which dwells, in
general, near the sea-coast. Tales of distant lands visited, of dangers
successfully encountered, and of wealth rapidly acquired, were repeated even in
the secluded villages of the mountains. Examples of penniless adventurers
becoming richer than pashas were daily witnessed. The ideas of the people were
enlarged ; they knew that order reigned in many countries ; their hopes of
improving their condition were awakened; they heard that security of property
prevailed, and justice was impartially administered, in most Christian states ;
and the determination to vindicate for themselves these advantages was
silently formed. Gradually the conviction was everywhere felt that this could
only be effected by establishing their national independence.
The corruption of the
Othoman government introduced many vices into the commercial system of the
Levant, which nourished fraud, and invited the Greeks to degrade their
character by habitual dishonesty. A Greek subject of the sultan was subjected
to higher duties than a foreigner, or a Greek enjoying foreign protection. To
carry on his business profitably, he was consequently compelled to find some
means of habitually cheating the Othoman government out of the differential
duty imposed by its ignorance and injustice. The fiscal corruption of the
Othoman administration introduced the practicc of the sultan granting special
exemptions from extraordinary taxes to many of his
A. D.
1718-1821.
346
PROGRESS TOWARDS INDEPENDENCE.
chap. v. subjects. This privilege was conceded to
Christians who enjoyed the favour of the sultan or his ministers, and was
gradually extended until it placed them in fiscal matters in the same position
as Mussulmans, or as the subjects of Christian princes most favoured by their
commercial treaties with the Porte. Firmans, in this sense, were granted to
rayahs, called barrats. The abuse was carried so far that it became customary
for the Turkish government to bestow forty of these barrats as a gift on every
new ambassador when he arrived at Constantinople. The ministers of the sultan,
and the Phanariots in high office, made a traffic of these immunities. The
dragomans of foreign embassies, the consuls, and even the ambassadors
themselves, were accused of selling these barrats to the Greeks. The Eussian
legation systematically extended its influence by availing itself of this
corruption of the Othoman administration. It procured as many barrats as possible,
it granted passports to Greek subjects of the sultan as if they were Russians,
and it authorised Greek vessels to hoist the Russian flag.
The capitan-pasha,
Hussein, who effected great reforms in the Othoman naval administration after
the peace of Yassi, always protected the Greeks who sailed under the Turkish
flag. During his long and liberal administration, the Albanians of Hydra and
Petzas found it more advantageous to sail under the Othoman flag than under the
Russian. Hussein had two hundred Christian Albanian sailors from Hydra on
board the three-decker which carried his flag in the year 1797.1 He
was particularly attentive to the shipping of Hydra, which increased and
prospered under his protection. After Hussein’s death, the disorder that
prevailed in the naval administration revived the ex-
1 Antonios Miaoulis (son of the admiral),'Ynofivrjfia
7rept rrjs vrjaov VY8pas, p. 11.
EDUCATION.
347
actions of subordinates
and local pashas, and the Christians in Turkey again endeavoured to protect
tlieir property under the Eussian flag. It is needless to dwell on the evils of
a political system in which corruption alone afforded the means of escape from
oppression.
In the darkest periods
of tlieir national existence the Greeks continued to feel the influence of
literature. The greatest of the Iconoclast emperors feared John Damascenus. Yet
the influence of Greek literature was for ages unfavourable to the progress of
society. It is reasonable to complain of its nature during many centuries, but
it is an error to suppose that learning entirely failed among the Greeks at any
period of their history. The Greek clergy always kept up a competent knowledge
of the ancient language, though their schools conveyed very little instruction
to the mass of the people. During the Othoman domination, it is probable that
the proportion of Greeks who could read and write was as great as in any other
European nation ; and every Greek who could write had some faint knowledge of
Hellenic literature. When the Greek mind, therefore, began to emancipate itself
from ecclesiastical trammels, education became the purest and most powerful
instrument of national centralisation. Schools were very generally established,
and the difficulties which both the founders and the scholars of these schools
met with in their pursuit of knowledge, increased their zeal. The progress of
the modern Greeks in intellectual culture does not require to be traced in
detail. A chronological enumeration of the schools established, and a list of
the names of individuals who devoted their lives to teaching, would cause a
grateful throb in the heart of every patriotic Greek, but the history of the
nation only requires us to record the result. That result is attested by the
formation
A. D.
1718-1821.
348 PROGRESS TOWARDS INDEPENDENCE.
chap. v. of a common
literary dialect of the modem language, which served as the means of uniting
the ideas of the people. The literary progress of the modern Greeks must not be
measured by a comparison with the standard of knowledge of Greek literature in
Western Europe. The Greeks were unable to throw light on the topography of
their native land, or to extend the interpretation of the language of their
ancestors; but they made their spoken and written language an instrument of
national centralisation distinct from all provincial dialects, yet intelligible
and harmonious to every Greek.
Every fact relating to a language which has given its form and character
to the literature of Europe and America, must be deeply interesting to the
student of Greek political history; but the subject demands a chapter, not a
paragraph. The great feature of the revival of modern literary cultivation was
the emancipation of the Greek mind from ecclesiastical subjection. To effect
this it was necessary to abandon the language of ecclesiastical literature,
and give a literary character to the language used by the people. Two
individuals, Eugenios and Koraes, distinguished themselves as active
instruments in this great and noble undertaking. They united the Greeks by
intellectual ties far stronger than the bonds which Turkish domination had
laid on the clergy.1
Eugenios Bulgares of Corfu was the first reformer of the ecclesiastical
system of education, which had perpetuated Byzantine pedantry in the schools,
and ecclesiastical servility in politics. He taught at Joan-
1 Some interesting observations on the living
language of the Greeks have been published by Professor Blackie of Edinburgh,
the translator of iEschylus, who unites sound sense with profound learning. I
must also refer to the admirable little dissertation, entitled Romaic and
Modern Greek compared with one another and with Ancient Greek, by James Clyde,
M.A., from whom I borrow the selection of Eugenios and Koraes as the
prototypes of modem Greek literature.
KOEAES. 349
nina, at Mount Athos,
and at Constantinople ; but his reforms in the ancient system of education, and
his strong pleadings in favour of religious toleration, alarmed the clergy. He
was silenced by the ecclesiastical and Phanariot influence, which supported
the sultan’s authority, and was in turn supported by it. In 1775 he was invited
to Bussia, and raised to the bishopric of Sclavonia and Kherson. Eugenios was
the first scholar who employed a style generally intelligible, in a serious
work, written in Greek, and addressed to all classes.1 The tract of
Eugenios on religious toleration was considered a revolutionary production by
the ecclesiastical party, which maintained its supremacy at Constantinople
under the sultan’s protection. Anthimus, the patriarch of Jerusalem,
accordingly endeavoured to apply an antidote. In 1798 he printed a work at the
Greek press of Constantinople, in which he congratulated the Greeks on having
escaped the artifices of the devil, who had enticed the Catholics, the
Lutherans, the Calvinists, and various other sects, into the path of perdition.
He told them, that when the last emperors of Constantinople began to be
infested with the Western heresy, the particular favour of Heaven raised up the
Othoman empire to protect the Greeks against heresy, to be a barrier against
the political power of the Western nations, and to be the champion of the
Orthodox Church.
Koraes, a native of
Chios, but who fixed his abode at Paris, was the great popular reformer of the
Greek system of instruction, the legislator of the modern Greek language, and
the most distinguished apostle of religious toleration and national freedom. He
was a firm opponent of the Orthodox bigotiy which would have enslaved Greece to
Bussia, and of the Phanariot
A. D.
1718-1821.
1 See the passage in Leake, Researches in Greece,
103; and compare the notice of Eugenios in Clyde, Romaic and Modern Greek, 48.
350 PROGRESS TOWARDS INDEPENDENCE.
chap. v. servility which supported the Othoman
domination.
' His residence in
France protected him from those whose interests he assailed, and he was
personally endowed with all the qualities which gave authority to his teaching.
He was indifferent to wealth, honest and independent, a sincere patriot, and a
profound scholar. Unlike his countrymen, the Chiots, who are generally as
remarkable for avidity as for industry, he passed his life in independent
poverty, in order that he might consecrate his whole time, and the undivided
strength of his mind, to improve the moral and political feelings of the
Greeks. His efforts have not been fruitless. He methodised the literary
language of his countrymen, while he infused into their minds principles of
true liberty and pure morality. His influence on the men who participated in
the Greek Eevolution was so great, that no political history of Greece would be
complete which omitted to name Adamantios Koraes as one of those wTho
contributed to establish the national independence.1
The fact that the Greeks
have hitherto made greater progress in regenerating their language than in improving
their moral condition, must be attributed to the superiority of the material on
which they worked. The language retained its ancient structure and grammar ;
the people had lost their ancient virtues and institutions. Literary eminence
may be attained in retirement, where feeble men can write under the guidance
of reason alone; but moral superiority can only be displayed and acquired
amidst the temptations and the duties of active life.
We have seen that the
two earliest institutions tending to national centralisation after the Othoman
conquest—the patriarchate of Constantinople and the official
1 See the Biography of Koraes, also the sketch of his
philological influence, in Clyde, 49.
c, y Microsoft i
r
MUNICIPAL INSTITUTIONS. 351
dragomans—were employed
by tlie sultan’s govern- a. n.
ment as
instruments for enslaving the Greeks. Even ______________________
the centralisation
effected by the cultivation of the language and the creation of a modern Greek
literature, might have been pressed into the service of bigotry and
despotism, had the influence of the French Revolution not counterbalanced that
of orthodox Russia, and infused the love of freedom into the popular mind. The
Greek language was saved, by this alliance with mental liberty, from becoming
an instrument of priests and princes, and perpetuating an insignificant
existence, which, like a national dress or a national music, might form an
interesting subject of study for an antiquary, but could add little to the
strength, virtue, or future political improvement of the people.
Indeed, had a large part
of the Greek population not enjoyed municipal rights which enabled them to feel
the spirit of independence, and labour to better their condition, the
improvement of the language would have remained a barren fact for philological
literature.
It was the municipal
activity which displayed itself at Chios, at Ambelaki, and at Galaxidhi, that
gave to the literary centralisation of language its political power.
The same municipal
institutions and religious feelings drew the Albanian population of Hydra and
Petzas within the circle of Greek centralisation, though they remained long
without the sphere of Greek literary influence. The local energies and local
patriotism of all the Christian municipalities in the Othoman empire could
readily unite in opposition to Othoman oppression, whenever a connecting link
to centralise their efforts could be created. In these local institutions the
foundation was laid for a federal union of all the Orthodox races in European
Turkey, which time may perhaps consolidate, if they can escape from the
bureaucratic power of Continental centralisation. The
352 PROGRESS TOWARDS INDEPENDENCE.
chap. v. vigorous Albanians of Hydra, the warlike
Albanians of Suli, the persevering Bulgarians of Macedonia, and the laborious
Vallachians on the banks of the Aspropota- mos, embarked in the struggle for
Greek independence as heartily as the posterity of the ancient inhabitants of
the soil of Hellas. Ecclesiastical ties greatly facilitated this union, but
they neither created the impulse towards independence, nor infused the
enthusiasm which secured success. The first step to national liberty in modern
Greece, as in every country which has made any considerable advance in improving
the condition of the mass of the inhabitants, was made in the municipalities.
They were the political soul of the nation.
Too great influence has
been generally ascribed to the clergy and to ecclesiastical literature in
preserving national feelings, and too great merit is attributed to the popular
songs, as well as too much influence, in forming the character of the people.
Ecclesiastical learning was so deeply tinctured with pedantry as to be
generally unintelligible ; it spoke in a language which few understood. The
popular songs neither possessed the poetic feeling nor those general expressions
of human sympathies which exert a strong and permanent influence on every rank
of society. The Greeks had no poetry which the mother taught her child alike in
the palace on the shores of the Bosphorus, and in the cottage on the banks of
the Alpheus.
In the mean time the
most striking feature in the political state of Greece, at the opening of the
nineteenth century, was the decline of the Othoman empire. The sultan’s
administration was every day growing weaker and more exclusively fiscal. The
Turks were dwindling away under the operation of social and political
corruption. The primary object of the government appeared to be, to draw money
to Constantinople without reference to the manner in
h.icrc soft
DECLINE OF THE OTHOMAN EMPIRE.
353
which it was to be
expended. The most oppressive exactions of pashas were winked at, in order to
share the profits of their injustice. Yet while the authority of the sultan was
weakened, and the power of the empire declined, the influence of the central
executive administration was absolutely augmented by the social changes which
time had produced in the Mohammedan population. Every barrier which privilege
and class had once opposed to the exercise of arbitrary power had vanished. The
Ulema, by corruption and venality, had forfeited all influence over the people,
and formed no longer a systematic cheek on the executive. The janissaries had
ceased to be regular troops. They were a mere Mussulman city-guard, an
ill-organised militia, without discipline or tactics. The old Turkish feudal
militia, the provincial timariots, were too poor and dependent to oppose the
pashas and the central government. They had fallen so completely from their
ancient position, that they generally sought employment as farmers of the
public revenues, or as mere tax-gatherers. The only manifestation of their
former influence was displayed in their readiness to join any pasha, or other
agent of the central authority, in rebellion.
The increase of the
power of the pashas, as agents of the sultan's central authority rather than as
representatives of the sultan's person, is the characteristic of the period
immediately preceding the Greek Revolution. The progress of society had swept
away the medieval privileges of Mohammedanism, and the pashas intrusted with
the sultan’s delegated power enjoyed the fruits of the change, and were
absolute monarchs in their provinces. This phasis of administrative government
repeats itself in all despotisms, and generally leads to the dismemberment of
large empires. The caliphates of Damascus, Bagdad, and Cordova, the Seljouk
empire of the Great Sultan, and the Seljouk
z
A. D.
1718-1821.
354 PROGRESS TOWARDS INDEPENDENCE.
chap. v. empire of Roum, all fell to pieces from this
cause. The corruption and weakness of the central authority enabled the
governors of provinces to found independent States. The Othoman empire, towards
the end of the eighteenth century, had reached this crisis of its existence.
Many pashas seemed on the eve of founding independent dynasties. A succession
of rebellions suppressed seemed only to open a field for new and more powerful
rebels. Not to speak of the deys of Tripoli, Tunis, and Algiers, Pashvan Oglou
at Vidin, Djezzar Pasha at Acre, Ali Bey in Egypt, long ruled almost as
independent sovereigns. At a later period, Ali Pasha of Joannina was rather a
tributary prince than a dependent pasha; and Mehemet Ali of Egypt at last
became the founder of a dynasty.
This feature in the
state of society must not be overlooked in examining the social and political
causes which produced the Greek Revolution. The tendency to dismember the
Othoman empire was shown by the Arab population in Syria and Egypt, and by the
Albanians in Epirus, as well as by the Christians in Greece and Servia. The
increased authority of the central government enabled the sultan ultimately to
crush his rebellious pashas, and restore the integrity of the Othoman empire.
But in Greece and Servia, where the struggle was one for national independence
and religious liberty, the cause of the people was victorious, the Othoman
empire was dismembered, and two new States were added to Christian Europe.
The career of the
Othoman conquerors in Greece was now terminated. They were themselves involved
in a struggle to maintain their national existence against political anarchy
and external attacks. But their domination in Greece had not been without its
use ; it had accomplished a task which neither the
GREEK REVOLUTION.
355
Roman power nor the
Orthodox Church had effected ; 171£®-2
it had
nationalised the Greeks, and compressed their _____________________
various communities into
one body. A great cycle in the history of Greece was completed. The tribe of
Othman had fulfilled its mission in Hellas, and it was now to depart from the
land, like the Romans, the Crusaders, and the Venetians.
On the other hand, the
desire of civil liberty had already germinated in the modern Greek nation which
the Othoman rule had formed. Political institutions of a permanent character
existed, and were rapidly giving a new organic form to Greek society. Communities
and municipalities, governed by established laws and usages, secured a basis
for popular self-government. Provincial assemblies for fiscal purposes, though
used only as instruments of Othoman oppression, afforded the means of
connecting local liberties with national centralisation. Throughout the East it
was felt that the hour of a great struggle for independence on the part of the Greeks
had arrived. The Greek Revolution was a social and political necessity. National
sovereignty is an inherent right of the people, as civil liberty is of the
individual. Men know instinctively that there are conditions and times when
the rebellion of subject nations and of disfranchised citizens becomes a duty.
“ The liberties of nations are from God and nature, not from kings and governments.”
The whole history of the Othoman domination in Greece attests that the Greeks
were perpetually urged, by every feeling of religion and humanity, to take up
arms against their tyrants. The dignity of man called upon them to efface the
black stain of their long submission to the tribute of Christian children from
the character of the Hellenic race, by some act of self-sacrifice.
Though the Othoman
government had relaxed its
o o
356
PROGRESS TOWARDS INDEPENDENCE.
chap. v. fetters on the
minds and bodies of the Greeks at the commencement of the nineteenth century,
it was still a powerful and dangerous enemy. The sultan was engaged in a
struggle to centralise the administration of his empire ; and if his endeavours
had been crowned with success before the Greeks could succeed in establishing
their independence, new bonds would have been imposed on them, which would have
restrained their movements as effectually as their former chains. The patriarch
and the synod, the princes of the Pha- nar and the provincial primates, were
always ready to serve as the agents of the sultan. It is therefore needless to
justify the Greek Revolution. The time was well chosen. The act was the natural
result of human sympathies. The growth of popular intelligence, and the
development of moral, political, and religious feeling in every class of
society, made the yoke of the Mohammedans insupportable. To others the
increased strength of the slave might make the fetters which he wore appear
light; but it was his growth that really rendered them the cause of intolerable
torture. The Greeks arrogated to themselves the highest rank among the Christian
races under Mohammedan domination. It was consequently their duty to stand
forward as the champions of civil liberty and Christian philanthropy.
*.L rosoftte
List of the Othoman Sultans. Othman, from the death of the last Seljouk Sultan of
Roum or Iconimn, .... 1307
Orkhan, son of Othman, .... 1325
Murad I., son of Orkhan, .... 1359
Bayezid I., son of Murad I., . . . . 1389
Interregnum under Suleiman, Musa, and Isa, sons of Bayezid I.
Mohammed I., son of Bayezid I., . . . 1413
Murad II., son of Moliammed I., . . . 1421
Mohammed II., son of Murad II., . . . 1451
Bayezid II., son of Mohammed II., . . . 1481
Selim I., son of Bayezid II., .... 1512
Suleiman I., the Legislator, son of Selim I., . . 1520
Selim II., son of Suleiman I., . . . . 15C6
Murad III., son of Selim II., .... 1574
Mohammed III., son of Murad III., . . . 1595
Achmet I., son of Mohammed III., . . . 1(503
Mustapha I., son of Mohammed III., (dethroned) . 1617
Othman II., son of Achmet I., (strangled) . . 1018
Second reign of Mustapha I., (dethroned) . . 1622
Murad IV., son of Achmet I., . . . . 1623
Ibrahim, son of Achmet I., (dethroned) . . 1640
Mohammed IV., son of Ibrahim, (dethroned) . 1649
Suleiman II., son of Ibrahim, .... 1687
Achmet II., son of Ibrahim, .... 1691
A. D.
1325
1359
1389
1402
1421
1451
1481
1512
1520
1566
1574
1595
1603
1617
1618 1622 1623 1640 1649 1687 1691 1695
358
APPENDIX.
Mustapha II., son of Mohammed IV., (dethroned) Achmet III., son of
Mohammed IV., (dethroned) Mahmud I., son of Mustapha II., . . Othman III., son
of Mustapha II., . . Mustapha III., son of Achmet III., . . Abdul-hamid, son of
Achmet III., . . Selim III., son of Mustapha III., (dethroned) Mustapha IV.,
son of Abdul-hamid, (dethroned) Mahmud II., son of Abdul-hamid, . . Abdul-meshid,
son of Mahmud II., . .
A. D.
1695
1703
1730
1754
1757
1774
1789
1807
1808 1839
A. 1>.
1703
1730
1754
1757
1774
1789
1807
1808 1839
II.
List of Signors of Mitylene of the Family of
Gattilusio.
A. D.
1. Francis I., ...... . 1355
2. Jacobus, son of Francis I.,
was Signor in 1395.
Ducas, page 52, ed. Bonn. Le livre des faicts du bon
Messire Jean le Maingre dit Bou- cicaut, Pt. i. c. xxviii. Paul Jo vis,
Turcic. rerum commen. Bajazetes I.
A brother of Jacobus, named Nicolezo, was Signor of
Ainos.—Codinus, De officiis et ofticialibus curiae et ecclesiae Constantino-
politanae, 415, edit. Par.
3. Francis II.—Codinus, 415,
edit. Par.
4. Dorinus, brother of Francis
II. (?), .... 1455
Signor of Mitylene (Lesbos), Lemnos, and Phocaea.—Ducas, 328, edit. Bonn.
Clial- cocondylas, 249, edit. Par.
5. Dominicus or Kyriakos, son of
Dorinus, . . 1455 to 1458
Murdered by his brother Nicolas.—Ducas,
328, 346 ; Italian translation, 503, 511, ed. B. Chalcocondylas, 277, ed.
Par.
6. Nicolas, brother of Dominicus,
. . . 1458 to 1462
Surrendered Mitylene to Mohammed II.; embraced Islam, and was soon after
strangled by order of the sultan.
See Memoir on the Coins of the Gattilusii, by Julius Friedlander, in
Beitrage ziir Aeltern Miinzkunde, von Pinder and
Friedlander ; Berlin,
1851.
Microsoft R
APPENDIX.
o
o
III.
List of Phanariot Voivodes or Hospodars of Vallachia
and Moldavia.
Vallachia.
A. D.
1716 Nicolas
Mavrocorclatos I.
1717 John
Mavrocordatos T.
1719 Nicolas
Mavrocordatos I.
1731 Constantine
Mavrocordatos I.
1733 Gregorios
Ghika I.
1735 Constantine
Mavrocordatos I.
1741 Michael
Rakoviza I.
1744 Constantine
Mavrocordatos I.
1748 Gregorios
Ghika I.
1752 Matthew Ghika I.
] 753 Constantine Rakoviza I.
1756 Constantine
Mavrocordatos I.
1758 Skarlatos
Ghika I.
1761 Constantine
Mavrocordatos I.
1763 Constantine
Rakoviza I.
1764 Stephen
Rakoviza.
1765 Skarlatos
Ghika I.
1766 Alexander
Ghika.
Moldavia.
A. D.
1712 Nicolas Mavrocordatos I.
1716 Michael Rakoviza I.
1727 Gregorios Ghika the elder. 1733
Constantine Mavrocordatos I. 1735 Gregorios Ghika I.
1741 Constantine Mavrocordatos I. 1743 John
Mavrocordatos II.
1747 Gregorios
Ghika I.
1748 Constantine
Mavrocordatos I.
1749 Constantine Rakoviza I.
1753 Matthew Ghika I.
1756 Constantine
Rakoviza I.
1757 Skarlatos
Ghika I.
1758 John Th. Kallimaki.
1761 Gregorios Kallimaki I.
1764 Gregorios
Ghika II.
1766 Gregorios
Kallimaki I.
1769 Constantine
Mavrocordatos I.
1768 Gregorios Ghika II.
Military occupation of the two provinces by the Russians from
1770 to 1774.
1774 Gregorios Ghika II.
1777 Constantine Mourouzi.
17S2 Alexander Mavrocordatos I. 1785 Alexander Mavrocordatos II. 1787
Alexander Ypsilanti I. Military occupation of Vallachia and Moldavia by the
Russians, 1788 to 1789.
1774 Alexander
Ypsilanti I.
1778 Nicolas
Ivaradja.
1783 Michael
Soutzo I.
1786 Nicolas
Mavroyeni.
1792 Alexander
Mourouzi I.
1793 Michael
Soutzo I.
1794 Alexander
Kallimaki. 1799 Constantine Ypsilanti I. 1801 Alexander Soutzo I. 1S02
Alexander Mourouzi I. 1804 Skarlatos Kallimaki I. 1806 Alexander Mourouzi I.
1791 Michael Soutzo I.
1793 Alexander Mourouzi I.
1796 Alexander Ypsilanti I.
1798 Constantine
Handjerli.
1799 Alexander
Mourouzi I.
1801 Michael
Soutzo I.
1802 Alexander
Soutzo I.
1802 Constantine Ypsilanti I.
1806 Alexander Soutzo I.
1806 Constantine Ypsilanti I.
Military occupation of Vallachia and Moldavia by the Russians, from 1808
to 1812.
1812 John Ivaradja. I 1S12 Skarlatos
Kallimaki I.
1818 Alexander Soutzo I. I 1S19
Michael Soutzo II.
Insurrection at the commencement of the Greek Revolution, 1S21.